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MATTER OF C-D-G-V-

APPEAL OF CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE DECISION

Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office

DATE: JAN. 2, 2018

PETITION: FORM I-360, PETITION FOR AMERASIAN, WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT

The Petitioner was born in Mexico and asserts that he entered the United States when he was one year old. The Petitioner's identity is in question in this case, and he has presented identification and other documents identifying him by two different names, with the initials D-R-G- 1 and C-0-G-V -. When D-R-G- was years old, a juvenile court in Illinois issued an order granting legal custody of him to his guardians. The juvenile court also found that D-R-G-'s mother and father neglected and abandoned him, family reunification was not viable, and it was not in his best interest to return to Mexico. Based on this order, the Petitioner seeks classification as a special immigrant juvenile (SIJ). See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) sections 1 01(a)(27)(J) and 204(a)(l)(G), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(27)(J) and 1154(a)(1)(G). SIJ classification protects foreign-born children in the United States who cannot reunify with one or both of their parents because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law.

The Director of the Chicago, Illinois, Field Office denied the Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow( er), or Special Immigrant (SIJ petition) based on a finding that the Petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence to establish his identity.

On appeal, the Petitioner submits a brief and copies of previously submitted evidence and asserts that he has established his identity.

Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal.

I. LAW

To establish eligibility for SIJ classification, a petitioner must show that he or she is unmarried, under 21 years of age, and has been subject to a state juvenile court order determining that the petitioner cannot reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law. Section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). A petitioner must have been declared dependent upon the juvenile court, or the juvenile court must have placed the

1 We use initials in this decision to protect the identities of the individuals.

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petitioner in the custody of a state agency or a guardian appointed by the state or the juvenile court. Section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act. The record must also contain a judicial or administrative determination that it is not in the petitioner's best interest to return to his or her or his or her parents' country ofnationality or last habitual residence. !d. at section 101(a)(27)(J)(ii).

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must also consent to the grant of SIJ classification. !d. at section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii). USCIS' consent is an acknowledgment that the request for SIJ classification is bonafide, which means that the juvenile court order and best-interest determination were sought to gain relief from abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar basis under state law and not primarily or solely to obtain an immigration benefit. 6 USCIS Policy Manual J.2(D)(5), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual. Petitioners bear the burden of proof to demonstrate their eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010).

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Petitioner's Identity

According to the Petitioner, he was born in Mexico in and was abandoned by his parents as an infant. His current guardians, A-G- and C-G-, stated in a joint personal declaration submitted below that A-G- first met the Petitioner during a trip to Mexico to visit her family. A-G- indicated that she and her niece, T-P-, accompanied another niece to visit a girl the niece planned to adopt. They arrived to discover that a malnourished and uncared for baby boy also resided in the same location. A-G- recalled that the woman who was caring for the boy asked her to adopt him because the boy's mother used drugs and alcohol, and stated if A-G- did not take him, he would be picked up by family services. A-G- stated that she called her spouse, C-G-, in the United States to discuss the matter and he agreed to adopt the boy. According to A-G-, the next day she met with the boy's biological mother, who signed a document authorizing A-G- to adopt the boy. She stated that the boy's mother had not yet named the child and suggested that A-G- name him, so A-G-, upon advice from an attorney, named the boy D-R-G-, with the surname of his biological mother. A-G- also stated that due to "complexities in the adoption process," she did not legally adopt D-R-G-under Mexican law, but she took him with her to the United States the same day his mother signed the adoption authorization document, when D-R-G- was approximately According to A-G- and C-G-, they returned to Mexico the following year in an attempt to locate D-R-G-'s mother and finalize the adoption, but could not find her. They stated that they also learned that D-R-G-'s mother had not registered his birth with Mexican authorities, so they did so, listing themselves on his birth certificate as his parents and indicating that his name was C-D-G-V-. They reported that they raised C-D-G-V- as their son in the United States. In a later statement submitted in response to a notice of intent to deny (NOID) from the Director, A-G- again explained her first meeting with the boy and her decision to adopt him and raise him as her own. C-G- indicated in a later statement that he gave his own name to D-R-G-, and that in all records his son's name is C-D-G-V-.

