non-progress of philosophy

8/3/2019 Non-Progress of Philosophy

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Toappear:EssaysinPhilosophy,volumeentitled"Philosophy'sFuture."Probably2011.Comments

welcome.

ThereIsNoProgressinPhilosophy

EricDietrich

PhilosophyDept.BinghamtonUniversity

Binghamton,NY

[email protected]

Abstract

Exceptforapatinaoftwenty-firstcenturymodernity,intheformoflogicand

language,philosophyisexactlythesamenowasiteverwas;ithasmadenoprogress

whatsoever.WephilosopherswrestlewiththeexactsameproblemsthePre-

Socraticswrestledwith.Evenmoreoutrageousthanthisclaim,though,isthe

blatantdenialofitsobvioustruthbymanypracticingphilosophers.TheNo-Progress

viewisexploredandarguedforhere.Itsdenialisdiagnosedasaformof

anosognosia,amentalconditionwheretheaffectedpersondeniesthereisany

problem.ThetheoriesoftwoeminentphilosopherssupportingtheNo-Progress

viewarealsoexamined.Thefinalsectionoffersanexplanationforphilosophy's

inabilitytosolveanyphilosophicalproblem,ever.Thepapercloseswithsome

reflectionsonphilosophy'sfuture.

1.HowPhilosophyislikeScience

I'maprofessorinaphilosophydepartment.Mostofmyphilosophical

colleaguesstudyethicsofonesortoranother.Wehaveinourdepartmentseveral

consequentialists,acoupleofdeontologistsandmoralessentialists,acoupleof

virtueethicists,andafewrelativists.Itisacommonplacethattheseviews,atleast

incertainwell-knownformulations,areincompatiblewitheachother.Certainly,

mostofmycolleaguesbelievethis.Mostalsobelievethatheorsheisright.Since

theyalsobelieveintheory-incompatiablism,theybelievethattheircolleaguesare

wrong.Theconsequentialists(agrouptowhichIdonotbelong)areparticularly


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vociferous(nodoubtjustbychance).Theypassionatelyandearnestlyexplaintothe

restofusthatwearewrong,andtheygiveusargumentsbotholdandnewtogetus

tochangeourviews.Weneverdo.

Thisisnottosaythattheirargumentsdon'taffectus.Likephilosophers

everywhereandofeverystripe,wenonconsequentialistsarestronglyaffectedby

ourcolleagues'argumentsforconsequentialism:theycauseustodrawdistinctions

andfindfalsepremisesanderrorsinourcolleagues'reasoning.Ofcourse,whenwe

pointtheseout,theconsequentialists,likeus,don'tchangetheirminds,theymuster

evenmoreresolveandbeginafresh.

Religionisalsoimportantinmydepartment.Heremattersareevenmore

pointed,whichisobviousfromthefactthatdiscussionsaboutreligionarefarmore

politethandiscussionsaboutethics.Thetheiststhinkthattheatheistsare

benighted,andviceversa.TheBuddhiststhinkbotharesadlyconfused,andwill

onlylosetheirconfusionaftermanymorecyclesofdeathandrebirth.Since

religionscarryrobustontologicalcommitments,thedisagreementshereabout

who'srightandwho'swrongaredisagreementsabouttheactualstructureand

contentoftheuniverse;theyaredisagreementsaboutwhatkindofuniversewelive

in.Argumentshereareevenmoreinefficaciousthantheethicalarguments

discussedabove.

Thesetwocases--ethicsandreligion--arelocalinstantiationsoftheway

philosophersbehaveandhavebehavedsincephilosophyfirstappearedin

humankind,whichisprobablycontemporaneouswiththeemergenceoflanguage.

Philosophersstronglydisagreewitheachother,argumentsrarelychangeanyphilosopher'smind(thoughsometimesargumentsawakenaphilosopherfromhis

orherdogmaticslumbers),andtheythinktheotheriswrongandhasmade

mistakes,ratherthanthinkingthateachothermerelyhasadifferenttakeonthe

relevantfacts.


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Inthusbehavingastheydo,philosophersareactingalmostexactlylike

scientists(andmathematicians).Toseethis,comparethesituationinmy

departmentwiththeoneacrosscampusinthebiologydepartment.Wehave,at

BinghamtonUniversity,awell-knownbiologistDavidSloanWilsonwhohasfor

decadesdevelopedandarguedforanimportantadditiontothecurrenttheoryof

evolution:groupselectiontheory.Ingroupselectiontheory,selectionpressuresact

notonlyonindividuals(orgenes),butalsoongroupsofsimilarindividuals,called

traitgroups.Wilsonusesgroupselectiontoexplainsuchthingsastheevolutionof

altruismandcooperation,forwhichgroupselectionworksquitenicelyand

apparentlybetterthanmodelsbasedongeneselection.Wilson'sviewismore

complicatedthanthisbriefdescription;forexample,groupselectionisbutonepart

ofhislargertheorycalledmultilevelselectiontheory,whichpositsselection

occurringatseveraldifferentlevels:gene,cell,organism,group(see,Soberand

Wilson,1998;Wilson,1975;WilsonandSober,1994;andWilsonandWilson,2008).

