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CHAPTER 9

Nuclear Technology Transfers

Contents

PageINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352

Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353Research Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355Enrichment and Reprocessing Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356Paths to Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

PERSPECTIVES OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES ONNUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361

Economic and Energy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362Technical Manpower Considerations: Technology Absorption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375Military Applications Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

SUPPLIER COUNTRY APPROACHES TO NUCLEARTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392

U.S. Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392Policies of Other Western Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393Soviet Policies.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395New Supplier States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395

CONCLUSIONS: THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERSTO THE MIDDLE EAST AND OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397

Future Prospects for Nuclear Technology Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397U.S. Policy options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398

Tables

Table No. Page84.

85.86.87.88.

Implications of Technology Transfer Policies for Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Electrical Demand in the Middle East and North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365Potential for Nuclear Reactor Installation, 1990, 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366Range of Projected Electricity Demand in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372Middle Eastern Students Receiving Doctorates in Technical Fields inthe United States, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

89. Hypothetical Cost of Dedicated Nuclear Proliferation Program forSelected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

Figure

Figure No. Page15. Kilowatthour Cost as Function of Plant Capacity and Load Factor . . . . . . . . . . 369

CHAPTER 9

Nuclear Technology Transfers

I N T R O D U C T I O NNuclear technology transfers are different

from the other technology transfers examinedby OTA because some nuclear technologiescan be used to supply the materials necessaryto construct nuclear weapons. Since the1950’s, when it first began to be developed forpeaceful purposes, nuclear technology has be-come the epitome of “dual use” technologies—those that have both civilian and military ap-plications.

On the one hand, developing nations—par-ticularly those not well endowed with oil andother natural energy resources—see in com-mercial nuclear power a way to meet theirrapidly growing demand for electricity. In ad-dition, many developing countries view nu-clear research as a means to build their nation-al technical and scientific infrastructures. Onthe other hand, because of their potentialweapons applications, some nuclear technol-ogy transfers raise critical military and foreignpolicy questions. Nuclear technology transfersto the Middle East, a region that has experi-enced major wars and changes of regime, aswell as growing oil revenues during the lastdecade, thus raise important technological,commercial, and strategic questions for coun-tries in the region. Nuclear technology trans-fers to the Middle East are also of central im-portance to U.S. nuclear nonproliferationpolicies.

In contrast to the other technology trans-fer sectors examined in this report, commer-cial nuclear power is currently at a very earlystage of development in the Middle East. Nev-ertheless, decisions taken now about nucleartechnology transfers can directly affect thepolitical, military, and economic future of theregion. There is today no commercial nuclearfacility in operation in the region, but thereare a number of nuclear research facilities, anda few nations have plans for commercial nu-

clear power development. The Islamic coun-tries of the Middle East1 have widely differ-ing plans for nuclear technology. Before itsrevolution, Iran had the most extensive plansfor such development. In Egypt the rationalefor commercial nuclear power is comparativelystrong, and planning for a commercial pro-gram is under way. Saudi Arabia and Kuwaithave not committed themselves to nuclearpower. Libya has clearly expressed an interestin nuclear weapons applications, as well as nu-clear power.

OTA’s analysis indicates that no Islamiccountry in the region will be capable of acquir-ing a nuclear explosive device on a wholly in-digenous basis within this decade, and mostwould find it impossible to do so before theturn of the century. Egypt has the strongesttechnical infrastructure, but would not be ableto produce nuclear weapons independently be-fore the late 1990’s. With assistance from for-eign scientists and engineers and suppliers ofcritical items, however, these constraintsposed by weak indigneous technical infrastruc-tures could be reduced or eliminated, depend-ing on the extent and type of assistance.

While it is unlikely that any of these nationswill acquire large enrichment and reprocess-ing facilities that could supply very large, ded-icated weapons programs,2 smaller-scale nu-

—-——— —1This report deals with the countries of the Islamic Middle

East. Because Israel has attained a much higher level of tech-nological development, it is not included as a major focus ofstudy. However, Israel’s nuclear capabilities are discussed inthis chapter as necessary for an understanding of nuclear tech-nology transfers to the region. The term “Islamic countriesis used here simply to indicate that sizable proportions of thepopulations of these countries are Muslims, or followers ofIslam. As discussed in ch. 3, there are many groups in thesecountries and the role of Islam in political, economic, and socialaffairs varies widely.

‘Enrichment and reprocessing technologies are referred to as“sensitive” technologies because of their applicability to weap-ons programs.

351

352 ● Technology Transfer to the Middle East

clear technology transfers (involving researchreactors and laboratory-scale sensitive facili-ties) are expected to increase. These small-scale sensitive facilities are required for peace-ful research, but they can also be used (albeitwith difficulty) for production of nuclear weap-ons materials. Therefore, the prospects for nu-clear weapons proliferation in the Middle Eastwill increase in the years ahead as these facil-ities are introduced, as new supplier nationsnot parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) enter the market, and as Middle East-ern countries improve their technical capa-bilities.

During the next decade a number of Mid-dle Eastern countries could begin operation ofcommercial power reactors. By themselvespower reactors do not pose a significant directproliferation risk.’ It is technically impossibleto use a light-water power reactor (LWR) ora Canadian Deuterium Reactor (CANDU) toproduce plutonium for a nuclear explosivewithout access to enrichment in the case ofLWRs, and to reprocessing for both.

——. .—.—‘The risk of a nation’s using either fuel or spent fuel from

such power reactors in the production of nuclear weapons isminimal when safeguards are effectively enforced, and nonex-istent when no sensitive facilities (open or clandestine) are pres-ent. However, it is technically possible to support a significantnuclear weapons program by using a reprocessing facility ofmoderate size to reprocess spent fuel from the power reactor.In the case of a safeguarded power reactor, spent fuel wouldhave to be diverted to a clandestine reprocessing facility or uti-lized in a reprocessing facility acquired for the ostensible pur-pose of peaceful research.

Despite the contribution that nuclear powercould make to meeting anticipated rapidgrowth in the demand for electricity, a num-ber of factors limit the attraction of nuclearpower to many Middle Eastern nations. Theseinclude the high costs of nuclear plants, lim-ited interconnected grids, and the availabilityof hydrocarbon and other energy sources, in-cluding solar energy. Of all the Middle East-ern countries, Egypt has the most extensivecurrent plans for commercial nuclear powerbut will be able to acquire reactors only withsubsidized foreign financing.

This chapter describes the constraints andopportunities for nuclear technology transfersto the Middle East, paying special attentionto both commercial and military applications,and identifies the implications for U.S. policy.The issues discussed are of particular concernbecause the spread of nuclear weapons in theMiddle East would not only threaten the na-tional survival of Middle Eastern countriesbut also substantially reduce the ability of theUnited States to influence events there.

In addition to the six nations of primary con-sideration in the report, this chapter deals per-ipherally with a number of other countries thatmust be considered in an analysis of nucleartechnology transfers to the Middle East. Onegoal is to identify major factors recipientsmust consider as they make choices about nu-clear technology transfers; another is to clarifytrends important for U.S. policies in the yearsahead.

NUCLEAR FACILITIES INTHE MIDDLE EAST

Developing countries account for only a mi-nor part of commercial nuclear capacity world-wide. At the end of 1980, there were 256 nu-clear power reactors operating around theworld, with an installed capacity of 136 giga-watts electric (GWe), or about 7 percent of in-stalled world electrical generation capacity.About 98 percent of this capacity was locatedin the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD) nations,4 and theSoviet Union and Eastern Europe.

For nuclear power or nuclear weapons, cer-tain types of nuclear technologies, fuel or ma-terial, technically trained manpower, systemsfor delivering either electricity or weapons,— .—-——

40ECD nations include the United States, Japan, Australia,New Zealand, and major West European nations.

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers ● 353

and political commitments are necessary. Therequirements are different for commercialpower production and weapons production,but some facilities can be used for both. Thediscussion that follows briefly identifies vari-ous types of nuclear technologies that havebeen or maybe transferred to Middle Easternnations, and then evaluates their significancefor both commercial power and weapons pro-grams.

C O M M E R C I A L N U C L E A RP O W E R R E A C T O R S

Commercial power facilities include a num-ber of reactor types currently in operation,such as LWRs, including pressurized waterand boiling water types, and CANDU. Mostof these reactors were developed for use in in-dustrial nations and are comparatively largescale, or more than 600 MWe in capacity.

Iran and Egypt: Countries WithCurrent or Previous NuclearPower Plans

Most of the major countries in the regionhave at some point studied the feasibility ofnuclear power for generation of electricity anddesalination. Iran under the Shah developedthe most ambitious program for nuclear powerdevelopment of any of the Middle Easterncountries. Iran’s program, which came to ahalt after the revolution, called for building 23reactors in 20 years to generate 23,000 mega-watts of electricity (MWe) by 1994.5

Iran carried out negotiations with a num-ber of suppliers during the 1970’s, and theWest German firm Kraftwerk Union beganconstruction of two 1,300-MWe pressurizedlight-water reactors near Bushehr on the Per-sian Gulf. When work stopped on these reac-tors in late 1978 with the mass exit of Germantechnicians during a nationwide Iranian laborstrike, the two reactors were 75 percent and

‘Daniel Poneman, ,t’uclear Pourer in the I)e\’eloping ti’orld(Imndon: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Bihan Mossa\ar-Rahmani,~.’ner~’ Poiic)’ in lran I New l’ork: I)ergamon I’ress, 19811, p.105.

65 percent complete. In the past year, someofficial Iranian spokesmen have indicated in-terest in a renewed nuclear program, but con-struction has not been resumed on the tworeactors, although a feasibility study wasunder way in May 1984.6

Egypt today has more extensive plans forcommercial nuclear power development thanany other Middle Eastern country understudy. By 2000, its official plan is to have 8reactors in operation, with a total generationcapacity of 8,000 MWe, amounting to 40 per-cent of its electricity. However, Egypt’s nu-clear plans have been quite volatile over theyears, with activity in the mid-1960’s, followedby inactivity until 1973-76, followed by moredelay. The Egyptian program is stimulated byinsufficient alternative power sources and acomparatively large nuclear manpower pool,but owing primarily to financing problems,construction has not begun on any of thesereactors. Negotiations with France progressedto an advanced stage, and that nation signedpreliminary agreements to supply two 950-MWe turnkey reactors to be located at ElDaba’a, northwest of Cairo. French spokesmencontinue to state that final agreements are im-minent and that the reactors will go online inthe early 1990’ s.’

Egypt selected the Swiss firm Motor Colum-bus to work 011 an 18-month contract as theconsulting engineer for the first two reactorsand to help prepare the tenders for the bidsfor the second two reactors. In early 1983 theEgyptian Government called for bids on fourreactor units, and by the end of the year theFrench firm Framatome. the West German

6Kraftwerk Union and the Atomic Energy Organization ofIran signed a contract under which Kraftwerk Union will carryout an inspection of the Bushehr site in order to determine thefeasibility of completing one of the reactors: the same reportclaims that site maintenance has been good, See ‘‘KraftwerkInspects Nuclear Plant,” Middle East Economic Digest. Dec.9, 1983, p. 12. See also “Official Comments on Iranian NuclearResearch, ” Iranian News Agency, Mar. 16, 1982. KraftwerkUnion spokesmen confirmed that 40 engineers were carr}’ingout a feasibilit~. stud~’ on site in May 1984.

““According to the Current Timetable, Egypt and FranceShould Come to Terms, ” .Vuc)eonics 1$’eek, ,June 10, 1982, p.7 ; 4’ In Brief , ’ ,Jliddle F,’ast J;conomic Digest, \ol, 26, N o . 51,1982.

354 ● Technology Transfer tc the Middle East

firm Kraftwerk Union, and U.S. firms West-inghouse and Bechtel had submitted bids. a

Thus, negotiations continue with firms fromvarious nations for supply of reactors, butEgypt has reached no firm agreements, andtechnical assessment of the bids continues.

Middle Eastern Countries ConsideringNuclear Power

A number of other Middle Eastern countrieshave shown interest in developing commercialnuclear power, but none of them is as far alongas Egypt. Libya has plans to acquire four nu-clear reactors by 2000 and is negotiating withthe Soviet Union to purchase a 440-MWe reac-tor from the Soviet export organizationAtomenergoexport.9

The Syrian government has plans for twoto six reactors, but has done little to carry outthese plans. In 1981 the Minister of Electri-city announced that feasibility studies hadbeen initiated. The French firm Sofratome wasselected to carry out a feasibility study in thesummer of 1982, but the study was delayedthrough the end of that year. Discussion inSyria has focused on two power reactors, eachwith a capacity of 660 MWe.10 Iraq has ex-pressed interest in a commercial nuclear pro-gram, and at the Second Arab Energy Con-ference in 1982, it was forecast that Iraq willhave an installed capacity of 1,400 MWe by2000. Negotiations with France for the pur-chase of a 900-MWe pressurized-water reac-

——— ——.——8See “Egypt: Nuclear Bids In–Will Financing Follow?, ” A4id-

dle East Econom”c Digest, Dec. 2, 1983. See also, Paul Taylor,“U.S. and Japanese Groups Link in Egyptian Nuclear PowerBid, ” Financial Times, Sept. 1, 1983, p. 1; “Consultant’s Bidto Egypt Show Huge Gap; EDF Leads French Reactor Offer, ”NUCkOm”CS Week, vol. 23, No. 4, Jan. 28, 1982, p. 1.

‘Robin Miller, “Nuclear Power Plans Outlined, ” Jamahh”ya.hReview, No. 22, March 1982, p. 17. See also, James Everett Katzand Onkar S. Marwah, Nuclear Power in Developing Countn’es(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1982), p. 8. Press reports indi-cate that the Belgian firm Belgonucleaire may also participatein the project. See “Libya-Belgian Firm to Supply Plants,Paris International Press Service, 1245 GMT, May 23, 1984,reported in FBIS, May 23, 1984

1oRob Laufer, “Syria Plans Nuclear Power Unit by 1991, ” Nu-c)eonics Week, vol. 22, No. 24, June 18, 1981, p. 1.

tor were mentioned.11 More recently, it wasreported that the Iraqi nuclear energy orga-nization signed an agreement with the Sovietfirm Atomenergoeksport to carry out the firstphase of a study to choose a site for a nuclearpower station. 12

Algeria has made no firm commitment tonuclear power development, but governmentplanning organizations have considered nucle-ar power in medium- to long-term developmentplans. In 1976, for example, a special decreewas issued which called for establishment ofnuclear reactors as a stimulus to industrial de-velopment.13 Similarly, Kuwait has no formalplans for a nuclear power program, but a num-ber of feasibility studies have been carried out,some regarding use of nuclear reactors in de-salination. More recently, the Kuwaiti Gover-nment discussed the possible purchase of fourCANDU reactors with Canadian officials in1982, but these discussions were not con-tinued.14

Thus, while Middle Eastern nations haveconsidered nuclear power programs, few havecarried these plans very far, and those thathave, have experienced delays–Iran’s pro-gram came to a stalemate during the revolu-tion, and Egypt is still negotiating for the pur-chase of its first commercial reactor. It isunlikely that any Middle Eastern nation will

———————1lAdnan Shihab-Eldin and Yusef Rashid, “Cooperative De-

velopment of Nuclear Energy in the Arab World, ” paper pre-sented at the Second Arab Energy Conference, Mar. 6-11, 1982,sponsored by the League of Arab States, the Arab Fund forEconomic and Social Development, Arab Industrial Develop-ment Organization, and Organization of Arab Petroleum Ex-porting Countries, pp. 10 and 20.

‘z’’ Contract with USSR to Study Nuclear Power Site, ”JN071i!Ol Baghdad INA in Arabic 1052 GMT 7 March 84, re-ported in FBIS, Daily Report.- Middle East and Africa, Mar.7, 1984, vol. v., No. 046, annex No. 016.

“See Adnan Mustafa, “Nuclear Fuel Resources in the ArabWorld, ” paper presented at Second Arab Energy Conference,ibid.; sce also “Interministerial Committee Set Up to DefineNuclem Energy Policy, ” El Moudjahid (Algerie), Nov. 1, 1980,p. 5.

“Can,~dian officials reported that they would not sell the reac-tors unless Kuwait became a party to the NPT. See “Offer toSell Reactors Denied, ” Cana&”an Radio, in FBIS Jan. 28, 1982.Kuwait has signed but not ratified the NPT,


have an operating commercial reactor beforethe mid-1990’s.

R E S E A R C H R E A C T O R S

A second type of nuclear facility currentlyin operation in the Middle East, the researchreactor, is used in conjunction with nuclear re-search at several training centers in the Mid-dle East. Research reactors provide a sourceof neutrons and/or gamma radiation for phys-ics, biology, chemistry, and metallurgy re-search; for investigation of the effects of ra-diation on many types of materials; and forproduction of isotopes used in medicine, indus-try, agriculture, and training and teaching.There are more than 350 research reactorsworldwide.

Israel was the first Middle Eastern countryto build a research reactor; in 1960 it com-pleted a 5-MWt15 IRR-1 research reactor usinghighly enriched uranium (HEU) and a fewyears later, a 26-MWt research reactor atDimona.16

Egypt is the Islamic nation with the oldestresearch reactor in the Middle East. Built withSoviet assistance in the early 1960’s, Egypt’s2-MWt research reactor using 10 percent en-riched uranium is located at the Inchass Nu-clear Research Center. It has been operatedsince 1972 by Egyptians without foreign assist-ance. In addition, West Germany has agreedto sell Egypt a l-MWt research reactor.17

Iraq has constructed the largest number ofresearch reactors. One is a small pool-type re-search reactor supplied by the Soviets, whichwas upgraded to 5 MWt in 1978 and is locatedat the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.This IRT-2000 reactor is suitable for small-

1’1 MWt would produce approximately 0.3 Mwe. Unless other-wise noted, MW indicates megawatts (electric). Thermal meg-awatts ( Mk$’t) is used to refer to capacity of reactors not usedfor production of electricity.

“No U.S. observers have inspected the Dimona facility since1969, and Israel says that it has no nuclear weapons. However,informed opinion is that Israel does have nuclear weapons ca-pability. Some claim that the Dimona reactor was upgradedto 70 MWt capacity in the 1970’s. See George H. Quester, 4’Nu-clear Weapons and Israel, The ilfiddle East Journal, \’ol, 37,No. 4, a u t u m n 1983, p. 548.

‘T’’ (lerrnan Minister %ks Trade Increase, ” Afiddle East ECOnomic Digest, vol. 26, No. 13, 1982,

scale medical and civilian research applica-tions and can be fueled with uranium of vari-ous enrichments. Two other research reactorswere supplied by the French in the 1970’s. Isis(or Tamuz 2) is a small 800-kilowatt criticalassembly, which has a negligible annual fuelutilization. Osirak, as the French called it, orTamuz 1 was a research reactor before it wasdestroyed by Israel in 1981. According to theIAEA, this reactor had a capacity of 40 MWt.Iraq has discussed rebuilding the reactor withthe French, but this has not occurred. Amongthe points of controversy was the suggestionthat medium-enriched uranium (MEU) fuel beused in a rebuilt reactor, which was opposedby Iraq. ’8

It is not clear whether Iran’s 5-MWt reac-tor provided by the United States in the1960’s and located at the Teheran UniversityNuclear Center is still in operation.19 Finally,Libya has a 10-MWt Soviet-built (WWR-C) re-search reactor fueled by 80 percent enricheduranium.20

A number of nations have plans for or areconsidering building research reactors. Alge-ria, for example, has a nuclear research insti-tute and has carried out some discussions withthe U.S. firm General Atomics concerning con-struction of a research reactor, but no pur-chase has been announced.21 Morocco has pur-chased a 100-kilowatt TRIGA Mark I researchreactor from General Atomics, but the facil-ity has not yet been constructed.22 Saudi Ara-

——.— ——‘aSee “France, Iraq Unveil Secret Nuclear Accord, ” Ener~r

DaileV, June 19, 1981; “Mideast Nuclear, ” Reuters Report, Mar.19, 1982. The U.S. Department of Energy cited a 70 MW’t ca-

pacity, but the French said that the reactor had a 40 M1l’t ca-pacity. Due to limitations of the heat rejection system, the reac-tor would have been operated at 40 MWt, according to theIAEA. See IAEA, Background Briefing Paper, “Safeguardsand the Iraq Nuclear Centre,” December 1981.

‘gZivia A. Wurtele, Gergory S. Jones, Beverly C. Rowen, andMarcy Agmon, Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for the itliddleEast amd South Asia (Marina de] Rey: Pan lieuristics, 1981),p. A-18.

‘“’’ Development of Nuclear Capability’ Reviewed, ” The ArabMrorld k%”eek)~. (Jan, 24, 1981), reprinted in JPRS Nuclear De-velopment and Proliferation l{rorldwide Report #84, Alar. 3,1981.

“’’Algeria To Go Nuclear, ” 8 lla~w, Feb. 28, 1981, pp. 46-47.2i’’Extraction of Uranium from Arab Phosphate: The Arab

World Decides to Turn to the Nuclear Alternative, ” Al Duster(1.ondon), No. 231, Apr. 26, 1982.


bia has plans to build a nuclear research cen-ter, but no research reactor has yet been built,although feasibility studies have been carriedout.23 In Kuwait, similarly, discussions aboutresearch reactors have been pursued, but thoseorganizations interested in purchasing onehave not appropriated funding for fiscal year1984 to proceed. Likewise, Syria and Tunisiahave also considered research reactors, but inneither case have negotiations been finalized.

E N R I C H M E N T A N DR E P R O C E S S I N G F A C I L I T I E S

No Middle Eastern nation currently hassuch facilities on a commercial scale, nor is itlikely that any of these nations will have com-mercial-scale enrichment and reprocessing fa-cilities in this century. However, a number ofcountries are reported to have small-scale re-processing facilities. (There is, however, no au-thoritative source identifying all small reproc-essing facilities worldwide. )

Only a few Middle Eastern nations are re-ported to have small-scale reprocessing facil-ities in operation. At the Inshass Center,Egypt has a small complex of hot cells whichwere supplied by the French. Iraq contractedwith the Italian firm SNIA in 1976 for a radi-ochemistry laboratory. Construction on the fa-cility was completed in 1978. The lab consistedof a hot cell complex. Such hot cells are usedto manipulate radioactive substances andhave many potential peaceful uses, but alsocould be used to separate small quantities ofplutonium from dissolved uranium in theOsirak reactor.

Italy also reportedly agreed to provide Iraqwith four additional labs designed to give theIraqis “mastery of the fuel cycle, ” in the words

~ !~~et ~een 1976 and 1982 Genpra] Atomics attempted to Per-

suade King Saud University to purchase a small Triga Mark 1reactor, but was unsuccessful. The Saudis signed a memoran-dum of understanding with Great Britain in late 1981 to facili-tate nuclear research and training. The physics department atthe University of Petroleum and Minerals has ordered a 14-MeVneutron generator, and has plans for a linear accelerator. TheUniversity of Riyadh is acquiring a 2.5-MeV Van de Graaf gen-erator for its physics department. Thus, the Saudis are initiatinga low-level research program.

of Dr. Umberto Colombo, head of the firmCNIEN. These labs are said to have includeda fuel fabrication lab, a chemical engineeringlab, and a radioisotope lab. The exact statusof these projects is not clear.24

The only other laboratory-scale sensitive re-search reported in the Middle East are effortsin Israel and prerevolutionary Iran. Iran ac-quired experimental laser enrichment technol-ogy in late 1978 from a U.S. firm. The fate ofthis equipment is unknown. Observers believethat separation facilities in the form of hotcells exist at two Israeli reactor facilities.25

P A T H S T O N U C L E A RW E A P O N S

A number of Middle Eastern nations do pos-sess research reactors and laboratory-scalesensitive facilities, and a few have plans fornuclear power programs. A key question iswhether these facilities now in place, or thoseplanned, could result in proliferation of nuclearweapons in the Middle East. The term “pro-liferation’ is used hereto refer not only to themanufacture or acquisition of nuclear weap-ons by nations that do not now possess them,but also to programs that prepare for the con-struction or testing of a weapon and thatwould allow nations to produce a nuclear de-vice in a very short period of time.26

Israel, for example, is generally creditedwith the capability to produce nuclear weap-ons in a very short period of time. Just as com-mercial nuclear power development promisesto enhance the electricity-generating capacityof Middle Eastern nations, nuclear weapons-—.— -—- . -—

“For the most detailed published account, see Richard Wilson,“A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq,Nature, vol. 302, Mar. 31, 1983, pp. 373-376. The report is basedon observations made onsite in early 1983. More recent reportsof onsite conditions are not available. According to informa-tion provided by Dr. Wilson in July 1984, about 30 scientistsand 100 others (non-military), as well as 100 soldiers are onsiteat Tuwaitha; French and Italian technicians are not present.

