Social Interactions and the Development of Social Concepts in Preschool ChildrenAuthor(s): Larry P. Nucci and Elliot TurielSource: Child Development, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 400-407Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Society for Research in Child DevelopmentStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1128704 .Accessed: 28/03/2011 19:38

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Social Interactions and the Development of Social Concepts in Preschool Children

Larry P. Nucci University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Elliot Turiel

University of California, Santa Cruz, and Institute of Human Development, University of California, Berkeley

Nucci, LARRY P., and TURIEL, ELLIOT. Social Interactions and the Development of Social Concepts in Preschool Children. CmLD DEVELOPMENT, 1978, 49, 400-407. Observations were made in 10 preschools of interactions in 2 domains of social events: social conventional and moral. On the basis of criteria defining each domain, observed events could be reliably classified as social conventional or moral. As another aspect of the study, an interview was administered to children from the preschool who had witnessed the same events as the observer. The children's view of the events as social conventional or moral was in agreement with our classifi- cations of the events in 83% of the cases. It was hypothesized that the responses of both children and adults to social conventional events differ from their responses to moral events. Observed behaviors were rated on a standard checklist of response categories. Different types of responses were elicited by the 2 types of events. Almost all responses to social conventional transgressions were initiated by adults. Children and adults responded with equal frequency to moral transgressions. Adults responded to social conventional transgressions differently from the ways they reacted to moral transgressions.

This article presents the results of an ob- servational study of preschool children's social interactions in the context of two types of events: social conventional and moral. The research dealt with two interrelated questions. The first was whether preschool children make a conceptual discrimination between social conventional and moral events. The second was whether preschool children experience dif- ferent social interactions in the context of social conventional and moral events.

Social conventions are behavioral uni- formities which coordinate interactions of indi- viduals within social systems (Turiel, in press a, in press b). Thus, social conventions con- stitute general and shared knowledge of uni- formities in social interactions and are deter- mined by the social system in which they are formed. Some illustrative examples of social conventional acts would include uniformities in modes of dress, usages of forms of address

(e.g., first names or titles and last names), and modes of greeting.

Social conventional acts in themselves are arbitrary in that they do not have an intrin- sically prescriptive basis: alternative courses of action can serve similar functions. That is, a conventional uniformity within one social sys- tem may serve the same function as a different uniformity in another social system. As an example, the content of a conventional uni- formity regarding modes of dress (e.g., formal attire in certain social contexts) is arbitrarily designated, so an alternative mode of dress could be designated to serve the same func- tion. Therefore, social conventions are defined relative to the social context. Accordingly, it would only be events involving violations of implicit or explicit regulations that would be regarded by individuals as (conventional) transgressions.

We wish to express our appreciation to Jill Brown, Jan Fried, and Maria Santiago for their help in the collection of the data. Thanks are due to Allen Black and Neal Gordon for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. Reprints may be requested from Larry P. Nucci, College of Education, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Chicago, Illinois 60680, or Elliot Turiel, Psychology Board of Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064.

[Child Development, 1978, 49, 400-407. @ 1978 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc. 0009-3920/78/4902-0018$00.81]

Nucci and Turiel 401

In contrast, within the moral domain actions are not arbitrary, and the existence of a social regulation is not necessary for an individual to regard an event as a (moral) transgression. An example of such an act would be one person hitting another and thereby causing physical harm. An individual's percep- tion of that type of event as a transgression would stem from factors intrinsic to the event (e.g., from the perception of the consequences to the victim). Thus, moral issues are neither relative to the social context nor determined by social regulations; they are structured by underlying concepts of justice (Damon 1975; Kohlberg 1969; Piaget 1932/1948).

On the basis of the above, it has been proposed (Turiel, in press a, in press b) that social convention and morality constitute two distinct conceptual domains and that their development stems from different aspects of the child's social interactions. Research with subjects from 6 to 25 years of age has shown that there is a developmental progression in the individual's concepts of social convention. This progression is characterized by seven levels (described in Turiel, in press a); at each level concepts of social convention are closely tied to the individual's conception of social organization.