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As supporting evidence, the Petitioner previously submitted a copy of the document D-R-G- ' s mother signed in 1999, authorizing the adoption of D-R -G- by A -G-2 and C-G-. He also provided two Mexican birth certificates for C-D-G-V -, both listing A-G- and C-G- as his parents, one issued in May 2000 (May 2000 birth certificate) and the other in June 2013 (June 2013 birth certificate). The Petitioner also submitted his Mexican passport and identification card, both issued in January 2015, and school identification card from the United States. All three of those documents list the Petitioner's name as C-D-G-V-. The Petitioner also previously submitted a certificate of baptism for C-D-G-V-, listing C-G- and A-G-as his parents. These documents support a finding that the Petitioner's name is C-D-G-V-, but do not connect his identity to that of D-R-G-. He also provided photographs he states depict himself as a child, but those photographs do not establish the identity of the child pictured.

The Director concluded that the Petitioner did not establish that D-R-G- and C-D-G-V- are the same person. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he submitted sufficient documentation showing his identity, as well as personal affidavits from people with personal knowledge of his identity, to establish his name, date of birth, and the circumstances of his being raised by A-G- and C-G-. He also alleges that the Director failed to consider his birth certificates, baptism certificate, and supporting affidavits. 3 The Petitioner has shown that his name is C-D-G-V-. However, although we have considered all of the evidence, it does not establish that D-R-G- and C-D-G-V- are the same person or that the juvenile court's order regarding D-R-G- applies to the Petitioner.

There are several problems with the June 2013 birth certificate. First, the original Spanish version misspells a portion of the surname of C-D-G-V- and C-G-. It spells their name ' but other documentation in the record shows that portion of the surname is spelled ' " The reason for this error in the original Mexican document is not clear. The English translation of the June 2013 bitih certificate spells the name ' ' but is not an accurate translation of the original Spanish version of the document. Also, the English translation lists the mother's surname as ' "but the Spanish version lists her surname as ' ' Furthermore, the format and content of the English translation of the June 2013 birth certificate differ from the Spanish version. The Spanish version contains a paragraph of text at the top which is not included in the English version. The English translation lists several pieces of information in paragraphs numbered 1 through 6, but those numbered paragraphs do not exist in the Spanish version. On its face, when compared to the Spanish version, the English translation does not appear to be a full and accurate translation of the original document.

2 The adoption authorization and birth certificates list the female guardian ' s name as A-V-P-. Other evidence in the

record indicates that A-G-'s name was previously A-V-P-. 3

The Petitioner also cites the Federal Rules of Evidence and contends that the Director failed to comply with those rules. Rule II 0 I of the Federal Rules of Evidence explains that the rules "apply to proceedings before" U.S. federal courts. T~e Petitioner has not provided any legal support showing that the rules also apply to administrative proceedings such as thts one.

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Additionally, the Petitioner has not explained how his guardians obtained two birth certificates in Mexico listing themselves as his parents when they had not legally adopted him. Also, he has not explained how or why they listed C-D-G-V- as his name when registering his birth in 2000 if, upon attempting to adopt him in 1999, they gave him the name D-R-G-. The birth certificates are not accompanied by any documentation to indicate that at the time they registered his birth, they established that his original name was D-R-G- or that they had authority to list an alternative name of C-D-G-V -. Similarly, the birth certificates are not accompanied by any records to show that A-G­and C-G- had established their authority to be listed as his parents on his birth certificates. Although A-G- and C-G- stated in their personal declaration that they listed his name as C-D-G-V- and raised him with that name, their reasoning and authority to do so shortly after they allegedly named him D-R-G- is not clear. A preponderance of the evidence does not establish that D-R-G-, who is listed as the child on the adoption authorization, is the same person as the Petitioner, C-D-G-V -, who is listed on the birth certificates and other identification documents.

