Notes

Chapter 1

1. For details, see Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Democ-ratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey (Budapestand London: Central European University Press, 2009), pp. 7–29.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the LateTwentieth Century (Norman and London: University of OklahomaPress, 1991).

3. The Ottoman local notables should not be confused with the Europeanfeudal nobility. In medieval Europe, the relations between the monar-chy and the feudal lords were based on an intricate system of laws reg-ulating mutual rights and obligations, whereas the Ottoman notables’power was essentially a de facto phenomenon. The rise of such powerwas a consequence of the decline of central authority in the seven-teenth century, and it was effectively destroyed in the nineteenth cen-tury with the restoration of the central authority. On the rise of localnotables, see, for example, Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: TheOttoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807 (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1971); Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reformand the Politics of Notables,” in Beginnings of Modernization in theMiddle East: The Nineteenth Century, ed., William R. Polk and RichardL. Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,1968), pp. 41–68.

4. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empireand Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic, TheRise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1977), p. 3.

5. Stanford J. Shaw, “The Central Legislative Councils in the NineteenthCentury Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876,” International Jour-nal of Middle East Studies 1, no.1 (1970): 54–56.

6. Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 147–149.

160 NOTES

7. Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Studyof the Midhat Constitution and Parliament (Baltimore, MD: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1963), pp. 126–148, especially 147–148.

8. On the second constitutionalist period and the Party of Union andProgress, see Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Unionand Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914 (New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1969); Sükrü Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late OttomanEmpire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

9. Ergun Özbudun, 1921 Anayasası (Ankara: Atatürk Arastırma Merkezi,1992).

10. On the National Assembly debates on the 1924 Constitution, A. SerefGözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin, 1924 Anayasası Hakkındaki MeclisGörüsmeleri (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayını, 1957), and Edward C. Smith,“Debates on the Turkish Constitution of 1924,” AÜSBF Dergisi 13, no.3(1958): 82–105.

11. On the events leading to the military intervention of 1960, ErgunÖzbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to DemocraticConsolidation (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 29–33.

12. For the text of the draft and the dissenting opinions, see Kazım Öztürk,Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Vol. 1 (Ankara: Türkiye Is BankasıKültür Yayınları, 1966), pp. 23–338.

13. For the text of Law No. 157, see ibid., pp. 4–19.14. Osman Dogru, 27 Mayıs Rejimi: Bir Darbenin Hukukî Anatomisi

(Ankara: Imge, 1998), pp. 122–124.15. Quoted by Bülent Tanör, Iki Anayasa: 1961 ve 1982 (Istanbul: Beta,

1986), pp. 29–37, 61–67.16. On the 1971–1973 interim regime, Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish

Politics, pp. 33–35; also Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment inDemocracy, 1950–1975 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), pp. 288–326.

17. For the circumstances leading to the 1980 military intervention, seeÖzbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics, pp. 35–43.

Chapter 2

1. On the exit guarantees, Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazıcı, “MilitaryRegimes’ Extrication from Politics,” in Nation- Power- Society, ed.Aleksandra Jasinska- Kania and Jacek Raciborski (Warszawa: Scholar,1996), pp. 325–340; Serap Yazıcı, Türkiye’de Askerî MüdahalelerinAnayasal Etkileri (Ankara: Yetkin, 1997).

2. Levent Gönenç, Türkiye’de Seçim Uyusmazlıkları ve Çözüm Yolları(Ankara: Adalet, 2008).

NOTES 161

3. Osman Can, Demokratiklesme Serüveninde Anayasa ve Siyasi PartilerinKapatılması (Ankara: Seçkin, 2005).

4. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1993/3, K. 1994/2, June 16, 1994,Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi (AMKD) (Constitutional CourtReports), no. 30, Vol. 2, pp. 1199, 1201. See also the Court’s ruling onthe Socialist Party, E. 1991/2, K. 1992/1, July 10, 1992, AMKD, no. 28,Vol. 2, pp. 696–831, especially 701 and 804–805.

5. European Court of Human Rights, Case of the Socialist Party andOthers v. Turkey (20/1997/804) 1007, May 25, 1998, paras. 46, 47.For a comparison of the rulings of the Turkish Constitutional Courtand ECtHR, Ergun Özbudun, “Party Prohibition Cases: DifferentApproaches by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights,” Democratization 17, no.1 (2010): 125–142;Mustafa Koçak and Esin Örücü, “Dissolution of Political Partiesin the Name of Democracy: Cases from Turkey and the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights,” European Public Law 9, no.3 (2009):399–423.

6. Venice Commission, Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of Polit-ical Parties and Analogous Measures, Venice, December 10–11, 1999,CDL-INF (2000), 1.

7. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Refah Partisi (the WelfareParty) and others v. Turkey, Judgment, Grand Chamber, February 13,2003. Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98,paras. 98, 99. The ECtHR maintained the same reasoning in its rul-ing on Yazar, Karatas, Aksoy, and the People’s Labour Party (HEP) v.Turkey, 22723/93, ECHR 408, April 9, 2002, para. 49.

8. Venice Commission, Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provi-sions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey, adopted atits 78th Plenary Session, Venice, March 13–14, 2009, CDL-AD (2009),006, paras. 30, 85, 86, 107, 108.

9. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sadak and othersv. Turkey (No. 2), Application nos. 25144/94, 26149/95 to 26154/95,27100/95, and 27101/95, June 11, 2002; Affaire Kavakçı c. Turquie,Requête no. 71907/01, July 5, 2007; Affaire Ilıcak c. Turquie,Requête no. 15394/02, March 15, 2007; Sobacı v. Turkey, Applicationno. 26733/02, 29/02/2008.

10. Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: TheUnited States, France, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2009), p. 11 and passim. See also Ali Fuat Basgil, Dinve Laiklik (Istanbul: Yagmur, 1962); Çetin Özek, Türkiye’de Lâiklik(Istanbul: IÜHF, 1962); Mustafa Erdogan, Demokrasi, Lâiklik, ResmîIdeoloji (Ankara: Liberte, 2000).

162 NOTES

11. European Court of Human Rights, Judgment, Case of Hasan andEylem Zengin v. Turkey, Application no. 1448/04, October 9, 2007.

12. Constitutional Court Decision, E. 2008/1, K. 2008/2, July 30, 2008,Resmî Gazete (Official Gazette), July 1, 2008, no. 26923.

13. Case of Refah Partisi (see Note 4 above), paras. 116, 119, 129, 131.14. Constitutional Court decision, E.1970/53, K.1971/76, October 21,

1971, AMKD, no. 10, pp. 60–70.15. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1986/11, K.1986/26, November 4,

1986, AMKD, no. 22, p. 312.16. Constitutional Court decision, E.1989/1, K.1989/12, March 7, 1989,

AMKD, no. 25, pp. 144–148.17. Constitutional Court decision, E.2008/16, K.2008/16, June 5, 2008,

Resmî Gazete October 22, 2008, no. 27032.18. Constitutional Court decision, see Note 12 above.19. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1988/19, K. 1988/33, October 26,

1988, AMKD, no. 24, pp. 451–452.

Chapter 3

1. Mustafa Erdogan, Anayasa ve Özgürlük (Ankara: Yetkin, 2002),pp. 80–85. On the establishment and the authoritarian practices ofthe single-party regime, Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması: 1923–1931(Ankara: Yurt, 1981). On theunsuccessful Free Party episode and its aftermath, Walter F. Weiker,Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and ItsAftermath (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973).

2. For a more detailed analysis of this transition, Ergun Özbudun, Con-temporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 14–24.

3. Ibid., pp. 29–33.4. Ergun Özbudun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku (Ankara: Yetkin, 2009),

pp. 114–117.5. For these debates, Bülent Tanör, Siyasî Düsünce Hürriyeti ve 1961

Türk Anayasası (Itanbul: Öncü, 1969); Fazıl Saglam, Temel HaklarınSınırlanması ve Özü (Ankara: AÜSBF, 1982).

6. For these debates, Mustafa Erdogan, Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmî Ideoloji(Ankara: Liberal Düsünce Toplulugu, 1995).

7. On constitutional patriotism, Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patri-otism (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).

8. Erdogan, Anayasa ve Özgürlük, pp. 88–89.

NOTES 163

9. Ibid, pp. 90–91. See also, Mehmet Akad, Teori ve Uygulama Açısın-dan 1961 Anayasasının 10. Maddesi (Istanbul: IÜHF, 1984); OktayUygun, 1982 Anayasasında Temel Hak ve Özgürlüklerin Hukukî Rejimi(Istanbul: Kazancı, 1992), pp. 21–53.

10. Serap Yazıcı, Yeni Bir Anayasa Hazırlıgı ve Türkiye: SeçkinciliktenToplum Sözlesmesine (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2009),pp. 85–88; Erdogan, Anayasa ve Özgürlük, pp. 95–96.

11. Özbudun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku, pp. 115–116.12. On the statist-nationalist philosophy of the 1982 Constitution and its

effects on the human rights regime, Erdogan, Anayasa ve Özgürlük,pp. 93–95; Yazıcı, Yeni bir Anayasa Hazırlıgı ve Türkiye, pp. 65–82;Bülent Tanör ve Necmi Yüzbasıoglu, 1982 Anayasasına göre TürkAnayasa Hukuku (Istanbul: YKY, 2001), pp. 64–68.

13. Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Iç Mevzuat,Içtihat, Uygulama (Istanbul: Tesev, 2004), pp. 70–71.

14. Ergun Özbudun, “The Post-1980 Legal Framework for Interest GroupAssociations,” in Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience, ed., Metin Heper (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,1991), pp. 41–53; also, Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and PoliticalDevelopment in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

15. Erdogan, Anayasa ve Özgürlük, pp. 89, 94–95. On the two systemsof interest representation, Philippe C. Schmitter, “Still the Centuryof Corporatism?” in Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, ed.,Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lembruch (Beverly Hills: Sage,1979), pp. 7–52.

16. For an extensive, and a comprehensive, criticism of human rightsregulations and practices in Turkey, Bülent Tanör, Türkiye’nin InsanHakları Sorunu (Istanbul: BDS, 3rd ed., 1994), passim. Also hisTürkiye’de Demokratiklesme Perspektifleri (Istanbul: TÜSIAD, 1997)and Türkiye’de Demokratik Standartların Yükseltilmesi Tartısmaları veSon Gelismeler (Istanbul: TÜSIAD, 1999); Tanör and Yüzbasıoglu,1982 Anayasasına Göre Türk Anayasa Hukuku, pp. 127–190.

17. On the constitutional and legislative reforms, Ergun Özbudunand Serap Yazıcı, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993–2004)(Istanbul: TESEV, 2004); Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya,Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey(Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2009),chs. 3–5; Esin Örücü, “The Turkish Constitution Revamped,”European Public Law 8, no.2 (2002): 201–218; Esin Örücü, “SevenPackages towards Harmonisation with the European Union,” EuropeanPublic Law 10, no.4 (2004): 603–621; Levent Gönenç, “The 2001Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey,” Ankara Law Review

164 NOTES

1, no.1 (2001): 89–109; Kemal Gözler, Anayasa Degisikligi Gerekli mi?1982 Anayasası için bir Savunma (Bursa: Ekin, 2001); Zühtü Arslan,Anayasa Teorisi (Ankara: Seçkin, 2005), pp. 150–163.