The distinction we have drawn between social convention and morality is one that has not been made in most explanations of moral development. Generally, conventional regula- tion and moral prescription have been treated as part of the same conceptual and develop- mental domain. Some theorists (e.g., Aron- freed 1968; Grinder 1962; Sears, Rau, & Alpert 1965) have assumed that moral devel- opment is the learning of socially acceptable behavior and the acquisition of transmitted values and thus have not made conceptual distinctions among different social behaviors. Other theorists (e.g., Kohlberg 1969, 1976; Piaget 1932/1948) have proposed that moral development progresses through stages that en- tail the differentiation of morality from conven- tion. At lower developmental stages convention and morality are presumed to be undifferenti- ated, while at the higher levels the two are differentiated in such a way that morality (jus- tice) displaces convention (for further discus- sion see Turiel, in press a).

However, our hypothesis that social con- ventional concepts form a developmental sys- tem distinct from that of moral concepts is

supported by two recent studies (Nucci, Note 1; Turiel, Note 2) with subjects from 6 to 19 years of age. Nucci (Note 1) found that at all ages judgments about social conventional acts depended upon their status as regulations within a social context, while judgments about acts within the moral domain were not based on the existence of social regulations. Corre- spondingly, in the Turiel (Note 2) study it was found that subjects viewed rules pertain- ing to conventional acts, but not rules per- taining to moral acts, as legitimately change- able from one social context to another.

In the previous studies, however, we have not determined if younger children discrimi- nate between social convention and morality, nor have we ascertained whether the social interactions experienced by young children in the context of social conventional events are of a different type from those experienced in the context of moral events. In the research reported here these questions were addressed through an observational study of spontane- ously occurring events in 10 different pre- schools. The following two procedures were used: (a) assessments of the responses of chil- dren and adults (teachers) in the preschools to what were classified as events entailing transgressions of social conventions and events entailing moral transgressions, and (b) inter- views of preschool children about those events immediately after they had occurred.

First, it was hypothesized that the pre- school children would make conceptual dis- criminations between social conventional and moral transgressions. It was expected (a) that children's judgments of moral events would be based on factors intrinsic to actions and not on the presence of a rule, and (b) that their judgments of social conventional events would be based on whether or not they are in violation of a rule. Second, it was hypothe- sized that moral events would produce dif- ferent types of social interactions from those produced by social conventional events. On the basis of the way we have distinguished the two domains, it was expected that re- sponses to moral transgressions would focus on the intrinsic consequences of the act (such as on personal loss or injury to a victim), while responses to social conventional trans- gressions would focus on aspects of social or- ganization (such as rules and regulations). Furthermore, given that the social organization of the preschool is primarily regulated by

402 Child Development

adults, it was expected that the adults would be more likely to respond to social conven- tional transgressions than the children, while children and adults would be equally likely to respond to moral transgressions.

Method

Settings and subjects.-The observations were conducted at 10 preschools in the Santa Cruz, California, area. The schools varied in size (from 12 to 40 children), social class back- grounds of the children (working, middle, and upper-middle), and teachers' instructional and socialization practices (parochial, traditional, and progressive). The children ranged in age from 2-10 to 5-2.

Design and procedure.-Prior to the obser- vational sessions, the experimenters spent 1 hour in the school talking informally with children and teachers. Two observational peri- ods, each lasting 90 min, were conducted in each of the 10 schools. During these obser- vational periods two different procedures were performed. One procedure was conducted by a person who observed and tape recorded a descriptive narrative of events entailing social conventional and moral transgressions. Defi- nitions of what would constitute social conven- tional and moral transgressions had been con- veyed to the observer. Since one of the aims of the study was to assess the types of re- sponses made to transgressions, the observer only recorded those events that evoked a re- sponse from children or adults. That is, for these purposes an event was considered a transgression only if it was responded to as such by someone in the school. For each of these events, the observer also rated the re- sponses made by children and adults to the transgressions. These ratings were done on a standard checklist of response categories. The observer tallied the number of responses within each category displayed in the observed events. The observer did not know the hypothesized associations between the checklist response categories and type of event.

