nikola duric, respondent, by his attorney, james a. … the matter of: nikola duric, before the...

In the Matter of:

NIKOLA DURIC,

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD

OF THE

ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION

AND

DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

Commission No. 2015PR00052

Attorney-Respondent,

No. 6190677.

ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Nikola Duric, Respondent, by his attorney, James A. Doppke, Jr. of Robinson Law Group,

LLC, answers the complaint filed by the Administrator in this matter, as follows:

COUNT I

(Alleged conversion ofreal estate sale proceeds - Kozak]

1. In February 2012, Andrew Kozak ("Kozak") agreed to sell a home located at

5846 N. Melvina in Chicago ("the Melvina property") to Pinet, Inc.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1.

1. In February 2012, Respondent and Kozak agreed that Respondent would

represent Kozak in matters relating to the real estate transaction described in paragraph

one, above. At that time, Respondent and Kozak agreed that Respondent would be paid a

fee of $1,500 for his legal services relating to that transaction.


3. On March 9, 2012, the parties closed on the Melvina property, and agreedthat Kozak was entitled to $133,557.93 as his proceeds ofthe sale.


4. On March 9, 2012, Respondent told Kozak that the title company was

required to "hold" $20,000 of the proceeds from the sale to "verify that everything went

through." At that time, Respondent directed the closing agent to issue aseparate check for

$20,000 ofKozak's proceeds.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 4.

5. Respondent's assertion to Kozak, described in paragraph four, above, was

false. In fact, no such requirement existed.

ANSWER: Respondent denies that he made any false statements to Kozak.

Respondent denies any remaining allegations contained in paragraph 5.

6. At the time Respondent made the statement described in paragraph four,

above, he knew that the title company had not imposed a requirement that $20,000 of

Kozak's sale proceeds be held separately from the remainder ofthe proceeds.

ANSWER: Respondent denies that he made any false statements to Kozak.

Respondent denies any remainingallegations contained in paragraph 6.

7. At the closing on March 9, 2012, at Respondent's direction, Chicago Title and

Trust issued the following checks to Kozak: checknumber 5012006104,payable to Kozak's

order in the amount of $113,557.93; and check number 5012006106, payable to Kozak's

order in the amount of $20,000. Kozak received check number 5012006104, and

Respondent received check number 5012006106.


8. On March 12,2012, Respondentdeposited checknumber 5012006106, in the

amount of$20,000, into his Bridgeview Bank account bearing an account number ending in

the four digits "8501," which was entitled "Marko Realty and Investment Corp." Bridgeview

Bank account number 8501 was not an I0LTA account but was an account used by

Respondent for his own business or personal purposes.

ANSWER: Respondentadmits the allegations contained in paragraph 8.

9. Atno time did Kozak authorize Respondentto use any portion of the $20,000

proceedsofchecknumber 5012006106 for Respondent'sown purposes.

ANSWER: Respondentdenies the allegations contained in paragraph 9.

10. On April 3, 2012, prior to any disbursement to Kozak, Respondent drew the

balance in his Bridgeview Bank account numberending in 8501 to $10,601.92, by drawing

funds from the account to pay his own personal or business obligations.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that the records maintained by Bridgeview Bank

reflecting activity in account number ending in 8501 reflect that as of April 3, 2012, the

balance in account number ending in 8501 was $10,601.92. Respondent denies all

remaining allegations contained in paragraph 10.

11. As of April 3, 2012, Respondent had used at least $9,398.08 of the proceeds

to the sale of Kozak's property for his own business or personal purposes.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11 as

alleged. Further answering, Respondent states that the statement associated with the

Bridgeview Bank account indicates that the balance in the account was $10,601.92 on April

3, 2012, but other records associated with the account do not indicate the manner in which

the account was drawn to that balance. Further answering, Respondent states that the

records associated with the account indicate that amounts that the bank debited from the

account prior to April 3, 2012 were credited back to the account by April 13, 2012, and

therefore that the funds were notactually disbursed or used.

12. Respondent's conduct, described in paragraphs one through 11, above,

constitutes conversion of funds received in connection with his representation of Kozak.

ANSWER: The allegations contained in paragraph 12 are not factual, but rather

state legal conclusions. Therefore, no answer is required. To the extent an answer is

deemed required, Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12.

