nuclear power in japan: fukushima and after

Nuclear power in Japan: Fukushima and after

Richard TanterNautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

[email protected]

http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications

Royal Australian Chemical Institute, Health Safety & Environment Group1, at Risk Engineering Society,

1 September 2011

2

Outline

• What happened at Fukushima?• What is the situation at Fukushima now?• What will happen from now on?• What have been the health and environmental consequences?• Why did these events occur?• What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?• What are the implications beyond Japan?

3

1. What happened at Fukushima?

•

4

Nuclear plants and facilities in Japan

5

Nuclear power plants in Japan

6

Unit 4 reactor schematic - NHK

7

Boiling Water reactor System

8

BWR reactor vessel

9

Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP, 11 March

Pre-quake: – Units 1,2,3 operating; – Units 5 and 6 offline in cold shutdown; – Unit 4 offline; defueled November 2010

14.46 Magnitude 9 earthquake 135 km offshore at – Automatic shutdown of Units 1,2, and 3.– Offsite power is lost. – Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) provide coolant power

15.46 14 metre-tsunami breaches plant seawalls and inundates most of the plant– Emergency generators knocked out– Battery powered pumping system starts; fails by March 12.

19.30 Fuel assemblies in Unit 1 completely exposed

10

Japanese government report to IAEA: Fukushima “worse than meltdown?”

Source: “'Melt-through' at Fukushima? / Govt report to IAEA suggests situation worse than meltdown”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 June 2011.

11

Explosions and fires

• March 12: – 15.36 Unit 1 hydrogen explosion destroys upper

structure exposing fuel pond; 4 workers injured• March 14

– 11.01 Unit 3 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure exposing fuel pond; 6 workers injured

• March 15 – Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond– Hydrogen explosion in Unit 2; suspected damage to

wet-well in primary containment.– Explosion at Unit 4 spent fuel pond

12

Spent fuel at Fukushima I NPP

Source: Masa Takubo, cited by David Wright, More on Spent Fuel Pools at Fukushima, All Things Nuclear, March 21, 2010

• March 16– Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond

• March 23

– Fire reported at base of heavily damaged Unit 3

13

Fukushima I NPP, 2004

Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011

14

Fukushima I NPP, March 12, before explosion of Unit 1


15

March 13, after explosion of Unit 1


16

March 14, 1 minute before explosion of Unit 3


17

March 14, 3 minutes after explosion of Unit 3


18

March 14

19

Seawater pump - March 17

Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome.org

20

Flooded electric equipment room, Unit 6, March 17

Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome.org

21

Potential steam production by radioactive afterheat

Source: Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, “Containment of a Reactor Meltdown,” Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982

22

BWR nuclear fuel structure

23

2. What is the situation at Fukushima now?

24

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:a. reactors and spent fuel

Source: Status of countermeasures for restoring from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 through 4. As of August 30th, 2011. (Estimated by JAIF)

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

Core and fuel integrity

Damaged (core melt

Damaged (core melt*

Damaged (core melt

No fuels loaded

RPV structural integrity

Partially damaged and leaking

Unknown Unknown No damage

PCV structural integrity

Damage and leaking suspected



No damage

Spent fuels in the SFP

292 587 514 1331

Fuel integrity in SFP

Unknown Most spent fuels not damaged

Unknown Most spent fuels not damaged

SFP cooling Function recovered

Function recovered

Function recovered

Function recovered

25

Source: Asahi Shimbun 10 August 2011

26

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:b. contaminated water leakage and water storage

• Contamination of huge volumes of sea-water and freshwater injected and sprayed into containment buildings and spent fuel ponds– Some released to sea– Most stored onsite in turbine building basement, etc.– Some stored on floating barges

• Highly radioactive leakages from damaged reactor pressure vessels and containment vessels– into sea and into groundwater

27Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:c. Site debris and contamination

28

Key current site operations

• Heat exchange of cooling water to CPV/RPV • Decontamination of radioactive water in containment vessel, in

flooded areas, and in storage– As of 9 August, 42,000 tonnes processed, but 120,000 tonnes

remained on site; expected end-year goal of 200,000 tonnes now unlikely

• Reducing/eliminating onsite radioactive hotspots• Covering all four units with steel and plastic to reduce air-borne

contamination

29

Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule

Source: Fukushima Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule, NikkeiNet, 17 August 2011

30

3. What will happen from now on?• Units 1-4 to be decommissioned; Units 5-6 unclear• New TEPCO “roadmap” presented to JAEC 31 August

– Plastic covering for Units 1-4 to contain airborne radiation matter

– Cold shut down by January 2012 ….?– By end-2011will start building ground shield between Units 1-4

and sea• 800 metres long and 20 metres deep• possible extension around whole of Units 1-4

• Removal of fuel from spent fuel ponds 1-4• Removal of spent fuel from reactors 1-4• Removal of corium from Units 1,2 and 3 - from RPV and/or CPV

– 10-50 years before attempt at reactor/corium removal possible• Decontamination, dismantling and clean-up …. Sometime in the

future

31

Model of plastic

coverage for Unit 1

Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release

32

Unit 1 plastic cover: before and after

Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release

33

Seaward-side water shield plan

Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6.

