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Logo of the JFTC, Japan's watchdog against bid rigging.

INTRODUCTION Bid rigging is a form of procurement fraud that occurs when participants in a bidding process for public contracts conspire to undermine the integrity or transparency of the process, sometimes with the complicity of public officials. Common examples of violations include collusion among bidders to fix a common price, requests for proposals deliberately and unnecessarily tailored so that only select bidders can meet their requirements, and lowballed bids with hidden costs and fees. In Japan, where corruption is generally perceived to be relatively rare, bid rigging—nyusatsu dango—is a persistent and problematic form of public corruption. In many cases, bidders make secret agreements among themselves about who will win and at which price. Other bidders will then deliberately submit losing bids. The colluding bidders will then attempt to keep prices high, or rotate the allocation of winning bids among themselves, undermining the neutral, independent, and competitive nature of the process. Such bid rigging deprives government agencies and enterprises at all levels of taxpayer funds. Of course, bid rigging is not just a problem in Japan alone. A 2014 survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found procurement fraud to be the second-most common economic crime reported by companies worldwide.1 A 2008 study found that corrupt practices added 20-25% to the costs of public contracts in Europe.2 A 2013 estimate by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) found a similar loss to corruption in procurement contracts among member states.3 A study of Japan’s legal and administrative reforms against bid rigging over the last fifteen years may hold lessons for other jurisdictions struggling to curb this common form of public corruption.

BID RIGGING IN JAPAN The annual number of bid rigging cases subject to enforcement by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) in Japan has varied from 2 to 33 since the early 1990s (See Figure A). Bid rigging has occurred in public construction contracts, as well as procurement contracts for goods and services. According to a manual on bid rigging published by the Japan Fair Trade Commission in 2015 (the “JFTC Manual”),4 documented cases of bid rigging in Japan include contracts for goods such as medical X-ray film and furniture for defense bases and services ranging from construction consulting to aerial photography to water and soil analysis.5 Some cases of bid rigging by private firms are so carefully executed that public officers have trouble detecting the collusion. In other cases, public officers responsible for oversight fail to detect collusion due to negligence or a lack of training, time, or resources. Some egregious cases have come to light in Japan in which public officers rigged bids at their own initiative. Typically, such officers tipped bidders off about who would win in advance, intentionally leaked confidential information that allowed select bidders to set prices that met government targets, or encouraged bidders to fix prices or allocate orders. In Japan, bid rigging cases involving the complicity of public officers is known as kansei dango, “government-involved bid rigging.” A JFTC study found that high-ranking public officers (specifically, ranked at “manager class” or above) were involved in almost all cases of government-involved bid rigging. Many cases involved former officers who had retired at the time of misconduct.6 This may be related in part to a phenomenon called amakudari, or “parachuting.”

2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1992*1993* 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Nu

mb

er

of

Cas

es

Fiscal Year

Source: JFTC Annual Reports, 1992-2014. (http://www.jftc.go.jp/soshiki/nenpou/).*Measurement was not yet standardized and included price-fixing cartel cases. Given figures are conservative, lowest estimate. Number

of cases may be as high as 36 in 1992 and 33 in 1993.**Prior to 2012, the statistics in the JFTC Annual Report seem not to have distinguished the number of cases of bid rigging for public

contracts from those for private contracts (See the JFTC Manual, at 1).

Annual Incidence of Bid Rigging Cases in Japan

Amakudari is a “Japanese term used to refer to the practice of government officials retiring into industries and institutions, often those that they have formerly been involved in regulating.”7

