192

Notes

Foreword

1 Dan Jenkins, “The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in theCanadian Corps, 1914–1918”, Canadian Military History, Vol.10 No.2, (Spring2001); Albert Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office andControl of the Enemy in World War 1”, The Journal of Military History, Vol.63No.1, (1999), 55–74.

2 James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German MilitaryReform Between the Wars, (Lawrence, Ks., 1992); Robert Citino, “Beyond Fireand Movement: Command, Control and information in the GermanBlitzkrieg”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.27 No.2, (June 2004), 324–44.

3 John Ferris, “The British Army, Signals and Security In the Desert Campaign,1940–42” in John Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, Selected Essays, (London:Routledge, 2005).

4 John Ferris, “Catching the Wave: The RAF Pursues an RMA, 1918–1945” inMonica Tufts and Imlay, Talbot, The Fog of Peace, (London: Routledge, 2006).

5 David French, Raising Churchill’s Army, The British Army and the War AgainstGermany, 1919–1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Introduction

1 Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney and theWar in the Southwest Pacific, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000),Gary Null, Weapon of Denial: Air Power and the Battle for New Guinea,(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1995), Herman Plocher, TheGerman Air Force versus Russia, 1942, (New York: Arno Press, 1968), JamesSterret, “Learning is Winning: Soviet Air Power Doctrine, 1953–41”,Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (eds), Air Power History: turning points fromKitty Hawk to Kosovo, (London: Routledge, 2002), Air Historical BranchMonograph. Close Air Support, (London: HMSO, 1955), Richard Hallion,Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911–1945,(Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1989), Richard Hallion, “Battlefield AirSupport – A Retrospective Assessment”, Air Power Journal. Vol.4 No.1 (1990),B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support,(Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1990), Williamson Murray andAllan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996), Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern For Joint Operations,(Washington: Office of Air Force History), and Daniel Mortensen, Air Powerand Ground Armies, (Air University Press, 1998), Arthur Coningham, “TheDevelopment of Tactical Air Forces”, Royal United Services Institute JournalVol.91 (1946), Lt. Col. C. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943”,Royal United Services Institution Journal Vol.114 (1971), W.A. Jacobs, “Air

Support for the British Army, 1939–1943”, Military Affairs Vol.46 (1982), D. Hall, “The Birth of the Tactical Air Force”, D. Phil. thesis Oxford University,1996, David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43” in Cooling, CaseStudies in the Development of Close Air Support, Ian Gooderson, Air Power atthe Battlefront, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), Thomas Greer, The Developmentof Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941, (Manhattan Kan.: AerospaceHistorian, 1955), J. Heither, The Development of Tactical Doctrine at AAFSATand AAFTAC, (Manhattan Kansas: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian, 1944),Hughes, T.H. Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical AirPower in World War II, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), Williamson Murray,“The Luftwaffe Experience, 1939–1941”, B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies inthe Development of Close Air Support, Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939”,B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support.

2 James S. Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918–41”, Journalof Military History, 59 (1995), 1, James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe’s Way of War,(Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1998),James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating The Operational Air War, 1918–1940,(Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1997).

3 There are few historians who treat issues like C3I as a system combiningtechnology, thought, and action. Characteristically, these issues have beentreated separately, while they are in fact interrelated. Apart from the author,one of the few who has acknowledged this is Professor John Ferris. Forexamples, see “Ferris, John, “Achieving Air Ascendancy: Challenge andResponse in British Strategic Air Defence”, Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray(eds.), Air Power History: turning points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, (London:Routledge, 2002); Ferris, John, “Airbandit: C3I and Strategic Air Defenceduring the First Battle of Britain, 1915–18”. Strategy and Intelligence: BritishPolicy During the First World War. Michael Dockrill and David French, eds.,London: The Hambledon Press, 1995; Ferris, John, “Fighter Defence beforeFighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain,1917–1934”, Journal of Military History, Vol.63, No.4, October, 1999; Ferris,John, “The British Army, Signals and Security”, Intelligence and MilitaryOperations. Michael I. Handel, (ed.) London: Frank Cass and CompanyLimited, 1990; Ferris, John, “The British Army, Signals and Security in theDesert Campaign, 1940–42”, Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays, JohnFerris, ed., London: Routledge, 2005.

4 David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 1990), passim.

5 Public Record Office (PRO) WO 169/6638 War Diary of No.2 AASC, 18 May1942.

6 PRO WO 106/2270, Military Intelligence Service, War Office, Notes andLessons on Operations in the Middle East, January 30 1943, 14; LieutenantGeneral Lewis Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, (New York: Morrow, 1946),137–8.

7 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, theWestern Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 20.

8 PRO WO 169/647 Operation ‘Grapeshot’, 2 November 1942.9 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), Papers of Major-General

McNeill 1/2 A2, 1.

Notes 193

10 David R. Mets, “A Glider in the Propwash of the Royal Air Force?”, DanielMortensen (ed.), Airpower and Ground Armies, (Maxwell AFB Alabama: AirUniversity Press, 1998), 48.

11 For a discussion of ‘OODA’ or Boyd Loops, see Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Stra-tegy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, (London: Routledge, 2006);Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training, and Tactics in theBritish and German Armies, 1888–1918, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 13; MartinVan Creveld, Command in War, (London: Harvard University Press, 1985),introduction; J. Wallace, “Manoeuvre Theory in Operations Other Than War”,Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.19 No. 4, 1996, 209; “The Information Advan-tage”, The Economist, June 10–16, 1995, 5.

12 Martin Samuels, Command or Control?, 3.13 Ibid., 7.14 Ibid., 4.15 Air Chief Marshal Sir Kenneth ‘Bing’ Cross with Prof. V. Orange, Straight

and Level, (London: Bugg Street, 1993), 157.16 War Office, Field Service Regulations, Vol.II, Operations – General, (London:

HMSO, 1935), pp. 26–7.17 Ibid., 27.18 Ibid., 28.19 U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations

1939, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 56.20 U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, Field Service Regulations, Operations 1941,

(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 29.21 Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers Vol.II, 1940–1945, (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin, 1974), 194–6.22 Ibid., 196.23 Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey, CAB 146/27 Evaluation of the British and

American Commands and Troops in North Africa, Appreciation by FreemdeHeere West, 18 May 1943.

24 PRO AIR 23/1299, Air Power in the Land Battle (Air Ministry, 1943).25 PRO AIR 39/129 Memorandum by GHQ Home Forces, Organization and Sys-

tem of Control of Air Forces in Support of Overseas Operations, 6 November1942.

26 Ibid., Questionnaire submitted to Air Headquarters Western Desert.27 James S. Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941”,

Journal of Military History, Vol.59, No.1 (1995), 70.28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (eds) Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New

Jersey: Princeton University Press), 117.29 John Ferris, “Airbandit: C3I and Strategic Air Defence during the First Battle

of Britain, 1915–18”, in Michael Dockrill and David French (eds), Strategyand Intelligence: British Policy During the First World War, (London: TheHambledon Press, 1995), 26.

30 WO 208/1559 Weekly Review of the Military Situation, 24 November 1941.31 PRO AIR 41/25 The Enemy Supply System in Libya, Appendix Z, 10 Novem-

ber, 1941.32 Ibid.33 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, the

Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 26.

194 Notes

34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 PRO AIR 26/402 Operations Record Book No.285 Wing, R.A.F. M.E.,

26 August, 1942.38 LHCMA Papers of Major General McNeill 1/1 A1 Military Situation, Period

1st–29th August ’42.39 AHB, Air Support, 52.40 LHCMA General Sir Richard O’Connor’s papers 4/3/1, An Account of Various

Events Written by General Sir R.N. O’Connor whilst a prisoner of war in ItalyMay 1941; PRO CAB 106/685 Letter Regarding Difficulties Encountered WhileCommanding 13 Corps 1940/41.

41 Neil Orpen, South African Forces in World War II, Vol.III War in the Desert, (CapeTown: Purnell, 1971), 268.

42 Losses during close air support and interdiction missions could be quitehigh, which affected Allied morale, but no evidence suggests that pilots wereunwilling to press home their attacks because of the risk. In a conversationon 10 June 1999, Squadron Leader Milt Jowsie, formerly of 93 Squadron RAF,indicated that the efficiency of a squadron’s commanding officer largelydetermined the effect of losses on morale depended largely on the efficiency ofthe squadron’s commanding officer. Where the commanding officer was effec-tive and enforced discipline, the effect of losses was minimized.

43 PRO AIR 19/92 Minutes of Meeting in CAS’s room, 26 July 1923, John Ferris,“Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence inGreat Britain, 1917–1934”, Journal of Military History, Vol.63, No.4, (October,1999), 850.

44 John Ferris, “Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of StrategicAir Defence in Great Britain, 1917–1934”, 853.

45 Ibid.

Chapter 1

1 Group Captain Andrew Vallance, Air Power: Collected Essays on Doctrine,(London: HMSO, 1990), VII.

2 Captain Mc A. Hogg, RE, “Aeroplanes in Future Warfare”, Army Quarterly,Vol.IX, No.1, October 1924, 104.

3 Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939”, in B.F. Cooling, (ed.), Case Studies inthe Development of Close Air Support, (Washington D.C.: Office of Air ForceHistory, 1990), 51.

4 For an analysis of the ten-year rule and its effect on strategic policy, as well asthe dialectic relationship between British diplomacy and its military policies,see John Robert Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy: The Evolution of BritishStrategic Policy, 1919–1926, (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1988).

5 General William Mitchell, Provisional Manual of Operations, in Maurer, U.S.Army Aviation, 1919–1939, (Washington D.C., Office of Air Force History,1988), 286.

6 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm,1917–1941, (Manhattan Kan.: Aerospace Historian, 1955), 128.

Notes 195

7 Bolling Air Force Base, Washington D.C., United States Air Force HistoricalResearch Agency (USAFHRA) Ira Eaker interview, K239.0512-829, 103.

8 Library of Congress, Washington D.C., (hereafter cited as LC) ManuscriptDivision, Papers of Benjamin Foulois, Box 26, Letter by John J. Pershing toGeneral Menoher 20 January 1926.

9 LC, Papers of Benjamin D. Foulois, Box 37, Address by Major General FrankM. Andrews before the National Aeronautic Association, St. Louis Missouri,January 16, 1939, 13.

10 Thomas A. Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of TacticalAir Power in World War Two, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 48.

11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Benjamin Foulois and Carroll Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts:

The Memoirs of Major General Benamin D. Foulois, (New York: McGraw-HillBook Co., 1968), 213.

14 LC, The Papers of H.H. Arnold, box 223, a letter from President Roosevelt toG. Dern, February 1934.

15 Richard R. Muller, “Close Air Support: the German, British and AmericanExperiences, 1918–1941”, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds),Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996), 175.

16 Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Powerin World War II, 57.

17 Ibid.18 Timothy Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics: The US Army Command

and General Staff School 1920–1940”, The Journal of Military History, April1994, 219.

19 Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Powerin World War II, 62.

20 Ibid., 108.21 Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power

in World War II, 47.22 Ibid., 77; Mark Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, (Office

of Chief of Military History, 1950), 163; Forest C. Pogue, George C. Marshal:Ordeal and Hope, (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), 290.

23 W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 1, 148.24 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 109 and 577;

H.H. Arnold, Global Mission, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 192.25 General Carl Spaatz, “Strategic Air Power”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.24, April 1946,

387.26 See Alexander De Seversky, Victory Through Airpower, (New York: Garden City

Publishing Co., Inc., 1943, particularly pages 43–73.27 Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress (LC) in Washington D.C.,

Quesada Papers, Letter from Major Quesada to Mrs. Helen Quesada, 20 April1941.

28 Increasing space was devoted to the close support system in the CGSS mag-azine Military Review, especially after operation ‘Torch’. For examples seeNational Archives and Record Administration, College Park MD. (NARA) RG337 Entry 105 Box 2 Capt. F.O. Miksche (Czech. Army), “What Really is Air

196 Notes

Cooperation”, Military Review, Vol.XXII, No.87, January 1943; Lt. Col. A. Vasilyev (Soviet Army), “Air Action Against Combat Formations”, MilitaryReview, Vol.XXIII, No.2, May 1943; Colonel Wilfrid H. Hardy, “Aviation in Support of Ground Troops”, Military Review, Vol.XXIII, No.3, June 1943;Col. W.H. Hardy, “The Air Support Command”, Military Review, Vol.XXIII,No.4, July 1943.

29 Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941, 113.30 NARA RG 407, U.S. Army Unclassified Decimal File, File 300.7 Field Manual

1–5 Employment of Aviation of the Army, 15 April 1940.31 Ibid.32 Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power

in World War II, 55.33 The only U.S. armed service with an effective close air support system was

the U.S. Marine Corps. However, given the absence of inter-service com-munication between the Marines and the U.S. Army, it had no impact onUSAAF close air support. See Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and theTriumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II, chapter 2.

34 NARA, RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Memorandum from Headquarters ThirdArmy to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Washington DC,25 November 1942.

35 NARA RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Memorandum from Col. D.M. Schlatter,Director of Air Support, to the Commanding General Army Ground Forces,Army War College, Washington DC, 24 October 1942.

36 Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, (RAFM) Trenchard Papers, CII/1, Memo-randum by Churchill to the Cabinet, 24 October 1919; Martin Gilbert,Winston S. Churchill, III, 769.

37 PRO AIR 8/3 The Second Report of the Smuts Committee, 17 August 1917;CAB 23/3, 233rd meeting of the War Cabinet, Appendix II.

38 PRO AIR 41/8, R.A.F. Narrative, The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 1934–1939, 2; H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918–1939,49; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA) Brooke-Popham papers,VII/22.

39 LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers 1/644, Personal Reflections by Sir John Slessor,September 1964, 7.

40 PRO CAB 5/4, The Air Force in Relation to the Army and Navy 150-C Memo-randum by the Secretary of State for War, 28 September 1921, 6.

41 Ibid.42 PRO AIR 8/2, Quartermaster General to Secretary of State for War, 25 July

1919.43 PRO CAB 5/4, 151-C, Memorandum from CAS Trenchard to Secretary of

State for Air, 17 Oct. 1921.44 David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, (Manchester: Manchester Uni-

versity Press, 1990), 36, also 38.45 PRO AIR 5/280, Memorandum to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,

10 December 1928.46 PRO AIR 10/1437, Manual of Combined Operations, 1938.47 Ibid.48 For examples of this debate, see Flight Lieutenant C.J. MacKay, “The Influence

in the Future of Aircraft Upon the Problems of Imperial Defence”, Journal of

Notes 197

the Royal United Service Institute, Vol.67, May 1922, 285; Group-Captain Foster,“Air Power and Its Application”, Journal of the Royal United Service Institute,Vol.73, 1928, 247.

49 PRO AIR 9/5 number 4 CID 139-C, Memorandum from Henry Wilson, F.M.,CIGS entitled, “The Role of the Air Force in Relation to the Army”, 25 May1921. For typical army views, see Major-General W.D. Bird, “Some Spec-ulations on Aerial Strategy”, Army Quarterly, Vol.IV, April 1922–July 1922, 249;“Air and Land Warfare”, Army Quarterly, Vol.X, April–July 1925, no author specified, 280; Colonel M.A. Wingfield, “Air Operations Against the Lines ofCommunication of an Army”, Army Quarterly, Vol.XI, Oct. 1925–January 1926,376.

50 Wing Commander T. Leigh-Mallory, “The Maintenance of Air Superiority in a Land Campaign”, Royal Air Force Quarterly, Vol.II, No.2, April 1931, 245;Wing Commander T.L. Leigh-Mallory, “Air Cooperation with MechanisedForces”, Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, Vol.75, 5 March 1930,566 and 572.

51 Slessor, The Central Blue, 42 and 83.52 Air Commodore Henry Probert, High Commanders of the Royal Air Force,

(London: HMSO, 1991), 41.53 Ibid.54 Slessor, The Central Blue, 94.55 J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 213.56 Ibid.57 Ibid.58 Field Service Regulations, Vol.II, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office,

1935), 16.59 Ibid; PRO AIR 10/1889, Royal Air Force Manual of Army Cooperation, 1937;

Lieut.-Colonel F.A. Pile, “The Army’s Air Needs”, Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute, 71, 1926.

