nsls-ii shielding workshop

1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES

NSLS-II Shielding Workshop

S. Buda

Personnel Protective Systems

March 27, 2007


Design Goals Personnel Protection System

Protects personnel from high radiation areas by preventing access and controlling radiation producing devices

• Linac (LPPS)

• Booster Ring (BPPS)

• Storage Ring (APPS) • Experimental Beam Lines (PSS) • RF test cell area


NSLSII Facility Hazards

Linac Hazards• Accelerated electrons• Dark Current

Main Ring /Booster Hazards• Radiation produced from secondary emissions in RF cavities

(Both main ring and booster RF cavities)• Accelerated electrons• Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation• Oxygen Deficiency Alarm (ODH) (RF Cavity and cryo plant)

Experimental Beam Lines hazards

• Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation


Linac Area


NSLSII Storage Ring


Design Goals Personnel Protection System

• Modular • Simple as possible to carry out task • Designed with testing as a key feature• Meet DOE and BNL requirements for Interlocks• Quality assurance system• Flexibility for expansion and modification• Diverse Component Selection• Ability to be upgraded with technology • Diagnostic capability


Technical Description Personnel Protection Systems

• Dual chain PLC architecture (one safety rated)• Modular • Designed with testing as key consideration• Reliability and availability emphasized• Reduce wiring where possible• Use fiber optic busses for interference and security• Compatible I/O for all systems • Separate safety and command functions in beam line systems


Technical Highlights of Personnel Protection Systems

• Integration of Radiation monitors with the main ring system (APPS) 40+ locations

• Main ring divided into 6 separate sections for modular concept.

• Main ring uses a distributed I/O system• Interface to APICS for archiving of system data• Use of safety rated PLC’s to increase reliability and

diagnostic capability


Other Design Features

• Interlock system must allow:• Linac operable with personnel in booster• Booster operable with personnel in storage ring

• All interlock logic trees will have redundant and independent chains

• The system will be fail safe for foreseeable failure modes (e.g., loss of power/pressure, open circuit, short to ground, and single component failure

• Redundant circuits will not share cables and should be separated physically on circuit boards and terminal strips. Redundant systems should be configured differently.


Other Design Features (Cont.)

• A rigorous configuration management program will be established to control unauthorized modifications to interlock system components

• All interlock lines and components will be labeled and readily identifiable.

• Testing & certification of interlock systems will be performed by independent personnel

• Design for enclosure search systems will include sequenced and timed inspection stations, warning lights, audible alarms, and emergency off- switches.


NSLS X-RAY INTERLOCK LOGIC


NSLS VUV INTERLOCK LOGIC


NSLS INJECTOR INTERLOCK LOGIC


NSLS STANDARD SHUTTER LOGIC


SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONTROL

CABLE IDENTIFICATION

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL


STANDARD LASER INTERLOCK


INJECTOR INTERLOCK PLC

nsls-ii shielding workshop

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