R E F O R M A T IO N ه R E N A I$ S A N C E REVIEW, ٧٠١. 1ه No. 2, 2012, 127-150

Not Scotist: understandings of being, univocity, and analogy in early-modern Reformed thoughtR i c h a r d a . M u l l e r

Calvin Theological Seminary, Grand Rapids

Several lines o f recent scholarship have identified developing Protestant thought as Scotist and, specifically, have contended a dominance o f the Scotist concept o f the univocity o f being in early modern Protestantism. The present essay examines early-modern Reformed metaphysics and theology and demonstrates that the contention is unfounded. Rather, the more typical approach to the language o f being and related issues o f predication concerning God and creatures in Reformed circles was advocacy o f the analogía entis, often understood in a classical Thomist manner as an analogy p ro p o rtio n a lity .

KEVWORDS Reformed scholasticism, $cotism, univocity of being, analogy, Thomism, Radical Orthodoxy

Introduction؛ the issue of □uns Scotus and early-modern Reformed thought

In the now outdated scholarship of the latter part of the twentieth century, Theodore Beza ( 5 ل-16م ل5و ) was typically identified as the hero or villain of developing ‘Calvinism.’ Perhaps because that debate has outworn its usefulness or perhaps because the perennial (and one might add, perennially misguided) quest for heroes and villains in the history of thought has been driven to find the sources of its issues deeper in the past, the figure of Duns Scotus (£.1266-1308) has emerged as the new source of all that is bad and of most of w hat is good in the older Reformed tradition and, in some accounts, in the entire heritage of the Reform ation.

One school of thought has argued that the various theological and ̂؛ ilosophical distinctions employed by Reformed or Calvinist orthodoxy ought to be read in a Scotist manner, on the ground of a pervasive Scotism in late-medieval and early-

D O l 1 0 .1 1 7 9 /1 4 6 2 2 4 5 9 1 3 2 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1© w. s. Maney 8c Son Ltd 2 ه1و

ו28 RICHARD A. MULLER

modern thought.1 Several studies belonging to this line of research argue that the older Reformed theology either held to the Scotist concept of the univocity of being or, at the very least, assumed a ‘univocal core’ in its language of God, even to the point of identifying univocity of being as the dominant view of seventeenth- century theologians.* There are two primary grounds for their claim: on the one hand, M artijn Bac assumes that the identification of all individual beings as having the transcendental properties of being itself (unity, goodness, and truth) will yield a conception of univocity; on the other hand Bac and Andreas Beck look to other instances of univocal predication, as evidence of a concept of the univocity of being.؟ This approach leads Bac to find an implication of univocity of being in the writings of one of the very authors who argued against it and supplies Beck with a basis for declaring that he can find among the Reformed ‘a nuanced univocity in foe Scotistic sense’ (although he does note some exceptions, notably Maresius and Turretin.)4

Yet another approach to the issue of Scotism and the Reformation, related to the so-called ‘Lortz Thesis’ concerning foe origins of the German Reformation, appears in the works of writers associated wifo Radical Grthodoxy and in foe recent historical diatribe of Brad s. Gregory. The Lortz thesis (now largely discredited) had claimed that Luther’s theological revolt was precipitated by foe decadent theology and philosophy of the later Middle Ages, specifically foe developments that took place after Duns Scotus largely among the nominalists.؟ Wifo the Radical Orthodox writers and Gregory, the thesis has become more focused on Scotus and his understanding of the univocity of being. According to their theses, Scotus’ understanding of univocity created a profound problem, identifying foe being of God wifo the being of creatures but nonetheless placed at an infinite distance from them, undermining traditional teaching concerning divine

1 A ntonie Vos, ‘D e kern van de klassicke gereformeerde theologie’, in Kerk en Theologie 47 (1996): 106-12.5; Vos, ‘Ab uno disce om nes’, in Bijdragen 60 (0 4 -2 - وول9ر: 173 ; Vos, ‘Scholasticism and R eform ation’, ؛٨ W illem ], van A sselt and Eef Dekker, eds. R eform ation an d Scholasticism : An E cum enical E nterprise (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 9 9 -1 1 9 ; Vos, ‘The Systematic ?lace o f Reformed ^ holasticism : Reflections Concerning the R eception o f C alvin’s Thought’, in Church H istory an d Religious Culture 91 , no. 1 -2 , 2011: 29 -4 1 ; Andreas J- Beck, ‘Gisbertus Voetius (1589 -1676 ): Basic Features o f his Doctrine o f G od’, in W illem 1. van A sselt and Fef Dekker, eds. R eform ation an d Scholasticism : An Ecum enical E nterprise , (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 20 5 -2 2 6 ; R oelf T. te Velde, Paths B eyond Tracing O ut: the connection o f m e th od an d con tent in the D octrin e o f G od , exam ined in R eform ed orth odoxy, K arl Barth, an d the U trecht School (Delft: Eburon, 2010); and Martijn Bac and Theo ?leizier, ‘Reentering Sites o f Truth. Teaching R eform ed Scholasticism in the C ontem porary C lassroom ’, in W illem ien O tten, Marcel Sarot and M aarten W isse, eds, Scholasticism Reform ed: Festschrift W illem van A sse lt, Studies in Theology an d R eligion, 14 (Eeiden: E.J. Brill, 2010),

^Martijn Bac, ‘?erfect W ill Theology: D ivine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as against Suárez, Episcopius, D escartes, and Spinoza’ (doctoral dissertation, Utrecht University, 2009), 1 4 0 -1 4 1 , 208; cf. Andreas Beck, G isbertus Voetius (1 j8 9 ~ 1 6 y6 ): Sein Theologieversta«ndnis und sem e G ottesleh re (Go«tflngen: V andenhoeck &c Ruprecht, 2007), 21 8 -2 2 2 ; and Te Velde, Paths B eyond Tracing O u t, 115, 1 2 5 -1 2 6 .3 Bac, ‘?erfect W ill T heology’, 140.4 Bac, ‘?erfect W ill T heology’, 4 ؤn. 11 ,ا 0 , citing M elchior D؛ydekker, Fax veritatis seu exercitationes ad nonullas controversias quae hodie in Belgio po tissim um m oventur: ... Praefixa est praefatio de sta tu Belgicae Ecclesiae, & suffixa dissertatio de Providen tia D e i (Leiden: D aniel à Gaesbeec'k et Eeh^ Lopez, 1677), 126 (e^^hcit denial o f univocity), and 2 5 2 -2 5 3 (purported im plication o f univocity); cf. Beck, G isbertus Voetius, 2 2 0 -2 2 1 .؟ Josef Lortz, The R eform ation in G erm any, 2 vols., trans. R onald Walls (London and N ew York: Herder & Herder, 1968), 1, 6 7 -7 7 , 193-2.10. A gainst the Lortz thesis, specifically on the backgrounds to Luther’s theology, see Dennis Janz, Luther an d Late M edieval Thom ism : A Study in Theological A n th ropo logy (Waterloo: W ilfrid Laurier University ?ress, 1983); and John Farthing, Thom as Aquinas an d G abriel Biel· Interpreta tions o f St. Thom as A quinas on the Eve o f the R eform ation (Durham and London: D uke University ?ress, 1988).

NOT SCOTIST 12 و

transcendence. Scotus becomes the ‘crucial’ figure ‘in a general shift away from a focus upon the metaphysics of participation.’̂ This problematic theological and p^losophical understanding then carried over wholesale into the Reformation, rendering ?rotestant theology highly flawed from the outset and, in the version of the thesis espoused by Gregory, yielding a defective understanding of the relationship of God and world, reason and theology, ultimately bringing about a new and highly secularized worldview as an unintended result of the R eform ation/

Despite the several voices that have identified Reformed theology as philosophically eclectic,® as also despite the scholarship indicating significant misreading of Scotus and the implications of his conception of the univocity of being on the part of Radical Orthodoxy,9 little has been done to address either form of the claim that Protestant and specifically Reformed or Calvinistic Protestant thought became foundationally Scotist. In what follows, I examine a series of philosophers and theologians who contributed to the Reformed intellectual milieu during the era of orthodoxy, from ca. و ل5ه to the end of the seventeenth century, and representing views found across the geographical spectrum of Reformed academies and universities, in Heidelberg (Zanchi), Geneva (Daneau, Beza), Danzig (Keckermann), Leiden (Junius, Burgersdijk, Jacchaeus, Heereboord), Franecker (Maccovius), Bremen (Crocius), Utrecht (Revius, Gisbertus and Paulus Voetius, Mastricht, Leydekker), Steinfurt (Timpler), Sedan and Groningen (Maresius), Cambridge (Crakanthorpe), Oxford (Twisse, Barlow, Gale), Aberdeen (Baron), Nimes (Derodon), Frankfurt-on-Oder (Grebenitz-Strimesius), M ontauban (Charnier), Lausanne (Mu«ller), Herborn (Alsted), Duisberg (Clauberg), and M arburg (Goclenius, Combachius)ro — arguably, a representative sampling. The essay will demonstrate that, contrary to the assumptions of both the positive and the negative readings of a purported

6 Catherine Pickst©ck, ‘M odernity and Sholasticism : A Critique ءه Recent Invocations o f U nivocity’, A ntonianum 78 هت0و): 5) , n. 2.7John M ilbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Craham Ward, eds. R adical O rth odoxy : A N e w T h eology (London: R outledge, رووول , z , 5, 2.3-24, 48 , 5 0 -5 1 وه1 , ; cf. M ilbank, ‘Alternative Protestantism: Radical O rthodoxy and the Reform ed Tradition’, in James K. A. Smith and James H . O lthius, eds, Radical O rth o d o x y an d the R eform ed Tradition: Creation, C ovenant, an d Participation (Grand Rapids: I^erdmans, 2005), 30, 35; M ilbank, Theology and Social Theory: B eyond Secular Reason (Oxford: O xford University Press, 13 0 3 - و9ه), 302 ; Catherine Pickstock, A fter W riting: O n the L iturgical C onsum m ation o f P h ilosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 23- ووآ8), 122 ; ar،d Brad s. Gregory, The U nintended R eform ation: H o w a R eligious R evolu tion Secularized S ociety (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 3 0 -3 4 , 3 6 -4 1 , 4 8 -4 9 , 5 2 -5 5 . Gregory provides page references to univocity am ong the Protestants, and the connection with Radical O rthodoxy is noted, هب-©لهه , n. 26. The supposed dom inance o f univocation, or as he prefers to call it, ‘u n ^ fe o c a t io n ’, is also argued in A m os Funkenstein, Theology an d the Scientific Im agination from the M iddle Ages ؛٠ the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 2 8 -2 9 , 5 7 -6 3 , 8 9 -9 0 .8 See John Patrick D onnelly, ‘Calvinist Thom ism ’, Viator 7 (1976): 4 4 1 -4 5 5 ; Richard A. Muller, ‘R e fo ^ a t io n ,O rthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism ’, and the Eclecticism o f Early M odern Philosophy’, N ederlands A rch ief voor K erkgeschiedenis 8, no. 3 (2001), 30 6 -3 2 5 ; Muller, ‘The “R eception o f C alvin” in Eater Reformed T heology’, Church H istory an d Religious Culture 91 , no. 1 -2 ), (2011), 2 5 8 -2 6 0 ; and note Muller, Post-R eform ation R eform ed D ogm atics, 4 vols (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), I, 4 r , 65 , 67 , 119, 344, 351, 3 6 7 -3 8 2 , 4 4 9 -4 5 0 ; Carl Truem an,/طم « O w en : R eform ed Catholic, Renaissance M an (Aldershot: A shgate Publishing, 2007), 57.؟ Richard Cross, ‘W here Angels Fear to Tread: D uns Scotus and Radical O rthodoxy’, A ntonianum 76 ههةت1:) 7־4ل) ; and Thom as W illiam s, ‘The Doctrine o f U nivocity is True and Salutary’, M odern Theology 2, no. 4 (2005): 5 7 5 -5 8 5 . *٠ N ote that Burgersdijk initially taught at Saumur, Jacchaeus and Clauberg at Herborn, D erodon at D ie. M y thanks to D avid Sytsma for discerning dialogue and for help in identifying various o f these Reformed sources.

1 0 ؤ RICHARD A. MULLER

Scotism in recent scholarship on early modern ?rotestantism, language of being or ens in the older Reformed theology did not lean toward the Scotist conception of the univocity of being but rather, with few exceptions, tended toward a more or less Thomistic understanding of being as analogical.