Nevertheless,thiswilldoforourpurposes.

Groupselectionisroundlyrejectedandevensavagelyattackedbythelikesof

RichardDawkinsandDanielDennettwhorejectitaseitherwrongoratbest

inconsequential(see,e.g.,Dawkins,1994,andDennett,2006).Groupselectionwas

bannedfromevolutionarybiologybackinthelate1960smostlyduetothelate

GeorgeWilliams(Williams,1972)--thereasonsarecomplexandsociologicalrather

thanscientific.ButthankstoDavidWilsonandotherbiologistslikehim,group

selectionismakingacomebackandfindingahomeinevolutionarytheory.Dawkins

andDennettremainunpersuadedbyWilson'sarguments.Wilsonthinksthey're

wrong;theythinkhe'swrong.ForeveryargumentWilsonmusters,Dawkinsand

Dennettgearuptheirdistinction-makingandfault-findinginordertorefuteWilson,andviceversa.Oneisstronglyremindedoftheoldsaw"Scientificdebatesarewon

onlywhenthecombatantsdieandanewgenerationcomesofageadoptingthenew

theories."Ifgroup(andmultilevel)selectiontheorydoeventuallywin,itwillbe

becauseanewgenerationofbiologistsembracethem.


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Itisremarkablehowcommonthisisinscience.Einsteinapparentlywentto

hisgravebelievingthatquantummechanicswaswrong(eventhoughhehelped

createit).HenriPoincar,LeopoldKronecker,L.Brower,andL.Wittgensteinwent

totheirsbelievingthatGeorgCantor'stheoriesoftransfinitenumberswerenotjust

wrong,but"agravedisease,"toquotePoincar.Thoughfewinnumber,legitimate

scientiststothisdaydisbelieveevolutionarytheory,preferringinsteadsomesortof

creation-by-intelligent-agent(s)theory.Nodoubttheywillgototheirgraves

maintainingsuchbeliefs(andviceversaforevolutionists).

Therearecounterexamples,ofcourse.RobertBakker'stheorythat

dinosaurswerewarm-blooded,fast,andsmartisnow(withsomevariation)the

receivedview,andithasbecomethereceivedviewinhislifetime.Thereisan

appropriateandexpiatingironyherethough:Bakkerrefusestoacceptthe

asteroid/cometimpacttheoryoftheextinctionofthedinosaurs,andthisdespitethe

2010publicationinScienceofamajorpaperstronglysupportingthetheory

(Schulte,etal.2010).

So,noonecanconvinceone'sopponent.Allonecanhopetodoisconvince

thenext,youngergeneration.Goodtheories,bettertheories,dojustthis.This

behaviorevenprobablymakessense,inthelongrun,forifwesurrenderedour

cherishedscientifictheoriestooeasily,wewouldnotbesufficientlytestingand

stressingourtheoriesforthemtobelegitimatelyawardedthecovetedhonorific:

True.Thusdoessciencelurchforward.

Butwhatofphilosophy?Itclearlydoeslookalotlikesciencehere:noone

canconvinceone'sopponent,etc.etc.Doesitalsothuslurchforward?

No,itdoesnot.


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2.HowPhilosophydiffersfromScience

Philosophydoesnotevenstumbleforward.Philosophydoesnotmove

forwardatall.Itistheexactlythesametodayasitwas3000yearsago;indeed,asit

wasfromthebeginning.Whatitdoesdoisstaycurrent;philosophersconfusethis

withadvancing,withmakingprogress.Stayingcurrentisnotmovingforwardany

morethanstayinguponthelatestfashionsormusicismovementtowardgreater

socialjustice.

Iknowthisclaimofminestrikesphilosophersasobviouslyfalse,crazy,and

outrageous.Igettwokindslooks.Onekindisoneofutterconfusion,asifI'djust

sincerelyasserted"Oneplusoneequalsthree."TheotherisoneofdisgustasifIjust

sincerelyasserted"Slaveryismorallyrequired."

"Look,"youmightsay,inaspiritoftryingtocorrectsomeonewhothinksthe

moonismadeofgreencheese,"weallthinkslaveryisimmoral.Infact,weknowit

is.Howisthatnotphilosophicalprogress?Howisthatnotprogressinethicswhich

isbranchofphilosophy?"

