COUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION

THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS

Non-classified Extract of a Report by NATO's

Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre

27 June 2013

C OUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS

27 June 2013

F OREWORD FROM THE C OMl\tlANDE R I am pleased to be able to publish this analysis report on Counter- and Anti-Corruption: Theory and Practice from NATO Operations, which examines lessons on corruption issues from fragile and post-conflict states, and particularly from ISAF.

For a number of reasons, this study was challenging. Corruption is a complex issue subject to cultural interpretation which cuts across many functional areas. It has not hitherto been seen as a military issue and particularly not one in which the military has needed specific expertise. There are very few recorded lessons, in NATO or elsewhere, on the relationship between military operations and corruption, or on the ways and degree to which corruption can affect-or be affected by-military operations. Thus, while there are many opinions and theories on how to fight corruption, few of them have proven to be fully effective and all seem to be specific to the particular operating environment. The JALLC has not found any new, easy or quick solutions to corruption; counter- and anti-corruption efforts must be long-term.

While this study was commissioned by COMISAF, it rapidly became clear that dealing with corruption effectively is not something that can happen purely at the strategic/operational level. It requires coordinated action at the political-military and strategic levels, in conjunction with other agencies, through a comprehensive approach. The participation of Allies, Partners and other actors in the International Community is needed if real and sustainable progress against corruption is to be made.

Corruption is a factor that should be considered from the outset of any military operation, and thus must be incorporated into policy, doctrine, training, assessment and other lines of capability development if we are to minimize its effects in future NATO-led operations. This report contains recommendations which COMISAF can implement. Some recommendations are directly relevant to NATO's RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION and thus require consideration and planning in the very near future, by the appropriate HQs. Finally, there are some longer-term issues for consideration by the Strategic Commands and NATO HQ.

I believe that the enduring value of this JALLC analysis report is not in its innovation but in its capturing of the hard-won counter- and anti- corruption experience of ISAF. The Alliance must ensure that the recommendations made in this report result in tangible action to institutionalize NATO's approach to counter- and anti-corruption.

This version of the report has been slightly redacted to permit its open publication, so that the many Inter · n Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations involved in counter­and a · orruptio that con!fiOuted to the study and expressed interest in the report may no access the '71ie JALLC analysis.

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COUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: THEORY AND

PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS

This project executed by:

Project Manager: TSAMIS Vasileios – LTC GRC A – Military Analyst

Analysts: TORO, Claudio – LTC ITA F – Military Analyst

FILLION Daniel – CDR USA N – Military Analyst (to Dec 12)

GREENE Michael – Sqn Ldr GBR F – Military Analyst

BRANSTON Nigel – GBR C – Civilian Analyst

With Cooperation from: WRIGHT John – USA C – JCOA

LOTHES Christa – MAJ USA F – JCOA

WIRTZ Phillip – CTR USA – JCOA

GOEHRING Russell – CTR USA – JCOA

REMY David – USA C – JCOA PERMREP ISAF

HORNYAK Zsolt – LTC HUN A – JALLC PERMREP ISAF

VIEIRA Filipe – LTC PRT A – JALLC PERMREP ISAF

At the JALLC in Monsanto, Lisbon, Portugal from October 2012 to April 2013 with data collected at Kabul, Afghanistan; Brussels, Belgium; London and Andover, UK; Washington DC and Monterey, CA, USA.

Acknowledgements

This project benefited greatly from subject matter experts’ voluntary contributions from a variety of personnel from NATO, ISAF, Nations (NATO and Partners), IOs, NGOs, and academics.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND AND MISSION In August 2012, Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) identified corruption as the “… primary risk that could undermine our mission”, and requested a study into counter- and anti-corruption in post-conflict states. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre to carry out such an analysis with the overarching aim being threefold:

Firstly, to provide assurance that ISAF is as effective as possible in its current anti-corruption activities.

Secondly, to ensure that ISAF is well-prepared for hand-over of those activities to the follow on mission.

Thirdly, to develop more enduring lessons thereby ensuring a better approach to counter- and anti-corruption (CAC) for future NATO-led operations.

Analysis Requirement: Analyse anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict states in order to identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges to support decision-making/policy development for ISAF and future NATO-led operations.

AO 1 Identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges for anti-corruption in post-conflict states by conducting a comprehensive review of existing research on the subject.

Sub-AO 1.1 Examine research conducted by international organizations (IO) and NGOs on anti-corruption

Sub-AO 1.2 Examine anti-corruption activities of Kosovo Force, Stabilization Force and other applicable missions.

AO 2 Identify NATO initiatives to reduce corruption in Afghanistan, with particular focus on ISAF efforts and relevant NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine.

AO 3 Compare and contrast AO-1 and AO-2 in order to identify success and/or gaps in ISAF’s operations and NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine.

METHODOLOGY CAC lessons and practices from ISAF and previous conflicts and stabilization missions were collated, reviewed and analysed together with many papers produced by academia, governments, IOs and NGOs. Additionally, more than fifty military and civilian experts were interviewed within NATO—International Staff, International Military Staff, the NATO Command Structure and ISAF—and representatives of IOs and NGOs, in Afghanistan, Europe and the United States. The outcome has been a dataset rich in both breadth and depth on CAC theory and practice. Further analysis of this dataset resulted in 146 CAC challenges and good practices being extracted, divided into eight distinct categories. Finally, 19 recommendations were developed, each with action bodies proposed.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS Corruption is extremely complex, and there are no obvious, quick or easy remedies to corruption encountered during Crisis Response Operations. Certainly, the military alone cannot counter corruption, although they have a significant role to play; dealing with it requires inter-agency cooperation and coordination, under a comprehensive approach. Information-sharing is a key success factor to effective cooperation. Supporting all CAC activities across the spectrum of actors from the International Community involved in an intervention—including the Host Nation—has proven beneficial.

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The three pre-conditions for minimizing corruption are: security, engagement of civil society, and political intent. Strategic Communications and Public Affairs are the most appropriate tools to address the latter two pre-conditions. The will of the Host Nation government, and the direct interest and involvement of its citizens can increase the pressure against corrupt actors and thus assist the International Community efforts to reduce corruption.

Given the likelihood of corruption in fragile and post-conflict states, NATO forces are likely to encounter it in future interventions. A cadre of trained personnel—working to agreed NATO policy and doctrine—must be available to meet the challenge. Corruption can pose a threat to the mission, and should therefore be addressed in planning processes: it is much harder to fight corruption once it becomes established.

Contracting and financial issues need close attention if NATO is to avoid fuelling corruption by employing inappropriate contractors or inadvertently channelling funds through corrupt agents. Financial intelligence may become an enabling capability for CAC in future operations.

The provision of appropriate CAC mentoring, education and training to Host Nation security forces and officials has been observed to be beneficial in Afghanistan and should be considered good practice for future operations.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS NATO must ensure that lessons from ISAF’s efforts against corruption are institutionalized and build on the experience gained through the Building Integrity initiative. There is a need for policy, doctrine, and directives to be developed or amended to incorporate CAC issues, and for increased training and education on corruption issues.

Corruption issues must be factored into assessment and planning activities and a comprehensive approach is essential. Although unity of command is unlikely in a multi-agency mission, NATO should strive to ensure unity of effort by enhancing cooperation and coordination with non-NATO entities. In the short term, ISAF—and in the future Resolute Support Mission (RSM)—should enhance sharing of information with relevant non-NATO entities; facilitate access to ISAF staff; and share CAC lessons and practices. In the longer term, the relationships that are needed at the operational level can be cultivated through agreements or exchanges at the political-military and/or strategic levels.

RSM will need—and future operational structures should incorporate where appropriate—a Branch or Cell to deliver output similar to that of ISAF’s Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force – Shafafiyat (see paragraph 54) and to lead efforts against corruption, including mentoring Host Nation officials. Access will be needed to relevant financial and other intelligence on contractors (international and Host Nation) and criminal patronage networks.

ISAF needs to ensure that a linked and coordinated approach to corruption, in line with COMISAF’s specific direction and guidance, exists within its own structure and across all levels of command. The use of Afghan contractors and companies should be increased, but attention should be paid to gathering and sharing intelligence on contractors. ISAF should seek to sustain and enhance CAC mentoring of Host Nation security and defence personnel.

ISAF (and future missions) must make effective use of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs to foster an appreciation and understanding in the Host Nation population of CAC activities.

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CONTENTS Foreword from the Commander ............................................................................................... i

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. iii

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

Background ...................................................................................................................... 1

Analysis Requirement and Analysis Objectives ................................................................. 1

Purpose and Structure of the Report ................................................................................. 1

Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 2

Terminology ...................................................................................................................... 2

Factors Affecting the Analysis ........................................................................................... 2

Other Factors Observed ................................................................................................... 3

2 On the Complexity of Corruption .................................................................................... 4

3 Corruption and its Relationship to Military Operations .................................................... 6

Defining Corruption and Counter- and Anti-Corruption ...................................................... 6

Corruption in Afghanistan – The ISAF Angle ..................................................................... 7

ISAF’s Growing Role in Fighting Corruption ...................................................................... 8

NATO and ISAF CAC Initiatives .......................................................................................11

ISAF Successes and Challenges .....................................................................................12

4 Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................................14

Introduction ......................................................................................................................14

Policy and Doctrine ..........................................................................................................14

Training Own Forces........................................................................................................15

Planning...........................................................................................................................15

Comprehensive Approach ...............................................................................................16

Structures and Command ................................................................................................16

Finance, Procurement and Contracting ............................................................................17

Mentoring the HN .............................................................................................................18

Strategic Communications and Public Affairs ...................................................................18

References ...........................................................................................................................20

Additional Bibliography ....................................................................................................21

Annex A Glossary of Acronyms ................................................................................... A-1

Annex B Inputs From Source Documents .................................................................... B-1

Annex C Apparent Correlation Between NATO Footprint and Corruption Perceptions .......................................................................... C-1

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1 INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND 1. Corruption has not until recently been considered of major significance to military operations. However, operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan—demanding a comprehensive approach to asymmetric warfare over extended periods coupled with the influx of large quantities of aid—have exposed NATO and the Allies to corruption and vice-versa. It is now understood that corruption threatens force protection and risks mission failure. Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) has “neutralize corruption and organized crime” as one of his objectives in his operation plan (OPLAN) – Reference A.

2. In 2012, COMISAF recognized the need to identify best practices and lessons in anti-corruption. Accordingly, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in an amendment to its Programme of Work (Reference B) to undertake such an analysis with the US Joint Staff J7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) in support. COMISAF was the identified customer. The customer representative helped refine the Analysis Requirement (AR) so that analysis would both cover ISAF operations and identify a better approach to corruption for future NATO-led operations.

ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT AND ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES Analysis Requirement: Analyse anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict states in order to identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges to support decision-making/policy development for ISAF and future NATO-led operations.”

3. From the AR, the JALLC team defined three Analysis Objectives (AO):

AO 1: Identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges for anti-corruption in post-conflict states by conducting a comprehensive review of existing research on the subject.

Sub-AO 1.1: Examine research conducted by international organizations (IO) and NGOs on anti-corruption.

Sub-AO 1.2: Examine anti-corruption activities of Kosovo Force, Stabilization Force and other applicable missions.

AO 2: Identify NATO initiatives to reduce corruption in Afghanistan, with particular focus on ISAF efforts and relevant NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine.

AO 3: Compare and contrast AO-1 and AO-2 in order to identify success and/or gaps in ISAF operations and NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine.

PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 4. This report presents relevant lessons and challenges gathered from previous missions and post-conflict situations. The intent is to inform current NATO and ISAF decision-makers, improving their awareness of corruption and how NATO and global agencies seek to minimize the effects of corruption.

5. In the short-term, the report should help COMISAF to focus current anti-corruption efforts on effective and efficient strategies and help planners address counter- and anti-corruption (CAC) in planning NATO’s future Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan.

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6. In the medium- to long-term, this report should provide insight to ensure that ISAF is well-prepared for hand-over of those activities to the follow on mission and record for posterity more enduring lessons thereby ensuring a better approach to CAC for future NATO-led operations.