‘5 Roger F. Pajak, Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East(Washington, D. C.: National Defense University, 1982), p. 38.

26This definition, and a more detailed explanation of the weap-ons applications of various nuclear technologies, can be foundin Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D. C.: U.S.Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-E-48, 1977)and appendix vol. 11.

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers “ 357

proliferation would have significant implica-tions for the balance of power in the region,including not only tension between Israel andits Arab neighbors but also rivalries amongIslamic states, and for the strategic interestsof the superpowers.

Commercial power reactors cannot, by them-selves, be used to manufacture nuclear weap-ons, To make nuclear weapons, plutonium orhighly enriched uranium is needed. Low-en-riched uranium is used as fuel for light-waternuclear power reactors. Such fuel would haveto be “enriched” in an enrichment plant toboost the concentration of uranium 235 to thelevel required for weapons production. OTA’sstudy, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards,stated that ‘‘it is impossible, not merely im-practical, to use light-water reactor orCANDU reactor uranium fuel in a nuclear fis-sion explosive without an expensive and tech-nologically advanced enrichment facility.”27

Another method of producing weapons in-volves plutonium. Plutonium is producedwhen uranium atoms in reactor fuel are bom-barded by neutrons during the normal opera-tion of a nuclear reactor. Such plutonium, how-ever, must be separated from used (“spent”)fuel through a process called reprocessing.Therefore, in addition to a light-water reactor,either an enrichment facility or a reprocessingfacility would be required to produce suitableuranium or plutonium for weapons production.

All of the nations that now have nuclearweapons have obtained them through “dedi-cated” programs devoted to military purposes,but there is at least a conceptual possibilitythat a country might use commercial nuclearfacilities, specifically reactors, in conjunctionwith an enrichment or reprocessing facility,to acquire or produce weapons materials-plu-tonium and/or highly enriched uranium. Diver-sion of materials needed for weapons produc-tion from a commercial reactor could occurthrough evasion of safeguards or through useof unsafeguarded facilities.

27F’or analysis of diversion potential from light-water reac-tor and other nuclear power systems, see Nuclear Proliferationand Safeguards, op. cit., pp. 23, 154-189.

Because light-water reactors require consid-erable time for removing “spent fuel assem-blies and replacing them with new fuel assem-blies, it is unlikely that spent fuel could bediverted to a reprocessing plant for weaponsuse without considerable economic and powerpenalties, except at a normal discharge andloading operation or from the spent fuel stor-age pool. This would make clandestine evasionof safeguards difficult.

Use of commercial reactors without associ-ated enrichment or reprocessing facilities con-stitutes at best a very indirect path to nuclearweapons production from the standpoint ofthe manpower involved as well. There is a lim-ited overlap between personnel requirementsfor a commercial nuclear program and a nu-clear weapons program. About a quarter of thepersonnel normally involved in operating acommercial reactor require specialized nucleartraining. A weapons program would also re-quire personnel with specialized training, someof it in different areas. Therefore, some per-sonnel working in a commercial program couldbe used for a weapons program (assuming thatmany were retrained) along with personnelpossessing specialized skills in areas such asnuclear engineering, physics, and the handlingof high (nonnuclear) explosives.28

In Egypt, the Middle Eastern nation mostlikely to acquire a new commercial power plantin the next decade, policy makers have indi-cated their preference for turnkey plants. Witha turnkey contract, indigenous personnel aregradually trained either in the host countryor abroad, and the contractor may also be re-sponsible for operations. Thus, the turnkey ap-proach implies a delay in development of in-digenous capabilities. For a nation that wantsto keep its nuclear weapons option open, com-mercial power plants (particularly turnkeyplants) raise no direct proliferation considera-tions. Indirectly and over a long time, how-

‘R’rhe total number of personnel required to operate a nuclearpIant in the United States is 600 to 800, including both onsiteand off site personnel. See Glenn A. Whan and Robert L. Long,‘‘Nuclear Power: Manpower and Training Requirements, pa-per presented at the Workshop on Nuclear-Electric Power inthe Asia-Pacific Region, Honolulu, Hawaii, Jan. 24, 1983.

358 . Technology Transfer to the Middle East

ever, such facilities could contribute to the cre-ation and maintenance of a technicalinfrastructure that would be useful if the na-tion later decided to develop nuclear weapons.

In contrast to commercial power reactors,which do not pose proliferation risks by them-selves, are small-scale sensitive facilities whichcan be used in conjunction with research orpower reactors to extract small quantities ofweapons materials if facilities are unsafe-guarded or safeguards are evaded.

During the next decade, it is quite likely thatmore research reactors will be supplied to con-tribute to the creation of a local science andtechnology infrastructure in developing coun-tries. However, research reactors can also beused, at least theoretically, as components ofprograms oriented toward weapons produc-tion. The critical considerations are: 1) the sizeof the reactor, with those over 10 MWt of par-ticular concern; 2) the use of very highly en-riched uranium as a fuel; 3) the presence of re-processing technology; 4) the strength ofsafeguards to monitor fuel and spent fuelstockpiled within the country; and 5) the oper-ation of such reactors.29

One concern is that HEU could be divertedand used in weapons production, although thiswould entail considerable effort to obtain suf-ficient quantities. Most safeguarded researchreactors fueled by HEU contain less than 25kg of U235 in inventory. During 1981, the In-ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)conducted inspections at 176 research reactorsand critical assemblies, of which about 43 con-tained more than one significant quantity(SQ) 30 of highly enriched uranium or plu-tonium.———. —.——

29The discussion on research reactors draws from the workof Marvin M. Miller and Carol Ann Eberhard, “The Potentialfor Upgrading Safeguards Procedures at Research ReactorsFueled with Highly Enriched Uranium,” for the U.S. Arms Con-trol and Disarmament Agency, contract No. AC2NC104, Nov-ember 1982.

‘“One SQ = 25 kg of [J’]’, Most of the proliferation concernregarding civlian applications has been with the use of veryhighlv enriched uranium (VHE U) containing 93 percent U’J’used in research reactors. Smaller quantities of about 5 kg U’”or between 2 and 8 kg Pu are also of proliferation concern. SeeMiller and Eberhard, “The Potential for Upgrading Proce-dures, ” op. cit.

Another concern is that more powerful re-search reactors might be modified to produceplutonium through irradiation of uraniumtargets in the core or the use of a uraniumblanket around the core.31 Small, but signifi-cant, quantities of plutonium could be pro-duced in reactors with a capacity of more than10 MWt. (If such a reactor were fueled withHEU, the uranium inventory would probablybe of more proliferation concern than wouldpotential plutonium production.) IAEA in-spections would detect activity involving mod-ifications in safeguarded facilites, but someplutonium could at least theoretically be pro-duced between inspections.

In the event that quantities of plutoniumcould be produced through such means, abilityto produce nuclear weapons would depend onthe presence of a reprocessing facility. Hotcells, such as those in the small radiochemistrylab provided by the Italians to Iraq, are gen-erally limited to gram-scale reprocessing—therefore limiting the amount of plutoniumthat could be produced annually to several kil-ograms, at most.

Research reactors larger than 10 MWt andfueled by very highly enriched uranium(VHEU) thus raise proliferation concerns.These include reactors constructed in the1960’s to the late 1970’s. More recently, theUnited States, France, and other nations ini-tiated efforts to encourage the use of low en-riched uranium (LEU) in order to reduce thepotential for nuclear weapons proliferationfrom diversion of HEU fuel. There have beenfew U.S. research reactor exports in recentyears; the United States exercises restraintsover research reactors abroad through deci-sions about supply of enriched uranium fuel.Libya is the only Islamic nation with a re-search reactor having a capacity of 10 M Wt.32

The Israeli 26-thermal megawatt (MWt) Di-

. .‘l See Hans Gruemm, “Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the

Record Straight, ” IAEA Bulletin, vol. 23, N’o. 4, December1981.

‘Wichard J$rilson confirmed in August 1984 that the So~ietJt’\$rR C reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq, has a 5-hlWt capacity.

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers ● 359—

mona reactor is estimated to be capable of pro-ducing 8 kilograms of plutonium (kg Pu) an-nually. 33

For nations wishing to produce weaponscovertly, it is at least possible for researchreactors to provide an avenue, albeit one muchless convenient than acquisition of large-scalesensitive facilities. However, diverting enoughHEU or plutonium from these small reactorsto support a weapons program (especially onegeared to the production of more than one ex-perimental device) would take some time; dur-ing that time, a strong safeguards programwould probably detect diversion, or at leastsuspicious circumstances.

The nuclear technologies raising greatestconcern in terms of proliferation are enrich-ment and reprocessing technologies. BecauseIraq has purchased laboratory-scale reprocess-ing equipment, concerns arose about whetheror not that country was attempting to producenuclear weapons, a subject which will be dis-cussed in more detail in the section that fol-lows. Sensitive facilities raise proliferation con-cerns because they could be used in a weaponsprogram if safeguards were inadequate or cir-cumvented. Requiring only a modest sum ofmoney and a modest construction effort incomparison to large-scale facilities, smaller-scale reprocessing facilities could be used toproduce clandestinely the material for a smallnumber of bombs annually if the spent fuelwere available. Although time-consuming,such an operation is not technically difficult.

Construction of either unsafeguarded enrich-ment or reprocessing facilities would consti-tute a violation of the Nuclear Nonprolifera-tion Treaty (NPT), which all Middle Easternnations except Algeria, Israel, Oman, Qatar,Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates(UAE) have ratified or signed. Dedicatedweapons programs could potentially use somesafeguarded facilities: e.g., in theory low-en-riched uranium could be diverted from a safe-guarded reactor and boosted in a dedicated en-richment plant, However, this would be a time-

— 33Miller and Eberhard, op. cit., P. 21.

consuming and difficult process if safeguardswere in place.

As OTA’s study of Nuclear Proliferationand Safeguards outlined, the path to weaponsproduction most accessible to developingcountries with modest technical infrastruct-ure is one involving construction of a 25-MWtplutonium production reactor (which wouldproduce enough plutonium for one or two ex-plosives per year) and a small reprocessingplant. The two facilities together would require10 to 20 professional engineers for operation.The reprocessing plant requires more exper-tise in remote control, the handling of very ra-dioactive materials, and chemical engineeringprocedures, but the equipment and suppliesneeded are generally available on world mar-kets. 34

A more demanding route would be the useof centrifuge enrichment facilities. In eithercase, the facilities would have to be con-structed and operated without detection. Fiveyears is the estimated time between the pointwhen a nation begins discussion of a dedicatedroute and the point when the weapons mate-rial could be in hand. In addition to these twodedicated routes, the next decade could seeprogress in advanced isotope separation tech-nologies such as laser isotope separation,which could greatly accentuate proliferationproblems.

It must be emphasized that in the MiddleEast, where manpower is a major constrainton transfer of advanced technologies, it wouldbe difficult to assemble a team with the appro-priate specialized skills. Even in newly indus-trializing countries, such as India, with muchlarger pools of scientific and engineering man-power, construction of reactors has requiredmore skilled workers than are needed in indus-trial countries. A small national program de-signed to produce weapons clandestinely with-out testing would require a core group of morethan a dozen well-trained and very competentpeople experienced in many fields of scienceand engineering, and access to open technicalliterature.

34See Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, op. cit., pp. 174-79.

3 5 - 5 0 7 0 - 84 - 24 : ~1, 3


In addition, a staff of technicians, diverselaboratory facilities, a field-test facility forhandling experiments with large-scale (nonnu-clear) explosives, and financial and organiza-tional resources to purchase or fabricate itemsrequired for the assembly mechanism wouldbe needed.35 Any one of these componentsmight be easy to acquire, but Middle Easterncountries face strong obstacles to assemblingthe entire package of skills needed and to re-training personnel over a long period of time.More important than the sophistication of thefacilities is the competence of the individualsinvolved in the program. Manpower is thus acritical constraint to nuclear technology trans-fer in the Islamic Middle East.

A final route to nuclear weapons is theft orpurchase of nuclear material or weapons on theblack market. This would eliminate the needfor the expensive and demanding technologiesdescribed above. Libya has reportedly at-tempted to purchase not only sensitive nucleartechnologies (reprocessing and enrichment)but also a nuclear bomb.36 While there is noevidence that such a black market now exists,one may develop if second-tier suppliers enterthe market to sell unsafeguarded facilities andif plutonium recycle becomes more extensive.The black market is the least technically de-manding route to nuclear weapons.

This discussion indicates an ascending or-der of proliferation problems, with commercialreactors at the bottom and sensitive facilitiesat the top of the list. In the case of power reac-tors, the commercial applications are most im-portant for these Middle Eastern nations, par-ticularly where the recipient possesses noneof the more sophisticated reprocessing or en-richment equipment. For commercial power-plants, particularly those built through turn-key contracts, there is no direct proliferationrisk if reprocessing and enrichment facilitiesare not present.

The most worrisome path to a weapons ca-pability would be one that involves acquisitionof small-scale fuel cycle facilities that could berationalized, more or less reasonably, as logical. . . . - . . . . —

35Ibid., p. 140.36Steven J. Rosen, Nuclear Proliferation and the ,\’ear-,VucIear

Countries, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), p. 178.

components of an orderly long-term effort todevelop a broad capability for using nuclearpower. Such facilities, designed with greatflexibility of operation in mind, maybe capa-ble of producing materials adequate for one toa f’ew weapons per year. However, it must beemphasized that such facilities would have tooperate over considerable periods of time andescape safeguards in order to be used for weap-ons production.

If a nation were to succeed in this covertweapons production path, it might produce afew small-scale, untested nuclear weapons.Some observers believe that in the IslamicMiddle East a number of nations–Iraq, Lib-ya, Egypt, Syria, and Iran37-might by theturn of the century be in a position to developsuch “small nuclear forces” (comprising 5 to10 deliverable and militarily serviceable fissionbombs or warheads).

If present nuclear supplier policies remainin force and are accepted by new suppliers, theIslamic nations of the Middle East will not beable by themselves to produce weapons formany years, unless they abrogate or violatesafeguarding agreements. In that case, pro-duction of weapons would be difficult, and be-cause the separation of plutonium required fora single weapon would take many months (de-pending on the type of reprocessing facility),detection of the program would be probable.

However, if new suppliers enter the marketwho are willing to provide sensitive facilitiesand assistance, and if recipients abrogate safe-guards, the possibility of nuclear weapons pro-liferation would increase dramatically. Table84 outlines the nuclear proliferation implica-tions of policies of supplier and recipient coun-tries, in their current form and under theoret-ical modifications.

The section that follows explores the plansof these and other Middle Eastern countriesfor nuclear power development. The technicalcapabilities of these nations to utilize nucleartechnologies are evaluated in the light ofstated policy toward commercial power devel-opment and toward weapons programs.. —

“Center for Strategic and International Studies, Prolifera-tion of Small Nuclear Forces (Washington: CSIS, 1983), p. i.

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers ● 361— — . —

Table 84.—implications of Technology Transfer Policies for Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Recipient policies

Acceptance of full-scopesafeguards (party to NPTor equivalent)

Acceptance of safeguardsonly as required byindividual suppliers

Suppler policies

No changes i policy, no new suppliers

Suppliers, possibly new ones, willing toprovide sensitive facilities (as well asreactors), with, however, Insistence onsafeguards on facilities they provide

Suppliers, possibly new ones, willing toprovide anything without safeguards

No change in policy, no new suppliers

Suppliers willing to provide sensitivefacilities (as well as reactors), withinsistence on safeguards at least onfacilities they provide

Suppliers willing to provide anythingwithout safeguards

No changes in policy. no new suppliers

Unwilling to accept Suppliers willing to provide sensitivesafeguards on anything facilities (as well as reactors), with

insistence on safeguards on at leastfacilities they provide

Suppliers willing to provide anythingSOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

1.

2

3.

4.5

6

7

8

Implications for weapons programs

Recipients could obtain reactors but nocapability for obtaining plutonium or HEU,except through faciIities of an undeclaredor clandestine nature (although abrogationof safeguards would allow for Pu path)Weapons capability would be Iimitedseveral years for a single weaponCould obtain everything necessary for afairly large-scale weapons program. butweapons could be obtained only afterabrogation or violation of safeguardingagreementsSame as 2. above

Same as 1

Same as 2

Recipients could acquire essentiallyunlimited weapons potential

Weapons capability for recipientsconfined to currently existing facilitiesRecipient might not be able to obtainadditional shipments of HEU; therefore,proliferation potential remote

Same as 7, above

9 Same as 6 above

PERSPECTIVES OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIESON NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

A number of economic, political, and man-power-related considerations restrict the abil-ity of Middle Eastern nations to develop nu-clear power and pursue a nuclear weaponsoption. Despite the growing awareness of theproblems associated with nuclear power—in-cluding waste management, potential for ac-cidents, and economic costs—some developingnations see nuclear power as essential for theireconomic development. Likewise, despite thepotentially destabilizing effects of nuclearweapons acquisition, some developing nations

have apparently invested considerable re-sources in attempting to keep a nuclear weap-ons option open.

This section explores the various types ofconstraints on nuclear technology acquisitionin the Middle East, with reference to specificcountries and programs. One important themeis that the manpower required for indigenoustechnology development is a significant con-straint for all of these nations. Also, thevolatility and early stage of nuclear programs


in the Middle East reflect an absence in mostof these countries of the political agreementand leadership needed to support a large-scalenuclear program.

E C O N O M I C A N D E N E R G YC O N S I D E R A T I O N S

In deciding whether to promote commercialnuclear power, developing nations face signif-icant constraints related to the following re-quirements: financing, validity of projectedenergy demand, electricity grid size, politicalagreement concerning the appropriateness ofnuclear power in view of overall developmentstrategies, and competing requirements forresources. OTA analysis leads to the conclu-sion that, despite the potential which nuclearpower holds for meeting anticipated rapidgrowth in electricity demand, only a few de-veloping Middle Eastern nations are likely tohave operating power reactors within this cen-tury. Egypt, the Middle Eastern nation withthe most extensive program for nuclear powerdevelopment, is likely to obtain nuclear reac-tors only with subsidized financing.

Financial Requirements

In developing countries, where financial re-sources are scarce and demand for central pow-er station electricity comparatively small, coal,oil, and hydropower have commonly been usedto meet electrical demand. For Middle East-ern nations, particularly those with abundanthydrocarbon resources, the rationale for com-mercial nuclear power is far from clear. Hereinlies the central question: What changes in theincentives and disincentives for nuclear powerwhich heretofore weighed against nuclear pow-er in the Middle East might “tip the logic” inits favor?

Cost and financing terms for the purchaseof nuclear reactors severely constrain the abil-ity of many developing nations to acquire reac-tors. While costs of reactors vary, dependingon a variety of factors such as reactor types,safety standards, and construction delays, a1,000-MWe reactor costs a minimum of about$1 billion in industrial countries, and could run

double or triple that amount elsewhere. Includ-ing indirect costs (interest, manpower train-ing, administration), a 600-MWe reactor alonehas been estimated at $1.5-$2 billion (in 1981dollars) for developing nations.”

Financial constraints have been particularlysalient for Egypt. Despite Egypt signed let-ter of intent to buy a 626-MWe pressurized-water reactor from Westinghouse in 1976, fi-nancing of $1.2 billion in loans was never re-solved and the sale was never completed.39 In1981, Egypt set up a alternative energy fundwhereby oil revenues were to have been setaside at the rate of $500 million annually. Asof December 1983, Egyptian Government offi-cials stated that $800 million had been depos-ited in this fund,40 and that another $300 mil-lion would be added in 1984. Financing con-tinues to be a major factor influencing Egyptnuclear power plans.

The reluctance of the U.S. Export-ImportBank to grant loans and congressional opposi-tion to loans to finance U.S. nuclear reactorexports has been a continuing issue in nego-tiations carried out by U.S. firms.” Similarly,financing has been the sticking point in Egyp-tian negotiations with the French for two 950-Mwe pressurized-water reactors valued at $2billion. Egypt announced plans to finance 20percent of the project itself and sought financ-ing for 80 percent of the project at 8 percentinterest rates. For the last 2 years, the pro-

—— . .——.—‘“In Taiwan, where labor costs are very low and skilled man-

power exists, two 950-MWe reactors were built at a total costof $1.7 billion in 1983, This low cost reflects the lack of publichearings and very limited backfitting, conditions not presentin the United States. See “Nuclear Costs, ” En~”neering News-Record, May 26, 1983, pp. 27-28. See Ian Smart, “The Consid-eration of Nuclear Power, “ in James Everett Katz and OnkarMarwah (Marwah) Nuclear Power in Developing Countries: AnAnalysis of Decision Making (Lexington, Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1982), p. 28.

“!%x: U.S. Department of Energy, Joint Egypt-United StatesReport on Egypt- United States Cooperative Energy Assess-ment, 5 vols. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-fice, 1979).

‘“!%e “Seminar Discusses Nuclear Safety, ” London A1-SharqA1-Awsat in Arabic, Nov. 24, 1983, p. 7 reported in JPRS TWD84-002; see also Charles Richards, “Four Bids Expected forElgypt N-Plant, ” Financial Times, Nov. 24, 1983.

‘ ]’’ Egypt Seeking Direct U.S. Aid for Nuclear Plant Pur-chase, ‘ Nucleonics Week, vol. 21, Feb. 14, 1980, p. 2.

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers `* 363

j e c t e d d a t e f o r b e g i n n i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h et w o r e a c t o r s h a s b e e n c o n t i n u a l l y p o s t p o n e d .

For a country l ike Egypt , which has l imi tedoil resources, a rising demand for food imports,a n d g r o w i n g g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , t h ev i a b i l i t y o f i t s n u c l e a r p r o g r a m h a s b e e nst rongly af fec ted by f inancing problems. Withd e c l i n i n g o i l p r i c e s , r e m i t t a n c e s f r o m E g y p -tian workers abroad initially fell, as did incomefrom the Suez Canal . Egypt ’s cur rent accountd e f i c i t i n c r e a s e d f r o m $ 8 2 0 m i l l i o n i n f i s c a lyear 1979-80 to $1 ,406 mi l l ion in f i sca l year1 9 8 2 - 8 3 .4’

The nation’s changed financial position is il-l u s t r a t e d b y i t s m o d i f i e d r e q u e s t s f o r e x t e r -n a l f i n a n c i n g o f n u c l e a r r e a c t o r c o n s t r u c t i o n :In 1980, Egypt was negot ia t ing to f inance 50percent of the reactor projec t a t 8 percent in-t e r e s t ; i n 1 9 8 2 , 8 0 p e r c e n t f i n a n c i n g w a s r e -q u e s t e d a t t h e s a m e i n t e r e s t r a t e . M e a n w h i l e ,c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e a l t e r n a t i v e e n e r g y f u n df e l l f r o m t h e $ 5 0 0 m i l l i o n p e r a n n u m a n -nounced in 1981 to $150 mi l l ion in 1982 .43 A l lo f t h e s e f a c t o r s s u g g e s t t h a t u n l e s s E g y p t i soffered a nuclear reactor a t h ighly subsidizedrates , i t s current nuclear plans are unl ikely toc o m e t o f r u i t i o n .