18. http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf May 20,2010.

19. Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2009: Setbacks and Resilience(Washington, D.C.: Freedom House), pp. 22–27.

20. See, for example, Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureau-cratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley:Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973);David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Juan J. Linz, Totalitar-ian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner,2000), pp. 184–208.

Chapter 4

1. Cem Eroglu, Türk Anayasa Düzeninde Cumhuriyet Senatosunun Yeri(Ankara: AÜSBF, 1977), pp. 51–53, 58, 60, 83, 87.

2. Ergun Özbudun, “Constitutional Debates on Parliamentary Inviola-bility in Turkey,” European Constitutional Law Review 2, no.1 (2005):272–280.

3. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1995/54, K. 1995/59, November 18,1995, Resmî Gazete, November 21, 1995, No. 22470.

4. Ümit Cizre, ed., Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and DemocraticOversight (Istanbul: TESEV and DCAF, 2006), particularly pp. 16–25.

5. Ergun Özbudun, Parlâmenter Rejimde Parlâmentonun HükûmetiMurakabe Vasıtaları (Ankara: AÜHF Yayını, 1962).

6. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1970/44, K. 1970/42, November 17,1970, AMKD, no. 8, pp. 448–449.

7. Kemal Gözler, Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerin Hukukî Rejimi(Bursa: Ekin, 2000); Burhan Kuzu, Türk Anayasa Hukukunda KanunHükmünde Kararnameler (Istanbul: Üçdal, 1985).

8. For example, Constitutional Court decision, E. 1988/64, K. 1990/2,February 1, 1990, AMKD (Constitutional Court Reports), no. 26,pp. 63–64, 73.

9. For example, Constitutional Court decision, E. 1994/53, K. 1994/48,July 8, 1994, AMKD, no. 30, vol. 1, pp. 315–317.

10. For example, Constitutional Court decision, E. 1990/25, K. 1991/1,January 10, 1991, AMKD, no. 27, vol. 1, pp. 100, 102; and E. 1991/16,K. 1991/20, July 3, 1991, AMKD, no. 27, vol. 1, pp. 375–421.

NOTES 165

Chapter 5

1. Paul Marie Gaudemet, Le Pouvoir Exécutif dans les Pays Occidentaux(Paris: Edition Montchrestien, 1966). On the Turkish system of gov-ernment in general, see Mehmet Turhan, Hükûmet Sistemleri (Ankara:Gündogan, 1995); Serap Yazıcı, Baskanlık ve Yarı-Baskanlık Sistemleri:Türkiye Için Bir Degerlendirme (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi,2002); Nur Ulusahin, Saf Hükûmet Sistemleri Karsısında Iki BaslıYürütme (Ankara: Yetkin, 2007).

2. Kenan Evren, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Baskanı Orgeneral KenanEvren’in Yeni Anayasayı Devlet Adına Resmen Tanıtma ProgramıGeregince Yaptıkları Konusmalar (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1982),pp. 88–89.

3. Constitutional Court decision, E. 207/45, K. 2007/54, May 1, 2007,Resmî Gazete, June 27, 2007, no. 26565.

4. On exit guarantees in general, J. Samuel Valenzuela, “DemocraticConsolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, andFacilitating Conditions,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: TheNew South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed.,Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 57–104.On the Turkish case, Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazıcı, “Mili-tary Regimes’ Extrication from Politics: Exit Guarantees,” in Nation,Power, Society, ed., Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania and Jacek Raciborski(Warsaw: Scholar, 1996), pp. 325–340; Serap Yazıcı, Türkiye’deAskerî Müdahalelerin Anayasal Etkileri (Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları,1997).

5. Felipe Agüero, “The Military and the Limits to Democratiza-tion in South America,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation, ed.,Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela, p. 173. Also, Alfred Stepan,The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 179.

6. On civil-military relations in general, see William Hale, Turkish Poli-tics and the Military (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); SerapYazıcı, Türkiye’de Askeri Müdahalelerin Anayasal Etkileri (Ankara:Yetkin, 1997); Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of theTurkish Armed Forces (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991); ÜmitCizre-Sakallıoglu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Autonomy,”Comparative Politics 29, no.2 (1997): 151–166; Ümit Cizre, “The Jus-tice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the PastAfter Reforming It?” in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey, ed. ÜmitCizre (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 132–171; Hasan

166 NOTES

Cemal, Türkiye’nin Asker Sorunu: Ey Asker Siyasete Karısma (Istanbul:Dogan Kitap, 2010); Ahmet Insel, Ali Bayramoglu, eds., Bir Zümre,Bir Parti: Türkiye’de Ordu (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2004); Mustafa Erdogan,Anayasa ve Özgürlük (Ankara: Yetkin, 2002), pp. 237–262; Ümit Cizre,ed., Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight(Istanbul: TESEV, 2006).

7. For a detailed account, Hasan Cemal, Türkiye’nin Asker Sorunu,passim.

8. William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberal-ism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (London and New York: Routledge,2010), esp. ch. 7.

