nrc epw report briefing

8/13/2019 NRC EPW Report Briefing

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Dr. Eugene Sevin, NAE

Summary report of the

TH E NATI ONAL ACADEM I ES Committee on

Effects of Nuclear EarthPenetrator and Other Weapons


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Effects of Nuclear Earth Penetrator

and Other Weapons

CONTENTS

The National Academies Study Background Statement of Task Committee Members Study Process

Assessment Process Major Conclusions Summary

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BACKGROUND The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates 10,000

known or suspected hard and deeply buried targets(HDBTs) worldwide as identified by the DefenseIntelligence Agency.

Of that number, about 20 percent have a major strategic

function, and of those, about half are in or near urbanareas. HDBTs are used for the protection of senior leaders,

command and control functions, and storage ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD), among other

purposes. Some of them are buried in rock at depths greater than

300 meters, and some are hardened to withstandoverpressures of about 1 kilobar.


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Shallow, Accessible Bunker/Silo

C3I Basement Bunker

Missile Tunnel Complex

For CW/BW Aboveground Bunker

C3I, Shallow Underground Bunker

Deep Underground C 3 Complex

Hard and Deeply Buried Targets


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Statement of Task Section 1033 of the Bob Stump National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed the Secretaryof Defense to request that the National Academy of Sciencesstudy the anticipated health and environmental effects ofnuclear earth-penetrator and other weapons

As requested, the study examined the following:1. The anticipated short-term and long-term effects of the use

by the United States of a nuclear earth-penetrator weaponon the target area, including the effects on civilian

populations in proximity to the target area at the time of or

after such use and the effects on the United States military personnel who after such use carry out operations or battledamage assessments in the target area.


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2. The anticipated short-term and long-term effects oncivilian populations in proximity to a target area:

a. if a non-penetrating nuclear weapon is used to attacka hard and deeply buried target; and

b. if a conventional high-explosive weapon is used toattack an adversarys facilities for storage or production ofweapons of mass destruction and, as a result of such attack,

radioactive, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons materials,agents, or other contaminants are released or spread into populated areas.

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Statement of Task (Cont)


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STUDY PROCESS

The National Research Council formed a committeeof individuals with a wide range of expertise.

Starting in February 2004, the committee met at fivefull committee meetings during which they :

Met with representatives from OSD, Air Force, Navy, Army,DOE, NNSA, DTRA, Congressional Staff, NationalLaboratories, interested lobbyists, Scientific and MedicalProfessionals

- Reviewed open literature and material submitted by experts.

- Deliberated and produced a report, which was concurredwith, in writing, by each committee member.

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MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1. Many of the more important strategic hard and

deeply buried targets (HDBTs) are beyond the

reach of conventional explosive penetratingweapons and can be held at risk of destructiononly with nuclear weapons.

Manybut not allknown and/or identified

hard and deeply buried targets can be held atrisk of destruction by one or a few nuclearweapons.


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MAJOR CONCLUSIONS (CONT)

Conclusion 2. Nuclear earth-penetrator weapons (EPWs) with a depth of

penetration of 3 meters capture most of the advantageassociated with the coupling of ground shock.

While additional depths of penetration increases ground-

shock coupling, it also increases the uncertainty of EPWsurvival. To hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets, the nuclear

yield must be increased with increasing depth of the target. The calculated limit for holding hard and deeply buried

targets at risk of destruction with high probability using anuclear EPW is approximately 200 meters for a 300kiloton weapon and 300 meters for a 1 megaton weapon.


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Equivalent Yield Factors


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Peak Stress Contours

Peak stress contours for 300 kt earth-penetratorweapon (EPW) at 3 meters depth of burst (left) anddamage equivalent 5.6 Mt contact burst (right).


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Conclusion 3. Current experience and empirical predictions indicate

that earth-penetrator weapons cannot penetrate todepths required for total containment of the effects ofa nuclear explosion.

Conclusion 4. For the same yield, and weather conditions, the

number of casualties from an earth-penetrator weapondetonated at a few meters depth is, for all practical

purposes, equal to that from a surface burst of thesame weapon yield.