13. Between March 12, 2012, and June 29, 2012, Kozak telephoned Respondent

on several occasions, and appeared at least once at Respondent's office, to request

information about the proceeds. On each occasion, Kozak did not reach Respondent, and

left a message for Respondent Respondent received each message shortly after itwas left.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that Kozak contacted him between March 12,

2012 and June 29, 2012, and that on certain occasions, he left messages for Respondent.

Respondent denies all other allegations contained in paragraph 13.

14. At no time did Respondent respond to Kozak's requests for information

about the $20,000.


15. At no time did Respondent deliver to Kozakany portion of the $20,000.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 15, as

those allegations are false. Further answering, Respondent states that on June 29, 2012, he

gave Kozak a check in the amount of $20,000. Further answering, upon information and

belief, Respondent states that the $20,000 check was cashed by Kozak, or by someone on

his behalf or at his direction, shortly after June 29, 2012. Further answering, Respondent

states that the Administrator has been in possession of a copy of the June 29, 2012 $20,000

check since the date an investigation was docketed in this matter. Furtheranswering, at his

deposition in this matter, Kozak acknowledged under oath that he had received the

$20,000 check from Respondent.

16. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the

following misconduct:

a. failure to hold property that is in the lawyer'spossession in connection with a representation

separate from the lawyer's own property, by conductincluding depositing Kozak's funds in a business

account, and converting $9,398.08 of Kozak's funds, inviolation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of

Professional Conduct (2010);

b. failure to promptly deliver to Kozak proceeds from thesale of his real estate, which funds Kozak was entitled to

receive, in violation of Rule 1.15(d) of the Illinois Rulesof Professional Conduct (2010);

c. failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests forinformation from Kozak, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(4) of

the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

d. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation, by conduct including falsely tellingKozak that the title company required a separate

distribution of $20,000 of Kozak's funds, by holding thefunds in Respondent's personal account without

Kozak's knowledge, and by converting $9,398.08 ofKozak's funds for Respondent's own personal or

business purposes without authority, in violation ofRule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct

(2010).




COUNT II

[Alleged conversion ofreal estate sale proceeds -Rees)

17. On February 11, 2012, Anita Rees ("Rees") agreed to sell a home located at

4946 W. Fargo Ave., Skokie, Illinois ("the Fargo Avenue property") to Marko and Gordana

Domazet ("the Domazets").

ANSWER: Respondent admits theallegations contained inparagraph 17.

18. In April 2012, Respondent and Rees agreed that Respondent would

represent Rees in matters relating to her sale of the Fargo Avenue property. At that time,

Respondent and Rees did not discuss what fee Respondent would be paid for his legal

services in the matter.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in the first sentence of

paragraph 18. Respondent denies the allegations contained in the second sentence of

paragraph 18.

19. On May 3, 2012, the parties closed on the Fargo Avenue property, and the

closing agent determined that Rees was entitled to $141,059.61 from the sale. At that time,

Respondent advised Rees that Rees could reduce her tax liability by entrusting a portion of

the sale proceeds to Respondent



paragraph 19.

20. Respondent's statement to Rees, described in paragraph 19, above, was false.

In fact, Rees' tax liability would not have been affected if Respondent had held a portion of

the sale proceeds.

ANSWER: Respondent denies that he made any false statements to Rees as

alleged in paragraph 20. Respondent denies that he made the statement attributed to him

in paragraph 19. Respondent is unable to answer the allegations contained in the second

sentence of paragraph 20, because those allegations are too vague and unspecific to allow

Respondent to formulate an answer. Respondent does not know, and cannot guess, what

"tax liability" is being referred to or whether any such liability would have been "affected"

or would not have been "affected" by any action or inaction of Respondent Respondent

denies any remaining allegations contained in paragraph 20.

21. At the time Respondent made the statement described in paragraph 19,

above, he knew it was false.

ANSWER: Respondent denies that he made any false statements to Rees as

alleged in paragraph 21. Respondent denies that he made the statement attributed to him

in paragraph 19. Respondent denies any remaining allegations contained in paragraph 21.

22. On May 3, 2012, the closing agent delivered to Rees, Chicago Title and Trust

Company check number 9511016373, which was made payable to Rees' order in the

amount of $115,506.05, and two additional checks, which represented the balance of the

sale proceeds.