60 Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, pp.42–3.61 PRO AIR 10/1708, Army Cooperation Report 1927, 14.62 PRO AIR 10/1759, Army Cooperation Report 1928, 21.63 Ibid., 7.64 PRO AIR 10/1777, Army Cooperation Report 1929, 7.65 Ibid.66 PRO CAB 53/5, Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 1 November 1934.67 PRO AIR 10/1914, Army Cooperation Training Memorandum, 1934, 6.68 LHCMA, Sir Jock Burnett-Stuart Papers, I/I, Southern Command Annual

Report on Training of the Regular Army 1936/1937, Appendix 10 Air Coop-eration, 1937.

69 Ibid.70 LHCMA, Sir Jock Burnett-Stuart Papers, I/I, Training Memorandum, 1931, 3.71 Ibid.72 Tedder was included on the distribution list of many of Slessor’s papers on

air control. In particular, AIR 75/27 Official Papers of Marshal of the RoyalAir Force (MRAF) Sir John Slessor, Air Control. The Other Point of View,193, 2. In this paper, Slessor outlined the importance of ground troops inAir Control operations.

73 RAFM Tedder Papers, Lecture given to RAF Staff College, Andover entitled,“Air Aspects of Combined Operations”.

198 Notes

Notes 199

74 Vincent Orange, Coningham, (London: Methuen, 1990), 39.75 Ibid.76 PRO AIR 23/542, Report by Air Marshal Salmond to the Air Ministry on his

Command in Iraq, April 1924.77 Orange, Coningham, 39–40.78 Ibid., 40.79 Ibid.80 Ibid.81 Slessor, The Central Blue, pp.124–8.82 Ibid., 128; PRO AIR 75/31, Combined Report on Air Cooperation Training,

2 (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade (Bde.) and 3 Indian Wing, November 1936,pp.5–6.

83 Slessor, The Central Blue, 129.84 PRO AIR 75/29, Air Staff (India) Memo No.1 April 1935; also PRO AIR 75/31

Combined Report on Air Cooperation Training, 2 (Rawalpindi) Infantry Bdeand 3 Indian Wing, November 1936, pp.7–8.

85 PRO AIR 75/28, Report to The Secretary, Military Department India Office,by the Air Officer Commanding in India on the Air Operations in Bajuar21st July, 1933 to 13 August, 1933. For example, air photographs taken ofeach attack and at the end of each day’s bombing were used to gauge theeffect and based on this information it was determined whether to continuethe bombing.

86 PRO AIR 75/28, Report to The Secretary, Military Department India Office,by the Air Officer Commanding in India on the Air Operations in Bajuar21st July, 1933 to 13 August, 1933.

87 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, 44.88 Ibid., 44–5.89 Ibid., 46.90 PRO AIR 5/1244 Report by Lieutenant-General Wavell on Operations in

Palestine and Transjordan, 12 September 1937 to 31 March 1937.91 General Sir Edmund Ironside, Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries 1937–

1940, (eds) Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, (Westport: Greenwood Press,1962), 140.

92 PRO WO 277/34, War Office Historical Monograph entitled Army AirSupport and Photographic Interpretation, 1939–1945, undated, 12.

93 AHB, Air Support, 19.94 PRO WO 277/34, War Office Historical Monograph entitled Army Air Sup-

port and Photographic Interpretation, 1939–1945 Chapter IV, The, “Wann-Woodall” Report, undated, 25.

95 Ibid.96 Ibid.97 Richard Townshend Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, (London: Leo

Cooper, 1991), 18. For a complete study of the LADA system and adoption forthe Battle of Britain in 1940, see John Ferris, “Airbandit: C3I and Strategic AirDefence during the First Battle of Britain, 1915–18”, Strategy and Intelligence:British Policy During the First World War, (eds) Michael Dockrill and DavidFrench, (London: The Hambledon Press, 1995), and John Ferris, “AchievingAir Ascendancy: Challenge and Response in British Strategic Air Defence”,Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (eds), Air Power History: Turning Points from KittyHawk to Kosovo, (London: Routledge, 2002).

200 Notes

98 Most sources dramatically underestimate the value and power of the RAF airsupport system developed in the desert, and fundamentally misrepresent howit functioned. For examples of this see James Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s ArmySupport Doctrine, 1918–1941”, Journal of Military History, Vol.59, No.1 (1995),53, and Corum, James S., The Luftwaffe: Creating The Operational Air War,1918–1940.

Chapter 2

1 PRO CAB 106/918, Despatch on Operations in the Western Desert From 7 December 1940 to 7 February 1941 by General A. Wavell, 1; B.H. LiddellHart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, (London: Collins, 1953), 91.

2 PRO CAB 106/918, Despatch on Operations in the Western Desert From 7 December 1940 to 7 February 1941 by General A. Wavell, 4.

3 Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 91.4 See John Ferris, “The British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert

Campaign, 1940–42”, in John Ferris, ed., Intelligence and Strategy: SelectedEssays, (London: Routledge, 2005), 181–238.

5 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, abridged edition,(London: HMSO, 1993), 62.

6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Ibid., 64.9 PRO AIR 40/2252 Mediterranean Air ‘Y’, 18 September 1943, 2.

10 Ibid.11 Aileen Clayton, The Enemy is Listening, 150–1.12 WO 208/5077, GSI (s) to DDMI (I), 14/2/41; WO 208/5021, Military ‘Y’

Mideast, GSI (s), 2/3/41; Clayton, The Enemy is Listening, 151.13 IWM, Papers of Major General Lloyd-Owen, LRDG 1/7.14 WO 208/4193, CSDIC Interrogation Reports, I/S R.X. 13 Information received

in UK on 10 September 1941.15 PRO WO 208/3478, The Interrogation of Prisoners of War, March 1943.16 Ibid.17 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume I, (London:

HMSO, 1979), 205; PRO WO 208/3248, Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean,1941, Part 1, 1.

18 AWM 54[423/4/24] Notes on the CSDIC, Cairo, Middle East, 1941, 1; PROWO 208/3248 Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean, undated, Part 1.

19 AWM 54[423/4/24] Notes on the CSDIC, Cairo, Middle East, 1941, 2.20 Ibid., Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, I, 205.21 AWM 54[423/4/24] Notes on the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation

Centre, Cairo, Middle East, 1941, 2.22 Ibid.23 PRO WO 208/3248, Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean, undated, Part 1, 7.24 Ibid.25 For an understanding of the requirements for effective interrogation see

Toliver, The Interrogator: The Story of Hanns Scarff, Luftwaffe’s Master Interrogator.

26 PRO WO 277/34, Army Air Support and Photographic Interpretation,1939–1945, Photographic Interpretation in the Middle East, 1.

27 Ibid.28 LHCMA General Sir Richard O’Connor’s papers 4/3/1, An Account of Various

Events Written by General Sir R.N. O’Connor whilst a prisoner of war inItaly May 1941; PRO CAB 106/685 Letter Regarding Difficulties EncounteredWhile Commanding 13 Corps 1940/41.

29 LHCMA General Sir Richard O’Connor’s papers 4/3/1, An Account of VariousEvents Written by General Sir R.N. O’Connor whilst a prisoner of war inItaly May 1941.

30 Ibid.31 Ibid.32 PRO WO 169/1107, Report on Army Cooperation Carried out In Connection

With the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya, 31 January 1941,sheet 2.

33 PRO AIR 23/6478, Battle of Cyrenaica 41/42, Notes on Fighter Organ-ization and Control.

34 PRO WO 169/1107, Report on Army Cooperation Carried Out in Connec-tion With the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya, 31/1/41,sheet 2.

35 Ibid.36 Denis Richards, Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, I, 409; PRO AIR 25 index

under 202 Group.37 PRO CAB 106/626, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, Air Operations

in the Middle East, 1 January to 3 May 1941, 3.38 Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War

1939–1945, 310–11.39 All maps in this document are courtesy of the Department of History, United

States Military Academy.40 CAB 106/918, Despatch on Operations in the Western Desert From

7 December–7 February 1941, by General A. Wavell, 1; PRO WO 169/16,Operations in Western Desert October to December 1940 (Notes onGenesis and Working Out of ‘Compass’ Plan), 3.

41 AHB, Air Support, 48.42 PRO WO 169/16, Operations in the Western Desert October to December

1940 (Notes on Genesis and Working Out of ‘Compass’ Plan, 3.43 Ibid.44 Ibid., 4; Corelli Barnett, The Desert Generals, (London: George Allen & Unwin,

1983), 31–4.45 PRO CAB 106/918, Despatch on Operations in the Western Desert From

7 December 1940 to 7 February 1941 by General A. Wavell, 7.46 Ibid.47 PRO WO 169/1107, War Diary of XIII Corps, Intelligence Summary No.8

for 8–9 January, 1941. 48 RAFM Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir A. Longmore DC 74/102/14 Despatch

by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, 1.49 Ibid., 2.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.

Notes 201

202 Notes

52 Richards, Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, I, 273.53 PRO AIR 41/44 Operations in Libya & The Western Desert September

1939–June 1941, 35. 54 Richards, Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, I, 273.55 WO 169/1107, War Diary of XIII Corps, XIII Corps Intelligence Summary

No.6, 17–19 January, 1941, 6.56 PRO WO 169/1107, Report on Army Cooperation Carried out in Connec-

tion With the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya, 31/1/41,sheet 8.

57 PRO WO 277/34, Army Air Support and Photographic Interpretation,1939–1945, 45.

58 AIR 25/803 Operations Record Book 202 Group, Recognition of GroundTroops, 4 Sept 1939.

59 John Ferris, “The British Army, Signals and Security”, 261.60 Ibid.61 PRO WO 201/353, Memorandum from the 4th Indian Division on operations

November–December 1940.62 LHCMA, O’Connor Papers 4/2/19, Letter to Brig. A.R. Selby, Commander

Matruh Forces, 14 December 1940.63 AHB, Air Support, 49.64 PRO AIR 41/25, Brief Report on Communications in the Western Desert

Operations 1941–42, Appendix D (i), 1.65 Ibid., 4; PRO AIR 23/1344, Memorandum from the Chief Signals Officer to

the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East, 13 April 1941.66 PRO AIR 23/6478, 10; PRO WO 106/2255 Lessons of the Operations in

Cyrenaica – No.5, 13 Dec 1941.67 PRO WO 106/2255 Lessons of the Operations in Cyrenaica – No.5, 13 Dec

1941.68 Ibid.69 PRO AIR 23/6203, CSO HQ RAF ME, 6 Feb. 1942.70 PRO AIR 40/1817 Signals Appendix for Marshal of the Royal Air Force

Lord Tedder’s Despatch on Middle East Operations, May 1941–Jan. 1943.71 PRO AIR 23/6478, 10.72 Robin Higham, Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece, 1940–1941, (Lexing-

ton: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 7–8, also 13 and 54.73 Richard Lamb, Churchill as War Leader – Right or Wrong, (London: Blooms-

bury, 1993), 127–8.74 LHCMA, Papers of General Sir Richard O’Connor 4/4/1 War Cabinet Defence

Committee (Operations), 20 January 1941.75 PRO WO 106/2270, Military Intelligence Service, War Office, Notes and

Lessons on Operations in the Middle East, January 30th 1943, 5.76 Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War

1939–1945, 301–18.77 Tedder, With Prejudice, 109.78 Ibid., 189.79 Richards, The Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 166.80 PRO AIR 40/1817, German Numbers in the Mediterranean, April 1943;

PRO AIR 40/1817 Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder’s Despatchon Middle East Operations May 1941–January 1942, section entitled GermanNumbers in the Mediterranean, April 1943.

Notes 203

81 CAB 106/379 Despatch by General Sir A. Wavell, 9.82 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy. Initially, the term Ultra refer-

red to information gained through breaking the Enigma, and later the Geheimschreiber, cipher. Later in the war, the term Ultra was expanded toinclude the decryption of high-grade ciphers of whatever source, German,Italian, or Japanese.

83 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, I, 19.84 Ibid., 571.85 Ibid., 570.86 PRO AIR 23/1209 Intelligence Organization-Mobile Fighter Group, 31/5/43.87 PRO AIR 40/2342 ‘Y’ Service report, 5 May 1941.88 PRO AIR 23/6482 Signal from 253 Wing to 268 Wing, 3 November, 1941;

NAM, Papers of Lt. Gen. Cunningham, Memorandum entitled What WeAsk of the Air, undated.

89 CAB 106/767 Report on Operations in Cyrenaica by Lt. Gen Neame, 7 April1941, 5.

90 Tony Devereux, Messenger Gods of Battle, (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 30, also38 and 80–1.

91 WO 169/1988, Report on Wireless Exercise 12/13 Aug. ’41, 18.8.41, 3.92 Ibid.93 PRO WO 201/369, Some Signals Lessons of the Libyan Campaign,

Part One, November 1941 to February 1942, 1.94 PRO AIR 40/1817 Signals Appendix for Lord Tedder’s Despatch on Middle

East Operations, May 1941–Jan. 1943.95 Ibid.96 Ibid.97 Ibid.98 CAB 106/379 Despatch by General Sir A. Wavell, 9.99 LHCMA Papers of Maj. Gen A. Leakey 1 “Nine Lives: A Soldier’s Story”,

66–72.100 AHB, Air Support, 50.101 Ronald Lewin, The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, (London: B.T. Batsford

Ltd., 1977), 62; Richards, II, 59.102 LHCMA Papers of Major General Sir M. O’Moore Creagh, GOC 7 Armoured

Division, Notes on Desert War, 1941. 103 Tedder, 124; Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941, (London:

Jonathan Cape, 1980), 296.104 PRO AIR 23/1391 Air Operations, 6 June 1941; PRO WO 106/2161 Secret

Cipher Telegram from HQ RAF ME to the Air Ministry, Whitehall, 21 June1941.

105 LHCMA, Papers of Maj-Gen Sir M. O’Moore Creagh, GOC 7 ArmouredDivision, Notes on Desert War, 1941.

106 Ronald Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, (London: B.T. Batsford,1968), 45–6; Hans Behrendt, Rommel’s Intelligence in the Desert Campaign1941–1943, (London: William Kimber, 1985).

107 PRO WO 106/2161, Most Secret Cipher Telegram from The War Office to29 British Liaison Staff, Washington, 17 July 1941.

108 John Rylands University of Manchester Library (JRUML), Papers of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Item 304, Note by the Prime Minister to theChief of Staff Committee, 29 August 1941.

109 National Army Museum (NAM), Papers of Lt. Gen. Cunningham, 8303-104/17, Despatch on Operations, undated, 7, also 8303-104/19, Control ofAir Forces, 4 October 1941.

110 Ibid., Letter from Coningham to Cunningham, 4 November 1941.111 Tedder, With Prejudice, 189.112 PRO WO 201/369, Some Signals Lessons of the Libyan Campaign, November

1941 to February 1942 Part Two – Detailed Technical Lessons.113 PRO WO 169/1123, GS 30 Corps War Diary 1941, Notes on First Phase

Operations in Libya 18 November–10 December, 1940.114 PRO WO 201/369 Some Signals Lessons of the Libyan Campaign, November

1941 to February 1942 Part Two – Detailed Technical Lessons, paragraph16 (i).

115 WO 169/1123 GS 30 Corps War Diary 1941 Lessons on First Phase of Opsin Libya 18 Nov–10 Dec 41, 25.

116 Ibid.117 Ibid.118 PRO WO 169/3904, Eighth Army Main Headquarters Signals, December

1941.119 PRO AIR 40/1817, Signals Appendix for Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord

Tedder’s Despatch on Middle East Operations, May 1941–Jan. 1943, 9.120 PRO CAB 106/535 Operations in the Middle East, 5 July ’41–31 October ’41.121 PRO WO 201/488 Appendix B to D.O. Circular No.12, 16 January 1944,

also NARA RG 331 Box 43, Reel 71-B, Records of Allied Force Headquarters(AFHQ), Air Liaison Officers’ Course, Italy 17 May to 2 June 1945.