Any reduction in casualties due to the use of an EPWis attributable primarily to the reduction in yield made

possible by the greater ground shock produced by buried bursts.


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Conclusion 6. For attacks near or in densely populated urban areas

using nuclear earth-penetrator weapons on hard anddeeply buried targets (HDBTs), the number ofcasualties can range from thousands to more than amillion, depending primarily on weapon yield.

For attacks on HDBTs in remote, lightly populatedareas, casualties can range from as few as hundredsat low weapon yields to hundreds of thousands athigh yields and with unfavorable winds.

Conclusion 7. For urban targets, civilian casualties froma nuclear earth-penetrator weapon are reduced by afactor of 2 to 10 compared with those from a surface

burst having 25 times the yield.


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Example

The area over which an individual in the open would face a10, 50, and 90 percent chance of death or serious injury fromthe prompt effects of a 10 kiloton earth-penetrator weapon(EPW; left) and a 250 kiloton surface burst (right) detonatedat 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2004, in Washington, D.C.SOURCE: Estimates prepared for the committee by DTRA.


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Example10 kt EPW 250 kt surface burst10 kt EPW 250 kt surface burst

The area over which an individual in the open would face a

10, 50, and 90 percent chance of death or serious injury fromthe prompt and acute effects of fallout from a 10 kilotonearth-penetrator weapon (EPW; left) and a 250 kilotonsurface burst (right) detonated at 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2004,in Washington, D.C. SOURCE: Estimates prepared for thecommittee by DTRA.


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Example

10 kt EPW100,000 casualties 250 kt surface burst800,000 casualties

promptfatalities

falloutfatalities

promptinjuries

falloutinjuries

10 kt EPW100,000 casualties 250 kt surface burst800,000 casualties

promptfatalities

falloutfatalities

promptinjuries

falloutinjuries

Comparison of the number of casualties (deaths and serious injuries)from prompt and acute effects of fallout from a 10 kiloton earth-

penetrator weapon (EPW) and a 250 kiloton surface burst detonated at

7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2004, in Washington, D.C. SOURCE: Estimates prepared for the committee by the DTRA.


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Conclusion 8. In an attack on a chemical or biological

weapons facility, the explosive power ofconventional weapons is not likely to beeffective in destroying the agent.

However, the BLU-118B thermobaric bomb, ifdetonated within the chamber, may be able todestroy the agent.

An attack by a nuclear weapon would beeffective in destroying the agent only ifdetonated in the chamber where agents arestored.


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Conclusion 9. In an attack with a nuclear weapon on a

chemical weapons facility, civilian deaths fromthe effects of the nuclear weapon itself arelikely to be much greater than civilian deathsfrom dispersal of the chemical agents.

In contrast, if the target is a biological weaponsfacility, release of as little as 0.1 kilogram ofanthrax spores will result in a calculatednumber of fatalities that is comparable onaverage to the number calculated for a 3 kilotonnuclear earth-penetrator weapon.

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Example

100

1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10

Amount Released as Respirable Aerosol(kilograms of dry anthrax spores, tons of sarin)

M

e a n

F a

t a l i t i e

3 kt Nuclear EPW

30 kt Nuclear EPW

0.1 to 5% Release of100 kg Anthrax Inventory or

100 ton Sarin Inventory

Target: City Center Washington, D.C.

Anthrax

Sarin

Estimated mean number of fatalities from releases of sarin or anthrax atcity center of Washington, D.C., compared with the mean number offatalities resulting from 3 kiloton and 30 kiloton nuclear earth-penetrator

weapon (EPW) explosions at the same location. SOURCE: Estimates prepared for the committee by the DTRA.


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Summary

Nuclear Earth Penetrator cannot go deepenough to avoid significant collateral

damage. Only nuclear weapons can hold some

HDBTs at risk


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BACKUPS


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THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

Consisting of the National Academy of Sciences, National

Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and NationalResearch Council, the National Academies is a private, nonprofitinstitution engaged in scientific and engineering research,dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology.

The National Academy of Sciences was founded in 1863, at theheight of the Civil War, with a mandate from Congress to advisethe federal government on scientific and technical matters.