In its 2016 order, the juvenile court appointed C-G- and A -G- as the guardians of D-R -G- and granted them care and custody of him. The juvenile court did not reference any person named C-D-G-V- in its order. The Petitioner alleges that the juvenile court's order relates to him, but he has not explained why, when all of his identification documents list his name as C-D-G-V -, the juvenile court issued an order using the name D-R-G-. The record does not contain the underlying petition for guardianship or any other relevant documentation the court considered to establish the identity of the child that was subject to its order, or to explain why it did not issue an order for a child matching the name on the Petitioner' s identification documents.

In response to the NOID, the Petitioner submitted copies of a petition for name change he filed with the Illinois, circuit court in 2016. The petition and related documents show that the Petitioner requested to legally change his name from D-R-G- to C-D-G-V-. However, the record does not contain any documentation showing whether the circuit court actually granted his petition.

Furthermore, the Petitioner filed for a legal name change after the juvenile court issued the guardianship and custody order for D-R-G-, when all of the identification documents for the Petitioner in the present record already listed his name as C-D-G-V -. The petition for name change does not explain why the juvenile court issued a guardianship and custody order relating to D-R-G­when that name did not match the Petitioner's identification documents.

As additional supporting evidence, the Petitioner previously submitted affidavits from relatives and family friends. In a statement submitted with the SIJ petition, A-G- ' s niece, T-P-, stated that she accompanied A-G-in Mexico when she met the boy she would adopt, and was present when A-G­named him D-R-G- and obtained paperwork from his biological mother. In a later statement, T-P­described A-G- ' s first meeting with the baby boy in Mexico and her decision to adopt him. T-P- did not state, in either of her statements, that D-R-G- later used the name C-D-G-V -. The Petitioner' s sister indicated that the Petitioner lived with her family since her mother brought him from Mexico as an infant. Six family friends wrote in statements that they had known C-D-G-V- since he was a

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young child and he grew up in the United States. The Petitioner's sister and family friends did not state whether they were aware of him previously being named D-R-G-.

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the Director should have interviewed him and his guardians to resolve the questions about his identity prior to denying his SIJ petition. USCIS retains the discretion to interview SIJ petitioners, but adjudicators are not required to conduct interviews. See 6 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at J.4(C)(l).

A preponderance of the evidence does not clearly establish the Petitioner's identity. He has submitted identity documents and other supporting evidence to show that his name is C-D-G-V-, but he lacks consistent evidence showing that his name was previously D-R-G-. The order of the juvenile court applies only to D-R-G- and does not reference C-D-G-V- in any way, and the record does not show how the juvenile court established the identity of D-R-G- or whether, if it intended the order to apply to the Petitioner, it was aware that the Petitioner uses the name C-D-G-V -. The evidence does not clearly demonstrate that the Petitioner is subject to the juvenile court's order regarding D-R-G-.

B. The Petitioner is Not Subject to an Order from a Juvenile Court

An SIJ petitioner must show that he or she is subject to a state juvenile court order determining that the petitioner cannot reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law. Section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act. The Petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that D-R -G- and C-D-G-V- are the same person. Due to the inconsistent evidence relating to the Petitioner's identity, it is not clear that the juvenile court's order, which granted custody and guardianship of D-R-G-, applied to the Petitioner. Accordingly, the Petitioner is not subject to a qualifying order from a juvenile court, as section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act requires.

C. No Qualifying Determination that Parental Reunification is Not Viable

Additionally, even if the juvenile court's order regarding D-R-G- applied to the Petitioner, it lacks a qualifying determination that his "reunification with 1 or both of [his] parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law," as section 10l(a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act requires. The determination regarding parental reunification must be made under state child welfare laws. 6 USC IS Policy Manual, supra, at J.2(D)( 4), J.3(A)(2). The court order itself should establish that the determination was made under state law, and state court orders that only cite or paraphrase immigration law and regulations will not suffice. Jd. at J.3(A)(2).