In some cases, government-involved bid rigging may involve an incumbent public officer trying to secure his own future parachuting position by doing favors for a government bidder.8 Such an official may make orders to private enterprises that employ former officials from his office, expecting to receive such a position in turn upon retirement. The JFTC found cases in which such current and former officers colluded to tailor government orders to favor construction companies that had allowed former officers to parachute into positions.9 For example, the Tokyo District Court found that in one case an incumbent officer “gave preferred orders to a company which has a track record of accepting former employees of his office, in exchange of securing these posts. We can regard this case as a typical government-involved bid rigging closely tied with amakudari.”10 On the other hand, research by the JFTC found that public officers implicated in government-involved bid rigging cases are not necessarily motivated by profit. Sometimes they wish to protect local businesses by securing them stable, repeat orders. Sometimes, officers wish to steer orders towards private enterprises they know to have a proven track record for performance, reliability, or high quality. Finally, some officers bend the rules just to keep bidding processes proceeding smoothly.11

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JAPAN’S ANTITRUST LAW

The Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (the “Antitrust Law”) governs most forms of bid rigging, including government-involved bid rigging.12 The law holds that an “enterprise must not effect private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade.” The latter term is defined in Article 2(6) as follows:

“Such business activities, by which any enterprise, by contract, agreement or any other means irrespective of its name, in concert with other enterprises, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner as to fix, maintain or increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities or counterparties, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade.”

Therefore, private enterprises that commit bid rigging, with or without the knowing involvement of public officers, violate the Antitrust Law. Trade associations, associations of two or more private enterprises with the principal purpose of furthering their common interests as enterprises (as defined in Article 2(2)), are also subject to the Antitrust Law, under Article 8(i). Enterprises or trade associations that violate Article 3 or 8(i) of the Antitrust Law are subject to four types of penalties: (1) Cease and Desist Order; (2) the payment of a surcharge calculated by multiplying a certain rate by the amount of sales from relevant goods or services; (3) criminal punishment, with a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment or a fine of five million yen for an individual,13 or five hundred million yen for an enterprise14 or (4) civil enforcement, after a cease and desist order becomes finally binding.15 In the latter case, the claim of damage is subject to strict liability; governmental agencies have filed 11 civil damage cases from 2011-2015.16

JAPAN’S BID RIGGING ACT

In May 2000, a case of government-involved bid rigging in a construction contract in Hokkaido prefecture resulted in a JFTC request that the Hokkaido government improve its internal governance to prevent future occurrences. The disparity in treatment between offending private enterprises and offending public officers in the case provoked outcry. Critics decried the lack of a legal mechanism to penalize or impose administrative measures on governmental agencies involved in bid rigging.17 In response, the Parliament of Japan passed the “Act on Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid Rigging, etc. and Punishments for Acts by Employees that Harm Fairness of Bidding, etc.” (the “Bid Rigging Act”) to make government agencies improve their internal governance to prevent recurrence of bid rigging.18 The Act passed in July 2002 and became effective in January 2003.19 The original Bid Rigging Act was not successful in eliminating or preventing government-involved bid rigging, due to two main factors. First, offending public officers were subject to relatively light criminal punishments. Second, illegal acts under the Bid Rigging Act were defined too narrowly. An Amended Bid Rigging Act was passed in December 2006 and became effective in March 2007. This amendment strengthened penalties and added new types of covered illegal acts.20 As amended, the Bid Rigging Act prohibits two types of government involvement in bid rigging, each of which results in a different enforcement action. First is “Involvement in Bid Rigging, Etc.,” defined in Article 2(5) as

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“involvement in bid rigging, etc., by the employees of government or local governments, or directors or employees of specified corporations (‘the employees’), and falling under any one of the following items:

(i) Having an entrepreneur or trade association engage in bid rigging, etc. (ii) Nomination of the counter party of a contract in advance, or indication or suggestion in

advance of wishes to the effect that a specified person be the counter party of the contract. (iii) Out of various data concerning bidding or contract, indication or suggestion of information

held in confidential files to a specified entrepreneur or trade association, access to which shall facilitate bid rigging etc. by the specified entrepreneur or trade association.

(iv) In connection with a specific bid rigging, etc., aiding bid rigging, etc. nominating a specific person as participant to a bid, or by any other method, at the express or implicit request of an entrepreneur, trade association, or any other entity or by voluntarily approaching these persons, for the purpose of facilitating such bid rigging, etc., in breach of such employee's duties.”