Metaphysics in early-medern Returned circlesAs a form of traditional Christian orthodoxy, the older Reformed theology embodied metaphysical concerns. Early in the Reformation, considerably prior to the publication of ?rotestant texts on metaphysics, the metaphysical underpinning of natural philosophy appears in Protestant physics texts by way of discussions of God and primary causality. أ أ So also are these metaphysical concerns present in foe theological works of writers of foe second generation of Reformers like Calvin, Vermigli, Hyperius, and Musculus, who consistently identified the divine essence as simple and spiritual, understood God as foe first mover and first efficient cause of all things, argued foe traditional doctrines of creation ex nihilo, and assumed an overarching providential concurrence. Recent scholarship, moreover, has ئmodified our understanding of early Reformation rejections of Aristotle and scholasticism and has pointed toward significant continuities with diverse currents in late medieval thought/^ Although, Scotist as well as Thomist, nominalist, and Augustinian accents are evident among foe Reformers of foe first two generations,* what we do not find is a folly developed metaphysics and certainly هnot any indication of how they might have dealt with foe question of univocity of being.‘5

11Philip M elanchthon, Initia doctrinae physicae (Wittenberg: Iohannes Lufft, ل54و)ث and Jerome Zanchi, A risto te lis de naturali auscultatione, seu de principas (Strasbourg: Wendelin Rihel, 1554). On M elanchthon and the developm ent o f Lutheran natural philosophy, see Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transform ation o fN a tu ra l Philosophy: the Case o fP h ilip M elanchthon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); on Z anchi’s approach to A ristotle, see D onald Sinnema, ‘A ristotle and Early Reform ed Orthodoxy: M om ents o f A ccom m odation and A ntithesis’, in Wendy H ellem an, ed., C hristianity an d the Classics: The A cceptance o f a H eritage (Lanham, MD: University Press of Am erica, 1990 )’, 132,-137.'*Eor example: John Calvin, In stitu tio christianae religionis (Geneva: Robert Stephanus, 1559), I .x iii.i; x v i.1 -5 ; Calvin, In Ezechelis praelectiones , in Ioannis C alvini opera quae supersunt om nia, edited by Guilielm us Baum, Eduardus Cunitz and Eduardus Reuss, 59 vols. (Braunschweig: Schwetschke, 1 8 6 3 -1 9 0 0 ), 40 , col. 4 8 -4 9 ; Peter M artyr Vermigli, L oci com m unes , ed itio secunda (Eondon: Thom as Vautrollier, 1583), I .x i . i - z ; x i i . i - z ; ^ iii.r -ro ; Andreas Hyperius, M ethodus theologiae, s ive praecipuorum Christianae religionis locorum com m unium libri tres (Basel: Ioannes Oporinus, 1567), 83 -8 9 ; W olfgang M usculus, L oci com m unes sacrae theologiae (Basel: Johannes H ervagius, 1567), i, iv-v, xlii (3 -4 , 7 -8 , 9 3 لت-ت5, 933־9 ).13 See D avid Bagchi, ‘Sic et N on: Luther and Scholasticism ’ in Carl Trueman and R. Scott Clark, eds, Pro testan t Scholasticism : Essays in Reassessm ent (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 3 -15 ; D avid C. Steinmetz, ‘The Scholastic C alvin’, in Bagchi, P rotestan t Scholasticism ., 16 -30 ; Frank A. James Ifl, ‘Peter M artyr Vermigli: At the Crossroads o f Late M edieval Scholasticism , C hristian H um anism and R esurgent A ugustin ian ism ’, in Bagchi, P ro te sta n t Scholasticism , 62 -7 8 ; John Patrick Donnelly, Calvinism an d Scholasticism in VermiglTs D octrin e o f M an and G race (Leiden: Brill, 1975); D onnelly, ‘Calvinist Thom ism ’, in Viator 7 (1976): 4 4 1 -4 5 5 .14See, for exam ple, D aniel ßolliger, ln fin iti con tem platio: G rundzu«ge der Scotus- und Scotism usrezeption im Werk H uldrych Z w inglis (Leiden: Brill, Z 0 0 3 ) ; Karl Reuter, D as G rundversta«ndnis der Theologie Calvins (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1 9 6 3 ) .

15Contra the undocum ented assertion in Gregory, U nintended R eform ation , 41 . C alvin’s thought is notoriously difficult to ^ aracter ize philosophically: see the excellent summary statem ent, critical o f Radical C rth odoxy’s reading o f Scotus and o f Calvin, in ] . Todd Billings, Calvin, Participation, an d the G ift: The A c tiv ity o f Believers an d U nion w ith Christ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Z 0 0 7 ) , Z 6 - 3 8 .

NOT SCOTIST ا3ل

Early on, however, some Reformed writers did raise the issue of predication of divine attributes, presaging the paths taken later on the question of being. Thus, Wolfgang Musculus held that the only name or term properly assigned to God was YHWH or Jehovah: all other names were predicated equivocally/^ Musculus, in short, denied univocal predications of God and creatures and left little room for analogy. Another resolution of problem of the predication of divine attributes occurs in Andreas ^ p e r i u s ’s Methodus theologiae (1567) and Girolamo Zanchi’s De natura Dei (1577). Zanchi poses a question (given that many terms referencing God are predicated of creatures and many terms referencing m atu re s are predicated of God): how ought these predications to be understood? His answer, like that of Hyperius, is that ،the terms [nomina] that are predicated of God and creatures are neither univocal nor simply equivocal, but are predicated αναλογικα".’7 ,Univocal predication is ruled out given that goodness, for example أis uncreated and most perfect in God and is not an incidental property, whereas in creatures goodness is created, incidental (٠accidens), and imperfect. N or is the predication utterly equivocal, given that ‘between God and the things created by God there is a most beautiful order,’ with God as the efficient and final cause of all created things — as Scripture teaches, all things are ‘from him, through him, and to him.’^ The perfections of all things are in God and their similitudes are in the creatures/؟ Zanchi’s view was carried forward by Daneau and probably also Beza, who denied the univocal predication of attributes to God and creatures and, specifically following Aquinas on the point, affirmed analogical p red ication /0

As universities in ^incipalities that had adopted the Reformation began to reframe those aspects of their curricula that reflected theological and philosophical concerns, the issue of teaching rataphysics and of the nature and limite of rataphysics was also broached in Reformed circles/* The result was a variation of the tradition of Christian Aristotehanism, not a simple recourse to late medieval patterns, but an adaptation ofthe ?eripatetic tradition as it had been carried forward from foe Middle Ages into and through the Renaissance. Eurther, foe result was صnot a specifically Reformed or confessional metaphysics, but a traditional ?eripatetic philosophy modified variously in Augustinian and ?latonist directions that shared a

16M usculus, L oci com m unes , xli (922).17Girolam o Zanchi, D e natura D ei, seu de divin is attributis, libri V (N eustadt: W ilhelm Harnisch, 1598), I.x, ٩ . 8 ت8ر) ; cf. Hyperius, M eth odu s theologiae , 91 citing D am ascenus, D e fide or th odoxa , lib. I, ca4 & 12 ; ?etrus Lombardus, Sententiarum lib. I, dist. z i ; and Thom as A quinas, Sum m a th eo log iae , la , ٩٠ 13.

Zanchi, D e natura D e i, I.x, ٩ . 8 (29), citing Romans 11:36.٠ ,Zanchi وأ ،? natura D ei, I.x, ٩ . 8 (29): ‘inter Deum vero, & res creatas, sim ilitudo est. Perfectionibus enim om nibus, & ipso Esse, similes sunt om nes D eo ’.Lambert D ص aneau, Christianae isagoges ad christianorum theologorum locos com m unes, libri II. (Geneva, 1 5 ؟8 ), I. vii (fol. I4r-v ), citing Aquinas; cf. Christianae isagoges, I.vi (fol. I2v), citing Aquinas and Zanchi; cf. Theodore Beza and A ntonius Faius, Theses theologicae in schola G enevensi ab a liqu o t sacrarum literarum Studiosus sub D D . Theod. Beza & A n ton io Layo SS. theologiae professoribus p ropositae & dispu tatae (Geneva: Eustathius V ignon, 1586), V .7 , 9 .

2,1 O n the rise o f ¡n tap h ysics in the D utch universities in the early seventeenth century, see J.A. van Ruler, ‘Eranco Petri Burgersdijk and the Case o f Calvinism W ithin the N eo-Scholastic Tradition’, in Egbert Bos and H . A. Krop, eds. Franco Burgersdijk (1 590 -1635 ): N eo-A risto te lian ism in Leiden (Amsterdam: R odopi, 1 9 9 3 ) , 3 7 - 5 5 .

Cf. Van Ruler, ‘Franco Petri Burgersdijk’, 37 قق -4 2 ; w ith Charles B. Schmitt, ‘Towards a R eassessm ent o f Renaissance Aristotelianism ’, in H istory o f Science rr (1973): 15 9 -1 7 3 ; Schmitt, The A risto telian Tradition an d Renaissance U niversities (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984); and Richard A. Muller, ‘Reform ation, O rthodoxy, “Christian A isto te lian ism ”, and the Eclecticism o f Early M odern Philosophy’, in N ederlan ds A rch ief vo o r Kerkgeschiedenis 81

.3 0 6 -3 2 5 (,0 0 (3י) (ت1

1 2 و RICHARD A. MULLER

common ground with the metaphysics taught in Roman Catholic and Lutheran circles and that debated most of the same issues. W hat can be established is which lines of traditionary conversation and debate concerning the definitions and ’ of metaphysics were characteristic of Reformed contexts and howthey carried over from philosophy into the Reformed theologies of the era. Reformed writers specifically reference one another’s opinions as well as the views of such thinkers as Duns Scotus, ?eter of Aquila, Peter Aureole, Aquinas, Cajetan, Zim ara, Fonseca, and S u arez /3 The immediate source of debate over foe univocity of being that occurred in the seventeenth century was foe metaphysics of Franciscus Suarez in which the concept of the univocity of being played a prominent role/ 4

Reformed coneepts ٠۴ ‘being’: univocal, epuivocal, ٠٢ analogical?/. Predication, being, and God, ca 1590-1640.As might be expected from the breadth of the debate and foe significant number of opinions referenced, there was a diversity of solutions to the question of the predication of being among the early modern Reformed. One approach to the question is found in the early seventeenth-century metaphysics of Bartholomaeus Keckermann. In defining metaphysics and arguing foe case for the discipline, Keckermann indicates that there can be a scientia concerning the ‘highest degree of things, or of Being’ in which human knowledge reaches its ultimate ex ten sio n /3 The proof of the point lies in a series of questions concerning essence or quidditas: if one asks what is Peter (quid sit Petrus), the answer is a human being; if one asks what is a human being, the answer is an animal; if one asks what is an animal, foe answer is a living body (corpus vivum); from the idea of living body, once can ascend to foe idea of body in a simple or general sense; if one asks what is a body, the answer is a substance; and, finally, if one asks what a substance is, the answer is ‘a thing or being existing of itself’ [res sive Ens per se existens].x6 Each of these quiddities is dealt with in a particular branch of knowledge, a scientia (and foe particular scientia devoted to being is called prima philosophia or ^ ta p h y s ic s ) .

Against what is probably foe Suarezian view, Keckermann rejected the language of univocity as well as the related inclusion of God in foe subject of metaphysics on the ground that God is ‘supra ens’ as also ‘super omnem Substantiam

*3 On these debates, notably on the a rg m en ta tio n ٠؛ Cajetan, Soto, Zim ara, and Suarez, see E. j . Ashw orth, ‘A nalogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan’, D ialogu e قوو:) ־ووؤ4ؤل1) 31 ; Ashw orth, ‘Suárez on the A nalogy ءه Being: Some Historical Background’, Vivarium 33 (1995): 5 0 -75 ; Constance Blackwell, ‘Thom as Aquinas A gainst the Scotists and Platonists. The D efin ition o f Ens: c ^ e ta n o , Zim ara, Pererio, 1 4 9 5 -1 5 7 6 ’, Verbum 6, no. I ( 1 8 8 - ههق4,) ل7و ; and Joshua Peter H ochschild, ‘The Semantics o f A nalogy According to Thom as de V io Cajetan’s D e nom inum analogía’ (doctoral thesis. U niversity o f N otre D am e, z o o i) .*4 See Walter Hoeres, ‘Francis Suarez on the Teaching o f John Duns Scotus on U nivocatio E n tis \ in John K. Ryan and Bernardin Bonansea, eds, John D uns Scotus, 1 2 6 5 -1 9 6 5 (Washington: Catholic University o f Am erica, 1965), 2.63-. ت9هBartholomaeus Keckermann, Scientiae m*؟ etaphysicae com pen diosum system a . . . i n duas partes (Hanau: Cuhelm us A ntonius, 1609), 1 7 -1 8 .*6 Keckermann, Scientiae m etaphysicae , 18.

NOT$C©TI$T 33ا

& Accidens,’2̂ a line of argument carried forward in such writers as Alsted and Gale.2̂ Having identified God as above being, Keckermann would go on to identify the subject of metaphysics as the being created by God, understood as being absolutely considered, in its incomplex referencing of individual species: hom o , identified as such, without modification, understood as a species, belongs to being in the proper sense. Thus qualified, having removed God from the category of being, Keckermann can state that ‘Being or reality is the highest genus, beyond which neither human understanding nor human words can ascend,’ the genus generalissimum. ت The formulation points toward either an analogical or وequivocal use of being when referencing God.

