Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

Devin T. Hagerty

Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

Devin T. Hagerty

Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability

in South Asia

ISBN 978-3-030-21397-8 ISBN 978-3-030-21398-5 (eBook)https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21398-5

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Devin T. HagertyDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Maryland, Baltimore CountyBaltimore, MD, USA

For Barb and Viv, with love

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On February 14, 2019, a suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into a long convoy of vehicles transporting Indian security forces toward Srinagar, on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir.1 Near Pulwama, the bomber’s improvised explosive device (IED) tore through one of the vehicles, killing 40 paramilitary troops of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), in the deadliest attack on Indian security personnel since an insurgency erupted in 1989 against New Delhi’s rule in the state. Jaish-e-Mohammed (“Army of Mohammed”—JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist group, took credit for the blast, and an unfortunately familiar scenario began to unfold. New Delhi immediately blamed Pakistan for the “heinous and despicable” attack, demanding that it “stop supporting terror-ists and terror groups operating from their territory and dismantle the infra-structure operated by terrorist outfits to launch attacks in other countries.”2 Islamabad countered that “we strongly reject any insinuation by elements in the Indian government and media circles that seek to link the attack to the state of Pakistan without investigations.”3 Indian prime minister Narendra Modi threatened to “punish the perpetrators of terror,” and Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan vowed that “Pakistan will retaliate” to any Indian strike.4 The massacre had ignited the fifth crisis between India and Pakistan since the two countries became acknowledged nuclear weapon states in May 1998.

Indian military retaliation seemed all but certain. Elected in 2014, Modi had sharply criticized previous Indian prime ministers for their cautious responses to subconventional operations emanating from Pakistan. In the autumn of 2016, after JeM had killed 19 Indian soldiers in a fiery assault

Preface

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on a military encampment near Uri, he had ordered Special Forces raids against terrorist targets across the LOC in Pakistani Kashmir. With an Indian general election looming in spring 2019, Modi had already been campaigning hard for a second term in office; as the Pulwama attack ener-gized his political base, pressure mounted for a resolute counter to Pakistan’s perfidy. After convening the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), India’s highest national security decision-making body, the prime minister said on February 15 that he had given “complete independence” to India’s armed forces, which had been authorized to “take decisions about the timing, place, and nature of their response.”5 Across the border, Pakistani leaders offered neither condolences nor contrition, and Pakistani troops were put on high alert along the LOC and the Working Boundary, a 193-kilometer line that runs between Indian Kashmir and the Sialkot area of Pakistan’s Punjab province.6 Indian military forces were also placed on alert, with restricted personnel leave, while the Indian Navy “shifted to combat mode.”7 Official U.S. statements in the attack’s immediate after-math were notable for condemning Pakistan, but saying little about any need for military restraint or talks between the two sides. The White House implored Pakistan “to end immediately the support and safe haven pro-vided to all terrorist groups operating on its soil, whose only goal is to sow chaos, violence, and terror in the region.”8 During a conversation between the U.S. and Indian national security advisors, John Bolton and Ajit Doval, Bolton “supported India’s right to self-defence against cross- border terror-ism.”9 Islamabad’s National Security Council stated after meeting on February 21 that Pakistan was “not involved in any way” in the Pulwama “incident,” which was “conceived, planned, and executed indigenously.” At the meeting, Khan authorized Pakistani armed forces to “respond deci-sively and comprehensively to any aggression or misadventure by India.”10

Early in the morning of February 26, Indian Mirage-2000 fighter- bombers carried out strikes against what New Delhi said was a JeM training camp in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—sovereign Pakistani territory bordering Kashmir. The Indian government pronounced the air assault a great success, claiming that it destroyed the installation near Balakot and killed some 200–300 people, including “JeM terrorists, trainers, senior commanders, and groups of jihadis.” According to Indian officials, intelli-gence had indicated that JeM was preparing another suicide bombing, with “fidayeen jihadis” being trained; “in the face of imminent danger, a preemp-tive strike became absolutely necessary.”11 Pakistani sources responded that the Indian aircraft had actually missed their target, harmlessly striking the nearby landscape and causing minimal casualties. On February 27, the