In all, narrative descriptions were re- corded by the observer for 263 events. It hap- pened that these were almost equally distrib- uted between the two types: 132 were classi- fied as social conventional, 114 as moral, and 17 were unclassifiable.

The second procedure, conducted by an- other person, was the administration of an

interview to preschool children who had wit- nessed the same event as the observer. The purpose of this interview was to determine if the children conceptualized a given event as social conventional or moral. The selection of interviewees and the interview itself took con- siderably longer than the observational pro- cess. The observer continued recording events independently of the interviews and, thus, children were interviewed about fewer events than were recorded by the observer. Fifty- seven children were interviewed on 29% (72 events) of the total (246) observed events. Of the 57 children, 42 of them were inter- viewed once and 15 were interviewed twice. The selection of interviewees was done while the observed events were occurring. For a given event the interviewer chose a child who (a) appeared to have seen the event in its entirety, (b) could accurately describe it, and (c) was willing to be interviewed (nine chil- dren were unwilling).

The transcribed descriptions of the ob- served events were classified as social con- ventional or moral by a trained judge. A dif- ferent judge coded the responses of the chil- dren who had been interviewed about the observed events. Neither of these judges served as observer or interviewer; they did not know the hypotheses of the study.

Classification of observed events as social conventional or moral.-Judges were instructed to classify the observed events as social con- ventional or moral on the following bases. Social conventional events were those that regulated social interactions and social order. They did not have an intrinsically prescriptive basis independent of the coordination of social interactions and maintenance of social order. Examples of social conventional transgressions included engaging in work or play activities in other than designated areas or time periods; engaging in acts different from the group while in group activities; failing to adhere to uniform behavior (e.g., eating snack while standing rather than sitting).

Events classified as moral involved the justice, welfare, or rights of individuals or groups. These were events that involved phys- ical or psychological harm to others, violation of rights, and deprivation of something to which the person is entitled. Examples of trans- gressions classified as moral included one per- son intentionally hitting another, taking what belongs to another, failing to share with others.

Nucci and Turiel 403

Response categories.-A list of categories of possible responses to social transgressions was compiled on the basis of the distinction we have drawn between social convention and morality. The response categories, which are listed and defined in table 1, were first used in pilot observations in preschool settings in order to verify their applicability. As can be seen in table 1, some of the categories refer to reactions based on the nature of the act itself (i.e., injury or loss statement, exclamation of emotional response, rationale, feelings, phys- ical response), while others refer to aspects of social organization. It was expected that the former would be associated with moral events and the latter with social conventional events. The observer, who was familiar with the defi- nitions of the response categories, used a list to tally the number of responses in a given category elicited during an observed event.

Interview of child observer.-Children in the preschool were taken aside individually by the interviewer and told that they would be asked some questions about what was occur- ring in the school. After the occurrence of an event that was being recorded by the observer, the child was asked the following questions: (1) "Did you see what happened? Can you tell me what happened?" (2) "Is there a rule in your school about [the observed act]?" (3) "What if there weren't a rule in the school about [the observed act], would it be right to do it then?"

Responses were coded as social conven- tional if the subject stated that the act would be all right if there were no rule. Responses were coded as moral if the subject stated that the act is not right even if there were no rule. It should be noted that these criteria for clas-

sifying children's responses were not identical with the criteria used by the judges to classify the observed events. Given that there are age- related changes in young children's social con- ventional (Turiel, in press a) and moral (Damon 1975) concepts, children's responses were coded on criteria that would be appli- cable to their level. It has been found that a basic component in the way the two domains are distinguished by subjects between the ages of 6 and 19 years (Turiel, in press b; Nucci, Note 1) is that moral transgressions are judged independently of social regulations while judg- ments of social conventional transgressions are based on the existence of social regulations. Consequently, this criterion was used to code the preschool children's responses.