122 LHCMA De Guingand Papers IV/2/10a 21 Army Group, Some Notes on theUse of Air Power in Support of Land Operations and Direct Air Support,December 1944.

123 PRO WO 277/34, Army Air Support and Photographic Interpretation,1939–1945, Organization and Training of Air Liaison Officers, 35.

124 PRO AIR 23/1209 Organization and Application of Air Intelligence in aTactical Air Force, undated.

125 Ibid.; IWM Papers of Lt. Col. R.R. Prentice, War Intelligence Course,undated.

126 PRO WO 208/3248, Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean, Part 1, 2.127 Group Captain A. Lambert, The Psychology of Air Power, (London: RUSI,

1995), 6.128 AWM 54[423/4/24] CSDIC Mobile Unit; PRO WO 208/3248, Notes on

CSDIC Mediterranean, Part 1, 7.129 Ibid; PRO WO 208/3248, Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean, Part 1, 2. 130 AWM 54[423/4/24] CSDIC Mobile Unit.131 JRUML, Papers of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Item 620 Notes on

the Present Military Situation by GSI Adv. HQ 8th Army, 9 January, 1942. 132 Ibid.133 PRO AIR 23/1345 Answers to War Office Questions, 27 December 1941, 2.134 PRO AIR 23/6472, Report on reconnaissance before and after the formation

of 285 Wing, 1945.135 RAFM Middle East Review No.2 January to March 1943, RAF HQ ME, 90.136 PRO AIR 23/6472 Report on reconnaissance before and after the formation

of 285 Wing, 1945.

204 Notes

137 Ibid.138 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary of Panzer Army Africa, Panzer Army HQ Ia

Report on RAF Operations, 5 September 1942.139 PRO AIR 23/1345 Army Air Support, Answers to War Office Questions,

27 December 1941.140 Ibid.141 PRO WO 169/6638, War Diary of No.2 AASC, January and March 1942.142 PRO AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, June 1941–January 1942, 62,

also 129.143 Ibid., 62, also 129. 144 Ibid., 61145 Ibid., 60.146 PRO WO 277/34, Army Air Support and Photographic Interpretation,

1939–1945, 4.147 Ibid.148 PRO WO 169/1123 GS 30 Corps War Diary 1941, Air Support and Signals

Exercise, October 1941.149 Ibid.150 LHCMA, Papers of Major General McNeill 2/4 B4, memorandum entitled

Ground/Air Recognition, Oct. 1941.151 WO 169/1123 GS 30 Corps War Diary 1941 Appendix KK to 30 Corps Oper-

ation Instruction No.1, Ground/Air Recognition 7 Nov 41.152 PRO CAB 106/650, The Crusader Operation 18 November–29 December

1941; James Lucas, Panzer Army Africa, (London, 1977), 66.153 PRO WO 169/1107, War Diary of XIII Corps, 8 Nov. 1941.154 Pitt, The Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941, 340.155 Richards, Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 171.156 Orange, Coningham, 84.157 Ibid.158 PRO AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, June 1941–January 1942, 87;

also see Sebastian Cox “The Difference between White and Black: Churchill,Imperial Politics, and Intelligence before the 1941 Crusader Offensive”,Intelligence and National Security, Vol.9, No.3, July 1996, which deals withnumbers of aircraft prior to ‘Crusader’, and how intelligence was distortedto reflect the wishes of superiors.

159 Richards, Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 175; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterraneanand Middle East, Volume III, (London: HMSO, 1960), 66.

160 John Ferris “The Usual Source: Signals Intelligence and Planning for the‘Crusader’ Offensive, 1941”, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.14, No.1(1999), 112.

161 PRO WO 106/2255, Lessons from Operations – Cyrenaica No.1, 5 Nov. 41,p,2.

162 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 66.163 JRUML, Papers of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Item 450, Situation

Report from Battle HQ 30 Corps, 23 November 1941.164 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 76–8.165 PRO WO 169/1107 War Diary of XIII Corps, Special Intelligence Summary

Report on Operations, 13–15 September 1941.166 Ibid.

Notes 205

167 PRO AIR 23/6479 Air Operations During Phase I, Oct. 14, 1941.168 PRO AIR 24/1662, Operations Record Book, Air Headquarters Western

Desert, 22 November 1941.169 Ibid.170 Richards, Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 175.171 AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.9, Ground Strafing by

Single Seat Fighters, February 1942, 1–2.172 Ibid., 2.173 Orange, Coningham, 93.174 Ibid.175 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum – The Employment

of Beaufighters in Day Operations, November 1941.176 Ibid.177 PRO AIR 23/1345, Secret Cipher Message from Air Marshal Tedder to the

Air Ministry, Whitehall, 27 November 1941.178 PRO AIR 24/1080 A.875, Operations Record Book Appendices Middle East

Air Staff 1942, 2 January 1942.179 Richards, Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 172.180 James J. Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II, (London: Greenwood

Press, 1994), 344.181 Ibid.182 JRUML, Papers of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Item 595 Brief

Appreciation of the Situation in the Agedabia area, by Commander,Eighth Army, 29 December, 1941.

183 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 96.184 PRO AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, June 1941–January 1942, 296.185 PRO CAB 106/650, The Crusader Operation 18 November–29 December

1941, 19.186 Major K.J. Macksey, Afrika Korps, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 85.187 PRO CAB 101/136 Telegram from C-in-C Middle East A-O-C-in-C Middle

East, 1942.188 PRO CAB 106/767 Despatch on Operations by General Sir Claude J.E.

Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, The Middle East Forces 1st November,1941–15th August 1942.

189 Ibid.190 Ibid.

Chapter 3

1 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 96.2 Richards, Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 187.3 PRO AIR 24/443 Operations Record Book of Forward Desert Air Force,

February 1942.4 PRO WO 169/6638 War Diary of No.2 AASC. This unit arrived in the

Middle East on 28 January 1942, but was not fully functional until twomonths later.

5 Ibid., 9 May 1942.6 Ibid., 14 March 1942.

206 Notes

7 Devereux, Messenger Gods of Battle, 82.8 PRO AIR 40/1817 Signals Appendix for Marshal of the Royal Air Force

Lord Tedder’s Despatch on Middle East Operations, May 1941–Jan. 1943.9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 John Ferris, “The British Army, Signals and Security”, in Intelligence and

Military Operations, 278.17 IWM, Papers of Brigadier H.N. Crawford, 7th Armoured Division Secret

Report on Operations 27 May to 31 July 1942, Appendix A, 7th ArmouredDivision W/T Communication as of 0600 27 May 1942.

18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 PRO WO 201/369 Some Signal Lessons of the Libyan Campaign November

1941 to February 1942.21 NAM, Papers of Lieutenant General Cunningham, 8303-104/17, Despatch

on Operations, undated, 6.22 Cross, Straight and Level, 156–7.23 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 114.24 PRO DEFE 3/755, MK 5066, 7 May, 1942.25 J. Connell, Auchinleck, (London, 1959), 504, and 517.26 PRO WO 208/5077, GSI (s) to DDMI (I), 14 February, 1942; WO 208/5021,

Military ‘Y’ Middle East, GSI (s), 2 March, 1942.27 Clayton, The Enemy is Listening, 151.28 PRO AIR 40/2345 Y Daily Reports Middle East for 20 May, 1942.29 Australian War Memorial (AWM) 54[423/4/24] Memorandum from Army

Headquarters New Zealand Military Forces on the Interrogation ofPrisoners of War, 22 June, 1942.

30 AWM 54[423/4/24] CSDIC Cairo Memorandum on Prisoner of War in-formation given, May 5, 1942.

31 PRO WO 208/4193, Interrogation of Italian Prisoner I/S S.R.X. 111, August1941.

32 AWM 54[423/4/24] Memorandum entitled Items of RAF interest from PW Sources, 7 May 1942.

33 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary of Panzer Army Africa 28 July–23 October,memorandum from Panzer Army HQ Ia, 5 September 1942.

34 Ibid.35 PRO CAB 106/1219 General Playfair’s Correspondence about the Enemy

Supply Situation, May 1942.36 PRO AIR 41/25 Enemy Supply System in Libya, November 1941.37 Ibid.38 Ibid.39 Ibid.40 PRO WO 201/539 Instructions for the Collection and Quick Dissemination

of Information, 9 May ’42.

Notes 207

41 Ibid.42 Ibid.43 Ibid.44 PRO WO 169/6638, War Diary of No.2 AASC, memorandum from Major

McNeill to BGS 8th Army discussing the employment of the AASC, 1 April1942.

45 Ibid.46 PRO WO 277/34, Army Air Support and Photographic Interpretation,

1939–1945, Photographic Interpretation in the Middle East, 2–3.47 PRO AIR 23/6472 No.285 Reconnaissance Wing: Report on Organization and

Operational Methods from Formation Until the Conclusion of the EuropeanWar, 1945.

48 PRO WO 201/539 Instructions for the Collection and Quick Disseminationof Information, 9 May 1942.

49 Ibid.50 PRO AIR 40/1167, Photographic Reconnaissance; RAFM, Middle East Review

No.2, Jan–Mar 1943, HQ RAF Middle East, 90.51 AIR 23/6472 No.285 Reconnaissance Wing: Report on Organization and

Operational Methods from Formation Until the Conclusion of the EuropeanWar, 1945.

52 WO 201/539 Instructions for the Collection and Quick Dissemination ofInformation 9 May 1942.

53 AIR 23/6472 No.285 Reconnaissance Wing: Report on Organization andOperational Methods from Formation Until the Conclusion of the EuropeanWar, 1945.

54 MA, Papers of Major General McNeill, 2/8 B8, Middle East Training Pamphlet3A.

55 Ibid., 59.56 PRO WO 277/34, Army Air Support and Photographic Interpretation,

1939–1945, 44.57 Orange, Coningham, 214.58 PRO AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns Volume II, June 1941–January

1942, 60.59 PRO AIR 20/6130 Report by Air Marshal Sir T. Leigh-Mallory on his visit to

North Africa, April 1943.60 PRO WO 201/488 The Application of Direct Support, December 1941, 14;

LHCMA, Papers of Major General McNeill, memorandum entitledTentacle Management, undated.

61 Ibid.62 LHCMA, Papers of Major General McNeill, memorandum entitled Air

Support Control, 2 November, 1942; PRO WO 201/585, Air SupportDemonstration, February 1943.

63 PRO WO 201/488 The Application of Direct Support, December 1941, 14.64 PRO AIR 23/6200, RAF Operations in the Western Desert and Eastern Mediter-

ranean, Report entitled Aircraft Reinforcements to the Middle East Command18 Nov. 1941–19 May, 1942; Richards, The Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, I,247–9.

65 Guedalla, Middle East 1940–42: A Study in Air Power, 192.66 Tedder, With Prejudice, 155.

208 Notes

67 PRO AIR 23/6200 RAF Operations in the Western Desert and Eastern Mediter-ranean, 1942.

68 Air Ministry, RAF Middle East: The Story of Air Operations February1942–January 1943, (London: Alabaster, Passmore & Sons, Ltd., 1945), 34.

69 PRO AIR 23/6493, Maintenance, Supply, and Salvage Organization, WesternDesert, 1942.

70 Ibid.71 Ibid.72 Air Ministry, RAF Middle East: The Story of Air Operations February

1942–January 1943, 34–5.73 Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst, “Mobile Air Forces”, Journal of the Royal

United Services Institute, Vol.96 (1951). Elmhirst was responsible for orga-nizing RAF units so they were more mobile, and better able to operate influid battles.

74 PRO AIR 23/6493 Maintenance, Supply, and Salvage Organization, WesternDesert 1942.

75 PRO AIR 23/1209, Organization and Application of Air Intelligence in aTactical Air Force, 1942, 19.

76 Ibid.77 Ibid.78 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.9, February 1942, 1,

also see Bill Colgan, World War Two Fighter-Bomber Pilot, (Blue Ridge Summit,PA: TAB Books Inc., 1985).

79 Ibid.80 PRO AIR 23/1281, Middle East Training Memorandum No.3, Report on

Trials on Salisbury Plain 24th June, 1941.81 Ibid.82 Ibid.83 LHCMA, Papers of Major General Sir Michael O’Moore Creagh, Notes

on Summing Up by Army Command, Air Vice-Marshal Saul and Group-Captain Cooper on Exercise “Rommel One”, Held 3–4 Feb. 42.

84 PRO AIR 23/1281, Middle East Training Memorandum No.3, Report onTrials – Fighter v. Tank on Salisbury Plain 24th June, 1941.

85 Ibid.86 Ibid.87 Ibid.88 PRO AIR 23/1826 The Characteristics, Limitations and Tactical Employ-

ment of the Fighter-bomber – Some Comparisons with the Light Bomber,Senior Intelligence Staff Officer, Air Headquarters Desert Air Force, 13 April 1944, 3.

89 Ibid.90 Ibid., 4.91 RAFM Papers of Air Marshal Robb, AC 71/9/153, Memorandum on the

Effect of Withdrawing Fighter Bombers from Tactical Air Force, from HQ,NWTAF, 29 December 1943.

92 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.10, Tactics Employedby day based upon Experiences Gained up to the Conclusion of the PresentCampaign In Libya, December 1941.

93 Ibid.

Notes 209

94 LHCMA MISC 26/5/4 Enemy Weapons Part IV German Infantry, HeavyAA and Divisional Artillery, published by the War Office in February 1943.

95 Ibid.; PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.8, EnemyAnti-Aircraft; PRO AIR 23/922 Operational Research Section MemorandumM.30, March 1942.

96 Ibid.97 LHCMA Major General McNeill 2/21 B21, Middle East Training Pamphlet

No.3B (Army & RAF), March 1943; PRO AIR 39/129 The Technical Aspectof Army Air Support, Air Tactics (Air Ministry), June 1942.

98 PRO AIR 23/6485 Operation Order No.164 of 12 Squadron, SAAF, 14 September 1941.

99 Ibid. 100 Ibid; also AIR 23/6485 Operation Report 0.0.164 of 12 Squadron, SAAF,

15 September 1941.101 AIR 23/6485 Operation Report 0.0.164 of 12 Squadron, SAAF, 15 September

1941.102 Ibid.103 Ibid.104 PRO AIR 23/1347 Secret Cypher Message from Air Marshal Tedder to the

Air Ministry, Whitehall, 27 June 1942. Also see Ian Gooderson, “Heavyand Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in Tactical Close AirSupport During World War II?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.15, No.3,September 1992.

105 This assumption is based on the increasing number of fighter-bombersquadrons from late 1941 onward (see Richards, The Royal Air Force,1939–1945, 385–90) and their suitability to close air support operations(see Richards, I, 204, 228, and 260; PRO AIR 24/1080 Operations RecordBook Appendices Middle East Air Staff 1942, 2 January 1942).

106 AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum – Hurricane I – Bombingand Ground Strafing Tactics, 5th February, 1942, 1; PRO AIR 30/129 TheTactical Aspect of Army Air Support, 3.

107 AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum – Hurricane I, 5th February,1942, 2.

108 PRO AIR 23/1826 The Characteristics, Limitations and Tactical Employ-ment of the Fighter Bomber – Some Comparisons with the Light Bomber,Senior Operations Staff Officer, 13 April 1944.

109 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.9, February 1942, 1.110 Ibid.111 Ibid.112 AIR 23/1281, Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.20, Notes on the

Employment of Kittyhawk Bombers, 1942.113 Ibid.114 PRO AIR 24/1080 A.874, Operations Record Book Appendices Middle East

Air Staff 1942, Message to Air Ministry, Whitehall from HQ RAF ME, 17 January 1942.