7. This analysis report should be of value to those involved in addressing the political, military, civil and resource aspects of a crisis as part of the operations planning consultations, and SHAPE in helping them to better account for corruption in planning and executing future operations.

8. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the principal challenge that the JALLC team experienced during the execution of this study: the complexity of corruption. Chapter 3 broadly describes NATO’s and ISAF’s initiatives in reducing corruption in Afghanistan, and highlights the research on CAC by non-NATO entities (NNE)—such as the World Bank and Transparency International (TI)—that is relevant to military operations. The intent of Chapter 3 is to summarize what JALLC has learned in addressing AO-1 and AO-2; the detailed research outcomes are given in Annex B to this report. Chapter 4 offers the most significant conclusions and recommendations arising from our research.

METHODOLOGY 9. The Project Team consulted widely with recognised authorities on corruption, embassy staff, serving and former military and civilian ISAF and NATO staff, and members of IOs and NGOs, such as TI and the World Bank. Orientation and guidance were provided by the NATO Building Integrity (BI) staff (see paragraph 52) within the International Staff (IS) at NATO HQ. The team read many academic and government papers and reviewed lessons and other material on CAC practices from Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. The JALLC Project Team carried out interviews in Europe, and JCOA staff did those in the US; in Afghanistan interviews were conducted jointly by JALLC and JCOA representatives to HQ ISAF. Special thanks for advice, support and content review goes to the many individuals from IOs and NGOs, especially TI.

10. Data was analysed to identify challenges, lessons and best practices. Those wholly inapplicable to the military sector were discarded and the remaining 146 grouped into the following eight categories: Policy and Doctrine; Training Own Forces; Planning; Comprehensive Approach; Structures and Command; Finance, Procurement and Contracting; Mentoring the Host Nation; Strategic Communications and Public Affairs. The conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 4 are based on the Team’s determination of the most relevant and pragmatic proposals, grouped into these eight categories. The full list of 146 issues is at Annex B.

TERMINOLOGY 11. ISAF and NATO use “anti-corruption” to refer to preventative measures and “counter-corruption” for action on corruption after the fact. This report uses the abbreviation “CAC” for Counter-/Anti-Corruption to describe all such work.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ANALYSIS 12. NATO has little time before the transition to RSM and, correspondingly, the time available for this study was short. Additional time may have allowed for more research and interviews with a broader spectrum of experts but the team believes that the majority of the issues have been captured. Nevertheless, requests for interview were declined by a small number of in-Theatre experts (NATO and others) and no contractors were consulted directly. Excluding such perspectives may have inadvertently coloured the findings.

13. Documented lessons within NATO on corruption are few as NATO, prior to the initiation of BI, has traditionally eschewed corruption, treating it as a non-military issue. The team

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looked for global, non-NATO examples, but the only major successes in fighting corruption we found have been in Hong Kong and Singapore, neither of which is a fragile or recent post-conflict state. Furthermore, access to material on fighting corruption in military interventions is limited. Data on past conflicts (Iraq, Kosovo etc.) came principally from non-military sources and individuals’ military anecdotal evidence. Consequently, the vast majority of the accessible, pertinent evidence presented in this report relates to Afghanistan.

OTHER FACTORS OBSERVED 14. Contrary to widely held perceptions that religious belief influences corruption levels, the team found that research evidence1 does not support a significant correlation between the two.

15. Annex C plots the changes to the TI Corruption Perception Index for Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Somalia over the period 2001 to 2011. The presence of a large in-theatre force footprint seems to result in a fall in the Corruption Perception Index i.e. higher levels of corruption. However, the presence of the in-theatre force has been accompanied by a large influx of aid into the country. Therefore, there are many factors that could be the cause of the observed changes to the Corruption Perception Index. We have not had the time during this study to build a comprehensive model and carry out the necessary statistical regression analysis to be able to make any definitive statements about which factors, for example, the presence of a large in-theatre military force, have the greatest influence on corruption levels. Such a regression analysis may be warranted; it may be possible to predict a deployment’s likely effect on corruption levels from a judicious analysis of factors in the planning stage.

1 Atkinson-Seiferling: http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/atkinson-seiferling.pdf

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2 ON THE COMPLEXITY OF CORRUPTION

16. Corruption is complex. There are no easy, obvious remedies: this is the main finding of this report. JALLC has found that the five months we were given to produce this report were insufficient to fully grasp the nature of corruption. Indeed, many much larger and more capable organizations—including one of the major contributors to this study, TI—have invested far more time and intellectual effort studying corruption and still have not found universally applicable approaches to combating it.

17. And yet, corruption will almost certainly impact any security or stabilization operation in a fragile or post-conflict state, particularly when that state is in political and economic transition. Corruption will therefore require attention from the commander of any multinational force engaged in such a country. Corruption is obviously not limited to these environments, but it is in such states that it will impact the kinds of military operations NATO can expect to be leading, indeed the kind it leads right now in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Therefore, NATO needs to have better understanding of the nature of corruption, its effects, and what do about it.

18. But, as already stated, corruption is a complex issue. It takes many different forms and manifests itself in quite different ways wherever it appears. Insidious and destructive, corruption can pass unnoticed by the military commander and set back his mission. Such indeed seems to have been the case in the early days of ISAF, when corruption was largely viewed as a minor impediment to the mission of ISAF and fighting it a task for other international partners in the country. Conversely, corruption and its effects on the legitimacy of the host nation (HN) government that the international force is tasked to support may be fully obvious, as General McChrystal (former ISAF commander) recognized publicly in 20092, yet a clear approach on how to tackle it remains elusive.

19. What JALLC has found is that this complex topic of corruption must be included in the planning phases for any security or stabilization mission, but that no one solution or approach can be prescribed in advance. The pervasiveness and functional mechanisms of corruption in the HN must be examined and understood to the extent intelligence allows. Characteristics specific to the theatre of operations, to the mission of the force, and to the nature and relationship of other national and international actors, including hostile actors, must be understood and accounted for. All of this must be taken into account in the campaign plan from the beginning of an operation and—depending on the anticipated extent of the problem—specific courses of action must be devised for the military forces’ engagement in CAC.

20. An essential element of planning CAC efforts is recognizing not only that corruption can impact achievement of mission objectives but also that the military force can contribute, largely unwittingly, to the rise and prevalence of corruption. Corruption can derail efforts to establish governance through its impact on the perceived legitimacy of the HN government and can be exploited by insurgents, who simultaneously profit from corruption monetarily and use it in their media campaign to reduce public support for the military force. Equally, a large international military force engaged in stabilization and capacity building across vast extents of a country will of necessity insert large amounts of cash into the HN economy. It may also be faced with the need to deal with a spectrum of unsavoury local leaders, many of whom are not just involved in corruption but will actively exploit dealings with the military force for their own corrupt gain. Operational pressures may lead to good practice being abandoned or

2 It should be noted that his predecessors as ISAF commanders, Generals Richards and McNeill,

made similar comments, in somewhat more subdued tones, before him.

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only partially implemented, and unless actively checked, the mere presence of the military force places it at risk of inadvertently fuelling corruption and of being seen to be complicit in it.

21. And all of this is to say nothing of the military force’s role within the overall efforts by the rest of the International Community (IC) in the HN. A comprehensive approach requires that the military force’s efforts be aligned with and complement those of other actors, including in combating and inhibiting the spread of corruption. The IC faces the same challenges and, as we discovered in the course of this analysis, frequently has just as few answers to corruption as NATO does.

22. This is not to say that the IC has not thought about the issue. JALLC examined research produced by IOs and NGOs on corruption. What we found was an overwhelming wealth of literature which posed two problems:

a. Synthesizing this large quantity of raw data on such a specialist, complex topic proved to be immensely challenging.

b. Frequently, commentators expressed contradictory views, approaches, recommendations and best practices which depended not only on their perspective but also the subject—geographical region, variety of corruption3—on which they were commentating.

23. In essence, corruption and how to address it defy simple explanation and developing a straightforward list of effective actions is unfortunately beyond the capacity of the JALLC in the time available. Nevertheless, JALLC distilled the data into 146 challenges, lessons and best practices with military applicability (at Annex B) as a foundation from which we developed the specific recommendations in Chapter 4 of this report.

24. Before presenting our recommendations, it is useful to discuss the definition and nature of corruption in more detail and, using the example of ISAF and corruption in Afghanistan as the context, examine the relationship of corruption to military operations. These topics are the subject of the next chapter.

3 See paragraph 29 in Chapter 3 for definitions of varieties of corruption.

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3 CORRUPTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO

MILITARY OPERATIONS 25. NATO’s interest in tackling corruption is relatively recent. NATO’s first formal CAC efforts were designed to help NATO and Partner countries to fight corruption in their defence sectors through the BI Initiative. The focus on corruption in direct relation to operations was principally fuelled by the impact corruption had on NATO’s activities in Afghanistan. The NATO-led ISAF operation has run up against all of the complexities described in the previous chapter. The vast majority of reports, papers and interviews reviewed by the JALLC team were based on experience from Afghanistan. In fact, JALLC found very little data relevant to the relationship between military operations and corruption that did not come from Afghanistan.

26. For this reason, it seems appropriate to discuss the definition of corruption and our overview of its relationship to military operations within the context of ISAF and Afghanistan.

27. This overview aims to provide the contextual background for our recommendations. While this chapter is indeed Afghanistan-focused, it is our intention that it will provide insight into broader types of corruption. Furthermore, describing ISAF’s specific situation regarding corruption will help the reader better understand the challenges likely to emanate from crisis response operations (CRO) and perhaps gauge what might be done.

DEFINING CORRUPTION AND COUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 28. Corruption defies universal definition. The concept is generally understood the world over but cultural factors, variances in laws between nations and other factors blur the line between what is acceptable or not in a given country; even the UN Convention Against Corruption (Reference C) does not define the term. For example, Afghan Muslims consider bribery to be an unjustifiable violation of Islamic law which should be punished, yet in Afghanistan, patronage is considered to be an obligation. All the same, a study such as this needs a defined starting point so we have adapted the definitions of corruption used by both TI4 and the World Bank5:

“The abuse of entrusted authority (public or private) for illegitimate (private or group) gain”.

29. Furthermore, the Stimson Center report (Reference D) defines three varieties of corruption:

a. Grand corruption: when high-ranking officials with access to government funds or resources abuse their positions to enrich themselves, often altering laws to do so.6

b. Petty corruption: when lower-level government officials seek additional payment to perform their remunerated role or to cancel unsubstantiated charges.

c. Private criminal corruption: when individuals or (transnational) criminal organizations extort resources or payments from individuals to “safely” conduct business. While not strictly having entrusted authority, the effect is indistinguishable from other varieties.

4 http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption#defineCorruption

5 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm

6 TI and the World Bank also propose a particular type of grand corruption, state capture: when some

with corrupt backgrounds and intentions hijack most or all of the governmental processes, to their own benefit over that of the population.

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CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN – THE ISAF ANGLE “Corruption always has debilitating long-term effects and thus cannot play a part in building sustainable peace. Failure to deal with the downward spiral may ultimately doom any effort to rebuild governance after conflict.” – Philippe Le Billon

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30. Corruption is perhaps currently the biggest problem in Afghanistan. According to a UNDP report from 2012 (Reference F), Afghans “now consider corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, to be at the top of their country’s list of biggest challenges—worse than poverty or security”. Corruption has worsened since the fall of the Taliban and the arrival of a large international presence together with the large amounts of international money flowing into the country. The IC’s funds were loosely-controlled, ill-targeted, manipulated and used to buy influence and freedom of movement, often without considering broader, longer-term effects. Between 2005 and 2007, Afghanistan slid 70 places down the global ranking by country of TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)8 to where it remains—at the bottom.

31. Corruption threatens both support to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities in Afghanistan and the safe and secure environment there. Funds lost through corruption do not get to where they are needed for reconstruction and state-building, but may also end up being passed through corrupt local leaders or powerbrokers into the hands of the adversary, thus giving them ever greater means to threaten security. The rise of other types of crime associated with corruption—often violent crime—also directly affect security and public safety. The resulting perceptions of corruption can be portrayed as an offence to Islam and used to support insurgents’ claims that ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are to blame for corruption’s rise in Afghanistan.