23. On May 3, 2012, pursuant to Respondent's advice, described in paragraph 19,

above, Rees affixed her signature to the back of check number 9511016373, in the amount

of$115,506.05, and delivered the check to Respondent.


24. At no time did Rees authorize Respondent to use any portion of the proceeds

of check number 9511016373 for Respondent's own personal or business purposes.


25. On May 10, 2012, Respondent deposited check number 9511016373 into a

North Community Bank client fund account bearing an account number ending in the four

digits "7072." The account ("client fund account") was entitled, "Nicholas M. Duric, Attorney

atLaw, IOLTA Account" and was used by Respondent as a depository of funds belonging to

Respondent's clients, tothird parties, or, presently orpotentially, toRespondent

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained inparagraph 25.

26. On June 27, 2012, Respondent drew check number 66159, which he made

payable to "cash," from his client fund account, in the amount of $75,000. On that date,

Respondent negotiated the check, and used it to purchase a cashier's check made payable

to Rees' order, in the amount of $75,000.


27. On June 27, 2012, Respondent delivered the $75,000 cashier's check,

described in paragraph 26, above, to Rees. After that delivery, Respondent continued to

hold $40,506.05 of the proceeds of check number 9511016373 for the benefit of Rees.


28. On June 29, 2012, prior to distributing any of the remaining proceeds of

check number 9511016373 to, or for the benefit of, Rees, Respondent drew the balance in

his client fund account to $249.34, by drawing funds from the account for his own personal

or business purposes.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that records ofactivity in his client fund account

maintained by North Community Bank reflect that the balance in the account was $249.34

as of June 29,2012. Respondent denies all other allegations contained in paragraph 28.

29. As ofJune 29, 2012, Respondent had used at least $40,256.71 of Rees' funds

for Respondent's own personal or business purposes.


alleged.

30. Respondent's conduct, described in paragraphs 17 through 29, above,

constitutes conversion offunds received in connection with his representation of Rees.




31. On several occasions after May 3, 2012, Rees requested that Respondent

deliver the remainder of the proceeds of the sale of the Fargo Avenue property to her. On

each such occasion, Respondent told Rees that her funds were not available.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 31. Further

answering, Respondent states that on July 9, 2012, he provided a check to Rees in the

amount of $14,000; that on July 20, 2012, he provided a check to Rees in the amount of

$11,000; and that on August 2, 2012, he provided a certified check in the amount of

$32,300.05 to Rees. Further answering, Respondent states that upon information and belief,

all of those checks were negotiated by Rees, or by someone acting on her behalf or at her

direction. Further answering, Respondent states that copies of those checks were in the

possession oftheAdministrator prior tothefiling oftheinstant complaint.

32. At no time did Respondent inform Rees that he had used her funds for his

own personal or business purposes.


alleged.



a. failure to hold property of a client that is in the lawyer'spossession in connection with a representationseparate from the lawyer's own property, by conductincluding conversion of $40,256.71 of the funds

belonging to Rees, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

b. failure to promptly deliver to Rees proceeds from thesale of her real estate, which funds Rees was entitled to

receive, by conduct including conversion of $40,256.71

of the funds belonging to Rees, in violation of Rule

1.15(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct

(2010); and

c. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation, by conduct including falsely

inducing Rees to entrust funds to Respondent by tellingher she could realize tax benefits by doing so,

converting Rees' real estate proceeds to his own use,

without authorization, while purporting to hold the

funds for her benefit, and failing to inform her of his useof her funds for his own purposes, in violation of Rule

10

8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct(2010).




COUNT III

{Alleged conversion ofearnest moneyfunds - Odsterczyl)

34. On June 11, 2013, Jacek and Elzbieta Odsterczyl ("the Odsterczyls") agreed to

purchase residential property located at 18 E. Old Willow Road, Unit 423N, in Prospect

Heights, Illinois ("the Willow Road property") from John Livaditis ("Livaditis"). Respondent

represented Livaditis with respect to the real estate transaction, and the Odsterczyls were

represented inthe matter by Agnes Pogorzelski ("Pogorzelski"). The parties agreed to close

the sale on August 7, 2013.


paragraph 34. Respondent admits that he represented Livaditis with respect to the

transaction. Respondent denies that the Odsterczyls were represented with respect to the

transaction by Agnes Pogorzelski as of June 11, 2013, and affirmatively states that they

were represented at that time by attorney Mark Sciblo, as the Administrator has been

aware since the date that the investigation into this matter was docketed. Respondent

admits the allegations contained in the final sentence of paragraph 34.