115 PRO AIR 27/873, Operations Record Book No.112 Squadron, R.A.F., 26 January 1942.

116 Orange, Coningham, 82.117 PRO WO 169/6638 War Diary of No.2 AASC, 18 May 1942.

210 Notes

118 Barrie Pitt, Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942, (London: Jonathan Cape,1982), 31.

119 Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel papers, 194.120 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 111–12.121 Ibid., 110.122 Ibid.123 PRO AIR 23/1347 Secret Cypher Message from Air Marshal Tedder to the

Chief of the Air Staff, 21 June 1942.124 PRO CAB 106/1219 The enemy supply route round Bir Hacheim, 1942.125 PRO AIR 23/1347 Secret Cypher Message from Air Marshal Tedder to the

Chief of the Air Staff, 21 June 1942.126 Richards, The Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 199–200.127 PRO WO 169/6638, War Diary of No.2 AASC, June 3 1942.128 Ibid.129 Ibid.130 Ibid., 4 June 1942; Orange, Coningham, 213.131 PRO AIR 23/904 AHQ Western Desert Correspondence, Letter from Tedder

to Coningham, 1 June 1942.132 Orpen, War in the Desert. Vol.III of South African Forces in World War Two,

268.133 Pitt, Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942, 82.134 Ibid., 80.135 Ibid., 99.136 Ibid.137 Richards, Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 225.138 Macksey, Afrika Korps, 85.139 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 197; PRO AIR 20/7706 WarDiary of Panzer Army Africa, memorandum from Army battle HQ to OKWOperational Staff, 1 August 1942.

140 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 190.141 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary for Panzer Army Africa, memorandum from

Army Battle HQ to German General at HQ Italian Armed Forces, Rome, 2 August 1942, also a memorandum from Army Battle HQ to Army GeneralStaff Operations Department, 8 August 1942.

142 Francis de Guingand, Generals At War, (London: Hodder and Stoughton,1964), 182.

143 Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, (New York:Morrow, 1946), 137–8.

144 PRO WO 106/2270, Military Intelligence Service, War Office, Notes andLessons on Operations in the Middle East, January 30 1943, 14.

145 LHCMA, Papers of Major General McNeill, 1/1, Report on Period 30th August–18th October, 1942.

Chapter 4

1 CAB 106/703 Address to Officers of HQ Eighth Army by GeneralMontgomery On Taking Over Command of the Army, 13 August 1942.

Notes 211

2 Montgomery, The Montgomery Paper, 109.3 Ibid.4 PRO AIR 23/1299, Air Power in the Land Battle, 1943.5 Ibid.6 PRO AIR 23/1299, Air Power in the Land Battle, 1943; Craven and Cate,

The Army Air Forces in World War Two, I. 7 Stephen Brooks (ed.), Montgomery and the Eighth Army: A Selection from the

Diaries, Correspondence and other Papers of Field Marshal The Viscount Mont-gomery of Alamein, August 1942 to December 1943, (London: The BodleyHead, 1991), 149–50.

8 Ibid., 150.9 Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944, (London: Hamish

Hamilton, 1983), 12.10 PRO CAB 146/27 Evaluation of the British and American Commands and

Troops in North Africa, 1943.11 B.L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of

Alamein, (London: Collins, 1958), 137–8.12 Ibid., 138.13 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 112.14 Ibid., 126.15 PRO DEFE 3/770 MKA 2239, 13 August 1942, and MKA 2094 and 2095,

15 August 1942.16 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 142.17 Ibid., 157.18 WO 208/5077, GSI (s) to DDMI (I), 14/2/41; WO 208/5021, Mil-

itary ‘Y’ Middle East, GSI (s), 2/3/41; Clayton, The Enemy is Listening,151.

19 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 215.20 Clayton, The Enemy is Listening, 200.21 PRO AIR 40/2252 Mediterranean Air ‘Y’, 18 September 1942, 2.22 PRO AIR 23/6472 No.285 Reconnaissance Wing: Report on Organization

and Operational Methods from Formation Until the Conclusion of theEuropean War, 1945.

23 Ibid.24 PRO WO 277/34, Army Air Support and Photographic Interpretation,

1939–1945, 4.25 PRO WO 169/6638, War Diary of No.2 Army Air Support Control, 28 August

1942.26 Ibid., memorandum entitled Ground to Air Recognition Signals, 23 August

1942.27 PRO WO 169/6640 War Diary of No.5 Army Air Support Control, 21 July

1942.28 Ibid.29 LHCMA, Papers of Major General McNeill 1/1, Intelligence summary for

Period 30th August–18th October.30 Tedder, With Prejudice, 120.31 Ibid.32 W.H. Tantum and E.J. Hoffschmidt (eds), The Rise and Fall of the German

Air Force, (Greenwhich: WE Inc., 1969), 137–45.

212 Notes

33 PRO AIR 40/1817 Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder’s Despatchon Middle East Operations May 1941–January 1942, section entitled GermanNumbers in the Mediterranean, April 1943.

34 Ibid.35 PRO AIR 26/22, War Diary of No.7 (SA) Wing: SAAF, 1 September 1942.36 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.10, Tactics

Employed By Light Bomber Squadrons By Day Based Upon ExperiencesGained Up to the Conclusion of the Present Campaign (Phase I) In Libya,December 1941, 2 paragraph 5.

37 Orange, Coningham, 145.38 PRO WO/6640, War Diary of No.5 Army Air Support Control, 16 July

1942.39 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.21, The Oper-

ational Employment of the Hurricane IID, September 1942.40 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.21, The Oper-

ational Employment of the Hurricane IID, September 1942, also PRO WO169/6083 War Diary of No.2 AASC, Appendix A, 23 July 1942.

41 PRO AIR 23/1281 Middle East Tactical Memorandum No.21, The Oper-ational Employment of the Hurricane IID, September 1942.

42 Ibid.43 Ibid.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.46 Ibid.47 Ibid.48 PRO AIR 41/50, The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya,

the Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 279.49 Ibid.50 Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 295.51 PRO AIR 39/141 Suggestions for Direct Air Support By Night, circulated by

Air Tactics HQ RAF Middle East, February, 1942.52 Ibid.53 PRO AIR 20/7706 War Diary of Panzer Army Africa 28 July–23 October 1942

Memorandum on RAF Operations, 8 September; PRO AIR 41/50 Appendix10, Advanced Air Headquarters, Western Desert Operation InstructionNo.5, 21 October, 1942.

54 PRO AIR 20/7706 AIR 20/7706 War Diary of Panzer Army Africa 28 July–23 October 1942 Memorandum on RAF Operations from Panzer Army HQ Iato Panzer Army Africa, 8 September 1942.

55 Ibid.56 WO 169/6638 War Diary of No.2 AASC, 30 August 1942.57 WO 169/6638 War Diary of No.2 AASC, 30 August 1942.58 Ibid, also RAFM RAF Middle East Review No.1, 28.59 Pitt, Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942, 134.60 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary of Panzer Army Africa, Memorandum on the

Situation regarding personnel from Battle HQ, 25 August 1942.61 Lewin, Montgomery as Military Commander, 55.62 Playfair, III, The Mediterranean and Middle East, 278–9.63 Brian Horrocks, A Full Life, (London: Collins, 1960), 108.

Notes 213

64 Wolf Heckmann, Rommel’s War in Africa, (New York: Doubleday, 1981),311, also see Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War,Volume V., Strategic Deception, (London: HMSO, 1990).

65 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 154.66 AHB, Air Support, 81.67 Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Charles Portal, Folder 8, Letter

from Tedder to Portal, 30 June 1942, quoted in Orange, Coningham, 102.68 Ibid.69 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 151.70 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary of Panzer Army Africa, Assessment of the

Situation and the State of Panzer Army Africa on 15 August, 1942.71 Ibid.72 Ibid.73 Barrie Pitt, Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942, 224.74 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary of Panzer Army Africa, memorandum to OKW

Operations Staff, OKH Operations Department, and German General atHQ Italian Armed Forces, Rome, 29 August, 1942.

75 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 157; PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diaryof Panzer Army Africa, Daily Report from Panzer Army Africa, 31 August1942.

76 David Hunt, A Don At War, 125.77 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary of Panzer Army Africa, memorandum from

Army Battle HQ to Panzer Army Africa Ia, 2 September, 1942.78 Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, 160.79 PRO AIR 20/7706, War Diary for Panzer Army Africa, memorandum to

Fliegerfuehrer Africa, 2 September 1942.80 Ibid.81 Ibid., Report on the Bombing Attack on the unit carried out during the

Night of 31 August/1 September, 1942, 3 Sept. 1942.82 Ibid.83 Ibid; PRO WO 169/6638, War Diary of No.2 AASC, 1 September 1942.84 PRO WO 169/6638, War Diary of No.2 AASC, 1 September 1942.85 Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 283.86 Ibid.87 Ibid., 286.88 Ibid.89 B.L. Montgomery, 135; PRO WO 106/2254, Order Issued by G.O.C.-in-

C. Eighth Army for Final Break Through, 30 October 1942, 2.90 Duncan Anderson, World At War, (Singapore: Library Books Ltd., 1991),

248.91 Pitt, Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942, 248.92 Ibid.93 PRO WO 169/3802 GHQ, MEF Intelligence Summary No.604, 13 October

1942 to 14 October 1942.94 Liddell Hart, (ed.), 290.95 Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II, 344.96 Ibid., 344.97 Ibid.98 Ibid.

214 Notes

99 Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs 1940–1945,John North (ed.), (London: Cassell, 1962), 53.

100 PRO AIR 20/7706 21st Panzer Division Report on the Battle of Alameinand the Retreat to Marsa El Brega, Appendix to the Report for the Period23 October–20 November, 1942.

101 Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 298, also 305.102 PRO AIR 20/7706 15th Panzer Division Report on the Battle of Alamein

and the Retreat to Marsa El Brega, 2 November 1942.103 PRO AIR 20/7706, 21st Panzer Division Report on the Battle of Alamein

and the Retreat to Marsa El Brega.104 PRO DEFE 3/778 QT3024 8/10/42; Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers,

307.105 PRO AIR 41/50, The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya,

the Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 320.106 Ibid.107 Ibid., 280.108 LHCMA, Papers of Major General McNeill 1/1, Period 19 October to

3 November 1942.109 PRO Air 41/50, RAF Bomb Weights Dropped by Desert Air Force,

3 November 1942.110 PRO WO 208/4202 First summary of information gained during the inter-

rogation of General Der Panzertruppe von Thoma, 2.111 Ibid.112 PRO WO 208/4193 Interrogation of Italian Prisoners of War, I/S R.X. 126,

1942.113 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya,

the Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 20.

Chapter 5

1 PRO WO 169/647 Operation ‘Grapeshot’, 2 November 1942.2 Ronald Walker, Alam Halfa and Alamein, Vol.14 of War History Branch, Official

History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45, (Wellington: His-torical Publications Branch, 1967), 423; PRO DEFE 3/783 QT 5794 and 5797for 10 November 1942.

3 PRO DEFE 3/783 QT 5794 and 5797 for 10 November 1942. 4 PRO AIR 23/1776 Advanced Air Headquarters Western Desert Operation

‘Buster’, 11 October 1942.5 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, the

Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 361.6 Orange, Coningham, 114.7 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, the

Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 365.8 Ibid. 9 PRO CAB 106/386 Appendix A to “Lessons from Operations for INT to take

to U.K”. Extracts of report by GSO I Eighth Army, 1943.10 Ibid., AHB, Air Support, 75.11 RAFM Papers of Air Marshal Robb, AC 71/9/109, Air Power in the Land

Battle – A Note by the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry 1943, 3.

Notes 215

12 IWM Bernard Montgomery Collection BLM 29/1 The Battle of Egypt 1942,The Pursuit – 5 November–25 November, 1942.

13 AHB, Close Air Support, 75.14 RAFM Papers of Air Marshal Robb, AC 71/9/109, Air Power in the

Land Battle – A Note by the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry June 1943, 4.

15 Ibid., 5.16 PRO AIR 23/1209 Intelligence Organization – Mobile Fighter Group, 30 May

1943, 3.17 Ibid., 1.18 Ibid., 1–3.19 PRO AIR 23/1209 Organization and Application of Air Intelligence in a

Tactical Air Force, 13.20 Ibid., 15.21 Ibid., 16.22 Ronald Walker, Alam Halfa and Alamein, Vol.14 of War History Branch, Official

History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45, (Wellington: His-torical Publications Branch, 1967), 423; PRO DEFE 3/783 QT 5794 and 5797for 10 November 1942.

23 Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 64; PRO WO 214/18 AlexanderPapers, letter from Montgomery to Alexander, 18 November 1942.

24 Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 65.25 PRO WO 201/2155 ‘Y’ Service Report No.354, 2 November 1942.26 PRO DEFE 3/782 QT 5032, 2 November 1942, also Hinsley, British Intelligence

in the Second World War, II, 447–8.27 PRO WO 208/3248 Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean, Part 1.28 Ibid.29 Australian War Memorial (AWM) 54[423/4/24] Outline of Information Given

by Prisoners 5 May 1942.30 PRO WO 208/4199 Extracts from German and Italian PW Interrogation

Reports, Extract 9, undated.31 WO 208/4180 CSDIC Report on General interrogation of German Military,

Naval and Air Force Prisoners of War during February 1943, 2.32 Ibid., 3.33 PRO WO 208/3248 Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean, Part 1, Appendix III Notes

on the Use of Air Photos and Photo Intelligence Material in the DetailedInterrogation of Prisoners of War.

34 PRO CAB 146/27 Evaluation of the British and American Commands andTroops in North Africa, Appreciation by Freemde Heere West, 18 May 1943.

35 Ibid.36 Hans-Otto Behrendt, Rommel’s Intelligence in the Desert Campaign, (London:

William Kimber, 1985), chapter 5, argues that although some sources ofintelligence had dried up, the Panzer Army still conducted limited recon-naissance, and had some success against British signals traffic. They wereable to determine British orders of battle with considerable accuracy, butMontgomery’s hesitancy baffled the Axis commander.

37 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, theWestern Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 365.

38 Ibid., 467.

216 Notes

39 PRO AIR 26/402 Operations Record Book No.285 Wing, R.A.F. M.E. November1942–January 1943.

40 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, theWestern Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 467.

41 PRO WO 208/4197 German and Italian Prisoner of War Interrogationreports.

42 Ibid.43 PRO AIR 26/402 Operations Record Book No.285 Wing, R.A.F. M.E. November

1942–January 1943.44 PRO AIR 24/1662 Operations Record Book of Air Headquarters Western

Desert, Administrative Instruction No.132, 23 February 1943.45 RAFM RAF Middle East Review No.2, January to March 1943, RAF HQ Middle

East, 90.46 PRO WO 201/572 Plan for the Agheila Battle, 10 December 1942.47 Ibid.48 Nigel Hamilton, The Making of a General, 1887–1942, (London: Hamish Hamil-

ton, 1981), 732.49 Stephen Hart in his article “Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation

and ‘Colossal Cracks’: 21st Army Group’s Operational Technique in North-West Europe, 1944–45”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.19, No.4, 1996, arguesthat conservation of morale and avoiding unnecessary casualties forced Mont-gomery to build up his forces to a point where he could overwhelm his oppo-nent. This argument is weakened by the intelligence in Montgomery’s handsabout the dismal state of the Panzer Army, and the overwhelming Britishmoral and material advantage. If Montgomery’s style was to act to preservehis army’s morale only if he was ensured of material advantage, certainly heshould have acted more firmly to destroy the remnants of the Panzer Army.Given such excellent intelligence, the best way to prevent casualties andensure continued morale was to crush his exhausted and poorly suppliedenemy.

50 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, theWestern Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 399.

51 JRUML Papers of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Item 304, Note bythe Prime Minister to the Chief of Staff Committee, 29 August 1941.

52 Ibid., 368 Air Officer Commander-in-Chief’s despatch of 5 November 1942.53 Orange, Coningham, 117.54 Ibid.55 Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 321.56 PRO AIR 25/816 Operation Record Book for 205 Group, 4/5 November 1942.57 Ibid., 5/6 November 1942; PRO AIR 27/631 Operational Record Book of

No.73 Squadron, 5/6 November 1942.58 Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 339.59 See Map 5.2, black circle.60 PRO AIR 27/821 Operations Record Book of 104 Squadron RAF, 10 November

1942.61 PRO AIR 25/816 205 Group Operational Summary, 7 November 1942.62 Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 345.63 PRO AIR 27/95 Operations Record Book of No.6 Squadron RAF November

1942.