The National Research Council, organized in 1916, is the principaloperating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the

National Academy of Engineering in providing services to thegovernment, the public, and the scientific and engineeringcommunities.

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NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PROCESS

Study committee are volunteers, serving pro bono- sometimes over long periods.

This report is the work of the committee, not thestaff.

After Committee concurrence, each report issubjected to a rigorous institutional reviewprocess.

Once initiated NRC studies cannot be influencedby the sponsors and will not be released to thepublic until the NRC staff is convinced it iscomplete in all aspects.

Once completed the sponsor can share theoutcome with anyone they choose and precedeany quote with:

The National Academy of Sciences has said that ...5


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COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP Dr. John F. Ahearne, Chair (NAE)Director, Ethics ProgramSigma Xi, The Scientific ResearchSociety

Dr. Lynn AnspaughResearch Professor RadiologyUniversity of Utah

Dr. Rodney C. EwingProfessor, Dept of Nuclear Engineeringand Radiological SciencesUniversity of Michigan

Dr. Steve FetterProfessor, School of Public AffairsUniversity of Maryland

Dr. Richard L. Garwin (NAS,NAE, IOM)Fellow EmeritusIBM Thomas J. Watson ResearchCenter

Dr. Sydell P. Gold

Senior Vice PresidentScience ApplicationsInternational Corporation

Mr. Eugene G. GrewisIndependent Consultant

Dr. Theodore M. HardebeckDirector of Science, Technology,and Strategy; ScienceApplications InternationalCorporation

(Continued)

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP


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COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP(cont.)

Dr. Raymond Jeanloz (NAS)Professor in Earth and PlanetaryScience and in Astronomy;University of California,Berkeley

Mr. William J. PattersonIndependent Consultant

Dr. Gloria S. Patton

Independent Consultant

Dr. Heinz W. SchmittIndependent Consultant

Dr. Eugene Sevin (NAE)Independent Consultant

Dr. C. Bruce Tarter

Director EmeritusLawrence Livermore NationalLaboratoryUniversity of California

RADM Robert H. Wertheim, USN(Ret.) (NAE)

Independent Consultant

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Example

Areas within which the dose rate from external gammaradiation exceeds 1, 10, 100, and 1,000 millirems per hour at1 day, 1 week, 1 month, and 6 months after the detonation ofa 10 kiloton earth-penetrator weapon (EPW) at 7:00 p.m. onJuly 14, 2004, in Washington, D.C. SOURCE: Estimates

prepared for the committee by the DTRA.


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Example

Areas within which the dose rate from external gammaradiation exceeds 1, 10, 100, and 1,000 millirems per hour at1 day, 1 week, 1 month, and 6 months after the detonation ofa 250 kiloton surface burst at 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2004, inWashington, D.C. SOURCE: Estimates prepared for the

committee by the DTRA.

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Example

100

1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10

Amount Released as Respirable Aerosol(kilograms of dry anthrax spores, tons of sarin)

M

e a n

F a

t a l i t i e

3 kt Nuclear EPW

30 kt Nuclear EPW



Anthrax

Sarin

Target: 10 km NW ofWashington, D.C.

Estimated mean number of fatalities from releases of sarin or anthrax 10kilometers northwest of Washington, D.C., compared with the meannumber of fatalities resulting from 3 kiloton and 30 kiloton nuclear earth-

penetrator weapon (EPW) explosions at the same location. SOURCE:Estimates prepared for the committee by the DTRA.

E l


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Example

100

1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10Amount Released as Respirable Aerosol

(kilograms of dry anthrax spores, tons of sarin)

M e a n

F a

t a l i t i e

3 kt Nuclear EPW

30 kt Nuclear EPW



Anthrax

Sarin

Target: 50 km NW ofWashington, D.C.

Estimated mean number of fatalities from releases of sarin or anthrax 50kilometers northwest of Washington, D.C., compared with the meannumber of fatalities resulting from 3 kiloton and 30 kiloton nuclear earth-

penetrator weapon (EPW) explosions at the same location. SOURCE:

Estimates prepared for the committee by the DTRA

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