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Pakistan Air Force (PAF) followed through on Islamabad’s retaliatory threat by sending its fighter- bombers across the LOC to strike targets in Indian Kashmir. An aerial dogfight apparently ensued, during which an Indian Air Force (IAF) MiG- 21 was shot down. The Indian pilot ejected, and both aircraft and pilot landed on Pakistan’s side of the LOC. Pakistani authorities took custody of the pilot and displayed photographs of the plane’s wreck-age. Islamabad claimed also to have shot down a second Indian aircraft, which seems not to have been true, while New Delhi maintains that the MiG-21 shot down a Pakistani F-16 before itself being struck, a claim which has not been confirmed as of this writing (in mid-March). After a meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan’s highest nuclear decision- making body, Prime Minister Khan stated that the “sole purpose of our action [today] was to convey that if you can come into our country, we can do the same.” Observing that miscalculations cause wars, he said, “I ask India: with the weapons you have and the weapons we have, can we really afford such a miscalculation? If this escalates, things will no longer be in my control or in Modi’s.”12 On the evening of February 27, Doval spoke by phone with Asim Munir, the head of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s apex espionage agency, warning that India would not back off from its new campaign of counter-terrorism and was prepared to escalate it. Unnamed Indian and Pakistani officials were also reported to have exchanged threats to launch missiles at targets in the other country.13 The outbreak of direct India-Pakistan hostilities alarmed U.S. leaders. Bolton again spoke with Doval by phone late on the night of February 27–28, in an attempt to defuse the crisis.14 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo encouraged the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers to “exercise restraint, … avoid escala-tion at any cost … prioritize direct communication and avoid further mili-tary activity.”15 These and other U.S. efforts “were focused on securing the quick release of the Indian pilot by Pakistan and winning an assurance from India that it would pull back from the threat to fire rockets.”16 With Islamabad and New Delhi under intense diplomatic pressure, Khan announced on February 28 that the captured IAF pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, would be repatriated the next day.17 With Pakistan’s gesture, and Varthaman’s return to India on March 1, the crisis began to ease.

The latest India-Pakistan crisis made the topic of this book, the stability of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, all the more timely and relevant. At the time of the JeM attack in Pulwama, I had just finished writing a draft of the manuscript and was revising the text in anticipation of the late March submission deadline. I had written an introduction (Chap. 1), examined the previous four post-1998 Indo-Pakistani crises

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(Chap. 2), analyzed the reasons for Indian moderation during those crises (Chap. 3), assessed the prospects for deterrence stability between New Delhi and Islamabad (Chap. 4), and suggested ways that the two countries could strengthen nuclear deterrence between them and avoid deterrence failure (Chap. 5). The February confrontation presented me with a dilemma: To what extent should I examine the crisis and attempt to incor-porate it into my analysis? On the one hand, it is clearly too early for a granular analysis of February’s events. Many details remain secret or dis-puted, and it will take years for scholars to piece together a full picture of the crisis, much less to fully analyze its implications. On the other hand, it was equally clear to me that leaving the Pulwama attack and the subse-quent crisis out of the manuscript entirely would render the book dated upon publication. After much thought, I decided to include the February 2019 crisis in its general outlines and modify my analysis of India-Pakistan deterrence stability where that seemed warranted. I have added this Preface and made revisions to Chaps. 1, 4, and 5. Chapters 2 and 3 remain essentially unchanged but for some shortening.

It turns out it is even harder to write a book in your 50s than in your 30s and 40s. I have been blessed to have a great network of support along the way. My gratitude first and foremost goes to my wife, Barbara Bradley Hagerty, and my daughter, Vivian Hagerty. They have helped me more than they know, especially as the February crisis was unfolding and I wor-ried that I might have to give up the book or put it on hold while events played out. As a longtime reporter and author, Barb well knows the stress of deadlines and was a great source of empathy. Viv was a terrific editor, indexer, and all-around research assistant. In addition to providing steady moral support, Barb and Viv both read and helpfully critiqued chapter drafts. At the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC), I have been fortunate to have some excellent teaching assistants who have saved me an enormous amount of time and energy. Warm thanks to Madeline Dement, Jacob Street, and Rhyner Washburn. I am also grateful to Roger C. Lipitz and the Lipitz Family Foundation, and the UMBC College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, for awarding me research funding through the 2014–2015 Lipitz Professorship. Special thanks, as well, to Patricia Martin and her colleagues at Georgetown University’s Bioethics Research Library, which is the warmest, most comfortable space I know of for writing and quiet contemplation.

Baltimore, MD Devin T. Hagerty

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Notes

1. In this book, I refer to the disputed territory in the conventional short-hand, as “Kashmir.” While each side claims the entirety of Kashmir, the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of the territory have been divided by the LOC since the 1972 Simla Agreement. For the sake of convenience, I refer to these areas as “Indian Kashmir” and “Pakistani Kashmir.”

2. “India Strongly Condemns the Cowardly Terrorist Attack on Our Security Forces in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, February 14, 2019 (https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31053/India+strongly+condemns+the+cowardly+terrorist+attack+on+our+security+forces+in+ Pulwama+ Jammu+ amp+Kashmir).

3. “Attack in Pulwama,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, February 14, 2019 (http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php).

4. “Terrorists Will Pay for Pulwama Attack, Says PM; Delivers Warning to Pak,” Hindustan Times, February 15, 2019; “Pulwama Attack: Pakistan Warns India Against Military Action,” BBC, February 19, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47290107).