34

Seaward-side water shield - schematic cross-section(piles: 1 metre diameter, 14-22 mm. thick, 22-23 metres deep)


35

Fukushima No.1 NPP hydrology (pre-quake data)


36

Cross-section of hydrology model (pre-quake data)


37

Underground water trajectory modelling schematic


38

Anticipated underground water levels with seaside-ward water shield in place


39

The corium issue: corium lava flow at Chernobyl

Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html

40

The corium issue: corium “elephant’s foot uranium fuel flow in Chernobyl NPP basement

Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html

41

The corium issue:Three Mile Island NPP Core End-

State Configuration

Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/cor

ium.html

42

4. What have been the health and environmental consequences?

• Immediate injuries and deaths• Longterm radiation illness and mortality• Temporary social disruption from accident

consequences– social, economic, psychological

• Longterm social consequences– How many former residents can never go back?

43

Schematic of 31 August accident at cesium

decontamination equipment: two workers drenched

Source: TEPCO, 1 September 2011

44

Ionising radiation maximum permissible dose limits (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)

• Average background radiation: 2-3 mSv/y; half due to radon gas• General population: 1 mSv

– Japan: women regulated at 5 mSv over 3 mo– 1 mSv/y ~ 0.11 microSv/h

• Radiation workers:– 100 mSv over 5 y with no more than 50 mSv in any year

• ICRP recommendations accidents/emergencies: – In lower part of 1-20 mSv range for public – Workers – 100 mSv, ICRP up to 500 for volunteers in emergency

rescue operations– Post-Fukushima Japan:

• 250 mSv/y workers• 20 mSv for public including children

• Codex Alimentarius Commission food recommendations based on max 1 mSv/y assuming contaminated food max 10% of diet

45Source:AREVA

Fukushima radiation releases, 11-20 March 2011

(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)

46Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.

47

US Fukushima radiation monitoring, to April 29


48

Zoning criteria Belarus 1991

kBq/m2 Individual dose (mSv)

Zone

>1480 >5 Priority resettlement

555-1480 <5 Secondary resettlement

185-555 >1 Resettlement rights

37-185 <1 Periodic radiation monitoring

ICRP 111, 2009

49

Applying Chernobyl evacuation criteria to Fukushima

• Red and most yellow is > Chernobyl relocation zone (>1480 kBq/m2)

• Rest of yellow, green, light blue and some dark blue is > Chernobyl dose reduction zone

• Cs 137 T1/2 =30 years


50

Protective measures

• Evacuation for est ext >50 mSv– 20 vs 80 km; late – still ongoing to ?end June

• Sheltering – for ext est >10mSv, esp 20-30 km zone • Acceptance increased exposures• Stable iodine – appears not used?

– initial evacuation completed by time instruction issued VII-9 GOJ IAEA subm 6.11)

• Food and water monitoring and restrictions• Local monitoring• Remediation – including local initiative eg schools• Long-term health assessment planned – details sparse

51

Killing them softly: radiation exposure limits for workers and children

• International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendation for workers:

– maximum permissible annual dose of 20 mSv averaged over five years– no more than 50 mSv in any one year.

• Japanese worker exposure standard:– Pre-crisis: 100 mSv p.a– Post-crisis “emergency” exposure limits: 250 mSv p.a.

• Resignation of Kosako Toshiso, Tokyo University, – Appointed Special Advisor to Cabinet, March 16; resigned 29 April – Reported METI now discussing 500 mSv emergency exposure limit for

workers– Refused to approve promulgation of children’s exposure level at “3.8 µSv

per hour” on the basis of “20 mSv per year”

• See Tilman Ruff, Children of Fukushima need our protection, The Age

52

MEXT data on Cesium-137 soil contamination, 29-30 August

Sources: “34 spots top Chernobyl evacuation standard”, Daily Yomiuri Online, 31 August 2011; original data: MEXT: http://radioactivity.mext.go.jp/

“According to a soil contamination map submitted at a study meeting of the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry, six municipalities recorded more than 1.48 million becquerels of cesium 137 per square meter--the standard used for forced resettlement after the 1986 Chernobyl accident.”