Notably, this list excludes potential forms of public officer’s involvement in bid rigging. The JFTC Manual raises four examples falling under each type above:

(i) showing annual target amount of gross sales to each bidder and providing instructions to coordinate to achieve these targets;

(ii) designating a bidder who should win a certain bid, or disclosing the name of a bidder who desires to win to other bidders in advance of the bidding process;

(iii) leaking confidential target prices; and (iv) approving an order table allowing bidders to take turns in winning bids, or to lower a

threshold of required specification of work for purpose of fostering bid rigging.21

The second type of involvement is described as “any acts that harm the fairness of such bidding, etc.” Article 8 of the Bid Rigging Act lists examples including inciting any entrepreneur or person to conduct bid rigging or informing any entrepreneur or person the target price or any other secret concerning such bidding processes. In contrast to “Involvement in Bid Rigging, Etc.,” Article 8 does not provide an exclusive list and covers other acts that harm the fairness of such bidding processes and breach the duties of public officers.

PENALTIES UNDER THE BID RIGGING ACT

The Bid Rigging Act stipulates three types of enforcement for “Involvement in Bid Rigging, Etc.” All types are administrative or civil enforcement, rather than criminal penalties. 22 Even when a public officer violates the provision, the decision about how to treat him as a disciplinary action is left to the government agency itself. The first type of enforcement is for the JFTC to order the head of the offending government agency to implement improvement measures, as stipulated in Article 3 of the Bid Rigging Act. The kind of specific measures to be implemented is left to the offending government agency’s choice. The agency heads are required to “perform the necessary investigation” to eliminate and prevent bid rigging problems. In a number of recent cases, the JFTC has mandated improvement measures (See Figure B).

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Figure B: Examples of Government Reform Measures Undertaken in Response to JFTC Orders

Year Government Entity Implemented Reforms

2003 City of Iwamizawa Establish a Compliance Manual

Separate Business Departments from Contracting Departments

“Revolving Door” Prohibitions/Restrictions on former employees taking posts in associated enterprises

Restrictions on private enterprises meeting with employees in procurement departments

2004 City of Nigata Establish/Disseminate a Compliance Manual

Establish system for recording and disclosing any attempt by bidders to influence public officers

Establish system for reporting improper conduct by public officials

Establish new department charged with compliance monitoring

Remove geographic/location-based restrictions in from bid qualifications

Restrict communication between public officers and private enterprises

Prohibit private enterprises from promoting sales to public employees

Implement stricter “Revolving Door” Prohibitions/Restrictions on former employees taking posts in associated enterprises

Prohibit former employees from influencing current public servants

2005 Japan Highway Public Corporation

Implement stricter code of professional ethics

Hold regular seminars on compliance for public employees

Collect affidavits from public employees and directors promising to comply with relevant laws, rules, and regulations

Establish a compliance committee and whistle-blower reporting system

Request private enterprises refrain from making sales promotions to public officers

Request retiring officers refrain from taking posts with associate enterprises

2007 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,

Transport, and Tourism

Establish and disseminate compliance manual

Hold regular seminars on compliance for public employees

Record any improper efforts to influence public officers and disclose specific agency response

Establish whistle-blower reporting system

Increase frequency of staff rotation

Request retiring officers refrain from taking posts with enterprises accused of, or found guilty of, bid rigging

2010 Ministry of Defense Request that any private enterprise accused of/found guilty of bid rigging refrain from hiring former public employees

Abolish existing program to assist retiring public employees with finding new employment

Outsource procurement program

Modify existing guideline regarding drafting of specification requirements

Strengthen payment monitoring processes

Hold training sessions on compliance with “Bid Rigging Act”

Disseminate information regarding internal reporting system

Strengthen existing monitoring over suspicious bid results

2011 Ibaraki Prefecture Improve existing public employee ethics and compliance training

Disseminate information regarding internal reporting system

Review existing bid and contracts procedures

Establish standardized ethics policy

Reform personnel management

Source: The JFTC Manual at 40-42.

