nuclear japan 1945 - 1965 lt david a. backer ns 3041 24 august 2007

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Nuclear Japan Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

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Page 1: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Nuclear JapanNuclear Japan1945 - 19651945 - 1965LT David A. BackerNS 304124 August 2007

Page 2: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

OutlineOutlineIssue / ArgumentChaptersRough outline of time periodsPolitical FactorsSocial FactorsEconomic FactorsResultsConclusion

Page 3: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

IssueIssueThere have been four instances in

Japan’s history where it considered developing nuclear weapons. These four instances were:◦1) Mid 1960’s: Following China’s

nuclear test◦2) Mid 1970’s: Ratification of NPT◦3) Mid 1990’s: Signing indefinite

extension of NPT◦4) Today

Page 4: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

ArgumentArgumentMy thesis argues that Japan will

continue to abstain from developing a nuclear weapons program because the incentives to remain a non-nuclear state outweigh the incentives to do otherwise.

To support this argument, my thesis will look at the three previous cases and develop trends based on national, regional, and global factors that fueled the policy debates that had prevented Japan from developing nuclear weapons in the past.

Page 5: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

ChaptersChaptersIntroductionChapter Two – Development of CapabilitiesChapter Three – 1945-1965

◦ China Nuclear TestChapter Four – 1968 – 1976

◦ Signing and Ratification of NPTChapter Five – 1991 – 1995

◦ Indefinite Extension of NPTChapter Six – Current Debates

◦ Increasing China/Regional Instability/Faith in security

Conclusion

Page 6: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Post WW IIPost WW IIWhat happened to Japan in World

War II?

Page 7: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Japan - 1965Japan - 1965How did Japan recover?

Page 8: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

How did they recover?How did they recover? Political

◦ Alliances◦ Treaties◦ Documents

Social◦ Physical and psychological effects of the bombs

were still fresh in the Japanese psyche◦ Strong influence over politicians◦ Re-focused on a new goal

Economics◦ Results

Page 9: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

PoliticalPoliticalAlliances

◦SCAP◦U.S. – Japan security alliance

Treaties◦1951 U.S-Japan Security Treaty◦1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation

and SecurityDocuments

◦Constitution (Article 9)◦Atomic Energy Basic Law

Page 10: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

PoliticalPoliticalAlliances

◦Supreme Commander Allied Forces Occupied Japan after war Intentions were to stand up political

structures focused on economic development

Created a new constitution Japan was forced to renounce its right as

a sovereign state

◦U.S. – Japan alliance

Page 11: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

PoliticalPoliticalTreaties

◦ 1951 U.S. Security Treaty Removed SCAP organization Terminated the “state of war” Withdrawal of occupational troops w/in 90 days Restoration of Japan’s sovereignty Right to self-defense Access to international markets

◦ 1960 Treaty for Mutual Cooperation Each party recognizes that an armed attack

against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Page 12: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

PoliticalPoliticalDocuments / Laws

◦Constitution Art. 9 “The Japanese people forever renounce war

as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” Furthermore, “…land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”

◦Atomic Energy Basic Law Created in 1955 and stated, “The research,

development, and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes.”

Page 13: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

SocialSocial◦Physical and psychological effects of

the bombs were still fresh in the Japanese psyche

◦Strong influence over politicians

Page 14: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

SocialSocial• Physical and psychological effects of

the bombs were still fresh in the Japanese psyche

◦ Physical Destruction Hugh M. Gloster’s account of Hiroshima

in 1953

◦ Psychological Destruction Perceived “Japanese faces as Oriental

masks which conceal all emotion” and concealing these emotions was something the Japanese was good at.

Page 15: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

SocialSocialPerceptions

◦ Public opinion polls conducted by major papers in 1952 38% : Favored creation of a SDF Of that 38%, 60% consisted of post-war youth

◦ Directly attacked 41% : Would fight back 11% : Would not fight back 5% : Would flee

◦ Should nuclear weapons be used in Korean War 85% : Wanted to end the war early 73% : Opposed nuclear weapons

55% : Consider them inhuman 12% : Did not want a repeat of Hiro/Naga 9% : Avoid human extermination 5% : Feared they were a catalyst for World War III 3% : Feared a retaliatory attack

Page 16: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

SocialSocialStrong influence over politicians

◦The belief was that if Japan possessed nuclear weapons and if it were involved in another war, nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be used.

