nuclear innovation analysis: landscape review september …...2005 • nuclear decommissioning...
TRANSCRIPT
-
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
September 2013
Produced for the
Department of Energy & Climate Change
Innovation Delivery Team
by The Madano Partnership and
Integrated Decision Management Ltd
-
By The Madano Partnership
and Integrated Decision Management Ltd
Nuclear Innovation Analysis:
Landscape Review
Produced for the Department of Energy & Climate Change
Innovation Delivery Team
September 2013
-
Nuclear Innovation Analysis:
Landscape Review
Produced for the Department of Energy & Climate Change
Innovation Delivery Team
September 2013
-
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Department of Energy and Climate Change
Contents
Chapter
1. Introduction and Background to Study _____________ 1
2. UK Nuclear Innovation Landscape _________________ 2
3. Clarifying Assumptions and Project Development ___________________________ 7
4. Stakeholder Research and Research Findings ____________________________________ 10
5. Discussion of Findings _________________________ 12
6. Cost Benefit Analysis __________________________ 21
7. Conclusions and Recommendations ______________ 30
Appendices:
I. Bibliography _____________________________________________________ 32
II. Study Participants ________________________________________________ 33
III. Interview Guide __________________________________________________ 34
IV. Challenges/Barriers derived and rated by workshop participants _____________________________________________ 36
V. Acronyms _______________________________________________________ 37
VI. UK Fuel Market Share from Oxford Economics Report _____________________ 38
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 1
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
The Madano Partnership (Madano) and Integrated Decision Management Ltd (IDM), were commissioned by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to undertake a “Nuclear Energy Innovation – Investment Analysis”1.
DECC’s Energy Innovation Delivery Team has a remit to
invest in technologies that will provide significant benefits
to the UK in terms of the secure supply of renewable and
low carbon energy, and require that investment decisions
are evidence-based to ensure that public money is used
in the most cost effective manner. Previous analysis in the
nuclear sector had indicated that investment across the
nuclear life cycle could provide benefits worth between
£5-40bn to 2050 and £5-90bn to 21002.
DECC had prioritised a number of sub-areas where
there was considered to be an early need for investment,
identified as themes in this earlier analysis. Areas were
prioritised based on the potential benefit resulting
from investment in innovation that were within DECC’s
Innovation programme remit. These themes included:
i. Innovative Fuel Formsii. Capex – Components
iii. Capex – Building Materialsiv. Capex – Construction, Installation and
Commissioningv. Waste Management, Reprocessing and Storage (in
relation to historic, existing and future systems)vi. Innovation in the Regulatory Process
To ensure optimal benefit is derived from any future
investment decisions, DECC wished to undertake further
analyses within each of these sub-areas to define specific
R&D programmes and/or capital investment that will
unlock benefits for the UK. Early project meetings clarified
that the area of study was to start with Technology
Readiness Levels (TRLs)3 of around 4, with projects to take
the TRL to around 8. The innovation should be deployable
in 10-20 years, a much shorter time horizon than other
studies which extended to 2050 and beyond.
This shorter time horizon emphasised that reviewing
the current organisation of the nuclear industry in the
UK would enable innovation to be identified “starting
from where we are now”, leading to an understanding
of the opportunities, challenges and barriers faced
by potential innovators operating in the real nuclear
world of 2013. The Madano-IDM project therefore
centered on engaging with a wide range of actual and
would-be innovators, and with their actual and potential
customers, to map both the innovation landscape and
the marketplace in which they operate as well as the
opportunities and possible barriers, including cost
benefit analysis of investing in potential areas.
Chapter 1.
Introduction and Background to Study
1 Tender No: TRN 500/10/2012
2 See Technology Innovation Needs Assessment (TINA) Nuclear Fission, Summary Report, Carbon Trust, April 2013 at www.lowcarboninnovation.co.uk/document.php?o=16
3 Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are a technology management tool that provides a measurement to assess the maturity of evolving technology. Typically, TRL 1 is where Basic Principles have been observed and reported; TRL 4 is where Technology basic validation has been made in a laboratory environment through to TRL 9 where Actual Technology has been qualified through successful mission operations. See for example “Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) in the Project Lifecycle”, Ministry of Defence website, www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/techman/content/trl_applying.htm
-
2 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
In order to explore the potential opportunities for the UK it is important to understand first the landscape in which UK nuclear innovation now operates. It is instructive to appreciate how the industry has evolved into its current state, and to be clear about the structural benefits and barriers presented by the 2013 nuclear industry in the UK.
UK Nuclear Industry Evolution
The UK nuclear power landscape evolved from the 1950s
early dominance of the national imperatives to become
a nuclear weapons state, to a structure reflecting the
‘flowsheet’ of nuclear energy generation, namely:-
1. United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) – an R&D organisation which pursued scientific progress and undertook development of reactor designs and fuel cycle concepts
2. British Nuclear Fuels plc. (BNFL) – a manufacturing and processing organisation, spun out of UKAEA in 1971, which carried out fuel cycle operations from uranium ore concentrate to nuclear fuel, and from spent fuel to wastes, reprocessed uranium and separated plutonium
3. URENCO – a tri-national uranium enrichment organisation set up by the Treaty of Almelo in 1971, and pioneer of the centrifuge enrichment process. It and its technology are now world-leading. This was originally organised with three nationally-owned production plants.
4. Reactor consortia: the UK contracted out the construction of both the Magnox and AGR stations to consortia of UK engineering companies
5. Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) – electricity utilities which placed orders for nuclear stations and sold their electricity output.
The Figure below shows the arrangement circa 1975.
Chapter 2.
The UK Nuclear Innovation Landscape
UOCReactor
andProcess R&D
UKAEA
BNFL
PurificationReactor Design
Pu storage
U storageU recycle
fuel plant designFuel Element DesignSpringfields
Harwell
SellafieldCapenhurst
Risley, Culcheth
Uranium metalproduction
Reprocessing U,Pu SeparationUranium
Hexafluorideproduction
Gaseous DiffusionCentrifuge
Uranium Enrichment
Uranium OxideFuel
Uranium metalFuel CEGB
MagnoxReactors
CEGBAGR
Reactors
Figure 1. The UK Nuclear Industry circa 1975
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 3
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
40 020 1030
1400
0
1200
0
1000
0
8000
6000
4000
2000 0
UK
Nuc
lear
dev
elo
pm
ent
-19
50 -
201
2 &
onw
ard
s
The
Mad
ano
Par
tner
ship
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
1957
• N
ucle
ar p
ower
ac
cide
nt ta
kes
plac
e at
Win
dsca
le
- a
fire
in th
e re
acto
r re
sults
in a
rele
ase
of r
adio
activ
ity
1986
• C
hern
obyl
acci
dent
2011
• Fu
kush
ima
acci
dent
1979
• Th
ree
Mile
Isla
ndin
cide
nt
1954
• U
KA
EA
cre
ated
und
er
the
Ato
mic
Ene
rgy
Act
1956
• C
alde
r H
all,
Win
dsca
le is
ope
ned
by th
e Q
ueen
1962
- 1
971
• N
ine
full
scal
e M
agno
x po
wer
st
atio
ns o
pen.
Of
thes
e W
ylfa
and
O
ldbu
ry
are
still
oper
atin
g to
day
1980
• To
rnes
s, H
eysh
am,
two
AG
Rs
star
t co
nstr
uctio
n
1965
- 1
970
• A
GR
sta
tions
sta
rt
cons
truc
tion
1971
• U
KA
EA
reor
gani
sed
unde
r th
e A
tom
ic
Ene
rgy
Aut
horit
y A
ct•
BN
FL is
form
ed to
ta
ke c
ontr
ol o
f the
fuel
cy
cle
oper
atio
ns
prev
ious
ly u
nder
take
n by
UK
AE
A
1976
- 1
988
• S
even
adv
ance
d ga
s co
oled
reac
tors
(AG
Rs)
ar
e bu
ilt to
repl
ace
Mag
nox
as th
e pr
inci
pal
sour
ce o
f nuc
lear
en
ergy
. The
se a
re n
ow
owne
d an
d op
erat
ed b
y E
DF/
Brit
ish
Ene
rgy
1988
• C
onst
ruct
ion
begi
ns
at S
izew
ell B
, Suf
folk
af
ter
a le
ngth
y pu
blic
en
quiry
. It r
emai
ns th
e U
K’s
onl
y P
WR
pow
er
stat
ion.