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The second enforcement tool is a “mandatory” damage claim by the government under Article 4(5). This provision obligates the government to demand compensation if the internal investigation triggered by a JFTC order for remedial reforms concludes that an offending public officer caused damages with willful or gross negligence.23 The third enforcement tool is to investigate and take disciplinary action against the offending officer. Such an investigation is also triggered by a JFTC order for remedial reforms. The governmental agency has an obligation to investigate under Article 5 of the Bid Rigging Act, and to disclose the investigation’s results. After an investigation, the government has authority to decide whether to institute disciplinary actions.24 These actions may include an admonition or reprimand, suspension, temporary pay cut, or other sanctions.25 In contrast to “Involvement in Bid Rigging etc.,” acts that harm the fairness of bidding are subject to criminal sanctions, as determined by prosecutors and police, rather than the JFTC or government agency heads.26 The maximum criminal punishment is a prison term of five years or a fine not exceeding 2,500,000 yen, under Article 8 of the Bid Rigging Act. In such cases, the prosecutors need not verify any violations of the Antitrust Law by private enterprises. Therefore, it is possible that prosecutors start investigations ahead of the JFTC. In contrast, in cases of “Involvement in Bid Rigging etc.,” the JFTC must verify violations of the Antitrust Law before demanding improvement measures under Article 3 of the Bid Rigging Act.27 Criminal sanctions have been enforced in several cases in recent years, often involving leaks of confidential government information to competing bidders for public contracts.28

COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST BID RIGGING IN JAPAN

Article 3(ii) and Article 3(iii) of the Act for Promoting Proper Tendering and Contracting for Public Works (“the Promoting Properness Act”) stipulate that government offices must: promote fair competition in tenders and contracts for public works and exclude improper procurement practices such as bid-rigging. Under Article 17 of the Promoting Properness Act, the Cabinet of Japan established the Promoting Properness Guideline to describe specific measures to achieve the law’s goals. The guideline specifically addresses the prevention of bid rigging.29 Under the Promoting Properness Guideline, the governmental agencies are expected to implement various measures including:

(i) stop disclosing internal target prices which the governmental agency sets in advance of the bidding; (ii) statistically analyze bidding results to detect possible evidence of bid rigging; and (iii) adopt electronic bidding systems to reduce risks of collusion between competing bidders.30

Furthermore, to prevent government-involvement bid rigging, the guideline requires government offices to:

(i) improve accountability in the bidding and contracting processes; (ii) educate officers about rules and regulations related to tenders and contracts for public works; and (iii) strictly enforce rules against misconduct, in cooperation with the police and the JFTC.31

The guideline allows each agency to adopt its own measures to meet the guideline’s demands. In September 2011, the JFTC disclosed the results of a survey of measures actually adopted by agencies (the “JFTC Report”), based on questionnaires sent to 526 governmental entities and hearing inquiries into 33 governmental entities.32 The JFTC points out that a substantial proportion of public officers might have lacked sufficient familiarity with the Bid Rigging Act.33 After the JFTC held a seminar on the Bid Rigging Act for public officers, it surveyed attendees and

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found that less than half of the attendees had known what the Bid Rigging Act covers.34 The JFTC recommended that government agencies implement measures to improve their awareness of compliance rules.35

