Notes

1 Introduction

1. The eleven countries included are Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei Darussalam andEast Timor.

2. As Leifer puts it: ‘Vietnam had changed from a triumphalist revolutionarystate to a diplomatic supplicant as its domestic and regional circumstancesdeclined after its ill-fated Cambodia intervention’ (Leifer, 1996: 23).

3. Michael Leifer concisely sums up this kind of argument. Discussing the cre-ation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) he states that ‘In the event, ASEANhad little option but to widen the multilateral dialogue to the rest of the Asia-Pacific because it had become impossible in security terms to conceive ofSouth-east Asia as a separate entity’ (Leifer, 1996: 26).

4. A nice summary of these views as attributed to their defenders is in Huxley(1996).

5. The percentage of each country’s total trade with the US, the EU and Japan com-bined in 2000 was: Brunei – 48.5 percent; Indonesia – 46.5 percent; Malaysia –47.9 percent; Philippines – 54.5 percent; Singapore – 40.8 percent; Thailand – 52.0percent; Cambodia – 44.2 percent; Laos – 17.3 percent; Myanmar – 28.1 percent;and Vietnam – 37.0 percent.

6. As David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan point out, a theory of internationalrelations may be useful in understanding one regional system but would notbe applicable to another. Certainly realism is more relevant to Southeast Asiathan to Europe, where substantial progress has been made in communitybuilding (Lake and Morgan, 1997).

7. I stipulate that on the global level the US dominates a unipolar world. InChapter 2, however, following Samuel P. Huntington I concede that on theregional level the US often shares power with regional powers, thus makingthe international system ‘uni-multipolar.’ For simplicity of expression I willcontinue to use the more convenient unipolar to describe the global system.

2 The United States: Primary Global Power

1. A selective sample of the literature includes: Goodman and Segal, 1997;Nathan and Ross, 1997; Kristof, 1993; Wang, 1996; Roy, 1994; Segal, 1999;Goldstein, 1997/8 and 2001; Conable and Lampton, 1992/3; Kim, 1998;Byman, Cliff and Saunders, 1999; and Shambaugh, 1996.

2. Other works extremely critical of China’s behavior and military potential areTimberlake and Triplett (1999) and Gertz (2000). Both of these works are sim-plistic and sensational and neither has systematic analysis of strategic issues.More judicious, but very critical is Mosher (2000).

3. A. F. K. Organski originally presented a power transition theory in the 1958 edition of his text book. A later edition (Organski, 1968), Chapter 14 and p. vii,

218

is cited here. In this book, I have relied on GDP figures to indicate relativecapabilities, even though they are rather crude indicators.

4. According to Henry Kissinger, ‘[Legitimacy] implies the acceptance of theframework of the international order by all major powers, at least to theextent that no state is so dissatisfied that…it expresses its dissatisfaction in arevolutionary foreign policy. A legitimate order does not make conflictsimpossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will be foughtin the name of the existing structure and the peace which follows will be justi-fied as a better expression of the “legitimate,” general consensus. Diplomacyin the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiations, ispossible only in “legitimate” international orders’ (emphasis in the original).Quoted in Gilpin (1981: 12).

5. Other contributors to the volume are more positive about the correlation.See especially Lemke (1996); Thompson (1996).

6. To put it another way, Robert Gilpin, in his book dealing with themes simi-lar to Organski, but in a more general context, argues that a state will seek tochange the system only if it is believed that ‘such change will be profitable.’Governments make calculations, which in turn hinge on many factors,including capabilities and values such as the degree of satisfaction with theexisting system (Gilpin, 1981: 50–1).

7. This interpretation assumes that the US did not supplant Great Britain ashegemon until the Second World War. The Japanese attack on the US cer-tainly indicated that it viewed the US as the main obstacle to its goals in Asia.

8. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita points out, strictly speaking the key point atwhich war breaks out is not necessarily when the challenger’s capabilitiesapproach those of the dominant power, but when they are perceived to reachthat point (Bueno de Mesquita, 1996: 276–81). Useful insights on the moti-vation for preventive war by the challenged power are in Levy (1987), whileSchweller discusses the historical evidence that it is usually the challengerwho initiates war (Schweller, 1999a: 8–9).

9. On the role of nuclear weapons in the Cuban missile crisis, see Kennedy(1971). For the opposing view, see Organski (1968: chapter 13); and Tammen(2000: chapter 4). The Bush administration has indicated it wants to buildboth a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, and a Theater Missile Defense(TMD) system in Asia. If these systems are built, it will undoubtedly affect themilitary balance between the US and China, since the Chinese will view eithersystem, but especially NMD, as diminishing their capabilities. China believesthat NMD, deployed in the US would diminish or destroy the deterrencevalue of China’s ICBMs, while deployment of TMD in Japan or Taiwan wouldcounter the potential value of China’s missiles directed toward them. ButBeijing is particularly sensitive about deployment in Taiwan. It is too early tosay what the impact of these developments will be on Sino-US relations.There are as of yet no discussions of missile defense deployments that woulddirectly affect Southeast Asia (Green and Dalton, 2000; Silver, 2000: 54–6).

10. John Lewis Gaddis supports Ikenberry’s contention that American prepon-derance preceded the cold war: ‘Few historians would deny today, that theUnited States did expect to dominate the international scene after WorldWar II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear andpresent antagonist.’ Quoted in Layne (1997: 247).

Notes 219

11. The argument for decline is in Gilpin (1987: chapter 9) and Kennedy (1987:chapter 8). On the persistence of American dominance see Nye (1990) andKapstein and Mastanduno (1999), especially Kapstein (1999).

12. As Organski himself recently said, ‘[p]resently, the United States holds mas-sive power advantages over other nations, leaving no room for ambiguityabout who and what guarantees the peace in the post-cold war era’ (Organskiand Tammen, 1996: 331). (See also: Layne, 1993; Mastanduno, 1997; Jervis,1993; Waltz, 1993; Huntington, 1993; and Wilkinson, 1999.) In spite of itsmilitary dominance, the US currently devotes only 3 percent of its GNP tothe military, less than anytime since Pearl Harbor.

13. Contrast this with Robert O. Keohane’s definition of economic hegemony,which focuses more on capabilities. ‘To be considered hegemonic in theworld political economy … a country must have access to crucial raw materi-als, control major sources of capital, maintain a large market for imports, andhold comparative advantages in goods with high value added, yielding rela-tively high wages and profits. It must also be stronger, on these dimensionstaken as a whole, than any other country’ (Keohane, 1984: 34–5).

14. Wilkinson probes these relationships by asking 11 questions such as: 1) Arelocal governments selected or given legitimacy by the hegemon? 2) Are localwars suppressed by hegemonic intervention? 3) Does the hegemon have andmonopolize the right to forbid, or the power to prevent collective action bystates? 4) Does the hegemon monopolize the high command of the collec-tive actions of the armed forces of the states? 5) Does the hegemon deliber-ately export preferred ideology, religion, language, ethics, laws or customswhich the other states import and imitate? Joseph Nye indicates that theUnited States is a ‘preponderant but not a dominant, power’ (Nye, 1999: 24).

15. Kenneth Waltz, from his realist premise, denies both the restraint and thelongevity. On restraint he writes that ‘Balance-of-power theory leads one topredict that other countries, alone or in concert, will try to bring Americanpower into balance.’ Waltz believes that ‘a country wielding overwhelmingpower could not for long be expected to behave with moderation.’ Onlongevity, he wrote in 1993 that ‘Peace is sometimes linked to the presence ofa hegemonic power, sometimes to a balance among powers … the response ofother countries to one among them seeking or gaining preponderant power isto try to balance against it. Hegemony leads to balance … That is now hap-pening, but haltingly so because the United States still has benefits to offerand many other countries have become accustomed to their easy lives withthe United States bearing many of their burdens’ (Waltz, 1993: 53, 77).

16. Randall Schweller, in a review of Ikenberry’s most recent book, After Victory:Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), maintains that the US wasrestrained during the cold war because of competition with the Soviets ratherthan because of multilateral international institutions binding it to its alliesand imposing restraint. But this does not explain why the US treated itsNATO allies better than the Soviets did their Warsaw Pact allies. He lateranswers this question, and he is certainly partially correct when he suggeststhat in a unipolar world the American people, and we should add, demo-cratic institutions, will ‘effectively restrain current US power and aspirations’(Schweller, 2001: 161–86).

220 Notes

17. Henry Kissinger, tracing the tradition of American exceptionalism and itsemphasis on liberal values, rejection of balance-of-power politics and faith incollective action to Woodrow Wilson, notes the staying power of these ideas.

18. They are: Liberty, or Exceptionalism; Unilateralism, or Isolationism; theMonroe Doctrine; Expansionism, or Manifest Destiny; Progressive Imperialism;Wilsonianism, or Liberal Internationalism; Containment and Global Meliorism.Commenting on this abundance of foreign policy models, McDougall com-ments that ‘[c]onfusion and discord have been the norm in American foreignrelations not because we lack principles to guide us, but because we have can-onized so many diplomatic principles since 1776 that we are pulled everywhich way at once.’ Summing up US policy, McDougall borrows imagery of thethree characters in Sergio Leone’s spaghetti western, The Good, the Bad, and theUgly as an analogy for the nature of US policy. American behavior occasionallyhas been wise and decent beyond hope. At other times it has been foolish or brutal. But much of the time, we have simply been human, ‘pursuing ourshort-term self-interest more or less skillfully, and the rest of the world bedamned.’ Arnold Toynbee likened America to ‘a large friendly dog in a verysmall room – every time it wags its tail, it knocks over a chair’ (McDougall,1997: 2–4, 6).

19. Definitions of US foreign policy objectives in East Asia are in: US Departmentof Defense (1998a: 9–18) and Gordon (1990: chapter 1). Takuma Takahashidefines America’s interests in East Asia as ranging from ‘preventing the emer-gence of a regional hegemony or a hostile coalition to promoting commer-cial interests to protecting human rights’ (Takahashi, 1997: 124).