9. Kemal Gözler, Idare Hukuku, Vol. 2 (Bursa: Ekin, 2003), pp. 553–740.10. Kemal Gözler, Idare Hukuku, Vol. 1 (Bursa: Ekin, 2003), pp. 160–173.11. Ibid., pp. 173–190.12. Constitutional Court decision, E. 2006/140, K. 2008/15, December 25,

2008, Resmî Gazete, April 4, 2009. For a critique of this decision,Ergun Özbudun, Türkiye’nin Anayasa Krizi (Ankara: Liberte, 2009),pp. 231–237; also Serap Yazıcı, Yeni Bir Anayasa Hazırlıgı ve Türkiye:Seçkincilikten Toplum Sözlesmesine (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniver-sitesi Yayınları, 2009), pp. 138–151.

13. Constitutional Court decision, E 1994/71, K 1995/23, June 28, 1995,AMKD, No. 32, Vol. 1, pp. 159–166.

14. Kemal Gözler, Idare Hukuku, Vol. 2, pp. 341–416.

Chapter 6

1. Constitutional Court decision, E 2009/52, K 2010/16, January 21, 2010,Resmi Gazete, January 27, 2010, No. 27475.

2. See especially Ümit Kardas, “Military Judiciary,” in Almanac Turkey2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight, ed., Ümit Cizre(Istanbul: DCAF-TESEV, 2006), pp. 50–55.

3. Venice Commission, “Judicial Appointments,” Report adopted at its70th Plenary Session, Venice, March 16–17, 2007, CDL-AD (20017)028,paras. 27–31. The Commission reiterated its opinion in a more recentreport, stating that “in all cases the council should have a pluralisticcomposition with a substantial part, if not the majority, of membersbeing judges. With the exception of ex officio members these judgesshould be elected or appointed by their peers”: “Report on the Inde-pendence of the Judicial System: Part I: The Independence of Judges,”Venice Commission, December 11–12, 2009, CDL (2010) 006, para.32. Also in favor of a mixed composition for the judicial council,

NOTES 167

Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 10, Strasbourg,November 21–23, 2007.

4. Zühtü Arslan, “Reluctantly Sailing Towards Political Liberalism: ThePolitical Role of the Judiciary in Turkey,” in Fighting for Political Free-dom: Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism,ed., Terence C. Halliday, Lucian Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feely (Oxfordand Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 220 and passim.

5. Mithat Sancar and Eylem Ümit Atılgan, Adalet Biraz Es Geçiliyor:Demokratiklesme Sürecinde Hâkimler ve Savcılar (Istanbul: TESEVYayınları, 2009), pp. 108–180.

Chapter 7

1. On the jurisprudence of the French Constitutional Council,Dominique Rousseau, Droit du contentieux constitutionnel (Paris:Montchretien, 1990), pp. 91–104. With regard to the Turkish case,Necmi Yüzbasıoglu argues that, according to the jurisprudence of theConstitutional Court, rules of international law, the general principlesof law, and Atatürk’s principles and reforms are also elements of theblock of constitutionality: Türk Anayasa Yargısında Anayasallık Bloku(Istanbul: IÜHF Yayını, 1993).

2. Ece Göztepe, Anayasa Sikâyeti (Ankara: AÜHF; 1998).3. Constitutional Court decision, E 1968/5, K 1968/13, May 3, 4 and 6,

1968, AMKD, No. 6, pp. 169–175.4. Constitutional Court decision, E. 2007/72, K. 2007/68, July 5, 2007,

Resmî Gazete, August 7, 2007, no. 26606; and E. 2007/99, K. 2007/86,November 27, 2007, Resmî Gazete, February 19, 2008, no. 26792.See also Nur Ulusahin, “Yokluk Teorisinin Anayasa Hukukunda Yerive Uygulanabilirliligi,” Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun’a Armagan, Vol. 2(Ankara: Yetkin, 2008), pp. 675–737; Osman Can, “Anayasa YargısındaYokluk,” Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun’a Armagan, pp. 175–213.

5. For example, Constitutional Court decision, E. 1990/36, K. 1991/8,April 9, 1991, AMKD, no. 27, vol. 1, pp. 285–323.

6. For example, Constitutional Court decision, E. 2000/45, K. 2000/27,October 5, 2000, AMKD, no. 36, vol. 2, pp. 772–796.

7. Zühtü Arslan, “Anayasa Mahkemesinin Yorum Tekeli, Yargısal Üstün-lük ve Demokrasi,” Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun’a Armagan, Vol. 2,pp. 59–89; Yusuf Sevki Hakyemez, “Anayasa Mahkemesi KararGerekçelerinin Baglayıcılıgı Sorunu,” Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun’aArmagan, pp. 365–398.

168 NOTES

8. Constitutional Court decision, E. 2003/6, K. 2008/4, January 8, 2008,Resmî Gazete, March 22, 2008, no. 26824.

9. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1993/33, K. 1993/40–42, October 21,1993, AMKD, no. 29, vol. 1, pp. 574–581.

10. Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics inEurope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 151 and passim.

11. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences ofNew Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 2004), pp. 50–59 and passim. Thus, he argues that “unlessproven otherwise, the most plausible explanation for voluntary, self-imposed judicial empowerment is . . . that political, economic, andlegal power-holders who either initiate or refrain from blocking suchreforms estimate that it will serve their interests to abide by the lim-its imposed by increased judicial intervention in the political sphere”(p. 39).

12. Zühtü Arslan, “Conflicting Paradigms: Political Rights in the TurkishConstitutional Court,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 11,no.1 (2002): 9–25. See also Ergun Özbudun, “Political Origins of theTurkish Constitutional Court and the Problem of Democratic Legit-imacy,” European Public Law 12, no.2 (2006): 213–223; Esin Örücü,“The Constitutional Court of Turkey: Anayasa Mahkemesi as the Pro-tector of the System,” Journal of Comparative Law 3, no.2 (2008):256–257.