The h is tory of I ran’s nuclear program i l lus-t ra tes tha t even in o i l - r ich developing nat ions ,pol i t ica l d i f f icul t ies may ar ise f rom excess ivec o s t s a c c o m p a n y i n g a r a p i d l y d e v e l o p i n g n u -c lear program. In 1975, the Canadian consul t -i n g f i r m M o n e n c o ( M o n t r e a l E n g i n e e r i n g C o .Ltd. ) es t imated nuclear const ruct ion costs inI r a n a t $ 6 9 0 p e r k i l o w a t t i n s t a l l e d c a p a c i t y .At the t ime, th is es t imate made nuclear powera p p e a r v e r y a t t r a c t i v e ; c o s t e s t i m a t e s c o m -p a r e d f a v o r a b l y w i t h a n a v e r a g e $ 7 0 0 t o

$ 1 , 0 0 0 p e r k i l o w a t t f o r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s .H o w e v e r , t h e i n s t a l l e d c o s t s a p p r o a c h e d$ 3 , 0 0 0 p e r k i l o w a t t , a s c o n s t r u c t i o n n e a r e d

“In 1982, Egypt’s financial situation improved somewhat asearnings from the Suez Canal and remittances increased. Seehfiddle East EcorIonic Digest, E~rpt Special Report, JUIJ 1983,p. 9. See also “Egypt’s Economy on the Right Track’?” MiddleF;ast Economic Digest, Dec. 2, 1983, p. 11.

““In Brief,” Middle East Econom”c Digest, vol. 26, No. 45,1982. By early 1984, it was estimated that a total of $700 mil-lion to $900 million had been set aside under the fund.

complet ion before terminat ion of const ruct ionf o l l o w i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n . ”

T h e c o s t d i s c r e p a n c i e s w e r e d u e l a r g e l y t oi n f l a t i o n , c o s t o v e r r u n s , l a r g e i n f r a s t r u c t u r eexpendi tures for associa ted road and por t con-s t r u c t i o n , t h e s y s t e m o f c o m m i s s i o n s p a i d t or o y a l f a m i l y m e m b e r s , a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ sm i s m a n a g e m e n t o f t h e b i d d i n g p r o c e s s . C r i -t ics charged that I ran’s has ty dr ive to developn u c l e a r p o w e r m e t w i t h s u c h d i f f i c u l t i e s b e -c a u s e , a m o n g o t h e r f a c t o r s , d e c i s i o n m a k e r sl a c k e d s u f f i c i e n t t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e .

Determinants of Electricity Demand

In addi t ion to cos ts and f inancing te rms, ex-pecta t ions about fu ture demand for e lect r ic i tya r e k e y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r p l a n n e r s i n d e v e l -o p i n g n a t i o n s . T h e d e m a n d f o r e n e r g y , a n dspecif ica l ly for e lec t r ic i ty , i s determined by av a r i e t y o f f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g p o p u l a t i o ngrowth , economic growth , energy in tens i ty ofe c o n o m i c g r o w t h , e n e r g y p r i c e s , a n d t e c h n o -l o g i c a l c h a n g e .

Popula t ion growth i s a major fac tor af fec t -i n g e n e r g y d e m a n d i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s .B a s e d o n c u r r e n t t r e n d s , p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t hin a l l the Middle Eastern countr ies wi l l remainh i g h , a t l e a s t u n t i l t h e e n d o f t h e c e n t u r y .W h i l e p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h m a y e v e n t u a l l y d e -c l i n e u n d e r t h e i m p a c t o f u r b a n i z a t i o n , i n -creases in educat ion, income levels and s tand-a r d s o f l i v i n g w i l l t e n d t o l o w e r m o r t a l i t yrates. Population growth in all of these nationsis expected to average well above 2 percent an-nual ly unt i l the turn of the century . The Per-s ian Gulf Sta tes , as a group, are projected toexperience the world’s highest levels of popula-t i o n g r o w t h , a v e r a g i n g 2 . 6 p e r c e n t a n n u a l l y ,a c c o r d i n g t o W o r l d B a n k e s t i m a t e s .4 s

Expans ion of Middle Eas tern economies de-p e n d s s t r o n g l y o n t h e r a t e o f o i l i n c o m e . A sc h a p t e r 1 4 e x p l a i n s , i t i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t

—- —“’’Nuclear Still Wrong for Iran, But Events May Dictate

Otherwise, Analyst Says, “ NUCleOniCS Week, Oct. 16, 1980, p. 6.46 World Bank, World Development Report 1983, p. 185. Pop-

ulation growth for Saudi Arabia for the period 1960-2000 is projected at 3.4 percent annually, 2.6 percent for Kuwait, and 2.0percent for the UAE.


to p r e d i c t e c o n o m i c g r o w t h r a t e s f o r v a r i o u sMiddle Eastern nations. However, if the cur-rent trend in slack oil prices continues, eco-nomic growth rates could fall far below thoseachieved by Middle Eastern nations duringthe 1973-74 and 1979-80 periods of dramaticexpansion. Since many countries already havea large amount of electrical generating capac-ity in place or under construction, if economicgrowth proceeds at rates well below those ofthe 1970’s, demand for additional generatingcapacity will be dampened. Therefore, as coun-tries complete their conventional powerplantsnow under construction, there could even beovercapacity by the mid-1980’s if Middle East-ern economies grow at a slower rate than an-ticipated in the early 1980’s.

The structure of economic growth also hasan important bearing on energy demand. De-velopment strategies favoring industrializa-tion and urbanization are more energy-inten-sive than strategies stressing agriculture andservice sector development. Generally speak-ing, during the early stages of industrializa-tion, increasing rates of growth in energy con-sumption occur. Those Middle Eastern nationswhere diversified heavy industrialization isunder way will thus experience a more rapidlyrising demand for electricity.

Demand for energy is also affected by prices.Governments in the Middle East tend to setoil-based fuel prices lower than the opportu-nity cost to the economy. In Egypt, for exam-ple, the price of kerosene used in home heatingand cooking was 15 percent of the world mar-ket price in 1980.46 Subsidized energy prices,which are politically popular but reduce incen-tives to conserve oil and to diversify to otherenergy sources, have probably contributed toacceleration of growth rates of energy con-sumption. During the period 1974-76, theserates averaged over 20 percent in Saudi Ara-bia, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt. Althoughsome fuel efficiency improvements will takeplace through import of energy-efficient goodsfrom nations where energy costs are high, sig-

——46World Bank figures, cited by R. Mabro, “Factors Affect-

ing Future Energy Demand in Arab Countries, Second ArabEnergy Conference, March 1982, Qatar.

nificant energy savings are unlikely to occurin the presence of continued subsidization ofenergy prices.

All of these factors help influence the pat-tern of growth in demand for energy. Histori-cally, the pattern has been that electricity con-sumption has risen more rapidly than energyconsumption. Fifty years ago, for example,electricity represented only 4 percent of totalprimary energy consumption worldwide;today the figure is 27 percent. The proportionof commercial primary energy transformedinto electricity is projected to rise in develop-ing countries from 25 percent in 1980 to 31percent in 1990.47

Annual growth rates of electricity consump-tion in the Middle Eastern countries duringthe past decade have been dramatic, in manycountries approaching 15 percent. At this rate,consumption doubles in less than 5 years. Inthe late 1970’s, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, and Sau-di Arabia all ranked among the 20 largest con-sumers of commercial energy among develop-ing countries. 48 Table 85 presents a summaryof data relating to electricity demand in theregion in the year 1980. Growth in electricitydemand was, during the last decade, strikinglyhigh in Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia andthe UAE. During 1980, Egypt, Iran, and Sau-di Arabia were the countries with the highestlevels of electricity generation.

Interconnected Electricity Grids

There is a wide diversity in projections ofelectricity consumption for the next decade.Planners must consider regional and sectoraldemand in their analysis of the relative costsof various electricity-generating systems. Na-tional projections of electricity demand and in-stalled, connected, electrical grid, however,provide a general context for evaluating therationale for nuclear power in specificcountries.

. —47World Bank, Energy in Developing Countries (Washington,

D. C.: World Bank, 1980), p, 63.48Joy Dunkerley, William Ramsay, Lincoln Gordon, and Eliz-

abeth Cecelski, Energy Strategies for Developing Nations(Was)lington, D. C.: Resources for the Future, 1981), p. 41.

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers “ 365

Table 85.— Electrical Demand in the Middle East and North Africa

Growth in demandfor electricity 1980 Installed 1980 Installed 1980 electricity

Country 1971-80 (percent) capacity (GWe) connected grid generated (GWh)a

Algeria . 112 18 1,4 6,400E g y p t 8.7 4.5 4,5 18,500I r a n 7,5 5 3 5 3 17,000Iraq 134 12 12 8,000J o r d a n 166 0.4 0 4 1,100Kuwait 134 2 8 2 6 9,300Lebanon 27 0 7 0.7 1,800Libya 17,0 12 0.9 3,100Morocco 8 0 12 10 4,800Oman 220 0 4 0 4 800Q a t a r 165 0.5 0.5 1,500Saudi Arabiab 4 0 0 6 2 3 0 17,000S y r i a 125 11 0.9 3,400T u n i s i a 107 0 9 0 8 2,800UAE . . . . . . . . 360 11 11 4,500A R Y e m e nC 180 002 002 70PDR Yemen 0 0 007 0,07 200aGWh gigawatt-hours.b1975-80C1971-77NOTE: There ia a wide disparity in data provided by the United Nations. the Central Intelligence Agency, and other sources

concerning current electricity production as well as future g r o w t h p r o j e c t i o n s . T h i s c o m p l i a t i o n i s b a s e d o n U . N . d a t a

which are gathered from government sources, but uses other e s t i m a t e s a s w e l l .

SOURCE: United Nations. Statistical Yearbooks 1970-79: Central Intelligence Agency, National Basic Intelligence Factbook.

1974-82 additional materials used for each country estimate.

Power workmen string Iine on the Saudi ConsolidatedElectric Company's 230 kw power distribution network

A rule of thumb is that no single generat-ing plant should constitute more than 10 per-cent of the system’s total installed intercon-nected grid. This criterion is based onconsiderations of system reliability, reserve ca-pacity, and economics. For example, if a powerstation in an electrical grid fails, reserve ca-pacity must be brought online or portions of

the load must be shed if the operating frequen-cy of the system is not to be reduced by theadded load of the remaining generators. Toprevent this, some fraction of the installedelectrical capacity is usually kept spinning insynchronization with the grid (’‘spinning re-serve’ ‘), ready to take over in seconds untilother components of the reserve capacity suchas quick-start turbines can be brought online.Requirements for spinning reserve are smallerif load can be shed. Although load sheddingis not a normal practice in industrialized coun-tries, many developing countries shed loadduring peak hours. The smaller the size of thelargest plant, the less reserve margin is neededto achieve a given system reliability.

Developing nations such as India, South Ko-rea, Argentina, and Brazil all have had nuclearpowerplants constituting less than 10 percent(and as low as 6 percent) of their grids at va-rious times. On the other hand, in 1978 whenTaiwan’s Chin-shan 600-MWe reactor wentcritical, it represented 10 percent of a basicallyintegrated national grid estimated at 6.5 GWe,and Pakistan’s 125-MWe KANUPP reactorwas designed with a capacity to make up 17


percent of Karachi’s interconnected grid, al-though it has apparently rarely been operatedat that level.

The 10 percent rule of thumb has been morecommon for industrialized countries than fordeveloping countries, but it does help to inden-tify situations where addition of a nuclear reac-tor might not be clearly warrented. In prac-tice, the upper limit may be higher or lower,depending on analysis of the nature of thegrid, its load, and acceptable outages and loadshedding. The rule of thumb points out caseswhere the installation of a power reactor mightbe questionable in terms of energy and eco-nomic considerations.

Applying the 10 percent rule to projectionsfor electricity grids in various Middle Easternnations indicates that most of them would notbe in a position to install a 900-MWe reactorin this decade. Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Leb-anon, Oman, Qatar, and North and SouthYemen would not be in a position to do so un-til after the year 2000. Algeria, Iraq, Libya,Syria, and the UAE (only under high-growthassumptions) would have the installed grid toaccept a 900-MWe reactor by the year 2000,but not as early as 1990. As table 86 indicates,only Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia

would be able to accommodate a 900-MWe

reactor at 10 percent of grid size by the year1990. These projections are based on assump-tions that interconnected grids will be ex-panded rapidly. If Middle Eastern countriesmove to link their electricity grids, an optionwhich has been discussed, power reactorsmight be accommodated earlier without violat-ing the 10 percent rule.49

Small Reactors

The feasibility of nuclear power reactorscould change substantially if small nuclearreactors (less than 600 MWe) were as readilyavailable as large reactors on world markets.While a few older, small reactors are in opera-tion, the Soviet 440-MWe reactor is the onlysmall reactor currently available on the inter-national market. According to U.S. industry,a major reason why such small reactors arenot available is that there are marked differ-ences in economies of scale for smaller units.

49The Gulf ‘Cooperation Council (GCC) nations are consider-ing the feasibility of linking national grids in a regional powergrid, but there is some doubt that these countries will be will-ing to contribute the massive capital costs that would be nec-essary. See “The Pros and Cons of Regional Power Grid, ” Mid-dle East Economic Digest, vol. 27, No, 43, Oct. 28, 1983, p. 19.Interconnection of grids was discussed at the 2nd Arab EnergyConference, Mar. 6-11, 1982, held in Doha, Qatar.

Table 86.— Potential for Nuclear Reactor Installation, 1990, 2000

1980 Size ofActual grid hypothetical

capacity in GWe reactor

Algeria ‘- (1.4) 440 MWe900 MWe

Egypt . . . (4.5) 440900

Iran ., (53) 440900

Iraq . . . . (1.2) 440900

Kuwait ., . . . . (2.6) 440900

Saudi Arab ia (3.0) 440900

x reactor could be installed and not exceed 10 percent of projected grid

Demand assumptions

1 9 9 0 2000

Low High Low High—x

x xx x x x

x x xx x x xx x x x

x xx

x x x xx x x

x x x xx x x x

NOTES Other countries able to install a 900-MWe reactor by 2000 under 10 percent assumptions Libya, Syria, UAE underhigh electricity growth assumptionsOther countries unable to Install a 900-MWe reactor until after 2000 under the same assumptions Morocco TunisiaJordan Lebanon Oman Qatar North and South Yemen

SOURCES Computed from table 91 World Bank Energy in the Development Countries (World Bank Paper August 1980) background Information prepared for the paper and energy analyses, Joseph Egan. Small Power Reactors in Less De-veloping Countries: Histroical Analysis and Preliminary Market Survey (Westmont, Ill,: ETA Engineering Inc., 1981)additional sources for individual countries (For example the high demand estimate for Egypt is based on U SDepartment of Energy, and the low demand estimate Is based on Shuli, as indicated in table 93

Ch. 9–Nuclear Technology Transfers ● 367

For reactors larger than 600-MWe, a 0.7scaling law is normally applied to direct con-struction costs. Therefore, a 1,200-MWe reac-tor would cost only about 60 percent more tobuild than would a 600-MWe reactor. Thestandard unit built by major reactor vendorsincreased to the 900- 1,200-MWe range typicaltoday; these larger reactors are more appro-priate for industrialized nations where gridsize is not a major constraint. A second fac-tor is research and development (R&D) costsof several hundred million dollars, which firmsmust take into account when considering com-mercial development of small reactors. Indus-try experts believe that only if a firm couldanticipate 5 to 10 orders for such reactorswould it be reasonable to proceed with the nec-essary R&D.

Despite these factors, which some believeweigh against small reactors, some factors arein their favor. Smaller units may require lessconstruction time, and therefore reduce pros-pects of cost overruns. It is not clear whethersmall reactors are more reliable than largereactors.”) While some older, smaller reactors,such as the 220-MWe Rapp 1 heavy-waterreactor in India, have poor reliability records,others such as the 325-MWe Atucha 1 heavy-water reactor, built by the German firm Kraft-werk Union in Argentina, have been world-wide leaders in uninterrupted operation. TheArgentine reactor has had a capacity factorof 90 percent since it began operation in 1974.Small reactors have several potential features,such as compatibility with shop fabricationand barge transportation, that might tend tocompensate for higher direct constructioncosts per kilowatt installed. To summarize,scale issues are complex. In the face of uncer-tain demand and limited resources, develop-ing countries may see small reactors as attrac-tive because of the possible reduced riskinvolved in building several short lead-timeplants rather than one large unit.

‘W. Komormff, Power Plant Cost Escalation (New York: Kom-onoff ~; ner~’ Associates, 1981 ). See also, h’uc]ear Power in anAge of Uncertaint~’ Iif’ashington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Officeof Technology Assessment, OTA-E-2 16, 1984), pp. 106-107.

Availability of small reactors would enhancethe feasibility of nuclear power for developingnations with comparatively small grids. Forexample, if demand for electricity grows at ahigh rate, Iraq could be in a position by 1990to install a 440-M We reactor that would meetthe 10 percent rule of thumb. Similarly, Egyptwould be able to meet this criterion even underlow electricity demand growth assumptions by1990. Flexibility would be increased further iflarge reactors could be derated (operated atlower capacities) during initial stages of oper-ation and still be operated efficiently.

Two factors could significantly change theprospects for small-reactor sales. The SovietUnion has exported a few 440-MWe powerreactors. If the Soviet-designed VVER 440-MWe reactor can be manufactured and soldat attractive prices, Middle Eastern nationsmay be interested in importing it. In 1980,there were five such reactors operating in theSoviet Union, and plans exist for installing afew additional reactors. However, since Sovietconstruction facilities are pressed to meet con-struction deadlines for larger reactors now atthe center of Soviet nuclear plans, construc-tion of the smaller reactors has been shiftedto the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.

VVER 440 reactors, reported to be reason-ably reliable and economical, will be installedin East European nations. The question iswhether the Czech works will have the capac-ity for exports, and whether small reactorsproduced there will gain a reputation for reli-ability .51 In addition, India has built a 235-MWe heavy-water reactor for domestic use,but it is not attractive for export.

The second possibility is that some of theWestern firms with design concepts for smallpower reactors would decide on a commercial-ization strategy. A handful of companies inWestern nations have such design concepts,and if such small reactor designs embodyinginherent rather than engineered safety werecommercialized, developing countries more. .

“See Technology and So+’iet Ener~’ A va”labilit>r (J$’ashing-ton, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,OTA-1f3C-153, 1979), pp. 116, 130, 295.


concerned with safety in the post-Three MileIsland era might find them attractive. Kraft-werk Union of Germany, for example, has adesign for a 400-MWe boiling water reactorthat features uncomplicated safety technolo-gy. In all cases, however, these designs havenot advanced beyond the drawing board, anda major R&D effort would be required in thecountry of origin to produce an attractive ex-port product.52 Nevertheless, if small reactorscould be marketed near the turn of the cen-tury, that could change the prospects for nu-clear power in some Middle Eastern countries.

Other Incentives for CommercialNuclear Power

Nuclear power plants have two other civil-ian applications—to supply process heat fordesalination of sea water and in stimulatingheavy oil production–-which Middle Easternnations may wish to develop in addition togenerating electricity. Nuclear desalination iscurrently economically feasible only in con-junction with nuclear generation of electricity.While the UAE, Qatar, and Oman convention-ally desalt large amounts of water, their elec-tricity grids are too small and poorly inte-grated for introduction of nuclear desalinationplants at the present time. In contrast, nucleardesalination appears more feasible for SaudiArabia and Kuwait. The only commerciallyavailable option for nuclear desalination in-volves the use of light-water reactors, usingbackpressure steam or extracted steam. Otherspecially designed reactors, such as the FrenchThermos, the Swedish Secure, or Soviet de-signs, are not currently commerciallyavailable.

Economic tests of the feasibility of nucleardesalination depend on capital and fuel costsof the nuclear plants versus conventionalplants, as well as on water demand and elec-tricity requirements. As a general rule, if nu-clear electricity is economically feasible, thenthe cogeneration of low-temperature steam53

. .“See .Joseph R. J3gan, Smafl Power Reactors in Less De\’el-

oped Countries: Historical And-vsis and Preliminary .blarketSurvey (Westmont, 111,: E;TA Engineering, Inc., 1981),

“‘F;xcess steam used in the production of electricity that canbe used for other purposes.

Al-Khobar Desalination Plant

(used in desalination) makes the system moreattractive. Small reactors have not beenviewed as particularly attractive for desalina-tion. Kuwait, for example, drafted specifica-tions in 1977 for a 40 MWt water desalinationand research reactor, but owing to the smallscale of the reactor and to its multipurpose us-age, the project was canceled when it wasdetermined that the costs per kilowatt wouldhave been extremely high. ”

Use of heat produced in nuclear powerplantsfor stimulating heavy oil55 production does notappear to be a major option for Middle East-ern nations. Heavy oils sufficiently viscous toprofit from enhanced steam recovery havebeen discovered in Kuwait and Libya, but theyare of only marginal interest for these nations,given the large quantity of proved reserves ofconventional oil. Nor would standard reactordesigns produce steam of appropriate pressureand temperature to drive the large MiddleEastern oil reservoirs.

Uranium Resources

Presence of uranium deposits does not pro-vide sufficient economic justification for a nu-clear program. The mining and refining are ex-pensive and enrichment is a complex and

54 Power produced in this reactor would ha~’e cost ,$1 ~ ~()()(~ Per

kWr. See Egan, op. cit., p. 5-1.“l~eavy oil is a term used to apply generally to an~r crude

oil of less than 20 percent API (or with a spe{ific gravity of(),934 ]r more).


technically demanding operation; thus, mostdeveloping nations with commercial nuclearprograms contract for supplies of enricheduranium.

Algeria and Morocco illustrate this point.Algeria has the richest reserves of uranium ofany Middle Eastern nation. These reserveshave been estimated at 26,000 tonnes at a re-covery price of $80/kg.56 Algeria has been ex-ploring for uranium since 1969; the state min-ing company, Sonorem, is building a uraniummine in Algeria that is expected to open in1985 and produce 1,000 tonnes annually. Al-geria could also produce uranium as a byprod-uct of phosphate mining, although no planshave been announced to do so. But while Al-geria has emphasized its uranium reserves asan asset in nuclear planning, the nation hasno commercial or research reactor.

Morocco also has considerable uranium de-posits, and uranium will be extracted in con-junction with fertilizer production. One plantis being modified for uranium production.When it begins operation in 1985, Morocco willbe in a position to export 200 tonnes of urani-um annually. Like Algeria, Morocco is alsoconsidering nuclear development, but the pres-ence of uranium deposits has apparently notbeen a major factor- in this regard.

Total world production of uranium is wellin advance of demand, and this situation is ex-pected to continue into the future.57Therefore,t h e a t t r a c t i o n o f u r a n i u m p r o d u c t i o n i s n o tg r e a t f o r d e v e l o p i n g n a t i o n s n o t a l r e a d y e x -p o r t i n g . I n d e e d , s i n c e a l l l i g h t - w a t e r r e a c t o r srequi re enr iched uranium for fue l , the purchaseof enr ichment serv ices f rom abroad would s t i l lb e a r e q u i r e m e n t , e v e n f o r n a t i o n s p r o d u c i n gu r a n i u m . 58 H o w e v e r , u r a n i u m p r o d u c t i o n b ynat ions such as Alger ia and Niger , which aren o t p a r t i e s t o t h e N P T , r a i s e s p r o l i f e r a t i o nconcerns , s ince they are not covered by safe-

““OF;(’1) ~’-uclear pjn[jr~qr ~\genc}. a n d I.AF; A , {~ranium: lie-s~}ur[y~q, l~rwiuctjon, :In{i [kmand ( [’aris: ( )1+:(’ 1 ) , 1 9X2).