32. Perhaps ironically, the IC and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan are seen by many experts—including those of TI and the World Bank—and by President Karzai himself to have contributed to the rise in corruption. Post-conflict reconstruction is often characterized by large-scale injection of resources into an environment of fragile or non-existent legal and institutional frameworks. Foreign aid “may have as many negative, unintended effects as positive ones.”9 International peacekeepers’ spending and inflows of international aid can be many times the recipient nation’s gross domestic product10. When this influx exceeds a recipient’s ability to manage and use it effectively—also known as its ‘absorptive capacity’—the excess will likely be lost to corruption. Such losses are more likely to happen during the first few years of an intervention when the IC provides large amounts of aid funding and “corruption opportunities abound amid high aid inflows, the pressure to deliver, weak state institutions and the legacies of war economies” (Reference I).

33. It is widely acknowledged among the IC and academics that the influx of funds has fuelled corruption and given regional powerbrokers a degree of autonomy and credibility that they exploit to this day in their relations with the central Afghan state. This situation has threatened not only political security, but also economic security where, in the words of a leaked US diplomatic cable, “elites are extracting as much wealth as possible while conditions permit” from the large sums of unmonitored aid spending, citing the example of the Afghan Vice President entering Dubai with $52 million in cash, the origins of which he refused to reveal.11

7 Buying Peace or Fuelling War: the Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts (Reference E). Phillipe le

Billon is an Associate Professor at the University of British Columbia.

8 See: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/

9 Stuart Gordon of Chatham House, quoted by David Brooks (Reference G)

10 PO(2010)0044 (Reference H) provides some figures for spending comparisons for 2008

11 From UK Government Stabilisation Issues Note (Reference J)

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34. Specific practices of the IC in Afghanistan have been documented to contribute to the rise of corruption. An Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA)12 official observed that “donors rarely monitor projects in situ themselves; updates are documented by photographs and letters from local officials without independent audit and perceptions are easy to manipulate.” Other interviewees have noted instances of donors not coordinating with other donors, leading to some projects being paid for twice with one donor being played off against another.

35. ISAF, as part of the IC, has certainly contributed to corruption’s spread. Whether buying locally or importing, the contracting and logistics required to sustain such a large international force offer opportunities for corruption. In achieving security aims, some ISAF commanders have unknowingly cooperated with corrupt officials and abusive warlords for intelligence, logistics and direct military operations because their local control and insight were considered valuable to helping maintain security. ISAF needs an understanding of local dynamics to support its capacity building and reconstruction efforts; too often it relies for this understanding on a limited number of ‘trusted’ Afghan agents, local government officials and powerbrokers, some of whom could be (and in some cases are) corrupt.

36. The rise of corruption has led to a contradictory perception among Afghans of the IC’s efforts in Afghanistan. According to a UNDP Report (Reference F), Afghans are unsure of where and for whom the IC stands. The IC encourages Afghans to report and act against corruption when they see it but perversely, Afghans see it every day in their own government; a government supported by the IC.

ISAF’S GROWING ROLE IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION 37. CAC was not—and is not—an assigned task in ISAF’s mandate13. However, the effect of corruption on governance and Defence Institution Building—which are specifically mentioned—should have led to the immediate identification of CAC as an implied task. ISAF mission reports from 2004 to 2006 and early versions of the SHAPE OPLAN recognized that corruption, along with narcotics and other crime, formed a part of the environment in Afghanistan but were not highlighted as areas that required direct involvement by ISAF. The JALLC team often heard that little action was taken by ISAF on corruption until 200714. This delay can probably be attributed to two factors: the limited scope of ISAF’s original mission, providing security in Kabul; and the fact that in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (Reference K), anti-corruption was included as a cross-cutting issue permeating the three ANDS pillars.

Plans

38. In April 2010, an updated Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP) (Reference L) provided ISAF’s framework for engagement and contribution to wider IC efforts in support of GIRoA and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Originally valid until 2013 (the start of the transition period), the aim was to assist relevant Afghan ministries in promoting good governance and, through existing mechanisms, encourage the GIRoA to fight corruption, boosting its authority and legitimacy.

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See paragraph 47.

13 See NATO website: http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/

14 Unfortunately, the JALLC interviews were limited to personnel with ISAF experience from the past

few years; we were unable to arrange any interview, in the limited time available for this study, with earlier leaders, such as previous ISAF Commanders, or other senior staff whose service dated from prior to 2011. However, published media interviews with Generals Richards, McKiernan and McNeill show that corruption was certainly on their minds during their tenures as COMISAF but was not yet considered a specific task for ISAF within a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign.

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39. In May 2012, the Allies agreed NATO’s Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (Reference M) which superseded the CSPMP while retaining enduring principles of shared commitment, enhanced Afghan leadership, enhanced coordination and a regional approach. It includes the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission and initiatives—such as the BI programme, aimed at reducing the risk of corruption in the ANSF—to build Afghan capacity to sustain own governance and services.

40. In March 2012, SHAPE stated that insurgency, corruption, crime and narcotics are the main threats to GIRoA and the ISAF mission, and assigned a specific task to provide targeted CAC expertise to the GIRoA15. The Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum OPLAN created a “Building Integrity and CAC” programme outlining how Commander JFC Brunssum will support ISAF CAC operations and provide out-of-theatre engagement through support to the BI Initiative, Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) – Shafafiyat and NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) initiatives16. CAC has been fully-integrated into ISAF’s Campaign Plan17.

ISAF Engagement with GIRoA CAC Initiatives

41. Following the Chicago Summit (May 2012) and the Tokyo Conference18 (July 2012), donors are expected to provide continuing financial support post-2014 and throughout the Decade of Transformation, subject to conditions (some relating to anti-corruption). Moreover, responsibility for leading the fight against corruption was allocated to the GIRoA.

42. Afghanistan has an established system of loyalties underpinning political power. Despite having introduced some CAC measures, the GIRoA has not been universally willing to act decisively; President Karzai’s focus is on maintaining his political coalition and its support for his government. “When confronted with difficult decisions over dismissing corrupt ministers, government leaders procrastinate to the point of inaction” (Reference F). Any CAC effort that risks disrupting the balance of power may be perceived as a threat and is often undermined. Furthermore, failure on the part of the IC (including NATO and ISAF) to enforce stated conditions for aid will permit perpetuating—and possibly increasing—corruption, which will thus continue to threaten ISAF and RSM.

43. The Afghan National Anti-Corruption Strategy (Reference P) was produced by the GIRoA in 2006 to guide national and governmental efforts to reduce corruption. It was superseded by Presidential Decree 45, issued in on 26 July 2012 (Reference Q), which set out in detail the GIRoA response to international pressure at the Tokyo Conference to demonstrate Afghanistan’s determination to combat corruption. Additionally, several entities were created within an Afghan framework to fight corruption. However, while President Karzai and the GIRoA have followed some of the IC-imposed conditions, sources19 report that they have done so more in name than substance:

a. The MOD’s Transparency and Accountability Office receives no direction, guidance or authority to operate independently or without approval from the MOD or the Inspector General.20

15

Reference N

16 Reference O

17 Reference A

18 The Tokyo Conference established promises from international donors for future investment and

funding for Afghanistan out to at least 2015.

19 For example, MEC (Reference R), various reports from the UN and other members of the IC, etc.

20 From US Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan quarterly report 30 April 2013:

http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-04-30qr-section3-governance.pdf

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b. The High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) remains a weak institution with little or no enforcement mechanisms21.

c. The Transparency and Accountability Working Group, is said by senior UN personnel not to have provided any recent updates, nor identified any new areas on which to focus counter-corruption efforts.

d. The MOI’s Transparency and Accountability Committee—which CJIATF-Shafafiyat staff perceive as having a promising CAC role—has yet to make an impact, according to Shafiyat staff.

44. A former officer from the SCR Office commented that the absence of effective government regulatory bodies means little audit or oversight allows corruption to flourish. Additionally, Tim Sullivan of the American Enterprise Institute—and formerly a member of CJIATF-Shafafiyat—notes that with no effective whistle-blowing process, much corruption goes unreported. The HOOAC has no trained prosecutors and can only refer cases to the government; without the full backing of the politicians, it is effectively toothless. For fear of disrupting political power bases, officials—even when caught red-handed—either go unpunished or are reemployed elsewhere.

45. ISAF has achieved some significant influence through formal relationships with the MOI and MOD, partly through the inspector generals, but coordination with other ministries is mostly ad hoc. However, elements of ISAF do regularly meet with GIRoA representatives from a variety of ministries, giving ISAF a window—sometimes even a door—into non-military areas.

ISAF Cooperation with the IC

46. There are many IC actors involved, to a greater or lesser degree, in CAC in Afghanistan such as UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), UNDP, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Bank, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development, TI and many more.

47. The two principal IC entities evaluating and monitoring progress in CAC in Afghanistan are the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) and IWA:

a. The MEC was created to provide independent monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan. Under its mandate, it is to identify effective development criteria for GIRoA institutions, with necessary monitoring and evaluation of activities conducted against corruption at the national level. MEC comprises three senior anti-corruption experts appointed on the recommendation of the GIRoA and three on the recommendation of the IC. It makes recommendations and publishes biannual reports to the President, Parliament, IC and the people of Afghanistan. The MEC investigates and reports on corruption, including among Afghan authorities and officials. It has already provided 74 recommendations, of which the majority are for GIRoA action with 14% addressed to the IC.

b. IWA was created in October 2005 and established itself as an independent civil society organization in 2006 with the aim of evolving into a reference actor related to understanding, analysing and acting for transparency, accountability and anti-corruption issues in Afghanistan. The IWA aims to increase transparency, integrity and accountability in Afghanistan through the provision of policy-oriented research, development of training tools and facilitation of policy dialogue.

21

On 04 June 2013, Ariana News reported that Azizullah Ludin, Head of the HOOAC, had personally and openly stated that his Office “lacks the necessary authority to eliminate corruption”.

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48. COMISAF has stated (most recently in his Quarterly Report dated February 2013, Reference S) that “ISAF will continue to need the assistance of the broader IC to achieve substantive counter-corruption reforms” and, indeed, there is a degree of CAC cooperation between ISAF, GIRoA and the wider IC. While there has been generally good communication between organizations—notably through the Counter-Corruption Inter-Agency Effects Group and the International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group—there is little direct coordination among the larger and longer-term actors such as the UN, USAID, World Bank and ISAF.

49. There has been development of parallel committees, rather than cohesion of existing structures to help build a synergetic whole, and cooperation is less effective than it could be. For example, a senior source in UNAMA advised that some UNAMA staff were not aware of several of ISAF’s specific efforts to counter corruption—demonstrating an information gap.

50. Indeed, the willingness and ability to share information and intentions plays a fundamental role in successful coordination and cooperation between ISAF and other IC actors. However, a significant number of IOs and NGOs have little appetite to share information with NATO—or any military organization—and are not always transparent in what they do and how they do it. Equally, the security classification and releasability of ISAF information can be a significant barrier to cooperation and coordination with NNEs. These two factors combine to give some IC actors the view that sharing tends to be one-way—they are expected to provide ISAF with information, but get little in return, deepening their own reticence to sharing with the military.22

51. The following example illustrates how all these factors play out. A member of the MEC advised in interview that, MEC recommended that CJIATF-Shafafiyat review the procurement law and systems, but CJIATF-Shafafiyat does not issue products or updates, thus leaving the MEC unsighted on any progress or action taken. CJIATF-Shafafiyat has access to those who can and do implement changes, which the MEC does not. The two organizations have complementary knowledge, skills and access; so both would benefit from sharing information to engender better cooperation.

NATO AND ISAF CAC INITIATIVES 52. Many parts of the ISAF structure are actively engaged in CAC, from the SCR and COMISAF themselves to individuals working in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). However, two particular initiatives are of note.

Building Integrity Initiative

53. NATO’s BI Initiative, established in November 2007 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Reference U), aims to improve transparency, accountability, good practice and reducing the risk of defence and security sector corruption by promoting good practice and providing NATO nations and partners with practical tools, including the BI Education and Training Plan (Reference V)23. BI’s tools were introduced to Afghanistan from 2010, with the

22

NATO has revised security rules in recent years to make information sharing with NNEs easier for operations staff. But these new rules are not well-known among ISAF staff, who tend to err on the side of caution. ISAF has recognized the problem and made efforts to downgrade more information. The need to improve releasability and the issue of over-classification are both covered in the JALLC report on “Information Sharing with Non-NATO Entities” (Reference T).