20. US force planning for conflicts in two particular regions has been dropped,in favor of ‘building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the spec-trum of possible force requirements, both functional and geographical’ (USDepartment of Defense, 2001).

21. A similar perspective, sharing some of the pessimism of the previous school onthe possibility of maintaining the status quo, is offered by Ravenal (1990–1)and Layne (1997). Specifically advocating cutbacks in Asia, Chalmers Johnson(2000) argues convincingly that the US troops stationed on Okinawa andother bases have often had deleterious effects on the local population.

22. Huntington’s spirited defense of primacy in his earlier article can be com-pared with the much more restrained view in Huntington (1999).

23. An indicator of the impact of the events of September 11 on US policytoward Thailand can be gained from the remarks of Assistant Secretary ofState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly in Kelly (2002a).

24. Robert Zoellick states that ‘[China and Russia] are “works in progress”; they arenot yet friends and are certainly not partners, but they need not be enemies’(Zoellick, 2000: 75). In a strong statement on the value of the Japan alliance forthe US, G. John Ikenberry states that ‘No “strategic partnership” with Chinacould make up for the arms race and security dilemmas that would follow froma nuclear Japan cut loose from the US’ (Ikenberry, 1998: 231).

25. Some of the debate over whether the US–China relationship can or should bea ‘constructive strategic partnership’ is clarified by going back to the docu-ments where this phrase was first used. Presidents Clinton and Jiang, at sum-mits in Washington in October 1997 and in Beijing in 1998 indicated incommuniques and statements that the partnership ‘was a goal worth building

Notes 221

toward, not a statement of present fact’ (Silver, 2000: 10). Background on theBush administration’s policies can be found in Rice (2000) and Zoellick(2000). The authors are President Bush’s National Security Advisor, and USTrade Representative, respectively. See also Scobell (2002).

26. A discussion of the new direction is in Lewis (2001).27. I am indebted to Steven Levine for this point. Personal communication.28. There is still considerable controversy over the extent to which democracies

abstain from war with each other, and why, if they do, that is the case. SeeLayne (1994); Spiro (1994); Owen (1994); and the critiques and responses inRussett (1995). In a review of the literature on the democratic peace, Jack S.Levy states: ‘This absence of war between democratic states comes as close asanything we have to an empirical law in international relations’ ( Jack S.Levy, 1989).

29. Mansfield and Snyder (1995); Snyder (2000); Goldstein (1997–8); Thompsonand Tucker (1997). See also Ward and Gleditsch (1998). The latter authorsargue that in general the ‘effect of democratization is to promote peace,’ butreversals in the process of democratization ‘increase the likelihood of war.’

30. It is surprising to find someone as sophisticated as Andrew Nathan using ashort time span standard for measuring China’s progress toward democrati-zation. He seems to accept the critics’ argument that because China has notbecome democratic after its nearly 25 years of reform, policies from outsidethat supposedly favor democratization are not working (Nathan, 2001: 9).See also the discussion in Chapter 3.

31. ASEAN has made no official pronouncement on either Theater MissileDefense or National Missile Defense. Within ARF, however, many ASEANnations attacked US missile defense plans (Green and Dalton, 2000: 38).

32. For more on past policies and recent statements see Simon (1999: 335); Biden(2001). The US and Japan have both refused to exclude Taiwan from thescope of the US–Japan alliance (Christensen, 1999: 74–5).

33. The US has avoided making explicit statements of support for the Spratly Islandclaims of Southeast Asian countries, but former Defense Secretary WilliamCohen recently suggested that the US–Philippines mutual defense treaty mightapply to Philippine forces in the Spratly Islands (Saunders, 1999: 249).

34. Chia Siow Yue writes that ‘One reason Mexico bounced back quickly from its1994 financial crisis was because the US quickly mobilized massive bilateraland international support and NAFTA provided a ready export market. ForSoutheast Asia, neither the US nor the EU found it in their strategic intereststo provide rescue packages beyond those provided by the IMF, despite theconsiderable exposure of American and European banks. Japan failed in itsrole as a regional locomotive, as its own economy and banking sector are inserious trouble’ (Yue, 1999: 267).

35. Bernard D. Cole argues that the US did not make the maximum effort tonegotiate retention of the Philippine bases and was not willing to pay theamount of compensation asked by the Philippines. The incentives to do sowere limited by the end of the cold war and the eruption of Mount Pinatuboand the damage it left. Personal communication.

36. Yue attributes ASEAN’s success in attracting FDI to: ‘political, social and eco-nomic stability; buoyant economies with rapidly growing domestic markets;favorable factor endowments, particularly natural resources and labor supply

222 Notes

in ASEAN-4 and human resources and infrastructure in Singapore; and development-oriented governments with sound macroeconomic and pro-FDI policies.’ The ASEAN-9 are the present day members of ASEAN except forCambodia. They are: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

37. Kim (2000) contains a nice summary of the causes and effects of the 1997 crisis.38. On the changes in priorities between traditional ‘high’ politics of diplomacy

and military issues compared to the ‘low’ politics of economic issues as a country modernizes and interdependence changes the nature of conflict,see also (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Rosecrance, 1986 and 1999).

39. An account of the American negotiating strategy with Japan is in Vogel (1997).40. For an early and prophetic treatment of the relationship between modern-

ization and information, see Apter (1965) and also Cairncross (1997).41. Nationalist demonstrations in Jakarta during the Wahid administration, at

least partially sparked by the outspoken US ambassador to Indonesia, RobertGelbard, also illustrate the perils of a high-profile and a culturally insensitivestyle. Many agree that Gelbard’s statements condemning corruption, and hisfailure to bring the military under civilian control and to disarm militiagangs that killed three UN workers in West Timor, carried the right message,but it appears that the style in which the message was delivered diluted itseffectiveness (Sims, 2000).

3 China: Challenging Regional Power

1. Robert Ross argues that China and the US form a bipolar system in East Asia(Ross, 1999). For the tripolarity argument see (Zhang and Montaperto, 1999).Useful discussions of the relationship between economic and military powerand the definition of a great power are in Schweller (1998: 198–201); Gilpin(1981: 129–31); Waltz (1993). On the nature of civilian powers, see Maull(1990–1).

2. In a 1996 meeting with top Chinese national security and defense officials,Brzezinski identified eight areas of common strategic interest between the USand China: (1) a peaceful Southeast Asia, (2) non-use of force in the resolutionof offshore issues, (3) peaceful reunification of China, (4) stability in Korea, (5) independence for Central Asia, (6) a balance between India and Pakistan,(7) an economically dynamic and internationally benign Japan, and (8) a stablebut not too strong Russia (Brzezinski, 1997a: 171–3, 187, n. 10).

3. On Japan’s unique national security culture see Katzenstein and Okawara(1993). On Prime Minister Koizumi’s positions, and the strength of the right-wing culture and related groups in Japan, see French (2001); Kattoulas(2001); Bix (2001); Nathan (2001). On Japan’s failed attempt to expand andnormalize its role through multilateral security so as not to disturb its neigh-bors, see Midford (2000); Johnstone (1999a).

4. On inequality, see Denny (1991) and Huang (1995: 66). Between 1985 and1992, income in innermost regions grew at a real annual average rate of 7.66percent, while the rate of growth in coastal regions was 5.86 percent. Butmeasuring regional disparities of GDP per capita, other analysts foundincreasing inequality, with China showing inequality exceeding that of

Notes 223

Indonesia, India and Yugoslavia before disintegration (Wang and Hu, 1999:chapters 3 and 7). Protests in March 2002 in Liaoyang against corruption,with a surprisingly political edge, were said to involve 20,000 people, thefifth time in two years that large protests have erupted there. One estimate ofunemployment in the city was 60 percent (Pomfret, 2002a, 2002b).

5. A recent work predicts the collapse of the current system, based primarily onthe weaknesses of the banking and financial systems, growing discontentand distaste for corruption, or the aftermath of bungled foreign adventuressuch as the recovery of Taiwan (Chang, 2001).

6. Vast differences in GDP/GNI figures result from alternate methods of calcu-lation, depending on which method of currency conversion is used. The purchasing-power-parity (ppp) method tends to inflate the value of GDP indeveloping countries. The alternative, using the prevailing nominal bilateralexchange rate between a currency and the dollar, favors the value of devel-oped countries GDP relative to developing countries (Wolf, 1995: 27–9).Using the ppp method, the Chinese economy is already the second largest inthe world. Wolf et al. projected that China will pass the US after 2006, assum-ing a stable Chinese growth rate.

7. Lucian Pye sees disregard of the content of ideology as a quintessentialChinese practice: ‘The Chinese have a great need for ideology, yet in practicethey seem to ignore the content of ideology; they do what advances their self-interest without amending the substance of their ideology’ (Pye, 1985: 206).

8. Andrew Nathan argues that economic development in and of itself does notbring human rights improvements, that it requires a long political struggle(Nathan, 1999: 156–9). This may be true, but the argument usually made isthat economic development provides the conditions that make development ofdemocracy more likely, not that democracy springs fully-formed from thebrow of economic progress. See for instance Lipset (1960: especially chapter 2).

9. A defense of many of the ‘internationalist’ perspectives is in Yan (1999).10. Anyone believing that Southeast Asians support the traditional Chinese view of

sovereignty would do well to read the address by Singapore’s Foreign Minister,S. Jayakumar to an international law seminar in Singapore in July 2000: ‘Today,more than ever …the Westphalian concept of a state with virtually absolutesovereignty within its borders is fast changing…countries have to interact in aweb of complex relationships with not only other countries but also with a vari-ety of other non-state entities. This process has brought about constraints ontheir freedom of action over a broad and expanding range of activities …Indeed, over the recent decades, various developments have inexorably beentransforming the concept of state sovereignty’ (Jayakumar, 2000). This fromSingapore, that bastion of Realpolitik! A more traditional Southeast Asian view isthat of Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister (in Alatas, 1999).