EDUCATION

The JFTC recommended three specific improvements. First, the government should provide officers with more seminars, which are a good opportunity to announce and disseminate agency policies. According to the JFTC Report, only one fourth of governmental agencies had held seminars within the previous three years. The JFTC found that numerous officers responsible for public procurement lacked knowledge of the Bid Rigging Act. 36 Moreover, the JFTC noted that managers attended the seminars less frequently than low-level staff. Since managerial officers are most likely to be involved in bid rigging, the JFTC recommended that they should be the main attendees of the seminars.37 Second, the JFTC suggested that each governmental agency establish its own compliance manual. According to the JFTC Report, nearly half of governmental agencies lacked compliance manuals. More than 60% of small or medium-sized municipal agencies lacked compliance manuals, and around 80% of agency compliance manuals failed to address the Bid Rigging Act.38 Third, the JFTC suggested that each governmental agency clearly announce and disseminate its policy against government-involved bid rigging. As stated above, many public officers involved in bid rigging do so for reasons of perceived public interest, ranging from supporting local businesses to securing a smooth bidding process. Understandably, such officers mistakenly believe such actions are legal and permissible. It is important for agencies to clearly announce and disseminate policies against bid rigging to clear up such misunderstandings.39 Relatedly, the JFTC recommended that government agencies include bid rigging as a cause of internal disciplinary action.40 The JFTC found in its research that only 23% of governmental agencies included bid rigging as an explicit cause of disciplinary action.41

MONITORING AND REVIEW

By establishing a “double-checking phase” in which another department reviews procurement contracts authorized by the department in charge of procurement, government agencies can more successfully prevent officers from getting involved in bid rigging. It is effective to check the properness of a form of specification or bidder qualification ex ante. According to the JFTC Report, 80% of governmental agencies had already isolated the procurement department from the contracts department—the procurement department decides which enterprise shall receive a procurement order, while the contracts department determines the contract terms and conditions. However, 40% of government agencies allowed their procurement departments to review orders by themselves, without permitting the contract departments to assist in the double-checking process. In such a situation, the double-checker, as an insider, has comparatively little incentive to discover irregularities. Thus, the JFTC suggested that governmental agencies allow outsider departments, such as contract departments, to double-check the properness of orders.42

More than 60% of small- or medium-sized municipal agencies lacked compliance manuals, and around 80% of agency compliance manuals

failed to address the Bid Rigging Act.

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To maximize effective oversight, the JFTC recommended that government offices institute measures for ex-post review of procurement bids, in addition to ex-ante review. The ex-post double-checking system examines the result of the bidding process for unreasonable or unnatural patterns. For example, if only one enterprise continues to receive orders for a long term, it may be evidence of misconduct by the procurement officer. Likewise, a case in which the price of the winning bid is identical to an internal target price prepared in advance of the bidding may indicate a leak of confidential information. By analyzing such unnatural patterns for evidence of bid rigging, government offices increase the chance of discovering and preventing government-involved bid rigging. According to the JFTC Report, 60-80% of government agencies had not adopted such ex-post double-checking measures, and thus were unaware of suspicious bidding results.43

WHISTLE-BLOWER REPORTING SYSTEM

More than 80% of the government agencies surveyed had built internal whistle-blower reporting systems, while only 30% of them had made officers aware that this reporting system covered information related to government-involved bid rigging. The JFTC noted that government agencies needed to make officers aware that whistle-blowers are protected under their internal reporting system when reporting evidence of government-involved bid rigging.44 The JFTC found some cases in which an offending officer got involved in bid rigging in response to a request made by a private enterprise, the prospective bidder. It is almost impossible to completely eliminate situations in which prospective bidders possibly try to improperly influence public officers in the procurement process, since such officers communicate with private enterprises on a daily basis.45 However, public officers may be expected to report such attempts at improper influence. The JFTC suggested that the governmental agencies build a reporting system for officers to make written reports to their supervisors when a prospective bidder requests a public officer to leak confidential information or to provide another favor. The JFTC Report found that only 30% of the governmental agencies had adopted such reporting system, but that interviews suggested that such reporting systems decreased attempts by the private sector to influence public officers. Thus, the JFTC found the reporting system to be an effective deterrent.46