23 NATO’s BI Education and Training Plan, issued in August 2012, includes the requirement for

training at the political-military, strategic and operations levels covering primarily integrity in defence and security institutions, and aims to “develop an understanding of corruption and its impact on NATO-led operations”. The objective is therefore to “ensure that NATO's HQs and current and future operations' forces understand the impact of corruption as a security risk and have the tools and institutional mechanisms to be good stewards of taxpayer resources.”

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NATO–GIRoA Enduring Partnership (Reference W). A tailored, 10-year ANSF BI programme (Reference X) was promulgated in July 2011, which was developed in cooperation with the NTM-A, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and key stakeholders such as the US Defense Resources Management Institute, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative of the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and TI.

CJIATF-Shafafiyat

54. General McChrystal (COMISAF 2009–10) is widely credited with raising corruption’s profile, as an integral element of his concept for a COIN approach in Afghanistan. In 2010, a US initiative, CJIATF-Shafafiyat24, was created in order to lead the in-theatre CAC efforts, in coordination with NTM-A. CJIATF-Shafafiyat is now subordinate to CJIATF-Afghanistan,25 which merges ISAF’s CAC, counter-narcotics and suppression of financial crime activities into one task force. For what remains of ISAF’s tenure, CJIATF-Afghanistan has refocused effort on the MOD, MOI and the HOOAC to enhance Afghan accountability and transparency, especially in procurement. CJIATF-Shafafiyat engages with civil society and media to campaign for Afghan corruption reform and coordinates with other organizations in theatre, such as embassies, UNAMA, the MEC and TI.

ISAF SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES 55. ISAF faces many challenges to CAC in Afghanistan and has not made as much headway as some would have wished, but there have also been clear CAC successes.

Mentoring

56. An integral part of ISAF’s mission to improve security is its role in building up and mentoring the ANSF. ISAF has tried to foster integrity within the MOD and MOI, particularly among junior personnel. It is reported that NTM-A and CJIATF-Shafafiyat have made progress in CAC mentoring. Indeed, there has been a measurable reduction in levels of bribery by the Afghan National Police (ANP), increased trust among Afghans and—in contrast to the country’s overall ranking at the bottom of the CPI26—TI recently reported the Afghan defence sector as being in the third quartile of its worldwide Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GDI)27.

57. CJIATF-Shafafiyat has worked closely with NTM-A in developing CAC awareness among Afghan MOD and MOI staff and contributed to the adoption of the MOD’s 50-item action plan. The Office of National Security Council Transparency and Accountability Workgroup fosters these mentoring efforts. The recently established MOD and MOI Schools for inspector generals created with ISAF’s support are considered by many in the IC to be successful in instilling CAC ethos.

Civil Society Engagement

58. Engaging with civil society is seen as a crucial aspect of CAC (see paragraph 77), since broad support for efforts to reduce corruption is essential and is a key objective of CJIATF-Shafafiyat. A significant success in this area has been the Afghan Hands Program

24

“Shafafiyat” is the Pashtun word for “Transparency”

25 CJIATF-Afghanistan mission is to synchronize operations related to Counter Narcotics, Counter

Threat Finance and Counter Corruption (from CJIATF-Afghanistan Mission Statement)

26 See: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/

27 See http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/publications/492-government-defence-anti-corruption-

index . Of note, of the two TI indices, CPI is considered to be more subjective and the GDI more objective.

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(part of the US Afghan/Pakistan Hands Program28) which provides a cadre of specially-trained military and civilian personnel equipped with language, culture and COIN skills, who have been posted into positions where they can engage directly with GIRoA, ANSF leadership and the Afghan public. The employment of Afghan Hands in ISAF is governed by COMISAF’s Implementation Directive (Reference Z) which does not specifically mention a CAC role for them. Nevertheless, in engaging with Afghan civil society, they have enhanced CAC awareness, fostering and linking networks of civil groups and enabling them to press for change in Afghanistan.

Rule of Law

59. There is some progress in supporting rule of law. Some corrupt minor officials have been removed based in part on evidence provided by ISAF. Some corrupt individuals have been identified at the ministerial level but a senior CJIATF-Shafafiyat officer noted that the Attorney General’s Office has appeared reluctant to investigate or prosecute because of pressure from criminal patronage networks (CPN) or high-level officials; this view is supported by many in the IC and academia. CJIATF-Shafafiyat has met with resistance from government staff but has identified and is supporting some “islands of integrity” at deputy ministerial level and below where there is increasing interest and an appetite to tackle issues.

Contracting

60. Contracting presents perhaps the greatest opportunity for ISAF funding to be diverted by corruption. NATO has limited central control of contracts because NATO Common Funding is only a small part of total ISAF expenditure and, for the most part, NATO agencies and Troop Contributing Nations control their own contracts with no NATO/ISAF visibility. Nations and contractors cite confidentiality to justify overriding the logic of cooperation and coordination. ISAF has therefore had little ability to directly reduce opportunities for corruption with military contracting.

61. Two successful CAC initiatives related to contracting are: ISAF’s Task Force – 2010, responsible for contractor vetting, which uses intelligence and assessment of mapped CPNs and other wrongdoers to eliminate the use of corrupt contractors; and COMISAF’s COIN Contracting Guidance (Reference AA) that has actively reduced the opportunities for corruption.

62. Afghan First29 is a programme designed to support Afghan leadership, capacity, and sustainability by channelling the international community's procurement to Afghan-owned and operated enterprises30. It increases local involvement by preferring local suppliers which meet standards of security, quality, price and reliability, and has simultaneously helped build local capacity and the wider economy.

Tax Evasion

63. A challenge for ISAF is the scope for contractors and partners to evade their financial obligations to GIRoA. For example, ISAF has not implemented effective customs control for contractors at Air Ports of Disembarkation. Contractors can import and export through military airbases without control over what comes, from whom, to where, or what it is used for. Therefore, ISAF could stand accused of being complicit in evading Afghan customs duty on items not genuinely for ISAF’s mission, thereby reinforcing the perception that ISAF too is party to corruption.

28

Initiated by the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2010 (Reference Y)

29 Launched by NATO Foreign Ministers in April 2010.

30 See website: http://www.afghanfirst.org/about

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4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION 64. In this chapter, we offer the most significant recommendations arising from our research grouped into the following eight categories:

Policy and Doctrine.

Training Own Forces.

Planning.

Comprehensive Approach.

Structures and Command.

Finance, Procurement and Contracting.

Mentoring the Host Nation.

Strategic Communications and Public Affairs.

65. For each recommendation, we identify our proposed action body where possible, but the complexity of CAC means that several actors (including NNEs) may need to engage. Any recommendation made for ISAF or RSM should also be considered for institutionalization in longer-term NATO policy, doctrine and guidance on CAC.

POLICY AND DOCTRINE 66. During the last three years, ISAF has established a framework (i.e. a structure and procedures) for conducting CAC activities in Afghanistan. This framework must be institutionalised within NATO to ensure that the lessons from Afghanistan are applied in future operations. CAC policy should be established at the Political-Strategic level, preferably Military Committee (MC)-approved, given the need for pan-IC action to combat corruption effectively. Supporting directives and doctrine will be needed to guide the actions of the NCS and NATO Force Structure HQs and forces. However, the JALLC team—in line with the BI initiative policy team and others—considers that CAC activities should be incorporated into existing doctrine which may be affected by or relate to corruption, such as Operations Planning, Intelligence, Info Ops, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) etc., rather than being developed as a stand-alone doctrine.

67. NATO CAC policy and doctrine must look both inwards and outwards: NATO should not contribute to corruption; and, when means and capabilities allow, should support other actors in their CAC aims. Clearly, NATO’s focus should remain on supporting security sectors.

Recommendations

68. Develop CAC Policy at the Political-Strategic level (Proposed Action Body: IS/ International Military Staff (IMS)).

69. Ensure that CAC Subject Matter Expert (SME) inputs are incorporated in future reviews policy and doctrine documents covering at least the following issues:(Proposed Action Bodies: IMS / HQ SACT / SHAPE / AJODWG):

NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.

The Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations (CFAO).

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Future Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction.

Joint Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security Doctrine.

Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.

Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures.

Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning.

NATO CIMIC Doctrine.

TRAINING OWN FORCES 70. Corruption is generally considered to be more the purview of HN governments and civilian IOs / NGOs than the military. However, there are circumstances in which military forces may have to undertake or even lead CAC efforts and it is clear that corruption can adversely affect a military operation. However, it is not a topic in which most military personnel are trained.

71. Given the vulnerability of fragile states to corruption and its effects, there is a clear need within NATO for enhanced awareness and understanding of corruption. Elements of CAC are now covered in ISAF pre-deployment training (PDT) and key leader training (KLT) delivered by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), on some CIMIC Centre of Excellence courses and as part of a course at the NATO School Oberammergau, and CAC is also part of the NATO BI Education and Training Plan. However, NATO personnel need more detailed understanding of corruption and its effects, if CAC is to be effective during future NATO missions.

Recommendations

72. Enhance current CAC training for ISAF within PDT and KLT (Proposed Action Bodies: SHAPE / HQ SACT / JWC).

73. Undertake a training needs analysis on NATO’s broader requirements, to facilitate development of more focussed CAC training in NATO (Proposed Action Body: HQ SACT Joint Force Trainer (JFT)).

74. Encourage Nations to incorporate CAC issues into appropriate levels of military (and possibly governmental) staff training to build enhanced awareness and understanding of CAC and to develop future SMEs (Proposed Action Bodies: IS / IMS / Nations).

PLANNING 75. During CROs, it is highly likely that NATO forces will encounter corruption and they (along with other elements of the IC) may be a causal factor in its increase. Corruption can pose a threat to the mission, and should therefore be addressed in CRO planning processes. There must be a clear understanding of the dynamics of any political- or state-level corruption in the HN and of factors such as the legislative framework, cultural norms and the will, capabilities and intent of the HN political leadership to confront corruption. A CAC risk assessment should be carried out to inform decision-makers on the possible impact of corruption to the mission objectives. Decisions on CAC actions must align with the mandate of the mission, and be incorporated from the early stages—in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Initiating Directive, the Concept of Operations, and the OPLANs at each level. Dealing with corruption from the early stages of a CRO will foster the understanding of the use of money as a weapon, contribute to bringing unity of effort and facilitate working with other national and international actors in a comprehensive approach.

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Recommendation

76. Incorporate corruption risk assessment and CAC activities into planning processes and review relevant documents (MC 133/4 – NATO’s Operations Planning Process; Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD); AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning) (Proposed Action Bodies: IMS / SHAPE / Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group).

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

77. The Stimson Center Report (Reference D) identifies three pre-conditions for minimizing corruption: security, engagement of civil society and political intent. Military forces engaged in CAC must understand, coordinate with, and influence many other actors to leverage support in order to engage effectively with the latter two aspects. HN civil actors, IOs and NGOs are more likely to support the military commander if:

a. He supports them in their aims, building trust and goodwill.

b. He enhances their capacity to act in ways he would wish them to, such as providing them with evidence of corrupt actors for prosecution.

78. ISAF and RSM can enhance CAC by facilitating information sharing, affording appropriate access to military HQs, and supporting the requests of others—such as the MEC or IWA—within means and capability in an atmosphere of transparency and inclusivity. In addition, ISAF can play its part in improving comprehensive understanding by sharing lessons learned (LL), collective experience, successes and failures.

79. Unity of command across a multi-agency and multinational S&R mission is unlikely. However, NATO should strive to engender unity of purpose and effort at the political-military level. Corruption is a common foe for all actors and offers an opportunity for developing a common, agreed approach. That unity should include IOs and NGOs and—given that several such organizations have openly complained that they have no forum for learning or sharing lessons—NATO should promote the use of its unclassified LL portal and database.