‘ S{w 1 )cpartment f~f l’~nfjr~. tl”f)rfd [ franium ,Supp)!’ and 1)(1-rnancl: lrn~ac”t on }“’wier:d I’fjljcic.+ ( Wrash ingtf~n, 1 ) . ( (1 s(jf)~’ernment l’rinting offlc~, 10Hf\), p , ~\6.

‘“’l’he (’A ‘N’ 1)[) reactor {Jpertites {In natural uranium. eliminat-ing the need for enrichment.

guards and could theoretically export to na-tions having clandestine weapons programs.

Alternative Energy Sources

-Judgments about nuclear power focus moreon the alternative means of meeting electricityrequirements than on the presence of uraniumor the other commercial applications of nuclearpower mentioned above. (The use of nucleartechnologies in civilian research programs im-portant for building a science and technologyinfrastructure will be discussed later in thecontext of technical manpower considera-tions.) In the Middle East the obvious alter-natives to nuclear power are oil and gas. Costcomparisons between oil and nuclear energyare sensitive to the assumed price of oil, capi-tal costs of oil and nuclear plants, costs of fi-nancing, and load factors. Figure 15 illustratesthe cost of nuclear power as a function of plantsize and load factor.

Figure 15.— Kilowatthour Cost as a Function ofPlant Capacity and Load Factor

) I I s

factor

I

200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200

Capacity, MW(e)

Note Th(s figure IS based on the following assumptions 30 year des~gn [deprec[atlon I I I fe for both 01 I and nuc leaf plants starttng from the date ot plantstart up w It h a cost of f Inane Ing of 5 percent per year (In conslant dol IarsiI nstal led capital cost for 011 plants of $1 000/k W(e) and for nuclear $2 x104 S ‘ , /kW(e) where S !s plant capacity in megawatts(e), fuel cost fornuclear of $0 )01 kWh opatlons and rna!nta[nence costs of $75{ kW(capacit yt yr and $40 for nuclear and oll respectively This figure should be regardpd as IIlustratlve only consldert~q fhe very grea~ uncertainties thatmust attach to some of these parameters part ic u Iarlv n sta I led capital costs


The oil-nuclear indifference curve (in dashes)illustrates the relationship between load fac-tor and break-even size for oil versus nuclearplants at two different assumed oil prices.Under the assumptions used, there will beanadvantage for nuclear power for conditions tothe right and below the oil-nuclear indifferencecurves. While this figure is merely illustrative,it suggests that if oil is priced at $25 per bar-rel, oil and nuclear-generated power will beabout equally costly if nuclear powerplants of630-MWe are used at a load factor of 45 per-cent. As the price of oil declines, the advan-tages of nuclear power are reduced, but suchpower is still attractive under reasonable loadfactors. However, if the oil price drops signif-icantly, as it did in 1983, it will be more diffi-cult to raise the capital to build nuclear plants,and the incentives for developing nuclear pow-er will be further reduced.

Comparing gas and nuclear power is a morecomplex issue because up until 1979 most gasin the Middle East was flared. This occurredbecause the costs of collecting and transport-ing gas in the Middle East were extremelyhigh in comparison to its market value in theMiddle East. After the oil price increases, how-ever, gas became more attractive in industrialoperations such as petrochemical and fertilizerplants. Gas-fired generating capacity is beingbuilt while nuclear is not, and in many situa-tions it will have an edge over nuclear power.

In addition to cost advantages, gas-firedplants can be installed more quickly, requirelower investment, are available in small sizes,demand fewer highly skilled operating person-nel, and raise fewer waste disposal and safetyconcerns. Some experts believe that associatedgas may be more profitably used in industrialapplications than in electricity generation,since the amount of gas available depends onthe level of oil production.59 The attraction ofgas for electricity production is strongest incountries such as Saudi Arabia that haveflared gas. There are, however, other potential

Photo credit Saudi Arabian United States Joint Commissionon Economic Cooperation

Solar collector panels of the SOLERAS project,focusing on solar energy research and development

uses for gas: in petrochemical production, and(for Algeria) exports.

In addition, there is an extensive list of re-newable energy resources—including solar en-ergy–-for Middle Eastern policymakers to con-sider. For many developing nations, includingthose in the Middle East, there is insufficientunderstanding of the potential role that thesesources of energy might play. In the MiddleEast, some countries such as Iran and Iraqmay be able to develop hydroelectric powermore extensively.60 Likewise, some believeIran, Algeria, and Egypt could use biomassas an energy source.61 Direct use of solar en-ergy in areas such as the Sahel offers poten-tial for crop drying and other agricultural uses.

Other technologies, such as solar photoval-taic systems, are under development, but arecomparatively costly. The United States andSaudi Arabia jointly fund a $100 million solarenergy research program through the U. S.-Saudi Joint Commission; the program includesestablishment of a 350-kW power station ina “solar village.” In Egypt, AID has spon-sored research on solar energy for rural devel-opment. However, solar energy for rural elec-trification is a longer term option.

59See T. Stauffer, “Oil Exporting Countries Need NuclearPower,” paper delivered at the Uranium Institute, London, Sep-tember 1982.

—— ————6ODunkerley, et al., op. cit., pp. 160-161.61 Ibid., p. 178.

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers c 371. — ——....—.

Nevertheless, technical assistance programsthat help clarify all energy options make animportant contribution.

The Economic Rationale forNuclear Power in Egypt

Of all the nations in the Middle East, Egyptcurrently has the most extensive official plansfor commercial nuclear power development.Its electricity grid is one of the largest in theMiddle East, and electricity demand grew rap-idly during the 1970’s. By 1980, the installedgrid capacity reached 4.5 GWe. The EgyptianGovernment has estimated that demand forelectricity will grow at an annual rate of 9.9percent from 1975 to 2000–to 12 GWe by1990 and 26 GWe 2000.” Egypt’s leaders be-lieve that there is a strong economic rationalefor nuclear power, based on these projections.

Egyptian officials have plans to develop asystem for monitoring electricity flowsthroughout the connected grid at the NationalEnergy Center. When the center is complete,it will have the capacity to accommodateplanned nuclear plants, as well as thermal andhydroelectric facilities.

Alternative energy sources may be insuffi-cient to meet projected rise in demand. Muchof Egypt’s hydroelectric energy potential isalready exploited by the Aswan High Dam(2,100 MWe) and the Aswan Low Dam (345MWe). The only options for expansion of hy-droelectricity include installing additional tur-bines at the Aswan Dam and constructingthree low dams and four barrages (for a totalof about 500 MWe).63 In addition, pumpedstorage with a potential of 4,300 MWe capac-ity could be added at seven locations along theNile. 64 Finally, the Qattara Depression Project,

“Cited ;n LJ. S. I)epartment of F:nergy, Joint E~qpt-U.S. Re-port. Lo], 1, op. cit., p. 42. The Pjgyptian Nlinistry of I+; lectri-city and E: nergy cites a total capacit~’ of 4,7 (iW’e for 1980, in.4nnual Repor( of h;lectric Statistics, 19H0, p, 8. For 1981-82,a figure of 5.0 (iifre total electricity;’ generating capacity is citedin Arab Republic of E;gypt, f~lectrlcit}’ and I+;ner~r in the .4rabRepublic of Egypt, 1983, p. 20,

“The three low dams could be located at I!sna, Nag Ilam-madi, and Assiut. The four additional barrages could be locatedat Silsila, Qift, Sohag, and Deirot.

“one pump storage facilit~’ was under construction at PortSuez. K, l;. A. F: ffat, H, Sirry, M, F. 111-Foul~, E, fi; l-Sharkaw~,and A. F, fi~l-Saiedi, Projected Role of ,\’uclear i)o~’er in l’l~”ptand Problems Encounter-ed in [implementing the First ,Y’uclt’arI’lant (~’ienna: 1 nternational Atomic h~ner~’ Agenc3’, 19’7’71.

which would involve excavating a canal andgenerating electricity from the flow of waterfrom the Mediterranean into the depression,could produce 670 MWe by the year 2000. 65

Solar energy and other alternative energysources can contribute to Egypt energy sup-ply in the years ahead. U.S. AID funding sup-ports a project sponsored by the NationalScience Foundation on solar energy in the de-velopment of an Egyptian village, mentionedabove. Nevertheless, while alternative energysources appear promising for small-scale ru-ral applications, costly large-scale solar pro-grams involving technology now under devel-opment would be required to contributesignificantly to electricity requirements.

Egypt has limited hydrocarbon reserves. Oilexports have been used for export earnings.Production increased from 450,000 barrels in1977 to 775,000 in 1983. Oil will probably notbe used to provide a large amount of new elec-tricity production because it is the mainstayof Egyptian export earnings. Accounting for37 percent of export revenues in 1978 and 65percent in 1980, it made up a remarkable 70percent in 1981. In addition, domestic con-sumption of oil at highly subsidized prices isincreasing at about 12 to 15 percent annually.The nation’s small coal reserves, estimated at50 million tonnes, are to be used to replace

“This project is being evaluated by the Swedish firm Swecoand is estimated to cost $1.2 billion, or approxin~atelJ’ theamount Egypt plans to spend on its oil and natural gas pr(J-gram from 1982 to 1987.


coke in the Helwan Iron and Steel Works andto fuel a 1,200-MWe power station planned inthe Sinai. Coal mines at Maghara in the Sinaiare also being developed to fuel a 1,200-MWepowerplant at El Arish.

Egypt has 203 billion cubic meters of gasreserves, which are expected to increase sub-stantially in the next 10 years. A substantialamount of gas could be utilized for electricitygeneration if the 88 percent of associated gaswhich is currently being flared were piped toand used in thermal power plants. However,Egypt’s ability to use this natural gas is se-verely constrained by a lack of facilities to col-lect and transport the gas. If Egypt’s total gasproduction in 1980 were dedicated to the gen-eration of electricity, about 20 percent of elec-tricity demand for that year could be met. TheEgyptians intend to use this gas for other in-dustrial purposes, especially steel production.Egypt situation thus contrasts sharply withthat of other Middle Eastern countries wheregas production is sufficient to meet all imme-

Table 87.— Range of Projected—

Author 1980. —.Shulli (1)

diate and even near-term projected electricalgeneration needs. Gas, nevertheless, repre-sents an important energy source, and addi-tional gas-fired plants are planned for upperEgypt.

Even if all of the nonnuclear sources are uti-lized, if the Egyptian Government projectedgrowth rates for electricity hold, nuclear powermay be used to provide a substantial fractionof generating capacity. A joint U.S.-Egyptianstudy completed in 1979 concluded that 40percent of Egyptian electricity could be gen-erated by nuclear reactors by 2000.66 Underhigh electricity growth rate “assumptions,Egypt could accommodate a 900-MWe reac-tor by 1990. Under low-growth assumptions,which appear more realistic, such a reactorcould be installed and not make up more than10 percent of the grid by 1995. Table 87 pre-sents a summary of the range of projections

———— — —66U.S. Department of Energy, JoirIt EgY@-U. S. RePort, oP.cit.

Electricity Demand in Egypt

1985 - 1990 1995 2000

Capacity (GWe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.460 — 8.815 — 15,480Production (GWh) ... . . . . . . . . . . 15,518 23,338 34,424 47,847 61,744

Egan (2)Capacity (GWe) . . . . . . . . . . . 4.595 7.36 10.103 13,392 16,769

World Bank (3)Capacity (GWe) . . ... . . . . . . . . . 3,915 6.734 9.708 13.168 (17,870)aProduction (GWh) ., . . . . ... . . 18,430 28,350 39,770 55,780 (78,234)a

U.S. DOE (4)Capacity (GWe) . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . – 6.954 — — 22.036Production (GWh) ., . . . . . . ... . . – 27,520 — — 88,000—. . —

aCalculated using the same growth rate as the Previous period

NOTE Assumptions of Electricity Growth—Shulli: 1 By 2000 the gross domestic product (GDP) will be divided with 14 percent from agriculture, 30 percent industry, 2 percent building, 12 percent transportation, 16 percent commerce and26 percent services (In 1977 it was 29 percent agriculture, 25 percent Industry, 4 percent building, 7 percent transpor-tation 13 percent commerce and 20 percent services), 2 Population growth will be 24 percent from 1980 to 1985 and23 percent from 1986 to 2000, 3 GDP growth wiII be 82 percent from 1981 to 1985, 7 percent from 1986 to 1990.6percent from 1991 to 1999, and 47 percent from 1996 to 2000, 4 Electrical consumption by 2000 wiII be divided, withindustry requiring 56 percent, housing 21 percent; transportation, 8 percent agricuIture 8 percent, and other, 6 percent (1975 Industry, 49 percent, household, 20 percent transportation, 2 percent, agricuIture, 8 percent, and other 21percent) 5. Natural gas will provide 52 percent of electrical production by 2000, 6 Nuclear power wilt provide 2500MWe by 2000Egan: Electricity growth assumptions 17 percent 1979-80; 9.2 percent, 1981-85.72 percent, 1986-9058 percent. 1991-95,46 percent, 1996-2000,World Bank: Electrical growth assumptions 11.4 percent 1980-85 75 percent 1985-90 63 percent 199195U.S. DOE: 1 Electricity consumption by the year 2000 will be 54 percent industry 6 percent agriculture 7 percent transpor-tation, 7 percent public utilities, 22 percent residential 4 percent other, 2 Electrical growth assumptions 1975-85127percent, 1986.20008 percent

SOURCES 1) Abdul Rahman Shunt A , “Energy Consumption Forecast for EJypt and Sudan !{1 the Year 2000 a paper presentedat the Second Arab Energy Conference, Qatar, Mar 6, 1982, 2) Joseph R Egan, Smal( Reactors (n Less DevelopingCountnes Hlstor/ca/ Arra/ysfs and Pre//rn~r?ary Market Survey (VVestmont Ill ETA Englneertng Inc , 1981) 3) WorldBank, Erergy In fhe Deve/op/ng Cour?tr/es (World Bank Paper August 1980), background {n formation prepared forthe paper and energy analyses 4) U S Department of Energy, ./o/nf Egypf/Un/fed States Report on Egypt/Unf(edSfafes Cooperaf~ve Energy Assessment 5 VO lS (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Off Ice, 1979)

Ch. 9—Nuclear Technology Transfers ● 373—

of Egyptian electricity demand. Even if Egyp-tian electricity demand rises at a low rate, itappears that the rationale for nuclear powermay remain comparatively strong in Egypt.Lower oil prices, however, enhance the attrac-tiveness of oil and reduce the ability of theEgyptian Government to finance theseprojects.

In the final analysis, the ability of Egypt todevelop nuclear power depends on its abilityto obtain subsidized financing. Indeed, it isprecisely the reluctance of the U.S. Export-Import Bank and financing agencies in otherWestern supplier nations that has repeatedlydelayed the project. As a result, U.S. and Jap-anese firms teamed up in 1983 to bid jointly.Practically speaking, the politics of exportfinancing 67 may influence Egypt nuclear pro-gram more than the various energy-economicconsiderations mentioned above.

Iran’s PrerevolutionaryNuclear Program

Iran’s experience with nuclear power devel-opment prior to its revolution illustrates thesusceptibility of a large nuclear program to be-ing criticized as unsound for economic, politi-cal, and infrastructure reasons.68 While the am-bitious nuclear program initiated under theShah was ended by the new revolutionary gov-ernment, criticism of the program had alreadybegun. Iran’s nuclear program was viewed bycritics as grandiose and wasteful, indicatingthat nuclear power development is a criticalchoice even for oil-rich developing countries.

Iran’s 1974 program called for rapid con-struction of nuclear plants so that 23 reactorswould generate 40 percent of the nation’s elec-tricity by 2000. The Atomic Energy Organiza-tion of Iran saw its budget grow from $30 mil-lion in 1975 to $1 billion in 1976. By the endof the 1970 ‘s, the Shah’s nuclear program—.

‘“ital~r-reportedl?’ promised to contribute 40 percent of thecost of building a nuclear power station. according to a protocolwith h~gvpt signed in earl}’ 1984,

“H7’his discussion of Iran debates about nuclear power isbased on Bijan Mossanar-Rahmani, Ener~ Polic~ in lran: Do-mestic Choices and International Implications (New York:Pergarnon l)ress, 1981). p. 105.

came under direct attack by the revolutionaryopposition on a number of grounds. Some crit-icisms focused on political factors. A smallgroup of energy specialists and economists(from both the government and the universitycommunity) charged that a small group of for-eign businessmen and advisors close to theShah who were not competent to make tech-nical judgments had spearheaded the nuclearprogram. The royal family, they said, hadreaped huge commissions amounting to 20percent of the total contracts, or several hun-dred million dollars per reactor.

Other criticisms, on economic grounds, high-lighted the exorbitant cost overruns in the con-struction program. Construction costs on twoplanned French-built reactors grew 90 percent,interest payments included. Additional costsfor consultants’ fees, training, and installingreserve capacity and high-voltage transmis-sion lines could have added several billiondollars to the cost of the first four reactors,according to some estimates. At a time whenoil export revenues declined and budget trim-ming was required, the costs of the nuclearprogram became a problem, Construction bythe West German firm Kraftwerk Union, how-ever, progressed on two power reactors atBushehr to the point where the steel dome wascomplete on one reactor and partially completeon the other when construction was inter-rupted after the revolution,

Part of the cost problem stemmed fromIran’s underdeveloped infrastructure. With ashortage of reserve capacity and problemswith brownouts, the additional reserve capac-ity to back up shutdowns of the 1,000-MWereactors would have been extremely costly. Inaddition, critics worried that the Bushehrplants were not designed for a region with seis-mic activity. Furthermore, the water temper-ature and salinity of the Persian Gulf createdadditional design problems relating to coolingcapacity and increased erosion.

Most important, perhaps, was the long dis-tance from the Persian Gulf to the main cen-ters of industrial electricity consumption andthe inadequacy of the national grid. Enormous


costs to build high-voltage lines, and inevita-ble transmission losses, reduced the attractiveness of plants sited along the Persian Gulfwhen these factors were taken into consider-ation. The Ministry of Power, not the AtomicEnergy Organization, was responsible fortransmission lines. At the end of 1977, Tava-nir, the company contracted by the Ministryof Power to build the transmission and distri-bution network, had not yet begun construc-tion on the 400,000-volt lines to carry powerfrom Bushehr to other parts of Iran.Gg

Despite statements by Iranian leaders, suchas Rafsanjani in 1982, that Iran must promote“technical independence” and reinvigorate theBushehr reactors, only limited budgetary al-locations have been made under the revolu-tionary government to support these state-ments. The case for nuclear power in Iran hasnot rested on strong economic arguments inthe past, nor is it likely to in the future.

The Iran-Iraq war may determine the futureof the Bushehr reactors. Energy resourceshave been targets of Iraqi air strikes. If Iran’slarge hydroelectric Karun River and Dexplants were hit, the case for nuclear powermight be stronger. On the other hand, theBushehr plants might also be damaged. Mostcertainly any revived Iranian nuclear programwould be smaller than that envisioned underthe Shah. The West German firm KraftwerkUnion agreed in 1984 to conduct a feasibilitystudy of the Bushehr site, but announced thatit would not complete construction until theend of the war with Iraq.70

Other Nations

Prospects for nuclear power in Saudi Arabiaare very uncertain. The nation has abundantoil and gas deposits, and large infrastructureprojects have been scaled back in order to pro-mote manpower development and completion

“lVucJeonics Week, Feb. 2, 1978, p. 10.~OIt wag reported in December 1983 that Kraftwerk union

had signed a contract to inspect the Bushehr site. See A4idcileEast Econorm”c Digest, Dec. 9, 1983, p. 12. Kraftwerk Unionspokesmen reiterated intentions to delay resumption of con-struction until the end of the war in communication with OTA,May 1984.

of current projects. While estimates of in-stalled electrical capacity differ widely, pro-duction of electricity has grown rapidly dur-ing the last decade. By 1985 the Saudi ArabianGovernment expects to have 12.4 GWe of in-stalled capacity, not including considerable ad-ditional capacity of at least 4 GWe under theSaline Water Conversion Corporation.

Currently, there are three major discon-nected load centers and several smaller discon-nected regional centers. However, the EasternProvince alone has a large grid system withan installed capacity of approximately 3 GWe,and another 4 GWe under construction. (The1980 installed capacity figure for Saudi Arabiain table 85 reflects this capacity. ) Becausemost of this electricity in the Eastern Prov-ince is generated to desalinate water, it is pos-sible that a nuclear reactor of 900 M We couldbe accommodated by 1990. However, no firmnuclear plans have been made in Saudi Arabia.

Algeria also has no firm plans for nuclearpower. The nation has a grid that connects themain population centers along the Mediterra-nean coast. Algeria’s primary near-term optionfor production of electricity rests on the useof its large natural gas reserves and large ex-isting natural gas collection and distributionsystem. Algeria’s production of natural gas in1980, for example, could have generated fivetimes as much electricity as was consumedduring that year. Algeria could have 4.3 GWeof installed capacity by 1990 and 10 GWe by2000; this would be sufficient to accommodatea 900-MWe reactor not exceeding 10 percentof the grid by 2000, but not before.

Given the current financial constraints fac-ing Algeria, the availability of electricity gen-eration from use of its abundant gas, and theresults of preliminary studies by the IAEAand SONEGAZ which indicated that nuclearpower was not an economic solution for gen-erating electricity, it is not likely that Algeriawill have an operating nuclear power reactorprior to 2000.

Kuwait has a relatively large electricity gridand could theoretically accommodate a 900MWe reactor by 1990. Despite the fact that


a number of feasibility studies have been car-ried out, Kuwait has no definite plans for a nu-clear power program. Anticipated declines inthe historic rate of growth in electricity con-sumption and budgetary constraints indicatethat Kuwait is not likely to have a power reac-tor until the mid-1990’s, at the earliest.

For Iraq, even more than Iran, the Iran-IraqWar provides a strong constraint on nuclearpower development. Iraq’s grid is much lessextensive. Faced with a severe fiscal crisis andplanning uncertainty due to the war effort, itappears highly unlikely that Iraq will acquirea nuclear power reactor until the war is con-cluded or the level of conflict significantly re-duced. In contrast to the situation in Iran,Iraq’s gas resources are not sufficient to pro-vide a large portion of electricity generation.

T E C H N I C A L M A N P O W E RCONSIDERATIONS: TECHNOLOGY

A B S O R P T I O N

For all the countries of the Middle East, lackof technical manpower is a major constrainton indigenous development of nuclear power.The dilemma for developing nations is thatwhile nuclear power often is viewed as a meansto reduce dependence on foreign supplies of en-ergy, a nuclear program inevitably increasesdependence on foreign suppliers for materials,equipment, technology, and skilled manpower.

IAEA has taken the position that a system-atic program for developing requisite person-nel, both engineers and technicians, must pre-cede construction of nuclear powerplants. Thisapproach implies a long lead-time, since qual-ified personnel are scarce in the Middle East.Developing countries likewise have empha-sized building their indigenous nuclear tech-nological base as a means to raise the generallevel of scientific and technological devel-opment.

An alternative approach is to have foreigncontractors build complete turnkey plants. Inthis case, the vendor is fully responsible fordesign and construction of the facility, whichis operated by the vendor or by an experiencedforeign firm, such as Electricité de France

(EdF), working in conjunction with the ven-dor. The turnkey approach normally involvesa degree of technology transfer, even thoughthe buyer’s staff may participate in trainingprograms to only a limited extent during con-struction work. Technicians continue on-the-job training when the plant is operating. Overtime, more host country personnel are trained,partly in the vendor country and partly onsite.

In sectors such as national airlines and pe-troleum refining there is a precedent for sucha turnkey approach in the Middle East. Whilesome argue it may limit the training of indig-enous personnel, others view it as a means toeliminate manpower as a constraint on nuclearpower in developing nations. The indigenousapproach is more costly in the shortrun—interms of time and human resources—than theturnkey strategy. Over the long run, however,the developing nation that has invested inbuilding a technical manpower base is in thebest position to adapt and master advancedtechnologies.