Fur
ther
pla
ns
for
othe
r po
wer
sta
tions
ar
e dr
oppe
d
1974
• S
GH
WR
ado
pted
- tw
o st
atio
ns a
t Tor
ness
and
H
eysh
am a
re a
nnou
nced
1978
• SG
HW
R ab
ando
ned
- G
over
nmen
t ann
ounc
es te
n ne
w p
ress
urise
d w
ater
re
acto
rs (P
WRs
) are
to b
e bu
ilt
1996
• S
izew
ell B
sta
rts
to
gene
rate
ele
ctric
ity,
Brit
ish
Ene
rgy
is
priv
atis
ed
1989
• M
agno
x re
acto
rs
are
with
draw
n fro
m
gove
rnm
ents
ele
ctric
ity
priv
atis
atio
n po
licy
plan
s af
ter
inve
stor
s re
fuse
to b
uy d
ue to
th
e hi
gh c
osts
of
deco
mm
issi
onin
g
1994
• Fa
st R
eact
or
Pro
gram
me
aban
done
d
2003
• E
nerg
y W
hite
Pap
er
rele
ased
sta
ting
that
nu
clea
r po
wer
is a
n un
viab
le o
ptio
n
2006
• G
reen
peac
e ap
peal
ed a
gain
st
the
cons
ulta
tion
proc
ess
• Th
e ju
dici
al re
view
fo
und
in fa
vour
of
Gre
enpe
ace
2005
• N
ucle
ar D
ecom
mis
sion
ing
Aut
horit
y se
t-up
taki
ng
stra
tegi
c re
spon
sibi
lity
for
UK
’s n
ucle
ar le
gacy
• B
ritis
h en
ergy
rest
ruct
ured
2018
• Fi
rst n
ew
nucl
ear
pow
er
stat
ion
expe
cted
to
be
oper
atio
nal
2006
• G
over
nmen
t rel
ease
s E
nerg
y R
evie
w R
epor
t. C
onst
ruct
ion
on th
e po
licy
fram
ewor
k fo
r ne
w n
ucle
ar b
uild
2007
• G
over
nmen
t la
unch
‘The
Fut
ure
of N
ucle
ar P
ower
’
2008
• ‘M
eetin
g th
e En
ergy
Cha
lleng
e’: A
W
hite
Pap
er o
n N
ucle
ar P
ower
set
s ou
t Gov
ernm
ent’s
vie
w th
at n
ucle
ar
shou
ld b
e pa
rt of
the
ener
gy m
ix•
Offi
ce fo
r Nuc
lear
Dev
elop
men
t cr
eate
d En
ergy
Act
200
8 ga
ins
Roy
al A
ssen
t
2009
• E
DF
com
plet
es £
12.5
billi
on
take
over
of B
ritis
h E
nerg
y•
Dra
ft N
ucle
ar N
atio
nal P
olic
y S
tate
men
t (N
PS
) pub
lishe
d al
ongs
ide
five
othe
r N
PS
s
2011
• E
lect
ricity
Mar
ket
Ref
orm
Pap
er•
Nat
iona
l Pol
icy
Sta
tem
ents
Num
ber
ofR
eact
ors
Cap
acity
MW
e
Num
ber
ofR
eact
ors
onlin
e
+ve
Pol
icy
chan
ge
-ve
Pol
icy
chan
ge
Acc
iden
t
Num
ber
ofR
eact
ors
onlin
e
Rea
ctor
sun
der
cons
truc
tion
Pea
kca
paci
ty
00
1
1012
12 8
18
3434
19
11
4112
160
MW
e
Rea
ctor
sun
der
cons
truc
tion
UK
Nuc
lear
dev
elop
men
t –
1950
–201
2 &
onw
ards
Chapter 2
Figure 2. UK Nuclear development – 1950-2012 onwards
-
4 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 2
Notably, the French industry was organised on similar
lines, with the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA)
covering nuclear research; Comurhex (Conversion Métal
URanium HEXafluorure) producing uranium hexafluoride;
Eurodif (European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment
Consortium) undertaking enrichment operations;
FBFC (Franco-Belge de Fabrication du Combustible)
manufacturing nuclear fuel, Framatome designing reactors,
Cogema (Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires)
dealing with the spent fuel, and EDF (Électricité de France)
owning the reactors and marketing the electricity.
As set up, both the UK and French nuclear energy and fuel
cycle systems were essentially state owned and operated.
Though the French system has been consolidated under
CEA (research), AREVA (reactors and fuel cycle) and EDF
(reactor owner/operator and electricity supply), it remains
within the orbit of the French state.
The UK nuclear programme has been characterised by
changes of policy direction, stops and starts over the
decades since its inception, as illustrated in Figure 2.
In 1990, the non-nuclear elements of the CEGB were
privatised as part of the then Government policy to sell off
nationalised industries. The CEGB’s nuclear responsibilities
were split in 1996, with the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR)
stations and recently-completed Pressurised Water
Reactor (PWR) at Sizewell B forming British Energy (BE),
while the older Magnox reactor fleet became Magnox
Electric, which was transferred to BNFL ownership in
1998. In 1999, BNFL acquired the Westinghouse Electric
Company, which covered fuel manufacture, reactor design
and construction, and reactor services, making BNFL
a complete nuclear company – from the processing of
uranium, fuel manufacture via reactor operation to spent
fuel management.
The UK Government’s 2002 Energy Review4 concluded
that “because nuclear is a mature technology within a
well-established global industry, there is no current case
for further Government support” and that “the decision
whether to bring forward proposals for new nuclear build
is a matter for the private sector”. This view was formalised
in “Our Energy Future – creating a low carbon economy”5
in 2003.
Meanwhile, the liberalisation of the electricity supply
structures under NETA (March 2001), meant that utilities
which were not vertically integrated with retail suppliers
were vulnerable to reductions in wholesale electricity price.
British Energy, which was not so vertically integrated, had
to be rescued by Government payments in 2002, and
ultimately was sold, becoming part of EDF Energy in 2009.
In parallel to the declaration of a ‘no new nuclear’ future,
there was increasing recognition of the scale and costs of
the historic waste management legacy, where liabilities had
been accumulating since the 1950s. The early 2000s saw
the restructuring of UK nuclear fuel cycle operations, with
an emphasis on waste management and decommissioning
rather than the commercial supply of fuel cycle services.
The establishment of the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority (NDA) as a Non-Departmental Public Body under
the Energy Act 2004 therefore resulted in the transfer of 19
sites, previously under the control of UKAEA and BNFL, and
their associated Civil Nuclear - Liabilities and Assets formally
back into the public sector6. BNFL had been a plc (with the
shares held by the Government) since 1984.
The commercial model adopted for the NDA was derived
from the US system, and delivers its clean-up mission
through Site Licensee Companies (SLCs) which are licensed
to operate nuclear sites. Competitive contracts are let out to
consortia of companies (Parent Body Organisations) who
own the SLCs for the period of the contract.
The Westinghouse business was sold to Toshiba in
2006, thus removing reactor building and nuclear fuel
manufacture from the UK’s nuclear portfolio. The decision
to sell that business was once again due to the Government
wanting to reduce the number of assets it actually owned,
and also to remove any potential conflicts it could be seen
to have with the advent of new nuclear build.
The privatisation of the nuclear energy industry in the UK
in the 1990s, the nuclear energy policy change between
early 2000 and 2006, and the restructuring of the legacy
clean-up sector has resulted in a much more fragmented
and complex nuclear landscape, which is discussed in the
following Section.
UK Nuclear Landscape 2013
The current UK nuclear marketplace can therefore be
characterised under two main headings – activities
associated with nuclear electricity generation and fuel
cycle operations, and legacy clean-up.