5. Amy Kazmin, “Narendra Modi Vows Retribution After Deadly Kashmir Attack,” Financial Times, February 15, 2019; “Terrorists Will Pay for Pulwama Attack.”

6. Kamran Yousaf, “Pakistan Launches Diplomatic Blitz Amid Indian Warmongering,” Express Tribune, February 16, 2019.

7. “Viewpoint: Balakot Air Strikes Raise Stakes in India-Pakistan Stand-off,” BBC, February 26, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india- 47370608).

8. “Statement from the Press Secretary on the Terrorist Attack in India,” The White House, Washington, DC, February 14, 2019 (https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-terrorist- attack-india/).

9. “Readout of Telephonic Conversation between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and U.S.  NSA Amb. John Bolton,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, February 16, 2019 (https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31058/ Readout_of_Telephonic_ Conversation_between_National_Security_Advisor_Ajit_Doval_and_US_NSA_Amb_John_Bolton).

10. PTI, “Imran Khan Asks Pak Army to ‘Respond Decisively’ to Any Indian Aggression,” Times of India, February 21, 2019.

11. “Statement by Foreign Secretary on the Strike on JeM Training Camp at Balakot,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, February 26, 2019 (https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/ 31089/Statement+by+Foreign+Secretary+on+26+February+ 2019+on+the+Strike+on+JeM+training+camps+at+Balakot).

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12. “All Wars Are Miscalculated, No One Knows Where They Lead To: PM Khan,” Dawn, February 27, 2019.

13. Sanjeev Miglani and Drazen Jorgic, “India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at Each Other: Sources,” Reuters, March 17, 2019. This account says “there was no suggestion that the missiles involved were any-thing more than conventional weapons.” A subsequent story reports that the Indian intelligence chief, Anil Dhasmana, told Munir that India would escalate the conflict if the Indian MiG pilot was harmed. Shishir Gupta, Rezaul H.  Laskar, and Yashwant Raj, “India, Pakistan Came Close to Firing Missiles at Each Other on February 27,” Hindustan Times, March 23, 2019.

14. Miglani and Jorgic, “India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at Each Other.”

15. Michael R.  Pompeo, Secretary of State, “Concern Regarding India-Pakistan Tensions,” Washington, DC, February 26, 2019 (https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/02/289733.htm).

16. Miglani and Jorgic, “India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at Each Other.”

17. Amy Kazmin and Farhan Bokhari, “Imran Khan Recast as Statesman after Deft Touch Eases India Crisis,” Financial Times, March 4, 2019.

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coNteNts

1 Introduction 1The India-Pakistan Nuclear Arms Competition in 2019 2The Political Context 3Main Arguments and Chapter Plan 5

2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999–2016 11The Kargil Conflict 13The “Twin Peaks” Crisis 17The 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks 22The Uri Attack and Indian “Surgical Strikes” 27

3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999–2016 43Nuclear Deterrence 45U.S. Crisis Management 52Poor Conventional Military Options 53Strategic Restraint 56Conclusion 58

4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia Today 67The Concept of Deterrence Stability 69India-Pakistan Relations After the February 2019 Crisis 73Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities, Doctrine, Command and Control 74

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The Nature of “Ugly Stability” Between India and Pakistan 78The Theoretical Logic of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence 86Conclusion: Deterrence Stability in South Asia? 94

5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence Stability 109Trends 112Measures to Enhance Deterrence Stability 117The U.S. Role 123

Index 131

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Devin T. Hagerty is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC). He was the founding director of UMBC’s Global Studies program. Hagerty teaches on international relations, national security policy, nuclear weapons and deterrence, and South Asian politics. He is the author of The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (1998) and co-author (with Sumit Ganguly) of Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (2005). Hagerty also edited South Asia in World Politics (2005). He is an executive editor of the journal Asian Security.

about the author

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BJP Bharatiya Janata PartyBMD Ballistic Missile DefenseCBM Confidence-Building MeasureCCS Cabinet Committee on SecurityCENTCOM Central CommandCFL Cease-Fire LineCOAS Chief of Army StaffCRPF Central Reserve Police ForceDGMO Director General of Military OperationsECC Employment Control CommitteeFATA Federally Administered Tribal AreasGLCM Ground-Launched Cruise MissileIAF Indian Air ForceICBM Intercontinental Ballistic MissileIED Improvised Explosive DeviceISI Inter-Services IntelligenceJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJeM Jaish-e-MohammedLeT Lashkar-e-TaibaLOC Line of ControlMIRV Multiple Independently targetable Reentry VehicleNCA National Command Authority (Pakistan)NCA Nuclear Command Authority (India)NFU No First UseNLI Northern Light InfantryPAF Pakistan Air Force

abbreviatioNs