35. In the purchase agreement, described in paragraph 34, above, the

Odsterczyls agreed to pay earnest money in the amount of $8,450 toward their purchase of

the Willow Road property. Respondent, as counsel for Livaditis, agreed with the

Odsterczyls and Livaditis to hold the earnest money in escrow pending the sale closing.

11


36. Between June 11, 2013 and June 18, 2013, the Odsterczyls tendered to

Respondent two checks as earnest funds towards their purchase of the Willow Road

property: their PNC Bank check number 558, which was dated June 11, 2013, and was

made payable to Respondent's order in the amount of$4,000; and PNC Bank check number

561, which was dated June 18, 2013, and was payable to Respondent's order in the amount

of $4,450.


37. On June 14, 2013, Respondent opened a personal checking account with PNC

Bank. The account was titled "Nikola Duric," and bore an account number ending in the

four digits "2216." Account number 2216 was not a separate and identifiable client fund

account. On June 14, 2013, andJune 19, 2013, Respondent deposited the Odsterczyls' check

numbers 558 and 561, in the amount of $8,450, into account number 2216.


38. At no time did the Odsterczyls or Livaditis authorize Respondent to use any

portion of the Odsterczyls' $8,450 earnest money payment for Respondent's own business

or personal purposes.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations of paragraph 38 as alleged.

39. On June 25, 2013, prior to distributing any portion of the proceeds of the

Odsterczyls' check numbers 558 and 561, Respondent drew the balance in account number

2216 to $30, by drawing funds from the account for Respondent's own personal or

business purposes.

12

ANSWER: Respondent admits that records reflecting activity in his account

number ending in 2216 maintained by PNC Bank reflect that as of June 25, 2013, the

balance in the account was $30. Respondent denies all remaining allegations contained in

paragraph 39.

40. As of June 25, 2013, Respondent had used at least $8,420 of the Odsterczyls'

funds for his ownbusinessor personalpurposes.


alleged.


constitutes conversion offunds received in connection with his representation ofLivaditis.



deemedrequired, Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 41.

42. The intended closing on the purchase of the Willow Road property did not

take place,and the real estate contract was voided in August 2013. Pursuant to the terms of

the contract, Livaditis became obligated to return the $8,450 in earnest money to the

Odsterczyls.


answering, Respondent states that the transaction closed on July 21, 2014, with the

Odsterczyls taking title to the property by warranty deed executed by Claire Livaditis, who

is Livaditis' wife and the owner of record of the property, on that same date. Further

answering, Respondent states that Respondent notified the Administrator of the July 21,

2014 closing by letter (directed to the Inquiry Board of the Commission, but sent to counsel

13

for the Administrator as is customary) dated July 28, 2014. Further answering, Respondent

states that information relating to the warranty deed is publicly viewable, without cost, on

the website maintained by the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. Further answering,

Respondent states that the Administrator is in possession of the file maintained by

Pogorzelski in relation to the Livaditis-Odsterczyl transaction, which contains information

correctly indicating that the closing occurred onJuly 21, 2014.

43. Between August 7, 2013, and February 6, 2014, Pogorzelski left several

telephone messages with Respondent requesting the return of her clients' earnest money

payment Respondent received each message shortly after it was sent.


answering, as the Administrator is aware, Respondent states that Pogorzelski did not

represent the Odsterczyls in the transaction prior to February 2014.

44. At no time did Respondent respond to Pogorzelski's messages, described in

paragraph 43, above.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that he did not have contact with Pogorzelski

between August 13, 2013 and February 6, 2014. Respondent denies that he was required

or obligated to have any such contact, because, as the Administrator is aware, Pogorzelski

did not represent the Odsterczyls with respect to the Livaditis-Odsterczyl transaction

between August 13, 2013 and February 6, 2014. Respondent denies any remaining

allegations contained in paragraph 44, including but not limited to any allegations to the

effect that Pogorzelski left him any messages between August 13, 2013 and February 6,

2014.