Notes 217

218 Notes

64 PRO AIR 20/7706 War Diary of 15th Panzer Division, 6 November 1942.65 Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War Two, 344.66 IWM Bernard Montgomery Papers (BLM) 29/1 The Pursuit – 5 Nov. to

25 Nov., 3; PRO DEFE 3/787 QT 7772, QT 7789, and QT 7903, 5 December1942.

67 PRO AIR 20/7701 VII/66 Air Operations by the 5th Squadra Aerea (Italian AirForce Command in Africa) Between October 20, 1942 and January 31, 1943translated from the official war diaries.

68 Ibid.; IWM, Montgomery Papers 29/1, The Battle of Egypt, 1942; LC CarlSpaatz Papers I: 12 Special Report: The Air Situation in the MediterraneanTheatre, 7 January 1943.

69 PRO WO 201/572, Plan for the Agheila Battle. This plan included the allot-ment of tentacles to the forward troops, and the assignment of ground/airrecognition signals.

70 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 177.71 PRO DEFE 3/789 QT 8601, 15 December 1942.72 IWM Montgomery Collection BLM 29/1 The Pursuit – 5 Nov. to 25 Nov, 3.73 Major William George Stevens, Bardia to Enfidaville, Vol.15 of War History

Branch, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45,(Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1962), 78.

74 Nigel Hamilton, The Making of a General, 1887–1942, 20.75 Ibid.76 PRO CAB 106/572 Account of Operations of Eighth Army Formations under

Comd First Army in the Final Phase of the North African Campaign, Appen-dix 1, Axis Losses in the African Campaigns.

Chapter 6

1 LHCMA, Papers of Major-General McNeill 1/2 A2, 1.2 David R. Mets, “A Glider in the Propwash of the Royal Air Force?”, Daniel

Mortensen (ed.), Airpower and Ground Armies, (Maxwell AFB Alabama: AirUniversity Press, 1998), 48.

3 H.H. Arnold, Global Mission, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 379;Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern For Joint Operations: World War II CloseAir Support North Africa, (Washington D.C., Office of Air Force History,1989).

4 Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power inWorld War II, 156–7.

5 David Ian Hall, “The Birth of the Tactical Air Force: British Theory andPractice of Air Support in the West, 1939–1943”, D.Phil. thesis from theUniversity of Oxford, 1996, Chapter 9, 28–9.

6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 27,also Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, Volume II, 1940–1945, (Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 79.

7 George C. Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol.3, ed. Larry I. Bland, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991), 158.

8 J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol.3, Part II, (London: Her Majesty’s Station-ery Office, 1964), 675.

9 Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, (Boston: Houghton, 1950), 646.10 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,

1941–1942, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953), 196.11 Ibid., 104.12 Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol.3, 271.13 Ibid., 277.14 Arnold, 321; LC, Arnold Papers, Letter from Arnold to the U.S. Army Chief

of Staff, 19 August, 1942.15 Blumenson, The Patton Papers, II, 81–2.16 PRO CAB 106/1220 The Structure of A.F.H.Q., undated.17 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 75.18 NARA RG 331 AFHQ Box 73 Reel 24-C, Signal Operation Instruction

United States – British Security and Priority Classification, 8 October 1942.19 PRO AIR 47/13 Operation ‘Torch’ (Plan ‘B’) Air Appreciation by Air Marshal

Sir William L. Welsh, 5 September 1942.20 PRO AIR 20/7703 Memorandum to Army General Staff, Operations

Division, from OKW Operations Staff, 17 October 1942.21 J.C. Masterman, The Double Cross System in the War of 1939–1945, (New

Haven: 1972), pp.109–10, also see Denis Smyth, “Screening ‘Torch’: AlliedCounterintelligence and the Spanish Threat to the Secrecy of the AlliedInvasion of North Africa in November 1942”, Intelligence and NationalSecurity, Vol.4, No.2, (1989), and John C. Beam, “The Intelligence Back-ground to Operation Torch”, Parameters: The Journal of the U.S. Army WarCollege, Vol.XIII, No.4, December 1983.

22 RAFM, Papers of Air Marshal Robb AC 71/9/3, Principles of War andStrategy by Air Vice-Marshal W. Brook.

23 AHB, Air Support, 82.24 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 101.25 George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, Vol.II,

Part 1 of The United States Army in World War II, (Washington D.C., Depart-ment of the Army, 1957), 40; LHCMA Papers of Major General F. DavidsonFile No.50 Visit by DMI Section VI, undated.

26 Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, 42–3.27 Ibid., 31; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 91.28 NARA RG 331 Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters,

World War II, Entry 49A Box 8, AFHQ, General Staff, G-3 Section Oper-ations Subsection, Center Task Force Plan Annex 5 Paratroop Plan and AirSupport Plan, AFHQ, General Staff, G-3 Section Operations Subsection,September 1942.

29 Hallion, Strike From the Sky, 164; Col. W.H. Hardy, “The Air SupportCommand”, Military Review, Vol.XXIII, No.4, July 1943.

30 David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43”, 157.31 NARA RG 331 Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters,

World War II Entry 49A Box 6, Air Force Annex to Administrative Order#1, 4 October 1942.

32 Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, 52.33 PRO AIR 23/6560 Army Cooperation Plan, Operation ‘Torch’, 5 October

1942; The initial landings were to be undertaken by American forces, tobe supplemented by British forces if the landings were successful. The

Notes 219

reason for the use of American forces was to limit the resistance of theFrench defenders. If the landings were British in character, it was felt theresistance would have been much greater due to the attack on the Frenchfleet in Mers el Kebir by British forces in 1940, and the subsequent Britishsupport of de Gaulle. The U.S., by contrast, maintained diplomatic contactwith the Vichy government until the landings.

34 PRO AIR 23/6575 Plans – Op ‘Torch’ (EAC and AFHQ) Sept/Oct 1942 ArmyCooperation Plan Operation ‘Torch’.

35 Ibid.36 PRO AIR 40/2358 Axis Air Operations North Africa and Mediterranean,

The Last Phase in North Africa 1st January 1943–12th May 1943; NARA RG331 Box 196 Reel 51-F AFHQ Comparative Air Force Strength MediterraneanArea, 26 January 1943.

37 Ibid.38 This did not take place as scheduled, and the U.S. forces fighting in Tunisia

were most often under the operational control of II U.S. Corps.39 Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, 37.40 Hall, ‘The Birth of the Tactical Air Force: British Theory and Practice of Air

Support in the West, 1939–1943’, chapter 8, 6.41 Hall, “The Birth of the Tactical Air Force: British Theory and Practice of

Air Support in the West, 1939–1943”, chapter 8, 12; PRO CAB 80/37 COS(42) 351 Continental Operations 1943: Operational Organization andSystem of Command of the RAF, 21 July 1942.

42 Hall, ‘The Birth of the Tactical Air Force: British Theory and Practice of AirSupport in the West, 1939–1943’, chapter 8, 8.

43 PRO PREM 3/8 Organization of Air Support for the Army in ContinentalOperations, 14 November 1942.

44 PRO AIR 47/13 Operation ‘Torch’ (Plan ‘B’) Air Appreciation by Air MarshalSir William L. Welsh, 5 September 1942, 5.

45 Ibid.46 Ibid.47 LC Papers of Carl Spaatz, I: Box 12, Memorandum on the Organization of

American Air Forces by Brigadier General L.S. Kuter, 12 May 1943.48 LC, Papers of Carl Spaatz, I: Box 10, Memorandum by Spaatz on 17 January

1943.49 Orange, Coningham, 130. Robb was an old friend of Coningham.50 JRUML Papers of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Item 304 Note

by the Prime Minister to the Chief of Staff Committee, 29 August, 1941.

51 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943.In December 1942, conflicting tasks allotted to Twelfth Air Force caused theformation of composite commands such as XII Bomber Command and XIIAir Support Command; Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in theWest, 294.

52 Ibid., 36.53 Ibid.54 RAFM Papers of Air Marshal Robb, AC 71/9/109, Talk by Air Vice

Marshal (AVM) Sir A. Coningham to British and American Senior Officers, 16 February 1943.

220 Notes

55 PRO AIR 23/6561 AFHQ Air Staff Memorandum for Commander-in-Chief,Allied Forces entitled Problems Connected with the Development ofAllied Air Power in the North African Theatre, 30 November 1942.

56 PRO AIR 24/469 Eastern Air Command Operational Summaries, December1942.

57 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943,76.

58 Ibid.; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 739–40.59 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943,

76.60 Ibid.61 Ibid.62 PRO AIR 25/1040 Operational Record Book of 242 Group RAF, Organ-

izational Memorandum No.1, 6 December 1942.63 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943,

77.64 Ibid., 79.65 Ibid.66 Ibid., 80.67 Ibid.68 Cross, Straight and Level, 257.69 AIR 27/244 Operations Record Book of No.18 Squadron RAF, 4 December

1942.70 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 739.71 Ibid., 739–40.72 PRO DEFE 3/783 QT 5720, 9 November 1942.73 Ibid., QT 5896, 10 November 1942.74 NARA RG 331 Mediterranean Allied Air Force Directorate of Operations and

Intelligence, E258 Box 13, Anglo-American ‘Y’ Liaison, undated; NARA RG331 Mediterranean Allied Air Force Directorate of Operations and Intelli-gence, Box 74 Reel 33-C Notes and Maxims on the ‘Y’ Service in the Mediter-ranean Intelligence Aspects.

75 PRO WO 204/938 AFHQ G-2 Section Report of 17 March 1943 entitledIntelligence Lessons from North Africa, 10.

76 PRO WO 204/938 Allied Force Headquarters A/COS G-2 report, 17 March1943.

77 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 741.78 NARA RG 331 Entry 258 Box 6, Mediterranean Allied Air Force Director of

Operations and Intelligence, Signals Intelligence Sub-section, Mediterran-ean Air ‘Y’, 4; PRO AIR 40/2252 Mediterranean Air ‘Y’, 18 September 1943,4; Clayton, The Enemy is Listening, 226.

79 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 744.80 Ibid.81 Ibid.82 Lieutenant Colonel Chandler and Colonel R.W. Robb, Front-Line Intelligence,

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 145.83 RG 331 Box 55 Allied Force Headquarters APO 512, 25 May 1943.84 Ibid.85 Ibid.

Notes 221

86 PRO AIR 23/7434 Report on Air Operations by 242 Group RAF in Supportof 1st Army, 1943.

87 PRO AIR 23/6571 EAC Intelligence Summaries, No.4 PRU, 8/11/42–31/12/42.

88 NARA RG 331 Entry 270 Box 2 Photographic Reconnaissance, Chapter 1The Algiers Period. The USAAF’s 3rd Photo Group had no qualified photo-graphic interpreters as late as the middle of December 1942.

89 Ibid.90 Ibid.91 Ibid.92 AIR 23/7434 Report on Air Operations by 242 Group RAF in Support of

1st Army, January 1943.93 PRO AIR 27/1395 Operations Record Book 225 Squadron, December 24

1942.94 Ibid.95 Ibid.96 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 190.97 LC Papers of Carl Spaatz, I: Box 12, Memorandum on the Organization of

American Air Forces by Brigadier General L.S. Kuter, 12 May 1943.98 PRO AIR 27/2120 Operations Record Book 614 Squadron RAF 5 December

1942.99 PRO AIR 27/181 Operations Record Book, 13 Squadron RAF January 1943.

100 PRO CAB 146/27 Evaluation of the British and American Commands andTroops in North Africa, Appreciation by Freemde Heere West, 18 May1943.

101 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943,121.

102 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War Two, Vol.II, 140, alsoLC Spaatz Papers I: 68 Order Establishing the Allied Air SupportCommand 23 January 1943.

103 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943,121; LC Spaatz Papers I: Box 68, HQ AAF January 1943.

104 NARA RG 331 Entry 251 Box 1, Mediterranean Allied Air Force, Director of Operations and Intelligence, Air Staff Registry, Report on Operations Conducted by XII Air Support Command USAAF Tunisia 13 January 1943–9 April 1943, 2.

105 Ibid.106 Ibid., 3.107 Ibid., 4.

Chapter 7

1 PRO CAB 106/670 Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatch North African Campaign1942–1943, 37.

2 Ibid.3 PRO AIR 23/1710 Report on Operations of the NWATAF in the Tunisian

Campaign 18 February–12 May 1943.4 PRO CAB 106/670 Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatch North African Campaign

1942–1943, 37.

222 Notes

5 LC Carl Spaatz Papers I: 12 Memorandum to the Air Commander-in-Chef,Allied Air Forces entitled Organizational Changes, 1 February 1943.

6 Blumenson, The Patton Papers, II, 206, also see Carlo D’Este, A Genius for War:A Life of General George S. Patton, (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 480–3.

7 Tedder, With Prejudice, 410–11.8 NARA RG 377 Entry 55 Box 965 “What the Soldier Thinks”, No.2, August

1943.9 Maintenance requirements and airfield construction were high on the pri-

ority list of the Allied forces, but even until March 1943, pilot and groundcrew training needed to be given more attention. LC Papers of GeneralCarl Spaatz I: 12 General Operational Directive from Air Marshal Coning-ham 2 March 1943, indicates the training standard for pilots and groundcrews needed improvement.

10 PRO CAB 106/670 Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatch North African Campaign1942–1943, 38.

11 Orange, Coningham, 140.12 Ibid.13 PRO AIR 23/1710 Headquarters Northwest African Tactical Air Force Final

Phase of Tunisian Operations, February to May 1943, 37.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 Ibid.18 Ibid.19 NARA RG 331 Entry 272 Box 29 Memorandum to NATAF from HQ NWAAF,

Agreed Rules US/UK, 19 March 1943.20 PRO CAB 106/572 Account of Operations of Eighth Army Formations under

Command First Army in the Final Phase of the North African Campaign,Part 1, General Notes, 1943.

21 PRO CAB 106/386 Eighth Army Report on Operations, 1943.22 Ibid.23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 NARA RG 331 Entry 253 Mediterranean Allied Air Force (MAAF) Directorate

of Operations and Intelligence, Operations Section, Army-Air Cooperation,Appendix ‘D’, 13 March 1943.

27 Ibid., Appendix ‘E’.28 NARA RG 331 Records of Allied Force Headquarters Box 72 Reel 6-C Allied

Force Headquarters Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Memorandumentitled Intelligence Procedure to B.G.S.I., 18 Army Group, 10 February 1943.

29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 Brooks, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 383; Carrington, “Army/Air

Cooperation, 1939–1943”, 38.32 PRO WO 175/16 HQ 18 Army Group G (Ops) Memorandum on the Visit

to Adv HQ First Army and HQ ‘E’ Squadron GHQ Liaison Regt to discusspossibilities of amalgamation of ‘J’ and Phantom Units, 27 February 1943.

33 Ibid.

Notes 223

34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 PRO WO 175/16 Discussion of proposed amalgamation of ‘J’ and Phantom

Units, Appendix ‘A’, 25 February 1943.37 Ibid.38 Ibid.39 Ibid., Orange, Coningham, 145.40 NARA RG 331 Entry 253 MAAF Directorate of Operations and Intelligence,

Operations Section, Army-Air Cooperation, Appendix ‘E’, 13 March 1943.41 Ibid.42 Ibid.43 NARA RG 407 The Adjutant General’s Office WWII Operations 1940–48

Special File, Box 24593, Air Cooperation Operations Memorandum, 15 Feb-ruary 1945.

44 Anderson did not receive Ultra directly until April 1943. NARA RG 331Entry 253 Box 5, MAAF Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, Oper-ations Section, Army-Air Cooperation, 12 March 1943, Appendix ‘B’.