Recommendations

80. At the operational level, facilitate cooperation with in-theatre NNEs, in line with the basic principles of the comprehensive approach, to ensure coherence and unity of purpose and effort, through sharing information, facilitating HQ access, and exchanging lessons (Proposed Action Body: ISAF).

81. At the political-military level, foster cooperation with NNEs on CAC through coordination and agreements, and provide access to and promote shared use of the NATO LLDB for CAC issues (Proposed Action Bodies: IS Political and Security Policy (PASP) / IMS).

STRUCTURES AND COMMAND 82. Within the overall context of mission command, commander’s guidance must be followed to ensure unity of effort throughout the operational and supporting structures.

83. Commanders need to understand corruption as a security risk, and therefore need accurate corruption assessments from across the theatre, to permit factor, risk and course of action analysis for informed decision-making:

a. To ensure strategic-level direction and guidance, and continuity of effort on CAC issues, there is a need for a coordinating section within the NCS in SHAPE.

b. Current CAC activities will need to be maintained as the ISAF operation draws down and is superseded by RSM. An RSM CAC entity must have the capability to conduct and

17

coordinate all CAC activities in the theatre and to promote best practices in HN entities—especially the ANSF.

c. A financial intelligence (FinInt) cell is needed, to gather and analyse information on corrupt contractors, organizations and individuals, and funding flows to terrorist groups. The FinInt should—if feasible—be shared between ISAF, Allies and relevant NNEs, and with the HN authorities, to provide enhanced visibility of money flow, and increase the likelihood of identifying corrupt actors.

84. For ISAF and RSM, NATO needs to ensure the availability of CAC SMEs (from nations, IOs and NGOs) and skilled cultural advisors, to advise commanders and to liaise and coordinate with GIRoA.

Recommendations

85. Validate the implementation of the previous COMISAF’s CAC guidance—or issue new guidance—throughout all ISAF entities, and ensure liaison and coordination between them is improved (Proposed Action Body: ISAF).

86. Establish a CAC focal point in the Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) at SHAPE (Proposed Action Body: SHAPE).

87. Pass current CAC activities on to RSM and ensure the CAC entity includes a FinInt cell (Proposed Action Bodies: ISAF / SHAPE / IS PASP / IMS).

88. For future operations, the IS and NATO commands should make use of CAC SMEs within existing databases, such as the COMPASS31, to support planning and operations, and work with Allies and Partners to identify any additional expertise for inclusion (Proposed Action Body: IS).

FINANCE, PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTING 89. In a CRO involving S&R, purchasing and contracting are the military activities most vulnerable to corruption—because they deal directly with funding and the transfer of money between entities. There is a need for ISAF to do its utmost to ensure that NATO and ISAF are clearly seen as not supporting any form of corruption; that funds are not diverted to support corrupt companies or individuals; and that contracts are written and managed to prevent or minimize the possibility of corruption.

90. Therefore, ISAF needs a central contracting office, with links to FinInt. It would coordinate contracts, increase contracting situational awareness, ensure relevant intelligence is applied, create and issue contracting guidance to NATO and IC users, and provide a centralized authorization process for certification of exemption from duties for NATO imports. Additionally, it should ensure that payment for contracts in the S&R arena is not made on contract award, but is made in stages according to project phase completion, in order to offer better visibility of the money flow and greater control over projects.

91. As ISAF begins to draw down, there is an increased need to ensure the ability of Afghan companies to undertake contracting work. Thus, use of the Afghan First concept needs to be increased and ISAF must reduce reliance on Western or multinational companies. At the political-military level, NATO should influence NNEs to take similar actions regarding contracting and financial issues.

31

The Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) database, maintained by the Civil Military Planning and Support Section within the Planning Directorate of the IS Operations Division, lists individuals who might be available as voluntary national contributions, across a range of specializations, to support NATO planning, assessment and operations.

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Recommendations

92. Establish a central ISAF contracting office, mandate its use by all ISAF elements and promote its use by Nations, and maintain it for RSM (Proposed Action Bodies: ISAF / SHAPE / NSPA).

93. Enhance vendor vetting, ensuring contracts are based on the principle of phased payments and incorporate mechanisms within contracts and the NATO–HN SOFA to enforce performance and allow for contract cancellation and access to HN courts in cases of proven corruption or inefficiency (Proposed Action Body: ISAF).

94. Prefer local firms over multinationals, enhancing Afghan First (Action ISAF). Use a similar principle for future operations (Proposed Action Bodies: NATO Office of Resources / SHAPE / NATO Support Agency).

MENTORING THE HN 95. Several interviewees suggested that ISAF should have directly mentored and supported the GIRoA across all departments and directly intervened to fill critical gaps in financial and public sector management or to educate and train officials. However, a clear distinction must be made between ISAF responsibilities and those of other actors. Military personnel would be ill-equipped—through training, education or experience—to support CAC in its broadest sense and the task would divert them from their primary task, the establishment of a safe and secure environment, which is also a pre-condition for success in CAC.

96. ISAF should identify the skills that cross-over into CAC, such as personnel management, contracting, procurement, purchasing, accounting, auditing, and budget and finance, and include them in the curriculum for ANSF mentoring.

97. An impact on corruption can be achieved if the citizens who are benefiting from contracted civil works and projects—building of roads etc.—are vested with some understanding of and responsibility for their costs and the quality of outcome. Several SMEs with practical experience of CIMIC and/or CAC within ISAF made the recommendation that community representatives should be suitably trained, using tools commensurate with available technology and literacy, to contribute to project conception, monitoring delivery and auditing.

98. The Afghan Hands engagement with civil society has proved beneficial to ISAF and the US but experience has shown that wider CAC benefits could be leveraged through their spreading CAC messages and influencing reform.

Recommendations:

99. Provide appropriate CAC education and training (aligned to the BI 10-year programme) to HN security forces in CAC-related military disciplines (Proposed Action Bodies: ISAF/ IS PASP).

100. Involve appropriate citizens in management and oversight of civil works and projects initiated on their behalf, enhancing their understanding of financial and project management and audits (Proposed Action Body: ISAF).

101. Capitalize on the Afghan Hands Program by extending its remit to include CAC. Institutionalize the concept for future operations (Proposed Action Bodies: ISAF / IS).

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 102. Strategic Communications (StratCom) and Public Affairs are the most appropriate tools to address two of the three pre-conditions described above: engagement of civil society and political intent. NATO and ISAF should use them to develop public awareness and understanding within the HN of how corruption affects them and why they should support

19

ISAF’s CAC efforts. Additionally, targeted key leader engagement has been shown to be pivotal in securing political will and intent. StratCom should publicize ISAF, GIRoA and IC CAC activities and successes and highlight NATO’s intent for post-2014 support.

Recommendation:

103. Use NATO/ISAF StratCom to deter and influence corrupt parties and complement other CAC activities. Support ISAF and GIRoA with StratCom and Public Diplomacy efforts at SHAPE and NATO HQ (Proposed Action Bodies: ISAF / IS PDD / SHAPE).

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REFERENCES A. COMISAF; OPLAN 38302 ISAF Operations in Afghanistan (Revision 6 Amendment 2);

27 October 2012; NATO/ISAF SECRET

B. SACT; Emergent Analysis Requirement from ISAF, Amendment 2 to 2012 JALLC Programme of Work; 17 October 2012; 5000 FPK-0040/TT-8689/Ser: NR0064; NATO RESTRICTED RELEASABLE TO ISAF

C. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; United Nations Convention Against Corruption; 2004

D. Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry; Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States; The Henry L Stimson Center; March 2007

E. Philippe Le Billon; Buying Peace or Fuelling War: the Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts; Journal of International Development; Vol 15; 2003

F. Jeffrey Coonjohn; Anti-Corruption Afghanistan 2012; UNDP; 25 September 2012

G. David Brooks; Smart Power Setback; The New York Times; 20 June 2011

H. NATO Deputy SECGEN; Assessing the Economic Footprint of the ISAF; 16 March 2010; PO(2010)0044; NATO RESTRICTED

I. Karen Hussman, Martin Tisné and Harald Mathisen; Integrity in Statebuilding: Anti-Corruption with a Statebuilding Lens; OECD; August 2009

J. UK Stabilisation Unit; Stabilisation Issues Note—Addressing Corruption in Stabilisation Environments; August 2012

K. GIRoA: Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008–13; April 2008

L. NAC; Update Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan for Achieving Enduring Progress in Afghanistan; NATO; 16 April 2010; PO(2010)0057; NATO CONFIDENTIAL Releasable to ISAF

M. NAC; NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan; NATO; 19 May 2012; PO(2012)0225; NATO CONFIDENTIAL Releasable to ISAF

N. SACEUR’s OPLAN 10302 Revision 3; 27 March 2012; CPPSPL/7380-20/12-282864; NATO SECRET Releasable to ISAF

O. COM JFC Brunssum OPLAN 30302 (Revision 5); 23 February 2010; J1600/JBCGCC/046/10; NATO CONFIDENTIAL RELEASABLE TO ISAF

P. GIRoA; Strategy and Policy for Anti-Corruption and Administrative Reform; 2006

Q. The Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; Decree no. 45 of 5 Asad 1391 [26 July 2012] on the Execution of Content of the Historical Speech of 1 Saratan 1391 [21 June 2012] in the Special Session of National Assembly’

R. MEC; Report on the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Related Elements of Presidential Decree 45; 13 March 2013

S. COMISAF; Quarterly Strategic Assessment Report (October–December 2012); February 13; NATO/ISAF SECRET

T. JALLC; Information Sharing with Non-NATO Entities; 13 November 2012; JALLC/CG/12/201; NATO UNCLASSIFIED

U. EAPC; Support for the Implementation of PAP-DIB Approaches to Building Integrity in Defence Establishments; 19 November 2007; EAPC(C)D(2007)0021; NATO/EAPC/PFP UNCLASSIFIED

21

V. NAC; The Building Integrity Education and Training Plan; 06 August 2012; PO(2012)0364; NATO UNCLASSIFIED

W. NATO SECGEN; Declaration by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and NATO on an Enduring Partnership; NATO; 19 November 2010; SG(2010)0788; NATO RESTRICTED Releasable to ISAF

X. IS PASP; NATO Afghanistan Enduring Partnership: Proposal for a Tailored Programme to Build Integrity and Reduce the Risk of Corruption in the ANSF (2011–2021); 29 July 2011; PPC-N(2011)0162 and AC/332(ISAF)N(2011)0075; NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to ISAF

Y. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Instruction 1630.01, Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands (APH) Program; 03 September 2010; NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

Z. COMISAF; Afghan Hands Program Implementation Directive; 02 October 2011; NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

AA. COMISAF; COMISAF’s COIN Contracting Guidance; 08 September 2010; NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to GIRoA

ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY Andrew Wilder; Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police; Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit; July 2007

Anthony H. Cordesman; How America Corrupted Afghanistan – Time to Look in the Mirror; Centre for Strategic and International Studies; 09 September 2010

Bertram I. Spector; Fighting Corruption in Countries Rebuilding After Conflict: a Democracy and Governance Program Brief; USAID; November 2008

Civil-Military Fusion Centre; Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan; February 2012

Cheryl Benard, Elvira N. Loredo; A Three-Pronged Approach to Confront Afghanistan's Corruption; Christian Science Monitor; June 4, 2010; http://www.csmonitor.com/ Commentary/Opinion/2010/0604/A-three-pronged-approach-to-confront-Afghanistan-s-corruption

Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams; Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Leave Behind; Center for American Progress; May 2010

Dipali Mukhopadhyay; Warlords as Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; August 2009

Emil Bolongaita; Controlling Corruption In Post-Conflict Countries; Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #26: OP:2; January 2005

Eray Basar; An Overview of Corruption in Afghanistan; Civil-Military Fusion Centre; November 2011

Gregory Sanders; Contracting for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; Center for Strategic and International Studies; 05 November 2009

COMISAF; ISAF Commander’s Counter-Insurgency Guidance; 2009

DGIMS; ISAF Autumn 2012 Periodic Mission Review (PMR); NATO; 14 November 2012; IMSM-0476-2012; NATO SECRET Releasable to ISAF

Integrity Watch Afghanistan; Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: a National Survey 2010; IWA; 2010

James Bovard; The Anti-Corruption Charade; Barron’s; 4 June 2011; http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111903629404576359664144090044.html