The discussion that follows examines thetechnical manpower availability and political/administrative resources of Middle East na-tions. These factors, in addition to the choiceof an indigenous or extended turnkey strate-gy, determine the ability of Middle Easterncountries to absorb or fully utilize nucleartechnology.

Manpower Requirements fora Nuclear Program

The nuclear industry in Western nations in-volves an unusually high proportion of scien-tific, engineering and technical workers. ’l Few

71In 1975, 49 percent of the U.S. work force in the nuclearindustry was made up of scientists, engineers, and technicians.See Ii. Miessner, 4 ‘Manpower- Sources for .Yuclear I)ower I’rc)-grammes, ” i n I ntemational A t o m i c I“: nt’r~q .Agencj., .lfanp~ )l{r[~rRequirements and De\’elopment for ,\’ucleiir 1)o\~er l’ro-

gramrnes: il-oceedings of a S~’mposiun], Sa(.la?, .\pril 197$)(Vienna: IAEA, 1980). Another source indicates that tht~ occu-pational distribution for [J. S. nuclear powerp]ant workers in197’7 included 17,4 percent engineer-s, 35 percent technicians,and 2.8 percent scientists, See ,J. S. (’hewning, D. 1,, Couchman,and G. 1 I. Katz, “ hleeting the NI anpower (’hallenge in th~~Transfer of Nuclear Technology\’ to I)e\eloping (’ountries, inI AkIA, .\’ucIear l’oi+er a n d Its F’ue] (’~cle, I’rocecldings of a nInternational Conferenc’t>, SalLhurg, ,Aust ria. !! a~ 2- 1;], 1 !)77,\’ol. 6, pp. 259-272.


countries in the Middle East have even a lim-ited technical manpower base necessary tosupport a nuclear program. The exceptions areEgypt, Algeria, Iran, and Iraq–which havelimited technical manpower pools.

In examining the technical base, two kindsof considerations are pertinent. One is thequantity and quality of scientists and engi-neers (high-level manpower), and the other isthe quantity and quality of supervisors andskilled craft laborers (technical manpower).Many developing countries in other parts ofthe world have found that while their scien-tific base is limited but adequate to supportnuclear programs, the scarcity of administra-tive, technical and craft labor places signifi-cant constraints on the operation and main-tenance of nuclear powerplants.

Leaving aside for a moment the issue ofscientists and engineers, the requirements fortechnical laborers and supervisors are particu-larly great during construction of a nuclearpowerplant. Construction of one 600-to 1,200-MWe light-water reactor requires 12 millionto 15 million man-hours, including 10 millionto 12 million man-hours of skilled labor suchas welders, electricians, operating engineers,and quality control specialists. Iran importedthe required manpower from the supplier coun-try for its nuclear power construction pro-gram. There, the vendor, Kraftwerk Union,brought in most of the skilled labor and prac-tically all of the managerial personnel fromWest Germany.

The bulk of technical labor requirementscome during the 5 years before the start ofcommercial operations. For a plant of 600 to1,300-MWe capacity, a peak work force ofabout 5,000 is required for plant constructionand manufacture of equipment and compo-n e n t s . U t i l i t y o f f i c i a l s e x p e r i e n c e d i n n u c l e a rp o w e r p l a n t c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n -t r ies conclude that f i rs t - level supervisors whohave 5 to 20 years of exper ience are par t icu-la r ly impor tant dur ing the cons t ruc t ion phase .In the view of U.S. officials working in an in-t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n o f a m a j o r v e n d o rc o m p a n y :

An adequate craft labor force is not a con-trolling factor in developing countries becom-ing self-sufficient, but the development of anadequate first-line supervision is. The neededskilled labor can be drawn from existing re-sources or by recru i t ing and t ra in ing thea v a i l a b l e a n d o f t e n h i g h l y m o t i v a t e d r e -sources. Single skills are quickly and readilyacquired, [However,] experience has shownthat nuclear power p lant cons t ruc t ion re-quires a significantly larger ratio of first-levelsupervisors to craft than is needed on otherheavy cons t ruc t ion projec ts .7 2

A f t e r t h e p l a n t i s b u i l t , a b o u t 3 0 0 t o 4 0 0workers may be needed to opera te i t , depend-ing on the type of reac tor .73 I A E A s p o k e s m e n

e m p h a s i z e t h a t d e v e l o p i n g n a t i o n s o f t e nu n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r h i g h l yski l led manpower needed to ensure safe ty andre l iabi l i ty in nuclear p lant opera t ions . Even forturnkey plants , there i s a need for a “core ofi n d i g e n o u s q u a l i f i e d m a n p o w e r f r o m t h e b e -g i n n i n g o f t h e p l a n n i n g f o r a n u c l e a r p o w e rp r o j e c t . ’7 4 I n a d d i t i o n t o r e q u i r e m e n t s f o rs c i e n t i s t s a n d e n g i n e e r s , a b o u t o n e - q u a r t e r o ft h e o p e r a t i n g p e r s o n n e l r e q u i r e s p e c i a l i z e dtraining specific to nuclear plants in areas suchas radiation protection, nuclear chemistry, andoperations.

The types of other personnel required aresimilar to those needed for an oil-fired plant,but the general capabilty of all technicians, es-pecially the maintenance personnel, must behigher in order to ensure safety and reliabilityof operations. In most developing countries,additional personnel must be trained to allowfor back-up and attrition, meaning that thefirst powerplant may demand twice as manytechnical personnel as a conventional power-

‘Zllavid R. Zaccari, Francois R. Martel, and Eric L. Westberg,“Establishing a Nuclear Program: Some Perspectives, ” a pa-per presented at Montevideo, Uruguay, May 12, 1980.

TslNhen Offsite per90nnel are taken into account, 600 to 900personnel may be required to operate a nuclear plant in theUnited States. The Connecticut Yankee 580-MWe pressurized-water reactor in 1981 had a staff of 387 onsite and 187 off sitepersonnel. See Lelan F. Sillin, “Management Initiatives–Manpower, “ Chief Executive Workshop, Institute of NuclearPower Operations (INPO), Sept. 1, 1981.

741’. Mautner-Markhof, “Manpower Development for NuclearPower, ” in Manpower Requirements, op. cit., p. 359.


plant of the same size. Many of those in thespecialized technical category must begrounded in the basics of engineering, includ-ing computer science, while those in the sec-ond category can often be trained on the job.

The importance of supervisory and skilledcraft labor to the operation of a nuclear power-plant cannot be overemphasized. South Korea,for example, found that it had the core groupof nuclear physicists needed for scientific re-search but lacked the welders and specializedtechnicians needed to build reactors. Majorsuppliers of reactors provide training as wellas services to deal with special problems asthey occur in the operation of a reactor. In atypical reactor sale, training is provided dur-ing the 6- or 7-year period between the sign-ing of the contract and the startup of a turn-key facility.

During this period, a large number of peo-ple are trained in a wide range of skills, fromgraduate engineer to nondegree-holding oper-ators. Westinghouse, for example, typicallybrings hundreds of local engineers who mustbe fluent in English to the United States fortraining, While the recipient may purchasesimulators at a cost of $7 million to $10 mil-lion to train personnel in the host country, itis generally believed that a country shouldhave more than one power reactor in operationto justify such an investment.

Eventually, such training programs mayevolve into a means for more extensive tech-nology transfer. Recipients wishing to acquirethe ability to design and fabricate equipmentand construct facilities may seek to purchasethe technology itself. If the supplier agrees,licensing agreements could be worked out withthe respective nuclear organizations in thehost countries, and design groups from thehost country might work alongside supplierfirm personnel in the United States. This levelof technology transfer normally occurs onlyafter the recipient has built up considerableexperience in operations and maintenance.

Based on experience in the United States,once a nuclear powerplant is built, most of theoperating staff have practical training and ex-

perience but not necessarily a professionalscientific education. While a developing coun-try may have a relatively large pool of techni-cal labor, operating and maintaining a nuclearplant requires considerable additional trainingin specialized areas such as health and safety,instrument calibration and repair, quality as-surance, and nuclear records. As noted earli-er, at least a quarter of the technical work forcerequire specialized training in an engineer-ing-based curriculum.

Requirements for back-up staff, and theneed to bring together individuals who canwork together as a team, mean that relyingon indigenous labor would be viable for Mid-dle Eastern nations only over a long-term pe-riod. All the Islamic nations of the MiddleEast that seek to develop nuclear power willhave to depend on foreign vendors for a con-siderable period of time after startup of facil-ities for training of personnel, spare parts, andrepair. Egypt’s decision to purchase its firstnuclear reactors on a turnkey basis reflects arecognition that it would now be impossibleto construct and operate such a facility withonly indigenous personnel.

Operating a nuclear power reactor does notrequire a pool of research scientists trained infields such as nuclear physics.75 However,scientists and engineers are needed to run theregulatory and planning organizations that ad-minister nuclear programs in developing na-tions. In addition, without a scientific and en-gineering research sector, it is unlikely thata developing nation would be able to surmountthe turnkey stage of comparatively low-levelnuclear technology transfer and move into in-dependent large-scale design and fabricationof equipment, including both commercial andmilitary applications.

Because nuclear programs require long lead-times, and because they imply a trend towardelectricity-based industrialization, the abilityof highly trained scientists and engineers to

“See Ian Smart. “The Consideration of Nuclear Power, ” in.James Evert Katz and Onkar S. Marwah, Nuclear Power in De-veloping Countries: An Analysis of Decision-Making (I.exing-ton, Mass,: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 152.


work with political leaders in establishing nu-clear program stability and continuity is a keyrequirement for developing nations. It is notenough that a country possess a large pool ofacademic research scientists: even more criti-cal are individuals with specialized advancededucation who can act as planners and mana-gers. The highly trained scientists and engi-neers play key roles in assuring the political/administrative success of nuclear programs.

Middle Eastern Nations WithComparatively Large Technicalinfrastructures

In contrast to Israel, the nations of the Is-lamic Middle East have limited technical man-power infrastructures. Israeli scientists, engi-neers, and technicians are among the best inthe world, and Israel has the technical capa-bility to support the most advanced nucleartechnologies. Israel, then, is in a situation com-pletely different from the countries of the Is-lamic Middle East.

Egypt.–Of all the Islamic nations in theMiddle East, Egypt has the largest pool ofscientists and engineers. The Egyptian Atom-ic Energy Establishment was formed in 1955,almost three decades ago. Even so, a lack ofappropriately trained technicians precludesthe possibility of Egypt developing commer-cial nuclear power on its own for some time.Egypt’s experience is especially significant,since other nations in the region face evenmore severe manpower problems.

The 2,000 Egyptians at the nation’s nuclearresearch center are far fewer than the 18,000people included in the scientific and technicalstaff of the Indian Department of Atomic En-ergy.76 It has been estimated that Egypt hasalmost 1,000 nuclear physicists with doctor’sor master’s degrees.77 In 1980, the Inshas Nu-clear Research Center employed approximate-ly 2,200 people, including 500 physicists and

..—“see Richard P. Cronin, “Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation

in South Asia, The Middle East Journal, vol. 37, No. 4,autumn, 1983, p. 597, for figures on Indian personnel.

77 Mohammad E1-Sayed Selim, “Egypt,” in Katz and Marwah,op. cit., p. 152.

engineers, 200 of whom held doctorates.78

However, these scientists have been criticizedfor their strong academic orientation by thosewho would prefer that they contribute moredirectly to the establishment of a nuclear pow-er program.

The Egyptian nuclear scientific communityis neither well-integrated nor supported withfinancial resources adequate for the large nu-clear program envisaged. Faced wi th a lack ofa d e q u a t e r e s e a r c h f a c i l i t i e s , E g y p t i a n s c i e n -t i s t s have been forced to accept teaching pos i -t i o n s i n E g y p t i a n o r o t h e r A r a b u n i v e r s i t i e s .T h e M i n i s t e r o f E l e c t r i c i t y c a l l e d o n t h o s es c i e n t i s t s w o r k i n g a b r o a d t o r e t u r n h o m e t ot a k e p a r t i n t h e n u c l e a r p r o g r a m , b u t a p p a r -e n t l y f e w h a v e d o n e s0 . 7 9

M a j o r d e c i s i o n s a b o u t n u c l e a r p o w e r i nE g y p t h a v e b e e n t a k e n a t t h e h i g h e s t p o l i t i -cal levels. The Higher Council for Nuclear En-ergy (HCNE), formed in 1975, is the formal dec i s i o n m a k i n g b o d y , c o m p o s e d p r i m a r i l y o fpol i t ic ians . Pres ident Sadat h imsel f , in consul -t a t i o n w i t h t h e H C N E , m a d e t h e d e c i s i o n i n1 9 7 5 t o p u r s u e a c o m m e r c i a l n u c l e a r p o w e rprogram. Cr i t ics of the program, however , in-c l u d e u n i v e r s i t y p r o f e s s o r s a n d p o l i t i c i a n sf r o m o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s s u c h a s t h e S o c i a l i s tLabor Par ty .60 Three s ta te corpora t ions pos-sess the major responsibi l i t ies for carry ing outt h e p r o g r a m , b u t t h e y h a v e b e e n p e r i o d i c a l l yreorganized, and the advice of the technical ex-p e r t s i n t h e s e a g e n c i e s h a s n o t a l w a y s b e e nh e e d e d b y p o l i t i c i a n s i n m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s .Some observers say tha t the Egypt ian AtomicE n e r g y C o r p o r a t i o n , o n e o f t h e s e t h r e e , w a snot fu l ly consul ted about a p lan to s tore Aus-t r ian nuclear waste in Egypt , which was la tera b a n d o n e d . 8 1

O n r a r e b u t s i g n i f i c a n t o c c a s i o n s , s u c h a sthe opposition of people in the Alexandria area

—— ——_——7“Louise Lief, “Egypt Reviews its Stance as MidEast Nuclear

Arms Swell, ” Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 18, 1980. Seealso U.S. DOE, Joint Egypt-United States, vol. 5, op. cit., p. 17.

‘gSee Selim, op. cit., p. 153 and Abdel-Gawad Sayed, “TheReality of the Arab Nuclear Capability, ” A1-Mustabkba/ Al-Arabi, January 1980, p. 162, (translated and quoted in Selim).

‘“Ibid., p. 148.“]Ibid., p. 147.


to proposed local siting of a nuclear plant, nu-clear policy choices have become matters ofpublic debate. In that case, President Sadathimself ordered suspension of siting plansafter the Alexandria council passed a resolu-tion rejecting the plant. In Egypt, where pro-fessional engineering and scientific authorityhas long been politically suspect, scientistsand engineers have played a much less impor-tant role in giving technical advice than theirnumbers might suggest.82

Iran.– In comparison to Egypt, other Mid-dle Eastern countries face even more severeconstraints on nuclear technology transfer byvirtue of their small technical manpower pools.In Iran, where the Institute of Nuclear Sciencewas established in Teheran in 1958, it is doubt-ful that the revolutionary government will beable to launch a new nuclear program basedon “indigenous technical expertise, ” as thehead of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Cen-ter has advocated.’3 Owing to political, social,and economic dislocations of the revolutionand the war with Iraq, a revised Iranian nu-clear program would have to start off withonly a fraction of the prerevolutionary tech-nical base.

In the 1970’s, hundreds of Iranian studentswere trained in the United States and Europein nuclear-related fields, but many of thesetechnicians and scientists fled from Iran dur-ing the revolution. The revolutionary govern-ment has passed legislation encouraging themto return, offering the incentive that theirproperty holdings will be guaranteed. How-ever, there is no evidence that this group hasreturned. Iran’s technical manpower base isthus currently weaker than it was prior to therevolution. Therefore, despite recent indica-tions that Iran’s leaders have begun to con-sider completing the Bushehr power reactors,it appears that inadequate local manpower will

“For a discussion of the limited role technical advisors playedin the decision to build the Aswan Dam see Clement HenryMoore, “The Politics of Technical Consultation, ” Images of De-velopment: Egyptian Engineers in Search of lndustry (Cam-bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), pp. 156-165.

“3See “Es fahan Nuclear Technology Center Reactivated, ”reported in JPRS, Nuclear Development and Proliferation, No.138, Apr. 14, 1982, pp. 26-27.

remain a constraint, particularly if Iran shouldemphasize a program based on independentdevelopment of nuclear power.

Iraq.—Iraq has committed itself to a nuclearresearch program and has acquired a numberof operating research reactors and a labora-tory-scale reprocessing facility. It is impossi-ble to gauge precisely the number of Iraqinuclear scientists and engineers, but theynumber far fewer than those in Egypt. Cur-rently, education and training in nuclear fieldsis limited to undergraduate studies in Iraq,and for the foreseeable future Iraq will dependon foreign countries such as France and Italyfor training.

Italy agreed to train 100 Iraqis in the fuelcycle labs they provided, and the Frenchagreed to set up a “nuclear university’ atTuwaitha to train 600 scientists and techni-cians. While information concerning the qual-ity of current programs is not available, theseassistance programs have not been officiallydiscontinued in the post-Osirak period. Thecombined impacts of the Iran-Iraq War andSaddam Hussein’s imprisonment of membersof the nuclear community have resulted in asetback to the nation’s nuclear program. 84

Iraq, through a technical cooperation agree-ment with Brazil, is acquiring training, ura-nium exploration technology, and engineeringservices. Because Brazil is not a signatory tothe NPT and the country has received nucleartechnology from West Germany, West Ger-many negotiated a bilateral nonproliferationprovision with Brazil which extended safe-guards over West German technology retrans-ferred by Brazil. While it appears that Brazildid not transfer any West German know-how,Brazil’s position as an importer of Iraqi oilraised concerns about the possibility that Iraqmight receive sensitive technologies from Bra-zil not covered in the Brazil-West Germany ac-cords. 8s

“See [J. S. Congress, Senate, AnaJ\7sjs of Six Issues AboutNuclear (’apahilities of India, Iraq, l;itj~’a and Pakistan (N’ash-in#mn. 1). (’.: [J. S, (lo~rernment Printing office, 1982); and l’ewScientist, Aug. 28, 19HO), p. 635. See also Richard Mrilson, op.cit., for a report on a \’isit to Tuwaitha in earl~’ 19K3.

“See “Flrazil and Iraq Signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agree-merit, ” Nucieonics Week, vol. 21, Jan. 17, 1980, p. 10.


Other nations such as West Germany andSweden have agreements with Iraq that in-clude training; however, it appears that farfewer Iraqi students have studied nuclear en-gineering in Western countries than haveEgyptians and Iranians. In 1981-82, for exam-ple, the Institute for International EducationSurvey showed that five Iraqi students werestudying nuclear engineering in U.S. univer-sities, four at the graduate level.8G Iraq’s co-operative agreements with the Soviet Unionare still valid, and the number of Iraqis trainedin the Soviet Union is considered to be sig-nificant.

Algeria. -In Algeria a nuclear research orga-nization was set up in the mid-1960’s, and edu-cation in physics, chemistry, and nuclear en-gineering is available through theundergraduate level. Algeria’s Center for Nu-clear Technology and Science (CNST) is devel-oping a broad-based nuclear science researchprogram that provides Algeria with the fourthlargest pool of nuclear manpower in the Mid-dle East. The center has research divisionsworking on uranium ore processing, fuel fab-rication, reactor engineering, nuclear physics,applied nuclear research, and health physics.It employs 170 scientists and has a total staffof 500. CSTN spends an estimated $9 millionannually and operates two Van de Graaf ac-celerators (3 Mev and 2 Mev).87

Algeria has tentative plans to build a nucle-ar research center at Ain Oussera, but no an-nounced plans to expand graduate-level edu-cation at the new technical universities thatare to be built. As a result, most advancedtraining in nuclear fields takes place outsideAlgeria, in Western nations. The nation hastechnical cooperation agreements with Bel-gium, Brazil, and France.

In years past, the Soviet Union providedsome limited nuclear assistance, but there isno indication that significant cooperation still

‘Institute of International Education, “Detailed Cluster Re-port on Nuclear Engineering, ‘ correspondence, Feb. 1, 1983.

“see “Cooperation is the Ke~ to Arab Nuclear Development, ”Nuclear En~”neering International, January 1982, p. 14. Seealso, papers by Adnan Mustafa and Adnan Shihab-Eldin forthe Second Arab Energy Conference, Doha, Qatar, Mar. 6, 1982.

occurs. Given the extreme limitations to train-ing programs for advanced technicians and theabsence of a formal decision by Algeria to em-phasize nuclear technology acquisition, it ap-pears that Algeria might develop the manpow-er ‘base required to operate nuclear reactorsbuilt on a turnkey basis and the skills neededto support limited uranium mining-all by theturn of the century. However, advanced train-ing will entail foreign study for the next 20years.

Limited Technical Infrastructures in OtherMiddle East Nations.–In contrast to Egypt,Iran, Iraq, and Algeria where a small techni-cal infrastructure exists, Libya and other Mid-dle Eastern nations have much more limitedtechnical manpower bases. In Libya, despitea high-level political decision to acquire nu-clear technology, mixed results have beenachieved-owing primarily to the reluctanceof foreign suppliers to involve themselves andto Libya’s comparatively late start in the early1970’s. Unable to acquire technology frommany Western nations, Libya has relied pri-marily on the Soviet Union and Belgium.

The Tagiura Nuclear Center near Tripoli wasbuilt with Soviet assistance and a 10-MWt re-search reactor, fueled with approximately 3 kgof 80 percent enriched uranium, was provided.This reactor went critical in late 1981 or early1982, but reportedly experienced some start-up difficulties.88 Libya has received assistancefrom the Belgian firms Union Mirac and Bel-gonucleaire for uranium exploration and fuelfabrication. It is also negotiating with theSoviet Union for a 440-MWe reactor, whichwould probably be imported on a turnkey ba-sis using skilled labor from Bulgaria and Yu-goslavia. As mentioned earlier, a Belgian firmmay participate in the power reactor project .89

Given its lack of facilities for advanced studyin nuclear fields, Libya will be dependent onstudy programs abroad, particularly in East-ern bloc nations, for many years to come.

-—.‘nSee Zivia Wurtele, Gregory S. Jones, Beverly C. Rowen, and

Marcy Agmon, Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for the MiddleEasI and South Asia (Marina Del Ray, Calif.: Pan Heuristics,1981 ).

6gRobin Miller, “Nuclear Plans Outlined, ” Jamahiri-yah Re-view, No. 22, March 1982, p. 17. See footnote 9.


This discussion underscores the weaknessof the nuclear technical manpower base in theIslamic nations of the Middle East. All ofthem, except Iran under the revolutionarygovernment, have publicly committed them-selves to a strategy of near-term reliance onforeign suppliers rather than attempting apurely “indigenous” route. (And in Iran it isdoubtful that the rhetoric can be translatedinto practice. ) Because of their limited tech-nical infrastructures, none of these nations canconstruct, fuel, operate and maintain nuclearpowerplants without considerable foreignassistance at this stage.

Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation

Nuclear technology transfer, particularlythe training component, has occurred mostoften in a bilateral context. Normally, govern-ments establish bilateral nuclear cooperationagreements that open the door for commercialsales and training programs. The UnitedStates has established bilateral agreements fornuclear cooperation with a number of MiddleEastern nations. A bilateral agreement wassigned with Iran in 1957, and a revised agree-ment was negotiated but not signed prior tothe revolution in Iran. The United States pro-vided technical assistance though its Atomsfor Peace Program.