45 NARA RG 331 Entry 253 Box 5, Recognition Signals, 2 March 1943.46 NARA RG 331 Entry 253 Box 5 MAAF Directorate of Operations and

Intelligence, Operations Section, Army-Air Cooperation, 31 March 1943.47 Ibid.48 PRO CAB 106/386 Eighth Army Report on Operations, 1943.49 Clayton, The Enemy is Listening, 265–6.50 NARA RG 331 Entry 258 Box 7 MAAF Director of Operations and Intel-

ligence, Intelligence Section, Signals Intelligence Subsection, Memorandumentitled Mediterranean ‘Y’ Cover, from Chief Signals Officer, MediterraneanAir Command to the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean AirCommand, 6th May 1943.

51 Clayton, The Enemy is Listening, 353–5.52 NARA RG 331 Entry 258 Box 7 MAAF Director of Operations and Intel-

ligence, Intelligence Section, Signals Intelligence Subsection, Memorandumentitled Mediterranean ‘Y’ Cover, from Chief Signals Officer, MediterraneanAir Command to the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean AirCommand, 6th May 1943.

53 Ibid. Both of these officers were from the RAF.54 PRO AIR 23/1710 Memorandum entitled Wireless Intelligence circulated

by the Chief Intelligence Officer, NATAF, 13 May 1943.55 Ibid.56 I.S.O. Playfair, The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, Volume IV, The

Mediterranean and Middle East, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,1960, 358.

57 NARA RG 331 Records of Allied Force Headquarters, Box 74 Reel 38-C, RAF(Middle East) Wireless Intelligence Service, Routes of German TransportAircraft, Report No.4 of 5 April 1943.

58 Howe, United States Army in World War II, II Part I, 601.59 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 745.60 PRO WO 208/3478 CSDIC and PWIS’s – General Policy, undated.61 PRO WO 208/3248 Notes on CSDIC Mediterranean, undated, Part 1, 3;

PRO WO 208/3478 CSDIC and PWIS’s – General Policy, undated. Teams of

224 Notes

between two and six interrogators were allocated per Corps, with a furthereight or ten at Army Headquarters to be sent forward as needed.

62 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 32.63 WO 208/4197 German and Italian Prisoner of War Interrogation reports

M159 General Thoma – General der Panzertruppe – Captured MIDDLE EAST,4 November 42.

64 PRO CAB 106/1220 The Structure of A.F.H.Q., undated; NARA RG 331Records of Allied Force Headquarters Box 72 Reel 6-C Allied Force Head-quarters, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Memorandum on IntelligenceProcedures, 10 February 1943, WO 208/4197. The volume of interrogationreports increased substantially after February 1943.

65 NARA RG 165 Entry 79 Box 640, CSDIC (AFHQ) Report A.22. PreliminaryReview of Documents Captured in Tunisia, 31 May 1943.

66 Cross, Straight and Level, 243, also 245. When Cross discovered that the US armed forces had no liaison section similar to the RAF’s system inwhich the air force learned what the army wanted, and taught what waspossible, he had 225 Squadron RAF respond to reconnaissance requestsfrom II Corps. When Bradley saw the difference between American andBritish reconnaissance reports, he asked if 225 Squadron could handle allrequests.

67 PRO AIR 23/7434 Report on Air Operations by 242 Group RAF in supportof 1st Army, Tunisia 1943.

68 Ibid.69 PRO AIR 20/6310 Report by Air Marshal Sir T. Leigh-Mallory on his visit to

North Africa, March/April 1943.70 PRO AIR 23/7434 Report on Air Operations by 242 Group RAF in support

of 1st Army, Tunisia 1943.71 LC Papers of Carl Spaatz I: 12 Memorandum from Major General McCreery

CGS to NWATAF, 12 March 1943.72 PRO AIR 41/7 Photographic Reconnaissance, Vol.II 62–5; NARA RG 331

Entry 250 Box 4 MAAF Director of Operations and Intelligence, APO 65014 April 1943; NARA RG 331 Entry 250 Box 4, MAAF Director of Operationsand Intelligence, Air Plans Section, Northwest African Photographic Recon-naissance Wing, 27 February 1943.

73 Ibid.74 Ibid.75 NARA RG 331 Entry 270 Box 2, Mediterranean Allied Photographic Intel-

ligence Wing, 1943.76 Ibid.77 NARA RG 331 Entry 270 Box 2 Photographic Reconnaissance Chapter 1,

The Algiers Period; PRO AIR 23/6570 Message for Spaatz from Bottomleyat the Air Ministry in Whitehall, 8 February 1943.

78 Ibid.79 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II ,II, 169.80 NARA RG 331 Entry 251 Box 1 Mediterranean Allied Air Force Director of

Operations and Intelligence, Air Staff Registry, XII Air Support CommandOperations in Tunisia, 23 June 1943.

81 PRO AIR 23/7434 Report on Air Operations by 242 Group RAF in Supportof 1st Army, Tunisia 1943.

Notes 225

82 RG 18 Entry 7, World War II Combat Operations Reports 1942–46, Box 2280 52nd Fighter Group Reports show that when following thesestandard procedures, the effect of enemy flak was lessened.

83 Ibid.84 Ibid.85 NARA RG 331 E251 MAAF Directorate of Operations and Intelligence,

Boxes 1 and 2 contain the bulk of these memoranda.86 PRO CAB 146/25 The Axis in Tunisia, February 1943.87 Ibid.88 Ibid.89 Ibid., Howe, United States Army in World War II, II Part I, 502.90 Liddell Hart ed., The Rommel Papers, 406; PRO CAB 146/25 The Axis

in Tunisia, February 1943. Rommel’s assertion that 5 Panzer Army had 19 Tigers is correct. Twenty Tigers were shipped to Tunisia in November,with one lost on 31 January to enemy action. Whether von Arnim refusedto send them is debatable, as some were under repair following action.However, at least thirteen were ready for action on 20 February, and werenot sent to help Rommel.

91 PRO CAB 146/27 Evaluation of the British and American Commands andTroops in North Africa, Appreciation by Freemde Heere West, 18 May1943; PRO CAB 146/25 The Axis in Tunisia, February 1943.

92 PRO WO 214/11 Most Secret Cipher Message to War Office from GeneralAlexander, 19 February 1943.

93 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 139.94 PRO CAB 146/25 The Axis in Tunisia, February 1943. After Rommel’s

Medenine offensive, which began on 6 March, Axis troops in southernTunisia were renamed 1st Italian Army under General Meese, along withvon Arnim’s 5th Panzer Army in the north. Both formations were part ofPanzer Army Group Africa.

95 Ibid.96 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 201.97 Orange, Coningham, 137–8.98 PRO AIR 24/1041 Operations Record book of 242 Group RAF, 16/17 February

1943.99 LHCMA, Papers of Lieutenant General Allfrey 3/9 Letter from Coningham

to Lt. Gen. Anderson, 2 March 1943.100 LC Papers of Carl Spaatz I: Box 10, Memorandum by Spaatz, 23 February

1943.101 Ibid., 2: Box 270 Air Power in Peace and War, North Africa, undated.102 PRO AIR 24/1041 Operations Record book of 242 Group RAF, 18/19 February

1943.103 Ibid., 23 February 1943.104 Ibid.105 Orange, Coningham, 142.106 Ibid.107 PRO DEFE 3/801 VM 4907; PRO DEFE 3/802 VM 5028, VM 5050, VM 5068,

VM 5095, VM 5111, VM 5182, VM 5197, VM 5207, VM 5244, VM 5262,VM 5273; PRO DEFE 3/803 VM 5722, 6 March 1943.

108 Hugh Skillen, Spies of the Airways, 249.

226 Notes

109 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 379; CAB 146/26 The Axis inTunisia, The Battle of Medenine, March 1943. The Axis claimed forty-onetanks lost.

110 CAB 146/26 The Axis in Tunisia, The Battle of Medenine, March 1943, 81.111 Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers, 421. Rommel believed Eisenhower

should have thrown his weight into southwest Tunisia in order to divide theFirst Italian from the Fifth Panzer Army, following this up by destroying theFirst Army in conjunction with Montgomery. Then he should have switchedhis effort to Pont du Fahs or Medjez el Bab in order to destroy Fifth Army.

112 General Omar N. Bradley, A General’s Life: An Autobiography of General ofthe Army Omar N. Bradley, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 140–2. Thelack of confidence in the American ground forces by Bradley and Eisenhowerwas replaced with satisfaction following the Kasserine battles. See JosephHobbs, Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall, (London:Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 75–6.

113 PRO CAB 106/468 Account of the Attack of 50th (N) Division on the MarethLine, March 1943, sheet 5, also LHCMA Papers of Brig. Gen. Sydney Divers2/5, Account of “Left Hook” at Mareth.

114 PRO CAB 106/468 Account of the Attack of 50th (N) Division on theMareth Line, March 1943, sheet 5.

115 IWM Montgomery Papers, BLM 31/4 Operation ‘Pugilist’ General Plan ofEighth Army.

116 CAB 106/468 Account of the Attack of 50th (N) Division on the MarethLine, March 1943, sheet 4.

117 Orange, Coningham, 143, also Cross, Straight and Level, 241.118 PRO WO 214/11 Most Secret Cipher Message for Prime Minister copy to

CIGS from General Alexander 8 March 1943; IWM Montgomery Papers,BLM 31/4 Operation ‘Pugilist’ General Plan of Eighth Army; LHCMA, Papersof Divers 2/5, Account of the “Left Hook” at Mareth.

119 PRO WO 214/11 Most Secret Cipher Message for PM and CIGS fromGeneral Alexander 29 March 1943.

120 PRO AIR 23/1708 Comment by AOC Tactical Air Force – The Eighth ArmyBreak-Through at El Hamma, 26th March 1943.

121 Ibid; Orange, Coningham, 144.122 NARA RG 331 Entry 272 Box 34 Operation ‘Pugilist’ General Plan of

Eighth Army, 26 February 1943.123 PRO CAB 106/531 MT Instructional Circular No.13, 28 April 1943, 3.124 Ibid; Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory, (London: Hodder and Stough-

ton, 1947), 256.125 PRO CAB 106/531 MT Instructional Circular No.13, 28 April 1943, 4.126 PRO AIR 23/1818 Report on Forward Bomber Control, May 1943.127 Ibid.128 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya,

the Western Desert and Tunisia, 400.129 PRO CAB 106/531 MT Instructional Circular No.13, 28 April 1943, 4.130 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya,

the Western Desert and Tunisia, July 1942–May 1943, 502.131 PRO AIR 23/1710 Report on Operations of the NWATAF in the Tunisian

Campaign 18 February–12 May 1943.

Notes 227

132 PRO CAB 106/531 MT Instructional Circular No.13, 28 April 1943, 3.133 Richards, The Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 266.134 PRO AIR 23/1708 Comment by AOC Tactical Air Force – Operations

N. Africa, Report of the air action which contributed to the break-throughof the Eighth Army at El Hamma, April 1943.

135 Ibid.136 NARA RG 331 Entry 272 Box 34 Report on Operations in Tunisia, Phase II

from 15th March to 6th April 1943; Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers,392. Rommel felt it was not possible for his mobile forces to hold fronts atEl Hamma and Gafsa, and or the Mareth Line. He also knew the positioncould be outflanked by experienced British desert troops.

137 PRO AIR 23/1710 Report on the Operations of the NWTAF in the TunisiaCampaign 18 February–12 May 1943.

138 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943,179.

139 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya,the Western Desert and Tunisia, July 1942–May 1943, 516; NARA RG 165P File Box 5 HQ NWAAF A-2 Section, Weekly Intelligence Summary No.21from 3 April to 9 April. This intelligence summary is the first to report aserious decline in Axis morale.

140 Orange, Coningham, 152.141 Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II, 343.142 PRO CAB 146/27 The Axis in Tunisia. The End in Africa April–May 1943,

Appendix 30, 15. 143 PRO AIR 41/33 The North African Campaign November 1942–May 1943,

185. Although Ultra had provided little information on the German army,since it was able to rely on landline communication in the final stages ofthe campaign, it did aid in the location of re-supply efforts, see Bennett,Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 215.

144 Ibid.145 Ibid., 185–6.146 Alfred Goldberg (ed.), A History of the United States Air Force 1907–1957,

(New York: D. van Nostrand Company Ltd., 1957), 60.147 Tedder, With Prejudice, 412.148 WO 208/4199 Extracts from German and Italian PW Interrogation Reports,

extract 8, undated.149 Ibid.150 Tedder, With Prejudice, 414.151 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, II, 611–14.152 Tedder, With Prejudice, 415.153 NARA RG 331 Records of Allied Force Headquarters Box 72 Reel 6-C 18

Army Group, Operation Instruction No.13, 3 May 1943; AHB, Air Support,90.

154 LHCMA, Papers of Major-General McNeill 1/2 A2 10–11.155 CAB 106/572 Account of Operations of Eighth Army Formations under

Command First Army in the Final Phase of the North African Campaign,Appendix I, Axis Losses in the African Campaigns.

156 PRO WO 214/11 Most Secret Cipher Message to Prime Minister fromAlexander, 13 May 1943.

228 Notes

Conclusions

1 Hallion, Strike From the Sky, 174.2 Orange, Coningham, 137.3 Ibid., 150.4 Richards, The Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, II, 161.5 David Mets, “A Glider in the Propwash of the RAF?”, Daniel Mortensen

(ed.), Airpower and Ground Armies, (Maxwell AFB Alabama: Air UniversityPress, 1998).

6 AIR 41/66 The Liberation of Northwest Europe Volume I, The Planning and Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Landings inNormandy, 5.

7 AIR 20/6130 Report by Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory on his visit toN. Africa March/April 1943.

8 PRO AIR 37/1057 Minutes of the Allied Air Commanders’ Conference, 14 June 1944. Montgomery’s relationship with Coningham and Leigh-Mallory was degraded by Leigh-Mallory’s rejection of Montgomery’s plan tocapture Caen with airborne forces.

9 Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Powerin World War II, 281–2.

10 AIR 20/6130 Report by Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory on his visit to N. Africa March/April 1943. A Composite Group consisted of fighters, fighter-bombers, bombers of various types, and reconnaissance aircraft.

11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 LC, Quesada Papers, May 1975 Interview section 2, 30. Quesada commented

that Coningham was very good at integrating intelligence from a variety ofsources into his operational planning.

14 AIR 20/6130 Report by Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory on his visit toN. Africa March/April 1943.

15 PRO AIR 23/1209 Intelligence Organization – Mobile Fighter Group, 30 May1942, also AIR 23/7434 Report on Air Operations by 242 Group RAF in Sup-port of 1st Army Tunisia 1943.

16 LC, Spaatz Papers I: Box 9, Letter from Craig to Spaatz, 23 December 1942.

17 Orange, Coningham, 150.18 Ibid., 181.19 PRO AIR 37/1213 Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Note on Planning and Prep-

aration of NW France by Personal Secretary to Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory,1944.

20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, 254–5.23 PRO AIR 8/1181 Allied Expeditionary Forces: Reorganization, 1944.24 Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43”, 184.25 NARA RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Field Manual 100-20, July 1943; NARA RG

331 Entry 272 Box 1, Mediterranean Allied Air Force Headquarters, Army AirTraining Instruction No.1, July 1943.

Notes 229

230 Notes

26 RG 331 Entry 272 Box 1, Mediterranean Allied Air Force Headquarters, ArmyAir Training Instruction No.1, July 1943, 1.

27 Ibid.28 NARA RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Field Manual 100-20, 1, RG 331 Entry 272

Box 1, Mediterranean Allied Air Force Headquarters, Army Air TrainingInstruction No.1, July 1943, 4.

29 NARA RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Field Manual 100-20, 2.30 Muller “Close Air Support, The German, British, and American Experiences,

1918–1941”, 186. Muller is correct to assert that FM 100-20 dealt more withorganization and control of air forces and less with the practicalities ofdelivering close air support. However, Army/Air Training Instruction No.1discussed practical methods for the employment of various types of aircraftin various roles. Also, organization and control are critical to the success ofclose air support operations, and the significant practical experience gainedby personnel in Tunisia provided the practicalities of delivering close airsupport.