STAFF ROTATION AND REORGANIZATION

The JFTC suggested that government agencies rotate employees, so they are not allowed to stay in the same position long enough to develop personal relationships with private bidders and conceal involvement in bid rigging. According to the JFTC Report, around 70% of governmental agencies had already engaged in such short-interval rearrangement of human resources. The JFTC expects and recommends that other government agencies adopt this measure.47

REGULATION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

The JFTC Report found that government offices have to be alerted to corruption risks posed by former public employees who may become implicated in government-involved bid rigging. According to the JFTC Report, some government agencies requested that private enterprises that hired former employees refrain from having the former employee handle procurement deals in connection with the former employee’s duty while in government service. Some government agencies held seminars for former employees to learn compliance with the Bid-Rigging Act.48

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CONCLUSION

Since the turn of the century, Japan has made great strides in cracking down on bid rigging, through the Bid Rigging Act and its amendments, the efforts of the JFTC, and counter-measures and training efforts instituted by government agencies. Cases of bid rigging have been on the decline since the Bid Rigging Act became effective in 2003. However, as the JFTC found, government agencies still have far to go in implementing reforms to stamp out bid-rigging. Successful counter-measures include training seminars, revised compliance manuals, clear announcement of policy, ex-ante and ex-post contract review mechanisms, whistle-blower systems, rotation of procurement staff, and rules discouraging “parachuting” employment relationships between procurement offices and private-sector firms that give such firms an unfair advantage in the procurement process. Other countries and jurisdictions seeking to combat bid rigging may wish to consider relevant Japanese laws and counter-measures as a potential model in the struggle against corruption in public procurement.

ENDNOTES

1 Will Green, Procurement fraud second most common economic crime globally, Supply Management, February 20, 2014, http://www.cips.org/supply-management/news/2014/february/procurement-fraud-second-most-common-economic-crime-globally/ (last visited August 9, 2016). 2 EU Anti-Corruption Report, European Commission, February 3, 2014, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf (last visited August 9, 2016), at 21. 3 Implementing the OECD Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement, OECD, November 2013, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/chapter/9789264201385-3-en (last visited August 9, 2016), at 22. 4 The Japan Fair Trade Commission, Nyusatsu Dango No Bosi Ni Mukete (“The goal of preventing Bid Rigging”), October, 2015, http://www.jftc.go.jp/dk/kansei/text.html (last visited August 10, 2016). 5 Id. at 4. 6 Shingo Kasahara, Kansei Dango Bosi Ni Muketa Hattyu Kikan No Torikumi Ni Kansuru Jittai Tyosa Hokoku-Syo - Hattyu Kikan Ni Okeru Compliance Katsudo - Ni Tsuite (“The report on research about what kind of efforts government agencies make in order to prevent Government-Involved Bid Rigging - Compliance inside governmental agencies - ”), Kosei Torihiki, Vol.736 (Feb 2012), at 44. 7 Colin P.A. Jones, Amakudari and Japanese Law, 22 Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 879 (2013), at 879. 8 Shingo Kasahara, supra. 9 See the JFTC Manual, at 34-35. 10 Tokyo Dist. Ct., Nov.1, 2007, 54 KOSEI TORIHIKI IINKAI SHINKETSUSHU 805 (In re Midori Shigen Kiko) 11 Shingo Kasahara, supra. 12 As for interpretation of the Antitrust Law into English version, see a website of “Japanese Law Translation” operated by Ministry of Justice at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2085&vm=04&re=02 (last visited August 17, 2016). 13 Antitrust Law, Article 89. 14 Antitrust Law, Article 95. 15 See the JFTC Manual, at 8-12. 16 Id. at 12. 17 Mitsuru Suzuki, Kansei Dango Bosi Ho No Igi To Kadai - Kansei Dango Ya “Amakudari” Wo Konzetsu Suru Hosaku No Kento - (“The meaning and problems of the Bid Rigging Act - Consideration of means to eradicate government-involved bid rigging and ‘Amakudari’ -”), Kosei Torihiki, Vol.758 (December, 2013), at 31. See the JFTC Manual, at 26. 18 For an English version of the Bid Rigging Act, see a website of “Japanese Law Translation” operated by Ministry of Justice at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=01&dn=1&yo=%E5%85%A5%E6%9C%AD%E8%AB%87%E5%90%88%E7%AD%89&ia=03&x=0&y=0&ky=&page=1 (last visited August 17, 2016). 19 See the JFTC Manual, at 26. 20 Hiroshi Kasahara, Nyusatsu Dango To Kanyo Koi No Haijyo Oyobi Bosi Narabini Syokuin Ni Yoru Nyusatsu To No Kousei Wo Gaisuru Koi No Syobatsu Ni Kansuru Horitsu (Kansei Dango Bosi Ho) Ni Tsuite - Seitei 10 Syunen Wo Mukaete - (“The Bid Rigging Act - at 10th Anniversary of Enactment -”), Kosei Torihiki, Vol.758 (December, 2013), at 5. 21 See the JFTC Manual, at 31-32. 22 Id. at 27-28 23 Id. at 43