22

James Cockayne & Adam Lupel; Rethinking the Relationship Between Peace Operations and Organized Crime; International Peacekeeping Vol 16 Issue 1; January 2009

Jaron S Wharton; 11 proposed steps for ISAF to help respond to corruption in Afghanistan; Foreign Policy; 19 September 2011; http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/26/ 11_proposed_steps_for_isaf_to_help_respond_to_corruption_in_afghanistan

Jeffrey J. Coonjohn and Dr. Azizallah Lodin; Developing a Strategic Implementation Plan for Anti-Corruption; 2012 http://jjcoonjohn.com/central-asia/developing-a-strategic-implementation-plan-for-anti-corruption

Justin Mankin; Rotten to the Core; Foreign Policy; 10 May 2011

Lianne Gutcher; Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts Thwarted at Every Turn; The Guardian; 19 July 2011

Lorenzo Delesgues; Corruption And Conflict; IWA; 11 August 2010

Manija Gardizi; Afghans’ Experience of Corruption: a Study across Eight Provinces; IWA; 2007

Manija Gardizi, Karen Hussmann and Yama Torabi; Corrupting the State or State-Crafted Corruption?; Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit; June 2010

Mark Checchia; Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces; Civil-Military Fusion Centre; January 2012

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Annex; Government of Japan; 08 July 2012

Moshe Schwartz; Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress; Congressional Research Service; 14 November 2011

Nancy Hopkins (Ed); Afghanistan in 2012 - A Survey of the Afghan People; The Asia Foundation; October 2012

AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning – Ratification Draft; NATO RESTRICTED

MC 133/4 NATO’s Operations Planning; 07 January 2011; NATO RESTRICTED

NAC; The Building Integrity in the Defence and Security Sector: Status Report for the Chicago Summit; NATO; 11 April 2011; PO(2012)0150; NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to EAPC, MD, ICI, Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan

Comprehensive Approach Task Force; Updated Comprehensive Approach Action Plan; 08 April 2011; CATF(2011)0001; NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to UN, EU Secretariat, ICRC, IOM,OSCE, OECD, World Bank and other relevant international organisations and NGOs

NATO/ISAF Strategic Communication Framework 2013; 10 December 2010; NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to ISAF

OSCE; Best Practices in Combating Corruption; Undated

Peter Andreas; The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia; International Studies Quarterly Vol 48; 29-51 2004

Sarah Dix and Nihal Jayawickrama; Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations: Learning from the Past; UNDP; June 2010

Seth G. Jones; It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan; Foreign Affairs; May/June 2010; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages

23

SACEUR; ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) Interim V1.0; 17 December 2010; CPPSPL/4010-79/10; NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Stefanie Nijssen; Civil Society in Transitional Contexts: A Brief Review of Post-Conflict Countries and Afghanistan; Civil-Military Fusion Centre; September 2012

Transparency International; Addressing Corruption and Building Integrity in Defence Establishments; TI; 2007

U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre; Lessons learned in fighting corruption in post-conflict countries; 17 December 2012

UNODC; The Global Programme Against Corruption: UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit; UN; September 2004

Victoria K. Holt & Alix J. Boucher; Framing the Issue: UN Responses to Corruption and Criminal Networks in Post-Conflict Settings; International Peacekeeping, Vol 16 Issue 1; February 2009

A-1

Annex A GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACO Allied Command Operations

ACT Allied Command Transformation

AGO Attorney General’s Office

AJP Allied Joint Publication

ANA Afghan National Army

ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AO Analysis Objective

AR Analysis Requirement

BI Building Integrity

Bi-SC of the two Strategic Commands

CAC Counter- and Anti-Corruption

CCOMC Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre

CFAO Concept for Future Alliance Operations

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation

CJIATF Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force

COIN Counter-Insurgency

COMISAF Commander ISAF

COMPASS Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support database

COPD Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

CPI Corruption Perception Index (TI)

CPN Criminal Patronage Network

CRO Crisis Response Operation

CSPMP Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan

FinInt Financial Intelligence

GDI Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

HN Host Nation

HOOAC High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption

IC International Community

IMS International Military Staff

IO International Organization

IS International Staff

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan

JALLC Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre

A-2

JCOA Joint Coalition Operational Analysis Division of the US Joint Forces Command

JFC Allied Joint Force Command

JFT ACT Joint Force Trainer

JWC Joint Warfare Centre

KFOR Kosovo Force

KLT Key Leader Training

LL Lesson Learned

LLDb LL database

MC Military Committee

MEC Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee

MOD Ministry of Defence

MOI Ministry of the Interior

NAC North Atlantic Council

NCS NATO Command Structure

NNE Non-NATO Entity

NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPLAN Operation Plan

PASP Political Affairs and Security Policy

PDT Pre-Deployment Training

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

RSM RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

S&R Stabilization and Reconstruction

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SACT Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation

SASE Safe And Secure Environment

SC Strategic Command

SCR Senior Civilian Representative

SFOR Stabilisation Force

SME Subject Matter Expert

SSR Security Sector Reform

StratCom Strategic Communications

TCN Troop-Contributing Nation

TF Task Force

TI Transparency International

UNAMA UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan

USAID US Agency for International Development

B-1

Annex B INPUTS FROM SOURCE DOCUMENTS

* For reasons of space, this table codes reference sources and documents in the two right-hand columns. Decodes are in the two tables at the end of this Annex.

Categories Input

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Policy and Doctrine Have an overall code of ethics and a detailed anti-bribery code 3 3

Policy and Doctrine Make explicit that its anti-bribery code applies to all employees to business partners, and to other relevant groups such as board members their families and close associates 3 3

Policy and Doctrine Have an explicit and detailed policy which makes clear that bribery, kickbacks and similar are not permitted 3 3 Policy and Doctrine Not tolerate bribery and corrupt practices by its business partners, and encourage and assist them to have robust anti-corruption policies in place 3 3 Policy and Doctrine Prohibit facilitation payments and commit to recording and reporting these when they occur 3 3

Policy and Doctrine Prioritize policies and reforms based on a clear understanding of the specific local political economy, as well as knowledge of which forms of corrupt practices produce the greatest harm to state legitimacy and grievances for the local population 1 7

Policy and Doctrine Assume a wider, overall "state-building lens" when looking at post-conflict situations in order to properly prioritize and position anti-corruption efforts at different stages of institution building. Prioritize state-building over poverty reduction. 1 10

Policy and Doctrine Several anti-corruption reforms applied across different countries have been criticized for their standardized approach whereby the specific nature of systemic corruption (where neo-patrimonial systems are often rife) has not been taken into account. 1 15

Policy and Doctrine Anti-corruption measures, such as promoting accountability and the rule of law, need to be considered in the context of wider peace-building objectives. 2 34

Policy and Doctrine

Many activities done under the mandate of Corruption prevention such as corruption slogans, promotions and education campaigns are developed in a superficial and generic way, missing the real problems and having absolutely no impact leading some cynics to conclude that these are a diversion, to distract the attention of the people from real issues and mask the inability and lack of political will by the governments to address the issues of corruption.

2 37

Policy and Doctrine Augment staff in three areas: financial management specialists, procurement specialists and public sector reform specialists. 6 41

Policy and Doctrine Provide sufficient human resources. Ensure donor staff have the right amount of time to spend on corruption matters, and avoid frequent turnover of in-country staff to avoid a loss of institutional memory. 1 45

Policy and Doctrine

The SFOR CJ2 personnel could have benefitted from in-house experts in different subjects, like media analysis, organized crime, governmental formation, corruption, financial investigation. None of them are areas of typical military expertise, thus civilian analysts seem to be a more likely potential source of such skills to support a military force engaged in a PSO. For the longer term and future operations, NATO CIMIC and intelligence Doctrines should include discussion of the CIMIC- intelligence interface. (Balkans)

19 65

Training own forces Have clear guidelines on giving and receiving gifts and hospitality, including upper limits, and have awareness of the cultural context of gift giving 3 3 Training own forces Communicate its anti-corruption policies to employees and agents and provide extensive training to employees and agents 3 3 Training own forces Create training programs and hold workshops for own staff, and for sectors of the beneficiary government. 6 39 Training own forces Implement staff guidelines on addressing corruption and sure that it is distributed and understood. 6 40

B-2

Categories Input

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Training own forces

This Manual can be used by companies and individuals wherever they are located or working, as the general principles and examples would have worldwide applicability. It perfectly describes the range of corruption by giving definitions and examples, and describing the mechanism which rules a specific type of corruption act (bribery, extortion, fraud, deception, collusion and money-laundering). The Manual also makes a remarkable difference between corruption in the public and private sectors, by considering the different consequences which need to be expected. (Training)

21 62

Planning The reporting and tracking of assets introduces transparency and accountability in the monitoring of public officials conduct an assessment of their potential enrichment from public office. 7 2

Planning Regularly review its policies and monitor and act on breaches, and have its systems externally monitored and verified/audited 3 3 Planning Report a range of meaningful Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), such as those recommended by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 3 3

Planning Assess the risks of corruption in terms of the likelihood of it occurring, the extent to which it will compromise development objectives, and the willingness/capability of the government to act to control it. 6 5

Planning Borrow measurement indices from other organizations in order to get a comprehensive view of the multiple variables that affect governance in order to assess progress. Realize at the same time that these indices will never be able to get a holistic picture of the status, and also that there will be margin for error.

6 6

Planning Take early action collectively to consider the risks of corruption in post-conflict contexts. 1 8 Planning Effective anti-corruption campaign requires detailed understanding of the political environment, governance, and power relations 2 12 Planning Many anti-corruption programmes fail because they do not anticipate the nature, location, organization, and resistance to reforms. 2 12 Planning Know what you want to measure or benchmark, and find the appropriate measurement tool 12 13 Planning Build your anti-corruption strategies and the indicators you need to measure progress in a modest, incremental fashion: 12 13 Planning Whenever possible, combine quantitative data with qualitative assessments 12 13 Planning Gravitate toward locally generated assessments: 12 13 Planning Embrace the need for multiple assessments and complementarity: 12 13 Planning Be responsible when using any measurement tool: 12 13 Planning Transparency of methodology is crucial 12 13

Planning Include locally driven monitoring tools to measure the efficiency of aid as seen by the population; the integration of locally meaningful mechanisms, frameworks and competencies are key in reducing the tensions and frustrations 5 16

Planning Define and stay within the mandate. 6 32

Planning Consider the different levels at which anti-corruption and counter-corruption efforts should be organized (country, project, global scale) and then develop distinct implementation plans. 6 33

Planning One key insight from renowned development expert Paul Collier and others is that young democracies with weak checks on presidential powers and an easy source of cash tend to have major problems with corruption—so Afghanistan’s challenges, rather than being viewed primarily as criminal, should be expected in some ways.

9 35

Planning Carry out Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments (VCAs) in several Afghan ministries and sectors to coordinate donor anti-corruption programming. 1 44

Planning Foster accountability by partner governments and donors toward national stakeholders by opening performance reviews to external oversight. Be self-critical! 1 46

Planning Transparency and Predictability: Progress reviews must be frequent and transparent 15 50

B-3

Categories Input

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Planning

The research describes a new approach to postwar reconstruction and to do that it goes through the different phases of the process. Particularly, the authors emphasize the early period which is characterized by an extremely intense flow of aid that very often are unrelated to the needs of the recipients. This effect (''The potlatch effect'') stems from a failure to align local needs and capacities with the distorting incentives of external assistance, and it results in massive waste. The short terms gains achieved by corrupt means inevitably backfire during the second (IO NGO)

23 52

Planning Establish Monitoring & Evaluation program (to provide a level of expectation, to allocate the resources and to measure both the success of anti-corruption initiatives as well as the effects of failure). 28 56

Comprehensive Approach

Build knowledge to better understand the dynamics of corruption (best practices). Learn from others. Ensure this knowledge is shared throughout your own organization, and with other entities. 6 4

Comprehensive Approach

Use multidisciplinary approaches, and develop knowledge of the dynamics of corruption in conflict settings. Use this as a basis for identifying priorities and the effects of trade-offs between tolerance of corruption and stability. 1 9

Comprehensive Approach

Addressing corruption in a comprehensive and holistic way carries the obvious and very real risk of spreading resources too thinly 2 12

Comprehensive Approach

Working with CJIATF, figure out how to share lessons learned from the international community using experts and leaders from places like Indonesia, Hong Kong, Georgia, Albania, Tanzania, and Rwanda who have recently dealt with similar problems. (Might have a more positive reaction to hearing suggestions from "other than Americans".)