Ididn'tsaysocietydoesn'tprogress.Itdoes.Wearenowquiteclearonthe

immoralityofslavery.(Moreorless:thoughslaveryisillegalineverycountryinthe

world,therearemoreslavesnowthanever,anditisabilliondollarbusiness).But

philosophydidn'tdiscoverslavery'simmorality.Philosophersweren'tleadingthe

chargeagainstslaverywhenitwasopenlyandcommonlypracticed.What

happenedwasthatpoliticalleadersandsocialactivists(whoweren'tphilosophers,

butsocialactivists)changedthewaymanythoughtaboutslaverytothepointthat

attitudeschanged,lawswereenacted,andsocietyandculturetherebychanged.Philosophershadtocatchup.Thisistrueacrosstheboardinethics.Exceptfora

tinyhandfulofwritings(Mill'sonwomen'srights,forexample;Lockeonindividual

libertyandequalrights),philosopherswere,andstillare,notatthevanguardofany

advanceinmoralityandethics.Philosophersdidn'tdiscoverandstartthepushfor

animalsrights,civilrights,rightsforthedisabled,thedisenfranchised,theydidn't


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pushfirst,beforeeveryoneelse,forincreaseddiversityandrespectforallhumans

andalllife.Theyhadtocatchuptotheseideas,andfrankly,manyarelaggingquite

farbehind,still.

"Butevenso,"youmightreply,"philosophersnowknowthatslaveryis

wrong.That'sanadvance,asyouclearlyadmitted,sophilosophydoesadvance."

Ohyeah...,whyisslaveryimmoral?Notwophilosopherswillanswerthis

thesameway.Evenwithintheconsequentialistsinmydepartmentthereare

severaldifferentexplanationsastowhyslaveryisimmoral.Inadeepand

importantsense,wedon'tknowwhyslaveryisimmoral.Wejustknowthatitis.

Andknowingthelatterissomethingmanyknow.Philosophy'sjob--ifitevenhas

one--istoexplainorsaywhyslaveryisimmoral.Andithasn'tdonethat.(Whyit

hasn'tdonethatwillbethetopicofsection6.)

Societydoesn'tturntoitsphilosophersforadeeperunderstandingofmoral

andethicalissues.Society,whenindesperateneed,cannotaskitsphilosophersfor

help."Whatshouldwedo?"wouldbeanswered"Well,thatdepends.Ontheone

hand,youmightconsidermaximizingthegood(inanyofseveraldifferentways,

usinganyofseveraldefinitionsof"thegood"),butontheotherhand,youmight

considerthatcertainactionsseemtosometobeintrinsicallywrongandothers

intrinsicallygood.Andonthethirdhand,perhapsmoralrelativismistrueafterall.

It'shardtosay,really."

Here'sarelevantquotefromJamesSterba(2005):

Ethicsappearstobeunlikeotherareasofinquiry.Afterall,wecannot

findcontemporarydefendersofPtolemy(c.100-c.170CE),Copernicus

(1473-1543),orevenIsaacNewton(1642-1727),allclaimingtohave

thebesttheoryofthephysicsofcelestialmotion.Norarethere

contemporarymercantilistsorphysiocrats,astherewereinthe


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eighteenthcentury,allclaimingtohavethebesttheoryofeconomics.

ButwecanfindcontemporarydefendersofAristotle(384-322BCE),

ImmanuelKant(1724-1804),JohnStuartMill(1806-1873),for

example,allclaimingtohavethebesttheoryofethics.Ofcourse,

significantdisagreementsremaininotherareasofinquiry,butthe

extentofdisagreementappearstobemuchgreaterinethics.

Sterbahashitthenailonthehead.Clearlyotherphilosophersalsoseethat

atleastsomebranchesofourchosendisciplinedon'tmakeprogress.Thetrouble

withSterba'sview,however,isthatitstopsatethics.Metaphysicsand

Epistemology,andalltheirsubdisciplines,suffertheexactsamefate(seealso,

McGinn,1993andNagel,1986).Veryunlikeanyscience,nopartofphilosophy

advances.Philosophyis,exceptforsomemodernizing,exactlythesamenowasit

haseverbeen.Ithasnotprogressedoneiota.

3.AristotleComestotheTwenty-FirstCentury

ImaginethatAristotle,ashe'swalkingaroundtheLyceum,encountersa

time-warpandpopsforwardtotoday,onawell-knowncampussomewhereinsome

English-speakingcountry,withtheabilitytospeakEnglish,dressedinmoderngarb,

andthathedoesn'tbecomederangedasaresultofallofthis.Curiousaboutthe

stateofknowledge,hefindsaphysicslectureandsitsin.Whathehearsshockshim.