13. For example, Yusuf Sevki Hakyemez, Hukuk ve Siyaset EksenindeAnayasa Mahkemesinin Yargısal Aktivizmi ve Insan Hakları Anlayısı(Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları, 2009), pp. 192–272; Serap Yazıcı, YeniBir Anayasa Hazırlıgı ve Türkiye: Seçkincilikten Toplum Sözlesmesine(Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), pp. 183–199.

14. On the notion of the “raison d’état” within the Turkish judiciary,Mithat Sancar, “Devlet Aklı” Kıskacında Hukuk Devleti (Istanbul:Iletisim, 2000). On the “selective activism” of the Turkish Court as partof the “Republican Alliance” see Ceren Belge, “Friends of the Court:The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the ConstitutionalCourt of Turkey,” Law and Society Review 40, no.3 (2006): 653–691.See also, Esin Örücü, “The Constitutional Court of Turkey: AnayasaMahkemesi as the Protector of the System,” pp. 254–268; YasushiHazama, “Constitutional Review and the Parliamentary Oppositionin Turkey,” The Developing Economies 34, no.3 (1996): 316–338.

15. Ran Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise ofPolitical Courts,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 93–118.

16. Alec Stone Sweet, “The Judicial Coup d’État and the Problem ofAuthority,” German Law Review 8, no.10 (2007): 915–927.

NOTES 169

17. For example, Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and theRise of Political Courts,” pp. 108–112, quotation is from p. 109.

18. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1997/1, K. 1998/1, January 16, 1998,AMKD, no. 34, vol. 2, pp. 762–1145 and E. 2000/86, K. 2000/50,December 12, 2000, AMKD, no. 36, vol. 2, pp. 896–913.

19. On this case and other instances of legislative response, ErgunÖzbudun, “Judicial Activism v. Judicial Restraint and Collisionswith the Political Elites in Turkey,” in Liber Amicorum: Antonia LaPergola, ed. Peter van Dijkand and Simona Granata-Menghini (Lund:Juristförlaget i Lund, 2009), pp. 261–270.

20. Ceren Belge, “Friends of the Court: The Republican alliance andselective activism of the constitutional court of Turkey,” pp. 658–691.

Chapter 8

1. The three unamendable articles of the 1982 Constitution are as fol-lows:

Article 1: The State of Turkey is a Republic.

Article 2: The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, andsocial state governed by the rule of law, respectful of human rights,committed to Atatürk nationalism, based on the basic principlesreferred to in the Preamble within an understanding of social peace,national solidarity and justice.

Article 3: The State of Turkey is an indivisible whole with its terri-tory and nation. Its language is Turkish. Its flag is the red flag witha white crescent and star, as described in law. Its national anthem isthe ‘March of Independence.’ Its capital is Ankara.

2. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Minutes of GNAT), Period 17, LegislativeYear 4, Vol. 40, Session 102, May 13, 1987, p. 302.

3. Constitutional Court decision, E. 2007/72, K. 2007/68, July 5, 2007,Resmî Gazete, August 7, 2007, no. 26606.

4. Ergun Özbudun, “Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments inTurkey,” European Public Law 15, no.4 (2009): 533–538.

5. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1970/1, K 1970/31, June 16, 1970,AMKD (Reports of the Constitutional Court), no. 8, p. 323.

6. Constitutional Court decisions, E. 1973/19, K. 1975/87, April 15, 1975,AMKD, no.13, pp. 430–431; E. 1976/38, K. 1976/46, October 12, 1976,AMKD, no. 14, pp. 252–286; E. 1976/43, K. 1977/4, January 27, 1977,AMKD, no. 15, pp. 106–131; E. 1977/82, K. 1977/117, September 27,1977, AMKD, no. 15, pp. 444–464.

170 NOTES

7. Constitutional Court decisions, E. 1987/9, K. 1987/15, June 18, 1987,Resmî Gazete, September 4, 1987, no. 19564, pp. 22–26; E. 2007/72,K. 2007/68, July 5, 2007, Resmî Gazete, August 7, 2007, no. 26606;E. 2007/99, K. 2007/86, November 27, 2007, Resmî Gazete, Febru-ary 16, 2008, no. 26792.

8. Constitutional Court decision, E. 2008/16, K. 2008/116, June 5, 2008,Resmî Gazete, October 22, 2008, no. 27032.

9. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalismand Judicial Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),pp. 249–253.

10. Venice Commission, “Report on Constitutional Amendment,” adoptedon December 11–12, 2009, CDL-AD (2010)001, paras. 218, 220.

11. Ibid., paras. 225–227, 235, 236.12. Ibid., para. 234.13. French Constitutional Council, No. 92–314, September 2, 1994, para.

34, quoted in Venice Commission, “Report on Constitutional Amend-ments,” para. 229, n. 156. See also Kemal Gözler, Judicial Review ofConstitutional Amendments: A Comparative Study (Bursa: Ekin Press,2008), pp. 14–15.

14. Ibid., pp. 16–19.15. Ibid., pp. 22–23, 55–64.16. Venice Commission, “Report on Constitutional Amendment,”

para. 194.17. Constitutional Court decision, E.2010/49, K.2010/87, July 7, 2010,

Resmî Gazete, August 1, 2010, No.27659, mükerrer (supplementary).