Under that program, a total of about 230people from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Ku-wait, Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia weretrained. More than half were Egyptians, andthe total number of trainees was far smallerthan that for countries such as India (1,104)or Taiwan (713).90 The United States has a fewprograms in the nuclear field with Israel; theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has a5-year agreement to exchange nuclear safetyand environmental information with Israel. g]

The most important bilateral agreement inthe nuclear field with any country in the Is-

90See U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on ~~t~mi~ Energy, S.1439: Export Reorganization Act of 1976, hearings, 94th Cong.,2d sess.; Mautner-Markoff, op. cit.

“U.S. Congress, Committee on Science and Technolo~’,Science, Technolo~r and .4merican Diplomac~ (M’ashington,D. C.: U.S. (;overnrnent Printing Office, 1982), p. 174.

lamic Middle East is the one with Egypt. In1981, the United States and Egypt signed afull nuclear cooperation agreement that con-tains strict provisions concerning controls andsafeguards. Programs sponsored under thisagreement have included special attention tosafety issues. Egypt’s decision to ratify theNPT and its willingness to accept bilateralcontrols opened the way for more extensivetechnology transfers. The bilateral agreementbetween the United States and Egypt has thuscontributed to U.S. nonproliferation policies.

Many other supplier nations have also es-tablished nuclear cooperation agreements withMiddle East nations. Bilateral cooperationagreements provide the assisting nation witha measure of influence over the nuclear pro-gram of the recipient in exchange for helpingthe recipient develop indigenous technical ca-pabilities. The inability of the U.S. Export-Import Bank to finance Egyptian reactor salesis seen by some as evidence that cooperationis limited, posing a significant problem forEgypt’s leadership.”

Middle Eastern Studentsin the United States

As discussed in chapter 13, foreign studentenrollment in U.S. educational institutionsmay be an important channel for technologytransfer. To date, comparatively few MiddleEastern students have been enrolled in tech-nical fields, but this pattern is likely to changeas those students who first came to the UnitedStates in the late 1970’s begin to consider ad-vanced graduate training.

An increasing number of engineering grad-uates from the 30 U.S. institutions which of-fer degree programs in science and engineer-ing are foreign nationals. The FederalGovernment has not collected data on the ex-act numbers of Middle Eastern students byfields of study enrolled in such U.S. programs,but of the almost 62,000 foreign nationals whoreceived science and engineering doctoratesbetween 1960 and 1981, there were 1,600 Ira-

“See ~. Henry M. Schuler, “Will ~lgypt Be Denied its ‘PeaceDi\~idend?’ “ American-Arab Affm”rs, No. 7. winter 1983-84.


nians, 500 Iraqis, and almost 1,400 Egyptians.About one-third of these degrees were awardedduring 1960-81 in engineering, of which about1,000 were awarded to students from Iran,Iraq, and Egypt. These numbers are far small-er than the numbers of students from the EastAsian region (about 15,000) who earned simi-lar degrees during the period.93

In 1981 alone, 189 Iranians, 26 Iraqis, and77 Egyptians were awarded doctorates in allscience and engineering fields from U.S. insti-tutions. In the more specialized fields of nu-clear engineering and physics, fewer MiddleEastern students received degrees. Table 88shows numbers of doctoral degree recipientsfrom these nations for 1981. Middle Easternstudents make up only a very small percent-age of student enrollment and doctoral recip-ients in science and engineering. According todata collected by the Institute for Internation-al Education, during 1981-82 there were about20 Middle Eastern students enrolled in nuclearengineering programs.94 These data are inade-quate indicators of Middle Eastern study intechnical fields, however, because a doctorateis not a prerequisite for an engineer to func-tion effectively in most developing countryprojects.

The small number of Middle Eastern stu-dents enrolled in and receiving Ph.D. in tech-nical fields contrasts sharply with enrollmentsin all programs. In 1981-82, 326,300 foreignstudents were enrolled in various programs ofeducation in the United States. Among thisgroup, 74,390 students were from the MiddleEast. The largest number (35,860) were fromIran, followed by 10,220 from Saudi Arabia,6,800 from Lebanon, 6,180 from Jordan, and3,330 from Kuwait.95 The enrollment of foreignstudents from the Middle East grew very rap-idly during the 1970’s. However, only a smallnumber of these students were studying sub-jects such as nuclear engineering. With the ex-

“National Science Foundation, Science and Engineening Doc-torates: 1960-81, NSF 83-309, p. 68.

“Data provided by the Institute for International Education,January 1983.

“Institute of International Education, Open Doors: 198182(New York: IIE, 1983), p. 18.

ception of Iran under the Shah, there is littleevidence of a directed effort by any MiddleEastern nation to train a large number ofstudents in nuclear engineering or in relateddisciplines in the United States.

In 1983, the Reagan administration issuedan order forbidding Libyan students to studynuclear engineering or aviation in the UnitedStates. However, officials in the State Depart-ment and the Immigration and NaturalizationService were unable to verify estimates that2,000 students from Libya were actually en-rolled in all U.S. programs, much less howmany were pursuing studies in nuclear engi-neering or civil aviation. In August 1983, de-portation hearings began for nine Libyanstudents whose visas had expired.9G The onlyother instance of such restrictions on foreignstudents from the Middle East occurred dur-ing the time of the hostage crisis, when an in-vestigation was conducted to verify the legalstatus of Iranian students studying in theUnited States.

Nuclear technology transfer also occursthrough the IAEA. U.S. contributions total-ing $5 million in 1981 supported the IAEA’sProgram for Technical Assistance for Safe-guards. This organization carries out trainingprograms in nuclear manpower developmentin a variety of fields. The organization esti-mates that its programs have trained about40 percent of the personnel needed by devel-oping countries.97 During the 4-year period1975-78, fewer than 100 people from the Mid-dle East were trained in IAEA programs, withthe largest numbers coming from Egypt (23)and Iran (27).

IAEA has forecast that no Middle Easternnation will attain the highest stage of capa-bility (“self-sufficiency”) in nuclear technologyby the year 2000. Also, even under extremelyoptimistic assumptions concerning growth innuclear power, only Egypt and Iran might at-

96"Libyan Students Held as Risks Freed on Bail; Deporta-tion is Expected, ” New York Times, Aug. 14, 1983.

97S. B. Hammon, and M. A. Kanter, “Nuclear Power: Proj-ect Training for Engineers from Developing Countries, ErI~”-neer,’ng Education, January 1982, p. 316.


Table 88 .—Middle Eastern Students ReceivingDoctorates in Technical Fields in

the United States, 1981

Ph.D.sCountry of origin engineering

Iran . . 74Iraq ., . . . . . . . 4Jordan. . ..., 8Kuwait ,...., . . . . 3Lebanon . . . ..., ..., 8Saudi Arabia .,...,. . . . . 15Syria .,..., . . . . . 1Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Egypt . . . . 41Libya, ..,. . . . . . 5

Total Middle East ., . . . 163

Total non-U S, citizens .,.., 1,241T a i w a n . , , . . , , . . , . . , . , , , . , 201

Physics andastronomy—

13110201011

20

71537—

NOTE It IS difficult to determine where these students wiII go after receivingtheir degrees data is collected well before graduation. Out of 13 studentsreceiving Ph.D.s in physics and astronomy for example 3 planned to stayin the United States 2 planned to return to West Asia and 8 had not madeplans when the survey was taken

SOURCE Data provided by the National Science Foundation August 1983

tain the level of a “confirmed” program withtwo or more plants in operation. 98 While manyof these countries are developing nuclear re-search programs, the quality of these pro-grams varies, and only Egypt and Algeriahave established programs that could be con-sidered indigenously based. Given these fac-tors, it appears highly unlikely that any ofthese Islamic Middle Eastern nations exceptEgypt will be a position to undertake a reac-tor project indigenously before the turn of thecentury, unless there are dramatic shifts inpolicy.

—““13. tJ. (’sik, “ Nlanpower Requirements for Nuclear [)ower in

I)e\reloping Countries, ‘‘in I A F] A, ,$lanpower Requirements, op.cit., p. 18.

M I L I T A R Y A P P L I C A T I O N SC O N S I D E R A T I O N S

The Middle East is generally viewed as apart of the world where nuclear weapons wouldbe particularly dangerous because of its his-tory of political turbulence and conflict. Ten-sion exists not only between Israel and itsArab neighbors, but also between other statesin the region (Iran and Iraq, Egypt and Libya)and within states. The introduction of nuclearweapons could affect the region’s balance ofpower. Moreover, the Middle East is strate-gically important to the superpowers, whoseinterests would be affected by the spread ofnuclear weapons in the region. U.S. ability toinfluence events there could be substantially


reduced if weapons proliferation reduced thewillingness of nations in the region to cooper-ate with the United States or to exercise re-straint in their military programs.

It seems unlikely that nuclear proliferationin the Middle East would be a stabilizing in-fluence. Arguments about stabilization havebeen based on the assumption that somestates would have a second-strike capability,but the possibility that any country in the re-gion except Israel could develop such a capa-bility in the next 20 years appears remote. Inaddition, given Israel’s stated intention notto allow any states in the region to develop anuclear explosives capability-and its destruc-tion of Iraq’s Osirak reactor—the spread of nu-clear weapons is almost certain to elicit re-sponse by major states in the region.

The analysis that follows leads to the con-clusion that because of shortages of skilledmanpower and the restrictive export policesof supplier nations, most Middle Eastern na-tions will be unable by themselves to constructnuclear weapons until well into the next cen-tury. Nevertheless, political variables willstrongly influence the course of nuclear pro-liferation in the region. If one nation were todemonstrate its ability to use a nuclear device,other nations might try to catch up. Similarly,if supplier nations (including countries suchas India and Argentina that are likely toemerge as suppliers) loosened restrictions onnuclear exports, proliferation would becomemore likely.

Intentions

While a host of technological, manpower,and financing considerations affect the spreadof nuclear weapons, political considerationsare paramount. Political factors that stimulateproliferation include the perception that Israelhas the technical capability to produce nuclearweapons in a short period of time. It is likelythat, barring a lasting peace settlement, themajor motivation for weapons acquisition byother countries in the region will be as a deter-rent to Israel.

A second factor involves concern that acountry’s weapons capability is on a par withthat of other Islamic countries in the region.Syria’s increased interest in nuclear technol-ogy may, for example, be due in part to con-cern about Iraq’s program. If Libya acquiresa militarily significant nuclear weapons capa-bility, Egypt might reevaluate the directionof its nuclear program.

Nuclear cooperation among nations in theregion could, under certain conditions, accel-erate weapons proliferation. Reported contri-butions by Middle Eastern nations to Pakis-tan’s nuclear program could be motivated bya desire to obtain nuclear technology or by thewish to ensure that the other contributors willnot obtain an advantage. Overt proliferationby any state in the region would undoubtedlystimulate activity by others. Finally, if the ex-port policies of supplier nations (includingsmaller nuclear states likely to become sup-pliers) become more lenient, the incentives forweapons acquisition will increase.

Pace and Nature of NuclearProliferation in the Middle East

Despite incentives for weapons acquisition,overt proliferation has not occurred. Inhibitingpolitical factors include safeguards and the re-luctance of major supplier states to providesensitive technologies. The perceived fear ofthe consequences of weapons proliferation, es-pecially for small states and those dependenton geographically clustered industrial or oil fa-cilities, has most certainly acted to limit nu-clear weapons acquisition.

Another major factor limiting nuclear weap-ons programs has been the domestic politicsof Middle Eastern nations: political leadershiphas not been strong enough to sustain steadydevelopment of commercial nuclear programs,much less to launch highly focused crashweapons programs. Nevertheless, the persist-ence of deep and costly conflicts such as theIran-Iraq War might propel leaders to attemptto steal or fabricate unsophisticated nuclearweapons.


While the existing nuclear weapons statesdeveloped their weapons in programs dedi-cated wholly or substantially to military pur-poses, and while these nations proved their ca-pability through testing, it appears that latentproliferation in conjunction with small re-search-scale facilities is the most likely pathfor nations in the region. (Indeed, Israel’sassumed capability is based on comparativelysmall-scale facilities. ) This is the case because,as mentioned earlier, most of these countriesare not likely to acquire commercial-scale sen-sitive facilties and because of the nonprolifera-tion controls of supplier nations.

While it is theoretically possible for a stateto purchase nuclear-grade graphite or heavywater and attempt to design and build its ownplutonium production reactor and a facility forextracting the plutonium, such a project wouldbe difficult for nations with such weak tech-nical infrastructures. In addition, a weaponsprogram that includes facilities such as thoselisted above would involve substantial impor-tation of equipment and, for all nations exceptEgypt, of technical personnel; it would be ap-parent to outside observers that a programwas under way.

Given these factors, the most worrisomepath to weapons capability is the acquisitionof small-scale fuel cycle facilities that can berationalized, more or less reasonably, as logicalcomponents of an orderly long-term effort todevelop a broad capability for using nuclearpower.

India represents an extreme example of thispath. Some of its power reactors are safe-guarded, but not all. India acquired unsafe-guarded research and materials-testing reac-tors, pilot-scale reprocessing plants, andheavy-water production facilities in the 1960’s,with substantial assistance from foreign com-panies and governments. Buying these facili-ties probably cost considerably less thanwould have construction of commercial-scaleplants. A program of this type, using research

reactors, could be comparatively inexpen-sive—on the order of $300 million.99

Libya.—Among the Islamic nations of theMiddle East, only Libya has made an overteffort to acquire nuclear weapons, althoughthere is strong circumstantial evidence thatIraq has attempted to equip itself with nec-essary facilities. If these nations are catego-rized as those with ‘‘high intentions, most ofthe Islamic Middle Eastern nations should beviewed as having medium or low intentions,based on nuclear technology trade patternsand policy positions.

Despite Libya’s well-advertised intentionsto acquire nuclear explosives and its willing-ness to use oil money to purchase any type ofnuclear technology possible, its nuclear ambi-tions are severely limited by the weakness ofits technical manpower base and lack of coher-ent planning and research programs. As a re-sult, it is unlikely that Libya will be able toachieve nuclear independence at India’s levelfor 30 years,

Libya’s overt designs on nuclear weaponshave made supplier nations reluctant to sell,Colonel Qaddafi’s request for sensitive nucleartechnology, and worldwide concern over Lib-yan-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, promptedthe French government of Giscard d’Estaingto cancel an agreement to sell Libya a 600-MWe reactor in 1975. Libya also failed in itsattempt to obtain ‘‘tactical’ nuclear weaponsfrom China in the early 1970’s and to acquireIndian nuclear explosives and production tech-nology in the latter part of the decade.

—— — — -———-99Vari~~s ~stima~es have been made of the cost of mo~’ing

to the first nuclear bomb test for a nation with no reactor ornuclear base. These estimates are re~’iewed in Gordon W’. Smithand Ronald Soglio, “Economic Development and Nuclear Pro-liferation: An Overview, ” in Dagobert L. Brito, Michael D. In-triligator, and Adele W. Wilk, Strategies for Managing NuclearProliferation (Lexington, Mass.: I.exington Books, 1983), pp.75-76. The authors conclude that the economic costs are lessa constraint than the ‘‘policy costs’ to less-developed countriesof moderate income and population which are determined toacquire nuclear weapons.

386 “ Technology Transfer to the Middle East

Through financial assistance to Pakistan, Lib-ya attempted to obtain sensitive nuclear tech-nology, but relations between the two nationscooled after the fall of Prime Minister Bhuttoand under pressure from the United States.

Of greatest current concern are reports thatNiger has sold at least 788 tons of uraniumto Libya, some of which may have beenshipped to Pakistan, thus circumventingIAEA safeguards.100 These sales apparentlywere ended in 1981, but the transactions raisea number of problems. The uranium could bestockpiled for use in an undeclared facility lo-cated either in Libya or abroad. Currently,Libya’s ability to acquire sensitive nucleartechnology depends to a great extent on thepolicies of the Soviet Union. If Soviet exportsbecome less restrictive or new suppliers enterthe market, Libya’s ability to acquire technol-ogy might increase. However, it is strikingthat the Middle Eastern nation most com-mitted to a nuclear weapons path has been sounsuccessful in acquiring sensitive technology.

Iraq.–The case of Iraq illustrates many ofthe difficulties in assessing the proliferationpotential of individual nations. AlthoughIsrael justified destroying the Iraqi Osirakreactor in 1981 on the grounds that “ . . . it isintended, despite the camouflage, to createatomic bombs, ” U.S. Government officialsstated that the U.S. intelligence communityhad not firmly concluded that Iraq was, infact, planning to build a weapon.101

Public attention has focused on the possi-bility that Iraq was pursuing a “quick-fix”rapid weapons building effort, when it appearsmore likely that the primary thrust of Iraq’sprogram was to acquire nuclear facilities andexperience needed to produce nuclear weaponssome years down the line after expiration of-—— ———-——

‘“”It is not clear whether shipments planned for 1981 werecompleted. If they were, the total shipped would have amountedto about 2,000 tons. See “Libya Buys Uranium Secretly, ” TheTimes, London, Aug. 29, 1981, p. 4.

“’’See Roger Pajak, op. cit., pp. 53 and 56. For a review ofthe evidence concerning an Iraqi nuclear weapons program, seeJed C. Snyder, “The Road to Osirak: Bagdad’s Quest for theBomb, ” Middle East Journal, vol. 37, No. 4, autumn 1983, p.587.

its bilateral accords with the French. The cov-ert and latent nature of the proliferation po-tential of Iraq underscores the importance ofexamining the long-term implications of tech-nical infrastructure building.

At the heart of debates about Iraq’s abilityto produce a nuclear weapon are questions ofthe effectiveness of safeguards. Because Iraqis a party to the NPT, concern about poten-tial Iraqi nuclear weapons proliferation hashighlighted uncertainties about the coverageof safguards, Iraq’s record of nuclear tech-nology acquisition has led many to questionwhether a nation might pursue a weapons pro-gram while publicly adhering to the NPT, andlater abrogate the NPT when it is convenientto do so.

Evaluation of Iraq’s future ability to pro-duce nuclear explosives requires an examina-tion of the proliferation scenarios consideredcredible prior to the bombing of the Iraqi reac-tor. One scenario involved Iraq acquiring suf-ficient highly enriched uranium (HEU) tomake a bomb. Using the IAEA definition ofa “significant quantity” of uranium needed fora nuclear weapon, Iraq would have had to ob-tain 25 kg of HEU in order to construct a nu-clear device. Concern focused on the HEU sup-plied to Iraq for its two research reactors.France initially agreed to supply 70 kg of 93percent HEU. HEU of this type could havebeen used directly in the production of nuclearweapons. This amount would have been suf-ficient for production of several nuclear de-vices, but IAEA safeguards and the presenceof French technicians onsite would have madediversion difficult, though not impossible.

Debates ensued within the French Govern-ment about whether caramel, or low enricheduranium, should be supplied as a substitute.Such uranium would have to have been fur-ther enriched in order to produce HEU. Ulti-mately, Iraq rejected this caramel option andthe French decided on a compromise plan thatinvolved shipments of HEU in consignmentsof about 12 kg, sufficient for a core-loadingreactor but insufficient for weapons manufac-


ture, as the reactor was to be operated con-tenuously.102

After the destruction of Osirak, the Frenchpromised to assist Iraq in rebuilding theOsirak reactor but French spokesmen report-edly called for strengthened safeguards andthe use of low-enriched uranium fuel in the re-built reactor. Iraq opposed this, some believe,on the grounds that it did not meet the condi-tions of the original contract and that the neu-tron flux resulting would have been lower andinadequate for certain types of research oper-ations. 103 No agreement has been reached at

this point, and fuel shipments from France ap-parently have not occurred. Nor has the Tam-muz 1 Osirak reactor been rebuilt.

The second major diversion scenario in-volved the production of plutonium for a nu-clear device. This diversion path would not beeliminated with the supply of caramel fuel.Osirak could have been used to produce plu-tonium by irradiation of uranium targets inthe reactor core or by installation of a uraniumblanket around the core, According to IAEAsources, removing the reflector elements fromthe reactor and irradiating fertile elementsboth inside and outside the core could provideup to one or two “significant quantities’ ofplutonium per year, or approximately 8 kg.’”’French physicists estimated that the reactorcould produce 3.3-10.0 kg per year; however,the actual amount is dependent on the pluto-nium production scenario.

In a “core” scenario, uranium targets couldbe placed in the reactor core and irradiated.Tammuz 1 was designed as a materials testingfacility; such a facility in industrialized coun-tries is for studying irradiation of power reac-

“’2The French also reportedly irradiated the IIEU, makingit much more difficult to use in weapons production. irradiated1;II U would have to be reprocessed in order to make it usablein nuclear weapons; ~apabili~ies to do so would have been limitedby the small size of Iraq’s repr~cessin~ laboratories.

“’3’’ France, Iraq Un\’eil Secret Nuclear Accord, ’ Enera’Dai]J’, June 19, 1981. “More Nuclear Guarantees From Iraqto be Sought, ” I.e Monde, ,Jan, 18, 1982, p. 7, reported in FIIIS:France, See also Andrew I,loyd, ‘*Can France Stop the 1 raqiflomb’?,‘‘ .\’ew .Scienti,st, ,,\pr. 2’2, 19H2, p. 201. for a report on~~rench dc~bates on the caramel option.

1“’Ilans Gruernm, “Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Rec-ord Straight, ’ IAI;.4 Bulletin, I’ol, 2:3, No, 4, December 1981.

tor construction materials and fuel elements.Substituting uranium would not have been dif-ficult because of in-core inspection limitations.The procedure might have been difficult to de-tect given the short irradiation time (weeks)required. However, the core size limits theamount of uranium that can be irradiated,m a k i n g p l u t o n i u m p r o d u c t i o n c u m b e r s o m e . I norder to ga in 8 kg of weapons-opt imal p lu to-n i u m , 8 , 0 0 0 t o 1 0 , 0 0 0 k g o f u r a n i u m w o u l dhave to be irradiated. ’05

T h e I A E A c o u l d h a v e d e t e c t e d t h i s a c t i v i -t y t h r o u g h e x i s t i n g s a f e g u a r d s t e c h n i q u e s ,but suff ic ient t ime passes between inspect ionst o a l l o w t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o m e p l u t o n i u m .W i t h t h e p r e s e n c e o f F r e n c h t e c h n i c i a n s a n ds u b s t a n t i a l i m p r o v e m e n t s i n I A E A i n s p e c t i o nt e c h n i q u e s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , d e t e c t i o nw o u l d h a v e b e e n h i g h l y p r o b a b l e .

T h e s e c o n d s c e n a r i o f o r p l u t o n i u m p r o d u c -t i o n r e q u i r e s a n a t u r a l o r d e p l e t e d u r a n i u m“blanket” to be p laced around the reac tor core .The length of i r rad ia t ion i s a funct ion of then e u t r o n f l u x - t h a t i s , t h e d e n s i t y o f n e u t r o nemiss ion f rom the reactor core . S ince the b lan-k e t i s o u t s i d e t h e c o r e , a n d t h e r e f o r e f a r t h e raway f rom the core , there is less neutron f luxa n d i r r a d i a t i o n t i m e i s l o n g e r . I n a d d i t i o n ,g r e a t e r c o o l i n g c a p a c i t y w o u l d p r o b a b l y b enecessary to remove the excess heat generatedb y i r r a d i a t i o n o f t h e b l a n k e t . D e s p i t e t h e s ec o n s t r a i n t s , m u c h m o r e u r a n i u m c o u l d b e i r -radia ted a t one t ime. The probabi l i ty of de tec-

t i o n w o u l d d e p e n d o n h o w e a s i l y t h e b l a n k e tw a s i n s t a l l e d a n d r e m o v e d . H o w e v e r , o n c ea g a i n , w i t h F r e n c h t e c h n i c i a n s p r e s e n t a n dI A E A s u r v e i l l a n c e c a m e r a s o p e r a t i n g , t h i sscenar io could have been detec ted wi th exis t -i n g s a f e g u a r d s t e c h n i q u e s .