The juvenile court's order does not establish that its finding was based in state law. In its order, the juvenile court found that D-R-G-'s mother and father neglected and abandoned him and that reunification with them therefore was not viable. However, the juvenile court did not cite to any Illinois law on neglect or abandonment, or any other relevant state child welfare law, to establish the basis for its findings. ld. at J.3(A)(2) (stating that the court order should establish that the

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determination was made under state law). The record does not contain the underlying petition for guardianship or other relevant evidence to establish the basis in Illinois law for the family court's findings. Consequently, the order lacks a qualifying determination that parental reunification is not viable, as section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) ofthe Act requires.

D. USCIS' Consent

Furthermore, the record does not establish that USCIS' consent to the Petitioner's SIJ classification, as required by section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii) of the Act, is warranted. In order to exercise our consent function, we must determine that the petitioner's purpose in seeking the juvenile court order was to obtain relief from abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law, rather than primarily or solely to obtain an immigration benefit. 6 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at J.2(D)(5). We generally defer to juvenile courts on matters of state child welfare law and we do not reweigh the evidence to determine whether a child was subjected to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law. Id. at J.2(A), J.2(D)(5). While template orders that merely recite the Act and regulations will not suffice, juvenile court orders that contain or are supplemented by judicial findings of fact are generally sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for the court's order and the judicial or administrative best-interest determination. Id. at J.3(A).

In this case, the Petitioner has established his identity as C-D-G-V -. As the Director noted, because C-D-G-V-'s birth certificates list A-G- and C-G- as his parents, he likely would not have been eligible under that name for a juvenile court finding that his mother and father neglected and abandoned him. Instead, the child subject to that finding was D-R-G-. Also, even if the Petitioner established his identity as D-R-G-, the evidence does not show that his primary purpose in seeking the juvenile court order was to gain protection from neglect and abandonment by his biological parents. The Petitioner has not provided any underlying documents such as the petition to the court or a transcript of any court hearings to show his motivation for seeking the juvenile court order. As such, the evidence does not show that, at the time D-R-G- obtained the juvenile court order in 2016, he did so for purposes of protection from neglect and abandonment by his biological parents rather than for an immigration benefit. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not established that USCIS' consent to his SIJ classification, as required by section 101 (a)(27)(J)(iii) of the Act, is warranted.

E. Full Faith and Credit

The Petitioner further asserts that we are required to give the juvenile court's order "full faith and credit." However, the full faith-and-credit provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 apply to courts, not federal administrative agencies such as USCIS. See NLRB v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 930 F.2d 316,320 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991) ("federal administrative agencies are not bound by section 1738 because they are not 'courts'"); American Airlines v. Dept. ofTransportation, 202 F.3d 788, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (2000) (finding that section 1738 did not apply to the Department of Transportation because it is "an agency, not a 'court'"). Regardless, we do not question the validity of the juvenile court's order in Illinois and we generally defer to state courts on matters of state child welfare law. 6 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at J.2(A). However,

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the juvenile court's order is deficient under federal law as it does not meet the SIJ requirements. The order does not clearly relate to the Petitioner and therefore does not make a qualifying custody placement or determination that the Petitioner's reunification with his parents is not viable.

III. CONCLUSION

The Petitioner has not established that the juvenile court's order applies to him. Therefore, he has not shown that he is subject to a qualifying dependency declaration or placement of custody or declaration that parental reunification is not viable. Furthermore, even if the juvenile court's order did apply to him, it does not establish the state law basis for the juvenile court's finding. Additionally, the Petitioner has not established that USCIS consent to his petition is warranted. Accordingly, the Petitioner is not eligible for SIJ classification.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

Cite as Matter ofC-D-G-V-, ID# 785148 (AAO Jan. 2, 2018)