14

45. By letters to Respondent dated February 6, 2014, and March 20, 2014,

Pogorzelski requested information about the status of the transaction, informed

Respondent that her clients no longer wished to purchase the property, and demanded the

return of the Odsterczyls' earnest money. Respondent received the letters shortly after

they were sent.



paragraph 45.

46. At no time did Respondent respond to Pogorzelski's letters, described in

paragraph 45, above.

ANSWER: Respondent denies theallegations contained inparagraph 46.

47. At no time did Respondent refund any portion of the escrow funds to the

Odsterczyls, or tender any portion of the escrow funds to Livaditis.

ANSWER: Respondentdenies the allegations ofparagraph 47 as alleged.



a. failure to promptly deliver to a client or a third personfunds that the client or third person is entitled toreceive, by conduct including depositing the Odsterczyls'funds into a non-trust account, and converting $8,420 ofthe funds, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the IllinoisRules of Professional Conduct (2010);

b. failing to hold property of clients or third persons that isin a lawyer's possession in connection with a

representation separate from a lawyer's own property,by conduct including depositing the Odsterczyls' fundsinto a non-trust account, and converting $8,420 of the

15

funds, in violation ofRule 1.15(d) ofthe Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct (2010); and

c. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, ormisrepresentation, by conduct including depositing theOdsterczyls' funds into a non-trust account, converting$8,420 of the funds, and failing to respondent toPogorzelski's requests for information, in violation ofRule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct(2010).




COUNT IV

(Alleged conversion ofescrowfunds - Holas)

49. In November 2012, Respondent and Frank Holas ("Holas") agreed that

Respondent would represent Frank [sic] in connection with outstanding financial

obligations relating to two properties owned by Alice Holas Revocable Trust ("Holas

Trust"), located at 6523 and 6525 Richmond ("Holas trust properties"). Alice Holas was

Frank Holas' mother and Frank Holas served as trustee for the Holas Trust.


50. In November 2012, Holas obtained a loan from a friend, David Wesseldyk, in

the amount of $52,650, to allow Holas to pay taxes and other obligations relating to the

Holas Trust properties.


51. On or about November 15, 2012, Wesseldyk tendered $25,189.72 to Holas,

pursuant to the loan agreement described in paragraph 50, above.


16

52. On November 15, 2012, Respondent and Holas agreed that Respondent

would receive the remaining $27,460.28 proceeds of the loan described in paragraph 50,

above, from Wesseldyk, and to hold the funds in escrow until the tax payments on the

Holas Trust properties were made.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that on November 15, 2012, Respondent and

Holas agreed that Respondent would receive the remaining $27,460.28 proceeds of the

loan described in paragraph 50, above, from Wesseldyk. Respondent denies all remaining

allegations contained in paragraph 52.

53. At no time did Holas authorize Respondent to use any portion of the funds

described inparagraph 50, above, for Respondent's own personal or business purposes.


54. On November 15, 2012, pursuant to the agreement described in paragraph

52, above, Wesseldyk wired the remaining $27,460.28 loan balance to Respondent's US

Bank account number ending in 4374, which was entitled "Nikola Duric."


55. Respondent's US Bank account number ending in 4374 was not a separate

and identifiable trust account, but was used by Respondent for his own business and

personal purposes.


56. On January 28, 2013, prior to distributing any funds from US Bank account

number 4374 in connection with Holas' legal matter. Respondent overdrew the account by

drawing funds from the account to pay his own personal or business expenses.

17

ANSWER: Respondent admits that records reflecting activity in his US Bank

account number 4374 maintained by US Bank reflect that on January 28, 2013, the account

was overdrawn. Respondent denies all remaining allegations contained in paragraph 56.


constitutes conversion of funds received in connection with his representation of Holas.




58. As of January 28, 2013, Respondent had used for his own business or

personal purposes the entire $27,460.28 wired to him by Wesseldyk for the purpose of

paying the tax obligation on the Holas Trust properties, without authority.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 58, except

the allegation that his actions as alleged were without authority, which allegation he denies.

