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No _________________ In The Supreme Court of the United States __________________________________________ Monica Hoeft Petitioner-Appellant v. Michael Astrue Commissioner of Social Security Defendant-Appellee __________________________________________ Motion to Reconsider the Timeliness of her Writ of Certiorari and Motion to File Writ out of Time ______________________________ Monica Hoeft

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The Clerk denied my entry for Writ of Certiorari based on the timing of the Writ of Mandate. Rule 13.3 of the SupCt Rules contradicts this - it is when the petition for rehearing is denied does the 90 SOL begin to run. A petition to the Fed Ct of appeals to entertain a petition for an En banc hearing tolls the 90 day limitation, and the 90 day limitation in which to file a writ of cert does not begin to run until the petition is denied. I still have some fight left in me. I think they want to try and weed out as many applicants to the US Supreme Ct as possible - even if it does mean breaking their own rules - its up to you to find which rule was broken.

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Page 1: DocumentNo

No _________________

In The

Supreme Court of the United States__________________________________________

Monica Hoeft

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

Michael Astrue

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant-Appellee

__________________________________________

Motion to Reconsider the Timeliness of her Writ of Certiorari and

Motion to File Writ out of Time

______________________________

Monica Hoeft

Page 2: DocumentNo

Comes now Petitioner in Pro Se and hereby moves this Honorable Court to reconsider

the timeliness of her Writ of Certiorari and Motion to File Writ out of Time

incorporated herein. Supreme Court Rule 13.3 clearly states that:

[T]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from thedate of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, andnot from the issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalentunder local practice). But if a petition for rehearing is timelyfiled in the lower court by any party, or if the lower courtappropriately entertains an untimely petition for rehearing orsua sponte considers rehearing, the time to file the petition for awrit of certiorari for all parties (whether or not they requestedrehearing or joined in the petition for rehearing) runs from thedate of the denial of rehearing or, if rehearing is granted, thesubsequent entry of judgment.

The final date of entry of judgement on Petitioner's case is December 18th 2090 (see

Petitioner Appendix "A" see court docket entries Pet. App. "B"). The court did not say

that the denial of judgement was "moot" instead it simply stated that the motion was

denied - therefore the court retained jurisdiction. According to Black's law, "[A] case

becomes "moot" when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties lack a

legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Murphy v. Hunt, U.S.Neb. 455 U.S.478,

102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L. Ed.2d 353." The application was returned as untimely —which

requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the

judgment below and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the

original 90-day period—since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period. Missouri

v. Jenkins, 495 US 33, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 109 L.Ed.2d 31

Page 3: DocumentNo

The Court rejects respondents' contention that the Director's certiorari petition was

jurisdictionally untimely and this Court's Rule 13.3. instructs that a petition must be

filed "within ninety days after the entry of . . . judgment," and this Court's Rule 13.3

elaborates on that statute's (28 USC 2101) instruction. More than 90 days elapsed

between the date the Ninth Circuit first entered judgment and the date the Director's

petition was filed. That time lapse, respondents assert, made the filing untimely under

Rule 13.3's first sentence: "[T]he time to file . . . runs from the date of entry of the

judgment or order sought to be reviewed." Moreover, respondents submit, because no

party petitioned for rehearing, the extended filing periods prescribed by the Rule's

second sentence never came into play. This case, however, did not follow the typical

course. The Ninth Circuit, on its own initiative, had recalled its mandate and ordered

the parties to brief the question whether the case should be reheard en banc. That

order, this Court holds, suspended the judgment's finality , just as a timely filed

rehearing petition would or a court's appropriate decision to consider a late-filed

rehearing petition, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 49. The Court of Appeals'

order raised the question whether that court would modify the judgment and alter the

parties' rights; thus, while the court-initiated briefing order was pending, there was

no "judgment" to be reviewed. See, e.g., id., at 46. The Director's certiorari petition was

timely under the statute because it was filed within 90 days of the date the Ninth

Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Hibbs Director Arizona Department of Revenue v.

Winn et al. 542 US 88. A timely petition for rehearing operates to suspend the finality

of the court's judgment, pending the court's further determination whether the

judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the parties.

Page 4: DocumentNo

As cited in United States v. Wall, 456 F3d 316; "While his petition for rehearing was

pending, there was no judgment to be challenged either in the Supreme Court by a

petition for a writ of Certiorari, or in an inferior court by habeas review."