I f I r a q h a d s u c c e e d e d i n i r r a d i a t i n g u r a n i -um, i t would have obta ined p lu tonium, bu t re -p r o c e s s i n g l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d h a v e d i m i n i s h e dthe prospect of near- term accumulat ion of s ig-n i f i c a n t q u a n t i t i e s o f p l u t o n i u m . T h e s m a l l

105Less optimal plutonium with 0.2 percent concentrationwould require irradiation of 4 tonnes (metric tonsl of uranium,The light-water reactor design is not a \’erJ’ “convenient pathto plutonium production because it does not produce the spareneutrons necessar~’ for a high rate of plutonium production,


l a b o r a t o r y p r o v i d e d b y t h e I t a l i a n s w o u l dh a v e p e r m i t t e d r e p r o c e s s i n g o n o n l y a s m a l ls ca l e .

B o t h o f t h e s e p l u t o n i u m p r o d u c t i o n s c e n a r -i o s a r e c o n s t r a i n e d b y t e c h n i c a l f a c t o r s a n ds a f e g u a r d s . F o r a c o u n t r y w i t h I r a q ’ s l i m i t e dt e c h n i c a l m a n p o w e r b a s e , i n d i g e n o u s p l u t o n i -um product ion would have been d i f f icu l t . Dur-i n g t h e n e a r t e r m , t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e F r e n c ha n d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f s a f e g u a r d s , a s w e l l a st h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n f o c u s e d o n I r a q ,w o u l d h a v e m a d e d i v e r s i o n o f H E U o r m o d i -f ied usage of the faci l i ty unl ikely unless I raqw i t h d r e w f r o m t h e N P T . 1 0 6

H o w e v e r , t h e t h r u s t o f I r a q ’ s p r o g r a m m a yhave been acquis i t ion of nuclear weapons overthe longer term. Given the presence of Frenchtechnic ians unt i l 1989, i t seems l ike ly tha t thegoal was to bui ldup a technica l capabi l i ty overt h e n e a r t e r m , l e a v i n g o p e n t h e o p t i o n f o rweapons product ion af te r the depar ture of for -e ign advisors and the development of a groupo f h i g h l y t r a i n e d I r a q i s . T h i s l o n g - t e r m s c e -nar io , requi r ing 15-20 years , would eventual lyprovide I raq wi th the ab i l i ty to develop a nu-clear arsenal ra ther than a few unsophis t icatedbombs. While some believe it may have set thep r o g r a m b a c k , I s r a e l ’ s r a i d o n t h e r e s e a r c hr e a c t o r t h u s d i d n o t e l i m i n a t e t h e l o n g - t e r mposs ib i l i ty of an I raqi weapons program s incet e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e i n r e p r o c e s s i n g - r e l a t e dt e c h n o l o g y c o n t i n u e s . M o r e i m p o r t a n t i n d i -m i n i s h i n g l o n g e r t e r m p r o l i f e r a t i o n p r o s p e c t si s t h e c o m b i n e d e f f e c t o f t h e I r a n - I r a q W a rand the repor ted impr isonment of members ofI r a q ’ s n u c l e a r c o m m u n i t y .

B e f o r e t h e r e a c t o r i s r e b u i l t , a n u m b e r o fissues wi l l have to be worked out . The Frenchhave expressed the i r in tent ion to extend safe-g u a r d s a n d t o “ i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e ” t h e p r o j e c tby insur ing tha t the new adminis t ra t ive sc ien-t i f ic d i rec tor would be a Frenchman or a rep-r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e I A E A . E x t e r n a l R e l a t i o n sM i n i s t e r C h e y s s o n h a s s t a t e d t h a t F r e n c h

‘[~If the French had been willing to cover up illegal actionsby the Iraqis, a prospect feared by Israel, the possibility of detec-tion would have been significimtly reduced.

assistance will be resumed only With the "dou-

b l i n g o r q u a d r u p l i n g ” o f s a f e g u a r d s . 1 ° 7

T h e c a s e o f I r a q i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t yt h a t w i t h c o m b i n e d i m p r o v e m e n t s i n f u e l a n df a c i l i t y d e s i g n a n d i n s a f e g u a r d s , t h e t h r e a tof prol i fera t ion could be substant ia l ly reducedw h i l e r e t a i n i n g a l e g i t i m a t e n u c l e a r p r o g r a m .T h r e e c h a n g e s c o u l d e n h a n c e t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y .Fi rs t , reduced enr ichment fuels (caramel or s i l -i c i d e ) n o w u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t m i g h t b e u s e di n r e s e a r c h r e a c t o r s p r e s e n t l y f u e l e d w i t hH E U . T h e u s e o f l o w - e n r i c h e d u r a n i u m f u e l ,i f i t could be fabr ica ted to mainta in the neu-t ron f lux of HEU, could serve nonprol i fera t iong o a l s . 1 0 8 S e c o n d , a n e w r e s e a r c h r e a c t o r c o u l dbe des igned to make the ins ta l la t ion of a b lan-k e t o u t s i d e t h e c o r e v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . F i -

n a l l y , b e t t e r r e m o t e - s e n s i n g a n d i n s p e c t i o ntechniques could upgrade the qual i ty of safe-guards.

Iran.–While it is difficult to ascertain thein tent ions of the Khomeini reg ime in I ran con-c e r n i n g n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h ep r e s s u r e s o f w a r f a r e w i t h I r a q m a y l i m i tI r a n ’ s a b i l i t y t o e n g a g e i n a c r a s h w e a p o n sp r o g r a m . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , i t s m o t i v a t i o n sfor do ing so may be increased . A sudden up-bra id ing of I raq’s program might s t imula te re-e v a l u a t i o n b y I r a n . I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e c u r -r e n t r e g i m e , l i k e t h a t o f t h e S h a h , m a yemphasize acquis i t ion of sophis t ica ted conven-t i o n a l w e a p o n s . T h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f n u c l e a rweapons would be seen as provocat ive by theSovie ts . In addi t ion , a res tar t of I ran’s nuclearprogram would be impeded by the flight of sci-entists and engineers from the country follow-ing the revolution.

Syria.–Syria was apparently as concernedabout the development of Iraqi and Iraniannuclear capability as Israel was. Syria’s ap-proach to nuclear development reflects a de-

——‘()’’ ’Nuclear Supplies to Iraq Dependent on Tougher Safe-

guards, France Asserts, ” Nucleonics Week, vol. 22, No. 26, July2, 1981, p. 1.

‘[]” However, this results in the production of more plutonium.In addition, some experts question whether lower-enricheduranium fuel could be used so as to maintain a high enoughneutron flux needed for cutting edge experiments.


sire not to fall too far behind any of the otherIslamic nations in the region. Consequently,setbacks to any of the other programs maymitigate Syrian proliferation prospects, par-ticularly if Israeli capability remains undem-onstrated. Syria’s important step has been todevelop plans for commercial reactors and sci-entific research facilities, and Syria’s militaryexpenditures have been concentrated on main-taining the front against Iraq and Israel andon local interventions in Jordan and Lebanon.The Soviet Union, Syria’s major military sup-plier, apparently has not provided Syria withsensitive nuclear technology. Syrian capabil-ity to produce a nuclear explosive device in-digenously will probably not develop until theturn of the century.

Egypt.–Egypt has a greater technical ca-pability than any other Middle Eastern Islam-ic nation to develop nuclear weapons if sucha political decision were made. However, itsnuclear technology purchases indicate that nosteps have been taken in this direction, andthe nation is generally not considered to be aproliferation threat at present. Egypt rejecteda proposal in the early 1960’s for a 200-MWnatural uranium-fueled, heavy-water reactorthat could have produced a large amount ofplutonium. The nation currently has no fuelfabrication plans and has concluded that anindigenous enrichment program would not becost effective. Egypt has little research relat-ing to the front end of the fuel cycle, and noknown R&D program related to uranium en-richment.

Although the argument has been made thatIsrael still may pose a major threat to Egyp-tian security, Egyptian leaders have said lit-tle about Israel’s nuclear capability since theCamp David accords. Whether because Egyp-tians have chosen a strategy of conventionalpreemptive attack or because the perceivedthreat has diminished, Egypt acceptance ofthe NPT indicates an emphasis on a long-termstrategy designed to develop the technologi-cal foundation for a nuclear power program.After acquiring a large amount of commercialnuclear technology and considerable experi-ence, Egypt could, of course, move toward a

nuclear weapons option later if the politicalchoice were made to do so.109 However, inorder to do so Egypt would have to acquiresensitive facilities.

The development of nuclear weapons by Lib-ya, if this were to occur, could seriously alterEgyptian thinking about the nuclear weaponspath. Likewise, if Israel demonstrates nuclearcapability or is perceived as having expansion-ist rather than status quo intentions, the pres-sure to develop nuclear weapons would be in-creased in many Islamic nations, Egyptprobably included.110

Algeria.—Algeria’s limited nuclear infra-structure precludes indigenous production ofa nuclear device until the end of the century.Because Algeria has been moving closer to theWest and is unlikely to experience a geopolit-ical change sufficient to cause it to initiate acrash weapons program, it does not appearthat Algeria has made the decision to pursuea weapons path. It could, however, build abroadly based program which could form thefoundation for a nuclear explosives programin the 21st century. The nation has not signedthe NPT; therefore, in order to import nucleartechnology, Algeria may be forced to accedeto safeguards. If Algeria exported uranium,it would be under no legal obligation to requiresafeguards, a situation that could raise pro-liferation concern in the next century.

Saudi Arabia.–Saudi Arabia currently hasno significant nuclear research facilities or nu-clear power plans. However, since the Saudishave the capacity to finance programs in othernations, they are important in the context ofMiddle Eastern nuclear weapons proliferation.Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in the sta-bility of the Middle East and therefore is likelyto view weapons development programs inother states as alarming. It could support re-gional and global efforts to reduce Israel’s in-centives to adopt an overt nuclear stance; forexample, participation in the nuclear programs

—-‘“An editorial writt,en ~J the editor-in-chief of Al Abram ad-

\’ocated ratification of the N PT on precisely these grounds. SeeSelirn in Katz, op. cit., p, 156.

“’’See CSIS, op. cit., p. 56,


of other nations could be directed at enhanc-ing Saudi Arabia’s capability to limit thespread of nuclear weapons technology in theregion and to ensure the peaceful orientationof such programs.

Some believe that Saudi Arabia may haveprovided financing for Pakistan’s nuclear pro-gram in order to preclude exclusive coopera-tion between Pakistan and either Iraq orLibya. Assistance to Iraq for reconstructionof its reactor could be given in such a way asto restrain Iraq from producing weapons.Another method would be to emphasize re-gional security interests through organiza-tions such as the Gulf Cooperation Council asa counterbalance to unilateral weapons pro-duction programs in individual states.

Other Limiting Factors

For Middle Eastern nations wishing to pur-sue a nuclear weapons path, gaining sufficientweapon-grade fissionable materials (with allthe accompanying technical expertise re-quired) presents a more serious constraintthan does weapons design or delivery. As Mid-dle Eastern nations develop the technical man-power and industrial infrastructure to produceindependently weapons-grade nuclear materi-als, the design and fabrication of simple, low-yield (10- to 20-kiloton) fission weapons willalso become feasible. Assuming that suchweapons would weigh as little as 1,000 pounds—much less than those first produced by theUnited States–delivery using aircraft alreadyin the region would be possible.

Therefore, if Middle Eastern nations are ableto produce nuclear weapons, they will proba-bly also be able to deliver them with a moder-ately high probability of success, at leastagainst their immediate neighbors. With smallair forces, limited numbers of bases, and lim-ited air defense capabilities, such delivery sys-tems are, however, likely to be quite vulnera-ble to destruction by preemptive attack, eitherconventional or nuclear. Given the technicaldifficulty and additional expense required, ini-tial nuclear capabilities are not likely to be ofa “secure second-strike” character.

One final issue is the expense of nuclearweapons programs. Based on historical data,a small dedicated nuclear weapons programwould cost about $300 million annually.111

Such an expenditure would, of course, be morefeasible for the richer oil-producing nations,but it would not be prohibitive for many coun-tries in the Islamic Middle East. Four coun-tries-Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—could operate such a program over 10 yearsat a cost less than 3 percent of their annualdefense budgets.

Table 89 provides cost estimates of a dedi-cated program for each of the countries, usingaverage annual defense expenditures for the1970-79 period as a baseline for calculations.Historically, no nation that has developed anuclear weapons program has spent more than3 percent of its annual defense on such a pro-gram. 112 Some nations of the region could cer-tainly spend more than this amount, but it isquite possible that bureaucratic infightingamong military leaders would result if the pro-gram were seen to be jeopardizing improvedconventional capabilities. As table 89 indi-cates, the economic constraints would be muchgreater for phase 2 and 3 programs, which in-clude dedicated delivery systems and devel-opment of a secure second-strike capability.

These conclusions should not, however, beinterpreted to indicate that there is little causefor concern about nuclear weapons prolifera-tion in the Middle East. In the years ahead,as new suppliers enter the market it may wellbe that developing countries determined to ob-tain nuclear weapons will be able to acquirethe required technical assistance and sensitivefacilities more easily. This is a major themeof the section which follows. In addition, po-litical variables will continue to weigh heavilyin determining the prospects for proliferation.If one nation in the region were to demonstrateits nuclear capability, this would probably———

111Estimates are based on costs of the Indian Phase 1 pro-gram and include costs of heavy-water and nuclear-grade graph-ite. See Thomas W. Graham, “The Economics of Nuclear Weap-ons in Nth Countries,” in Brito, et al., op. cit., pp. 16-18.

112Stephen Meyer, The Dynamics of Proliferation (Cambridge,Mass.: Ballinger, 1983).


Table 89.—Hypothetical Cost of Dedicated Nuclear Proliferation Program for Selected Countries

Percent of defense budget -

—Average annual defense Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

Country expenditure (1970-79) ($300 million) ( $ 2 b i l l i o n ) ($5 bill ion)

Algeria ., ., ., ., . . . . 447 6.7 44.7 111 - – –

Egypt . . . ., ., 1636 1,8 12,2 30Iran a . 7596 0.4 2.6 7Iraq ., ., 1811 1,6 11.0 28Jordan . . . . . 236 12,7 84.7 212Kuwait . . . . . . . . . 716 4,1 27.9 69Lebanon . . . . . . . . . 97 30.8 205.0 514Libya, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 7,1 47.8 119Morocco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478 6.2 41.5 105Oman ..., . . . . . . . . . 530 5,7 37.7 94Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . 718 4.1 27.8 70Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6802 .5 2 9 7Syria ., ..., . . . . . . — — — —Tunisia ., ..., ..., ., 67 44.0 297 742N o r t h Y e m e n 107 27,9 186 465South Yemen . . . . . , . . . , 55 53,7 350 896USE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 15,9 106 266

Selected countries of proliferation concernA r g e n t i n a 1245 2,4 16,0 40Brazil . . . . . . . . 1785 1.6 11.2 28India ., ., ..., ., ..., 3111 1,0 6.4 16Israel .. . . . . . . 3361 0.9 5.9 15Pakistan ., . . . . . . . 913 3,3 21.9 55South Africa ., . . . . . . . . 1410 2.1 14.1 35S o u t h K o r e a . . , . . 1739 1,0 11.4 29—aData for rerevolutlonary Iran.

. —

NOTE Phase 1 Acquisition of a few fission devices based on plutonium (includes both demonstrated and ’bomb In the basement type programs)Phase 2 Acquisition of a thermonuclear weapons capability with a dedicated aircraft delivery system.Phase 3 Development of a secure second strike capability

SOURCES US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 19701979 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office, 1982) Thomas W Graham The Economics of Producing Nuclear Weapons in Nth Countries in Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation, Brito,et al (eds) (Lexington Mass Lexington Books 1983)

stimulate weapons programs in other states.Military conflict and political disputes in theregion thus heighten the danger of prolif-eration.

Even if a nuclear weapons program weremade a matter of highest national priority, noIslamic country in the region is now capableof producing a nuclear device on a wholly in-digenous basis within this decade, and mostwould have difficulty doing so before the turnof the century. Therefore, while political andmilitary conflicts continue in the region, theweak technical capabilities of these nations re-

duce their ability to obtain weapons-grade ma-terials in domestic facilities and to produce nu-clear devices. Egypt, the nation with thestrongest technical manpower base, might bein position to independently produce a nuclearweapon by the end of the 1990’s if policieswere changed to emphasize development ofsensitive technologies. With the assistance offoreign experts willing to work in clandestineprograms, however, the technical manpowerconstraints to independent weapons produc-tion could be significantly diminished in theseMiddle Eastern countries.

35-507 0 - 84 - 26 : QL 3


SUPPLIER COUNTRY APPRoACHES TO NUCLEARTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Because Middle Eastern countries have lim-ited nuclear infrastructures, the possibility forand rate of proliferation will be strongly influ-enced by the amount and kind of external as-sistance provided by supplier nations. The pol-icies of the major nations supplying nucleartechnology worldwide—the United States,Great Britain, Canada, France, West Ger-many, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the SovietUnion-range from a reluctance to sell any nu-clear materials to countries in the Middle Eastto a willingness to sell sensitive facilities underIAEA safeguards. It is not likely, because oftreaty constraints and domestic political deci-sions, that any of the current suppliers wouldsell any type of unsafeguarded nuclear facil-ity to the region.

Nevertheless, the types of small-scale facil-ities and the nature of training and technicalassistance they are willing to provide will af-fect the rate at which Middle Eastern nationsdevelop indigenous capabilities to absorb nu-clear technologies-both for commercial andmilitary purposes. It is much more difficult toanticipate the policies which may be developedby new suppliers such as Argentina, Brazil,and India, which may enter the market in theyears ahead. While the “new” supplier nationsall have limited capabilities to produce nucleartechnologies and are not likely to export un-til the 1990’s, the fact that they are not par-ties to the NPT, and therefore not under obli-gation to require safeguards on the export ofnuclear materials or equipment, makes theirpolicies of particular concern.

U . S . P O L I C I E S

While different U.S. administrations haveplaced emphasis on different nuclear nonpro-liferation policy issues, American policies inpractice have precluded the sale of unsafe-guarded facilities or even sensitive safe-guarded facilities, such as enrichment or re-processing plants, to any Middle Easterncountry. U.S. sales of major nuclear items

such as reactors or fuel have generally beenmade only to countries accepting full-scopesafeguards on their facilities. It appears likelythat nuclear exports by U.S. firms will remaincomparatively limited to fuel, power reactors,or research reactors.113 It is not only thesetreaty and legislative obligations but also bi-partisan American leadership in internationalnonlproliferation efforts that indicate continua-tion and strengthening of policies designed tolimit nuclear proliferation. Amendments to theExport Administration Act passed separatelyby both the U.S. House of Representativesand Senate in 1983 and 1984 would, if enacted,widen the definition of prohibited nuclear ex-port items.

In addition, lower dependence of the UnitedStates on Middle Eastern oil nations reducesthe possibility that oil leverage could be usedto cause serious modification to these policies.U.S. firms such as General Electric and West-inghouse have emphasized sales of fuel cycleservices, such as fuel fabrication and spareparts, rather than reactor sales. Therefore,while the subdivisions of these companies pro-ducing reactors would obviously benefit fromincreased reactor exports, the firms are notsolely dependent on reactor sales. U.S.-maderesearch reactors are technically and financial-ly competitive on international markets, butin most cases require supplies of 25-percent

“’U.S. policies do not preclude assistance to nations not par-ties to the NPT, and in recent months nonsensitive spare partshave been provided to such nations in an effort to keep a dia-logue open with them, according to administration officials. See,for example, statement by Richard T. Kennedy before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs andInternational Economic Policy and Trade, House Foreign Af-fairs Committee, Nov. 1, 1983.

One type of proposed legislation would extend export restric-tions to a broad variety of dual-use items, primarily computers.This legislation would prohibit sales of any dual-use items tonations not signatories to the NPT. Another type of proposedlegislation which gained wider support in the 98th Congresswould expressly prohibit sales of nuclear components and tech-nology to nonsignatories. (In the view of proponents of the leg-islation, the fact that such sales are permitted while sales ofmajor nuclear items are prohibited amounts to a ‘ ‘loophole’which should be closed.)


enriched uranium. In addition, since 1977,Congress has reviewed all nuclear technologysales involving financing by the Export-Im-port Bank, with the result that exports of nu-clear technologies financed by the bank havedeclined in recent years.114

The United States has the most comprehen-sive export control system covering nuclearequipment and technology of any supplier na-tion. However, controversy has arisen as tohow this system can be strengthened. Recentchanges in the policies of the Reagan admin-istration, such as those loosening controls onreprocessing by friendly nations such as Ja-pan, have no significant or direct impact onthe nuclear programs of Middle Eastern na-tions. l15 However, critics worry that this“discriminatory’ nuclear export policy repre-sents a general softening in policy and leavesthe door open for reclassification of some de-veloping nations as not being proliferationrisks and therefore as potential buyers of sen-sitive U.S. facilities at some time in the future.

On the other hand, under the Reagan admin-istration countries such as Iraq, Libya, andIsrael, suspected of developing nuclear weap-ons, have been added to the list of nations re-quiring specific U.S. Department of Energyauthorization for exports of sensitive nucleartechnology by U.S. firms,’]’ As noted earlier,some advocate widening the scope of exportsbarred to non-NPT signatories (to additionalnuclear items, or to a broad array of dual-useitems). In neither case is it clear that the pro-hibitions would, if enacted, have strong or im-mediate impacts on the nuclear programs ofnations in the Islamic Middle East. 117

114 Export-import Bank of the United States, Report to the

U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, December 1982, p, 27, In1981, authorizations for nuclear power-related exports totaled$212 million, out of $1.3 billion for all energy-related exports.The Export-Import Bank supported no authorizations for nu-clear exports in 1982. See, Report to the U.S. Congress, 1983.

115 See Harry R.Marshall, Jr., “The Challenge of Nuclear Tech-nology, State Department Bulletin, September 1982.

‘‘6’’I)OFJ Moves to Expand List of Nations Needing Special(). K. for Nuclear Deals, ” Inside Energy, .Julj 2, 19H2, p. 4,

‘‘-l+lffects on (J. S. exports would be more sikmificant. I)uringthe ,Ju13T 19/! 1 -,June 1982 period, Israel imported $102 millionworth of dual-use equipment, while Saudi Arabia<s imports were\’alued at $179 million. See General Accounting Office, Con-trolling fi;xports of Dual-( {se, .Vuclear-I<elated fi;quipn]ent,GAO NSIAD-83-28, Sept. 29, 1983, p. 8,

Currently, about 6 percent of U.S. dual ex-ports go to these nations, and other suppliersare capable of providing both the dual-use andadditional nuclear items of concern.118 U.S.firms are not now major suppliers of nucleartechnology to nations of the Islamic MiddleEast which are nonsignatories to the NPT. Onthe other hand, in the view of proponents ofthe proposed legislation, dual-use exports canbe critical to nuclear programs and strength-ened prohibitions on nuclear and dual-usetrade with countries that have not acceptedfull-scope safeguards and are likely to them-selves become suppliers of nuclear technologyin the years ahead could contribute to U.S. nu-clear nonproliferation policies.

P O L I C I E S O F O T H E RW E S T E R N N A T I O N S

A number of nations such as Great Britain,Canada, Australia, and Japan, will probablymaintain their comparatively restrictive pol-icies on nuclear exports. Great Britain has notsold a nuclear reactor to any country for anumber of years, and its longstanding nonpro-liferation policies preclude sale of unsafe-guarded or sensitive nuclear facilities in theMiddle East. Canada and Australia are notlikely to provide assistance to any MiddleEastern nation that has not accepted full-scope safeguards.

Canada has recently reversed its previouspolicy of no nuclear sales to any Middle Eastnation. Therefore, sales of CANDU reactors,heavy-water production plants, and technol-ogy to nations covered by safeguards are pos-sible. Canada has ongoing negotiations withEgypt and Kuwait, and is marketing a 600-MWe reactor.