Legacy and current nuclear electricity generation and fuel cycle operations
• Magnox reactors – run by Magnox Ltd, an SLC of NDA. All reactors except Wylfa 1 are shut down and have entered defueling/decommissioning. Wylfa 1 scheduled to stop generation in September 2014
• AGRs – 7 twin-reactor stations owned and run by EDF Energy. Major work and incentive to increase planned lifetimes
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 5
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 2
• PWR – Sizewell B (single reactor) owned and run by EDF Energy. Currently scheduled to begin decommissioning in 2035, but life extension probable
• Fuel Manufacture – Springfields Fuels Limited is owned by Westinghouse Electric Company UK on a long term site lease from the NDA. Undertakes conversion of uranium tetrafluoride to uranium hexafluoride for enrichment, and is the only manufacturer of AGR fuel. Also fabricates PWR fuel
• Enrichment – URENCO has one of its three uranium enrichment plants at Capenhurst, and is installing a plant to convert uranium hexafluoride tails into oxide for storage and/or disposal. URENCO shares are currently held 1/3 by the UK Government, 1/3 by the Dutch Government and other parties and 1/3 by the German utilities RWE and E.On. The shareholders have all agreed to explore a possible sale of part or all of the organisation
• Spent Fuel Reprocessing – Magnox reprocessing is undertaken by Sellafield Ltd, the Sellafield SLC. The activity is scheduled to come to an end around 2020. Oxide Fuel Reprocessing is undertaken in the Sellafield THORP facility for UK and foreign customers. The activity is scheduled to stop around 2018
Nuclear New Build
In January 2006, the Government launched another energy
review consultation7, which revisited the potential role that
new nuclear reactors could contribute to energy security
and the decarbonisation of the UK economy. The “Meeting
the Energy Challenge” White Paper of 2007 contained “a
preliminary view is that it is in the public interest to give the
private sector the option of investing in new nuclear power
stations”.
Over the next six years, the Government introduced
a number of facilitative actions, including Regulatory
Justification and Generic Design Assessment of ‘new
build’ reactor designs, National Policy Statements with
eight nominated sites, Funded Decommissioning Plans
and Waste Transfer Prices, and Electricity Market Reform.
This has led to three proposals for new build on five of the
nominated sites. The three prospective ‘new build’ utilities
are:
• EDF Energy – Planning permission granted for the construction of two EPRs at Hinkley Point and a further 2 EPRs are proposed to be subsequently constructed at Sizewell. Originally the consortium anticipated the participation of Centrica, which withdrew from new build in February 2013. EPR™ (PWR – AREVA) achieved Regulatory Justification and, through the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process, the issue of a Design Acceptance
Confirmation by the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and a Statement of Design Acceptability from the Environment Agency (EA)
• Horizon Nuclear – now owned by Hitachi-GE (Japan) - twin ABWR stations planned for the Wylfa and Oldbury sites. Hitachi-GE have applied to DECC for Regulatory Justification and the regulators have been asked to begin the GDA process
• NuGen – owned by GDF-SUEZ (France) and Iberdrola (Spain), reactors planned to be constructed on the Moorside site adjacent to Sellafield but the technology choice has yet to be made.
The Westinghouse AP1000® PWR has achieved Regulatory
Justification, ONR Interim Design Acceptance Confirmation
(IDAC) and EA Interim Statement of Design Acceptability
(ISoDA), but has not yet been selected for deployment.
Legacy Clean-up
The NDA, through its SLCs, Dounreay Site Restoration
Ltd (DSRL) and Research Sites Restoration Ltd (RSRL) are
responsible for the remediation work at Dounreay, Harwell
and Winfrith.
• The Parent Body for DSRL is the Babcock Dounreay Partnership Ltd, a consortium of Babcock International Group (UK), CH2MHILL and URS (USA)
• The RSRL Parent Body is the Babcock International Group (UK)
The Magnox sites decommissioning SLC is Magnox Ltd,
whose Parent Body is Energy Solutions (USA).
The RSRL and Magnox Ltd contracts are currently the
subject of an NDA competition process. The consortia
wishing to proceed (as of January 2013) are:
• Reactor Site Solutions (Bechtel, Energy Solutions)
• Babcock Fluor Partnership
• CAS Restoration Partnership (CH2MHill, AREVA, Serco)
• UK Nuclear Restoration Ltd (AMEC, Atkins)
Sellafield site’s parent body, Nuclear Management
Partners, is a consortium of AREVA (France), URS (USA)
and AMEC (UK).
The NDA mission across its 19 sites is “to deliver safe,
sustainable and publicly acceptable solutions to the
challenge of nuclear clean-up and waste management”
and involves decommissioning and cleaning up the
range of civil nuclear facilities, ensuring that all the waste
products, both radioactive and non-radioactive, are
safely managed, and implementing Government policy
on the long-term management of nuclear waste. This
also involves managing the UK’s stocks of civil nuclear
-
6 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 2
materials including the development of technology
options for the storage, and either re-use or disposal of
uranium and plutonium inventories.
From the outline above, the structure of UK’s nuclear
sector is seen to be complex and complicated to map, as
seen in Figure 3 below.
With the advent of new international entrants into the
UK, it is still evolving both in market area of new nuclear
build projects and in legacy clean-up. This presents
challenges in aligning the range of structural, contractual
and commercial drivers of this diverse
marketplace to promote innovation.
UK Nuclear Market Size
The UK civil nuclear market size is also
split between ‘new build’ and clean-up;
the potentially major, developer-funded
‘new build’ market being added to the
publically funded legacy management
initiative set up in the early 2000s.
The financial split between these two
elements will depend on the size of
the ‘new build’ programme, this has
been initially envisaged as 16GWe8, but
DECC has been studying a number of
scenarios of up to 75GWe. The overall
size of the two markets is illustrated semi-
quantitatively, for programmes of 16GWe
and 40GWe, in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4 illustrates:
1. A clean-up market which, at least in this decade, is comparable in size to the ‘new build’ market, and is characterised by many one-off projects which would benefit from innovative approaches in the short term if legacy management costs are to be contained and progress facilitated.
2. A 16GWe ‘new build’ programme whose undiscounted costs are comparable with those of legacy clean-up in the early years. For this tranche, the reactor designs are
essentially fixed, and this would be expected to limit the possible potential for innovation in the 15-20 year timeframe envisaged in this study.
3. The large increase in amount and rate of spend attendant on changing to a 40GWe new build programme.
4 The Energy Review, Performance and Innovation Unit Energy, February 2002
5 Our Energy Future: Creating a low carbon economy, February 2003 CM 5761) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10719.pdf
6 Noting that BNFL had been a plc (with the shares held by the Government) since 1984
7 Our Energy Challenge, securing clean affordable energy for the long term, January 2006 (cm6887) http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm68/6887/6887.pdf
8 See Nuclear Industrial Vision Statement, HMG, 2013
Figure 4. UK Nuclear Spend, Schematic
Figure 3. Nuclear Industry in the UK, 2013
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
16GWe 40GWe
Clean-up - Discounted programme spend £ 53 B
£3.0B Current NDA SpendGross Annual
Und
isco
unte
d A
nnua
l Spe
nd
Control by licence/ownership Control by contract *Currently subject to competition
AGRs
SXB
ChapX
NB3Winfrith
MagnoxRepro
AGRRepro
AGR SFStorage
EDF (F) Reactors EPR Areva (F) Fuel Areva (?)
Magnox SF Storage
NuGen (F, Sp) Reactors ? Fuel ?
UF4, previously UOC
UF6 LEUF6
SpringfieldsFuel, UF6
CapenhurstEnrichment
MagnoxOps +
Cleanup
Ops, Fuel CycleCleanup
Magnox
Calder
Reactor AP1000Westinghouse –Toshiba (US/J) UK Build???
*
*
NDA
Dounreay
Harwell
NB1
Horizon (J) Reactors ABWR Hitachi (J) Fuel Hitachi (?)
NB2
EDF (F)
NDA
Last fuel supply 2008Tos
hiba
(J)
Wes
tingh
ouse
(US)
Sella
field
Ltd
(SLC
)
Ure
nco
(D, N
L, U
K??
?)