31 Ibid., 12.32 NARA RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Field Manual 100-20, July 1943, 10.33 Ibid., 2.34 NARA RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Review of FM 100-20 (Advance Copy) July

1943. Dr. Ian Gooderson, in his book Air Power at the Battlefront, (London:Frank Cass, 1998), 51, incorrectly focuses on the low ranking given to closeair support as being a dismissal of its value rather than an acknowledgmentof the infrequency of the need for it, in relation to the continuous attackon supply columns and enemy aircraft.

35 General der Flieger Paul Deichmann, et al., German Air Force Operations inSupport of the Army, (New York: Arno Press, 1962), 123.

36 NARA RG 337 Entry 55 Box 970, Field Manual 100-20, July 1943, 13.

37 Hallion, Strike From the Sky, 174.38 IWM Headquarters 9th Air Force Report on Tactical Air Cooperation, Organ-

ization, Methods, and Procedures, July 1945, 116.39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 LC, Arnold Papers, Box 42 9/23 File “Employment of Air Forces”, General

H.H. Arnold to Commanding Generals, All Air Forces, All Independent ArmyAir Force Commands, Commandant Army Air Forces School of AppliedTactics, July 1943.

42 Hallion, Strike From the Sky, 174.43 Ibid.; Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air

Power in World War II, 215.44 PRO AIR 40/1131 General Bradley and the U.S. 12 Army Group Air Effects

Committee, Effects of Air Power on Military Operations, Western Europe,Wiesbaden, German: U.S. 12 Army Group Air Branches, G-3 and G-2, 15 July1945, 41–2.

45 Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, (Washington, D.C.: Department ofthe Army, 1961), 309.

46 See David Zucchino, David. Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Bagh-dad, (New York: Grove/Atlantic, 2004), Tood S. Purdum, A Time of Our Choos-

ing: America’s War in Iraq, (New York: Times Books, 2003), Agency Group 09,Remembering the 3rd Infantry Division’s Thunder Runs, (Federal Document Clear-ing House, Regulatory Intelligence Database, 2004), and Peter Maass, “TheThunder Run”, New York Times Magazine, Vol.153, Issue 52697, December2003.

47 Sandra I. Erwin, “Close Air Support Tactics Sharpened in Iraq”, NationalDefense, (June 2003), accessed online 24 November 2006 at: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2003/Jun/Close_Air.htm. The kill-box isfrom pilot vernacular, and describes the area assigned to close air support air-craft. The kill-box is typically allocated by the air-war commander, based onavailable aircraft and the knowledge that no friendly ground troops are operat-ing in the area.

48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 Lt. Col. John Hixson and B.F. Cooling, Combined Operations in Peace and War,

(Carlisle: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1982), 111.51 IWM Headquarters 9th Air Force Report on Tactical Air Cooperation, Organ-

ization, Methods, and Procedures, July 1945, 10.52 Ibid.53 LC, Spaatz Papers I: Box 12, Organization of American Air Forces, 12 May

1943.54 Ibid.55 Futrell, Command of Observation Aviation, 25.56 Ibid., 26.57 Ibid.58 Ibid., 28.59 Ibid.60 IWM Photo Recon for Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF) and

15th Army Group by 3rd Photo Group, 1945, 1.61 Ibid., 4.62 Air Ministry, Air Publication 1300 (4th Edition) Royal Air Force Operations

Manual, March 1957, 66.63 Ibid.64 Ibid.65 Ibid., 25.66 Ibid., 33 and 66.67 Hughes, Overlord. General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power

in World War II, 305.68 Colonel John R. Stoner, “The Closer the Better”, Air University Review,

Vol.XVIII, No.6, Sept.–Oct. 1967, 31.69 Major Robert I. Weber, “Close Air Support in the Carolinas”, Air University

Review, Vol.XV, No.2, Jan–Feb 1964.70 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 Blueprint for the

AirLand Battle, (New York: Brassey’s, Inc., 1991), 47.71 Ibid.72 Ibid.73 Group Captain Timothy Garden, “The Air-Land Battle”, in Air Vice-Marshal

R.A. Mason (ed.), War in the Third Dimension: Essays in Contemporary Air Power,(London: Brassey’s, 1986), 150.

Notes 231

74 Ibid., 165.75 Ibid.76 Air Ministry, Air Publication 3000, (London: HMSO, 1999), section 1.3.1.77 Ibid.78 Garden, “The Air-Land Battle”, 165.79 Ibid.

232 Notes

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Bibliography 243

AAPIU, see Army Air PhotographicInterpretation Unit

AASC, see Army Air Support ControlACTS, see Air Corps Tactical SchoolAdvance Air Stores Park, 76, 85AFHQ, see Allied Force HeadquartersAfrika Korps, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 41, 42, 52,

58, 59, 60, 63, 67, 69, 70, 72, 92,94, 95, 102, 110, 113, 114, 116,120, 121, 128, 129, 161, 179

15th Panzer Division, 12, 67, 110,113, 116, 128, 169, 172

21st Panzer Division, 12, 67, 110,113, 116, 165, 166, 169, 172

90th Light Division, 63, 67, 116Air Control, 2, 27, 29, 37, 41, 51,

179Air Corps Tactical School, xvi, 23, 24,

25Importance of air support in its

training program, 24Air Headquarters, Western Desert, 10,

27, 47, 51, 62, 80, 81, 82, 118,172

Advance Air Headquarters, WesternDesert, 81, 172

Rear Air Headquarters, WesternDesert, 76

Air Liaison Officer, xvi, 46, 62, 80, 81,119, 162

Importance to the air supportsystem, 62, 80–1, 119, 162

Air Ministry, 21, 28–9, 31, 34, 35, 38,62, 72, 184

Conflict with War Office, 21, 28–9,34, 38

Air Service Command, 154Air Support Control, 114, 123, 126,

136, 157, 158, 159Air Support Control Officer, 136Air Support Party, xvi, 136Air Support Board, 27Air War Planning Department, xvi, 24

Alam Halfa, 4, 108–12, 120, 169Effect of air support in, 4, 108–12

Albacore, 97, 103, 107, 127, 172Alexander, General (later Field

Marshal) Sir Harold, 99, 156,165–6, 171, 176, 178

As Commander-in-Chief MiddleEast, 99

As Commander 18th Army Group,156, 165–6, 171, 176, 178

Assessment of American combatability, 165–6

Algiers, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141,145, 161

ALO, see Air Liaison OfficerAllied Air Support Command, 150,

166Allied Captured Intelligence Centre,

161Allied Force Headquarters, xvi, 133,

141, 142, 143, 145, 148, 156, 161,162, 163

Anderson, Lieutenant General SirKenneth, 136, 139, 141, 142, 143

AWPD, see Air War PlanningDepartment

Andrews, Major General Frank, 22, 27Arcadia Conference, 132Army Air Photographic Interpretation

Unit, xvi, 82Army Air Support Control, xvi, 51,

65, 76, 81, 82, 83, 102, 104, 105,106, 124, 136, 137, 158, 159, 162,163

Forward Air Support Links, 83Rear Air Support Links, 83, 105 Tentacles, 66, 82, 124, 136, 137,

158Army Cooperation Manual, 31Army Cooperation Report, 33Army Cooperation Squadron, 33, 34,

39, 46, 47, 62, 64, 80, 82, 103,123

244

Index

Arnold, General Henry ‘Hap’, 131,133, 186, 188, 190

ASP, see Air Support PartyAWPD, see Air War Planning

DepartmentAuchinleck, Field Marshal Sir

Claude, 2, 35, 53, 60, 73, 74, 78,92, 95, 102, 190, 191

As Commander-in-Chief Middle East, 53, 60, 73, 74, 78, 79, 92, 95, 102, 190, 191

B-17 Flying Fortresses, 87, 161Baltimore, 87, 123Bardia, 46, 49, 50, 51, 67, 72, 73‘Battleaxe’, 59, 67Beaufighters, 13, 71, 72, 176Benghazi, 12, 46, 50, 53, 56, 59, 72,

118Bennett, Ralph, 129Bir Hacheim, 92–4Bizerta, 148, 161, 176, 177Blenheim, 50, 71, 142

Bisley, 142, 143, 146, 166, 169‘Bolero’, 132Bomb-line, 13, 83, 157, 158, 172Bradley, Major General (later

General) Omar, 131, 171, 180

Brereton, Major General Lewis H., 97,131, 151, 182, 183

Assessment of Command Ability,131

‘Brevity’, 59British Army, xiii, 3, 8, 18, 32, 38,

41, 47, 49, 52, 60, 61, 95, 100,104, 145, 146, 165, 179, 182, 190

X Corps, 120, 129, 171XIII Corps, 46, 51, 61, 67, 73, 108,

112XXX Corps, 61, 67, 108, 112, 113,

124British Troops in Egypt, xvi, 34, 46,

51Command relationships in early

Western Desert campaign, 46,51

Eighth Army, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13,15, 18, 43, 60, 61, 64, 72, 73,77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 92, 95, 96,97, 99, 100, 102, 107, 108, 110,111, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119,121, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128,130, 131, 139, 145, 152, 154,156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161,162, 164, 166, 169, 171, 172,174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 185

First Army, 133, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146,148, 149, 157, 158, 159, 161,162, 163, 169, 176, 177, 188

Problems with signals security, 15,58, 59, 61, 101, 129, 156

Western Desert Force, 8, 46, 47, 50

Brooke, General Sir Alan, 138BTE, see British Troops in EgyptBurnett-Stuart, General Sir Jock, 34‘Buster’, 116, 118

C3I, see Command, Control,Communications, andIntelligence

Captured Enemy Documents, 12, 63, 79, 80, 97, 112, 122, 145, 162

As a source of strategic intelligence,12, 63, 79, 80, 97, 112, 145,162

Casablanca, 133, 135, 138, 150, 152Casablanca Conference, 150, 152

Centre Task Force, xvi, 135, 136CGSS, see Command and General

Staff SchoolChief of the Imperial General Staff,

xvi, 28, 34, 38, 138, 150Churchill, Winston, 28, 29, 37, 54,

60, 92, 125, 132–3, 139Champions Invasion of French

North Africa, 132–3Directive for air support, 60Pressures Auchinleck, 92

CIGS, see Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff

Index 245

Close Air Support, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13,14, 16, 26, 39, 43, 44, 63, 64, 69,72–3, 76, 78, 87, 88–90, 94–6, 97,98, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 110,113, 114, 115, 119, 129, 143, 178,179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189,190

Complements interdictionoperations, 4, 5, 16, 26, 69, 87,109, 115

Damage inflicted, 4, 13, 70–3, 90,94, 107, 110, 113, 114, 169

During ‘Compass’ battles, 49–50During ‘Crusader’ battles, 69,

70–3During El Alamein and Alam

Halfa, 13, 101, 103During ‘Gazala’ battles, 94–6During the Pursuit to Tunisia, 129Equal to German, 179Effect on Enemy Morale, 13, 44, 79,

114Fighter-bombers, 13, 87, 89–90,

105Heavy and Medium bombers, 87–9,

142Importance of C3I to, 5, 9, 11, 14,

16, 43, 44, 63, 64, 69, 76, 78,90, 95, 98, 101, 103, 113–14,119, 135–9, 152–64

In the Tunisian Campaign, 143,164–9, 171–3, 178

In ‘Torch’ landings, 131, 135–9Combined Services Detailed

Intelligence Centre, xvi, 44, 45,63, 79, 122, 161

Combined Services DetailedIntelligence Centre, Allied ForceHeadquarters, 161

Command and General Staff School,xvi, 23, 24

Importance of Air Support in itstraining program, 24

Command, Control,Communications, andIntelligence, ix–xiv, xvi, 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 7–18, 26, 38, 39, 42, 43, 49, 51,58, 59, 60, 62, 65, 69, 74, 76, 82,89, 90, 92, 95, 103, 104, 107, 115,

129, 131, 137, 139, 143, 140, 150,152, 163, 164, 173, 174, 176, 179,180, 183, 190

Role in effective air support, 5, 9,11, 14, 16, 43, 44, 63, 64, 69,76, 78, 90, 95, 98, 101, 103,113–14, 119, 135–9, 152–64

‘Compass’, 8, 43, 49, 50, 51, 54, 60,65, 80, 119

Effect of Air Support in, 51, 60Coningham, Air Marshal Sir Arthur,

xiii, 2, 4, 8, 9, 35, 36, 60, 67, 70,71, 78, 83, 90, 94, 96, 97, 100,105, 109, 110, 111, 114, 116, 118,125, 128, 138, 139, 152, 153, 154,158, 159, 166, 169, 173, 174, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 191

Craig, Colonel (later BrigadierGeneral) Howard, 138, 152, 182

Cross, Air Chief Marshal Sir Kenneth,78, 171

‘Crusader’, 7, 8, 12, 45, 52, 61, 63, 65,66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 80, 82,87, 90, 103, 106, 141

Effect of Air Support in, 67, 69,70–3

CSDIC, see Combined ServicesDetailed Intelligence Centre

CSDIC (AFHQ), see CombinedServices Detailed IntelligenceCentre, Allied Force Headquarters

CTF, see Centre Task ForceCunningham, Lieutenant-General Sir

Alan, 60, 78Cyrenaica, 3, 12, 43, 47, 53, 56, 58,

59, 67, 104, 127

Dakar, 135Dawson, Air Vice Marshal G.G., 54,

84Role in assisting air support

efforts, 54, 84de Guingand, Major General Sir

Francis, 97, 102, 124Desert Air Force, see Western Desert

Air Force

246 Index

Doctrine, xi, xiii, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 16,17, 18, 19–21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,27, 29, 30, 38, 40, 41, 70, 125,131, 178, 179, 180, 181, 185, 186,189, 190, 191

Doolittle, General James, 133, 135,137, 153

Opposes reorganization of AlliedAir Forces, 153

Douhet, Guilio, 22

EAC, see Eastern Air CommandEaker, General Ira, 22Eastern Air Command, xvii, 137, 139,

141, 142, 143, 146, 148, 150, 152,153, 155

Eastern Task Force, xvii, 135, 136,139, 144

Eden, Sir Anthony, 53Egypt, xvi, 3, 31, 34, 35, 41, 42, 46,

47, 67, 69, 84, 92, 95, 96, 97, 99,108, 125

Eisenhower, General Dwight, 5, 121,131, 133, 138, 139, 154, 156, 171,180, 183

El Agheila, 44, 53, 56, 72, 124, 128,129

El Alamein, xv, 4, 5, 13, 78, 81, 96,98, 99, 100–3, 106, 112–15

Effect of Air Support in, 78, 96, 100,102, 104–7, 108, 109–15

El Aouina, 144, 161Elmhirst, Air Marshal Sir Thomas, 129Embeck, Major General Stanley, 132ETF, see Eastern Task ForceEmployment of Air Forces with the

Army in the Field, 34Enigma, 55, 56, 78, 79, 122, 145,

171

Field Manual 31-35, 27, 131, 185Fighter-bomber, 13, 25, 69, 70, 71, 76,

86, 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 97, 102,105, 106, 111, 115, 118, 119, 153,159, 181, 182, 183, 184

Effectiveness in air supportoperations, 13, 69, 70, 71, 76,86–90, 105, 106, 111, 115, 181

Fighting Intelligence, 11

‘Flax’, 160, 176Fliegerfuehrer Afrika, 129FM 31-35, see US Army Field

Manual 31-35Foulois, General Benjamin, 23Fredendall, Major General Lloyd, 135,

138Understanding of how to employ

aircraft, 138Free French, 94, 95, 106

French XIX Corps, 138, 156In ‘Gazala’ operation, 94

Fuka, 125, 127

Gazala, 3, 8, 15, 55, 67, 74, 77, 81, 85,92, 95, 96, 97, 102, 131, 191

Effect of Air Support in, 3, 94–5The ‘Cauldron’, 94–5

GC&CS, see Government Code andCipher School

German Air Force, see LuftwaffeG.H.Q., Middle East, 44, 46, 78Goering, Hermann, 107, 149Government Code and Cipher