In the same era, Richard Crakanthorpe indicated that ‘being is the most general, equivocal notion or conception, by which is signified that which is existive, namely, that which either is an essence or has essence.’^ For Crakanthorpe, the term ‘being’ cannot have a univocal usage. The term must be recognized as equivocal, Crakanthorpe adds; this was foe position both of Forphyry and of Aristotle, inasmuch as Aristotle had pointed out that ‘being itself (as generally considered) is nothing, which is to say it denotes no thing or nature.’31 Both God and creatures are identified as beings; and it is rightly indicated by Aquinas that ‘nothing can be predicated univocally and essentially of God and creatures.’3ت Crakanthorpe stood, therefore, specifically against the ^ p ro p ria tio n of the Scotist and Suarezian concept of the univocity of befog into metaphysics, taking an aspect of the Thomistic reading of foe issue toward the foternative conclusion of equivocity.^

There are also variant expressions and further elaborations of the issue found among various Reformed philosophers. Timpler, who also held against Suarez and the Scotist tradition that being cannot be predicated univocally of God and

2,7 Keckermann, Scientiae m etaphysicae, ت-ؤق4أ Scotus أل sh،mld be noted excluded God from m etaphysics, but on rather different grounds: he held that no science demonstrates the existence o f its subject; Be:ng is the subject and G od the finis o f metaphysics: see Scotus, R eporta ta Pariesiense, 1, prol., q. 3, art. I, in o p e r a om nia , edited by Luke W adding, 2.6 vols, ?aris: (Vives, 1 8 و1-18و5 ), vol. XXII, 50, 52.. Keckermann argued w hat, in his tim e, w as identified as the Platonist as opposed to the Aristotelian definition of Ens: see Rudolph Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum , qu o tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur (Frankfurt: M atthias Becker, 1613), s.v. ens (147), offering as an Aristotelian definition: ‘Lns est om ne id, quod est extra nihil [...] in hac significations Deus est Ens’; and, as a Platonic definition, noting that God is ‘supra Ens & pura puta Entitas’; similarly, Goclenius, Isagoge In Peripateticorvm Scholasticorum ءة Prim am Philosophiam , quae dici consueuit M etaphysica. Accesserunt disputationes huius generis a liquo t (Frankfurt: Zacharias Palthenius, 1598), IO, leaning toward the Platonic definition inasmuch as G od, unlike creatures, is actus purus and proprie es t seu existit, proprie non habet esse; and denying that God can be the adequate subject o f metaphysics (14). ^ ]o h a n n Heinrich Alsted, M etaphysica: tribus libris tractata, per praecepta m ethodica, theorem ata selecta & com m entariola dilucida. Q uae om nia inferioribus disciplin is constituendis & percipiendis viam com pendiariam patefaciun t (Herborn: Christoph Corvinus, 1613), I.i (28); Theophilus Gale, The C ou rt o f th e G entiles, ©٢, A discourse touching the original o f hum an literature, bo th ph ilo logie an d philosophie, from the Scriptures an d Jewish church, 4 parts in 5 vols (O xford and London: !various publishers!, 1 6 7 ^ 1 6 7 8 ) , IV/1, II.iii.1 (238).2-9 Keckermann, Scientiae m etaphysicae, 2 0 -2 1 .30Richard Crakanthorpe, ln trodu ctio in m etaphysicam (Oxford: Iohannes Lichfield, & Iacobus Short, 1619), i (6): ‘Ens est notio seu conceptus aequivocus om nium com unissim us, quo significatur quicquid est existive, id est, quicquid vel est essentia, vel habet essentiam .’31 Crakanthorpe, ln trodu ctio in m etaphysicam , i (7), citing A ristotle, Peri herm enias, Liii: ‘ipsum ens (ut com m uniter sumitur) nihil esse, id est, nullam rem aut naturam notare, sed solum voce aequivocam esse affirm ât.’٢ Crakanthorpe, ln trodu ctio in m etaphysicam , i (7), citing Aquinas, Sum m a contra G entiles, I.xxxii: ‘At nihil om nino de D eo & creaturis univoce &c essentialiter praedicari potest, ut recte probat A qu in a s'33 Contra Gregory, The U nintended R eform ation , 5 3 -5 4 , w ho appears to view Suarezian m etaphysics and its approach to univocity as relatively uncontested in its time.

3 4 ו RICHARD A. MULLER

creatures,34 n«netheless held, agreeing with Scotus, that it could be predicated univocally ٠؛ created substances and their properties؛ C rak n th o rp e disagreed and did so on the basis of Aristotle, reflecting the ongoing debate over the problem of predication. Crakanthorpe’s view was that if being were predicated univocally of all creatures, then it would have to be considered as a genus. A genus, however, is determined by the differentiae shared by each of the species within it; but being, as the most universal or general concept, having the transcendental property of unity, cannot have differentiae, and therefore cannot be considered as a genus except equivocally. In the equivocal usage only, Crakanthorpe accepted Keckermann’s identification of ens in the finite order as the ‘most general genus.ص

Another line of argument, arguably the majority view among the Reformed, appears in the works of Baron, Burgersdijk, Jacchaeus, Alsted, and C o ^ a c h iu s .^ Baron identifies two extremes of opinion that must be rejected: the first is that of Peter Aureole, ‘who claims that Ens is a merely equivocal term with respect to substance & accidents’؛ the second is that of Scotus, ‘who claims that Ens is something univocal with respect to substance & accidents.ص Aureol’s view is to be rejected inasmuch as equivocal terms do not refer properly to anything signified and the term ens does properly refer to things signified that have esse. Scotus’ view is also to be rejected, on foe grounds that being cannot be predicated univocally either of uncreated and created being or of substance and accidents. Univocal predication functions with reference to things that belong to foe same genus: thus, ‘animal’ is predicated univocally of human beings and brute beasts. With regard to God and creatures, univocal predication is impossible inasmuch as it would be absurd to include in a genus something that is utterly superior to foe genus. Moreover, created beings are composite of genus and differentia and God is n o t.^ As to the univocal predication wifo regard to substance and accidents, this is ruled out for Baron on foe grounds that accidents or incidental properties cannot be identified as ens absolutely or simpliciter, but rather only according to an ‘analogy of dependence.’ال This latter argument is significant not only because it appears in many of foe Reformed works on m ^ p h y s ic s but also because the univocity of

34 Clemens Timpler, M etaphysicae system a m eth od icvm , libris quinqué per theorem ata e t p rob lem ata selecta concinnatum . ... A ccessit eiusdem technologia ... Seorsum accesserunt R o d o lph i G oclenii ph ilosoph i cl. notae & scholia (Hanau: Haeredes Gulielmus Antonius, 1612,), 1.للل1مت.35 Crakanthorpe, ln trodu ctio in m etaph ysicam , I, 7 citing Timpler, M ,־9 etaph ysica , I.i.5; and Aristotle, M etaph ysica , Ill.iii.Robert Baron, M ص etaphysica generalis: accedunt nunc prim um quae supererant ex parte speciali: om nia ad usum theologiae accom m odata: opus postu m u m , ex m useo A n ton ii C lem entii Z irizae i (Cambridge: John H ayes, 1685), H־i ( 4 ول־4ت4 ), hereinafter cited by parts, as, e.g ., the general m etaphysica as M etaph ysica , I, the special as M etaph ysica , ٥ ; Franco burgersdijk, Institvtion vm m etaphysicarum , Id?. II (London: 1. Crook &: j . Baker, 1653), !·9؛؛ ؛ل-ت4 (ل7־ل· ); Gilbertus Jacchaeus, Prim ae ph ilosophiae sive Institu tionum m etaphysicarum , libri sex, ed itio postrema (Cambridge: R oger D aniel, 1649), I.v (ل5־هت ); A lsted, M etaph ysica: tr ibu s lib ris ثوو-تو , and Johannes C om bachius, M etaphysicorum , libri duo vniversam prim ae ph ilosophiae doctrinam theorem atibus brevissim is com prehendentes, & com m en tan ts necessariis illustrantes: studiosis ejus disciplin perquam utiles & fru ctu osi (Oxford: w. Turner, 1633), Lih (2.9-33). O n Burgersdijk’s philosophy, see Egbert Bos and H . A. Krop, eds. Franco Burgersdijk (1 5 9 0 -1 6 3 5 ): N eo- A ristotelian ism in Leiden (Amsterdam: R odopi, 1993).37Baron, M etaphysica , I, 4 4 2 4 - cf. against Scotus, C ;ت0, 423 om bachius, M etaphysicorum , libri d u o , I . i i .n , 20 (2 0 - 2 t , 2 9 -3 3 ).38Baron, M etaphysica, 1, 4 2 3 -4 2 4 .٣ Baron, M etaph ysica , I, 421 , 4^4.

NOT SCOTIST 35ل

being in substanee and aceidents is one of the grounds on whieh Seotus argued the univocity of being in God and creatures.

Although in Baron’s and Combachius’s metaphysics, the first book is devoted to being in general, the second to separate spiritual beings, with God as the principle being, neither writer allows for a univocity of being and neither allows that God is the subject of metaphysics in general. Like the several other Reformed writers who take this approach, they argue that ens cannot be taken univocally when predicated of God and creatures, but rather must be understood analogically.^ Combachius addressed the problem in general, indicating that there could be no univocal predications of being and its transcendental properties to all individuals inasmuch as this would require a ‘single concept on the part of the thing’ such as could be the case only with species of foe same genus.41 If Scotus were correct in arguing the univocity of being, then a single objective concept of being could be predicated of all things in the same way and according to the same definition, including ‘inferiors,’ namely dependent, derivative, or caused beings as well as of their causes. Quite to the contrary, species belonging to the same genus are independent of one another. Dependency indicates a difference in genus. Combachius concluded, therefore, that being cannot be predicated univocally of inferiors; rather it is predicated variously (;multipliciter Accordingly, there .ر4تcannot be a parte rei [in respect of the thing] any objective concept predicated univocally of all being.

Combachius added, however, that a single concept a parte intellectus can be understood as predicated in a single way or mode of things when there is a proportional relationship, namely an analogy of proportionality. Thus divine and human wisdom, are diverse, indeed, utterly different in kind (toto genere inter se diversas), but can be conceived and considered under one mode: divine wisdom stands in relation to foe divine nature in a mode proportionate to the way that human wisdom stands in relation to human natu re .^ Similarly, according to Jacchaeus, ens is understood analogically when used to identify the common genus of all things in their substances and accidents.44 The analogía entis is an analogy of proportionality.45

//. The univocity and analogy of being in the later seventeenth century.Johannes Clauberg, who could be described as a mind in transition from a modified ?^p a te tic ism to an adapted Cartesianism ,^ stated categorically in his earlier work that notwithstanding foe infinite distance separating God and

40 C om bachius, M etaphysicorum , libri du o , I.i; II.i (2,9-30, 3ته ), citing A ristotle, M etaph ysica , IV.2; Baron, M etaphysica , Il.i (420 -422 ); see also Thom as Barlow, Exercitationes a liqu o t m etaphysicale, de D eo: q u od s it objectum m etaphysicae, 2nd edn (Oxford: A. Lichfield, 1638), III (102), citing Suarez, M etaphysicae d ispu ta tion es , I,

41 Com bachius, M etaphysicorum , libri du o , I.ii (22).٢ Com bachius, M etaphysicorum , libri du o , I.ii (29).43 C om bachius, M etaphysicorum , libri du o , I.ii, iii (29, 30).44Jacchaeus, Institu tionum m etaphysicarum , I.v (15-20 ); Com bachius, M etaphysicorum , libri d u o , I.iii (2 9 -3 3 ).45 Cf. lac'chaeus, Institu tionum m etaphysicarum , I.vi (26).46 On Clauberg, see Theo Verbeek, ed., Johannes C lauberg (1 6 2 2 -1 6 6 5 ) an d Cartesian Philosophy in the Seventeenth C entury (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999).

36 RICHARD A. MULLER

creatures, there is a similitude among them as between the cause and the thing caused and they possess names or terms in common؛ accordingly, while things cannot be attributed univocally to God and creatures, they can be attributed analogically.^ Later, when he divided being into corporeal and incorporeal in a rather Cartesian manner, he discussed the being ،of God and creatures, and of all individual beings according to their mode,’ annotating his language of ‘mode’ with the comment ‘if not univocal, failing an ^ternative, analogical [si non univoceو saltern analogice48’,ز perhaps indicating an affinity with Cartesian understandings of univocity, but not arguing any position as definitive. Clauberg also noted, still in some accord wiffi the Peripatetic tradition, that ‘God is being absolutely [ ٠simpliciter], creatures are beings relatively [secundum quid].'49

Among the late-seventeenth-century Reformed philosophers, specific denial of univocity is found in the thought of the ra i-C a rte s ian , Daniel Derodon, who posits a carefully formulated analogía entis. Derodon insists specifically against ffie Suarezian and Scotist understandings, that ‘Being wiffi respect to God & Creatures, substance & accidents, is neither purely univocal, nor purely equivocal, but analogical.’50 In Derodon’s view, ‘pure univocity’ cannot follow when there is an ‘essential dependence of an inferior on another,’ inasmuch as univocity requires ‘requires essential independence.’51 In the case of finite individuals, independent of one another, in all genera, ffie standard categories can be predicated univocally.** There is a properly univocal predication, it simply does not apply to language concerning God and creatures, substance and accidents; rather it applies to finite genera and species.