Bab
cock
Inte
rnat
iona
lG
roup
(UK
), C
H2M
HIL
L, U
RS
(US
)
DSR
L(S
LC)
RSR
L(S
LC)
Babc
ock
Inte
rnat
iona
l G
roup
(UK)
NM
PA
reva
(F)
AM
EC
(UK
) )
UR
S (U
S
Mag
nox
Ltd
(SLC
)
Ene
rgy
Sol
utio
ns
(US
)
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 7
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Madano-IDM project was asked to consider six sub-areas prioritised by DECC from the Carbon Trust report “Technology Innovation Needs Assessment: Nuclear Fission”, and other areas of potential interest to identify possible projects looking to advance from around TRL 4 to around TRL 8. The sub-areas were:
i. Innovative Fuel Formsii. Capex – Components
iii. Capex – Building Materialsiv. Capex – Construction, Installation and
Commissioningv. Waste Management, Reprocessing and Storage (in
relation to historic, existing and future systems)vi. Innovation in the Regulatory Process
The first four sub-areas can be viewed from the point of
view of innovation in either (a) existing (GEN III)9 or (b)
future reactor and fuel cycle technologies (GEN IV). The
Carbon Trust assessment included examination of GEN IV
systems, but the analysis does not differentiate between
the very different reactor systems within the GEN IV
categorisation, and there is currently no Government
policy on which, if any, of the systems are of interest to the
UK. These considerations, and the 10-20 year time horizon
of the Madano-IDM project, led to the exclusion of GEN
IV reactor systems from further study. The exclusion of
GEN IV essentially rules out the theme of Innovative Fuel
Forms, and even GEN III systems would be unlikely to be
able to introduce any truly innovative fuel in the 20 year
timeframe10.
For GEN III reactor systems, the assertion11 has been that as
more reactors are built, the cheaper the individual reactors
become, and this has been used to scope the effects of
innovation in any defined programme. The “First of a Kind”
(FOAK) to “Nth of a Kind” (NOAK) improvement is largely
predicated on economic modelling work for low-value
high-number manufactured items such as computers and
compact fluorescent light bulbs12. There are problems in
transferring this model to nuclear reactors, as published
figures for reactor cost are extremely variable13, and
modelling studies of nuclear systems14 15 16 generally rely
on an assumed improvement figure.
NOAK improvement has been tested by examining one
of the few sources of hard data on nuclear projects. The
IAEA’s Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)17, gives
building start dates and on-line dates for all reactors
in IAEA-participating countries. If there are FOAK to
NOAK improvements, these should be mirrored in a
reduction in construction time as programmes progress.
However, extensive examination has revealed only one
programme, PWRs constructed in South Korea, where
such a reduction is observed. A more typical example is
that of reactor construction in France, which is illustrated
in Figure 5 below, and where build time increases from
FOAK to NOAK. Similar effects are observed in the UK’s
Magnox and AGR programmes.9
Chapter 3.
Clarifying Assumptions and Project Development
-
8 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 3
The UK is seeking to embark upon a 16GWe initial
programme of ‘new build’ Light Water Reactors, which
relies on the candidate reactors satisfying the rigorous
demands of the GDA, which has involved reactor vendors
providing extensive and detailed information on their
designs to the UK Regulators. The GDA, therefore in
effect ‘freezes’ many details of the candidate reactor
design and, by extension, many of the components of
those designs and their manufacture, together with the
methods of construction of the reactor buildings.
In relation to the innovation marketplace, this means
that ‘new build’ innovation cannot be scaled by an
“NOAK Driver”, and must look to innovation at levels of
the supply chain which will not adversely impact on the
ability of reactors to meet GDA requirements and build
programmes.
It is also notable that themes ii – iv cover the supply
of components, the building and commissioning of
reactors, but do not focus on their subsequent operation,
maintenance, or assuring their operational life. In fact
there are many areas where developments in sensors,
data acquisition, storage and handling, and condition
monitoring could be assumed to be brought to bear on
the post-commissioning life of a nuclear power station.
These innovations were sought and examined as part of
the project.
In sub-area v, (Waste management, reprocessing and
storage in relation to historic, existing and future systems),
considerations of timescale have already eliminated
innovation for future (GEN IV) systems. Reprocessing
activities in the UK are scheduled to be completed by
around 202018. The current new build programme is
predicated on ‘one-through’ LWRs, where the spent fuel
is consigned to geological disposal, so current policy
would seem to offer little market driver for innovation in
this area. In the longer term, some of the Generation 4
systems being studied do require reprocessing, but others
do not. A driver for innovation would therefore only occur
when there was some level of strategic intent to deploy
systems requiring reprocessing.
In the area of waste management, decommissioning and
storage, there is great scope for innovation in the legacy
clean-up of NDA’s facilities, and the techniques developed
could assist in future decommissioning projects such as
the AGR stations, Sizewell B and, in due course, ‘new
build’ reactors in the UK, and a multitude of potential
facilities overseas.
A 2012 paper to the NDA Research Board19 reported the
R&D needs generated by the NDA, Radioactive Waste
Management Directorate (RWMD), ONR, EDF, EA, the
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the European
Commission. Many UK responses were co-ordinated by
the Nuclear Waste Research Forum, which is seeking to
share experience and maximise learning across the whole
UK Waste Management and Decommissioning sector.
The broad research topics derived are shown below.
18
Figure 5. Build times of French reactors versus start number
Bui
ld T
ime
for a
ll Fr
ench
Rea
ctor
s (y
ears
)
Reactors in order of construction start date
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 9
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 3
In sub-area vi (Innovation in the Regulatory Process),
innovation would involve improvements in cost and
timescale of projects by seeking ways of optimising the
regulatory approach while maintaining the stringent
application of safety, security and environmental
standards. For ‘new build’ reactors, there has already been
very significant innovation in the setting up and running
of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process,
which brought all the regulators together under a co-
ordinated joint programme. This innovation is now being
further tested by the requirement to perform GDA on a
very different reactor type, Hitachi’s ABWR. Anecdotal
evidence suggested that the GDA process evolved during
the consideration of the EPR and AP1000 reactor systems,
and is likely to further evolve during ABWR and any other
systems seeking deployment in the UK.
In the legacy clean-up area, the research topics already
quoted will involve site operators working with the
regulators to extend innovation from technology into the
effective regulation of the changing practices.
This review of the six sub-areas has shown that:
i. Innovative fuel forms: the timescale and TRLs examined by this project make it unlikely that any candidates for innovation will be found under this theme.
ii. Capex - Components iii. Capex - Building Materials iv. Capex - Construction, Installation and
Commissioning: innovation by the currently planned candidate reactors would appear to be somewhat constrained as a result of the reactor designs being fixed in order to pass through the GDA process. A UK commitment to a larger programme and/or the deployment of advanced reactor systems could open up further innovation opportunities.
v. Waste Management, Reprocessing and Storage (in relation to historic, existing and future systems): a fertile area for innovation in a marketplace currently worth £3bn per annum.
vi. Innovation in the Regulatory Process: possibilities for innovation in systems and processes, already achieved in new reactor build and with significant possibilities in waste management and decommissioning.
1. Characterisation:
• Improved techniques to support the development of decommissioning and site remediation plans
• Improved techniques to support the application of the waste hierarchy as a framework for waste management decision making, from prevention of waste generation through to minimisation of impact of disposal
2. Decommissioning:
• Improved decontamination techniques – to minimise waste or allow man entry
• Improved remote decommissioning technologies – to avoid man entry
3. Waste Treatment:
• Treatment techniques for wastes with no confirmed disposal route
• Alternative techniques to encapsulation
4. Waste Packaging & Storage:
• Optimised packaging solutions
• Understanding of waste package evolution from production to disposal
5. Land Quality:
• Improved technologies or approaches for the management of contaminated land to avoid ex-situ disposal
6. Management of Plutonium:
• Technically underpinned route for re-use in modern reactors
Box 1. Common R&D Themes from NDA Research Board Paper
9 ‘GEN III’ refers to reactors that are commercially available for deployment at the present time. The term ‘GEN IV’ is a generic catch-all for systems being developed for future use under the Generation 4 International Forum. The technologies covered by this term may be seen at http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/systems/index.htm
10 For an example of the issues involved, see feature on the development of slicon carbide fuel cladding at http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurestudying-silicon-carbide-for-nuclear-fuel-cladding/
11 See, for example, Electricity Generation Cost Model - 2011 Update, Revision 1, Parsons Brinkerhoff for DECC, August 2011, page 2412 For example, Using the Experience Curve Approach for Appliance Price Forecasting, USDOE Energy Efficiency and Renewable energy, February 201113 Costs of Generating Electricity, IEA-NEA, 201014 Mott McDonald UK Electricity Generation Costs Update, Mott McDonald, 201015 Parsons Brinkerhoff Electricity Generation Cost Model - 2011 Update16 Electricity generation cost model 2012 update of non-renewable technologies, Parsons Brinkerhoff, 201217 At www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/ 18 NDA-Business Plan 2013-2016, March 201319 Summary and Analysis of Board Member Responses to UK Decommissioning R&D Needs, Paper for NDA Research Board, April 2012
-
10 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Stakeholder Engagement
The examination in Chapter 3 of the industry and market structure, together with the analysis of the likely areas for innovation, prescribed a direct approach to a broad cross-section of the industry and its supply chain. This involved the Project Team undertaking desktop studies, using personal contacts and subsequent referrals to approach lead organisations such as NDA, NDAs SLCs, AREVA, Horizon and Westinghouse, together with Tier 2 contractors, universities, and research consortia. These contacts led to the identification of relevant SMEs.