13 14

Comprehensive Approach

Security Sector Reform (SSR) further complicated the reform process within the rule of law by bringing to the forefront its own contradictions and political imperatives. Consequently, the real problem was the one driven from external actors: a lack of coordination among different lead-nations, funding disparities among the five pillars of the SSR, the absence of a coherent strategy etc.

5 18

Comprehensive Approach

Determine mechanisms for sharing information: best practices for prosecution and prevention, investigative information, that will help convict corrupt individuals. 6 19

Comprehensive Approach

Maintain positive public perception of anti-corruption efforts by donors by ensuring complete transparency, accountability and value for money on the part of donor nations. 1 21

Comprehensive Approach

Raise the impact of corruption in dialogue with borrowing entities 6 25 Comprehensive

Approach Be an active partner in multilateral efforts to control corruption and reduce transnational bribery. 6 26

Comprehensive Approach

Have donors sign a voluntary code of conduct for coordinated donor responses to deteriorating corruption contexts. 1 29

Comprehensive Approach

We should try to involve more experts from such countries in the conversation about fighting corruption in Afghanistan. President Karzai and others might react more positively to hearing suggestions about how to reduce bribes, check nepotism, and improve governance from Indonesians or Tanzanians rather than Americans.

9 35

Comprehensive Approach

Ensure the linkage between technical-level anti-corruption work and the high-level political dialogue that is carried forward by political branches of donor governments. 1 36

Comprehensive Approach

Harmonization: Coordinated accountability between stakeholders upfront 15 48 Comprehensive

Approach Develop international relationships with respected anti-corruption organizations (cooperation & information exchange IAW UNCAC) 28 56

Comprehensive Approach

Comprehensive Approach: develop processes, key performance indicators and standard operating procedures for the entire government 28 56

Comprehensive Approach

EU States Parties shall consider developing and sharing with each other and through international and regional organizations statistics, analytical expertise concerning corruption and information with a view to developing common definitions, standards and methodologies, as well as information on best practices to prevent (ANTI) and combat (COUNTER) corruption.

22 60

B-4

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Structure and Command

Trained, independent auditors deployed from the central government to various parts of the country can make a meaningful difference in reducing malfeasance and improving the quality of government performance. 9 35

Structure and Command

Develop operational tools for Audits and Inspections 28 56 Structure and

Command Establish Financial Intelligence Unit to provide the evidence used in developing cases of corruption, transnational crime, terrorist financing and money laundering. 28 56

Structure and Command

Establish financial Intelligence units (FIU) IOT identify suspicious financial transactions. Ensure that it is adequately resourced in human and financial terms and independent from external pressure. 17 57

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

Customs: review of the Customs Act, information technology for the inspection at border check-points, access to customs officers’ facilities, incentives for customs officers and coordinating activities to avoid tax abuse related to tax exempt goods under Military Technical Agreements. 7 2

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Show an awareness that lobbying activities are an area of potential corruption concern, and commit to transparency regarding lobbying activities 3 3

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Improve metering and management tools such as management contracts 11 11

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Work with transportation associations to measure corruption, organize those most affected, and shift practices 11 11

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Promote ad hoc independent monitoring of large procurements or concession awards 11 11

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Support budget transparency 11 11

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Improve procurement transparency 11 11

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently said in a report that a large quantity of weapons given to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the US, are missing. The report also said that the US military has failed to keep records of about 135,000 weapons donated by allies to the ANSF (GAO, 2009). 409,022. There have been some disarmament efforts put into place under the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programs, but many warlords and leaders of armed groups still possess sufficient arms to pose a serious threat to security.

8 17

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

The creation of semi-parallel structures by the international aid community such as the Technical Assistance programs in various line ministries, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and private security agencies, often consume considerable amounts of net aid flows but undermine Afghan leadership, the effectiveness of the state and the accountability of aid towards Afghan citizens.

5 18

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Aid remains highly unpredictable and too much aid is channeled outside of government’s priorities and of the core government budget. 5 18

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

There is a growing and urgent requirement for the international community to develop alternative supply and logistics routes for ISAF. The Northern Distribution Network, which now accounts for some 40 per cent of the supplies, should be further developed and utilized. 4 22

B-5

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Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

It is imperative that the international community agree to a ten-year plan for funding the ANA in order to ensure predictability of financing and the achievement of the right priorities. 4 22

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Curtail lending/donation when there is poor governance or systematic corruption (pg 2) 6 24

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Disbar bidders from Finance/Procurement-projects if it has been determined that they have engaged in corruption 6 27

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Institute a "no bribery pledge" in contracts, ensure people state that they will observe the laws of a country 6 28

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Customization: funding aligned with National Prioritization Programs (NPPs) 15 49

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Vet the subcontractors 26 52

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Ensure that information on payments to governments by companies is published by both companies and governments. 17 57

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

Reform of the procurement system comprised several elements, including: Introducing more transparency, by putting more information on planned and finished procurements onto the web - Extending the use of electronic auction. − Enhancing quality assurance by reliable testing. − Preventing conflict of interest of tender committee members through additional regulations. − Promoting more competition through limitation of single source procedures to well-justified cases.

3 58

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

Develop an “debarring official,” who has the authority to enter a debarment (generally three years) against contractors, and to place their names on the internet 29 58

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting Require all government agencies to include clauses in all large contracts, requiring contractors to have “effective” ethics programs. 29 58

Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

The policy is mainly exercised to preserve the integrity of the procurement process between the time the Request for Proposal is issued and the time the contract is awarded. Only the Contracting Officer shall deal with prospective contractors during this period. The RFP will name the person to be contacted for information and who will represent NAMSA for this purpose. NATO Afghan First Policy has been approved by the NAC in April 2010. Its aim is to strengthen NATO's contribution to the economic development of Afghanistan by increasing procurement of local goods and services whenever the acceptable standards for security, quality, price and reliable supply are met. In implementing this policy utmost care has to be taken that the contracting funds do not unintentionally fuel corruption, Finance/Procurement insurgent organizations, strengthen CPN (Criminal Patronage Networks) and undermine the efforts of the Alliance in Afghanistan. NAMSA will, through an adapted certification process, endeavor to better know its Afghan suppliers and where the money ultimately goes. When administering its contracts in theatre, NAMSA will devote permanent and sustained efforts to its oversight remit.

18 64

B-6

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Finance, Procurement and

Contracting

ACO Management Structure: financial position & performance, cash flow, budget execution. All those documents, taken together, should demonstrate the accountability exercised by ACO for the NATO Nations' resources. Accounting Policies: Since 2006, MWA (Moral Welfare Activity) financial activities have been processed using the NAFS (NATO Automated Financial System). KFOR was the only entity to report MWA activities in its financial statements. Inventory reporting in ISAF is problematical at best. Many inventories are held off-line and are administered through spreadsheet systems. Merely gathering the data can be difficult. The local cash and cash equivalents balances were kept as low as possible, but enough to ensure liquidity for all scheduled payments within the year. (Balkans).

20 66

Mentoring the HN

Additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs in Afghanistan are key instruments through which the international community delivers assistance at the provincial and district level. As a result of their provincial focus and civilian and military resources, PRTs have a unique mandate to improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development. The combination of international civilian and military resources also allows PRTs to have wide latitude to implement their mandate.

10 1

Mentoring the HN NATO should immediately move to establish civilian mentoring teams. Such a program would operate similar to the OMLT and PMT programs and would pair bureaucrats from NATO and EU countries with their Afghan counterparts. This would prove to be a valuable tool in building competence and efficiency as well as combating corruption.

10 1

Mentoring the HN One can regard the PRTs as laboratories where different approaches can be tested and best practices established. A clearinghouse must be set up in which PRT commanders can exchange information and experiences and a series of best or innovative practices can be established and disseminated.

10 1

Mentoring the HN Civilian mentoring, which is desperately needed in Afghanistan, must become a priority. 10 1

Mentoring the HN Training capacity is the most immediate need. Developing Afghan military and police forces to provide security is the only meaningful transition strategy for NATO forces. The NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) currently lacks the necessary resources to operate effectively. European nations have the capacity to do more in this vital area.

10 1

Mentoring the HN Additional capacity is urgently needed to facilitate the training and building of Afghan security forces consisting of the military (ANA) and the police (both paramilitary police and local police) so they can take over additional security responsibilities. 10 1

Mentoring the HN Criminal investigation, seizure of assets and publication of official debtors. 7 2 Mentoring the HN Post information on citizens’ rights. 7 2

Mentoring the HN Personnel employed in key institutions; vetting procedures for important positions, the rationalization of personnel structures, and bans on reinstatement and compensation of officials removed from their positions for corruption and criminal offences. 7 2

Mentoring the HN Instructions to reinforce internal oversight capacity requests that instructions be issued to the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, the AGO and HOO to assess and reinforce their capabilities of internal oversight and investigative bodies 7 2

Mentoring the HN Generate credible information (fund audits, expenditure tracking surveys in key sectors; promote independent media; anonymous complaint mechanisms and NGO watchdogs 11 11

Mentoring the HN Expand community oversight of public investment and service delivery 11 11 Mentoring the HN Improve civilian oversight of military budgets 11 11 Mentoring the HN Use media to improve transparency and accountability 11 11 Mentoring the HN Support merit-based and transparent public sector employment practices 11 11

Mentoring the HN Civil society actors, despite problems at times with legitimacy and governance / management problems, should be part of the explicit or implicit anti-corruption portfolio, and the capacity of these groups should be supported specifically in countries where other oversight (governmental, parliamentary) is weak. The objective should be to generate demand for transparency and accountability.

2 12

Mentoring the HN If independent and not corrupt, media can play two important roles in countering low anti-corruption demand: expose acts of corruption and increase public awareness of costs/impact of corruption on daily lives 2 12

B-7

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Mentoring the HN Terms of reference of specialized anti-corruption agencies should be precisely defined, and they should be governed by a comprehensive legal framework. 2 12

Mentoring the HN Support to external audit functions 1 15

Mentoring the HN Bottom up approaches that emphasize local accountability and transparency, and which build on local resources and skills according to the particularities of each country, have been the most successful in both countering corruption and also in promoting more effective and inclusive programmes and policies.

1 15

Mentoring the HN To prevent further infiltration by the Taliban, it is pivotal for the Afghan and international forces to increase their presence in bordering areas and install the latest technology to strictly monitor these areas. 8 17

Mentoring the HN The empowerment of local communities will allow them to have a greater influence on the future aid projects, making them active citizens of aid and not just passive subjects of aid. 5 18

Mentoring the HN It is necessary to develop a mechanism where a greater engagement of ordinary Afghans is encouraged. For this a double compact between the donor, the government and the final beneficiaries is necessary so that aid becomes accountable to the Afghan people 5 18

Mentoring the HN The effectiveness and the accountability of the Afghan state have often been sacrificed to accommodate peace and security. 5 18 Mentoring the HN High corruption and low civil servants salaries create pressure on state revenues 5 18

Mentoring the HN The Afghan Government will have to depend much more heavily on its own Intelligence resources. The National Directorate of Security has done commendable work, but more needs to be done to build a strong and professional Intelligence apparatus that can provide capabilities at both strategic and tactical levels.

4 22

Mentoring the HN The US and Afghanistan should conclude, as speedily as possible, a Status of Forces Maintenance Agreement for the period after 2014. We recognize that our two countries also have responsibility to support the efforts towards post-2014 stabilization 4 22

Mentoring the HN Many people ultimately want a basic level of security above all else. Uncertain security and widespread perceptions of fraud has created circumstances that have emerged a number of election strategies that candidates and communities rely on to secure maximum political capital. 14 23

Mentoring the HN Address corruption and its economic effects more explicitly in country assistance strategies and the design of projects. 6 30

Mentoring the HN Help design and implement government programs to strengthen institutions through targeted interventions (tax, customs, or procurement) or comprehensive/incremental economic policy reform. 6 31

Mentoring the HN Increase the accountability of local institutions, by making transparency a condition for lending and financing projects, providing technical assistance to reform accounting systems and supporting civil society actors to monitor government spending and activities. 24 34

Mentoring the HN

The challenge should be seen, and described publicly, primarily as one of improving governance in Afghanistan rather than tackling a culture of criminality. If the United States in particular is too blunt, too dogmatic and too unilateral about the corruption issue, we can create several obstacles to success. An indirect approach to the problem—via broader institutional accountability mechanisms that improve governance—would be less threatening and more likely to stick.