School, xvii, 42, 55, 62, 143, 159‘Grapeshot’, 124‘Gymnast’, 132, 133

Halifax, 127Hawker Hurricane, 51, 56, 64, 69, 70,

71, 89, 90, 104, 105, 106, 118,127, 162, 173, 176

‘Hurribomber’, 89Hurricane IID tank-buster, 104,

105, 106, 118, 127, 173Himeimat ridge, 104, 106Hitler, Adolf, 24, 29, 107, 125HQ Royal Air Force Middle East, 80Hurricane, see Hawker Hurricane

Interdiction, xii, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14,16, 26, 43, 44, 50, 54, 59, 63, 64,69, 70, 72, 79, 80, 87, 90, 95, 98,101, 103, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,112, 115, 120, 127, 128, 129, 143,176, 177, 178, 180, 183, 185, 189

Complements Close Air Support, 4,5, 16, 26, 66, 76–7, 84, 87, 90,103, 107, 108, 111, 121, 170

Index 247

Interdiction – continuedDamage inflicted, 72, 90, 107,

113–15, 128During ‘Battleaxe’ battles, 59During ‘Compass’ battles, 50During ‘Crusader’ battles, 70–2During El Alamein and Alam

Halfa, 103, 107, 108, 109,110–15

During ‘Gazala’ battles, 94, 95

Effect on Morale, 4, 44, 54, 63, 79, 109, 110, 115, 122, 127

Importance of C3I to, 152–64In ‘Torch’ landings, 143In the Tunisian Campaign, 176,

177, 178Italian Army, 3, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51,

52, 53, 54, 58, 67, 72, 109, 112,116, 122, 128, 166, 174, 178, 179

Allied assessment of fightingability, 49

Ariete Armoured Division, 67, 92,94

Brescia Division, 67, 92German assessment of fighting

ability, 122Pavia Division, 67, 92Sabratha Division, 92Trento Division, 67, 92Trieste Motorised Division, 6, 92,

94, 95

‘J’ Service, xvii, 101, 105, 157

Kasserine Pass, 153, 159, 163, 164,165–6, 174

Kenney, General George, 25Kittyhawk, see P-40 KittyhawkKesselring, Field Marshal Albert, 104,

165, 169Kidney ridge, 113Kuter, General Lawrence, 150, 166,

182, 187

La Senia, 136Lawson, Air Commodore, 139, 141

Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford, 31, 181–3

Efforts to ensure the adoption ofMiddle East system, 181

Final victim of the collapse of theLuftwaffe, 183

LeMay, General Curtis, 19Libya, 42, 49, 54, 67, 69, 72, 79, 88,

112, 128, 137‘Lightfoot’, 112–14, 124

Effect of Air Support in, 113–14Lloyd, Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh, 153Longmore, Air Chief Marshal Sir

Arthur, 54Long Range Desert Group, xvii, 43–4,

127, 128, 171Providing strategic intelligence,

43–4, 127, 128, 171LRDG, see Long Range Desert GroupLuftwaffe, xii, xiii, 25, 54, 55, 70, 92,

96, 97, 104, 118, 121, 125, 153,183, 185

Focke Wulf 190, 144Ju 52, 160, 176Me 109, 71, 176Me 323, 160, 176Similarities in air support with that

developed by the Allies, 8, 10,179

Stuka, 94Lumsden, Lieutenant General

Herbert, 15, 120, 129Hesitancy in pursuit of the Axis

forces, 120

MAC, see Mediterranean AirCommand

MacArthur, General Douglas, 23Maison Blanche, 136, 145, 146 Malta, 72, 92, 96, 104, 112, 121, 123,

128, 137, 163, 176Mann, Group Captain W.E.G., 56Manual of Combined Operations, 30Manual of Frontier Operations, 36Mareth, 9, 44, 123, 129, 161, 166,

169, 171, 174Marshall, General George Catlett, 25,

27, 132, 183McNair, Lt. General L.J., 27, 186

248 Index

McNeill, Lieutenant Colonel J.M., 76,158

Attached to 18th Army Group, 158Role in development of AASC, 76,

158Mediterranean Air Command, xvii,

152, 155, 160, 182MEIU, see Middle East Interpretation

UnitMersa Matruh, 47, 50, 52, 79, 128Middle East Cipher School, 77Middle Eastern Air Command, 54Middle East Interpretation Unit, xvii,

81, 103Middle East Signals School, 77Mitchell, General Billy, 21, 22Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir

Bernard, xiii, xvi, 1, 2, 4, 5, 35,78, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 108,109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118,119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 128, 129,165, 169, 171, 173, 180, 190, 191

Air Control Experience, 2, 35As Commander, 1, 4–5, 97, 98, 105,

106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 116,118–19, 120–1, 122, 124–30,169, 171, 182, 190, 191

Brings the system together, xiii–xiv,4, 78, 98, 114

Personality, 35, 113Views on the appropriate

relationship with Air Forces,96, 173

Morocco, 132, 135, 137Mussolini, Benito, 102, 108

NACIU, see North African CentralInterpretation Unit

New Zealand Corps, 171New Zealand Division, 44, 70, 72, 97,

119, 124, 172During ‘Crusader’, 69, 70, 72

No.2 AASC, see No.2 Army AirSupport Control

No.2 Army Air Support Control, 76,124, 158

North African Central InterpretationUnit, xviii, 146, 148, 163

Northwest African Air Force, xviii,152, 154, 155, 163

Northwest African Coastal Air Force,xviii, 153, 180

Northwest African Strategic Air Force,xviii, 153

Northwest African Tactical Air Force,xviii, 8, 153, 155, 159, 160, 162,163, 164, 166, 174, 176, 177, 178,182, 183

NWAAF, see Northwest African AirForce

NWACAF, see Northwest AfricanCoastal Air Force

NWASAF, see Northwest AfricanStrategic Air Force

NWATAF, see Northwest AfricanTactical Air Force

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, xviii, 2,6, 7, 9, 11, 49, 58, 74, 95, 99, 101,179

O’Connor, General Sir Richard, 46,49, 52, 53

O’Moore Creagh, Major General SirMichael, 59

Office of Strategic Services, xviii, 135OODA, see Observer, Orient, Decide,

ActOperational Intelligence, 5, 11, 12,

13, 14, 16, 17, 45, 51, 82, 95, 102,121, 123, 145, 161, 162, 164, 174,180

Oran, 133, 135, 136, 138Orange, Vincent, 125OSS, see Office of Strategic Services

P-40 Kittyhawk, 13, 87, 90, 176P-40 Warhawk, see P-40 KittyhawkPatton, Lieutenant General George S.,

9, 133, 135, 153, 171Fight with Coningham, 153–4

‘Phantom’ Squadrons, 157Photographic Reconnaissance, xviii,

12, 37, 45–6, 56, 62, 64, 70, 81,82, 85, 98, 103, 110, 116, 122,123, 125, 146, 148, 157, 158, 162, 163, 164, 172, 174, 186, 187,188, 189

Index 249

Photographic Reconnaissance –continued

As a source of operationalintelligence, 37, 45–6, 62, 64,70, 82, 85, 103, 110, 112, 123,146, 148

As a source of strategic intelligence, 12, 80, 116, 122,125, 157, 174

Photo Reconnaissance, seePhotographic Reconnaissance

Portal, Marshal of the Royal Air ForceSir Charles, 137

Port Sudan, 83Prisoner of War Interrogation, xviii,

44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 56, 63, 79, 80,97, 114, 116, 121, 123, 145,161–2, 172, 177, 187

As a source of operationalintelligence, 116, 121, 122,161–2

As a source of strategic intelligence, 44, 50, 51, 56, 63,79, 80, 97, 114, 121, 168, 172,177, 187

Pure Intelligence, 11PW, see Prisoner of War Interrogation

Quesada, Major General Elwood‘Pete’, 24, 25, 180, 182, 183, 186

Views on the importance of airsupport, 24, 25, 180, 182, 183,186

Radio Telephony, xviii, 36, 43, 52, 56,58, 61, 76, 77, 80, 81, 90, 102,121, 144, 156, 160

RAF, see Royal Air ForceRed Army, 132Regia Aeronautica, 47, 54Repair and Salvage Unit, 76, 84–5Ritchie, Lieutenant-General Sir Neil,

15, 78, 95Robb, Air Vice Marshal James, 138,

152Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin, 4, 5,

12, 42, 43, 55, 58, 59, 67, 69, 70,72, 77, 78, 81, 86, 92, 94, 96, 97,

100, 102, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 124, 125,127, 128, 129, 130, 165, 166, 169,174

‘Rommel One’, 86Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 23, 24,

108, 133‘Roundup’, 132Royal Air Force, xiii, xviii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19,21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65,66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76,77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88,89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107,109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 127,128, 129, 131, 136, 137, 138, 141,142, 144, 145, 146, 148, 153, 155,157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 178, 179,180, 181, 182, 184, 188, 189, 190,191

4th Photographic ReconnaissanceUnit, 146

4 PRU, see 4th PhotographicReconnaissance Unit

204 Group, 47205 Group, 97, 99, 107, 127242 Group, 78, 142, 148, 153, 155,

158, 162, 166, 169, 171, 174276 Wing, 102, 121, 160380 Wireless Unit, 144, 160381 Wireless Unit, 144, 160

Royal Naval Air Service, 28Royal Navy, 28, 72, 128, 135, 136

Force ‘K’, 112 HMS Argus, 135HMS Avenger, 135HMS Formidable, 135HMS Victorious, 135

R/T, see Radio Telephony

Salmond, Marshal of the Royal AirForce Sir John, 16, 30, 35

Shuttle Service, 85, 90Sidi Barrani, 49, 50, 51, 52

250 Index

Signals Intelligence, ix, xiv, 12, 16,43, 44, 96, 100, 103, 123, 143,160, 187, 190

As a source of operationalintelligence, 16, 100, 123

As a source of strategic intelligence,12, 103, 187, 190

Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air ForceSir John, 2, 31, 35, 36, 137

Sollum, 67, 72, 127Spaatz, General ‘Tooey’, 25, 138, 150,

152, 153, 169SLU, see Special Liaison UnitSouth African Air Force, xvii, 13, 71,

88, 104, 106, 118, 123, 131, 176Soviet Red Army, xi, 132Special Communication Unit, xviii,

143Special Liaison Unit, xviii, 143 Spitfire, 25, 81, 114, 123, 146, 162,

163, 169Squadron Intelligence Officer, 62, 80,

120, 162, 184Staff Information Service, see ‘J’

ServiceStrategic Intelligence, 5, 11, 12, 14,

16, 17, 42–4, 46, 54, 63, 64, 95,121, 144, 159, 162, 164, 174, 180

Strategic Reconnaissance, 45, 64, 80,90, 103, 123, 127

Strategic Reconnaissance Flight, 64,65, 80, 103, 123

Stumme, General Georg, 113Supply, 4, 5, 6, 12, 17, 22, 26, 32, 37,

43, 54, 59, 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73,74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 90, 92,94, 95, 96, 102, 103, 105, 108,109, 110, 112, 115, 118, 120, 121,122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 145,149, 152, 154, 160–1, 164, 166,169, 174, 176, 177, 178

Allied difficulties, 5, 54, 72–3, 90, 96, 118, 125, 129, 149, 154

Axis difficulties, 4, 54, 70, 71, 72,78, 79, 80, 90, 94–7, 102, 108,109, 110, 112, 115, 117, 120–1,128, 149, 160–1, 169, 174, 176,177, 178

Tactical Bomber Force, 155, 157, 158,174

Under Coningham’s Command,158, 174

Tactical Intelligence, 13, 42, 43, 51, 58,78, 83, 103, 122, 145, 158, 161

Tactical Reconnaissance, xvii, 46, 56,64, 69, 76, 81, 98, 99, 103, 123,136, 138, 139, 148, 158, 162, 163, 164, 169, 173, 174, 186, 187, 188

Tafaraoui, 136Takoradi, 83, 84Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air

Force Sir Arthur, 2, 4, 35, 54, 59,60–1, 72, 76, 78, 84, 94, 99, 109,114, 125, 137, 138, 150, 153, 154,178, 179, 180, 190

Personality, 35Relationship with Coningham, 4,

59, 60, 78, 94, 109, 114, 125,138, 153–4, 179

Relationship with Montgomery, 4,114, 125

Telecommunication Centre, MiddleEast, 77

Thoma, General Ritter von, 114, 123,161

Tobruk, 12, 46, 50, 53, 59, 67, 69, 70,73, 74, 80, 92, 96, 97, 118

‘Torch’, vii, viii, 5, 10, 18, 27, 100,131, 133, 135, 137, 138, 142, 146,153, 156, 159, 161, 178, 183

Tomahawk, see P-40 KittyhawkTrenchard, Marshal of the Royal Air

Force Sir Hugh, 28, 29, 31Tripoli, 12, 53, 72, 80, 97, 118, 121,

122, 124, 129, 130Troop Carrier Command, 154Tunis, 136, 137, 142, 144, 148, 149,

161, 165, 176, 177Tunisia, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 38, 40,

42, 44, 60, 78, 116, 118, 119, 120,121, 123, 129, 130, 133, 136, 137,139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 149,150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158,159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 166, 169,171, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180,181, 183, 184, 185, 187, 190

Index 251

Twelfth Air Force, 135, 136, 137, 139,143, 150, 152

Type X Machine Cipher, 156

Ultra, 43, 54, 55, 56, 59, 62, 63, 69,78, 79, 90, 97, 102, 108, 112, 116,120, 121, 125, 128, 129, 143, 144,159, 166, 169, 176, 183

As a source of strategic intelligence, 43, 54, 78, 90, 97,102, 108, 116, 120–1, 125, 128,159, 166, 169

United States Army, 8, 188, 190II Corps, see II US CorpsII US Corps, 9, 138, 153, 154, 156,

157, 158, 160, 163, 165, 171,176

British assessment of fightingability, 165, 171

United States Army Air Corps, xviii, 2,20, 22, 23, 25

United States Army Air Forces, xviii,2, 3, 5, 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 27,29, 40, 97, 118, 131, 137, 138,139, 142, 143, 146, 148, 153, 155,159, 160, 163, 166, 176, 178, 179,180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186,187, 188

3rd Photographic ReconnaissanceGroup, 146

12th Air Force, see Twelfth Air ForceXII Air Support Command, 135,

148, 155XII Air Support Control, 138, 150,

153, 155, 158, 159, 160, 165,166, 171

XII ASC, see XII Air Support Control United States Army Air Service, xix,

19USAAC, see United States Army Air

CorpsUSAAF, see United States Army Air

ForcesUSAAS, see United States Army Air

Service

US Army, see United States ArmyUS Army Field Manual 31-35, 27US Naval Task Force 34, 135

Vichy French Government, 126

War Department, 11, 25, 44, 171, 174

War Office, xix, 21, 28, 29, 33, 34, 39,44, 97, 139, 165, 184

Wavell, General Sir Archibald, 37, 46,49, 53, 58, 60

WDAF, see Western Desert Air ForceWehrmacht, xi, xii, xiii, 51Wellington, 50, 87, 103, 107, 127Welsh, Air Marshal Sir William, 133,

137Western Air Command, 137Western Desert, xix, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10,

14, 18, 27, 34, 35, 42, 46, 47, 50,51, 56, 62, 65, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82,84, 97, 102, 118, 123, 139, 142,145, 152, 153, 155, 158, 159, 162,163, 164, 165, 171, 172, 178, 179,181, 184, 187, 188

Western Task Force, xix, 135, 137Western Desert Air Force, xix, 18, 47,

97, 148, 152, 153, 155, 156, 158,160, 164, 169, 171, 172, 173,178,181, 182, 185

Wigglesworth, Air Vice MarshalVincent, 152

Wilson, General Sir Henry, 28, 29, 46,49

Wing Intelligence Officer, 119, 120Wireless Telegraphy, xix, 36, 43, 53,

55, 56, 61, 76, 77, 80, 102, 118,121, 144, 155, 160

W/T, see Wireless TelegraphyWTF, see Western Task Force

‘Y’, xix, 43, 53, 55, 56, 59, 69, 78, 79,90, 98, 102, 103, 121, 143, 144,145, 155, 157, 159, 160, 161, 169,172, 176

252 Index