53

Social effects

• Short- and medium-term evacuation • Loss of livelihood• Damage to deep cultural roots• No return zones• Compensation

54

Nuclear labour - the return of the nuclear gypsies

• Pre-crisis Fukushima NPP 1 labour force– Regular employees (seisha’in 正社員 )= 1,1,08– Contract employees (hiseisha’in 非正社員 ) = 9,195 [“day labourers”]

• 2009 worker radiation exposure at Fukushima No. 1 NPP– “of those who received a dose between 5 and 10 millisieverts (mSv), there

were 671 contract laborers against 36 regular employees. – “Those who received between 10 and 15 mSv were comprised of 220 contract

laborers and 2 regular workers, while 35 contract workers and no regular workers were exposed to a dose between 15 and 20 mSv”

• Post-crisis nuclear gypsy recruitment– More than 2,000 workers now onsite; – TEPCO planning to raise to 3,000– Recruited by construction company:

- jobs advertised for “10,000 yen for three hours work per day”• Paul Jobin, “Dying for TEPCO? Fukushima’s Nuclear Contract

Workers”, Japan Focus, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Paul-Jobin/3523

55

6. Why did this happen?

• Levels of cause• immediate/proximate causes :

– Earthquake plus tsunami– Remediation efforts generating new problems (e.g.

contaminated water)• Immediate failures in risk assessment and management

– E.g. sea-wall height known to be inadequate since 2008– E.g. subsequent discovery of five active fault lines

immediately offshore

56

Distant/ultimate causes

• Gradations of strength/salience• Japanese nuclear industrial regulation and safety

regimes• TEPCO as a repeat offender/rogue company

• Weakness of Japanese political structures

57

7. What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?

58

The forgotten side of Japan as a nuclear power: as many planned NPP as succeeded were abandoned due to widespread and long-lasting local opposition.

Source: courtesy Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo

59

Nuclear facilities: actual Nuclear projects abandoned

Source: CNIC, 原子力市民年鑑 2008 年

60

Nuclear power plants in operation as of end-August

61

Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum

6 months after Fukushima three-quarters of Japan’s nuclear power plants offline or shut-down

62


Nuclear Power Plants in

operation, as of 4 September

2011

Hokkaido Electric Power

Tomari-3 Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1 Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5

Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO)

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6 Mihama-2 Takahama-2 Takahama-3

Kansai Electric Power

Ohi-2

Chugoku Electric Power

Shimane-2

Shikoku Electric Power Ikata-2 Genkai-1 Kyushu Electric Power Genkai-4

63

Nuclear Power Plants in operation, as of 4 September, 2011

Hokkaido Electric Tomari-3

Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO)

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1



Kansai Electric Power

Mihama-2

Takahama-2

Takahama-3

Ohi-2

Chugoku Electric Power Shimane-2

Shikoku Electric Power Ikata-2

Kyushu Electric PowerGenkai-1

Genkai-4


65

Energy requirements and supply options

66

What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?

• Expansion of output from remaining thermal and hydroplants.

• Note only 13 NPP online at present.

• Great success of energy conservation and efficiency measures in Tokyo and Tohoku

– E.g. TEPCO capacity fell from 64,000 MW to 56,400 MW; but peak summer demand has been 49,000MW

• Spotlight on utility regional monopolies and regional “islands”

• Alternative energy pathways:– Energy efficiency– Renewable energy– Distributed generation

• Note: all three require construction of smart grids

67

The utilities as islands

68

Smart grids

69

Japan effects: nuclear power mortally wounded

• Nuclear politics in Japan– Grassroots opposition– Nuclear alliance - makers, utilities, METI, LDP/DJP– JAEC

• Revolt– Release of previously suppressed information

• Safety• Costs• spent fuel cul de sac

– Politicians will never again trust the nuclear alliance to keep them safe– Public trust

• likelihood of corruption revelations over Fukushima NPP I – design and construction and operation

– the failure of the plutonium project: Rokkasho reprocessing facility and the fast breeder reactors

– >> support for “once-through” NPP process as first step.– Non-nuclear energy producers

70

The nuclear alliance, utilities nuclear manufacturers and the bureaucracy• TEPCO will be bankrupt before the clean-up is complete• Nationalisation as risk displacement onto tax-payers• The clean-up bonus for anyone by TEPCO

• Power companies as fiefdoms; • power grids as islands

• Industry restructuring:– Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Hitachi nuclear division merger– MHI and other nuclear companies also reviewin non-nuclear divisions– Rapid expansion of solar industries.