9 35

Mentoring the HN We are now seeing points of light in the anticorruption effort, such as President Karzai’s new specialized anticorruption agency—the High Office of Oversight—which is mandated to oversee and coordinate corruption prevention efforts and assist ministries in developing and implementing anticorruption plans and strategies. The President’s anticorruption efforts are in their infancy and will require time and continued support.

9 35

Mentoring the HN Fill critical gaps in financial management, procurement and public sector management. 6 38 Mentoring the HN Be aware of potential security risks for anti-corruption personnel--they are often threatened when they begin to do their work. 6 42

Mentoring the HN Develop guidelines for parallel investigations (i.e. within the nation in which it occurred and in another nation). Determine if there is a means to bring corrupt individuals to trial in an international setting, such as the International Criminal Court. 6 43

Mentoring the HN Support Civil Society Organization initiatives that have proven successful. Successful initiatives were those that directly targeted the promotion of accountability in state-building efforts, educating citizens on their rights, and expanding citizen-government dialogue in a targeted fashion. 1 47

Mentoring the HN Support honest and just leaders/reformers 25 51

B-8

Categories Input

Ori

gin

ato

r*

Do

cum

ent*

Mentoring the HN Map CPNs (Intel, Collection, Analysis, Dissemination) 25 51 Mentoring the HN Use domestic skills and resources for the reconstruction projects 26 52 Mentoring the HN Whistleblower hotlines (for staff and citizens). 3 53 Mentoring the HN Public expenditure tracking by civil society and citizen oversight of public procurement processes 3 53

Mentoring the HN Hiring & promotion reform: (i) reduce the number of unnecessary senior officers in the ANP, which had been top heavy; (ii) institute a merit-based recruitment and promotion system by replacing the system of bribery and personnel affiliations mentioned above; and (iii) improve the pay scale and delivery of salary to police in the field. (Plus report appointments and promotions to the president’s office. SIGAR quarterly report)

16 54

Mentoring the HN Make literacy program mandatory for basic army and police training, 16 54

Mentoring the HN Organize public employees in unions and train them in order to be able to scrutinize the bidding processes, monitor the material procurement and control the implementation of public projects. Develop a form to report corruption and provide legal protection for members who will use it. 27 55

Mentoring the HN Allocate resources to receive, investigate and prosecute legitimate complaints 28 56 Mentoring the HN Educating civil servants on the law and their responsibilities under the law 28 56 Mentoring the HN Establish Integrity and Behavioral Assurance Tests, and a Code of Ethics for civil servants 28 56

Mentoring the HN Counter-Corruption in Defence, Security and the Military. Strengthen integrity and reduce corruption: Concept of transparency and good governance / How to integrate the topics of integrity and corruption / How to engage better with the public and civil society. (Universities Academic)

3 61

Mentoring the HN The AC Toolkit contains a detailed set of specific Tools intended for use by officials called upon to elaborate elements of a national AC strategy and to assemble these into an overall strategic framework. They provide information about the conditions under which a particular programme will or will not work and how various tools can be adapted or modified to suit the circumstances in which they are likely to be used. (UN)

2 63

Mentoring the HN Developing corruption reporting tools as of, for instance ''a nationwide telephone hotline or internet reporting conduit and protect the citizens who use it''. 25 51

StratCom / Info Ops Be committed either to not making political contributions, or to making explicit and public when such contributions are made 3 3

StratCom / Info Ops Focus CJIATF to manage perceptions carefully in order to avoid aggressive unilateral approaches to anti-corruption which are insensitive to the current environment and a sovereign GIRoA 13 14

StratCom / Info Ops Donor Assistance Database and the ISAF database are nominally accessible to the public, these have no value for the vast majority of Afghans who are not computer-literate, have not access to Internet and do not speak English. Access to information and local accountability should become an integral part of any project or program in Afghanistan.

5 18

StratCom / Info Ops Control strategic communications and make the case that the need for anti-corruption matters should not be shelved in place of politically popular deliveries of aid quickly and without oversight. 1 20

StratCom / Info Ops Allow access to information on donor-founded projects to local leaders/communities/state agencies/members of parliament/NGOs (e.g. create a nominally accessible database in English and local language) 26 52

StratCom / Info Ops Public information campaigns and innovative approaches, such as through sport and interfaith activities. 3 53 StratCom / Info Ops Media training. 3 53 StratCom / Info Ops Report on the "State of Corruption" to the President, the Parliament and the people. 28 56

StratCom / Info Ops STRATCOM: publicize all enforcement actions, major electronic media campaigns and other strategic initiatives to reinforce the anti-corruption themes 28 56

StratCom / Info Ops Use of a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) and a follow up public awareness campaign, IOT reduce the levels of diversion of Finance/Procurements intended for public use. (Uganda) 30 59

B-9

ORIGINATOR REFERENCES Id Originator

1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

2 United Nations (UN)

3 Transparency International (TI)

4 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

5 Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA)

6 World Bank (World Bank)

7 Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring & Evaluation Committee(MEC)

8 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

9 Col Gregory Douquet, Michael O'Hanlon

10 Center for Study of Presidency & Congress

11 US Agency for International Development (USAID)

12 Global Integrity/UN Development Programme (UNDP)P

13 US Army War College (USAWC) Monograph

14 Afghanistan research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)

15 Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-Shafafiyat (CJIATF-Shafafiyat)

16 Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC)

17 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre

18 NATO Support Agency (NSPA0

19 Stabilisation force (SFOR)

20 Allied Command Operations (ACO)

21 Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre (GIACC)

22 EU Council

23 TIRI (Integrity Action)

24 Dominik Zaum and Christine Cheng

25 Tom Rick

26 Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisné

27 Donna McGuire

28 Jeffrey Coonjohn & Dr. Azizallah Lodin

29 International Anti-Corruption Conference Athens

30 Africa Regional Department Financial Accountability & Anti-Corruption Team

B-10

DOCUMENT REFERENCES Id Document Reference

1 Mobilizing NATO for Afghanistan and Pakistan: Ensuring the Alliance’s Future

2 Second Six Month Report

3 Reporting on Anti-corruption: A Report on Corporate Practices

4 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank. September 2000

5 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank. September 2010

6 The World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services; Implementation Plan for Strengthening 4 Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption; September 28, 2008

7 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality? OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2016

8 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality? OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2019

9 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality? OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2020

10 Hussman, Karen and Martin Tisne; Integrity in State-building: Anti-Corruption with a State-building Lens. OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; August 2009

11 USAID AC Strategy

12 Mainstreaming Anti-Corruption in Development, Dec 2008, UNDP

13 User's Guide to Measuring Corruption, GI/UNDP

14 USAWC Monograph, Col John Smith, 2011

15 Integrity in State-building: Anti-Corruption with a State-building Lens

16 Second Six Month Report

17 Asian Transnational Security Challenges: Emerging Trends, Regional Visions

18 Bringing Accountability Back In

19 International Corruption Hunter's Alliance--First Meeting, Post-meeting Report; December 8, 2011

20 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality? OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2013

21 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality? OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2015

22 Toward a Stable Afghanistan: The Way Forward

23 Practicing-Democracy in Afghanistan

24 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 1997

25 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 1998

26 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 2002

27 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 2006

28 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 2007

29 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?; OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2010

30 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 1999

31 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 2004

B-11

Id Document Reference

32 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of The World Bank; September 2005

33 The World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services; Implementation Plan for Strengthening The World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption; September 28, 2007

34 Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-building, Dominik Zaum and Christine Cheng, PROGRAM ON STATES AND SECURITY, C11Y

35 A Realistic Anticorruption Strategy for Afghanistan

36 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?; OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2017

37 UNDP, Phil Matshezam, International Conference on Promotion of Transparency and Accountability for Strengthened Integrity Systems, 5-6 December 2012, Ankara / Turkey

38 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank; September 2001

39 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank; September 2011

40 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank; September 2012

41 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank; September 2013

42 The World Bank; Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank; September 2014

43 International Corruption Hunters’ Alliance--First Meeting, Post-meeting Report; 8 December 2010

44 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?; OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2011

45 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?; OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2014

46 Hussman, Karen; Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?; OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team; 18 October 2018

47 Hussman, Karen and Martin Tisne; ; OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance - Anti-Corruption Task Team. August 2011

48 International Assistance & Synchronization of Counter-Corruption Efforts, CJIATF-S, 14 Aug 2013

49 International Assistance & Synchronization of Counter-Corruption Efforts, CJIATF-S, 14 Aug 2014

50 International Assistance & Synchronization of Counter-Corruption Efforts, CJIATF-S, 14 Aug 2015

51 11 proposed steps for ISAF to help respond to corruption in Afghanistan, Tom Rick

52 A new approach to postwar reconstruction, Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisné

53 After the Conflict: Nation- Building and Corruption

54 CIVIL-MILITARY FUSION CENTRE. Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan February 12

55 Creating a Tidal Wave Against Corruption in the Philippines, Donna McGuire

56 Developing a Strategic Implementation Plan for Anti-Corruption, Jeffrey Coonjohn & Dr. Azizallah Lodin

57 Illicit financial flows and measures to counter them: An introduction

58 Papers for Workshop Session 2.1 on ‘Tackling corruption in the defence and security sector. International Anti-Corruption Conference Athens

59 Targeting Corruption A selection of Case Studies. Africa Regional Department Financial Accountability & Anti-Corruption Team.

60 Council Decision of 25 September 2008 (L287/1)

61 Discussion at the National Defence University Washington DC (2011)

62 Anti-Corruption Training Manual (May 2008)

63 The Global Programme Against Corruption - UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (2004)

64 NAMSA Procurement Regulations (251-01 of 6 January 2012)

65 JAT SFOR Final Report on C2-Transition CIMIC (NC) as of 31 July 1997

66 Military Budget Committee - Financial Statements for ACO (11 August 2009)

C-1

ANNEX C APPARENT CORRELATION BETWEEN NATO

FOOTPRINT AND CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS 1. NATO carried out operations/missions in 5 countries between 2001 and 2011: KFOR (Kosovo), ISAF (Afghanistan), NTM-I (Iraq), Operation OCEAN SHIELD (Somalia) and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Libya). The graph below plots the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index—which is measured on a scale of 0 (absolute corruption) to 10 (no corruption)32—for these nations over the period 2001 – 2011. Overlaid on this plot are significant milestones for NATO operations.

Notes:

Kosovo did not declare independence until 2008 and no earlier corruption data exists - not plotted. However, a separate

plot of data available for countries in the region shows no clear correlation between KFOR’s intervention and corruption

indices. Operation Ocean Shield has not had any ‘boots on the ground’ and is consequently unlikely to have affected corruption.

NATO has limited financial interaction with the Somali authorities.

The intervention in Libya was so short lived that its effect on the TI corruption indices across a decade is unlikely to be

significant and until the 2012 figures are available cannot be seen.

2. A pattern may be seen—albeit from only two data sets—in both Iraq and Afghanistan of marked drops in corruption indices (38% and 48% respectively) coinciding with the arrival of NATO and coalition forces in-theatre and mild recovery with their (imminent) departure.

32

Note that the 2011 TI Corruption Perception Index is on the scale of 0 to 100.

Aug 2004 - NTM-I established

Oct 2004 - ISAF Stage 1 Complete

Sep 2005 - ISAF Stage 2 Complete

Jul 2006 - ISAF Stage 3 Complete

Oct 2006 - ISAF Stage 4 Complete

Dec 2011 - NTM-I Complete

Aug 2009 – Operation Ocean Shield

Mar to Oct 2011 – Op Unified Protector