Afeatherandironballfallatthesamerateinavacuum;beingheavierdoesn'tmean

fallingfaster,somethinghedoesn'tunderstand.Aristotlealongwiththerestofthe

classisshowntheexperimentalverificationofthisfromthemoon(fromthe

moon?!?!?)performedbyCommanderDavidScottofApollo15.Theverysame

equations(equations?!?!?)thatexplainwhyanapplefallstothegroundexplainhowthemoonstaysinorbitaroundEarthandhowEarthstaysinorbitaroundthesun

(orbits?!?!?).Helearnsofquantummechanicsstrangnesses.Themorehehears,the

moreshockedhegets.Finally,hejustfaintsaway.Hefaintsawayagainin

cosmologyclasswherehelearns,forstarters,thatcometsandmeteors,andthe

MilkyWayarenotatmosphericphenomena,asheconcluded.TheBigBang,


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relativity,thesizeoftheuniverse,thenumberofgalaxies,darkmatter,anddark

energy...arealltoomuchforhim.Inbiologyclass,helearnsthatalivingthing's

potential,itsmatter,isnotatallexplanatory,ashethought,butinsteadlearnsof

geneticsanddevelopmentalbiology.Healsolearnsthathisideaofspontaneous

generationisjustplainwrong--notevenclosetobeingcorrect.Helearnsof

evolutionandthediscoverythatalloflifeonEarthisrelated.Astheclasscontinues,

heagainfaintsdeadaway.

Afterhecomestoo,hesoberlyconcludesthatthismodernworld,this

advancedtime,hasutterlysurpassedhisknowledgeandtheknowledgeofhistime.

Hefeelsdwarfedbyourepistemicsophistication.Sadly,hetrundlesofftoa

philosophyclass--ametaphysicsclass,asitturnsout.Herehehearstheprofessor

lecturingaboutessences,aboutbeingquabeing,aboutthemostgeneralstructures

ofourthinkingabouttheworld.Heknowsexactlywhattheprofessoristalking

about.Aristotleraiseshishandtodiscusssomeerrorstheprofessorseemstohave

made,andsomeimportantdistinctionsthathehasnotdrawn.Asthediscussion

proceeds,themetaphysicsprofessorisabittakenabackbutalsodelightedatthis

(older)student'sacumenandinsight.ThenAristotlegoestoanethicsclass,where

helearnsofthecurrentimportanceofwhatisapparentlycalled"virtueethics."He

recognizesitimmediately,butagain,theprofessorseemstohaveleftoutsome

crucialdetailsandfailedtoseesomedeeperaspectsoftheview.Aristotleraiseshis

hand....

ThisstoryofAristotle'sreturntophilosophynodoubtissomewhatplausible

tothereader(excluding,probably,thetime-travelpart).Perhapsitisnomorethan

thatorjustbarelythat.ButthisisallIneed.Thefactthatthisstorycontainsevenawhiffofplausibilityshowsthatthereadercandiscernacrucialdifferencebetween

scienceandphilosophy.Fromourtwenty-firstcenturyperspective,weseethat

Aristotlewasnotevenintheballparkwithmostofhisscientificideas,theories,and

conclusions.Hisworksinscienceareonlyofhistoricalinterest.Butheisagiantto

thisdayinphilosophy.Wecanlearnbyreadinghisphilosophicalworks.


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Thispatternofignoringoldsciencebutrereadingoverandoveragainold

philosophyrepeatsthroughoutthehistoriesofscienceandphilosophy.Here's

anothercase.ConsiderEinstein(1879-1955),Frege(1848-1925),andWittgenstein

(1889-1951).Theworksofthelattertwophilosophersarereadcloselytothisday,

notonlybyaccomplished,professionalphilosophers,butingraduateseminars

wheretheirworksareplumbedfordeeptruths.Yet,nophysicistsreadEinstein's

1905papers,eventheoneonSpecialRelativity,nordotheyreadhis1916paperon

GeneralRelativity.Ofcourse,bothSpecialandGeneralRelativityarestilltaught--

theyareregardedasthebackboneofmodernphysicsandcosmology.Havingbeen

testedthoroughly,Einstein'stheoriesarecurrentlyregardedastrue.Butitis

preciselybecausethesetheoriesareregardedastruethatnoonereadsthemin

theiroriginaldescriptions.Insteadmodernversionswithmuchmoreperspicuous

mathematicsaretaughtandused.Sincehistheoriesaretrue,whatEinsteinactually

saidneedn'tbefoughtover.Frege'sandWittgenstein'stheoriesandconclusions,on

theotherhand,arenotregardedastrue;theyareregardedasinterestingand

important.So,ofcourse,theoriginalswouldbereadandexamined...andfought

over.Forexample,Kripke'sinterpretationofWittgenstein(1982)causedstrong

debate,withmanyWittgensteinscholarsdecryingKripke'sbookandtheideasinit

(e.g.,McGinn,1984;BakerandHacker,1984).

TheexactsamepatternemergeswithCharlesDarwin(1809-1882)andJohn

StuartMill(1806-1873).Darwin'sconclusionsareregardedastrue,sothere'sno

needtoagonizeoverwhatheactuallysaid.Mill'sconclusionsarenotregardedas

true,butrather,interestingandimportant.Sowedoneedtoagonizeoverwhathe

actuallysaid.

Insum,thoughtherelevantscientifictextsareold,thetheories,whentrue,

aren't(truthdoesn'tage).Soweteachthetheories,whichweupdatewithbetter

techniques.However,nophilosophicaltheoryistrue,oratleastnotheoryis

regardedastruebysignificantandlargemajorityofphilosophers.So,wehaveno


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recoursebuttoagonizeoverandrehashwhatthephilosophersaid.Inthecaseof

philosophy,thetextsremain"new,"inthesensethattheyarestillpublishedand

read.