11. For the Chinese, their past suffering ensures future virtue. When asked aboutthe ‘China threat,’ Foreign Minister Qian Qichen responded this way in1993: ‘The modern history of China was written in blood and tears as thenation was subjected to untold sufferings under the aggression, suppression,bullying and humiliation of imperialism and colonialism … . As a countryhaving regained its independence and sovereignty, China does not, and willnot, impose hegemony and power politics on others and will not threaten orbully any one’ (Qian, 1993: 9).

224 Notes

12. An illustration of the proposition that foreign crises can be used to domesticadvantage is Mao’s comment during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis that devel-oped at the same time as the great leap forward was under way. Mao said ina speech to the Supreme State Council that ‘besides its disadvantageous side,a tensed [international] situation could mobilize the population, could par-ticularly mobilize the backward people, could mobilize people in the middle,and could therefore promote the great leap forward in economic construc-tion’ (quoted in Chen (1995: 361).

13. ‘Several military advances have made the task of conquering Taiwan, impos-sible to carry out as recently as 1999, feasible in 2004, the country’s armyleaders are saying’ (Bernstein and Munro, 1998: 188). ‘It will be a decade ormore before the PLA can project enough power to seriously threaten the restof Asia, much less the United States’ (Shinn, 1996: 7). ‘China is 30–50 yearsaway from the type of comprehensive, across-the-board technological mod-ernization of its naval and air forces that could directly challenge Americanpower or the status quo in the Asian Pacific region’ (Feigenbaum, 1999: 83).Bates Gill and Michael O’Hanlon suggest it will be at least twenty yearsbefore China can significantly challenge the US and its allies in East Asia(Gill and O’Hanlon, 1999: 56). Hans W. Maull assumes that China’s emer-gence as a superpower, and eventual parity with the United States is a fore-gone conclusion. China will become ‘too big to be contained or balanced.’ Itis a question of when, not if (Maull, 1997: 468).

14. The US Defense Department states that in 2001 multiservice exercises whichreportedly emphasized amphibious warfare were conducted (US Departmentof Defense, 2002). The Military Balance, 1998/99 states categorically that ‘Chinadoes not have the resources to carry out an opposed landing, on Taiwan oranywhere else…’ (IISS, 1998: 165). According to Eric Grove, ‘It will take a verylong time, especially at present funding levels, for China to live up to its repu-tation as the coming maritime power of the Asia-Pacific region…China canthreaten to drive its neighbors out of the South China Sea and try to intimi-date Taiwan, but has little prospect of doing either if its bluff is called’ (Grove,1997: 315).

15. A particularly interesting analysis of a hypothetical military contest betweenChina and the combined forces of Singapore and Malaysia in the SouthChina Sea is Chang (1996).

16. Only the latest fighter acquisitions, the Su-27 and Su-30, are able to provide aircover for naval task forces, and then because of refueling limitations and thelack of carrier support, only for a short period. On China’s ability to createhavoc today, see Lilly and Ford (1999).

17. I have adapted the concepts of system transforming, system reforming, andsystem maintaining from Samuel Kim, who originally applied them tobehavior in the UN. Their application here to analysis of behavior in theinternational system is solely my own adaption (Kim, 1999).

18. China does favor expansion of the membership of the Security Council andreform of the UN, which should follow the principle ‘that all countries areequal,’ but no expansion of the number of permanent members (Guo, 1995).Contrast that position with Indonesia, which favors more developing coun-tries among both permanent and non-permanent members of the SecurityCouncil (Alatas, 1998b).

Notes 225

19. Alastair Iain Johnston found the Chinese more ready than most major powersto use substantial violence to settle disputes. But he also found that mostinstances of the use of violence had involved territorial claims, which havedeclined in number as they have been settled, suggesting that the bulk ofChina’s complaints against the system are limited rather than unlimited or ide-ological. See the discussion in Chapter 4. Interestingly, the Chinese white paperput out in July 1998 is contradictory on the question of the probable use offorce against Taiwan. Discussing the issue of Taiwan, the paper states that ‘Theissue of Taiwan is entirely an internal affair of China … The ChineseGovernment seeks to achieve the reunification of the country by peacefulmeans, but it will not commit itself not to resort to force…In deciding whichway to deal with the issue of Taiwan, the Chinese Government has no obliga-tion to make a commitment to any country or any person attempting to splitChina.’ But two pages later, we are told that ‘Strategically China pursues the [sic]defensive policy featuring self-defense and gaining mastery by striking onlyafter the enemy has struck, and adheres to the principle: “We will not attackunless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack.” ’Doubtless the Chinese leadership would explain this discrepancy on thegrounds that Taiwan is an internal Chinese affair and not subject to the rules ofinternational military issues. This is confirmed by Disarmament AmbassadorSha Zukang who said in 1996 that China’s no first use of nuclear weapons doesnot apply in the case of Taiwan since it is a province of China. That argument,of course, is precisely what bothers the West (State Council, 1998; Betts andChristensen, 2000–1: 19). On the use of force against Taiwan, see also Zhao(1999–2000).

20. The joint statement issued by China and Russia, December 1999 in Beijing,nicely illustrates that while Beijing’s positions on international issues differfrom those of the US, they are mostly cautious and orthodox. The statementfirst states that the two countries will work for the establishment of a multi-polar world on the basis of the UN charter, to strengthen the UN’s dominantrole in international affairs and peacefully resolve international conflicts bypolitical means, and is followed by a restatement of the five principles ofpeaceful coexistence. The statement opposes violation of the Anti-BallisticMissile Treaty and opposes ‘forces in the way of equitable international deci-sion making.’ The two countries believe the World Trade Organization(WTO) should have more universal representation and take into considera-tion differing levels of socioeconomic development. They favor observingthe UN resolutions on Iraq, resolving problems there by peaceful means, andlifting the economic embargo. The statement also provides the obligatorypronouncements on national unification with Taiwan, in favor of respectingthe sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and reiteration that thematter of Chechnya is an internal affair (Sino-Russian, 1999: 10).

21. Interestingly, Beijing also put pressure on the Thai government to force can-cellation of an international Falun Gong meeting to be held in Thailand.This was one of the few instances where ethnic Chinese businessmen appearto have been recruited to pressure a government (The Nation, 2001a).

22. Regarding the future of Sino-US relations, Kenneth Waltz’s contention that ‘Theuneven distribution of capabilities continues to be the key to understandinginternational politics,’ perhaps goes too far, but it suggests a good place tostart any analysis (Waltz, 1999).

226 Notes

4 China: Historical and Contemporary Policies in Southeast Asia

1. Swaine and Tellis support Johnston’s conclusions on the prevalence of violence in Chinese history, arguing that ‘the use of force has been endemicin Chinese history’ (Swaine and Tellis, 2000: chapter 3). A fascinatingaccount of the Chinese voyages to South and Southeast Asia and Africa isLevathes (1994).

2. Johnston does emphasize that once China is in a military dispute, it tends toescalate the dispute, and this tendency may be exacerbated by recently adoptedChinese doctrines that stress the offensive, preemptive use of force withoutalternative forms of crisis management. Especially when interacting with theoffensive preferences of the US military, there would be a tendency to escalatequickly, and both countries could profitably study ways to avoid such situations.

3. Relevant works on major conflicts include Whiting (1960 and 1975) andRobinson (1972).

4. Beijing claimed to have sent as many as 320,000 personnel to Vietnam dur-ing the war (Yahuda, 1983: 219).

5. Background on the genesis of ASEAN can be found in Leifer (1996).6. Background and context for the ‘four modernizations,’ the policy that makes

current policy possible, are in Baum (1980).7. China concluded border settlements during the 1960s with Myanmar,

Mongolia, Bhutan, Sikkim (now part of India), Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan.In the 1990s, it concluded boundary treaties with Laos, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,Kyrgyzstan, and Russia (Nathan and Ross, 1997: 9). China still has unresolvedborder questions with Russia, India, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan and SoutheastAsian countries over the Spratly Islands (Swaine and Tellis, 2000: 131).

8. For a longer discussion of the importance of control of the sea-lanes for tradeand shipping, see Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu (2000: chapters 2 and 3).

9. In 1981, Allen Whiting was told by a specialist in the PRC Ministry of ForeignAffairs, ‘we do not claim all the water in the South China Sea, only all theislands, reefs and shoals’ (Whiting, 1997b: 337).

10. Highlighting the basic differences between American and Chinese perspec-tives on Taiwan, Richard Madsen relates this exchange with a Chinese gen-eral in Beijing: ‘ “Americans who support Taiwan’s independence have nosense of history,” he said. “The people on Taiwan speak Chinese, their cul-ture is Chinese, their ancestors came from mainland China. Therefore theyare Chinese, and Taiwan should be part of China.” To which my rejoinder is:“Although there may be good geopolitical reasons for considering Taiwanpart of the PRC, your argument doesn’t correspond to basic American under-standings of moral value. If our founding fathers truly agreed with such anargument, we would still be part of England” ’ (Madsen, 1995: x).

11. For an analysis emphasizing Japan’s commitment to ‘national security poli-cies that de-emphasize military instruments as a means of achieving nationalobjectives,’ see Berger (1996).

12. Indonesia’s role as a power in Southeast Asia has been hurt badly by the eco-nomic downturn. World Bank figures show a 39 percent drop in GNPbetween 1997 and 1998 (World Bank, 1999 and 2000).

Notes 227

13. For arguments on the need for close Australian–Southeast Asian andUS–Australian relations, and Australia’s growing role in Asia, see MacIntyre(1996) and Thakur (1998). Stanley O. Roth, former US Assistant Secretary ofState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, praised the close cooperative relationsbetween the US and Australia when he said in February 2000 congressionaltestimony that ‘Australia has been by our side in every battlefield from Koreato Desert Storm’ (Congressional, 2000). On the Chinese view on theUS–Australian link, see Li (1996).

14. According to Chang, the Chinese are one of five global tribes identified byJoel Kotkin. Samuel P. Huntington’s book also has the theme that ‘cultureand cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities,are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world’ (Huntington, 1996: 20).