Johannes Maccovius and his commentator, Adriaan Heereboord, identify being as genus in an analogical sense inasmuch as ‘Being wiffi respect to God & creatures, ^ s t a n c e & accidents, is analogical.’55 If ‘being’ is to be understood as a genus, it is an ‘analogical genus [genus analogum],’ not a genus in the strict ontological sense of the term, but a conceptual genus in which one species has ffie name or nature intrinsically, another species by participation or dependence on the

47Johannes Clauberg, Elem enta ph ilosophiae sive on tosoph ia , scientia prim a, de iis Oe() creaturisque suo m od() com m uniter a ttribuuntur (Groningen: Joannes N ico la i, 1647), i -3 . ( .1- 2 ) 4 ־م Johannes claub erg, M etaphysica de en te, quae rectius on tosoph ia , aliarum disciplinarum , ipsius qu oque iurisprudentiae & literarum ٠ stusiosis accom m odata , 3rd ed. (Amsterdam: D aniel hlzevir, 1 5 ة4 ), i (1, 88).Clauberg, M و4 etaphysica de E nte لنل.وق (7 , ).50D aniel D erodon, Philosophia con tracta; cum indice capitum e t praecipuorum articulorum singulis huius philosophiae partibus praem isso , 2 parts (Geneva: Pierre Chouet, 1664), II, 41 . On D erodon, see M ichael H eyd, ‘From a Rationalist Theology to a Cartesian Voluntarism: D avid D erodon and Jean-Robert C houet’, in Journal o f the H istory o f Ideas 4 54 2 - 527 : (7 1و9 ) ه .51D erodon, Philosophia contracta , ٥ ل4 , : ‘puram autem univocationem non requiritur dependentia essentialis uniusinferioris ab alio, & semper requiritur independentia essentialis’; cf. Jean Bruguier, Idaea to tiu s ph ilosoph iae, in quaom nia ph ilosophiae studiosis scitu breviter ac dilucide ju x ta rationem & experien tiam demonstrandum (Saumur: Renatus Pean, 1677), 33; and Georg Mu«ller, M etaphysica, definitionibus, d ivision ibus & canonibus, cum eorum om nium com m entario lo (Bern: Georg Sonnleitner, 1652,), II, 7.٢ D erodon, Philosophia contracta , II, 4تل all o f w hich tends to undermine Funkenstein’s assum ptions about the im pact o f (iartesianism: cf. Funkenstein, Theology an d the Scientific Im agination , 25.

؟ ؛ Johannes M accovius, M etaphysica, ad usum quaestionum in ph ilosoph ia ac theologia adornata & app lica ta , explicata per A driaan H eereboord , 3rd edn (Leiden: Franciscus H ackius, 1658), I.i (3, nota c): ‘Fns respectu D ei & creaturae, substantiae & accidentis, est analogum .’

N©T$COTI$T ٧ ?

former. Maccovius also argues that ‘knowledge of God is not o m ^ eh en siv e , but apprehensive’ inasmueh as God cannot be perfectly grasped.54 Further, ‘God is apprehended by an analogical knowing, not [by analogy] of the thing but of the concept.’55 This must be the case since analogy by reason ‘of the thing’ assumes that the analogates belong to the same genus؛ but this is not true of God and creatures: what remains is an analogy of the concept according to which infinite God is known by similitude of concept to things that are f in ite .C re a tu re s , moreover, have being by participation or inaequaliter in relation to God; they do not have being in the sense that God has being, since their being is dependent on the divine. Heereboord notes specifically that this understanding ‘is opposed to a univocal genus’ in which individuals participate equally and independently of one another. An example of a univocity is the genus ‘animal’ in which humans and animals participate in independence from one o th er.^ God, therefore cannot be discussed under the rubric ens in genere, the subject of metaphysics; rather God is to be recognized as causa efficiens & finis Entis in genere, ‘the efficient and final cause of being in general.’*®

This distinction in being between God and creatures carries over into Heereboord’s comments on the transcendental properties of being. Being one (unum) is a property in one sense of the being of God whose essence is ‘certain, determinate, unique, not varied, not multiplied, not divided from himself’ — and a property in somewhat different sense of creatures such as humans insofar as they require only a single rational soul, a single body, and exist as a single being.*^ So also is the property of being good (bonum) understood differently of God and creatures: God is good in the manner of the end or goal; creatures are good in the manner of means tending toward God, to the glory of G od.60 Creatures are beings, one, good, and true by analogy, arguably an analogy of proper proportionality.

These definitions and assumptions are reflected but ultimately argued in a different direction in the commentary of the Reformed philosopher. Jacobus Revius, on Suarez’s Metaphysica. Revius declares categorically that metaphysics does not serve to complete theology but, citing Aquinas and Cajetan, rather

54Johannes M accovius, D istinctiones e t regulae theologicae e t philosophicae (Franeker: Joannes Archerius, 1653), iv.3: ‘Cognitio D ei non est com prehensiva, sed apprehensiva.’55 M accovius, D istinctiones e t regulae, iv.4: ‘Deus apprehenditur ،;ognitione analog^'a, non rei, sed conceptus.’56M accovius, D istinctiones e t regulae, .4 , ؛٧٧ M accovius, M etaphysica, ad usum , I.i (3, nota c), ‘Genus analogum est, cuius una species alteri debet hoc, quod nom en & naturam generis participet, ideoque convenit speciebus inaequaiiter & cum dependentia u n iu s specie ab alia; sic creatura debet D eo, accidens substantiae, quod nom en, & naturam Entis participent; ei oponitur genus univocum , quod ex aequo participatur a singulis speciebus, ut neutra ab altera hic dependeat; quale est anim al respectu hom inis& bruti; ñeque enim hom o debet bruto; ñeque brutum hom ini, quod utrumque sit anim al’; and cf. H eereboord, M eletem ata philosophica in quihus pleraeque res M etaphysicae ventilantur, to ta Ethica κατασκευαστικώς Kai άνασκευαστικώς explicatur, universa Physica per theorem ata & com m en tarios exponitur, sum m a rerum Logicarum per D isputa tion es traditur, ed itio nova (Amsterdam: H e n r ic u s W etstenius, 1680), xlv iii.7 1ر.) ت8 ي M accovius, M etaphysica, a d usum , I.ii (6).59 M accovius, M etaphysica, ad usum , I.v (17-18 , nota b).M ص accovius, M etaphysica, ad usum , I.viii (5ق, nota a).

38 RICHARD A. MULLER

serves to convince infidels of certain truths; and theology, as such, rests on divine light only and serves to perfect or complete truths learned from the natural light.^* Against Suarez, Revius argues that to confound or confuse the first and most general philosophical doctrina de Ente qua Ens with the doctrina de Deo dignitate prima is a ‘most infamous eg iv o ca tio n .’^ When he comes to Suarez’s arguments concerning the univocity of being as applied to God and creatures, Revius states that the term is not to be understood to be used synonymously but rather homonymously, that is: as having the same sound but a different meaning, yielding a certain am biguity.^ The ‘false opinion of Scotus concerning the univocity of Being among God and creatures’ is easily recognized and the equivocation made clear inasmuch as ‘essentially dependent Being and essentially independent Being, by reason of essence, albeit under the same name, have different meanings.’ب Revius cites Cajetan for a definition of equivocity and notes that, in Cajetan’s view, analogical predication is actually a kind of equivocity. He goes on to cite Camerarius at length to argue in more detail that there can be no genuine mean between univocity and equivocity ؟/

The high orthodox era did bring at least one exception to the general tendency of metaphysicians in Reformed circles on the question of the univocity of being: theses disputed by Elias Grebenitz under the presidency of Samuel Strimesius, professor of philosophy at Frankfurt-on-Gder. In the ‘special’ section of his m ^p h y sics , where he discusses the ‘division of being’ into God and creatures and argues the necessary connection but also necessary distinction between God as ens absolutely considered and ‘inferior’ beings, Grebenitz argues for a ‘universal concept.’^ Those who deny this way of understanding the division, he continues, admit an analogy between God and creatures on grounds of participation or composition; in his view, however, it is more suitable to recognize that the division of being into ens a se and ens ab alio or into infinite and finite being is based on formal reasons, formal synonymy, or rational univocity/^ The use of ‘formal’ in this context, taken together with Grebenitz’s frequent recourse to Suarez, indicates the background to his argumentation.

Theological associations and applicationsThe strongly negative voice of Reformed philosophers and theologians on the univocity of being served, among other things, to distinguish the disciplines of theology and metaphysics and to stand in the way of a merger the two disciplines:

61Jacob Revius, Suarez repurgatus. Sive syllabus d ispu tationum m etapbysicaru m Prancisci Suarez Societatis JesuTheologi, cum notis la co b i R evii ss. Theol. D. (beiden: Franciscus Heger, 1644), 1-2., citing A quinas, Sum m a theologiae , la , q . i , art. 8.Revius, Suarez repurgatus ء6 , z .أ6 Revius, Suarez repurgatus , 516.ب Revius, Suarez repurgatus, 517: ‘falsae opinioni Scoti de univocatione Fntis inter D eum & cre^uraram , ac facile [...] refelluntur. H oc veram aequivocationem evincit, nam Ens essen tia liter dependens & Ens essen tialiter independens, rationem essentia , licet sub eodem nom ine, diversam habent.’و Revius, Suarez repurgatus, 516.^ E lia s Grebenitz, P hilosophi & Theologi M etaphysica (Frankfurt: Zeitler, 1677), Pars specialis ل.1-ة (ل5ت-ل5رو.1 , . ^ Grebenitz, P hilosophi & Theologi M etaphysica , Pars specialis , I .i . i , z, 4 (153, 155).

blOTSCOTIST 1وو

Reformed writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made very clear distinctions between theology and me^physics, indeed, between ^ e rn a tu ra l ly revealed theology, natural theology, and metaphysics; ^ternatively, they rather strictly separated ‘general metaphysics’ from a ‘special metaphysics’ or natural theology. Their reasons for the denial are quite clear. If the univocity of being were accepted as a valid uderstand ing , m^aphysics, understood as the science of being, would with little qualification include discussion of God; if, however, the concept were questioned, a m ^ p h y sic s might consciously limit or exclude discussion of God on the ground that God ought not to be considered as ‘being in general.’ ®̂

Accordingly, the denial of univocity, taken together with the typical affirmation of an analogy of being, opened the way for the Reformed orthodox to argue a doctrine of the divine attributes that affirmed both the transcendence of God and the intimate r(dationship of God to ffie world order. Given that being could not be predicated univocally of God and creatures, the Reformed typically stressed the accommodated or ectypal character of God language and followed a language of analogical predication, typically noting either an analogy of ^oportionality or an analogy of attribution or proportion, when speaking of the divine attributes.69 William Twisse, for example, comments on the similitude between the divine essence and created things noting that Aquinas rightly indicated the relationship to be an analogy of proportionality. ‘I do not deny,’ he continues, ‘that ens is said to be a genus analogum with reference to uncreated and created being.’̂ °

A passage from Franciscus ]unius’s posthumous Summa aliquot locorum communium 5s. theologiae illustrates various applications of analogy and also an instance in which there can be a univocal predication of God, the latter, arguably, demonstrating also the Reformed denial of the univocity of being. The text is im portant to ffie point because Beck cites it in part and implies that its reference to univocal predication implies the univocity of being. The issue arises, Junius indicates, because ffie essence of God cannot be perceived by human beings as it is, but only according to a human mode of understanding and speech.71 Human beings cannot see ffie light of the sun, secundum modi ipsius, even though it penetrates ffie whole world, but only see it secundum modulum nostrum. So much the more is the sight of God, who is infinite light, beyond our reach. This language of accommodation itself points toward analogies.

There are three degrees (gradus) of the perception of God, whether in nature or in Scripture. The ‘first is by negation or remotion,’ namely by the negation of various creaturely properties. The ‘second, commonly called [the mode] of perfection^ namely, affirm ation’ speaks of God by identifying ffie ‘perfections that

68 Cf. the discussion in Muller, Post-R eform ation R eform ed D ogm atics, 111, 167־ل7ه .69 Thus, W illiam Ames, M edulla ss. theologiae, ex sacris Uteris, earum que in terpretibus, extracta, & m ethodice d isposita (London: Rohert A llott, 1629), I.iv .xx, 30, 34; c؛. Voetius, Selectae d ispu tation es theologicae , 5 vols (Utrecht: Joannes à W aesberge, 1 6 4 8 -1 6 6 9 ), ٧ ه5 , .70W illiam Twisse, D isserta tio de scientia m edia tribus libris absolu ta (Arnhem: Jacobus à biesius, 1639), D igressio ٥ , 305 , citing Aquinas, ٥ ،? verita te , q. 3, art I , ad. 7 , and art. X, having also rejected the views o f Scotus and Durandus.71 Franciscus Junius, Sum ma a liqu o t locorum com m unium ss. th eologiae , Il.ii, in o p e r a theologica Francisci ]unit Biturigis sacrarum literarum professon s ex im ii, X vols (Geneva: Caldorianus, 1607), 11, separate pagination, a d fin , col. 3x: ‘essentiae D ei non percipi ab hom ine, prout esse, sed prout com prehendit a nobis, & enuntiari sermone potest.’

ا4م RICHARD A. M ^ L E R

are in creatures’ as dependent on God and as present by way of Smilitude or vestige (secundum similitudinem aut vestigium). Thus God is identified as great, good, just, wise, powerful, and so forth Scotus, it needs be noted, did not think ت?.highly of the distinction, characteristic of A f in a s and Henry of Ghent, between negation and affirmation, and disputed the validity of a via negationis.73 The predication here is arguably an analogy of proper ^ o ^ r tio n a li ty , grounded in the relation that creatures have to God, the principle analogate: the objective concept is intrinsic to all of the analogates but is in creatures in a manner different than it is in G o d .^ The language of remotion and perfection as well as the language of similitude echo Zanchi, and Aquinas as well.