• Export policies and possibilities after Fukushima– Japan in world nuclear industry competition

• The Jordan deal• The Vietnam deal

– Cf Korea– Cf France– Cf China– Russia

71

Structure of nuclear safety regulation - pre-Fukushima

Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission

72

Oversight process - - pre-

Fukushima


73

Nuclear emergency response - on paper


74

Oversight process - - pre-

Fukushima


75

Regulatory changes

• Dismissal of senior METI and NISA personnel• Replacement of NISA• Cabinet ratification of reduction of role of nuclear

energy in national energy policy• Revision of costing procedures in comparative

evaluations of energy sources to include accident compensation, clean-up, and full decommissioning costs.

76

Multiple investigations

PM Kan announced investigation principles and goals:• To abide by the three principles of independence, openness and

comprehensiveness.• the committee will:1. be independent of the existing nuclear administration. 2. release all its facts and findings to the public and the international

community, and 3. examine not just the accident’s technical aspects, but also the effect

of existing systems and institutional cultures in causing it.

Japan Atomic Energy Commission: • suspends deliberations on national Framework for Nuclear

Energy Policy• Demands accident investigations include 1) efforts to restore

control at Fukushima Daiichi, (2) efforts toward regional development, (3) investigations into the cause of the accident, (4) confirmations of safety, and (5) the release of information.

77

Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear state-corporate-scientific complex

• GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I and II

– Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence– Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import– Japan?

• TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents– 2011: ongoing suppression of faults data– More information on suppression of design problems: sesimology

• Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and industry

• Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior politicians• The Kan government as a break?

– ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among government and utility officials.’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011)

78Nuclear power plants - 2008 - CNIC

79

Public opinion: April-August 2011, Mainichi Shimbun

Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August 2011

80

Public opinion: April-August 2011

Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August 2011

81

Available from:

http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications

Nautilus Institute early response reports on on Fukushima

82

Real world alternative energy pathways

• Energy efficiency

• Renewable energy

• Distributed generation

83

Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear state-corporate-scientific complex

• GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I and II

– Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence– Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import– Japan?

• TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents– 2011: ongoing suppression of faults data– More information on suppression of design problems: sesimology

• Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and industry

• Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior politicians• The Kan government as a break?

– ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among government and utility officials.’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011)

84

Key questions for Japan

• Five key questions for Japan:

• Will serious liberalisation of nuclear energy production help?

• Are the utilities locked into nuclear trajectory?

• Are the nuclear manufacturers (Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba) locked into nuclear power?

• Can an elected government gain control of nuclear policy?

• Can an elected government force the abandonment of the plutonium economy?

• Can a Japanese government breakthrough politically to direct new energy policy?

85

What does this mean for the rest of us?

86

Collective international regulation for nuclear safety• Notice international responses from China, Korea and United States

– Very slow release of US data and imagery

• IAEA: Why so silent?

– Mission statement: conflict of interest:

• Promoting nuclear power

• Regulating nuclear power

– Capture by major nuclear states and public-private nuclear alliance

• IAEA lack of effective powers

• Liability regime limitations– The farce of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

87

Convention on Nuclear Safety• Need for fundamental challenge to nuclear sovereignty embedded in

Convention on Nuclear Safety– CNS parties last week deferred Fukushima review meeting till

August 2012

• IAEA on the Convention:• “The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure

fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the Parties to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism is the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention.”

– http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.asp

88

Global civil society response ?

• Energy and climate change interconnection central:– Need for parallel and inter-linked responses

• No energy regime is without costs• Global public right to information and transparency

– Intelligence information access.• Rebuilding of transnational networks

89

• EnerWebWatch's Special Nuclear Situation in Japan– http://www.enerwebwatch.eu/webwatch?page=EarthQuake&id=update17

• The Fukushima Project: SimplyInfo– http://www.simplyinfo.org/

• Andrew DeWit and Iida Tetsunari, The “Power Elite” and Environmental-Energy Policy in Japan, Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus

– http://japanfocus.org/-Andrew-DeWit/3479

• After the Deluge: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (co-author with David Von Hippel, Kae Takase and Peter Hayes), Special Report, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, March 17, 2011

– http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

• The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on Japan’s Electricity System (contributing author with David Von Hippel, Kae Takase and Peter Hayes), Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, April 11, 2011

– http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

• TEPCO Country after Fukushima, Arena Magazine, June 2011 [footnoted version]– http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

http://japanfocus.org/-Andrew-DeWit/3479

nuclear power in japan: fukushima and after

Documents

explosion of unit

damaged unit

fukushima worse

japan earthquaketsunami

imagery report

cold shutdown unit

bwr nuclear fuel structure

nuclear power plants