15. But as Jusuf Wanandi points out, the Southeast Asia ethnic Chinese contri-bution to investment in the PRC is paltry (Wanandi, 1996: 127).

16. See also Wanandi, who states that ‘The “overseas Chinese” network is amyth,’ and that ‘[Beijing] consciously refrained from promoting the idea ofa greater China’ (Wanandi, 1996: 126–7). On the issue of investment flow,see Sutter (1997: 8).

17. This section on Chinese attitudes and policies toward multilateralism is basedon Garrett and Glaser (1994). The quote from Qian Qichen is on their page 15.

18. China has produced white papers in 1995, 1998 and 2000, plus one on theTaiwan issue in 2000. All of them are generally perceived as general andvague, but not that different from the white papers produced by SoutheastAsian countries (State Council, 1995, 1998, 2000a, 2000b).

19. Allen Whiting quotes Jusuf Wanandi (in Whiting, 1997a: 319). China hadpreviously seized islands claimed by Vietnam, but at that time Vietnam wasnot a member of ASEAN. For details see the section on Vietnam in Chapter 6.

20. Regarding regional multilateral institutions, Johnston and Evans suggestthat: ‘If we ask whether China has been more or less willing than the UnitedStates to offer fresh ideas and to compromise and make high-level sacrifices,even at the rhetorical level, the answer is flattering to China. The issue is notwhether Chinese leaders are sacrificing national interests in favor of promot-ing multilateralism. Rather, the issue is whether multilateralism is now seenas consistent with national interests’ (Johnston and Evans, 1999: 264).

21. A more optimistic assessment of the potential for Sino-ASEAN economicrelations can be found in Wong (1995).

5 Southeast Asia: Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area?

1. On the concept of a power vacuum in all of East Asia, see Roy (1995).2. A summary of the historical relation between religion and security can be

found in von der Mehden (1996) and an account of religion’s role inIndonesia in Hefner (1999).

3. Buzan’s weak states are ‘arbitrarily defined populations occupying post-colonial states possessing no firm political foundations of their own otherthan the fact of their existence, and their recognition by the international

228 Notes

Notes 229

community.’ He suggests that the existence of any one of the following char-acteristics should lead one to query whether a state is weak: (1) high level ofpolitical violence, (2) conspicuous role for political police in lives of citizens,(3) major political conflict over ideology used to organize the state, (4) lackof a coherent national identity or contending national identities within thestate, (5) lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority, and (6) high degree of state control over the media.

4. For divergent views on Asian and Western democracies, see Mahbubani,1995; Hood, 1998; Robison, 1996; Neher, 1994; Mauzy, 1997. It is disturb-ing that Mahbubani, arguing the relative peacefulness of Asia vis-à-visEurope, asserts that ‘more lives are lost daily on the periphery of Europe[Georgia and the Balkans] than in the entire Asia-Pacific region,’ and neg-lects even to mention the carnage in Cambodia which started in the mid-1970s, continued into the 1990s and led to over a million deaths just in thethree-and-a-half years the Khmer Rouge were in power, or one out of sevenCambodian citizens. While it can be argued that Western policies were par-tially responsible for the Khmer Rouge coming to power, there is no doubt itwas a homegrown movement that systematically implemented a dark andsinister philosophy amounting to a Cambodian holocaust (Jackson, 1989).

5. Reforms fell short of expectation that the military would be excluded frompolitics. The military was exempted from prosecution for past abuses undernew human rights laws, the assembly passed a measure allowing the armedforces to retain their 38 seats in the 700-member legislative body until 2009,and President Wahid was also forced to retreat from initial appointments ofreformers in the military (Chandrasekaran, 2000b, 2000c, 2001; Liddle,2000; McBeth and Murphy, 2000; Djalal, 2000; McBeth, 2001; Dhume andHiebert, 2001; Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 32; Editorial, 2001b; IISS,2001b). Under Sukarnoputri, the Assembly reversed itself and phased out themilitary representation, and took the momentous step of approving newdirect elections for the presidency. Some prosecution of military officersimplicated in the East Timor events is still ongoing.

6. Foreign investment is reported to have fallen from a peak of US$8.6 billion in1996 to US$1.4 billion in 1999 (Chandrasekaran, 2000a). The Janus-like atti-tude toward change and reform in Vietnam is described nicely in Pierre (2000).

7. As Keohane suggests, ‘Regimes provide information and reduce the costs oftransactions that are consistent with their injunctions, thus facilitatinginterstate agreements and their decentralized enforcement’ (Keohane, 1984:246; Stein, 1990). For a dissenting view, see Mearsheimer (1994–5).

8. George Yeo, Singapore’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs has been quotedas saying that ‘without the Vietnamese threat, it is doubtful that ASEANwould have become the regional grouping it is today’ (Buszynski, 1997–8;Dosch and Mols, 1998: 169–70). Leifer has also stressed the role of theIndonesian–Malaysian confrontation in the mid-1960s in jump-startingASEAN (Leifer, 1999a: 26–7).

9. Leifer states that the ARF, relying on the ASEAN model, represents both the strengths and the weaknesses of the ASEAN model: ‘The strength rests onthe culture of constraint that comes from a collective commitment to dialogue,while the weaknesses rest on placing the institution’s viability before

addressing the practical problems of regional security’ (Leifer, 1996: 29, 45–6).The members of the ARF are: the ten ASEAN states plus Australia, Canada,China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, SouthKorea, and the United States.

10. Setting up redundant and superfluous organizations not only will notstrengthen Southeast Asia’s influence, but will actually weaken it. For exam-ple, Indonesia President Wahid attempted in November 2000 to establish aWest Pacific Forum to include Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, NewZealand, East Timor and the Philippines (IISS, 2001b: 209).

11. On the impact of the liberalization in Indonesia on trade and AFTA, seeSmith (1999). On commitment institutions, see Mattli (1999). One reportdoes suggest that the ASEAN countries may largely meet their tariff reductiontargets by 2002 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 36).

12. Ravenhill points out that ASEAN has a long tradition of preferring politicalto administrative or juridical arrangements for the settlement of disputes(Ravenhill, 1995: 860).

13. As C. Oman points out, during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, coun-tries in Latin America and Africa, concerned about their dependency on thedeveloped countries, sought to reduce that dependency through regionalintegration. Today in contrast, the logic of regional integration in developingcountries is one of strengthening their participation in that trade. Quoted inBowles (1997: 225).

14. The members of APEC are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong,Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, thePhilippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States.

6 The Southeast Asian Nations: Views of China and the US

1. In 1996, Lee said that ‘By fighting and negotiating with the NorthVietnamese, Nixon bought time for South Vietnam to build up and fight onits own. The South Vietnamese did not succeed, but that extra time Nixonbought, enabled Southeast Asia to get its act together, and to lay the founda-tions for ASEAN’s growth’ (Lee, 1996: 4). The Foreign Minister is quoted inEmmerson (1996a: 67).

2. A Chinese analyst’s complaint about ASEAN countries that adhere to a ‘oneChina’ policy but ‘cater’ to Taiwan’s ‘practical diplomacy,’ the result of Taiwan’sattempt to develop ‘substantial relations’ with ASEAN countries, is in He (1998).

3. Chinese sensitivity over the treatment of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia is aperennial issue that transcends Indonesian foreign policy regimes dating backto 1959 when China actually sent ships to transport its nationals back to China.

4. Indonesia’s total defense spending is likely higher than these figures indicatebecause of frequent off-budget expenditures, but for the most part thisspending does not directly affect its defense capabilities.

5. Many Indonesians themselves believed that ASEAN served to restrain thegovernment’s foreign policy, and that absent ASEAN the area would revert tothe pre-1967 tension and conflict (Anwar, 1994: 282, 297).

6. Indonesia was one of only three Southeast Asian countries, the other twobeing Thailand and the Philippines, which received direct military aid fromthe United States (Anwar, 1994: 283).

230 Notes

7. Allen Whiting has an illuminating and detailed account of the discussionsover the Natuna Island claims in Whiting (1997a: 305–8).

8. On the significance of the treaty, one analyst stated that ‘The defense treaty…is particularly remarkable, for although in substantive terms the level ofdefense cooperation between the two countries is still very modest, in formalterms the commitment to consult each other in the event of external threatsto either party comes close to the agreement between Canberra andWashington under the ANZUS agreement’ (MacIntyre, 1996: 617). AllenWhiting makes a convincing case that the agreement was motivated byIndonesia’s concern about China’s activities and growing influence in theSouth China Sea (Whiting, 1997a: 303–11).

9. Wahid visited Beijing in May 2000 and signed a joint statement on bilateralcooperation. This statement included a defense of the Anti-Ballistic Missile(ABM) Treaty. This may be the first official Southeast Asian comment onTMD, presumably put in at Chinese request (PRC-Indonesia, 2000).

10. Joseph Chin Yong Liow writes that ‘Curiously enough, even thoughMahathir had always held the view that Japan would be the leader of theEAEC, he had chosen a meeting with a Chinese, not Japanese, leader as theplatform on which to announce his initiative (Liow, 2000)’.

11. It may illustrate Chinese awareness of Thailand’s feeling of ease with thedichotomous nature of Chinese policy that Defense Minister Chi Haotian,meeting with Thai armed forces’ supreme commander WatthanachaiWutthisire in 1995, was able to both refute the ‘China threat’ argument and still assert that China’s sovereignty over the Spratlys was ‘indisputable’(Li, 1995).

12. (Neher, 1999: 92–6). Neher suggests that Philippine ambivalence toward theUS is occasionally symbolically illustrated by the number of Filipinos demon-strating against US policy in front of the US embassy and the equal numberwaiting there in line for an immigrant visa.

13. I am indebted to Bernard Cole for the information on the MOU with theGermans. Personal communication.

14. This paragraph relies heavily on Whiting’s account in (Whiting, 1997a:315–17). According to Whiting, some ASEAN members believed that Marcosoverreacted to Mischief Reef for domestic reasons. On the general securitysituation see also Morada and Collier (1998).