The third way or degree is by way of ‘excellence or uperem inence.’ This predication refers particularly to the language of Scripture which references God in a way that is higher than the manner of referencing creatures and can, therefore, be called univocal/* Junius then explains what he means by a univocal predication with reference to God. There are two points to be understood when something is predicated univocally of God. The first of these is a general assumption (communiter) inasmuch as God is ffie cause of all things, the reason or cause of why all things are what they are, and ffie cause of all good in things: in this way, heat is predicated univocally of fire inasmuch as it is ffie heat of the fire that accounts for the fire being hot. That is to say, ffie heat is essentially the same as the fire. The second point identifies the specific or unique (singulariter) character of the predication, given that God is not merely ffie author of all good, but is ‘goodness itself, infinitely a m o u n tin g all good.’̂ In other words, a term can be predicated univocally of God when ffie term is understood by way of excellence or uperem inence, to be essential and intrinsic to God in a way that it cannot be to creatures. The term is predicated of God singulariter. This is clearly not an argument for ffie univocal predication of any term to both God and creatures؛ rather it argues a univocal predication of the term to God alone and implies an analogical form of predication to creatures. It is most probably also an analogy of proportionality, considering ffie attribute to be essential and perfect in God, derived and imperfect in the creatures. Junius’s argument, therefore, actually points away from a concept of the univocity of being. This approach to the predication of divine transcendental properties or affections echoes Aquinas who consistently held that meaning of words predicated of God and creatures is proper

^ ]u n iu s . Sum m a a liqu o t locorum com m unium , Il.ii (col. 32.).73 Cf. Scotus, O rd in a tio , 1, d. 3, q. I, in o p e r a om n ia , VIII, 9 -1 0 .74 Cf. D aniel Charnier, Corpus theologicum seu loci com m unes theologici, praelectionibus publicis in academ ia M ontalbanensi (Geneva: Samuel ch o u et, 1653), Ill.iii (83), s^ c ific a lly identifying tw o patterns o f analogy in the predication o f divine attributes, one by negation, the other by affirmation.٨ Junius, Sum m a a liqu o t locorum com m unium , Il.ii, col. 32: ‘excellentiae sive ^ c e m i n e n t i a e (ut vocant) quom odo enuntiam us de D eo, quaecunque sunt in scripturis, &c enuntiari possunt supra m odum creaturarum om nium , id est, (ut loquuntur) univoce.’ة7 Junius, Sum m a a liqu o t locorum com m unium , Il.ii, col. 32: ‘Cum autem univoce de D eo praedicamus, duo simul volum us intelhgi: primum communiter, qua causa est eorum om nium quae sunt, &c qua om nia quae sunt, a D eo sunt quicquid sunt, aut habent boni. Sic enim calor de igne praedicatur univoce, quia calida quaecunque sunt a calore ignis calida sunt: deinde vero singulariter, qua Deus non solum est om nis bonis auctor: sed ipsa bonitas in infinitum superans om ne bonum , quod ab ipsum profectum est. In hunc itaque m odum oportebit deinceps accipi, quaecunque de D eo ratione humana sumus enuntiaturi.’

NOT SCOTIST ו4ו

to God and by resemblance in creatures,77 and it neither places God into the order of being as a being like the creatures nor identifies God as inaccessible and unrelated in his infinitude.

Crocius and Maresius also specifically deny that Ens or, indeed, Efts understood as substantia can be univocally predicated of God and m atu re s. Creatures have Entitas only by dependence on God who exists a se ipso. Thus God and creatures are identified as ens in different ways; in Crocius’s view ens is predicated analogically of God and creatures, in Maresius’s view, equivocally — a point that Maresius makes specifically against the Socinians, Vorstius, and Duns Scotus.7 ̂ In the Maresian conception of the problem, the necessity and self-existence of God and the contingency and dependence of creatures bars the way to univocal predication. Maresius also indicates that Spiritus, when predicated of God and creatures, is predicated equivocally.7̂

Voetius’s very brief comment on the issue stands in accord with Zanchi, Baron, Maccovius, Jacchaeus and the various other Reformed writers who argue an analogy of being. After answering in foe affirmative to foe question An ornne ens recte dividatur in finitum & infinitum?, Voetius went on to ask: ،An divisio haec entis sit generis univoci in suas species9 an vero homonymi in sua significata, an denique analogi in sua a n a lo g a ta f\affirming the final choice, namely the analogy of being.^° Rlsewhere, he raised the questions of whether God is unnameable and of whether any terms could be univocally applied to God and creatures. To the former question Voetius responded that God could not be named in a folly commensurate way (adaequate)y but only in an incommensurate manner (inadaequate), given that no finite mind is capable of a concept adequate to the representation of God; no human term can be identified as a word sent forth from G od.^ To the latter question Voetius answered that there could be no ‘perfect univocation’ but that there could be predication if the language stepped back from

77 Cf. Aquinas, Sum m a theologiae, la , ٩ . 13, a. 6, cnrpus; w ith Aquinas, Sum m a contra gen tiles , I .x x x ii.1 -2 , 5-6 ; xlvi.7 .78 Cf. Ludovicus Crocius, Syntagm a sacrae theologiae quatuor libris adorna tu m : qu o exh ibetur idea dogm atum ecclesiasticorum (Bremen: Bertholdus Villerianus, 1636), HI.V (444): ‘N am ratio entis in D eo infinite excedit earn, quae est in creaturis: unde non univoce, sed analogice de D eo & creaturis end ^ aed ica tu r’; w ith Samuel M aresius, C ollegium th eo log icu m sive sy s tem s breve universae th eo log iae com prehensu m o c to d ec im d ispu ta tion ibu s (Croningen: Joannes N icolaus, 12 يم4رو, ت.نل (1 ): ‘Ens enim aut Spiritus non univoce de D eo & Creaturis ^aedicatur, sed tantum a e q u iv o c e cf. M aresius, S ystem s theologicum : hactenus saepius recusum , nunc vero locupleta tum prolix is annotation ibus, ad illius explicationum & defensionum facientibus (Groningen: A em ilius Spinneker, 1673), ii.2 (44).79M aresius, System a theologicum , ii.2 (43).80 Gisbertus Voetius, Syllabus prob lem atu m theologicorum , quae pro ٢،? n ataa p ro p o n i au t perstringi so ien t in priva tis publicisque dispu tationum , exam inum , collationum , consultationum exercitiis ... pars p rio r (Utrecht: Aegidius Rom anus, 1643), fol. D ir -V .81Voetius, Selectae d ispu tation es , [1st ref. in n .69j V, 50: ‘Pro¿?/. An D eus s it a nobis n om in abilis? R esp. D e nom ine adaequato N eg. D e inadaequato concedimus: uti nullus m entis finitae conceptus adaequate D eum representare potest, sic etiam nullus λΑ .γος π ροφ ορικ ός.’

ו42 RICHARD A. M U ^E R

univocation to a particular ‘unequal mode or m anner’; s^cifically, the terms predicated of God and creatures were, therefore, analogical, either as an analogy ‘of dependence or attribution’ or as an analogy of ‘similitude or proportion.’®* There is no ‘univocal core’ in Voetius’ expression, as Beck claims, unless it is a univocity of predications concerning finite genus and species.83 Voetius does not suppose that there must be some univocal predication of God and creatures, namely, being, in order to the justification of further analogical usage. The language of analogy chosen by Voetius thus points in a more or less Thomistic, not a Scotistic direction. And if his son, Paulus, is any indication, the analogy in question is an analogy of proportionality.®^

A Scotist approach to the problem has also been argued to be present in the thought of Richard Baxter (1615-1691), who in one place did imply the validity of Scotus’ account of the univocity of being, although, oddly, in the context of arguing the incom ^ehe^ib ility of God and the absence of adequate formal concepts concerning God’s nature: human beings, Baxter comments, only have knowledge of God that is ‘analogical, aequivocal, metaphorical, or by similitude.’®5 He specifically states that ‘Neither substantia, Vita, Perfectio, Potentia, Actus, Intellectus, Voluntas, Love, Truth, Goodness, Mercy, &c. are formally and univocally the same in God and Creature.’ He then adds, ‘Scotus excepteth only ENS. Which is true, as ens is only a Logical term, signifying no more than EST or Quoddity , and not QUID est, or Quiddity,’ going, however, on to emphasize knowledge of God by similitude.®^ W hat is more, even here, Baxter’s approach specifically runs against a Scotistic univocal understanding of other attributes, such as intellect and will.®إل

Baxter’s positive comment concerning univocity, moreover, clashes directly with foe point he made in his in M ethodus, reflecting foe standard rule that univocal predication cannot be made of individuals belonging to different genera, that predications of inferiors must be by analogy; also, that a majority of writers deny univocity and favor analogical predications concerning God and creatures.®® Elsewhere, Baxter makes clear that ‘Substance and Accident are Analogata,’ denying that aspect of Scotus’ theory of univocity, prohahly implying as well that Ens is understood analogically of God and creatures and that, in addition, there

Voetius, Selectarum d ق8 ispu ta tion es, ٧ , 50: ،P robl. A n aliqua nom ina de D eo & creaturis univoce dicantur? Res., D e Univocatione perfecta. N eg., de ea quae ad m odum ac rationem specialem inaequaliter descendit. A ff., Quae propterea ad analoga dependentiae seu attributionis, & similitudinis seu p rop ortion s referri debet’; cf. Petrus van M astricht, Theoretico-practioa theologia, qua, per capita theologica, pars dogm ática, elenchtica e t practica, perpetua successione conjugantur, praecedunt in usum operis, paraleipom ena, seu sceleton de op tim a concionandi m eth odo (Utrecht: van de Water, Poolsum , Wagens 8c Paddenburg, 1714), U.V.12 (97); Van ^ s t r ic h t , N ovita tu m Cartesianum Gangrena, nobiliores plerasque corporis theologici partes arrodens exedens, seu theologia Cartesiana detecta ءء (Amsterdam: Jansson, 1677), II.xvi.4 (3 07 -8 ).83 Beck, G isbertus Voetius, 221.84 Paulus Voetius, Prim a ph ilosophia reform ata (Utrecht: Johannes à W aesberge, 1657), I .x ix -x x ii (5 4 -5 6 ).85 Richard Baxter, An End o f D octrin a l C ontroversies w hich have la tely trou b led the churches by reconciling explication , w ith o u t m uch dispu ting (London: John Salusbury, 1691), viii.Baxter, End o ة8 f D octrin a l C ontroversies, v iii-ix . Significantly, Baxter understands Scotus’ concept o f the univocity of being as a logical, not an ontological concept.87 Baxter, End o f D octrin a l C ontroversies, ix; cf. Baxter, The R eduction o f a D igressor: ٠٢ Rich. Baxter's R ep ly to

K en dall’s digression in his book against Mr. G o odw in (London: A .M . for Thom as Underhill, 1654), 35. 88Richard Baxter, M ethodus theologiae christianae (London: M . W hite 8c T. Snow don, 1681), 1, 6, 31.

NOT SCOTIST آ4و

are also terms predicated e^ ivocally of God and creatures.^ The latter point was made against George Kendal. Baxter’s intention was not to deny analogy or to identify it as merely e^ iv o ca tio n؛ indeed, he explicitly indicates that terms are applied to God neither univoce nor pure aequivoce90 Baxter goes on to offer favourable assessments of Zanchi, ]acchaeus, Aquinas and others on the use of analogy of ^ o ^ r tio n a li ty with reference to God and creatures, on the denial of analogy of attribution, and on the denial that God is in a genus.^*

Melchior Leydekker states categorically, ،the concept of being & substance does not agree univocally to God and creatures, but analogically’ and immediately adds, ،as is generally taught contra Scotus and his sycophants [asseclas]^92, When commenting on the false theologies of pagans, he critiques very notion of polytheism with the comment that the distinction between ،the highest God & subordinate [deities], independent & dependent, infinite & finite’ is absurd, given that ‘the notion of Divinity includes infinitude’ and that ‘the Being of God is properly highest and independent.’̂ Leydekker’s point specifically counters Scotus’ conceptual abstraction of being as such from concepts of finitude and infinitude. In other words, there is no genus ‘god’ and, presumably, God cannot be considered as a species within a genus, all of which places God language outside of the locations in which univocation is possible. When he comes to discuss the attributes of God, Leydekker argues against those who claim that all of the attributes are stated equivocally of God and creatures. He agrees that eternity and immensity are predicated ‘utterly equivocally’ of God and creatures, but other terms applied to God have a similitude and analogy among the creatures, notably, life, understanding, will, holiness, justice.’̂

This assumption carries forward into the very passage that Bac cites to argue a hint of univocity. There, Leydekker indicates that there is truth prior to God’s will, but not truth independent of God, inasmuch as all truth is founded in the divine essence itself: ‘God, as existent and true being is the root and origin, the foundation of the truth of this principle, it is impossible at the same time to be and not to be.’95 The context is an argument against the radical voluntarism of the Cartesians, according to which, on his reading, the absolute power of God could

Richard Baxter, The R و* eduction o f a D igressor: or Rich. Baxter's R ep ly to G eorge K en dall’s digression in his book against Mr. G o odw in (London: A. M . for Thom as Underhill, 1.ة54,) و 1-3تBaxter, R °و edu ction o f a D igressor, 35. Despite his detailed argum entation, I cannot concur with Simon ].G . Burton, The H allow in g o fL o g ic : The Trinitarian M eth od o fR ic h a rd B ax ter’s M eth odu s Theologiae (Leiden: E. ] . Brill, 2.012.), 2,11-2.13, that Baxter ultim ately adopts a Scotistic solution: Baxter, rather, appears to he exercising his vast know ledge scholastic form ؛0 ulations, including Scotus as w ell as others, in order to argue the com plexity 0؛ foe problem against various adversaries; his ow n views include positive Thom istic as w ell as Scotistic re؛erences as w ell as positive uses o f other medievals a n d various late Renaissance philosophers, indicating an eclectic ^ p rop r ia tion rather than advocacy of one particular school o f m edieval thought.91 Baxter, R eduction o f a Digressor, 34 -3 6 .Leydekker, Fax Veritatis ءو , IH.vii, obs. I (1رةت: ‘conceptum entis &, substantiae non univoce sed analogic،؛ com petere D eo & creaturis, ut docetur com m uniter contra Scotum euisque asseclas’. N o te that Leydekker uses the pejorative, ‘asseclas’ as distinct from the m ore neutral ‘assectatores.’93 M elchior Leydekker, D e verita te religionis reform atae seu evangelicae, libri VII. Q uibus Christiana de oeconom ia s. S. Trinitatis in negotio salutis hum anae explicatur, e t R eform ata fides ex certis principas, in verbo D ei revelatis, congruo nexu dem onstra tur # .defenditur (Utrecht: Rudolphus à ^^11, 1688), I.i.56 ׳94Leydekker, Fax verita tis, IH.vii, fontes solutionum I (ل3ل-ل3ت ).95 Leydekker, Fax veritatis, V.v, fontes solutionum 2 (252).