Whatcouldexplainthispatternofvastdisparityinthehistoriesof

philosophyandscience,inwhatthereturningAristotleexperiences?Onlyone

thing:Philosophydoesn'tprogress.Yes,itmorphsandtransformstostaycurrent.

OurmetaphysicstodayisnotAristotle'smetaphysics.Oursispopulated,for

example,withpossibleworlds,whoseexistenceisbolsteredbyarobustandlarge

familyoflogicsthatAristotlecouldn'thaveimagined.Ourmetaphysicscontains

ideaslikesupervenience,whichisusedtoexplain,amongotherthings,the

relationshipbetweenmindandbrainandtherelationshipbetweenconsciousness

andbrain.Butmoreimportantly,ourmetaphysicsisforus.Itiswritteninour

languageforustocommunicateourtwenty-firstcenturyideasin.Butthat'sall;

that'stheextentofthe"progress".Theideasandtheoriesareneworcouchedin

modernlanguage,butnorealprogressismade,none.

4.PhilosophicalAnosognosia

Onemightobjectthatnotionssuchaspossibleworlds,supervenience,and

modallogicaredefinitelyadvances;theyobviouslyrepresentprogress.Infact,

philosophy,acrosstheboard,containsmanynotionsandconceptsthatare

completelynewandveryuseful.Aristotledidn'thavethesenotions,theseadvanced

andpowerfulconceptswithwhichtoexplainthemind,theuniverse,andeverything.

Imusthavereceivedthisobjectiondozensoftimes.What'sastonishing

aboutthisobjectionishowlameitiswhileatthesametimebeingardentlybelieved.Ifallthesenewnotionsrepresentadvances,where'sthetruephilosophicaltheories?

Where'sthedeepandwidespreadagreementthroughoutthephilosophicalworld

aboutwhichtheoriesaretrue?Ihaveevenbeentoldbyphilosophers,asthey

narrowtheireyes,furrowtheirbrow,andgetveryserious,thattheoryXistrue.The

problemis,andyou,thereader,knowsthisiscoming,thatXrangesnotonlyover


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manydifferenttheories,buttheorieswhichareflatlyincompatible.I'vebeentold

thatKant'stheoryofethics(withsomefixes)istrue,andthenbeentoldthatMill's

theoryis(withsomefixes).Inallthesecases,thetheoryXthatI'mtoldistrue,isthe

onethephilosopherhim-orherselfhappenstobelieveandworkon(nosurprise

there).

Howcouldtheobvioustruththatphilosophylackstruetheories,oratleast

lackstheoriesthatarewidelyregardedastrue,bedenied?Howcouldtheobvious

truththatphilosophyneverprogressesbesovociferouslydenied?

Anosognosiaisamentaldisabilityinwhichapersonwhosuffersfrom

another,primarydisabilitydeniesthatheorshedoesinfactsufferfromtheprimary

disability.Somecasesofanosognosiaareshockinginthattheprimarydisabilityis

conspicuousandlarge.Forexample,blindorparalyzedanosognosiacswillsimply

denythattheyareblindorparalyzed.

Philosopherstheworldoversufferfromanosognosia.Theirprimary

disabilityisthattheyworkinafield,adiscipline,thatneverprogresses,yetmostof

themgetstatemoneyintheformofsalaries.Thiscreatescognitivedissonanceand

isapparentlyimpossibletolivewith.So,theydevelopanosognosiaandsimplydeny

thatphilosophyneverprogresses.Theyassertthatphilosophydoesprogress,

because,afterall,wenowknowthat...waitforit...theoryXistrue.

Philosophersalsosufferfromothermentaldisabilities.Theysufferfromthe

IllusionofExplanatoryDepth.IOEDistheuniversalerrorthatallofusmakein

believingthatweknowmoreaboutsomethingthanweactuallydo.Example:Tryexplaininghowazipperworks.Orabattery(seeRozenblitandKeil,2002).

Philosophers(quaphilosophers)sufferfromaparticularlyegregiousformofthis

epistemicerror:Whileholdingaheavilymarked-upandannotatedcopyof

Aristotle'sMetaphysics,amodernmetaphysicianwillholdforthaboutmodern

metaphysicaltheoryXandwhyitistrue,evenwhilenoonebelieveshim.Atleast


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zippersactuallyworkandtherewasapre-zippertime--theyrepresent

technologicalprogress.And,andthisisthekey,atleastsomeonesomewherecan

explainzippersfullyandcompletely.