15. Jusuf Wanandi, quoted in Whiting (1997a: 319).16. Reportedly, much of the weaponry, including anti-aircraft missiles, were

deployed on the India–Myanmar border (Malik, 1997: 55). Since theMyanmar national accounts do not reflect the armaments money spent inChina, Stephen McCarthy suggests that much of this expenditure has beenfinanced with drug money. His estimate of the money spent on Chinesearms is $3 billion. (McCarthy, 2000: 250).

7 Further Security in Southeast Asia: Preparing for a Changing of the Guard

1. The testimony of Ralph A. Cossa at a congressional hearing (CongressionalHearing, 1996: 41).

Notes 231

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257

Index

Abdullah Ahmad Badawibalancing against Beijing is

risky, 188chosen successor to Malaysian

Prime Minister Mahathir, 122deprecates ‘cold war mindsets’, 191

Abu Sayyaf group, 200Aceh

aspirations for independence, 46festering regional problem, 155–6

Afghanistan war, effect on Chineseview of future battlefield, 86

Africa, comparison with SoutheastAsia, 32

AFTA, founding largely a defensivemove, 174

Alagappa, Muthiah, 170Alamonte, Jose, and importance of

South China Sea area, 45Alatas, Ali, trip to Beijing, 184–5alliance commitments in East Asia,

33–4, 94Alwi Shihab, 183–4Annan, Kofi

Jiang told China will not practice‘hegemonism’, 84

Anti-Ballistic Missile TreatyASEAN position on US missile

defense plans, 222 (n31)China-Indonesia signed defense of,

231 (n9)APEC, 100, 174, 215

as alternative to EAEC, 189–90becomes more important, 5Clinton emphasis on upgrading, 51members of, 230 (n14)US parochialism and reluctance to

take risks, 52Western and Asian perspectives on,

52, 174Aquino, Corazon

1989 potential coup against hergovernment, 46

ARF, 100, 113, 183, 185, 215ASEAN use of ARF to increase

influence, 169–73Chinese participation, 130lack of US role in creation, 47members of, 229–30 (n9)strengths and weaknesses, 229–30

(n9)Armey, Dick, view on US China

policy, 44ASEAN, 94, 96, 100, 113, 114,

116, 215and economic cooperation, 173–4China offered free trade agreement

to, 139‘commitment institutions’, 173,

230 (n11)decision making in, 167–8diminished prospects for

consensus, 5economic status of ASEAN-5, 135evidence of welcome of outside

intervention, 171–3failure of US to halt expansion

of, 47founding of, 111, 229 (n8)investment flows between

China–ASEAN, 138–9lack of leadership for peacekeeping

missions, 121Ministerial Meeting, Chinese

participation, 130‘operating premises’ of ASEAN can

only be inferred, 168position on US missile defense

plans, 222 (n31)Post Ministerial Conference,

Chinese participation, 130success in attracting foreign

investment, 222–3 (n36)successes of, 169trade with China compared to

industrial countries, 135–8

ASEAN � 3, 215Asian democracy

definition of, 54divergent views of, 229 (n4)implementation in Southeast Asia,

151–5Asian Fund proposal, 53Aung San Suu Kyi, on Western

values, 56Australia, 4, 114, 195–6

acceptable as leader of peacekeepingmissions, 121

and UN operation to restore orderin East Timor, 46, 185–6

as human rights advocate, 57essential to Southeast Asian security,

228 (n13)turning ASEAN countries against

China, 119

Baker, James A., nature ofinternational system, 20

Bandung Conference and policy, 110, 205

bandwagoning, 117, 193Banham, Thai Prime Minister, 117Bank of China, opens branches in

Jakarta and Manila, 138Baum, Richard, effect of reforms on

structure of governance, 73Bell, Coral, and future of US

dominance, 29Betts, Richard, 201bipolar system in East Asia, 59bombing of Chinese embassy by US,

impact on Chinese behavior, 43Britain, 77, 86, 109

colonial investments, 102overtaken by US, 15, 219 (n7)

Brunei, 117, 131Chinese criticism of cooperation

with US, 119trade with industrialized countries,

218 (n5)Brzezinski, Zbigniew

common US-China securityinterests, 223 (n2)

test of China sphere of influence, 85Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 219 (n8)

Bush, George H. W., 28Bush, George W.

administration promised militaryaid to Philippines, 200

and activist foreign policy, 24Buzan, Barry

definition of weak state, 151indicators of weak states, 228–9 (n3)

Cairo Declaration, 115Cambodia, 101, 109, 118, 122,

183–4, 193admission to ASEAN, 4–5and Cambodian holocaust, 229 (n4)and Human Development Index,

208and low priority to economic

growth, 49as insular state, 6; small amount of

high-level manufacturedexports, 137–8

as neutral state, 111Chinese aid to, 208Chinese visit to November 2000, 122civil conflict, 1975–91, 48, 145Hun Sen’s 1997 coup d’état,

162, 208international settlement and follow

on, 208losses in human life to Khmer

Rouge, 163struggle between US and China

over tribunal for Khmer Rouge,122, 208

trade with industrialized countries,218 (n5)

UNTAC authority in, 163US role in 1991 settlement, 47withdrawal of Vietnam, 203

Campbell, Kurt, and US commitmentto Southeast Asia, 50

Canada, as human rights advocate, 57Carter foreign policy in East Asia, 26Cebu, Philippines, closing of

consulate there, 50Chatichai Choonhaven, emphasis on

economy, 194Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, as Prime

Minister offered arms, 193

258 Index

Chen Ziming, 64Chi Haotian, 230 (n11)

asked Thai Prime Minister to serveas bridge to Southeast Asia, 194

delivered $3 million military aid toCambodia, 208

met Malaysian counterpart, 190visits Manila, 199

Chiang Kai-shek, and South Seamap, 115

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,support for involvement inEast Asia, 32

Chile, overthrow of government, 23China

ability to govern: corruption ofideology, 72–3, 224 (n7);devolution of authority toregions, 67; effect ofdemocratization, 71, 80; Islamicseparatists, 81, 113; media andcommunication changes, 74–5;political reform, 67–8; politicalsupport, 64; separatisttendencies, 82; tax revenues aspercent of income, 67

and Asian culture, 8and authoritarian rule, 8; and

human rights, 54–5;diminution of, 72–5; extent ofsupport for government, 64

and meeting demands of system, 8and US – mirror images of each

other, 59as a rising power, 7–8, 14–15, 17aspiration to be superpower, 58as ‘strategic partner’, 221 (n24, 25),

34; common strategic interests,223 (n2); view of George W.Bush, 35; views of Jiang andClinton, 221 (n25)

at war with US, 59contribution in Southeast Asian

1997 economic crisis, 53de facto alliance with US, 59economic situation: decline in

central government revenue,65; dependence on importedenergy, 102; economic

strengths and liabilities, 63–8;energy needs, 114;environmental degradation, 65;‘four modernizations’, 227 (n6);growth of exports and FDI, 65,102; growth rate, 63; inequality,67, 223–4 (n4); priority oneconomic development, 18;projected GDP and comparisonto US, 68–71, methodology for,68, 224 (n6); scepticism ofofficial economic figures, 65;stability and prognosis for, 64

elites: education and capability of,65–6; ‘nationalists’ and‘internationalists’, 76–7;PLA attitudes, 77–8

foreign policy attitudes/policies: andeffect on Chinese behavior,38–9, 71; as dissatisfied power,16; Bandung policy, 110;blaming others, 8; bordersettlements and problems, 81,227 (n7); complaint aboutASEAN ties to Taiwan, 230 (n2);factors tempering conflict withUS, 11; five principles ofpeaceful coexistence, 58, 110,112; importance of Spratlys toChina, 113–15, 227 (n9);insurgency (support for), 110;‘lean to one side’ policy, 110;missile defense, 219 (n9);multilateral institutions, 128–35,228 (n20); ‘myth of superiority,’108; nationalism, 11; objectivesin East Asia, 94; peacekeeping,133; policy of peace andindependence, 112; preferredinternational system, 93–4;sovereignty, 78–9; territorialambitions, 11; ‘the east windprevails over the west wind,’111; toward Japan, 37; towardmultilateral institutions, 36–7;toward Taiwan, 79, 88; views oncauses of war, 17–18; willingnessto use violence abroad, 109–10;xenophobia, 81, 108, 117

Index 259

China – continuedinterests in common with US, 8military capabilities, 85–90: ability

to provide air cover, 225 (n15);air force modernization, 87–8;lack of priority on navaldevelopment, 87; militaryspending, 87–8; nuclear arsenal,18; ‘pockets of excellence’ indefense development, 88;‘strategies to pose problems’ asdefense tactic, 89; tendency toover estimate China’scapabilities, 89

reform on UN Security Council, 225 (n18)

threat to Taiwan and South ChinaSea Islands, 36; capability totakeover, see Taiwan

threats to the internationalsystem, 39–43

white papers, 132, 228 (n18)worries about US attack, 17

Chinese Embassy, 103Christensen, Thomas

Chinese strategies to poseproblems, 89

on Chinese views of US presence, 36Christopher, Warren, human rights as

universal, 55Churchill, Winston S., 10Clinton administration

and economic hardball innegotiations, 50–1

Clinton visit to Thailand, 195on Chinese opinion of, 76resentment of economic

nationalism of, 51Cohen, William, 113–14cold war, 145Cole, Bernard D., 222 (n35), 230 (13)constructivism, 10, 168–9cosmopolitan states, 6, 175–7Cossa, Ralph A., 230 (n1)CPB (Communist Party of