An interview framework was created and is included in
Appendix IV, which was used to guide a variety of contacts
through interview discussions and in-depth meetings. The
purpose of the interview guide was intended to:
1. Guide the respondent as to the areas, TRLs and timescales that we were hoping to cover.
2. Identify innovation candidate technologies or opportunities.
3. Define the TRLs involved before/after innovation development.
4. Ask whether barriers exist to the maturing of these projects and what magnitude of investment would be involved?
5. If so, to identify the barriers.
6. Identify whether new funding or potential collaboration would assist the development of the innovation.
7. Determine if any current projects were feeding into any co-ordinating/networking schemes of workshops.
8. Ask whether the respondent ever engaged with DECC, TSB or EPSRC on any other funding body on the particular project(s) or technology(s)?
9. Find out whether the respondent consider bidding for such funding and;
10. If not why not?
11. Enquire whether the respondent any estimates of the cost/benefit of the market opportunity and;
12. If so could an estimate be given?
13. Had the respondent any other suggestions for DECC on the piece of work being undertaken by Madano-IDM.
By no means were all of those contacted willing to respond.
Their stated reasons ranged from time constraints, to
slight apathy with the current state of nuclear in the UK,
to some parties even denying involvement in the industry
even though they are clearly involved. However, some
56 responses were obtained and a complete list of the
organisations represented is seen in Table 1 below.
Information Sensitivity
The responses to the interviews and to the more
extensive meetings yielded a range of information at
varying levels of detail and commercial sensitivity. It
was impossible, when having in-depth discussions with
innovative organisations, to avoid conversations which at
least touched on levels of detail which impinged on the
Intellectual Property Rights of the companies concerned.
Also, in seeking to discuss opportunities and challenges
some fairly direct and forceful observations were made
which might be misconstrued outside the context of the
meeting/interview.
The decision has therefore been taken not to attribute
quotations to individual companies in this report, but
still to use the anonymised quotations where they add a
particular flavour and emphasis to the points respondents
made and the clear themes that developed over the
course of the interviews. Similarly, it was not felt prudent
to include all the meeting notes and completed interview
forms into a public domain report. Instead, a Commercial
Annex to this report is being prepared which will go only
to DECC as the commissioning organisation for the work.
Market Uncertainty
UK organisations seeking to develop innovative products
and services into the overall UK nuclear market, face the
fundamental problem of predicting the market size. As
detailed in Chapter 3, the size of the legacy market (waste
management, decommissioning and storage) is relatively
Chapter 4.
Stakeholder Research and Research Findings
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 11
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 4
well understood, in comparison to the uncertainty
associated with the size of the new build market. With
the reactor designs for at least the first phase of new
build essentially fixed, and as UK manufacture will
feed into, rather than lead, the supply chain, it would
appear unrealistic to expect UK innovation to have any
significant effect on the size of the market. UK innovation
in new build will therefore rely on generating market
share in the market that materializes. This is currently
uncertain, given the continued hiatus in the EDF Energy
commitment to Hinkley Point C, and the introduction of
new, ABWR, technology for Horizon’s two potential sites
in October 2012.
Because of this uncertainty, there was no valid basis on
which innovators could have been expected to produce
detailed business cases for their innovations, and there
was therefore limited evidence available from would-be
innovators which could present the basis of a “bottom-
up” Cost Benefit Analysis approach. Such uncertainty will
affect all and any CBA techniques, and for this reason the
analyses in Chapter 6 of this report are based on defined
new build scenarios20.
Consolidation of information
The information obtained was found to contain many
themes and topics which were common to many
organisations, sometimes viewing the same topic from
very different viewpoints. Overall, the project team
considered that the ‘general overview’ defined itself after
the first few contacts, and further interviews/meetings
added more detail, but did not change what became a very
well-defined picture of the industry and the opportunities
and challenges of innovation within it.
Workshop
This picture was further tested in a workshop held on
1st May 2013 and attended by some 20 people representing
a cross section of the industry, together with DECC, TSB
and the Carbon Trust. The workshop aimed to:
• Understand the current innovation context, landscape and concepts;
• Appreciate the challenges which innovation could address;
• Explore possible futures, developments and innovation directions.
This gave rise to a 20-page photo report full of useful and
astute observations, which was distributed to attendees
for comment. Once this material had been consolidated,
it was evident that, while it raised very few matters or
concepts which had not arisen in the interviews/meetings,
it did add greatly to the richness of views expressed and
underlined the wide agreement on a variety of topics.
In the light of this preliminary finding, it was decided not
to produce a separate report on the workshop, but to use
the workshop as an additional data source for the overall
evaluation of the industry’s views on the opportunities of,
and barriers to, innovation as defined by the DECC project
specification. This is discussed in Chapter 5.
•Alstom•AREVA•ONR •Arup•Atkins•Babcock•Bellrock Technology Ltd•Beran Instruments•Bradtec•Cambridge Ultrasonics•The Carbon Trust•CEMEX•Ceram•Costain•Cranfield University•Cybula Ltd•Dalton Cumbria Facility•Dalton Institute•Darchem Engineering
•DBD•Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills (BIS)•EDF Energy•EPSRC•Fluor•GE Hitachi•Halcrow•Horizon•Hosakawa Micron•Imperial College•Jacobs•Lloyds Register•Mott MacDonald•National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL)•Nuclear AMRC•Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority (NDA)•Nuclear Engineering Services (NES)
•NIA•Nuvia•OC Robotics•ONR•PCubed•Pinsent Masons•REACT•Redhall•Rolls Royce•Sellafield Sites Ltd•Sheffield Forgemasters•Sir Robert McAlpine•Sulzer•Technology Strategy Board•Tetronics•TISICS Ltd•University of Birmingham•University of Manchester•URENCO
Table 1. Organisations involved in interviews and/or meetings
20 For example, see range of scenarios in DECC 2050 Pathways at https://www.gov.uk/2050-pathways-analysis
-
12 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
This chapter summarises the findings of the interviews, meetings and workshop facilitated by Madano-IDM, under a variety of headings which arose from the assembled data and views, namely:
• What is Innovation?
• Roles and Organisation
• Public and Political Acceptance
• Innovation and Access
• IPR and Commercial Arrangements – sharing risk and reward
• New Build
• Waste Management and Decommissioning Legacy
• The Market is International
• Innovation Examples
• Recognising and Measuring Success
• Innovation Opportunities
What is Innovation?
The question “What is innovation?” came up in many of the
interviews and was extensively covered in the workshop,
as it became apparent that many meanings of the word
‘innovation’ were in use, some of them contradictory:
“I just improve the way we do things, I don’t
innovate.”
Madano-IDM had started from the Oxford English
Dictionary definition – “the introduction of novelties,
the alteration of what is established” – which covers
all ‘change in the way things are done’. In the current
context, we must add the rider that the “introduction
of novelties” should improve the outcome, arriving at a
definition like “the introduction of novelties, the alteration
of what is established so as to improve the outcome of the
endeavour.”