Chapter 9

1. TBMM’de Temsil Edilen Siyasi Partilerce TBMM Baskanlıgına SunulanAnayasa Degisikligi Konusundaki Görüs ve Önerileri (The Views andProposals of Political Parties Represented in the GNAT Concern-ing Constitutional Amendments) (Ankara, TBMM Baskanlıgı, March1993), pp. 122–173.

2. Ibid., pp. 37–38.3. Yeni bir Anayasa Için (TÜSIAD, 1992); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası

Önerisi Anayasa 2000 (TOBB, 2000); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti AnayasaÖnerisi (TBB, 2001); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Önerisi (TBB,2007). In addition, two reports sponsored by the TÜSIAD and writ-ten by Professor Bülent Tanör contain important critical comments onthe Constitution and suggestions for change: Türkiye’de Demokratik-lesme Perspektifleri (TÜSIAD, 1997), and Türkiye’de Demokratik

NOTES 171

Standartların Yükseltilmesi (TÜSIAD, 1999). The late Professor Tanör’sreports were updated by Professor Zafer Üskül: Türk Demokrasisinde130 Yıl (TÜSIAD, 2007). For an excellent comparative analysis ofthese drafts and reports, Serap Yazıcı, Yeni Bir Anayasa Hazırlıgı veTürkiye: Seçkincilikten Toplum Sözlesmesine (Istanbul: Istanbul BilgiÜniversitesi Yayınları, 2009).

4. Constitutional Court decision, E. 2007/72, K. 2007/68, July 5, 2007,Resmî Gazete, August 7, 2007, no. 26606.

5. For details of this constitutional crisis, Ergun Özbudun and ÖmerFaruk Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey (Budapest and New York: Central European Uni-versity Press, 2009), pp. 97–103.

6. Nice Ak Yıllara: Güven ve Istikrar Içinde Durmak Yok, Yola Devam(Ankara: AK Parti, 2007), p. 12.

7. The committee comprised the following law professors: ErgunÖzbudun (Chairman), Zühtü Arslan, Yavuz Atar, Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem,Levent Köker, and Serap Yazıcı.

8. The text of the draft is available in Legal Hukuk Dergisi 5, no. 58 (2007):3177–3272.

9. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Önerisi (Ankara: Türkiye Barolar Birligi,Ekim 2007), pp. 16, 19, 26, 283.

10. On the political background of constitutional debates, ErgunÖzbudun, “Turkey’s Constitutional Problem and the Search for a NewConstitution,” in Contested Sovereignties: Government and Democracyin Middle Eastern and European Perspectives, ed., Elizabeth Özdalgaand Sune Persson (Istanbul: Istanbul Swedish Research Institute,2010), pp. 17–22; also his “Turkey’s Need for a New Constitution,”Turkish Political Review, 0 (2010): 24–29.

11. On the TÜSIAD’s proposal, see Yazıcı, Yeni bir Anayasa Hazırlıgı veTürkiye, pp. 47–49.

12. Albert O. Hirschman, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Mar-ket Society,” Political Theory 22, no.2 (1994): 213–214. See also,Hanna Lerner, “Constitution-Writing in Deeply Divided Societies:The Incrementalist Approach,” Nations and Nationalism 16, no. 1(2010): 88.

13. See, for example, Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).

14. Constitutional Court decision, E 2007/1, K 2009/4, December 11,2009, Resmî Gazete, December 31, 2009, no. 27449.

15. Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey: Plural Society and Monolithic State,” inDemocracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, ed., Ahmet T. Kuru andAlfred Stepan (Columbia University Press, summer 2011).

172 NOTES

16. Ayse Ayata, “The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey,” NewPerspectives on Turkey 17, fall (1997): 59–73.

17. Türk Toplumunun Degerleri (Istanbul: TÜSIAD, 1991), pp. 22–23.18. Ergun Özbudun, “State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in

Turkey,” in Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries,ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1993), pp. 247–268.

19. See, for example, Venice Commission, “Interim Opinion on theDraft Law on the High Council for Judges and Public Prosecutors(of September 27, 2010) of Turkey,” December 17–18, 2010, CDL-AD(2010)042.

Chapter 10

1. For a fuller explanation, Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Pol-itics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder and London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

2. On the nature of the single-party system in Turkey, Ergun Özbudun,“Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution: ContrastingPatterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey,” in Authoritar-ian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, ed., Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Henry Moore(New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 380–405; and “The Nature of theKemalist Political Regime,” in Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State,eds., Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: Hurst, 1981),pp. 79–102.

3. Constitutional Court decision, E. 1986/11, K. 1986/26, November 4,1986, AMKD, no. 22, p. 312.

4. William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberal-ism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (London and New York: Routledge,2010), pp. 30–43 and passim.

5. Ziya Önis, “The Political Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Develop-ment Party,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and theAK Parti, ed., M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City, UT: University of UtahPress, 2006), p. 212.

6. For the history of Turkey-EU relations, Ergun Özbudun and ÖmerFaruk Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press,2009), chs. 3, 4.

7. Ibid., pp.40, 84.8. Ibid., pp. 49–67, 83–94; Esin Örücü, “Seven Packages towards Har-

monization with the European Union,” European Public Law 19, no.4(2004): 603–621.

NOTES 173

9. Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey:The Case of the AKP, pp. 121–128.

10. Ziya Önis, “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists:Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey,” Journalof Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no.3 (2007): 247–260.

11. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” inIssues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democ-racies in Comparative Perspective, ed., Scott Mainwaring, GuillermoO’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 18–19.