Burma), 205CPM (Communist Party of

Malaysia), 188critical military technology areas, 86

CSCAP (Council for SecurityCooperation in Asia Pacific), 131

Dallek, RobertUS Marshall Plan, 25

Deng Xiaopingand military, 78and ‘pockets of excellence’, 88and self-reliance, 8as internationalist, 76‘bide our time and build our

capabilities’, 93economic strategy, 64future of interdependence for

China, 101impressed with Singapore’s

economic strategy, 179on ideology in China, 73sovereignty more important than

human rights, 55de Villa, Renato, 199Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, 95, 113Dili massacre, 186dissatisfied power, indicators of, 90Dole, Robert, views on China, 39–40domestic factors in power transition,

18–19dominant party democracy

decline of, 153–5suitability of for developing

states, 153–5Dominican Republic, overthrow of

government, 23

EAEC (East Asian EconomicCaucus), 113

Chinese support for, 189–90EASI (East Asian Security Initiative),

reduction of troops in Asia, 28–9East Timor, 121, 181

abstention of US from direct role in1999 crisis, 47

and Australia led UN force, 46, 133and UN referendum in, 5and weakening of Southeast Asia, 5dependent on trade, 177festering regional problem, 155–6Singapore vote to condemn 1975

Indonesian invasion of, 177

260 Index

Eastern Europe, 68EP-3 incident, 89Estrada government, 158

lack of US role in ouster, 47

Falun Gong, 103crackdown on, 84

Federation of Malaysia, Singaporeexpelled in 1965, 177

five principles of peaceful coexistence,see China

Foot, Rosemary, 132FPDA (Five Power Defense

Agreement), 178France, 86, 109

displaced by Britain, 15

Gaddis, John Lewis, 219 (n10)Garrett, Banning, 128GDP, and power, 218–19 (n3)Gelbard, Robert, and nationalist

demonstrations, 223 (n41)Geneva Conference (1954), 110–11Germany, 86, 102

challenger to England, 15Gill, Bates, 225 (n13), 133Gilpin, Robert, 219 (n6)Glaser, Bonnie, 128Glendening, Paris, issued honorary

proclamation to Falun Gong –apologized, 103

Goh Chok Tongand US presence in Asia, 7on US in unipolar world, 7

Goldstein, Avery, China lacks appealas overall model for world, 85

Golkar (Indonesia), 155Goodman, David, 124, 127Gordon, Bernard, US opposition to

dominant power in East Asia, 25Gore, Al, criticism of Malaysia, 190–1great leap forward, 225 (n12)Grove, Eric, 225 (n14)Guangdong Province, and reform, 74Guatemala, overthrow of

government, 23Gulf of Thailand, 208Gulf War

deployment of Japanese ships, 118

effect on Chinese view of futurebattlefield, 86

small Chinese role in, 82

Habibe, B.J., 126–7, 167, 186hegemony, 94

and US, 21–2definition of, 220 (n14)

Heilongjiang Province, effect ofreform, 74

Helms, Jesse, policy towardChina, 40

Hong Kong, 77China’s attitude toward, 79economic growth rate, 63

Huang, Yasheng, 64human rights

as universal, 55–7how US should advocate for, 56–7

Hun Sen1997 coup by, 4, 122

Hunt, Michael, and US racism, 24–5Huntington, Samuel P.

and unipolar world, 218 (n7)changes in viewpoint of US policy,

221 (n21)leaders miscalculating

legitimacy, 153need for US restraint, 31

Huxley, Tim, 218, (n4)

Ibrahim, Anwarjailing sparked concern over

principle of non-interference,167

on human rights, 54visit to China in 1994, 190

Ikenberry, G. John, 20, 220 (n16)and open hegemony, 22China as a strategic partner,

221 (n24)IMF

reforms delayed in Indonesia, 156role in 1997 economic crisis, 53–4

India, 94–5, 96, 101, 109–10, 120as challenging power, 7, 61increasing apprehension of

Sino-Myanmarcooperation, 206

Index 261

Indonesia, 101, 110, 121, 200and ‘guided democracy’, 111, 181as cosmopolitan state, 6as mid-level power, 5, 9, 145, 181as part of ASEAN, 4China’s support for Indonesian

alternative to UN, 90–1Communist Party of Indonesia

(PKI), 111, 181coup against Sukarno (1965),

111, 181defense policy: and China’s interest

in Natuna Island (s), 88, 184,230 (n7); and South China Seaproblem, 184–5; low percent ofGDP spent on defense, 181–2,230 (n4); potential for outsideintervention, 46

effect of 1997 crisis, 49, 227 (n12)foreign policy: and IMF President

Camadessus, 53; and reform ofUN Security Council, 225 (n18);and three time cut-off of USmilitary aid, 186, 230 (n6);ASEAN foreign policy asIndonesian policy, 184–5, 230(n5); attitude toward Australianpeacekeeping mission in EastTimor, 186; Chinese criticism ofcooperation with US, 119;shares ‘mirror image’ withChina of proper place insubregion, 182; New Orderforeign policy, 181–3; Wahidforeign policy, 186–7

human rights in, 55nationalism in, 223 (n41), 186;

anti-Americanism in, 186;attitudes on and reaction toEast Timor independence, 186

public desire to end Suharto era, 153reforms after fall of Suharto, 156–7,

229 (n5)security treaty with Australia (1995);

almost certainly aimed atChina, 185–6, 230 (n8);as example for otherASEAN countries to broadendefense ties, 186

separatist areas, 147trade with industrialized countries,

218 (n5)insular states, 6, 175–7interdependence, 10, 80, 224 (n10),

98, 101–7and China’s dependence on

international economy, 101–2and the virtual state, 100

International Covenant on Economic,Cultural and Social Rights,Chinese ratified, 55

Iran, overthrow of government, 23Irian Jaya, see West Papua

Japan, 55, 86, 94, 101–2, 114,116–17, 120

alliance with US, 32–3and economic priorities, 10–11and multipolar international

system, 93and 1941 oil embargo, 17as challenging power, 7, 15,

219 (n7), 61Chinese and US interest in limiting

power of, 60deployment of military abroad since

World War II, 118domination of East China Sea, 88economic growth rate, 63has not atoned for behavior in

World War II, 81impact of Chinese attack on Taiwan

on Japan, 117–18unique history and culture, 59,

223 (n3), 227 (n11)Jayakumar, S.

lecture (1996) at GeorgetownUniversity, 178

views on international law, 224 (n10)

Jiang Zemin, 66China will not practice

‘hegemonism’, 84compliments Sukarnoputri on

handling OC issue, 127meeting with Ramos after Mischief

Reef, 199meeting with Thai PM, 117

262 Index

Jiang Zemin – continuedon the effect of democracy on

China, 71raised issue of overseas Chinese in

Indonesia, 126reassurance to Indonesia on

Aceh, 121sceptical about potential for

multilateralism, 129–30signed cooperation agreements with

Myanmar, 205timetable for takeover of Taiwan, 95visit to Cambodia, 208visits to Southeast Asia, 119

Johnston, Alastair Iain, and Chineseuse of violence, 226 (n19), 227 (nn1, 2)

Johnson, Chalmers, effect of UStroops on local population, 221 (n21)

Kastner, Scott, 103Kelly, James A.

China’s high confidence inSoutheast Asia economies, 139

on impact of September 11, 221 (n23)

Keohane, Robert O., 220 (n113), 229 (n7)

Khai, Vietnam Prime Minister, 162, 203

Kim Dae Jung, and US presence inEast Asia, 51

Kim Jong-Il, receptive to US presencein East Asia, 31, 51

Kim, Samuel S., 225 (n17)Kissinger, Henry, 93, 95

and legitimacy, 219 (n4)and Wilsonianism, 221 (n17), 27

Koizumi, Junichiro 61, 223 (n3)Konfrontasi, 48, 111, 145, 181Korea (North), 101, 109

good relations with Laos, 209US at war with, 59use of Japanese ship pilots during

Korean War, 118Korea (South), 95, 101–2

and Korean war, 89as trouble spot, 32, 33

democracy and human rights, 55economic growth rateIMF role in 1997, 53–4

Kosovo (war in), 83Chinese criticism of, 55little Chinese role in, 82

Lake, David A., and comparison ofregions, 218 (n6)

Laosadmission to ASEAN, 4and low priority to reform and

economic growth, 49, 209as insular state, 6; small amount of

high-level manufacturedexports, 137–8

as neutral, 111Chinese-Vietnamese competition

for influence, 209landlocked and dependent on

outside assistance, 208–9part of former Indochina

development triangle, 209trade with industrialized countries,

218 (n5)Law of the Sea Convention, 185Lee Kuan Yew

as effective leader of Singapore, 159enjoys commenting on Asian

situation, 176granted access to China available to

few others, 179long-time supporter of US presence

in Southeast Asia, 177, 230 (n1)on necessity of integrating China

into international system, 180on seriousness of Taiwan

conflict, 116says China is the biggest player in

history of man, 179triangular relationship with US,

Japan and China is mostimportant, 179

US bought time (with Vietnam War)for Southeast Asia, 230 (n1)

US is key player in East Asia, 180Lee Teng-hui, ‘two state theory’, 84legitimacy (domestic), definition

of, 152

Index 263

legitimacy in the internationalsystem, 16, 219 (n4)

Leifer, Michael, 218 (nn2, 3)lesser states using influence with

great powers to effect securityarrangements, 173

on Australian–Indonesian securitytreaty, 185–6

strengths and weaknesses of ARF,229 (n9)

Levine, Steve, corruption of ideologyin China, 73

Levy, Jack S., war between democraticstates, 222 (n28)

Li Hongzhi, 103Li Peng, 127, 189

on democracy in China, 72meeting with Thai PM, 117visit to Myanmar in 1994, 205visited Singapore in 1997, 179

Liow, Joseph Chin Yong, 230 (n10)

Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, 200Madsen, Richard, 227 (n10)Mahathir, Mohamad

and blaming others, 8, 159and diversity of Asia, 168as friend of China, 113ASEAN is helpless to influence

affairs of the world, 170–1critical of alliances, 189critique of democracy, 152meeting demands of system, 8US viewed as threatening as

China, 187visits to China, 190

Mahbubani, Kishore, no mention ofKhmer Rouge massacres, 229 (n4)