Clearly this beneficial change can take many forms, from
developing a totally new technology (e.g. flash drives),
developing completely novel materials (e.g. graphene),
via applying different technologies to old problems, to
simple incremental improvement of existing systems. All
these ‘introduce novelties that makes things better’, so we
have considered ‘innovation’ to cover everything from a
Nobel Prize to a successful item in a suggestions box.
Debate in the workshop centred round the Madano-IDM
view of innovation as shown in Figure six below. This had
been predicated on the DECC requirement for innovations
from TRLs 3-4 to TRLs 8-9, and for deployment over 10-20
years. It was pointed out that ‘manufacturing’ had been
omitted as a category, and this has been added to Figure 6.
Figure 6. Types of Innovation
Chapter 5.
Discussion of Findings
Types of innovation
• Science
• Technologies
◊ New Technologies
◊ Improvements
◊ New Applications
• Materials
• Engineering
• Manufacturing
• Regulation
• Organisational Structures
• Contractual Structures
• Commercial Systems/Applications
Too long timescale?
Too long timescale?
Drivers/barriers
Drivers/barriers
New materials too long timescale (?) – but new applications?
Immediate – but codes, regs?
Immediate – drivers/barriers
Balance timescale improvements with regulatory dilemmas
Attributes
Motivations
Barriers}
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 13
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 5
While the general impression given by Figure 6 was
agreed, it was felt, in many areas, to be too broad
brush, and probably too much influenced by the pace of
innovation in mainstream reactor designs and fuel cycle
processes. In particular, some SMEs pointed out that, in
areas such as data gathering/manipulation and robotics,
the pace of change can be such that projects will advance
from TRL3 to full deployment in less than a decade. The
Figure was thus deemed useful, but as a guide rather than
a ‘straitjacket’.
While the research found a significant number of areas
of activity around innovation based on new materials
or technologies, it was evident that process innovation
also offers significant savings and should be an area of
attention.
“My work is more around improving
processes in nuclear rather than new
technologies, it is just as important.”
Overall there was strong agreement that the key process
was to identify innovation, of whatever sort, then to make
and sell a compelling case for its introduction.
Roles and Organisation
There were many views expressed on the value of the
UK defining, and sticking to, a long term strategy for the
role of nuclear power in meeting energy security and
carbon reduction targets. This was contrasted with the
stop-go-stop experience over the last 60 years which has
been illustrated in Figure 2 in Chapter 2, and has led to an
industry structure put together for the 2003 ‘No Nuclear’
energy policy being still in place in the current “‘New
Build’, New Opportunities” climate.
The UK has a current policy of reducing its carbon
emissions by 80% (from the 1990 baseline) by 2050, which
will require the decarbonisation, not only of the electricity
supply industry, but of large segments of the economy. It
is clear to most informed opinion that nuclear must have a
significant role to play in this decarbonisation. Presently a
very large range of scenarios is in play (zero to 75GWe),
so there is no real clarity of what nuclear role is desired or
required. During the consultations most opinion was firm
that such decarbonisation could not be achieved without
a long term energy strategy with a clearly defined role for
nuclear.
This perceived lack of a long term strategy is combined
with a lack of clarity on who does what, both at policy
level between DECC and BIS, and in the roles of, and
coordination between, associated organisations such as
the DECC Innovation team, the BIS Low Carbon Economy
team, Go-Science, and the TSB. One continuing theme
was that there is real difficulty in “mapping the system”,
leading to uncertainty in matters such as who to talk
to, who funds what, and who to consult about making
alliances.
Amongst those we spoke to, DECC is widely seen as
lacking the general industry, and specific nuclear industry
background necessary to be able to look forward and
solve issues in the nuclear world ‘as it is’. In particular
the acquisition of such industry knowledge could aid
innovation projects by being able to understand the
challenges and how to help overcome them. There is
also a perception that there is very little knowledge flow
across departments and organisations, and still less cross-
department or cross-organisation working.
Moving away from central government, the current
structures of both the NDA and National Nuclear
Laboratory (NNL) are seen as sub-optimal, which seems
mainly to derive from an uncertainty in their roles. For NDA
this includes its role in setting strategy and its relationship
to DECC, and the level of its control/influence on SLCs.
NDA’s role in R&D comes in for comment, and for some its
role is not understood:
“Need a body to lead on R&D….. and leave
the NDA to start/keep shutting things down.”
“NDA does not accept responsibility for
technical strategy and expects its contractors
to lead engineering innovation and
development.”
NNL is widely seen as a potential competitor by many to
whom a proper “National Laboratory” would be a strong
ally (see also IPR). It should be noted that this study
was conducted before, during and after the Beddington
Review21 and Nuclear Industrial vision statement22. Various
Beddington-derived proposals include moves to develop
NNLs status as a National Laboratory, which would seem
to be universally welcomed.
Both NDA and NNL are perceived as lacking in commercial
expertise and acumen. There are, however some good
exceptions to this rule, with the Nuclear Waste Research
Forum (driven by Sellafield Technical Strategy area and the
NDA), which is itself driven by the NDA Research Board
already mentioned in Chapter 3. This is taking a ‘pan-UK
view’ and is appearing to open minds and to be making
progress in co-ordinating, and sponsoring best practice
and innovation in the area of waste management and
decommissioning. However such ‘areas of excellence’
often rely on personalities rather than system drivers,
which are notably absent – and this is acknowledged by
the participants.
-
14 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 5
The potential sponsors of innovation complain of a lack of
appreciation of the problems that need to be tackled, and
the timescales involved.
“Don’t propose immediate treatment of
groundwater when I won’t be tackling that
until 2040.”
– but from the supply chain this is read as a lack of
imagination:
“2040 is only a point on a Gantt chart, moving
points like that are what innovation is about.”
All of the above feed into a lack of energy and drive
from within the industry to find new projects and ways
to overcome the barriers. There are many reports of
nuclear-relevant innovations being used in oil and gas
sectors, because access is easier and innovation drivers
are stronger.
The Beddington Review has, however, raised expectations
that there is more interest in nuclear R&D and in nuclear
strategy in general. However, there are doubts of the
realism of the achievability of the stated objectives when
starting from the current fragmented industry structure
and R&D landscape. It is widely mentioned that France has
CEA as a ‘one-stop-shop’, whereas UK, by contrast, has a
dozen overlapping organisations to talk to. A coordinating
body is desperately needed and long overdue.
The overall requirement is for the UK to develop an
innovation-friendly culture, with a ‘chain of benefit’ across
the supply chain, so that innovation can come from any
level but retain a fair reward.
This ‘chain of benefit’ was explored in the workshop, and
was agreed to be the central requirement for a culture of
successful innovation. The need for linked drivers and
enablers is represented in Figure 7 below.
Figure 7. Need for linked drivers and enablers
This sort of coherence was deemed essential for success,
and the workshop also outlined a ‘path to the future’,
which, though currently only in outline, would surely
repay study and development. It is shown below.
Figure 8. Coherent route to a successful UK nuclear future
JointSharedVision
Fast startthat
fades out
‘Bottom of the Inbox’
Anxiety
Frustration
Falsestart
Success
Must have all 4 of these in place...
If any one is missing...
FAILURE
PressureFor
Change
CapacityFor
Change
ActionableFirstSteps
JointSharedVision
Fast startthat
fades out
‘Bottom of the Inbox’
Anxiety
Frustration
Falsestart
Success
PublicPositive
• Government Investment• Private Investment• Universities attract new talent• Skill culture• Programmes growing• Investment in facilities
• Customers buy• Learning curves / cost reduction• Supply pipeline• Plants building• World Gold Standard
GovernmentPositive
Must have all 4 of these in place...
If any one is missing...
FAILURE
NOW
FUTURE
PressureFor
Change
CapacityFor
Change
ActionableFirstSteps
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 15
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 5
One missing element in Figure eight, but which was
reflected in many of the interviews and much of the
workshop discussion, was the need for the UK to identify
and pursue a niche or niches where it could feasibly
become the ‘World Gold Standard’. This reflects a need
to “identify business opportunities” rather than “pursue
innovation per se” – identifying the niches, then using
“the supply chain from academia through to industrial
development and manufacture” as the best way of
maximising market development.