Japan has not yet substantially entered thenuclear export market but has the capacity todo so. However, it does not appear likely thatJapan would make its first independent for-eign sale in the Middle East. Mitsubishi, in ajoint bid with Westinghouse to market inEgypt, may provide nonnuclear equipment.

118GAO, Ibid. 1 srael and Saudi Arabia, both nonsignatoriesto the N I)’r, are among the largest single-countr}’ importers ofdual-use technologies from the United States.

394 ● Technology Transfer to the Middle East— — —

The Japanese Ministry of Trade and Indus-try initiated a feasibility and design study fora 200 to 300 M We reactor, indicating a poten-tial role for Japanese firms later in the century.

For a number of years, West Germany hasopposed the adoption of a blanket requirementfor full-scope safeguards by members of theLondon Suppliers’ Group.119 While West Ger-many has not sold reprocessing facilities toother countries since 1977, and has announcedit will not sell reprocessing plants, it did sellheavy-water production technology to Argen-tina, a country which has not accepted safe-guards on all of its nuclear facilities. West Ger-many has a strong nuclear power industry,and its firms are likely to remain importantcompetitors in world markets where firms likeKraftwerk Union make large proportions oftheir sales. Its ban on exports of reprocessingequipment reveals a commitment to nonpro-liferation policies, but the Germans have car-ried through with controversial agreements toprovide Brazil with sensitive facilities. TheBrazil-West Germany agreement does, how-ever, extend comparatively strict safeguardson German technology. The West Germanshave adhered to the guidelines of the NuclearSuppliers Group (NSG),120 but governmentspokesmen have also said that the specific sit-uation of each importing country should betaken into account, along with provisions ofthe NPT in nuclear exports.121

In the past, France has exported sensitivefacilities; the nation is not a party to the NPT.However, its agreement to the NSG guidelinessuggests that it will continue to require IAEAsafeguards, but probably not full-scope safe-guards, to nations that receive French nuclearassistance. France, like other exporters, isunder pressure to export because its reactor

. —.‘1yAll of the Western supplier nations discussed here are mem-

bers of the London Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was set upin the mid- 1970’s at U.S. initiative. The members have indi-vidually and unilaterally agreed to control exports of nucleartechnologies on the “trigger list. ”

“~he NSG has made an important contribution to extendingIAFIA safeguards and to standardizing the conditions for ac-quisition of sensitive technologies.

“)Joseph Pilat and Warren Donnelly, “Policies for NuclearP;xports, Cooperation and Non-Proliferation of Seven NuclearSupplier States, ” CRS Report No. 82-100 S, May 1982, p. 24.

production facilities are not utilized to capac-ity. The most likely Middle Eastern exportcandidate is Egypt, where negotiations for tworeactors are well advanced. French Govern-ment and business officials closely coordinatetheir export negotiation efforts, and talks havebeen held with nations such as Iraq, Morocco,and Algeria concerning possible reactor sales.

It is not clear whether the French will sellreprocessing facilities to Middle Eastern na-tions in the future, though they have an-nounced they will not do so and have notsigned contracts for export of sensitive facili-ties in recent years. French commercial con-siderations have been at least as prominent inFrench export policies in years past as non-proliferation issues. In certain instances, how-ever, they have exercised restraint: Francewithdrew from a contract to provide Pakistanwith a reprocessing plant owing to concernsabout Pakistan’s alleged effort to develop nu-clear explosives.

France may well refrain from selling com-mercial-scale sensitive facilities to MiddleEastern nations. In addition, French experi-ence with Iraq’s research reactor has led it tomove toward more stringent requirements onresearch reactor exports. However, France’slack of insistence on full-scope safeguards andthe commercially oriented nature of its nuclearexport policies are issues of concern from aproliferation standpoint.

Belgium and Italy provide nuclear assist-ance that is not directly required for near-termdevelopment of commercial power for peacefulpurposes. Both of these nations have suppliedsuch technologies to nations of particular pro-liferation concern–Libya and Iraq. Belgonu-cleaire has provided Libya with fuel fabrica-tion technology and is considering supplyingtechnologies that could be of concern if Libyawere to obtain centrifuge technology fromPakistan or to develop an indigenous enrich-ment program.122 The Italian Nuclear Agency(Comitato Nazionade per l’Energiie) has pro-vided Iraq with considerable nuclear assist-

—.122"Libya and Belgonucleaire of Belgium are in Detailed

[Talks], ” Nucleonics Week, vol. 23, Dec. 2, 1982, p. 4.


ance, including a range of laboratory-scale re-processing facilities.

In neither case is the type of assistance be-ing offered ‘‘sensitive’ in the sense that it canlead directly and quickly to the developmentof a nuclear weapons capability, but it will pro-vide Libya and Iraq with precursor technolo-gy that would make it easier for either nationto take such a step in the future. As notedabove, neither Libya nor Iraq is today in a pos-ition to develop such technology on an indig-enous basis, but the assistance contributes tothe development of their technical capabilities.The position taken by Italy and Belgium, bothparties to the NPT, is that their assistance isbeing provided under safeguards, and there isno indication that safeguards are being vio-lated. Given the stated interest of Libya, inparticular, in developing nuclear weapons, theUnited States has viewed this assistance asa matter of concern.

S O V I E T P O L I C I E S

The Soviet Union is a party to the NPT andhas historically been a strong supporter of acomprehensive nonproliferation regime, to agreat extent due to its experience with thespread of nuclear technology to China. It hasadvocated full-scope safeguards, participatesin the London Suppliers Group, has not as-sisted recipients in developing complete fuelcycle technologies, and has insisted that spentfuel from reactors it has supplied in EasternEurope be returned to the Soviet Union. TheSoviets, for example, strongly encouragedLibya to sign the NPT, which it did.

There are, however, some who argue that So-viet nonproliferation policy may become lessunified and strict in the years ahead. The So-viet Union and Eastern European nations thatmanufacture nuclear equipment may see it asboth politically and economically advantage-ous to expand exports to Middle Eastern de-veloping countries, thus gaining hard currencyand perhaps some political leverage. More-over, a loosening of U.S. nonproliferation re-solve might act to diminish that of the Soviets.

The signs of Soviet policy change are farfrom clear, however. Moscow’s dealings withLibya illustrate the point. The Soviet Unionconcluded its cooperation agreement with Lib-ya only after that nation had ratified the NPT,and waited to expand assistance until full-scope safeguards were instituted. The SovietUnion shipped 11.5 kg of HEU to Libya justbefore the full-scope safeguards went into ef-fect, a fact that some view as a sign of loosen-ing of controls and that others see as a tech-nicality. In addition, the Soviet Unioncontinues to supply Libya and other nationswith HEU instead of developing fuels of lowerenrichment. Observers note that it is not yetcertain whether or not the Soviet Union willrequire Libya to return spent fuel rods, but ithas done so in other cases thus far.

Some experts worry that Soviet nuclear ex-port policies are in flux and point to the de-stabilizing effects on the Middle East ifMoscow should move toward a more commer-cially or politically oriented nuclear assistancestance .123 It does not appear likely that Sovietpolicies will shift sharply and rapidly, but evena gradual diminution in proliferation resolvewould be a matter of serious concern in thecontext of the Middle East. For Libya andSyria, the Soviet Union is the major force de-termining the nature and extent of nucleartechnology acquisition. However, there is lit-tle concrete evidence that Soviet nuclear ex-port policies have changed.

N E W S U P P L I E R S T A T E S

While it maybe correct to assume that noneof the major suppliers listed above will pro-vide Middle Eastern nations with unsafe-guarded sensitive technologies needed forweapons development, a major question iswhether the “new” supplier states likely to en-ter the market in the years ahead will followthe same policy. Several countries such as Ar-

—123

Tyrus W. Cobb, “Small Nuclear Forces: Soviet Political andMilitary Responses, ’ paper prepared for the Georgetown Cen-ter for Strategic and International Studies and the Defense Nu-clear Agency, September 1982,


gentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and SouthAfrica have already engaged in a limitedamount of international nuclear commerce orhave the potential to do so. None of them havesigned international treaty agreements requir-ing them to place safeguards on their exports.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) re-fused to give Egypt nuclear weapons technol-ogies in the early 1960's and more recently re-fused Libya’s requests for nuclear weapons orsensitive nuclear technologies. While China re-portedly assisted Pakistan with sensitive nu-clear technology, it does not appear that anyMiddle Eastern nation is likely to provide aquid pro quo of advanced conventional mili-tary technology, as Pakistanis capable of do-ing. The PRC has also provided limitedamounts of basic nuclear training to countriesin the Middle East; however, it has recentlyjoined the IAEA, and its participation in safe-guards programs is expected.

Both Brazil and India have been pressuredby Iraq and Libya, respectively, to provide nu-clear materials and technology, but in bothcases no sensitive technology was transferred.Thus new suppliers have exercised some re-straints, indicating willingness to supportsome parts of the nonproliferation regime. Itwas no coincidence that as Iraq found itselfincreasingly unable to buy nuclear technolo-gies from major Western suppliers it turnedto Brazil, a nation purchasing 40 percent ofits oil from Iraq. Brazil’s response was meas-ured. The nation diversified its oil imports andconcluded an agreement with West Germanyensuring that no retransfer of West Germantechnology to Iraq would occur.

Nevertheless, concern remains that Iraqmight receive uranium hexafluoride (a feed ma-terial for enrichment) and relatively primitivecentrifuge technology from Brazil since theyare not covered in the Brazil-West GermanyAccord. While Brazilian officials deny thatthey have supplied Iraq with uranium, the nu-clear cooperation agreement signed with Iraqin 1979 calls for a supply of uranium, joint re-search and experimentation, uranium explora-tion technology, finished fuel elements, equip-

ment and engineering services for reactorconstruction. 124 The policies of new supplier na-tions like Brazil will be extremely importantin determining the prospects for Middle East-ern nuclear proliferation.

Libya turned to Pakistan with requests fornuclear technology when France tightened upits policies on nuclear exports. Countries suchas Libya and Saudi Arabia have reportedlycontributed financially to Pakistan’s nuclearprogram, with Arab credits valued at $1 bil-lion extended to Pakistan for various purposesduring the 1974-76 period.125 Pakistanis highon the list of nations of nuclear proliferationconcern. Reports that Pakistan was buildinga small clandestine reprocessing plant andthat the nation had assembled a small enrich-ment plant through purchases of specializedequipment ostensibly destined for other proj-ects indicate the nation’s steps down the pathtoward nuclear weapons capability.

Some have argued that because of Islamictraditions, as well as growing economic inter-action between Pakistan and the oil-producingstates of the Gulf, Pakistan is the most likelycandidate to retransfer nuclear technology tothe Middle East. 126 Despite reports of Arab fi-nancial contributions to Pakistan, there is noevidence that Pakistan has transferred sensi-tive nuclear technologies. It has not been a ma-jor supplier of nuclear technologies to anyMiddle Eastern nation, and has made assur-ances to the U.S. Government that it will nottransfer sensitive nuclear technology. It ap-pears that relations between Libya and Pakis-tan cooled after the ouster of Prime MinisterBhutto.

The most important potential “new” sup-plier of nuclear technology to the Middle Eastmay be India. With its comparatively broadnuclear and industrial base, and its expandedforeign policies in the region, India may playa greater role in the years ahead. Indeed, in

‘24’’ Brazil and Iraq Signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agree-merit, ” Nucleonics Week, vol. 21, Jan. 17, 1980, p. 10.

‘25 Pzljak, op. cit., p. 68.12’ Steve Weismarm and Herbert Krosney, The lslm”c Bomb

(New ‘York: Times Books, 1981).


1979 it signed an agreement to provide Libyawith sensitive nuclear technology.127 The In-dian nuclear scientists who were to be involvedin the transfer objected, and Libya respondedby terminating a 2 million-ton oil contract withIndia. After a period of strained relations, Lib-yan scientists began training in India in lesssensitive areas such as theoretical nuclearstudies, reactor operations, and medical appli-cations.

This incident illustrates that despite consid-erable oil leverage exerted by Libya, India ap-parently refrained from transferring sensitivetechnologies. Thus, it would be a mistake toassume that Third World solidarity (or otherfactors such as common religious heritage) willnecessarily dictate the policies of the new sup-plier states, Nevertheless, the potential forproliferation increases as new suppliers notparties to the NPT enter the market.

—‘“Argonne National Laboratory, Mrorki i,’ner~r Data S.\ Fs-

terns, (’ountr~’ Data: I.ib?ra, vd. 3, 1979.

CONCLUSIONS: THE FUTURE OF NUCLEARTECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

AND OPTIONSF U T U R E P R O S P E C T S F O RN U C L E A R T E C H N O L O G Y

T R A N S F E R S

No Islamic Middle Eastern nation is in aposition to carry out a commercial reactor pro-gram on a wholly indigenous basis during thenext decade, and most will not have the capa-bility in the year 2000. The major constraintson commercial nuclear power development inthe region include a shortage of appropriatelytrained scientists, engineers, and skilled craftworkers; an absence of interconnected electri-city grids; and the disincentive provided bythe presence of alternative sources of energy.As indicated in table 86, only Egypt, Iran,Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia might be able to in-stall a 900 MWe power reactor not exceeding10 percent of their electricity grids by the year1990.

Nations that choose a turnkey plant strat-egy can minimize the salience of manpowerconstraints, but this implies continuing de-pendence on foreign suppliers. Egypt is theMiddle Eastern nation with the strongest ra-tionale for a commercial nuclear program andwith the largest technical manpower base tosupport one, but Egypt has decided to importturnkey plants and to rely on foreign assist-ance for some years to come.

FOR U.S. POLICYDeveloping countries in the Middle East

may expand nuclear research programs in theyears ahead, even in the absence of commer-cial nuclear power programs. Such research isviewed by many developing countries as essen-tial for building their indigenous technologi-cal infrastructures, permitting more effectiveuse of imported technologies.128

Acquisition of commercial light-water reac-tors without sensitive nuclear facilities posesno direct or significant threat of weapons pro-liferation. However, even small-scale reproc-essing facilities (components of peaceful re-search programs) could be used (albeit withdifficulty) to produce plutonium for nuclearweapons.

The Middle Eastern nation that has mostoutspokenly stated its ambitions to carry outa nuclear weapons program, Libya, also hasan extremely limited technical infrastructure,which will force it to continue to depend onforeign suppliers for many years to come.Egypt, and perhaps Iraq, may have the tech-nical capability needed to produce a nucleardevice in the next decade. (In the case ofEgypt, the agreement to safeguards and the

‘ “SW hlichael J. \lora\’(’sik, “’1’hc Role of $k.ience in ‘I’ec>h-nolog}r Transfer, Rt’.warch }’oli(s,~, 12 { 13831, pp. 287-296. foran elahorat ion of this point.


emphasis on acquisition of nuclear technolo-gies needed for a peaceful nuclear power pro-gram indicate an absence of intention to do so.)

For nations of the Middle East, financingand delivery systems do not present great ob-stacles to development of small weapons pro-grams. More important are manpower con-straints (particularly in the near term) andpolitical factors, including the policies of sup-plier nations.

Overt proliferation has not occurred in theMiddle East. One major explanation is surelythat the suppliers have not been willing totransfer sensitive technologies without ade-quate safeguards. Thus, the nonproliferationregime through which suppliers limit their ex-ports has been the major factor influencing thepace and nature of proliferation in the region.This analysis underscores the critical impor-tance of the “new” supplier states and theneed to bring them into the nonproliferationregime. Incentives for latent proliferation canbe expected to persist and grow, however, andsafeguards cannot fully guarantee that facili-ties are used for peaceful purposes.

Assuming that the current situation contin-ues and disputes between Israel and its Arabneighbors and among Islamic countries areprolonged, the possibility of nuclear weaponsproliferation may increase in the Middle Eastduring the next 20 years. There are two rea-sons for this pessimistic conclusion: 1) the newsupplier states may be more willing to trans-fer sensitive technologies, and 2) nations in theregion will gradually improve the technicalmanpower and infrastructures required to sup-port weapons programs. Unless a nuclear de-vice is actually used, most of the nations inthe region will probably move slowly towarddeveloping expertise and importing facilitiesneeded to start a weapons program. Neverthe-less, technological advances such as develop-ment of laser isotope separation would in-crease the potential for nuclear weaponsproliferation.

While it is impossible to anticipate the wayin which nuclear weapons proliferation mightoccur, there are a number of possibilities. A

new supplier state might provide sensitive andunsafeguarded facilities, perhaps in exchangefor oil supply guarantees. The reluctance ofboth Brazil and India to succumb to such pres-sure exerted by Iraq and Libya suggests thatthe new suppliers would probably have to per-ceive a significant threat to their security in-terests to do so. Likewise, the policies of oneof the major Western nations or the SovietUnion now supplying nuclear technologiesmight change, permitting freer transfer of sen-sitive nuclear technologies.

Still another possibility is that nationsmight accelerate their progress down the pathto nuclear weapons production through jointprograms, perhaps involving some of the new-er supplier states. On the other hand, it is dif-ficult to imagine which nations might forge apolitical alliance strong enough to supportsuch a joint program over a number of years.In addition, it is not clear which suppliersmight be induced to participate, even underthe guise of a peaceful program.

A nation or nonstate group might try to pur-chase or steal a nuclear device. However, na-tions such as Libya have failed in their at-tempts to do so. In addition, detonation of asingle nuclear device is unlikely to provide thelong-term deterrence or defense capability re-quired.

The most likely pattern for nuclear prolif-eration in the Middle East may, therefore, bea slow and indirect path. Given the technicaldependence of most of these nations, they maychoose to develop their technical manpowerbases and import nuclear technologies thatcan be justified as parts of a peaceful nuclearprogram, thus increasing their capabilities toinstitute a weapons program sometime downthe road if they make the political decision todo SO. Assuming that suppliers continue to re-quire IAEA safeguards, however, the proba-bility would be high that covert weapons pro-duction programs could be detected.

U . S . P O L I C Y O P T I O N S

OTA's analysis of nuclear technology trans-fers to the Middle East indicates that while


U.S. leadership in establishing the nonprolif-eration regime has been important, only a lim-ited number of policy options are available andeven fewer exist that the United States couldintroduce unilaterally with significant effect.

Options that the United States could adoptunilaterally include an extension of restric-tions on Government-supported financing ofnuclear exports by the U.S. Export-ImportBank. Export-Import Bank support for nucle-ar sales has declined sharply in recent years,and this is seen by many as contributing tothe reduced overseas sales of reactors by U.S.firms. ’z’ However, sales of turnkey reactors donot by themselves pose a nuclear weapons pro-liferation risk, and they contribute only indi-rectly and over a very long time to buildinga technical manpower base in developing na-tions. U.S. firms may form partnerships withforeign firms and seek financing elsewhere.Another possibility might be to selectivelysubsidize reactor sales to countries that acceptstringent nonproliferation restrictions. In thiscase, nuclear technology would be used as areward to countries that agree to certain po-litical conditions.

Second, the United States could move tolimit the number of foreign students admittedto nuclear physics and engineering programs.However, only in the case of Iran under theShah have large numbers of Middle Easternstudents been enrolled in such U.S. programs.In view of lack of precise information aboutwhat foreign students are studying, it wouldbe difficult to implement such restrictions.Moreover, because of the apparently smallnumber of Middle Eastern students currentlyenrolled in such programs, it appears that U.S.leverage is not strong, Associated questionsof the freedom of American academic institu-tions would certainly be raised, and develop-ing countries in other parts of the world mightreact negatively. Finally, since foreign stu-

— -.“’1’hese restrictions do not prohihit U.S. firms from turning

to foreign goy’ernments for financing. I n late 19R3{ it was an-nounced that Westinghouse and the ,J apanese firm NI itsuhishihad decided to bid jointly on the F;gyptian reactor contract,presumably with financing pro~rided h} ,Japanese hanking in-stitutions.

dents are free to enroll in programs in othersupplier nations, U.S. restrictions would notseverely restrict their ability to study in thesefields unless other supplier nations institutedsimilar restrictions.

A more positive type of approach that theUnited States could independently pursuewould be an extension of nuclear cooperationagreements with other Middle Eastern na-tions, similar to that with Egypt. In many re-spects, the U.S.-Egyptian nuclear accord rep-resents a model by virtue of its detail and thestrength of safeguard provisions. One argu-ment in favor of extending such accords is thatthe offer of assistance to a developing nationmight be more persuasive than the threat ofdenial of U.S. technologies. However, in orderfor cooperation agreements to be perceived bythe recipient as significant, real assistancemust be provided, resulting in the recipientdeveloping greater technical capability. Coop-eration agreements of this type are most easilynegotiated with nations having close relationswith the United States. Failure to followthrough with cooperative efforts or inconsis-tent policies (e.g., those limiting financing ofU.S. nuclear exports to Egypt) can lead to fric-tions which may diminish the importance ofthe agreements.

The United States could also make greaterefforts to assist nations in developing alter-native energy sources and to help them assessthe feasibility of nuclear power. Of the possi-ble alternatives or supplements to nuclearpower in the region, the role of indigenous nat-ural gas and the potential for greater efficien-cies in energy-use merit further analysis on acountry-by-country basis. Such assistanceshould be viewed as strongly contributing toU.S. nonproliferation policies. Those who op-pose U.S. assistance to commercial nuclearpower programs would welcome expanded ef-forts to develop alternative energy sources inthese countries.

A number of other policy options would re-quire coordination with other suppliers. Oneapproach would be to continue support for thedevelopment of low-enriched uranium fuels in


programs such as the Argonne National Lab-oratory research and test reactor (RERTR)program. In addition, study of the plutoniumproduction potential of research reactorsshould be promoted so that technical refine-ments could be introduced that would makeit difficult to misuse such reactors. Becauserisks of proliferation are smaller when researchreactors with a capacity of less than 10 MWtand fueled by low-enriched uranium are used,other suppliers could be encouraged to providesuch types of research reactors. Nations suchas the Soviet Union could also be encouragedto provide only low-enriched uranium fuel.

In addition, a very important contributionwould be to clarify the upper bounds on hotcells and other fuel cycle facilities and to estab-lish limits on their export. The United Statescould also make a major effort to develop andmaintain a consensus among suppliers thatthey not assist in the development of capabil-ities that will permit Middle Eastern nationsto separate kilogram quantities of plutoniumper year from irradiated fuel. Similarly, theUnited States could encourage formation ofa consensus not to export enrichment technol-ogies to the region. Such efforts could be com-bined with a willingness to cooperate withMiddle Eastern nations in nuclear power andcivilian research programs.

The United States can continue to promotestrengthened safeguards, such as the use ofremote sensing in reactor cores and more fre-quent inspections. While critics have pointedout the potential weaknesses of safeguards,

the safeguards system contributes to the iden-tification of potential proliferators. It isunlikely that international safeguards can besubstantially strengthened outside the IAEAand the NPT. The IAEA is the major inter-national working organization involved in nu-clear training and technology transfer, and theU.S. must participate in order to influence itsprograms.

In the past, the United States has encour-aged nations to sign the NPT. In the MiddleEast, a number of key nations including Al-geria, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have not signedthe treaty. It maybe difficult to persuade Sau-di Arabia to sign the NPT unless equal pres-sure is placed on Israel. In the case of Algeria,Soviet and French support would be critical,and French nonaccession is a definite liabilityin this respect. Agreement by the countries ofthe region to a nuclear test ban treaty couldalso limit the prospects for detonation of a nu-clear device.

Policy options open to the United States arethus limited, and most of those likely toachieve significant results require the cooper-ation of other nations supplying nuclear tech-nology. It is clear that Middle Eastern coun-tries no longer regard the United States as theworld’s dominant supplier of nuclear technol-ogies, and that a number of them may developnuclear power for peaceful purposes in theyears ahead. It is therefore essential that U.S.energy and nonproliferation policies stressmultilateral efforts to reduce the spread of nu-clear weapons.

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