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Index

Abdülhamid II, 3, 4abstract norm control, see principal

proceedings (of the ConstitutionalCourt)

abuse of rights, 48acts of state, 34administrative courts, 33–4, 98–100administrative tutelage, 89, 91–2affirmative action, 36, 53, 54Alevis, 28–9, 52Anatolian bourgeoisie, 154approval of international agreements

(by parliament), 69–70assembly government, 5, 7assertive secularism, 27, 28Association of Turkish Businessmen

and Industrialists (TUSIAD), 21,139, 144

Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal), 5, 6, 7, 84,124, 146

Atatürk nationalism, 32–3, 46Atatürk reforms and principles, see

Kemalism

Bayar, Celal, 13Belge, Ceren, 127bicameralism, 59–60block of constitutionality, 116budgetary powers of parliament, 68–9

central administration, 85–7Chamber of Deputies, 3, 4, 5checks and balances, 8, 9, 11Chief of the General Staff, 8, 12, 13, 78,

82, 83, 84, 102, 114

Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court ofCassation, 26, 32, 78, 98

“civil constitution” iniative, 141–3“civilizing mission”, 152civil-military relations, 81–5,

109–10civil rights (in the Constitution of

1982), 49–54civil servants, 86collective responsibility of

ministers, 80Commander-in-Chief, 7–8, 78, 83compulsory religious education,

51–2concession contrats, 94–5concrete norm control, see ıncidental

proceedings (of the ConstitutionalCourt)

Constituent Assemblyof 1960–61, 10–11, 123of 1981–83, 16–17

Constitutionof 1876, 3–5, 129of 1921, 5–6, 129of 1924, 6–9, 39–41, 111, 129of 1961, 9–15, 41–4, 111, 123, 129

Constitution of 1982its elitist and tutelary

character, 19–22the making of, 15–17

constitutional complaint, 119–20Constitutional Court, 13, 35, 46, 62, 64,

68, 70, 71–2, 78, 92–3, 94, 100–1,107, 111–27, 141, 145, 148, 153

effects of its decisions, 119–22as the High Court, 114, 121

182 INDEX

Constitutional Court – continuedjudicial activism of, 122–7modes of judicial review, 117–19powers, 114–16procedural review, 116and prohibition of political

parties, 24–7reasoning of its decisions, 121review over constiututional

amendments, 126, 127, 131–7and secularism, 29–32structure, 112–14substantive review, 116

constitutional referendum, 130–1constitutional revisions, 129–37

of 1971 and 1973, 12, 14–15, 132of 2001, 133of 2010, 147–8

Consultative Assembly, 16cooling-off period, 80–1Copenhagen political criteria, 55,

154–5Council of Ministers, 67, 68, 70, 71,

79–81, 82, 83, 86Council of State, 13, 20, 22, 70, 78, 95,

99, 104, 105, 112, 113, 114countersignature, 76Court of Accounts, 20, 98, 112Court of Cassation, 13, 20, 22, 78, 98,

104, 105, 112, 113, 114Court of Conflict, 99–100Courts of Independence, 40

death penalty, 35, 52–3declaration of war, 70deconcentration, 87Deed of Alliance, 2delegated legislation, 70–2, 115Demirel, Süleyman, 12, 78Democratic Left Party, 31, 155Democratic Society Party

(DTP), 31, 145democratic state (in the Constitution

of 1982), 22–7Democrat Party (DP), 9, 10, 11, 13,

40–1, 84–5, 123, 152–3

denial of justice, 35detention period, 52Devereux, Robert, 3

electoral constituencies, 64electoral system, 23emergency law-decrees, 71–2equality, 36Erbakan, Necmettin, 78, 85Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 141Ergenekon case, 85Erim, Nihat, 14Erkmen, Hayrettin, 67essence of rights guarantee, 41– 42European Convention of Human

Rights, 48, 52, 53, 69, 141European Court of Human Rights, 47,

52, 109, 121and party bans, 24, 25–6, 29–30and religious education, 28–9

European Union, 140, 154–6Evren, Kenan, 16, 20, 73–4, 76, 123exit guarantees, 20–1, 81–2, 115, 130

focal point of unconstitutionalactivities (of political parties),24–5, 29

forfeiture of parliamentary seats, 61–2foundational issues, 145, 155Freedom House, 1, 55freedom of religion and

conscience, 43, 51–2Free Republican party, 40French Constitutional Council, 136

General Assembly, 3German Constitutional Court, 136governor, 56–87, 92Grand Council of Justice, 2Grand National Assembly of

Turkey, 5, 59powers, 64–72structure, 60–2

Gül, Abdullah, 109Gürler, Faruk, 12Gürsel, Cemal, 10, 12, 14

INDEX 183

harmonization packages, 53, 55, 83headscarf issue, 31–2hegemonic preservation

theory, 122–3, 127Helsinki Summit, 155hierarchical control, 90–1High Council of Judges and Public

Prosecutors, 20, 34, 78, 98, 99,104–7, 136–7, 148

Higher Education Board (YÖK), 20,37, 78, 113

High Military Administrative Court,101–2, 112, 113, 114

Hirschl, Ran, 122–3, 124, 125, 127Hirschman, Albert, 145House of Representatives, 10–11,

16, 123human rights

in the Constitution of 1924, 39–41in the Constitution of 1961, 41–4in the Constitution of 1982, 44–57

Huntington, Samuel, 1

identity politics, 146Igsız, Hasan, 84illegally obtained evidence, 35impeachment, 68incidental proceedings (of the

Constitutional Court), 119independence of the judiciary, 97–8,

103–8independent administrative

authorities, 89–90indirect (two-stage) elections, 40International Criminal Court, 35interpellation, 67interpretation in conformity with the