The contrast between Figure eight and the situation
reported in the bulk of the research findings, points to
a clear opportunity for DECC to lead in facilitating the
development of innovations across the TRL 3-4 to 7-9
TRL “Valley of Death”. However, from the evidence,
many of the key barriers to innovation appear cultural
and structural rather than stemming merely from lack
of funding. Creating a “Nuclear UK Innovation Culture”
will probably depend more on coherent leadership than
additional funding, however welcome this might be.
The workshop looked, in four groups, at four ‘case
studies’ of different types of innovation, and reported
on the challenges and barriers to innovation that
were anticipated. These were then ‘marked’ by all the
workshop attendees. The results of this exercise are
given in Appendix V, and while not, of course, statistically
robust, do give a very useful insight into the difficulties
anticipated by those actually operating within the industry.
In particular, the four highest ranked challenges/barriers
chime very well with the rest of the research findings, and
are reproduced below.
Challenge/Barrier Marks Rank
Lack of institutional innovation climate
13 1
Need for national leadership (public and private), direction and vision
11 2
No incentive for business given long return on investment/access to (private sector) funding
9 3
Making and selling a compelling case for changes (team/individual credibility)
8 4
Table 2. Ranked Challenges/Barriers from Workshop Exercise
During the workshop there was much discussion around
the development of “innovation portals” similar to the
Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE). Many thought
such a scheme aligned to civil nuclear power could have
enormous benefit for the UK and help unblock a number
of the current issues.
The CDE is aligned with the Government’s Small Business
Research Initiative (SBRI) managed by the Technology
Strategy Board (TSB).
CDE is the first point of contact for anyone with a disruptive
technology, new process or innovation that has a potential
defence application. CDE funds research into novel high-
risk, high-potential-benefit innovations sourced from
the broadest possible range of science and technology
providers, including academia and small companies, to
enable development of cost-effective capability advantage
for UK Armed Forces.
CDE is the entry point for new science and technology
providers to defence, bringing together innovation and
investment for the defence and security markets.
All CDE research proposals must be submitted online via
the portal. The CDE team at Harwell is available to talk to
you about your innovative idea or you can book a one-to-
one surgery appointment via the events page. Once your
proposal is submitted you can track its progress online.
CDE welcomes research proposals via two different routes:
• Open call – an enduring call for any innovative research ideas that have a potential defence and security application;
• Themed call – a specific call for innovative research ideas to meet particular challenges.
Public and Political Acceptance
This area, which would not initially come to mind under
the heading of ‘innovation’, was mentioned in several
interviews and was discussed in the workshop, appearing
in Figure eight. It is plausible that the cyclical nature of
political support for nuclear power revealed in Figure two,
Chapter two, may be put down to a relationship between
the perceived need for nuclear power by politicians and
the acceptance of it by the public. It has been argued that
a long term strategy is necessary if innovation is to flourish
in the nuclear industry in the UK. This would involve a long
term political commitment, which would be made easier if
there was demonstrable long-term public support, which
in turn would require public appreciation of the role of
nuclear in an energy-secure low carbon economy.
The fragmented nature of the industry, already reviewed,
has meant there is no ‘owner’ of the industry’s stakeholder
relations, a role which was, in the past, largely undertaken
by BNFL as part of its ‘license to operate’. The need for
some overall stakeholder role was emphasised in the
workshop:
“Scope for innovation in political/public
acceptability arenas, particularly with respect
to the Geological Disposal Facility.”
-
16 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 5
This in turn chimes well with the work being done by
DECC to define/refine the Managing Waste Safely
(MRWS) process in the aftermath of the rejection by the
Cumbrian stakeholders of continued participation in the
search for a Geological Disposal Facility for radioactive
waste, The broader context of public acceptance should
be borne in mind during any future developments in the
industry, and will be a factor in the on-going support for
secure low carbon energy.
Innovation and Access
Reflecting the fragmented nature of the industry, its
confusing organisation and the inadequately-defined
roles, the innovation landscape lacks co-ordination and
collaboration – there is no one-stop shop to find out what
is happening, and there are major issues of accessibility
and complexity. This makes both ‘knowing what’s going
on” and “affecting what’s going on” difficult.
There is perceived to be lack of innovation right across the
landscape, partly due to past and on-going uncertainties
around nuclear policy – the same legacy of the past 60
years of chopping and changing. This feeds into difficulties
in R&D funding and access to innovation – with diverse
funders mirroring the complex industry structure. Access
is adequate for practised companies, but even the good
ones admit that entry is a struggle, and many holders of
good innovations are not big enough/good enough/
determined enough to succeed. SMEs particularly find it
difficult to be able to put together bids: it is always difficult
to break into new markets, and SMEs are at a natural
disadvantage as they are small and any extra effort in
processes is disproportionately difficult for them.
“It would be easier if the funding was better
aligned.. at least in one central place.”
The TSB approach was actively criticised by some SMEs
and Institutions, and it is considered onerous, particularly
as it appears to require a large commercial partner
(though, in some situations, this is actually not the case).
Such partners can be difficult to find, and when they are
found it is often difficult to partner while at the same time
protecting the SME’s IPR. However, and understandably,
the process has been praised by some of the larger
players. Alternative approaches are suggested, with the
MOD’s Centre for Defence Enterprise23 much quoted
as an exemplar of good practice. This offers open calls
on managed themes, and once an outline proposal is
received CDE representatives contact the proposer to
refine an application with the intent that its assessment
chances will be improved. There is also no requirement
for partnering or matching funding, making it easier for
SMEs with worthwhile innovations to make progress.
“TSB calls are quite difficult actually. We can
end up doing projects we don’t necessarily
want to do as the guidelines push you into
collaborations you wouldn’t otherwise do.”
“We have a lot of experience and have been
successful in TSB calls, but can understand
how new entrants find the task daunting.”
The paragraphs above indicate a real problem: that
SMEs, particularly ‘out of industry’ SMEs, may have the
innovations that the nuclear industry needs, but the
barriers to entry are high: how to find out what’s needed,
how to fit solutions within the nuclear regulatory and
safety case framework, how to find industry players
motivated to innovate, how to get partners without being
‘eaten’. Individually, such remarks could be passed off a
“the whingeing of the unsuccessful”. Collectively, they
paint a clear picture of an industry with widespread and
high barriers to innovation, particularly from SMEs.
“The key thing for companies like us, is
that we need to bring the market in to us…
we need big companies to engage with us
otherwise we’re almost shooting in the dark.”
With these barriers, the 3-4 to 7-9 TRL “Valley of Death”,
which innovations fail to cross, seems to be a reality. A
DECC call for projects in this area would be well aimed,
but might end up ameliorating a few of the symptoms,
while leaving the structural ‘illness’ untreated. There is
a need to generate market “pull” as well as innovation
“push”: perhaps targeted contractual change which would
allow/promote cultural and motivational change to “do a
good job for UK plc”. The key question is how to generate
motivation within a system with multiple organisational,
contractual, commercial and procurement barriers to
innovation. This is reported at various layers – from those
who look above them and find barriers to innovation, and
to those that look at them from below and find the same
problem.
“We spend 1bn euros a year on R&D and
while we have an interest to do that, the UK’s
set up is almost anti-innovation.”
Innovation requires access to information – “what is the
problem” – access to data (which frequently cannot, or
will not, be shared) and physical access to environments in
which solutions can be tested. There was speculation on
whether it might be possible to derive metrics for inertia/
resistance to innovation: while clearly a non-trivial task,
this might allow improvement to be measured.
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 17
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 5
IPR and Commercial Arrangements – sharing risk and reward
There were many problems reported on the difficulty of
protecting IPR, and difficulties in negotiating confidentiality
agreements. Some of the larger organisations are said to
refuse confidentiality agreements outright, and often take
over the IPR as a condition of support. Innovative SMEs
can end up either with little return for their idea, or they
can be bought up and shut down.
“How can you encourage innovation when
the client will take the IP off you in return for
a relatively small contract.”