Andfinally,philosophers(quaphilosophers)sufferfromIllusorySuperiority,

acognitivebiasthatcausespeopletooverestimatetheirpositivequalities.Again,

philosopherssufferfromanextremeversionofthis.Philosophyisessentially

destructive.Whateveryoubelieve,nomatterhowobviousorfundamental,no

matterwhoyouare,orwhere,orwhen,there'sagoodphilosophicalargumentthat

yourbeliefisfalse.Thereisnodeep,foundationalbeliefthatphilosophycannot

refute(notevenDescartes'Cogito).MostwhoaresusceptibletoISthinktheyare

aboveaverage,butphilosophersthinktheyaresosuperiorthattheyclaimtobethe

directoppositeofwhattheyactuallyare:theVandalsandVisigothsofthe

intellectualworld.Or,better:theincoming,Everest-sizedasteroidstreakingtoward

allthatdecentpeopleholddear.

5.PhilosophyandtheNosognosiacs

Nosognosiacsknowthattheysufferfromsomeailmentordisability

("nosognosiac"isatermofmycoinage).Aswe'veseen,therearesome

philosopherswhodoknowthatphilosophyneverprogresses,oratleastarewaryof

claimsofsignificantprogress.TwoofthemostdistinguishedareThomasNageland

ColinMcGinn.Theirseminalworksonthistopicare,respectively,TheViewFrom

Nowhere(1986),andProblemsinPhilosophy(1993).Here,verybriefly,aretheir

theories.

Nagelarguesthatphilosophicalproblemsareintractablebecauseofthecontradictoryinteractionoftwonecessaryandineluctablepointsofview:the

objectivepointofviewandthesubjectivepointofview.Forexample,fromthe

subjectivepointofview,weseemtohavefreewill,butfromtheobjectivepointof

view,weseemtolackfreewill,andinsteadbecausallydeterminedlikeeveryother

physicalthing.


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ScienceworksonNagel'sviewbecauseitisonlydonefromtheobjective

pointofview.Thesubjectivepointofviewthoughreal,isignoredinscience:even

whensciencestudiesconsciousness--thesinequanonofthesubjectivepointof

view--itstudiesitfromtheobjectivepointofview(tonogreatsuccess,obviously).

Therelationbetweenscience'scrucialpropertyofbeingpublicandopenly

accessibleistightlytiedtoitsbeingpracticedonlyfromanobjectivepointofview.

McGinnarguesthatphilosophicalproblemsareintractablebecauseofthe

wayourmindsfunction.Ourmindsareprimarilyforknowingabouttheworld.

Theyworkbestwheretheretheycandiscernsomedomainofprimitiveelements

thecombinationofwhichgivesrisetocomplexaggregatesorstructuresthat

superveneontheprimitiveones.Theproblemisthatphilosophicalproblemsare

notamenabletosuchanunderstanding.Allphilosophyproblemsaretractablein

principle,justnottous.Itisasifweaskedaturtletorunthe100meterdashin

under20(orevenunder60)seconds.Orweaskedachimpanzeetofigureouthow

tocombinegeneralrelativityandquantummechanicsinasingletestabletheory.

ScienceworksonMcGinn'sviewbecausethebottom-upstrategyourminds

preferisapplicabletotheordinaryworld:physics,chemistry,biology,andeven

psychologydoseemtoworkthisway.

6.Philosophy:aRiotofRelativism

McGinn'sandNagel'stheoriesseemdifferent,butacloserexaminationof

themrevealsthattheyarevariantsofthesameidea.Fromhere,wewillseethat

theyinfactarecontradictory.

CrucialtoMcGinn'sviewisthatideathatthoughwecannotsolvethe

problemsofphilosophy,theyareinfactsolvable,atleastinprinciple(1993,chs.8

and9,esp.pp.128ffand135-156.).Andthisisn'tmerelogicalpossibilityeither,this

isphysicalpossibility(possibleinthisuniverse;indeed,hethinksaspectsofour


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ownbrainshaveinfactsolvedsomecentralphilosophyofmindproblems,butwe

cannotaccesssaidknowledge,pp.135-143).Therefore,thereare,inprinciple,aset

ofphysicallyrealizableepistemic,cognitivecapacitiescansolvephilosophy's

problems.Thissetofcapacitiesconstitutesapointofviewfromwhichphilosophy's

problemscanbesolved.Humansjusthappennottoinhabittherightpointofview,

i.e.,havetherightcognitivecapacities,tosolvephilosophyproblems.Nagel'sview

isdirectlyaboutpointsofviewshifts.Therefore,bothMcGinn'sandNagel'stheories

ofwhyphilosophydoesn'tprogressarebasedonpointsofview.

Giventhissimilarity,itisnoweasytoseethatthetwotheoriesare

contradictory.Nagel'stheorysays:

Therearethreepointsofview.Fromthesubjectiveview,wegetonesetof

answerstophilosophyquestions,andfromtheobjectiveview,weget

another,usuallycontradictory,set,andfromathirdview,fromwhichone

canseetheanswersofboththesubjectiveandobjectiveviews,onecansee

thatthesubjectiveandobjectiveanswersareequallyvalidandequallytrue.