As stated - the Petitioner's Motion for Recall and Motion to file an En Banc brief was

still pending before the Ninth Circuit and as the case law in Wall dictates, there was

no judgment to be challenged either in the Supreme Court by a petition for a writ of

Certiorari. Therefore based on the text of the Supreme Court Rules 13.3 and the case

law cited herein, the Petitioner has filed for a timely Writ of Certiorari as the final

decision did not come down until December 18 , 2090. Petitioner has until Thursdayth

March 18 , 2010 to file a Writ of Certiorari.th

Procedural history of the Case as of July 7 , 2009th

July 7 , 2009 Docket entry 36 Judgement enteredth

July 14 , 2009 No Docket Entry Mandate issuedth

Aug. 17 . 2009 Docket entry 37 Filed - Motion to extend time to file petition forth

rehearing until 10/05/09

Aug 17 , 2090 Docket Entry 38 Received - change of address of Monica Hoeftth

Aug 18 , 2009 Docket Entry 39 Clarification of last names used.th

Aug 20 , 2009 Docket Entry 40 Motion to extend time to file for petition forth

rehearing until 10/05/09 GRANTED

Oct. 6 , 2009 Docket Entry 41 Motion for Counsel (petitioner)th

Page 5: DocumentNo

Oct. 14 , 2009 Docket Entry 42 Mandate Issuedth

Oct. 26 , 2009 Docket Entry 43 Motion for appointment of Counsel is DENIEDth

Nov. 30 , 2009 Docket Entry 44 Filed Motion to recall mandate and to file lateth

petition for rehearing

Nov. 30 , 2009 Docket Entry 45 Received Appellant’s petition for En Banc onlyth

Number of pages 15 Deficient: mandate

issued, motion to recall and file late PFR

pending. Served on 11/24/2009. (PANEL.)

(Panel should advise orders clerk: en banc

circulation) [7147346](TB)

Dec. 18 , 2009 Docket Entry 46 Appellant’s motion for recall and leave to fileth

documents out of time are DENIED

Jan. 4 , 2010 Docket Entry 47 Received copy of Appellant’s petition forth

Certiorari to USSC [7184414](TB).

At no time from the mandate issued on July 7 , 2009 and October 14 . 2009 did theth th

court divest itself of jurisdiction until the phone call placed by Plaintiff on Monday

January 4 , 2010 when the Clerk of the Court of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appealsth

stated to the Plaintiff Hoeft in plain terms that the court no longer has jurisdiction and

she must take the matter up with the Unites States Supreme Court. No order of

finality was issued, other than the order of December 18 , 2009 that states that theth

Plaintiffs motion for recall and leave to file En banc petition out of time are DENIED.

This is consistent with Supreme Court Rule 13.3 that a timely Writ of Certiorari.. runs

Page 6: DocumentNo

from the date of the denial of rehearing... [Emphasis added]. That denial did not

occur until December 18 , 2009 and the Petitioner has therefore until March 18 , 2010th th

to file her petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Motion to File Writ out of Time

For good cause, a Justice may extend the time to file a petitionfor a writ of certiorari for a period not exceeding 60 days. Anapplication to extend the time to file shall set out the basis forjurisdiction in this Court, identify the judgment sought to bereviewed, include a copy of the opinion and any order respectingrehearing, and set out specific reasons why an extension of timeis justified. The application must be filed with the Clerk at least10 days before the date the petition is due, except inextraordinary circumstances.

Petitioner is in dire financial straights and is not able to send her petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the Supreme Court back and forth until the Court so requests. The

jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Supreme Court Rule 13.3, in that Petitioner

is seeking review of a judgement that is NOT out of time, in that the Federal Appeals

Court still had jurisdiction to entertain Hoeft’s petition for a Motion to Recall and

Leave to File an En Banc Petition out of time, which was denied on December 18 ,th

2009 making March 18 , 2010 the time when the petition for Writ of Certiorari is due.th

Certiorari petition is timely under the statute because it was filed within 90 days of

the date the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Hibbs Director Arizona

Department of Revenue v. Winn et al. 542 US 88. The judgement sought to be

reviewed is whether or not the Ninth Circuit Court of appeal applied the correct

standard under Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 in

addressing Petitioners non-exertional limitations. The Ninth Circuit circumvented

Page 7: DocumentNo

Heckler supra in that Petitioner presented with non-exertional limitations and the

Circuit Court did not require that the ALJ either have a Vocational Expert present or

read the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, he just stated that the Claimant (Petitioner

Hoeft) could not work around people and left the claimant to figure out what jobs the

ALJ had in mind. The Petitioner is not a mind-reader and does not know what jobs

in the national economy are available to her.

Petitioner does not know if this motion will be granted and does not have the finances

to resend the writ petition unless so called for by the Court. Therefore good cause

exists that Petitioner’s motion for an extension of time in which to send in her petition

for writ of certiorari should be granted. The petition is completed and only has to wait

on the green light for the court to accept her petition.