4 4 ا RICHARD A. M ULER

will something to be other than what it is؛ for example, will a four-sided triangle. The point, he notes, is not whether God could will something not to exist that he has willed to exist. That is uncontested. Rather foe point concerns foe genera of the things themselves, so that God could not create a soul that was not a spirit, not could God create a human being, as a human being, who was not also a rational a n i m a l . T h e divine essence itself, then, as true and as necessarily existent, embodies the principle of non-contradiction and does so because ‘all of the ideas of God concerning the essences and reality of possible creatures have God himself as object, and his essence as infinitely imitable ad extra’; still, this imitability does not imply ‘creatures extra D eum ,’ in a ‘primary sense’؛ rather it indicates that all creatures are conceived ‘as possibles through foe power of foe most perfect and most potent divine essence.ص Accordingly, it is a mistake to claim that creatures can have no knowledge of God, ‘inasmuch as all things participate somehow in God؛ and unity, truth, and, goodness are affections belonging to created things, it is impossible that these do not in some way refer to God their creator.’̂ Thus, the transcendental properties, unitas, veritas, and bonitas are necessarily in uncreated God and present also as affections in created being, not absolutely, certainly not uncreatedly, but by participation, given the existence of creatures by ^ rtic ip a tio n in being.

Whereas Bac reads foe text as implying univocity of being, or at least univocity of unity, truth, and goodness, given what Leydekker has argued concerning the divine attributes (not to mention his denial of foe univocity of being), the argument ought to be interpreted as indicating an analogy. As heydekker had previously indicated, communicable properties are predicated of God and creatures by similitude or analogy. By extension, unity, truth and goodness are transcendental properties of divine and of creaturely being and the properties themselves, as perfections or objective concepts are understood as intrinsic to the being of God and creatures, albeit in different modes: perfectly and infinitely in God, imperfectly and finitely in creatures. In short the predication is by an analogy of proper proportionality.

ConclusionsA significant sampling of philosophers writing in foe Reformed context confirms the conclusion tentatively drawn in an earlier study from examination of the doctrine of divine attributes in foe older Reformed theology: foe Reformed are somewhat eclectic in their reception of traditionary models and patterns of explanation and a Scotist language of the univocity of being is not at all characteristic of Reformed orthodox thought. The absence of such language from what is arguably the majority of Reformed formulations on the issue of Being- language stands against the facile characterization of early modern Reformed thought as ‘Scotist.’ The documentary evidence points specifically toward a diverse

96Leydekker, Vax verita tis , ٧ ٧ , notandum 3 ( Z 4 8 ) ; c f . argum enta 4 9 (ق ت־3 ).

9^Leydekker, Vax verita tis , ٧ ٧ , fontes solutionum ت5ت) 3 ).Leydekker, Vax veritaئ9 tis , ٧ ٧ , fontes soluti©num 4 ( 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 ) .

NOT SCOTIST 45 آ

reception of arguments concerning predication (whether related to predications concerning God and creatures or the nature of analogy) and a positive interest in Thomist as opposed to Scotist formulations. There is also, contra Gregory, no ground for claiming a nearly universal acceptance of Suarezian metaphysics.

After Zanchi and Daneau had established a Thomistic line of argument, specifically referencing Thomas A f in a s as distinct from later Thomists like Cajetan ( ل46و-ل5ؤ4ر , denying univocity and affirming analogy, the majority of Reformed writers held to the basic denial of univocity of being, but were divided on the further question of the nature of the non-univocal predications. The greater number of writers examined echoed Aquinas by grounding the analogy in a doctrine of p ^ ic ip a tio n and arguing an analogy of proportionality: God is being essentialiter, creatures have being by participation. Indeed, the foundational arguments against univocity of being rest on the assumption of creaturely dependence and a metaphysics of ^ rtic ip a tio n . Twisse specifically references Aquinas on the point after rejecting views of Scotus and Durandus. Various others, like Baron and Barlow relied more on Cajetan and Suarez for their discussions of analogy but, against Suarez, denied the univocity of being. As Baron, Heereboord, and Bruguier, indicated, the case of God and creatures stood as an exception to the usual patterns of predication: univocity of concepts was a necessary assumption when developing arguments concerning the finite order. Univocal predication occurs when a generic term is predicated of two species or individuals belonging to the same genus; and from the perspective of the Reformed writers, either ‘being’ is not a genus or, if it is, God as su^ressential is not within it. The language of God as ‘supra ens’ found among some of the Reformed writers (Keckermann, Alsted, and Gale) points toward a ?latonizing tendency, distinct from the more traditional Peripateticism of the majority.

A lesser number, including Musculus at foe time of foe Reformation and Crakanthorpe, Revius, and Maresius in foe era of orthodoxy, denied both univocity and analogy and argued for an equivocal predication of being with respect to God and creatures. Grebenitz’s affirmation of univocity is the single clear exception, with one of Clauberg’s accounts potentially opening a door to the concept, but not very widely. Baxter’s single positive reference to the Scotistic univocity of being must be placed into the framework of his more typical advocacy of analogy and of philosophical conclusions, such as those of Aquinas, Cajetan, Zanchi, and Jacchaeus, that ran counter to those of Scotus.

If one can speak of a ‘core’ of univocity in the Reformed language of predication, it is with regard to predications concerning a genus and its species or a species and its individuals, not wifo reference to God and creatures. Given, moreover, both the explicit denials of univocity of being on the part of the large majority of writers in Reformed circles, including the declarations of several that God must be understood as supra ens, and the equally explicit condemnations of Scotus on foe issue by Baron, C m bach ius, Revius, and Leydekker, the Reformed approaches cannot be accommodated to foe notion of ‘reverent exposition’ characteristic of Vos’s argumentation, according to which Scotist meanings were

RICHARD A. MULLER ا46

conveyed through the use of nominally Thomist vocabulary.^ Against the claim of Bac, discussions of the transcendental properties that appear in the metaphysics of these authors also typically include qu^ihcations concerning the ways in which these properties belong to divine and creaturely being, presuming analogy rather than univocity.

The large number of Reformed denials of univocity of being calls into question both foe positive and the negative readings of the Reformation as foundationally Scotist in its philosophical directions. Against the positive approach of Vos, Beck, Bac, and others, we must offer a partial verdict, inasmuch as the absence of one key Scotist theme, although it undermines their unqualified identification of Reformed theology as Scotist, does not demonstrate the absence of other Scotisms. Rather it points toward the generally eclectic reception of medieval materials on the part of the early modern Reformed. Against the negative approach of Radical Orthodoxy and Gregory, we offer a significantly firmer verdict. W hatever one concludes concerning the implications of the univocity of being, the claim that the concept invested itself in Protestant theology cannot be sustained, nor indeed that early modern Protestant thought evidenced a ‘shift’ away from a ‘metaphysics of ^ rtic ip a tio n .’ In short, their claim that the absorption of the concept of the univocity of being into early modern Protestantism accounts for foe perceived problems of twentieth and twenty-first century secular culture is seen to be a sorry im posture.

BibliographyP rim a ry sou rces

A lsted , Joh ann H ein rich . M e ta p h ys ic a l tr ib u s lib ris tra c ta ta , p e r p ra e c e p ta m e th o d ic a , th eo re m a ta se le c ta &

co m m en ta r io la d ilu c ida . Q u a e o m n ia in fer io r ib u s d isc ip lin is c o n s titu e n d is & p erc ip ien d is v ia m

c o m p en d ia r ia m p a te fa c iu n t. H erborn: C hristoph C orv in u s, 1 6 1 3 .

A m es, W illiam . M ed u lla ss. th eo lo g ia e , ex sacris U teris, ea ru m q u e in te rp re tib u s , e x tra c ta , & m e th o d ic e

d isp o s ita . A m sterd am , 1 6 L ثو2 on d on: R obert A llo tt , 1 وق6 .

Baxter, R ichard . A n E n d o f D o c tr in a l C o n tro vers ie s w h ich h a ve la te ly tr o u b le d th e ch u rches b y reco n c ilin g

ex p lica tio n , w ith o u t m u ch d isp u tin g . L ondon: Joh n Salusbury, 1 6 9 1 .

· . M e th o d u s th eo lo g ia e ch ristian ae. L ondon: M . w h i t e & T. S n o w d o n 6ل , ل8 .

■ . T h e R ed u c tio n o f a D ig resso r: or R ich . B a x te r ’s R e p ly to G eo rg e K e n d a lls d ig ress io n in h is b o o k

a g a in s t M r. G o o d w in . L on d on: A . M . for T h om as U nd erh ill, 1 6 5 4 .

B arlow , T h om as. E x erc ita tio n e s a liq u o t m e ta p h ys ica le , d e D eo : q u o d s i t o b je c tu m m e ta p h ys ica e . 2n d edn .

O xford: A . L ichfield , 1 6 3 8 .

B aron , R obert. M e ta p h ys ic a gen eralis: a cc ed u n t n un c p r im u m q u a e su p e re ra n t e x p a r te specia li: o m n ia a d

u su m th eo lo g ia e a c c o m m o d a ta : o p u s p o s tu m u m , ex m u seo A n to n ii C le m en tii Z ir iza e i. C am bridge: Joh n

H ayes, 1 6 8 5 .

B eza, T h eod ore and A n ton iu s Faius, T h eses th eo lo g ica e in sch o la G en even s i a b a liq u o t sacraru m litera ru m

S tu d iosu s su b D D . T h eo d . B eza & A n to n io F ayo ss. th eo lo g ia e p ro fe s so r ib u s p r o p o s i ta e & d isp u ta ta e .

G eneva: E u stath iu s V ign on , 1 5 8 6 .

99 Contra Vos, The Philosophy o f jo h n D uns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University ?ress, ^006), 530-539; Vos, ‘De kern van de klassieke G ^H orm eerde theologie’, 120 -1 2 2 ; Vos, ،Ab uno disce om nes’, 1 9 5 -1 9 6 , 2 0 1 -2 0 3 ; and Bac and Pleizier, ‘Reentering Sites o f Truth’, 3 1 -5 4 . For a m ore balanced account o f exponere reverenter and its place in m edieval thought, see M .-D . Chenu, T ow ard U nderstanding Saint T h om as , trans., A .-M . Landry and D . Hughes (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), 1 4 4 -1 4 9 .

NOT SCOTIST 4 7 ו

Bruguier, Jean. Idaea to tiu s p h ilo so p h ia e , in q u a o m n ia p h ilo so p h ia e s tu d io s is sc itu b re v i te r a c d ilu c id e ju x ta

ra tio n em & ex p e rien tia m dem o n stra n tu r . Saum ur: R en atus Pean, 1 6 7 7 .

B runo, G iord an o and R aph ael E glinus. S u m m a te rm in o ru m m e ta p h y s ic o ru m Jordan i B ru n i N o la n i. A c c e ss it

. . . p e r R a p h a e le m E g lin u m Ico n iu m tigu rin u m . . . cu m su p p le m e n to R o d o lp h i G o c le n ii S en ioris . M arburg:

R o d o lp h H u tw elck er, 1 6 0 9 .

Burgersdijk , Eraneo. I n s ti tv t io n v m m e ta p h ys ica ru m , lib . f / . Leiden: 1 6 4 0 . L on d on: j . C rook & J . Baker, 16 5 3 ;

O xford : H . H a ll & R . D av is , 1 6 7 5 .

C alv in , Joh n , lo a n n is C a lv in i opera qu a e su p e rsu n t o m n ia . E d ited by G u ilie lm u s B aum , E duardus C un itz , and

Eduardus R eu ss. C orpus R eform atoru m . 59 vo ls . B raunschw eig: S ch w etsch k e, 1 8 6 3 -1 9 0 0 .

I n s titu tio ch ris tian ae re lig ion is . G eneva: R obert S tephanus, 1 5 5 9 .

. In E zech elis p ra e le c tio n e s . In o p e r a , vo l. 4 0 .