Malaysia, 101, 110, 117, 181 see alsoMahathir

as cosmopolitan state, 6as developed nation, 6; high

percentage of high-levelexports, 137–8

as large economy, 145China as security risk, 188–9;

balancing against Beijing isrisky, 188; Mischief Reefincident a shock, 191;

more modern military thanChina has, 145; normalizationof relations with China, 188;refused to condemn China’saction toward Taiwan (1995–6),190

Chinese criticism of cooperationwith US, 119

Chinese endorsement of ZOPFAN,111, 188–9

development of institutionsconducive to economicsuccess, 49–50

effect of 1997 crisis, 49foreign policy orientation, 188Framework on MultiDimensional

Cooperation with China(1999), 190

human rights in, 55importance of ethnic issue in, 188possible succession crisis, 122, 161primary proponent of ZOPFAN,

188; Australian–Indonesiadefense agreement welcomed inspite of, 192; maintenance ofties with West in spite of, 191–2

recognized by China, 111Spratly problem, concern about,

188–9; reversal on issue ofsolving by bilateralnegotiations, 192

trade interests in Taiwan, 116trade with industrialized countries,

218 (n5)Mao Zedong

and PLA, 78and preferred international system,

93strategies of economic

development, 64Taiwan Strait crisis, 225 (n12)timetable for takeover of Taiwan, 95

Maull, Hans W., 225 (n13)Mauzy, Diane, difference in Western

and Asian values, 55May 4, 1919, 80McCarthy, Stephen, Myanmar arms

purchases depend on drug money,230 (n16)

264 Index

McDougall, Walter A.and patterns in foreign policy,

221 (n18)Medan, Indonesia, closing of

consulate, 50Meiji Restoration, equivalent to PRC

takeover, 63–4Middle East, comparison with

Southeast Asia, 32Mischief Reef, 88, 132, 197–8

and US role, 47conflict with China, 109–10, 115

Morgan, Patrick M., see Lake, David A.Mosher, Steven, 218 (n2)multipolar system, 93Myanmar, 4, 101, 110

and low priority to economicgrowth, 49

as insular state, 6; small amount ofhigh-level manufacturedexports, 137–8

as neutral, 111as weak state, 161border disputes with Thailand,

121, 207China’s use of Myanmar to check

India, 206Chinese economic impact in

Myanmar, 206–7Chinese use of Myanmar for

intelligence gathering, 206early relations with China, 204–5elections (1990) as miscalculation,

153, 161joined ASEAN in 1997, 207lack of US concern over closeness to

China, 204–5, 207military size and arms purchases,

205–6, 230 (n16)policy of nonalignment, 205potential for outside intervention,

46problems with ethnic minorities,

161, 207prospects for change, 207State Peace and Development

Council (SPDC), 161talks between military and

NLD, 161

trade with industrialized countries,218 (n5)

US failure to bring regimechange, 47

visits between Myanmar andChinese officials, 205

Najib Tun Razak, 189–90Napoleon, defeated, 15Nathan, Andrew

China as rising power, 14relationship between development

and democratization, 224 (n8)views on democratization in China,

222 (n30)nationalism

Chinese, 79–84defined, 79, 150genesis of Chinese nationalism, 82rising East Asian nationalism, 100–1

Nationalists (Guomindang), 79National People’s Congress (China),

115passed law affirming China’s

jurisdiction over Spratlys, 203NATO, as aggressive military

bloc, 83Natuna Island(s), Indonesian concern

with China’s claims, 184Neher, Clark, 230 (12)neorealism, 22Nixon, Richard M., 93Norodom Ranariddh, 122Norodom Sihanouk, 111, 179, 208

signed into law framework forKhmer Rouge trial, 208

Northeast Asia, 5, 48, 50, 62, 79, 153,204, 206, 212, 247

nuclear weapons, and powertransition, 18

Nye, Joseph S., 21alternative China policies, 43

offshore islands (China), 110O’Hanlon, Michael, 225 (n13)Oksenberg, Michel, ‘confident

nationalism’, 82Olympics, rejection of China’s bid to

host, 83

Index 265

Oman, C, regional integrationstrengthens integration ininternational system, 230 (n13)

open door policy, 26Opium War, 79, 83Organski, A.F.K., 90, 117

American dominance, 220 (n12)and power transition theory, 16,

218–19 (n3)over-optimistic prediction of

China as dominant globalpower, 89–90

overseas Chinese, 120, 122–8community not well defined, 124–5little evidence of PRC manipulation

of OC, 1231980 Nationalities Law, 124–5occurrence of riots and exodus of

country, 123own disproportionate share of

wealth in Southeast Asia, 123protests over Indonesian

discrimination, 125–7, 230 (n3)

Pakistan, 96, 101PAP (People’s Action Party–Singapore),

159Papayoanou, Paul, 103Papua New Guinea, 4Paracel Islands, 81, 88, 109–10, 113,

185seizure by China, 203

Pearl Harbor, 89People’s Daily

China as rising power, 14complaints about ASEAN countries

cooperation with US, 119war in Kosovo as new hegemony by

US, 83permanent normal US trade status

with China, 40–2Pfaff, William, US over commitment

in East Asia, 31Philippines, 4, 101, 110, 117

acquired by US, 26as cosmopolitan state, 6as large economy, 145as weak state, 157–8deplorable state of armed forces and

new appropriations, 198–9

growing poverty and inequality, 158human rights in, 55impact of Marcos period, 158inclined most (with Thailand)

against non-interference inASEAN, 167

measures taken to compensate forUS withdrawal, 197

relations with China and SpratlyIslands: as second ‘front line’state, 200; ASEAN draft code ofconduct over South Sea Islands,114, 199; China could createhavoc in military action, 88;Chinese criticism ofcooperation with US, 119;concern over Spratlys andpassing of US Visiting ForcesAgreement, 197; disputes withChina over South China SeaIslands, 114–15; establishmentof diplomatic relations withChina, 111; good relations until1995, 197–8

relations with US: Bushadministration promises $90million military aid, 200; failureby US in base negotiations, 47,222 (n35); US mutual defensetreaty might apply toPhilippine forces in Spratlys,113; withdrawal by US and roleof bases, 50, 178, 196–7

trade interests in Taiwan, 116trade with industrialized countries,

218 (n5)Pillsbury, Michael, 93PLA

control recentralized, 84technological challenge, 86

point at which internationalchallenger attacks, 17

power transition, 11, 15–19, 213–14,217

definition of, 15preventive military strike, 17–18Prueher, J.W., Commander in Chief,

122public opinion on US foreign

policy, 30

266 Index

Pye, LucianAsia has diversity of root

civilizations and religions, 146China’s failure to follow ideological

tenets, 224 (n7)

Qian Qichenand PLA, 77–8China’s past suffering ensures future

virtue, 224 (n11)foreign policy as extension of

domestic, 71maintenance of stable peripheral

environment, 112, 139on multilateralism, 128–9opportunities for East Asian

countries, 119

Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby,multi-power presence inSoutheast Asia is desirable, 178

Ramos, Fideland vulnerability of East Asia, 9meeting with Jiang Zemin, 199on a pluralistic China, 71replace ‘balance of power’ with

‘balance of mutual benefit’, 100Thais believe he exaggerated

Mischief Reef issue, 196Ravenhill, John, 230 (n12)Rawski, Thomas G., rate of economic

growth, 65, 69–70Reagan foreign policy in East Asia, 26–7realism, 22

applicability to subregion, 10–11definition of, 10‘realism plus’, 27

Realpolitik, 93China’s bias toward, 10deemphasis on by Singapore, 224

(n10)still very much alive in Southeast

Asia, 170region (subregion)

Southeast Asia as, 4Reilly, James, 133revolution in military affairs (RMA), 85Rice, Condoleezza

National Security Advisor for Bushadministration, 222 (n25)

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 20Roosevelt, Theodore, legacy of, 27Rosecrance, Richard

kinds of interdependence, 102virtual state, 100, 105

Roth, Stanley O., praise for Australia,228 (n14)

Rowen, Henry, 74Russia, 86, 94–5, 120

agreement with China (1999), 226(n20)

as challenging power, 61no threat to China, 96

Sandarac, Malaysian naval base at, 188

Saunders, Phillip, 112Scarborough Shoal, 114, 199

clashes over, 200Schell, Paul, apology to China for

honoring Falun Gong, 103Schevechenko, Alexei, see Baum,

RichardSchweller, Randall

challenger usually initiates war, 219(n8)

US restraint during cold war, 220(n16)

Segal, Gerald, China’s promotion ofsovereignty, 78

September 11 eventsand debate on Asia, xiand US presence in Southeast Asia, 7impact on US policy, 29–30, 221

(n23)Sha Zukang, 226 (n19)Sheridan, Greg, nationalism among

young Chinese, 80Siddhi Sawetsila, 194Sihanoukville, 208Simon, Sheldon, interviews done in

Southeast Asia, 50Singapore, 23, 101, 110, see also Lee

Kuan Yewas cosmopolitan state, 6as developed nation, 6; high

percentage of high-levelmanufactured exports, 137–8

as large economy, 145democracy and human rights, 55

Index 267

Singapore – continuedeconomic success, 48; development

of institutions conducive toeconomic success, 49–50;growth rate, 63

establishment of diplomaticrelations with China, 111

has most investment in China of allASEAN countries, 139

more modern military than China,145, 160

MOU to host Logistics Command ofUS Seventh Fleet, 178

opposed US invasion of Grenada,177

pledge of $5 billion to Indonesiaduring 1997 crisis, 53

restrictions on speech and politicalactivity, 159

seeks free trade agreement with US,139

takes sovereignty very seriously, 177trade interests in Taiwan, 116trade with industrialized countries,

218 (n5)US viewed as benign superpower,

178Sino-Japanese War, 79Solomon, Richard, 3South China Sea, 77, 45, 81, 86, 113,

118, 191, 193Chinese discuss situation with

Malaysia, 190Ramos proposes demilitarization, 199workshops on conflicting claim in,