◦If Prime Ministers failed to support initiatives that promoted economic development, they were promptly replaced. PM Kishi (1960 Treaty for Mutual Cooperation

and Security) PM Hayato (Promoted Economic

development)

Page 17: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

EconomicEconomicResults

◦Compare Pre-War II to Post WWII (1945) to end of studied Period (1965)

◦Same institutions, theories, and mechanisms in 1965 as Pre-War II?

Page 18: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Economic: Pre-WWIIEconomic: Pre-WWIIDespite the Great

Depression, the Japanese economy recovered during the 1930’s◦ Rearmament

Military controlled drastically focused spending 31% in 1932-1934 47% in 1936-1937 10 carriers, 3000 aircraft,

3500 pilots Technologically advanced

weapons By start of War, had

1,000,000 men and 2,000,000 reservists

◦ Exploitation of captive East Asian Markets

Comparison of GDP per capita between East-Asian Nations and the U.S. in 1935:

Page 19: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Economic: World War IIEconomic: World War II

Wartime GDP of the Great Powers1938 to 1945 in International Dollars and 1990 Prices (billions)*

Country 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

USA 800 869 943 1094 1235 1399 1499 1474

UK 284 287 316 344 353 361 346 331

France 186 199 164 130 116 110 93 101

Italy 141 151 147 144 145 137 117 92

USSR 359 366 417 359 274 305 362 343

Germany 351 384 387 412 417 426 437 310Austria 24 27 27 29 27 28 29 12Japan 169 184 192 196 197 194 189 144

Allied/Axis GDP 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.3 3.1 5.0

Japan continued to concentrate its economy of supplying its war machine.

Page 20: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Economic: World War IIEconomic: World War II

United States

Soviet Union

Germany Japan

Tanks 88410 105251 45857 2515

Fighter A/C 99950 63087 55727 30447

Recon A/C 3918 0 6229 5654

Carriers 22 0 0 16

Battleships 8 0 2 2

Cruisers 48 2 0 9

Destroyers 349 25 17 63

Submarines

422 52 1337 167

What Japan was able to produce from 1939-1945 as compared to other countries.

Page 21: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Economic: Post World War II Economic: Post World War II (1945)(1945)SCAP replaced the military run

government with a democratic government◦Disestablished the “thought police”◦Break up of landlord holdings

Given to peasant proprietors Productive capacity channeled into programs

that provide peasants with life necessities◦Worked w/ Japan to recover from

Near starvation Soaring inflation Innumerable strikes Rampant criminality

Page 22: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Economic: Post World War II Economic: Post World War II (1955)(1955)

Post◦ Occupation◦ Creation of U.S. alliance◦ Korean War

Initiated programs that centered on:◦ High rates of personal

savings◦ Private-sector facilities

investment◦ Strong work ethic◦ Supply of cheap oil◦ Innovative technology◦ Effective intervention in

private-sector◦ Progressive income tax

schedules◦ Social Security Programs

Page 23: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

Economic: Up to 1965Economic: Up to 1965By 1955, production

rated matched pre-War levels

1955-1965◦ GDP: +9% / year◦ Manufacturing/Mining:

+13%/ year◦ Construction:

+11%/year◦ Infrastructure:

+14%/yearSectors employed by:

◦ 41% labor force◦ 26% remain in

agriculture

Page 24: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

ConclusionConclusionThe political and social focus on

economic development was the genesis that prevented Japan from developing nuclear weapons during the period between 1945 – 1965.

Page 25: Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

ConclusionConclusionEconomic development

◦Politically Alliances – initial framework and security Treaties and laws – forced Japan to

concentrate on non-military development

◦Socially Preserving status within international

markets Society focused on a new goal Nothing new, just given the mechanisms“If we establish any goal we will proceed to attain it

without considering any other factors. For if we are set in motion toward any direction, we have just too much energy and no mechanism to check its direction…” Professor Chie Nakane, University of Tokyo