Charnier, D an ie l. C o rp u s th eo lo g icu m seu lo c i co m m u n e s th eo lo g ic i, p ra e le c tio n ib u s p u b lic is in a ca d e m ia

M o n ta lb a n en s i. G eneva: Sam uel C h ou et, 1 6 5 3 .

C lauberg, Joh ann es. E le m en ta p h ilo so p h ia e s ive o n to so p h ia , sc ien tia p r im a , d e iis D e o c rea tu r isq u e su o m o d o

co m m u n ite r a ttrib u u n tu r . G roningen: Joan nes N ic o la i, 1 6 4 7

. M e ta p h ys ic a d e en te , qu ae rec tiu s o n to so p h ia , a lia ru m d isc ip lin a ru m , ip s iu s q u o q u e iu r isp ru d e n tia e &

litera ru m , s tu sio s is a c c o m m o d a ta . 3rd ed n . A m sterdam : D a n ie l E lzevir, 1 6 5 4 .

C om b ach iu s, Joh ann es. M eta p h ys ic o ru m , lib r i d u o vn iv e rsa m p r im a e p h ilo so p h ia e d o c tr in a m th e o re m a tib u s

b rev iss im is co m p re h e n d e n te s , & c o m m en ta r iis n ecessariis illu stran tes: s tu d io s is ejus d isc ip lin a p erq u a m

u tiles & fru c tu o si. O xford: w. Turner, 1 6 3 3 .

C rak anth orp e, R ichard . In tro d u c tio in m e ta p h ys ica m . O xford: Iohan n es L ichfield & Iacob us Short, 1 6 1 9 .

C rocius, L u d ovicu s. S yn ta g m a sacrae th eo lo g ia e q u a tu o r lib ris a d o r n a tu m : q u o ex h ib e tu r id ea d o g m a tu m

ec c les ia s tico ru m . Brem en: B ertholdus V illerianu s, 1 6 3 6 .

D an eau , Lam bert. C h ris tian ae isagoges a d ch ris tia n o ru m th e o lo g o ru m lo c o s co m m u n e s, lib r i / / . G eneva:

E u stath iu s V ign on , 1 5 8 3 .

D ero d o n , D an ie l. P h ilo so p h ia co n tra c ta ; cu m in d ice c a p itu m e t p ra ec ip u o ru m a r tic u lo ru m sin gu lis h uius

p h ilo so p h ia e p a r tib u s p r a e m isso parts. G ت. eneva: Pierre C h ou et, 1 6 6 4 .

D u n s S cotu s, Joh n . R e p o r ta ta Pariesiene, I, p ro l., ٩٠^, art. I . In o p e r a o m n ia , 2 6 v o ls , ed ited by Luke

W ad din g, vo l. X X II, 5 0 , 52 . Paris: V ives, 1 8 9 1 -1 8 9 5 .

G ale, T h eop h ilu s . T h e C o u r t o f th e G en tile s , or, A d isco u rse to u ch in g th e o r ig in a l o f h u m a n lite ra tu re , b o th

p h ilo lo g ie a n d p h ilo so p h ie , fro m th e S crip tu res a n d Jew ish ch u rch . 4 parts in 5 vo lu m es. O x fo rd and

L on d on: [various p ub lishers!, 1 6 7 0 -1 6 7 8 .

G oc len iu s , R u d o lp h . Isagoge In P e rip a te tico rvm e t S ch o la s tic o ru m P r im a m P h ilo so p h ia m , q u a e d i d co n su e u it

M eta p h ys ic a . A cc esse ru n t d isp u ta tio n es huius g en eris a liq u o t. Frankfurt: Z ach arias Palthen ius, 1 5 9 8 .

. L e x ico n p h ilo so p h icu m , q u o ta n q u a m cla ve p h ilo so p h ia e fo re s a periu n tu r. Frankfurt: M atth ia s

Becker, 1 6 1 3 .

G reb en itz, E lias. P h tlo so p h i & T h eo lo g i M e ta p h ys ic a . Frankfurt: Z eitler, 1 6 7 7 .

H eereb oord , A driaan . M e le te m a ta p h ilo so p h ica in q u ib u s p le ra e q u e res M e ta p h y s ic a e ven tilan tu r , to ta E th ica

κ α τα σκ ευα σ τικ ώ ς καί άνασκευαστικώ ς exp lica tu r , u n iversa P h ysica p e r th eo re m a ta & co m m e n ta r io s

ex p o n itu r , su m m a reru m L o g ica ru m p e r D is p u ta tio n e s trad itur. E d it io n o va . A m sterdam : H enricu s

W etsten iu s, 1 6 8 0 .

H yp er iu s, A ndreas. M e th o d i th eo lo g ia e , s ive p ra ec ip u o ru m c h r is tia n a e re lig ion is lo c o ru m co m m u n iu m lib r i

tres . Basel: Ioan n es O p orin u s, 1 5 6 7 .

Jacchaeus, G ilbertus. P rim a e p h ilo so p h ia e s ive ln s titu tio n u m m e ta p h ys ica ru m , lib ri sex . E d itio p ostrem a.

C am bridge: R oger D a n ie l, 1 6 4 9 .

Junius, Franciscus. o p e r a th eo lo g ica Francisci Ju nii B itu rig is sacraru m lite ra ru m p r o fe s so n s ex im ii. 2 vo ls .

G eneva: C ald orian u s, 1 6 0 7 .

■■ ■ S u m m a a liq u o t lo c o ru m co m m u n iu m 5S. T h eo lo g ia e . In o p e r a , II, separate p a g in a tion , a d fin .

K eckerm ann, B arth o lom aeu s. S cien tiae m e ta p h ys ica e c o m p e n d io su m s y s te m a . . . in du as p a r te s . H anau:

G u lielm u s A n ton iu s , 1 6 0 9 .

ا4ة RICHARD A. M U ^E R

Leydekker, M elch ior. D e v e r ita te re lig ion is r e fo rm a ta e seu evan ge licae , lib r i VII. Q u ib u s C h ris tian a d e

o ec o n o m ia S.S. T rin ita tis in n e g o tio sa lu tis h u m an ae ex p lica tu r , e t R e fo rm a ta f id e s ex ce rtis p r in c ip a s , in

ve rb o D e i reve la tis , con gru o n exu d em o n s tra tu r & defen d itu r. U trecht: R ud o lp h u s à Z y ll, 1 6 8 8 .

■ . Fax ve r ita tis seu ex e rc ita tio n es a d n on u llas c o n tro ve rs ia s q u a e h o d ie in B e lg io p o tis s im u m m o v e n tu r :

. . . P raefixa e s t p ra e fa tio d e s ta tu B elg icae E cc lesiae , & su ffix a d is se r ta tio d e P ro v id e n tia D e i. Leiden:

D an iel à G aesb eeck et F elix L op ez, 1 6 7 7 .

M a cco v iu s , Joh ann es. M eta p h ys ic a , a d u su m q u a es tio n u m in p h ilo so p h ia ac th eo lo g ia a d o rn a ta & a p p lic a ta .

Leiden: Franciscus H ack in s , 16 5 0 ; th ird ed itio n , ed. A driaan H eereb oord . Leiden: Franciscus H ack iu s,

— — . D is tin c tio n e s e t regu lae th eo lo g ica e e t p h ilo so p h ica e . Franeker: Joan nes A rcherius, 1 6 5 3 .

M aresiu s, Sam uel. C olleg iu m th eo lo g icu m s ive s y s te m a b reve u n iversae th eo lo g ia e co m p re h e n su m o c to d e c im

d isp u ta tio n ib u s . G roningen: Joan n es N ico la u s , 1 6 4 9 .

■ ■■■ ־■־ . S ys tem a th e o lo g ic u m : h acten u s sa ep iu s recu su m , n un c ve ro lo c u p le ta tu m p r o lix is a n n o ta tio n ib u s , a d

illiu s ex p lic a tio n u m & d e fen s io n u m fa c ien tib u s . G roningen: A em iliu s sp in neker, 1 6 7 3 .

M astr ich t, Petrus van. T h eo re tico -p ra c tica th eo lo g ia , qu a , p e r ca p ita th eo lo g ica , p a rs d o g m á tic a , e len ch tica e t

p ra c tica , p e rp e tu a su ccess ion e con ju gan tu r, p ra ec e d u n t in u su m op er is , p a ra le ip o m en a , seu sce le to n d e

o p tim a co n c io n a n d i m e th o d o . U trecht: van de W ater, P oo lsu m , W agens & Pad d en b urg, 1 7 1 4 .

^ ^ — ٠ N o v ita tu m C artes ian u m G an gren a , n o b ilio re s p le ra sq u e co rp o r is th e o lo g ic i p a r te s a rro d e n s e t

ex ed en s, seu th eo lo g ia C artesian a d e te c ta . A m sterdam : Jan sson , 1 6 7 7 .

M ela n ch th o n , Philip . In itia d o c tr in a e p h ys ica e . W ittenberg: Ioh an n es L u؛ft, 1 5 4 9 .

M u «ller, G eorg. M eta p h ys ic a , d e fin itio n ib u s , d iv is io n ib u s & ca n on ibu s, cu m eo ru m o m n iu m C o m m e n ta r io lo .

Bern: G eorg Sonnleitner, 1652,.

M u scu lu s, W olfgan g . L o c i co m m u n e s sacrae th eo lo g ia e . Ba^el: Joh an n es H ervag iu s, 1 5 6 7 .

P o lanu s v o n P olan sd orf, A m and u s. S yn ta g m a th eo lo g ia e ch ris tian ae. H an au : W echel, 1 6 1 5 .

R eviu s, Jacob . S u arez repu rga tu s . S ive sy lla b u s d isp u ta tio n u m m e ta p h ys ica ru m Francisci S u arez S o c ie ta tis je s u

T h eo lo g i, cu m n o tis Ia co b i R e v ii SS. T h eo l. D . Leiden: Franciscus N eger, 6 4 ل4 .

Tim pler, C lem en s. M e ta p h ys ic a e s y s te m a m e th o d ic v m , lib ris q u in q u é p e r th eo re m a ta e t p ro b le m a ta se lec ta

co n c in n a tu m . . . . A cc essit e iu sd em te ch n o lo g ia . . . S eorsu m a cc esse ru n t R o d o lp h i G o c le n ii ph ilo soph a cl.

n o ta e & sch o lia . Fianau: H aered es G u lielm u s A n ton iu s, 1 6 1 2 .

T w isse , W illiam . D isse r ta tio d e sc ien tia m e d ia tr ib u s libris a b so lu ta . A rnhem : Jacob u s à B iesius, 1 6 3 9 .

V erm igli, Peter M artyr. L o c i co m m u n e s. E d itio secu n da . L ondon: T h om as V autrolher, 1 5 8 3 .

V oetiu s, G isbertus. S electa ru m d isp u ta tio n e s th eo lo g ica e p a r te s q u in q u é . U trecht: Joan n es à W aesberge, 1 6 4 8 -

— . S yllabu s p r o b le m a tu m th eo lo g ico ru m , q u a e p r o re n a ta a p r o p o n i a u t p e rs tr in g i s o ie n t in p r iv a tis

p u b lic isq u e d isp u ta tio n u m , ex a m in u m , c o lla tio n u m , co n su lta tio n u m ex e rc itiis . . . p a rs prior. U trecht:

A egid iu s I^ m a n u s , 1 6 4 3 .

V oetiu s, Paulus. P rim a p h ilo so p h ia re fo rm a ta . U trecht: Joh ann es a W aesberge, 1 6 5 7 .

Z an ch i, G iro lam o . D e natura D e i, seu d e d iv in is a ttr ib u tis , lib r i V. N eu stad t: W ilhe lm F larnisch , 1 5 9 8 .

Z an ch i, Jerom e. A r is to te lis d e n a tu ra li a u sc u lta tio n e , seu d e p r in c ip iis . Strasbourg: W endelin R ih el, 1 5 5 4 .

S eco n d a ry litera tu re

A sh w orth , E. j . ‘A n a log ica l C oncepts: T h e F ou rteen th -C en tu ry B ack grou n d to C ajetan .’ D ia lo g u e 31 (1 9 9 2 ):

3 9 9 -4 1 3 .

. ‘Suárez o n the A n alogy o f Being: Som e H istor ica l B ack grou n d .’ V ivariu m 33 (1 9 9 5 ): 5 0 -7 5 .

B ac, j , M artijn . ‘Perfect W ill T h eo logy : D iv in e A gen cy in R eform ed S ch olastic ism as aga in st Suarez,

E p iscop iu s, D escartes, and S p in oza .’ D o cto ra l d isserta tion , U trech t U niversity, 2 0 0 9 . !N o w p ub lished in

B rill’s Series in C hurch H istory , 4 2 (Brill: L eiden. هث1ه)ا .

B ac, M artijn and T h eo Pleizier. ‘R een tering Sites o f Truth. T each ing R eform ed S ch olastic ism in the

C on tem p orary C la ssro o m .’ In S ch o la stic ism R e fo r m e d : E ssays in H o n o u r o f W illem j . van A s se lt , ed ited by

W illem ien O tten , M arcel Sarot, and M aarten W isse , 33-54, in S tu d ies in T h e o lo g y a n d R e lig io n , 14. Leiden: E. j . Brill, 2 0 1 0 .

B agch i, D av id . ‘Sic et N o n : Luther and S ch o la stic ism .’ In P r o te s ta n t S ch o la stic ism : E ssays in R ea sse ssm en t,

ed ited by Carl T ruem an and R . S cott C lark, 3 -1 5 . C arlisle: P aternoster Press, 1 9 9 9 .