Constitution, 120–1

Judicial coup d’etat, 125, 126judicialization of politics, 124–5judiciary (in the Constitution of

1982), 97–110political role (judicial

activism), 108–9

Justice and Development Party (AKP),29, 31, 32, 66, 75, 85, 104, 105,110, 141, 143, 144, 147, 149–50,153, 156

Justice Party (AP), 12, 13, 14, 15

Kayasu, Sacit, 107Kemalism, 27–8, 42–3, 45–6, 51, 84–5,

109–10, 124, 142, 146Korutürk, Fahri, 12Kurdish question, 145, 149–50

languages prohibited by law, 50–1, 52law-amending ordinances, see

delegated legislationLaw on the Election of Deputies, 63–64Law on the Establishment of Peace, 40Law on Political Parties, 23–4, 33legal judicial process (natural judge),

35, 102–3legislative power, 65–6local administrations, 87–9local democracy, 89, 96

Magna Carta, 2martial law, 48–9martial law courts, 102–3Menderes, Adnan, 9Military Court of Cassation, 101, 112,

113, 114military courts, 100–3Minister of Justice, 104, 105, 106ministries, 86Motherland Party (ANAP), 75, 78, 155municipalities, 88Muslim Calvinists, see Anatolian

bourgeoisie

National Assembly, 112, 129national (electoral) threshold, 63–4nationalism, 32–3, 46Nationalist Action Party (MHP), 31,

144, 149, 155National Security Council, 12, 19–20,

21, 37, 78, 82–3

184 INDEX

National Security Council regime,15–17, 50–1, 56, 107–8, 115, 153

national sovereignty, 5, 6National Unity Committee, 9–10,

123non-retroactivity of criminal laws, 35

of Constitutional Courtdecisions, 119–20

notables, 2nullity, 120

O’Donnell, Guillermo, 156–7official ideology, see KemalismOmbudsman, 92–3Onar, Sıddık Sami, 9Özal, Turgut, 76, 84, 130Öztorun, Necdet, 84

parliamentary control over theexecutive, 66–8

parliamentary elections, 62–4parliamentary immunities,

60–1parliamentary inquiries, 68parliamentary investigations, 68parliamentary resolutions, 115parliament, see Grand National

Assembly of Turkeyparty bans (prohibitions), 23–7, 55,

121, 124Peace and Democracy Party (BDP),

145, 149–50PKK, 109political questions, 34political rights (in the Constitution of

1982), 54–5Preamble (of the Constitution of

1982), 19, 22, 45, 46(of the Constitution of 1961),

42–3Presidency of Religious Affairs, 27,

28, 30President of the Republic

under the Constitution of 1924, 7–8under the Constitution of 1982, 20,

34, 37, 66, 70, 73–4, 91, 104, 107

election, 74–6impartiality, 74–5, 76–7powers, 76–8, 112–13unliability, 76–7, 114

Prime Minister, 77, 79–80, 81, 82, 84,91, 107, 114

Prime ministerial government, 72principal proceedings (of the

Constitutional Court), 117professional organizations with the

status of public institutions, 52, 90Progressive Republican Party, 40proportional representation, 63–4provinces, 86Provisional Council of Ministers, 81public administration, 85–90public institutions, 87, 89–90public services, 93–4

questions (in parliament), 66–7

Reform laws (of the Kemalist era),27–8, 115

Republican alliance, 127, 144, 146, 153Republican Peasant Nation

Party, 10, 16Republican People’s Party, 6, 9, 10–11,

13, 14, 15, 16, 31, 40–1, 106, 123,127, 141, 144, 146, 149, 152

Republic (proclamation of), 6review of expediency, 100revolution from above, 17, 108, 152Rousseau, Jan Jacques, 8rule of law, 33–5

Sarıkaya, Ferhat, 107Second Constitutionalist period, 4, 5second wave ( of democracies), 1secularism, 27–32, 124–5semi-democracy, 1semi-presidentialism, 75–6Senate (Ottoman), 3Senate of the Republic, 11, 59–60, 63,

112, 129Sezer, Ahmet Necdet, 66, 88, 141single-party rule, 1, 6, 7, 9, 17, 40, 152

INDEX 185

social rights (in the Constitution of1982), 55–6

social state, 35–6, 43–4

Society of Union and Progress, 4, 5

Speaker (of the Grand NationalAssembly), 62

Standing Orders ( of parliament), 62,65, 115

State Board of Supervision, 20, 78

state of emergency, 48–9

State Planning Organization, 36, 44

State security courts, 15, 102

Stay orders (of the ConstitutionalCourt), 122

Sultan (Ottoman), 2, 3, 4

Sunay, Cevdet, 12, 14

superiority of international law, 53–4,69, 116

supra-positive constitutionalnorms, 131

Supreme Board of Election, 22

Supreme Military Council, 20–1, 34,84, 107

Sweet, Alec Stone, 125

Tanzimat (reform) period, 2territorial and national unity of the

state, 24third wave (of democracies), 1, 33,

151–2

unamendable clauses (of theConstitution), 21, 22, 31–2,106–7, 131–7

unicameralism, 59Union of Turkish Bar

Associations, 21, 139Union of Turkish Chambers of Trade

and Industry (TOBB), 21, 139universal suffrage, 22

Venice Commission, 25, 26, 105–6,134–7, 148

village administrations, 88vote of censure, 67–8, 80vote of confidence, 80–1

Welfare Party (RP), 25–6

Yılmaz, Mesut, 78Young Turks, 4