Measures of reliability.-The interjudge re- liability of the observer's ratings of responses to transgressions was estimated by a second observer's ratings of 37 events. The percentage agreement between the two observers ranged from 82 to 100.

Seventy-six of the observed events were chosen randomly to be classified by a second judge as social conventional or moral. The two judges agreed in their classifications on 93% of the events.

Forty-two of the interviews administered to children observing events were chosen ran- domly to be classified by a second judge. The two judges were in agreement on 95% of their classifications.

Results

There were two aspects to the study: interviews of children witnessing transgres- sions and observations of responses to the

TABLE 1

DEFINITIONS OF RESPONSE CATEGORIES

Injury or loss statement.......... Statements indicating pain or injury to self or personal loss (loss of property, personal space, etc.)

Emotional exclamation of response Statement expressing emotional state or exclamation of affect Providing rationale .............. Reason(s) given for a rule or behavior Feelings of others ............... Statements by others pointing out the feelings of the victim; telling victim of

transgression to express feelings to transgressor or telling transgressor how it feels to be the victim of the act

Physical response ............... Any physical act taken toward the transgressor Involve adult .................. Request for adult intervention, or statement by a child to an adult describing the misbehavior of another, or threat to tell adult of another's misbehavior

Disorder statement. ............. Indication that behavior is creating a mess, disorder, or chaos Rule statement .................. Statements specifying a rule governing the action Sanction statement .............. Statement indicating that a sanction will be the response to the behavior Command...................... A statement to do or cease from doing an act, without a statement of rule

404 Child Development

transgressions. The interview responses were coded to determine if children discriminated between social conventional and moral events (as classified by an independent judge). Ob- served responses of participants in the events were rated on the checklist (table 1) to ascer- tain if their responses to moral events differed from responses to social conventional events.

There was high agreement between the children's classifications and the judge's clas- sifications of observed events. Children were interviewed regarding a total of 72 events. There was agreement between the classifica- tions of the children and the judge in 83% (60 of 72) of the cases. Of the 60 events about which there was agreement in classifi- cation, 29 were social conventional and 31 were moral.

Regarding behavioral responses to the moral and social conventional events, the anal- yses include (a) comparisons of responses made by children with responses made by adults, and (b) comparisons of frequencies of types of responses (as measured by the cate- gory checklist) to moral events with frequen- cies of types of responses to social conven- tional events. While both adults and children responded to moral transgressions, it was pri- marily adults who responded to social con- ventional transgressions. Of the 246 classifiable events, 132 (54%) were social conventional and 114 (46%) were moral. The distribution of respondents to social conventional trans- gressions was as follows: 92% of the events had an adult as the sole respondent, 3% had a child as the sole respondent, 5% had both adults and children as respondents. Thus adults responded to many more social conventional transgressions than did children (sign test: p < .00001). In contrast, both children and adults responded to moral transgressions. The distribution of respondents to moral transgres- sions was as follows: 38% of the events had an adult as the sole respondent; 46% had a child as the sole respondent; 16% had both adults and children as respondents. These dif- ferences were not statistically significant (sign test: p = .18).

The frequencies of types of adult and child responses (other than those of the trans- gressor[s]) to the observed events were tallied on the response-category checklist. Table 2 presents the percentage of responses made by adults for each of six categories within each of the schools as well as for the 10 schools

combined. As expected, for all the schools combined adults showed more frequent pro- viding rationale and feelings of others re- sponses to the moral events than to the social conventional events. As was also expected, adults showed more frequent responses focus- ing on features of social organization-com- mand, rule, sanction, disorder-to the social conventional events than to the moral events.

Using the normal approximation of the binomial distribution, the statistical significance of these findings was tested by calculating the probability of deviation from chance expec- tancy. For each response category the number of schools showing greater frequency of re- sponses to moral or social conventional events was compared with chance expectation. In all 10 schools there was a greater frequency of providing rationale and feelings of others re- sponses to moral events than to social con- ventional events (p < .002, two-tailed). In all 10 schools there was a greater frequency of disorder and rule responses to social conven- tional events than to moral events (p < .002). In nine of the 10 schools there was a greater frequency of sanction and command responses to social conventional events than to moral events (p < .02). Also using the normal ap- proximation of the binomial distribution (Wil- kinson 1951), the probability of obtaining sig- nificance by chance for all six response cate- gories is less than .001.