NOT SCOTIST آ4و

B eck, A ndreas ] . ‘G isbertus V oetius (1 5 8 9 -1 6 7 6 ) ; B asic Features o f h is D o ctr in e o f G o d .’ In R e fo rm a tio n a n d

S ch o lastic ism : A n E cu m en ica l E n te rp r ise , ed ited by W illem ر . van A sselt and £ e f D ekker, هة5־س . G rand

R apids: Baker, ههت1م

— — . G isb er tu s V oetiu s (1 5 8 9 -1 6 7 6 ) : Sein T h e o lo g iev ers ta « n d n is u n d sein e G o tte s le h re . G o«ttin gen ;

V and en h oeck & R up rech t, 7ههت .

B lack w ell, C on stan ce. ‘T h om as A qu in as aga in st th e Scotists and F latonists: T he d efin ition s o f C ajetan o,

Z im ara , Pererio, 1 4 9 5 - 1 5 7 6 .’ V erbu m 6 , n o . I (2 0 0 4 ): 1 7 9 -1 8 8 .

Völliger, D an ie l. In fin iti co n te m p la tio : G ru n d zu « g e d er S co tu s- u n d S co tism u sre ze p tio n im W erk H u ld ryc h

Z w in g lis : m i t au sfu «h rlich er E d itio n b ish er u n p u b liz ie r te r A n n o ta tio n e n Z w in g lis . S tudies in the H istory o f

K r is t ia n T h ou gh t, هء7م Leiden: Brill, 2 0 0 3 .

B os, F gbert and H . A . K rop, eds. F ranco B u rgersd ijk ( 1 5 9 0 -1 6 5 5 ) : N e o -A r is to te lia n ism in L e iden .

A m sterdam : R o d o p i, 1 9 9 3 .

B urton , S im on l.G . T h e F Ia llow in g ٠/ L og ic: '¡he T rin ita rian M e th o d o f R ic h a rd B a x te r ’s M e th o d u s

T h eo lo g ia e . B rill’s Series in C hurch H istory , 37 . L eiden & B oston: E. j . Brill, 2 0 1 2 .

C henu , M .-D ., T o w a rd U n d ersta n d in g S a in t T h o m a s . T ranslated by A .-M . L andry O.P. and D . H u gh es O.P.

C hicago: R egnery, 1 9 6 4 .

C ross, R ichard. “W here A n ge ls Fear to T read’: D u n s S cotus and R adica l O r th o d o x y .’ A n to n ia n u m 7 6 (2 0 0 1 ):

7 -4 1 ·D on n elly , Jolm Patrick. C a lv in ism a n d S ch o la stic ism in V erm ig li’s D o c tr in e o f M an a n d G race. Leiden: Brill,

19 7 5 -— . ‘C alv in ist T h o m ism ’. In V ia to r 7 (1976 ): 4 4 1 - 4 5 5 .

Farthing, John. T h o m a s A q u in a s a n d G a b r ie l B ie l· In te rp re ta tio n s o f S t. T h o m a s A q u in a s on th e E ve o f th e

R efo rm a tio n . D urham and L ondon: D u k e U niversity Press, 1 9 8 8 .

Fu n k en stein , A m os. T h e o lo g y a n d th e S cien tific Im a g in a tio n fro m th e M id d le A g es to th e S even teen th

C en tu ry . Princeton: P rinceton U niversity Press, 1 9 8 6 .

G regory, Brad s. T h e U n in ten d ed R e fo rm a tio n : F low a R e lig io u s R e v o lu tio n S ecu la rized S ocie ty . C am bridge:

H arvard U niversity Press, 2 0 1 2 .

H ey d , M ich ael. ‘From a R a tion a list T h eo lo g y to a C artesian V oluntarism : D a v id D ero d o n and Jean -R obert

C h o u et.’ Jou rn al o f th e H is to ry o f Ideas 4 0 (1 9 7 9 ): 5 2 7 -5 4 2 .

H o c h sch ild , Joshua Peter. ‘T h e S em antics o f A n a logy A ccord in g to T h o m a s de V io C ajetan ’s D e n o m in u m

a n a lo g ía .’D o cto ra l th esis , U niversity o f N o tre D a m e, 2 0 0 1 .

H oeres , W alter. ‘Francis Suarez o n th e T each ing o f Joh n D u n s S cotu s o n U n ivo ca tio E n tis .’ In John D u n s

S co tu s , 1 2 6 5 -1 9 6 5 , ed ited by Joh n K. R yan and B ernardino B on an sea , 2 6 3 -2 9 0 . W ash in gton , D C :

C ath o lic U niversity o f A m erica Press, 1 9 6 5 .

Jam es, Frank A ., III. ‘Peter M artyr V erm igli: A t the C rossroads o f L ate M ed ieva l S ch o la stic ism , C hristian

H u m an ism and R esurgent A u gu stin ian ism .’ In P r o te s ta n t S ch o la stic ism : E ssays in R ea sse ssm en t , ed ited by

C arl T ruem an and R . S cott C lark, 6 2 -7 8 . C arlisle: Patern oster Press, 1 9 9 9 .

Janz, D en n is. L u th er a n d L a te M e d ie v a l T h o m ism : A S tu d y in T h eo lo g ica l A n th ro p o lo g y . W aterloo: W ilfrid

Laurier U niversity Press, 1 9 8 3 .

K u su k aw a, S ach ik o. T h e T ra n sfo rm a tio n o f N a tu ra l P h ilo so p h y : th e C ase o f p h i l i p M ela n ch th o n . C am bridge:

C am bridge U niversity Press, 1 9 9 5 .

Lortz, Josef, '¡'he R e fo rm a tio n in G erm an y. 2 vo ls . T ranslated by R on a ld W alls. L on d on an d N e w York:

H erder & H erder, 1 9 6 8 .

M ilb an k , John. ‘A ltern ative P rotestantism : R adica l O r th o d o x y and the R eform ed T rad ition .’ R a d ic a l

O r th o d o x y a n d th e R e fo rm e d T rad ition : C rea tio n , C o ve n a n t, a n d P a r tic ip a tio n , ed ited by Jam es K .A .

Sm ith and Jam es H . O lth iu s , 2 5 -4 1 . G rand R apids: E erdm ans, 2 0 0 5 .

— . T h e o lo g y a n d S oc ia l T h eory: B e y o n d Secu lar R ea so n . O xford: O x fo rd U n iversity Press, 1 9 9 0 .

M ilb an k , Joh n , C atherine P ick stock and G raham W ard. R a d ic a l O r th o d o x y : A N e w T h eo lo g y . L ondon:

R ou tled ge, 1 9 9 9 .

M uller, R ichard A . ‘R eform ation , O rth od oxy , “C hristian A risto te lian ism ” and fo e E clectic ism o f Early

M od ern P h ilo sop h y .’ N e d er la n d s A r c h ie f v o o r K erk g esch ie d en is , 81 /3 ( 23 2 5 - 3 0 رتمه: 6 .

P o s t-R e fo rm a tio n R e fo rm e d D o g m a tic s . 4 vo ls . G rand R apids: Baker, 2 0 0 3 .

ا5م RICHARD A. M U E R

— . ‘T h e “R ecep tion o f C a lv in ” in Later R eform ed T h eo lo g y .’ C h u rch H is to ry a n d R e lig io u s C u ltu re I ,

n o . 1 - 2 ( i o n ) , 2 5 8 -2 6 0 .

? ick sto ck , C atherine. A fte r W ritin g : O n th e L itu rg ica l C o n su m m a tio n o f P h ilo so p h y . O xford: O x fo rd

U niversity ?ress, 1 9 9 8 .

—. ‘M od ern ity and Sch olasticism : A C ritique o f R ecen t In voca tion s o f U n iv o c ity .’ A n to n ia n u m 78

(2 0 0 3 ): 3 -4 6 ·

R euter, Karl. D a s G ru n d vers ta « n d n is d e r T h eo lo g ie C a lv in s. N eu kirch en : N eu k irch n er V erlag, ول6و .

S chm itt, C harles B. ‘T ow ards a R eassessm en t o f R en aissan ce A risto te lia n ism .’ H is to r y o f S cience I I (1 9 7 3 ):

1 5 9 - 1 7 3 ■

— . T h e A r is to te lia n T ra d itio n a n d R en a issan ce U n ivers ities . L on d on: V ariorum R ep rin ts, 1 9 8 4 .

S innem a, D o n a ld . ‘A risto tle and Larly R eform ed O rth od oxy: M o m en ts o ^ c o m m o d a t i o n and A n tith esis’. In

C h ris tia n ity a n d th e C lassics: T h e A cc e p ta n c e o f a H e rita g e , ed ited by W endy H e llem an , 1 3 2 - 1 3 7 . L an h am ,

M D : U niversity Press o f A m erica , 1 9 9 0 .

S tein m etz, D av id c. ‘T h e S ch olastic C a lv in .’ In P r o te s ta n t S ch o la stic ism : E ssays in R ea sses sm en t , ed ited by

C arl T ruem an and R. Scott C lark, 1־ة3مه C arlisle: Paternoster Press, 1 9 9 9 .

Te V elde, R o e lf T P aths B e y o n d T racing O u t: th e co n n ec tio n o f m e th o d a n d c o n te n t in th e D o c tr in e o f G o d ,

ex a m in e d in R e fo rm e d O rth o d o x y , K a r l B arth , a n d th e U trech t sch o o l. D elft: E buron , 2 0 1 0 .

Todd B illings, j . C alv in , P artic ip a tio n , a n d th e G ift: T h e A c t iv i ty ٠/ B elievers a n d U n ion w ith C h rist.

C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 2 0 0 7 .

Truem an, C arl. Joh n O w e n : R e fo rm e d C a th o lic , R en a issan ce M a n . A ldershot: A sh gate P u b lish in g , 2 0 0 7 .

V an R uler, J .A . ‘F ranco Petri B urgersdijk and the C ase o f C alv in ism W ith in the N eo -S ch o la stic T rad ition ’. In

F ranco B u rgersd ijk (1 5 9 0 -1 6 3 5 ) : N e o -A r is to te lia n is m in L e id en , ed ited by Egbert B os and H . A . K rop, 3 7 -

55 . A m sterdam : R o d o p i, 1 9 9 3 .

V erbeek, T h eo , ed . Joh ann es C la u b erg (1 6 2 2 - 1 6 6 5 ) a n d C artes ian P h ilo so p h y in th e S even teen th C en tu ry.

D ordrecht: K luw er, 1 999 .

V os, A n ton ie . ‘A b u n o d isce o m n e s .’ B ijd ragen 6 0 ( 7־2م4 ل9وو:)ل3 .

. ‘D e kern van de k lassick e gereform eerde th é o lo g ie .’ K erk en T h eo lo g ie 4 7 1م) 2 5-1 0 6(:9 9 ا6

Th e P h ilo so p h y o f John D u n s S co tu s. E dinburgh: E dinburgh U niversity Press, 2 0 0 6 .

. ‘S c h la s t ic is m and R efo rm a tio n .’ In R efo rm a tio n a n d S ch o lastic ism : A n E cu m e n ica l E n te rp r ise ,

ed ited by W illem j . van A sseh and E ef D ekker, 9 9 - 1 1 9 . G rand R apids: Baker, 2 0 0 1 .

—— . ‘T h e System atic Pl^ce o f R eform ed S ch olasticism : R eflec tion s C on cern in g th e R ecep tion o f C a lv in ’s

T h o u g h t.’ C h u rch H is to ry a n d R e lig io u s C u ltu re , 9 1 , n o . 1 - 2 (2 0 1 1 ): 2 9 - 4 1 .

V os, A n ton ie and A ndreas j . Beck. ‘C on cep tu a l Patterns R ela ted to R eform ed S ch o lastic ism .’ N ed e r la n d s

T h eo lo g isch T ijd sch rift 57 /3 (2 0 0 3 ): 2 2 3 - 2 3 3 .

W illiam s, T h om as. *The D octr in e o f U n ivocity is True and Salutary . ,M o d e rn T h eo lo g y , 2 1 , n o . 4 (2 0 0 5 ): 5 7 5 ־

585·

Notes on contributorsCorrespondence ٢(): Richard A ׳. ل\1ااال־،ا . Email: mullri@calvinseminary.edu

آلمآورلم؛

Copyright and Use:

As an ATLAS user, you may priut, dow nload, or send artieles for individual use according to fair use as defined by U.S. and international eopyright law and as otherwise authorized under your respective ATT,AS subscriber agreement.

No eontent may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the copyright holder(s)’ express written permission. Any use, decompiling, reproduction, or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a violation of copyright law.

This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS eollection with permission from the eopyright holder(s). The eopyright holder for an entire issue ٥۴ ajourna! typieally is the journal owner, who also may own the copyright in each article. However, for certain articles, tbe author ofthe article may maintain the copyright in the article. Please contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific work for any use آس covered by the fair use provisions of tbe copyright laws or covered by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement. For information regarding the copyright hoider(s), please refer to the copyright iaformatioa in the journal, if available, or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s).

About ATLAS:

The ATLA Serials (ATLAS®) collection contains electronic versions of previously published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission. The ATLAS collection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association (ATLA) and received initia؛ funding from Liiiy Endowment !)٦٥.

The design and final form ofthis electronic document is the property ofthe American Theological Library Association.