Therefore,philosophyproblemsareintractable.Philosophycannotprogress

becauseitcannotsolvethem.

McGinn'stheorysays:

Therearetworelevantpointsofview.Fromone,thehumanview,

philosophyproblemsareintractable.Fromtheother,thealienview,

philosophyproblemsaretractable(perhapseventrivial;again,seech.8,op.

cit.).ThesituationhereisexactlylikethesituationwithdogsandEnglish.Weeasilyunderstandit.Dogsunderstandonlyatinynumberofwords,and

seemtoknownothingofcombinatorialsyntax.Therefore,thoughitis

unlikelywecansolveanyphilosophyproblems,theyarenotinherently

intractable.


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Weseethen,thatNagelthinksthatphilosophyisinherentlyintractable:any

humanlyintelligent,consciousbeingisgoingtobeensnaredbyphilosophy,

providedonlythatitconsidersanyofit.Andthereexistsapointofviewfromwhich

thistruthcanbeseen.McGinndeniesthis.Hethinksthatphilosophyisonlylocally

intractable.Alienbeingscouldwellfindphilosophyproblemsintuitivelyeasyto

solve.Thereexistsapointofviewfromwhichphilosophyproblemsaresolvable.

NagelandMcGinnareofcoursedoingmetaphilosophy.Plausibly,

metaphilosophyisphilosophy.Therefore,wehavehereaparadigmcaseexhibiting

thepropertyphilosophyhasincommonwithscience:twotheoristsdisagreeing

abouttheirexplanations(inthiscase,aboutwhyphilosophydoesn'torcan't

advance).Butsincethisisphilosophy,wecanpredictthatneithertheorywillever

winout,eveninthemindsoffuturegenerations.

Butwait!Isn'tthisincorrect?Ifspacealiensshowupandgiveusthe

solutionstoourphilosophicalproblems,thenMcGinnwillbeprovenrightand

Nagelwrong.But,McGinndeniesthatthiscanhappen:wewouldn'tunderstand

theirsolutions.Again,thinkofgivingdogsoursolutiontomakingdogtoys

(factories,synthetic,harmlessfibers,plasticsqueakers,etc.).Theywouldn'tgetit,

toputitmildly.And,inanycase,theargumentsareaboutwhattobelievenow.Of

course,wemightwakeuptomorrowwithasuddenunderstandingofthe

freewill/determinismproblem.Butifweask,today,whatthatunderstandingwould

be,we'dbedoingphilosophyandwe'dgetnowhere.

SoNagelandMcGinnaredoingphilosophy,andaccordinglywewillnever

knowwhichoftheirtheoriesiscorrect,ifeitheris.FromNagel'spointofview,thesubjective/objectivedivideisunbridgeable,andisthefontofallphilosophyandits

intractability.FromMcGinn'spointofview,thereisapointofviewfromwhichthe

problemsofphilosophyaresolvable,indeed,solved.


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WeseefrommycouchingtheclashbetweenNagel'sandMcGinn'stheories

asaclashbetweenpointsofviewthatNagel'spointofviewtheorygeneralizes:All

philosophyproblems,andindeed,anythingthatseemslikeaphilosophicaladvance

canberenderedasaclashbetweenpointsofviewonaspecificissue.Fromone

pointofview,wegetoneanswer,andfromanotherview,wegetadifferent,usually

contradictory,answer.Nagel'stheoryrestrictsthesepointsofviewtosubjective

andobjectiveones,butthatrestrictioncanberelaxed.

Foranexample,considerafamouscasefromthehistoryofphilosophy.Quite

sometimeback,itwasthoughtthatallnecessarytruthscouldbeknownapriori.So,

ifa=bwasanecessarytruth,thenitcouldknownwithoutanyinvestigationofthe

world.Butthenaposterioritrueidentitieslikewater=H2Owhichcannotknown

withoutinvestigatingtheworld,mustbecontingentlytrue.Thenotionofcontingent

identitywaswidelyagreedtobecorrect,andfoundsteadyemploymentinthe

philosophyofmind,whereitbolsteredphysicalism.In1970,SaulKripkechanged

allthatbypointoutthatcontingentidentitieswereusuallynothingofthesort.

Assumingthat"a"and"b"arenamesofacertainkind(whatKripkecalledrigid

designators-namesthatdesignatethesamethinginallpossibleworlds),thena=b

hastobenecessary.Usually,"a"and"b"arerigiddesignators.Sousuallyidentities

arenecessary;contingentidentityisalmostvanishingrare,accordingtoKripke.