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24 Id. at 47 25 Id. at 48-49 26 Id. at 52 27 Id. 28 Id. at 53-54 29 Ryo Shigesawa, Hattyu Kikan Ni Taisuru Kansei Dango Bosi Ho Ihan Koi Mizen Bosi No Torikumi (“The governmental agencies’ measures to prevent violation of the Bid Rigging Act”), Kosei Torihiki, Vol. 758 (December, 2013), at 10. 30 See the JFTC Manual, at 21-22. 31 Ryo Shigesawa, supra at 11. 32 The Japan Fair Trade Commission, Kansei Dango Bosi Ni Muketa Hattyu Kikan No Torikumi Ni Kansuru Jittai Tyosa Hokoku-Syo - Hattyu Kikan Ni Okeru Compliance Katsudo - (“The report on research about what kind of efforts government agencies make in order to prevent Government-Involved Bid Rigging - Compliance inside governmental agencies - ”), September, 2011, http://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/cyosa/cyosa-tyoutatsu/h23/11092802hontai.html (last visited August 10, 2016), at 1-2. 33 See the JFTC Report, at 60. 34 Ryo Shigesawa, supra at 13-14. 35 See the JFTC Report, at 60. 36 Id. 37 Id. at 61. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 62. 40 Id. 41 Id. at 20. 42 Id. at 63. 43 Id. at 63-64. 44 Id. at 64-65. 45 Id. at 65-66. 46 Id. 47 Id. at 66. 48 Id. at 66-67.

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About:

Author Takaki Sato is an associate lawyer of the law firm Iwata Godo in Tokyo, and a member of the committee on combating anti-social organizations activities in transactions of the Daiichi Tokyo Bar Association. He received an LL.M. from Columbia Law School in 2016. What is CAPI? The Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity is a nonprofit resource center dedicated to improving the capacity of public offices, practitioners, policymakers, and engaged citizens to deter and combat corruption. Established as partnership between the New York City Department of Investigation and Columbia Law School in 2013, CAPI is unique in its city-level focus and emphasis on practical lessons and tools. Published: August, 2016 by the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity at Columbia Law School. Available at www.law.columbia.edu/CAPI.

This publication is part of an ongoing series of contributions from practitioners, policymakers, and civil society leaders in the public integrity community. If you have expertise you would like to share, please contact us at CAPI@law.columbia.edu. The series is made possible thanks to the generous support of the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the author’s organization or affiliations, the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity, Columbia Law School, or the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.

© 2016. This publication is covered by the Creative Commons “Attribution-No Derivs-NonCommercial” license (see http://creativecommons.org). It may be reproduced in its entirety as long as the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity at Columbia Law School is credited, a link to the Center’s web page is provided, and no charge is imposed. The paper may not be reproduced in part or in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without the Center’s permission. Please let the Center know if you reprint. Cover Design by Freepik.