This perception is widespread, and emphasises the need
for a ‘chain of benefit’ across the supply chain – with
a fair distribution of risk and benefit for all stages of the
innovation chain. ‘Small’ must be able to present to ‘large’
without getting ‘eaten’. There seems little to encourage
joint engagement between an equipment manufacturer
and an end user, and the ‘Tiering’ of contractors, formalised
in the legacy waste management and decommissioning
market, promotes barriers between tiers.
New Build
There is a growing lack of conviction that ‘new nuclear’
will actually happen, and no real understanding of the role
nuclear could/would play in the UK low carbon energy
future. The 2050 aspiration (i.e. 80% less CO2 by 2050)
does not appear to reflect the UK’s need for integrated
energy systems to deliver a low carbon economy, and
a meaningful longer term energy policy joining “now”
and “then” with a real strategy would help to signal
Government commitment.
If ‘new build’ does not happen, there will be major
knock-on effects for people, skills, graduate recruitment/
retention, all of which are essential resources if any UK
nuclear success is to be had. On the other hand, positive
commitments on ‘new build’ can unlock investment in the
UK ‘new build’ supply chain.
“Financing R&D on civil nuclear remains challenging...
particularly with the delays on ‘new build’, a move on ‘new
build’ would unlock a lot of stalled activity.”
The current position is that on ‘new build’ “UK is playing
catch-up and the start is being delayed”, although EDF is
progressing AGR life extension.
UK is seen as highly regulated across the whole nuclear
industry, and this is essential to the level of public
acceptance it can achieve. However, it should be noted
that the Generic Design Assessment process was an
example of innovation, with all the regulators working
as a team with a common goal and an incentive to
work thoroughly but without delay. This ‘balance of
forces’ was conspicuously lacking during the licensing
of Sizewell B, as there were strong timescale drivers
to get the station constructed, licensed and operating,
which overrode any motivation of the Sizewell B team to
challenge the regulator requirements to modify/augment
safety systems, therefore increasing costs. There was
widespread support in the workshop for the proposition
that “there would never have been another reactor as long
as the Sizewell B licensing process remained in place,”
Waste Management and Decommissioning Legacy
The UK legacy nuclear cleanup is, at £3bn or so per annum,
a major market which should give a real opportunity for
the UK to be a world leader in nuclear decommissioning.
The current structure is widely seen as a barrier rather
than a driver of such developments, with perceptions
from the outside virtually unanimous that the system
does little to incentivise innovation or, indeed, progress
a decommissioning and waste management, a drive by
Government which could “help UK firms to the top table.”
“Decommissioning is an obvious area for the
UK to develop a leadership role both in terms
of expertise and technology innovation…
It’s a large industry for the UK and I don’t
understand why we don’t exploit the
opportunities it presents more.”
There are exceptions, for example the Nuclear Waste
Research Forum, but as already discussed this is
‘people and personality’ based rather than driven by the
contractual/commercial structure. It would only take a few
people to move on and the progress could cease.
Perceptions of the legacy clean-up market include:
“There is currently no incentive to
decommission and deal with waste …
[decommissioning] policy is about care and
maintenance.”
“The current system is based upon care and
maintenance rather than actually wanting to
do anything.”
“The current system at Sellafield does not
make contractors think how best to get the
most innovative processes or technologies
on to the site… it is very much focused on an
operations and maintenance model.”
One area where innovation is reported is in a more
phased approach by regulators to high-hazard-potential
plants at Sellafield. Formerly, no project could be initiated
until all the downstream processes and projects were in
-
18 Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 5
place to take waste into a final disposable form. Now, the
realisation that the priority is progress in Hazard Potential
reduction in the short term, short term progress is being
facilitated by phased approvals, while ensuring that routes
to final disposal are not compromised.
To maximise the chances of the UK becoming a world
leader in nuclear clean-up, the clean-up market would
need to maximise the opportunities for UK firms to win
jobs, gain experience and strengthen the UK supply chain.
However, the perception is that procurement procedures
and recourse to OJEU24, are widely used/interpreted to
the detriment of setting up UK capabilities and supply
chains, with the UK apparently playing to a set of rules
very different to those of its international competitors.
One subject which was not much mentioned in the
interviews/meetings, but was dealt with in the workshop,
was the disposal of radioactive waste and the progress
towards a Geological Disposal Facility. Progress on
disposal, along with ‘new build’, would be a signal that the
UK nuclear industry is ‘on the move from cradle to grave’.
The current hiatus may, in the long term, be as damaging
as a short term hiatus for ‘new build’.
“They need to sort out the GDF issue. It was
a massive blow to the UK and the nuclear
industry that GDF process has stalled. It
could have really delivered a lot of innovation
around nuclear waste management.”
The Market is International
The international dimension of innovation is growing, and
this was discussed, and found broad agreement, in the
workshop. Even a nuclear industry the size of France’s is
turning to its international peers for ideas. This was not to
say that the UK could not find international markets for
its innovative ideas, merely that it must find, and pursue,
suitable niches. For example by setting the benchmark for
regulation, standards and codes, the UK could develop
an international niche, attracting good people into the
industry and the UK.
This observation emphasises the need for any analysis of
nuclear industry futures for the UK to ‘start from where we
are’ (i.e. the industry structure as seen in Figure three), not
‘where we’d like to be’.
Innovation Examples
Though the observations of the industry representatives
that have been contacted, as reported in the sections
above, has concentrated on barriers to innovations and
on the changes needed for improvement, the interviews
and meetings did reveal a range of innovative ideas which
could make a significant difference to the effectiveness of
nuclear activities in the UK if they were implemented.
The detailed findings have been included in the
Commercial Appendices to this report, with distribution
restricted to DECC, but it is relevant here to give a broad
representation of the innovations proposed and the field
in which they could operate. It should be noted that Table
3 below is not intended to be comprehensive, but gives
a “snapshot” of the innovation topics discussed during
the stakeholder engagement exercise. The innovations
are assigned to the six themes identified by DECC, which
were examined in Chapter three, and are repeated for
convenience below.
i. Innovative Fuel Formsii. Capex – Components
iii. Capex – Building Materialsiv. Capex – Construction, Installation and
Commissioningv. Waste Management, Reprocessing and Storage (in
relation to historic, existing and future systems)vi. Innovation in the Regulatory Process
-
Department of Energy and Climate Change 19
Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review
Chapter 5
Table 3. Example Innovations proposed during stakeholder contacts
Technology Description TRL Level Opportunities Theme
Data management and consolidation
Integrates sensors and monitoring technologies without the need for a central concentrator
5 Automatically determine how data can be interpreted in a system
a25
Condition monitoring system
Monitors integrity of machinery Not stated Identifies early on issues with machinery and parts and allows early warning for maintenance / improves safety
a
Corrosion studies and testing
Only one rig in the UK 4-5 As a nuclear capability the ability to understand corrosion in reactors is very important
a
Virtual environments Developing gaming engines to deal with specific issues around nuclear sites
7-8 Develops knowledge on decommissioning and testing. Good training tool
v
Robotics Development of hand sensors for robotics
5-6 Would reduce time and improve efficiency
v
Graphite management Convert graphite to CO2
7 Speed up decommissioning and save money
v
Concrete integrity measurement
CMS – Inspects and monitors the integrity of concrete structures from installation and construction
5-6 Identifies early on issues with structures and allows early warning for maintenance
iv
Waste encapsulation Encapsulation of solid intermediate Level Waste (ILW)
4 More cost effective than other forms of encapsulation
v
Depth of contamination in concrete
Measuring the depth of contamination in concrete
5 Reduction in the cost of decommissioning and waste management
v
Plasma Arc Technology
Using plasma arc technology will significantly reduce amount of nuclear waste for disposal
7 Technology would significantly reduce the amount of cost spent on nuclear waste disposal
v
Data Signals monitoring system
Monitors signals – heat, vibrations, movements. Seeks to analyse data and produce abnormality detection systems
4 Requires large data sets. Difficult to get access to large players and existing plants
a
Fire protection technology
The thermal insulation technology is endothermic and absorbs heat
7-8 Would reduce major fire risks ii
Metal-fuelled fast reactor
Various components and fuel forms Not Applied
-
Powder technology applications
Applying powder processing and sorting techniques in place of chemical processes
9 in other industries