Hence,theremustbenecessarytruths,e.g.,water=H2O,thatcanonlybeknowna

posteriori.OneargumentKripkeusedtomakehiscaseagainstcontingentidentity

wasthis.Consideryourdesk.Fansofcontingentidentitywerefondofsayingthings

like"Thedeskcouldhavebeenmadeoutofice;butitisnot;itistherefore

contingentlytruethatyourdeskismadeoutofwhatitis,wood,let'ssay;whence

thereisacontingentidentityhere."But,asKripkepointedout,thisdesk(here,youpointtoyourdesk)couldnothavebeenmadeofice;thisdeskismadeofwood.If

yourdeskhadbeenmadeofice,itwouldnothavebeenthisdesk.Byusingthe

demonstrative"this,"Kripkewaschangingthepointofviewinthedebateabout

contingentidentity:hewasforcingthereadertoconsiderthisverydesk,ratherthan

adeskconsideredonlyunderthedescription"Mydesk."TheKripkeanpointofview


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(K)ofthisverydesk,focusesthereaderonthedeskasanobjectinandofitself,

ratherthanthedeskasfallingundersomedescriptionas"Mydesk,atwhichIsit

andtype."FrompointofviewK,thedeskisperceivedindependentlyofall

descriptions,whilefromthedescriptionpointofview,thedeskisperceivedundera

description.Essentially,Kripkepointedoutthatfansofcontingentidentitywere

guiltyofthinkingonlyofthingsunderadescriptionandneverasthingsasthey

wereinandofthemselves.

Kripke'spointofviewchangehadahugeimpactonphilosophy,butitisnota

changebetweensubjectiveandobjectivepointsofviewsuchasrequiredbyNagel's

theory.ExamplessuchastheKripkeanoneareeverywhereinphilosophy,andare

responsibleformuchofit.Wecansee,then,thattherearemorepointsofview

changecrucialtophilosophythanthosebetweensubjectiveandobjectivepointsof

view.ThechangebetweenNagel'sandMcGinn'sisanotherexample(formoreon

thisexample,seeDietrichandHardcastle,2004,esp.ch.6).(Ishouldpointoutthat

ascompellingandimportantasKripke'sdemolitionofcontingentidentitywas,since

itwasphilosophy,contingentidentityhasmadeacome-back(see,e.g.,Gibbard,

1975).Todate,bothapproachestoidentityarealiveandkicking,naturally.)

Philosophy,then,emergesasariotofrelativism.Viewsthatareflatly

contradictoryareequallyplausible.Allonehastodoisadopttherightpointofview

toseefirstoneanswertoaphilosophyproblemandthen,byadoptinganotherpoint

view,seeaconflicting,secondanswer.

Thereismuchmoreworktodoonpointsofview,workthatisrequired

beforetheweirdnessthatisphilosophycanbeexplainedandunderstood.Butwenowknowthismuch:Inphilosophy,clashingpointsofviewareineluctable,and

theirexistenceistheonlytruth.Thusphilosophycannotprogress.

(Pointsofviewdon'tgoawaywhenwedoscience.Butalltherelevantviews

belongtothesamefamily,andthusbelonging,cooperate,atleastinthelongrun.It


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isquitehardtocharacterizethisfamily.Itisnotjustthefamilyofobjectivepointsof

view,thoughitisthat.Public,repeatable,objectivearetermsthatonlypartially

characterizethisfamily.Ihopetohavemoretosayaboutthisinfuture.)

7.Hewhounderstandsmefinallyrecognizesmeasright...andwrong

In6.54-7ofhisTractatus,Wittgensteinsays,

Mypropositionsareelucidatoryinthisway:hewhounderstandsme

finallyrecognizesthemassenseless,whenhehasclimbedoutthrough

them,onthem,overthem.(Hemustsotospeakthrowawaythe

ladder,afterhehasclimbeduponit.)

Whatwecannotspeakaboutwemustpassoverinsilence.

Samethinghere,andI'massilentasWittgensteinwas.Myexplanationofwhy

philosophydoesnotandcannotprogress(clashingpointsofviewareineluctablein

philosophy)isabitofphilosophy.So,ofcourseitwillnotconvincethe

anosognosiacs.Anditwon'tevenconvincethenosognosiacs,likeNagelandMcGinn,

whosetheoriesdifferfrommine(theunionofthosetwosetsisprobablyeveryone

butme).Norwillthetruthofwhyphilosophyneverprogresseseverbeknown.

Eonsfromnow,afterthehumansaregone,perhapspointsofviewwill

remain.Perhapspowerfulintelligenceswillstillexist--asufficientconditionfor

pointsofview.Perhapstheywillexistelsewhereintheuniverse,perhapswewill

havecreatedourowndescendents(Dietrich,2007).Regardless,wecanbecertainofthis:ifpointsofviewstillexist,thensowillphilosophy--theveryphilosophywe

arewrestlingwithtoday,andtheveryphilosophywewrestledwithallthose

centuriesago.


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Acknowledgements

IthankZachWeber,ChrisFields,andDavidChalmersforreadingandcommenting

onpreviousdrafts.ThankstoZachandChrisforlongandtrenchantdiscussionson

thistopic.IalsothanktheparticipantsofBinghamtonUniversity'sApril2011TEDx

Conferenceforcomments.


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non-progress of philosophy

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