Since there were so few responses on the part of the children to the social conventional transgressions, it was not possible to compare the two types of events. Table 3, which pre- sents children's responses to moral events, shows that their responses were somewhat dif- ferent from those of adults. In particular, it should be noted that children generally re- sponded to the moral events as victims of transgressions. Thus, some of the responses made by the children focused on the conse- quences of the acts: emotional responses to the act and expressions of injury or loss. The children also reacted to moral transgressions with physical responses, commands, and by seeking to involve adults.

Discussion

The findings of this study demonstrate that preschool children distinguish between so- cial convention and morality. We have seen that in their observations of spontaneously oc- curring behaviors children discriminated be-

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGES OF FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSES BY ADULTS TO SOCIAL CONVENTIONAL (S-C) AND MORAL (M) TRANSGRESSIONS

RESPONSE CATEGORY

Providing Feelings Disorder Rule Sanction SCHOOL Rationale of Others Statement Statement Statement Command

1: S-C ............ 0 0 11 26 5 58 M............. 33 44 0 0 0 22

2: S-C............. 0 0 8 42 15 35 M.............. 15 31 0 23 8 23

3: S-C............. 0 0 17 17 8 58 M.............. 25 25 0 8 0 42

4: S-C ............ 0 0 7 36 7 50 M............. 33 8 0 8 0 50

5:

S-C............ 13 0 25 13 6 44 M.............. 50 33 0 0 0 17

6:

S-C............ 0 0 10 38 5 48 M.............. 29 57 0 0 0 14

S-C......... 0 0 13 13 13 63

M.............. 20 40 0 0 20 20 8:

S-C ............ 7 0 10 21 3 59 M.............. 43 29 0 0 0 29

9:

S-C......... 0 0 13 .19 13 56

M.............. 22 67 0 11 0 0 10:

S-C ............ 0 0 9 22 26 43 M.............. 38 15 0 8 15 23

All schools combined:

S-C ............ 2 0 11 26 10 50 M............. 30 32 0 8 4 26

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGES OF FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSES BY CHILDREN TO MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS

RESPONSE CATEGORY

Injury or Loss Emotional Physical Involve Rule

SCHOOL Statement Reaction Response Adult Statement Command

1............... 19 31 25 19 0 6 2............... 26 26 16 16 0 16 3 ............... 17 14 28 3 3 34 4 ............... 15 23 8 15 0 38 5............... 27 18 9 9 0 36 6 ............... 22 22 11 11 0 33 7 ............... 17 33 17 17 0 17 8............... 24 33 19 14 0 10 9 .............. 50 25 8 8 0 8

10............... 25 21 21 8 0 25 All schools

combined....... 24 24 18 11 1 23

406 Child Development tween events that were classified as social conventional or moral. While it has previously been found (Turiel, in press b; Nucci, Note 1; Turiel, Note 2) that the two domains were distinguished by older subjects, this is the first study showing that preschool children do so. Thus, the present study lends further support to the proposition that social convention and morality constitute two distinct conceptual do- mains and that their respective courses of de- velopment can be analyzed independently of each other. In turn, these findings fail to sup- port the view (see Kohlberg 1969; Piaget 1932/1948) that moral development entails a process of progressively differentiating mo- rality from convention.