184Southeast Asia

and cold war, xiand military vulnerability, 9as subregion, 5, 6Asia has diversity of root

civilizations and religions, 146bifurcation of, 5change from political-military to

economic priorities, 49China most likely enemy of

Southeast Asian countries, 165comparison with other world

regions, 32, 49

conflict in, xicosmopolitan and insular states,

175defense expenditures compared

within ASEAN and to Korea,Australia, 163–4

discontent with US policies, 32;doubts about future US role,50–1

diversity in, 5; ethnic and religiousdiversity, 146–50

economy of: and development, xi;and foreign investment, 48; andthriving economies, 24, 27;economic crisis (1997), 100,135, as downside ofglobalization, 48–9, curtailmentof defense modernization asresult of, 145–6, 165, lack ofeffective response fromsubregion, 52–3, passive role byUS in, 50, three governmentsfell as result of, 145; increasedpriority to, 48–9

lag in creation of Southeast Asianinstitutions, 167–8

limitations on military capabilitiesof Southeast Asian countries,165–6

nation states in, 150–3rivalries within subregion, 165Singapore most advanced militarily,

164South Vietnam, 111, 115Soviet Union, 24, 100, 193, 197

challenger to US, 15collapse of, 203de facto alliance with China

against, 59participated less than China in

international organizations, 97Spratly Islands, 81, 95–6, 105, 109–10,

120, 131China lacks resources to defend

southern part, 88China unlikely to take major action

against now, 88discussion with China in

ARF, 132

268 Index

Spratly Islands – continueddispute could trigger use of force by

China, 113–15energy resources potential, 114strategic value of, 45–6US policy on, 222 (n33)

Steel, Ronald, ‘internationalisttemptation’, 30–1

Straits of Malacca, Sunda andLombok, 114, 191

Chinese support forMalay/Indonesianadministration of, 111

speculation Chinese interest inaccess to throughSihanoukville, 208

US role in keeping open, 46–7‘strong’ states, 150–5

definition of, 13distribution in Southeast Asia,

152–3subregional institutionalization, 9,

166–73Suharto regime

and democracy, 55ASEAN decision making more

flexible after departure of, 167relations with China, 120

Sukarno, President, 111, 182and New Emerging Forces

movement, 111relations with China, 120

Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 120policies after gaining power, 157,

229 (n5)replaced Wahid as president, 155

Summa, Rizal, 185Summers, Lawrence, praise for IMF

role in Korea, 53Sutton, Willy, 169Swaine, Michael D., 227 (n1)Syed Hamid Albar, view of China in

Spratlys, 191

Taiwan, 7, 59, 77, 86, 89, 95–8, 102,104–5, 131

and ASEAN, 4and overseas Chinese, 127and US–Japan alliance, 222 (n30)

as diversion from PRC domesticproblems, 225 (n12)

as province of PRC, 226 (n19)as trouble spot, 32attempt by US to postpone

settlement on, 55capability of PRC to militarily

takeover, 225 (nn13, 14)China’s attitude toward, 79, 81China’s timetable for taking

over, 95Chinese first use of force and

nuclear weapons over Taiwan,226 (n19)

crisis of 1995–96, 96democracy and human rights, 55dispute over could trigger use of

force by China, 113, 115–18economic growth rate, 63effect of confrontation with China

on Southeast Asia, 44–4US weapons sales to, 91, 94

Takahashi, Takuma, definition of USinterests, 221 (n19)

Tan, Tony, impact of conflict overTaiwan, 116

Tang Jiaxuan, 121, reluctance toprotest Indonesian treatment ofChinese minority, 125–6

Tarnoff, Peter, 28Tellis, Ashley J., 227 (n1)Thailand, 101, 110

as cosmopolitan state, 6as developed nation, 6as ‘front line’ state, 193changing relations with

US, 195–6economic issues: and declining

poverty, 158; as large economy,145; development ofinstitutions conducive toeconomic success, 49–50;effect of 1997 crisis, 49;success of political andeconomic reforms in, 158–9;trade with industrializedcountries, 218 (n5)

golden age of 1980s, 193human rights in, 55

Index 269

Thailand – continuedinclined most (with Phillipines)

toward criticizing non-inter-ference principle in ASEAN, 167

rapid turnover of foreign ministers,194–5

relations with China: and arms salesfrom China, 193–4; Chavalitasked by Chinese to act asbridge with Southeast Asia, 194;criticism of Thai cooperationwith US, 119; establishment ofdiplomatic relations withChina, 111; pressure on Thaigovernment to cancel FalonGong meeting, 226 (n21);support for insurgency innorthern Thailand, 193

relations with Myanmar, 194Vietnam as traditional enemy, 193

Thaksin, Chinnawat, 195Than Shwe, 205Theater Missile Defense, 222 (n17)Tian Jiaxuan, 112Tibet, 96, 113

separatist tendencies, 81US attempt to loosen Chinese

hold on, 55Tiananmen

growth of nationalism in aftermathof, 83

Timberlake, Edward, 218 (n2)Toynbee, Arnold, and US foreign

policy, 221 (n18)Tran Duc Luong, 203tributary system (China), 107Triplett, William, 218 (n2)‘two state theory’, 84

UMNO (United Malay NationalistOrganization), 160

uni-multipolar, see unipolarunipolar, and US, 21, 218 (n7)United States

and development of institutions inEast Asia, 53

and distance from Southeast Asia, 8and humanitarian issues in

Southeast Asia, 47

and multipolar internationalsystem, 93

and Philippines, 7and unipolarity, 21commitment to East Asia during

World War II, 26comparison of response to Mexico

and Southeast Asia crises, 222(n34)

contribution in 1997 economiccrisis, 53

countering Chinese power, 7defense policy: categories of

involvement in Southeast Asia,44–8; commitment to East Asia,27–9; commitment to tworegions of the world, 221 (n20);‘schools’ on US role abroad,28–30; ‘three good things’ andpolicy priorities, 34; USpresence as reassurance for EastAsians, 33

dominance and decline, 21effectiveness in influencing events

in Southeast Asia, 47–8global dominance, 3, 7, 15–16,

19–25historical experience of, 24, 220

(n16)in common with China, 8nature of US policy: and ‘open

hegemony’, 24; and tradition ofdemocracy, 8; andunilateralism, 11, 31; arroganceof US, 11, 31; as ‘benignhegemon’, 18; potentialintervention in Cambodia in1997, 122; receives basing andlogistical support fromcosmopolitan countries, 175–7

policy toward China, 34–44: Bush,George W., policy, 35–6, onTaiwan, 40; Clinton policy,37–8; policy of engagement,36–9; rapprochement withChina in 1972, 110–11;US–Japan mutual defensetreaty, 60

270 Index

US Department of Defense, Chinesecapability to take over Taiwan,225 (n14)

US Department of State, reviewedapology to Falun Gong, 103

US Energy InformationAdministration, 114

US–Japan Defense CooperationGuidelines, 94, 134

Vietnam, 95, 101, 109–10, 117, 183–4,193, 197

admission to ASEAN, 4agreements on land borders and

Gulf of Tonkin, 203and low priority to economic

growth, 49and unique history with China,

201as insular state, 6; low amount of

high-level manufacturedexports, 137–8

assistance from China in war withUS, 109, 227 (n4)

China could create havoc inmilitary action, 88

comparison of Chinese andVietnamese response to reform,202–3

conflicts over South China Sea andSpratlys, 203–4

expiration of Russian rights inCam Ranh Bay, 202

has subordinated quarrels withChina, 96, 121–2

joined ASEAN in 1995, 162, 202lifting of US embargo and new trade

agreement, 202reluctant reforms and

declining growth rate, 162,229 (n6)

slow pace of normalization with US,201–2

trade agreement with US, 162trade with industrialized countries,

218 (n5), 138use by China of archipelagic

principle to define baselines ofParacel Islands, 185

US interest in Vietnam, 202war with US, 25, 32, 48, 59, 111,

145xenophobia, 162

Wahid, Abdurrahmanand nationalist demonstrations, 223

(n41)discussion of overseas Chinese issue

in Beijing, 126elected for 5-year term, 155erratic leadership and

impeachment, 155–6improved Indonesia’s relations with

China and Russia, 120set up West Pacific Forum, 230

(n10)signed statement on bilateral

cooperation with Beijing, 230(n9)

Waltz, Kenneth, 226 (n22)and lack of US restraint, 220

(n15)Wanandi, Jusuf, 230 (n15)

overseas Chinese network is myth,228 (nn15, 6)

Watthanachai Wutthisire, 230 (n11)

West Papua, 182aspirations for independence, 46festering regional problem, 155–6

Whiting, Allenlack of Chinese attempt to

understand Japan, 118Mischief Reef and domestic

considerations, 230 (n14)Wilkinson, David, 21–2Wilsonian, Woodrow

ideas of self-determination, 115legacy, 221 (n17), 27

Wolfowitz, Paul D., on terrorism inSoutheast Asia, 46

World War I, 79World War II, 89, 145WTO

and US multilateral commitments,51

China membership in, 20effect of China’s admission to, 67

Index 271

Xinjiang, 96attempt to loosen Chinese

hold on, 55

Yan XuetongChina as rising power, 14, 58

Yang Shangkun, 190Yeo, George

foreign investment insubregion, 48

on founding of ASEAN, 229 (n8)Yue, Chia Siow, US role in

international financial crises, 222(n34)

Zhejiang Province, and reform, 74Zhou Enlai

and Bandung Conference, 110and preferred international

system, 93Zhu Rongji, 66

China’s hope for stable andprosperous ASEAN, 119

visited China, 190ZOPFAN

and subregional autonomy, 9as ‘ideal type’ of ASEAN’s

aspirations, 170–1Indonesia’s conception of, 183

Zoellick, RobertUS Trade Representative for Bush

administration, 222 (n25)views on China and Japan, 221

(n24)

272 Index