In this study the preschool children's dis- crimination between the two domains was as- sessed through their judgments about social regulations pertaining to acts in each domain. Events that we classified as entailing moral transgressions were judged by the children to be wrong regardless of the presence or ab- sence of a school rule pertaining to the act. Events that we classified as entailing trans- gressions of social conventions were judged to be wrong only if a rule pertaining to the act existed in the school. Therefore, for pre- school children, as well as for older subjects, judgments about social conventional acts de- pend upon their status as implicit or explicit regulations in a social context, while judg- ments about acts within the moral domain are not based upon the existence of a social regu- lation. In the moral domain, a rule is an ex- plicit formulation of a prescription regarding the justice or injustice of an action (or class of actions). The rule stems from the act to which it pertains and is justified on the basis of factors intrinsic to the act. As an example, a subject's evaluation of a rule prohibiting killing would be based on the judgment that it is wrong to take a life. In the social con- ventional domain, uniformities or regulations serve to coordinate social interactions and per- tain to acts that are arbitrary. Such rules, therefore, would be evaluated on the basis of their functions within a social system and would be viewed as relative to their social contexts (Turiel, in press b).

The data we have presented on the dif- ferent types of behaviors associated with each domain suggest that the experiential origins of social conventional concepts may be different from those of moral concepts. In this regard

it has been hypothesized (Turiel, in press a, in press b) that, in general, children's concepts are constructed out of their interactions with the environment and, more specifically, that experiences likely to stimulate development within the social conventional domain would be different from those likely to stimulate de- velopment within the moral domain. The pre- ceding discussion of the role of regulations in each domain points to some of the differ- ences in experiential origins. For instance, in the case of events that would stimulate moral concepts, it is not necessary that there be a violation of social regulation for a child to respond to those events as transgressions or to begin formulating prescriptions about them. Such responses on the part of a child can originate from the event itself (e.g., from a perception of the intrinsic consequences of the act). In contrast, for a child to respond to a social conventional event as a transgres- sion there must be a perceived violation of social regulations or general expectations. Thus, regulations (or their violation) and unifor- mities forming part of social organization would be likely to stimulate concepts of social con- vention.

In accordance with these propositions, we have seen in this study that the types of social interactions associated with social conventional transgressions did differ from those associated with moral transgressions. Children were much more likely to respond to moral transgressions than to transgressions of the school's social conventions. Generally, the moral transgres- sions we observed involved actions among the children, with children often experiencing con- sequences as the victims of such transgressions. In addition, moral transgressions often pro- duced direct communications by the victim to the transgressor. In these ways moral trans- gression often resulted in direct feedback to the children of the effects of the acts upon the victim. Communications between the chil- dren involved in moral events generally in- cluded statements about the injury or loss ex- perienced by the victims of the transgressions. Physical reactions and responses expressing emotional reactions to the transgressions were also prevalent in the moral events. Moral trans- gressions also produced commands from the children to refrain from behaving in a given way. In sum, the children's responses revolved around the intrinsic consequences of the actions.

Another aspect of the social interactions

Nucci and Turiel 407

experienced by the children stemmed from responses made by adults. We have seen that child-adult interactions in the context of moral events differed from such interactions in the context of social conventional events. Feed- back from adults in the context of moral trans- gressions complemented the responses initiated by children. Adults often responded either by

ointing out to the transgressor the effects of is actions upon the victim or by encouraging

the victim to do so. Another characteristic type of response to moral transgressions on the part of adults was to explain the reasons for prohi- bitions.

Social conventional transgressions resulted in feedback that came primarily from adults. In contrast with the moral events, responses to social conventional transgressions consisted mainly of communications focusing on aspects of the social order of the school. In large part, such communications entailed commands to refrain from violating norms, directives to en- gage in normative behavior, and statements specifying school rules. Adult responses to so- cial conventional transgressions also focused on the maintenance of classroom order and entailed reiteration of the negative sanctions that would result from noncompliance.

These findings show that the forms of social interaction experienced by preschool children differ according to domain. Through this observational study we have begun to identify the types of social interactions asso- ciated with the moral and social conventional domains. It is still necessary to determine the relation of these social interactions to processes of development within each domain.

Reference Notes 1. Nucci, L. P. Social development: personal,

conventional and moral concepts. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1977.

2. Turiel, E. Social-convention and the develop- ment of societal concepts. Unpublished manu- script, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1977.

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