59. On several occasions between January and March 2013, Respondent spoke

by telephone with John Rogers ("Rogers"), an attorney retained by Holas, and promised, at

Rogers' request, to provide Rogers with information regarding the disposition of Holas'

funds, andthestatus ofthe Holas Trust's outstanding financial obligations.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that on several occasions between January and

March 2013, Respondent spoke by telephone with John Rogers, anattorney who purported

to have been retained by Holas. Respondent denies all remaining allegations contained in

paragraph 59.

60. At no time did Respondent reveal to Holas or to Rogers his use of Holas'

funds.

18

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 60 as they

pertain to Holas. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 60 as they

pertain to Rogers. Further answering, Respondent denies that he had any obligation to"reveal" anything to Rogers.

61. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in thefollowing misconduct:

a. failing to hold property ofclients or thirdpersons that isin a lawyer's possession in connection with arepresentation separate from a lawyer's own property,by conduct including depositing escrow funds into apersonal account, and converting $27,460.28 of thefunds, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessionalConduct(2010);

b. failure to promptly deliver to a client or a third personfunds that the client or third person is entitled toreceive, by conduct including depositing escrow fundsinto a personal account, and converting $27,460.28 ofthe funds, failing to distribute the escrow funds, andfailure to respond to Holas' requests for informationabout the funds, in violation of Rule 1.15(d) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

c. failure to promptly comply with reasonable requestsfrom Holas or Rogers for information about the fundsRespondent was purportedly holding to pay the for thetrust properties, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(4) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

d. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, ormisrepresentation, by conduct including depositingescrow funds into a personal account, and converting$27,460.28 of the funds, and by failing to inform Holasor Rogers of Respondent's use of the funds for his own

purposes, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rulesof Professional Conduct (2010).

19




COUNTV

(Alleged conversion escrowfunds -Naqhavi)

62. In November 2012, Respondent and Chris Dimas ("Dimas") agreed that

Respondent would represent Dimas in the sale of a Lincolnwood, Illinois, restaurant

property.


63. On November 6, 2012, Javad Naqhavi ("Naqhavi") agreed to purchase Dimas'

restaurant property, and tendered to Respondent his check number 1915, which was made

payable to Respondent's order in the amount of $10,000, as earnest funds. Respondent

agreed to hold the earnest funds in trust pendingthe close of the sale of the business and

real property.


64. At no time did either Dimas or Naqhavi authorize Respondent to use any

portion of the $10,000 earnest moneypayment for Respondent's own personal or business

purposes.

ANSWER: Respondent cannot presently recall facts relating to the allegations

contained in paragraph 64, and he therefore lacks sufficient information to be able to admit

or deny them. Further answering, Respondent states that he was not asked to provide

information to the Administrator concerning his contacts with Dimas or Naqhavi prior to

the instant Complaint being filed in this matter, and he has therefore recently undertaken

20

to search for materials in his possession that would provide him with further information

on which tobase a response to theallegations ofparagraph 64.

65. On November 6, 2012, Respondent deposited Naqhavi's check number 1915

into his US Bank account ending in 4374, which was entitled "Nikola Duric." Respondent's

US Bank account ending in 4374 was not a separate and identifiable client trust fund

account, and Respondent used the account topay his own personal orbusiness expenses.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained inparagraph 65.

66. On January 4, 2013, prior to any disbursement to or on behalf ofNaqhavi or

Dimas, Respondent drew the balance in US Bank account ending in 4374 to $6.45 by

drawing funds from the account to pay his own personal or business expenses.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that the records associated with the US Bank

account ending in 4374 indicate that the balance in the account was $6.45 as of January 4,

2013. Respondent denies any remaining allegations contained in paragraph 66.

67. As of January 4, 2013, Respondent had used at least $9,993.55 of the earnest

funds for Respondent's own business or personal purposes.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that the records associated with the US Bank

account ending in 4374 indicate that funds in that account were drawn, and replenished,

between November 2012 and January 2013. Respondent cannot presently recall facts

relating to the reasons for the deposits and withdrawals that occurred in the account

during that time, and he therefore lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny

the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 67. Further answering, Respondent

states that the records of activity in US Bank account ending in 4374 indicate that he

21

provided a certified check to Naqhavi in the amount of $10,000 on or about February 6,2013.


constitutes conversion of funds received in connection with his representation ofDimas.






a. failure to hold property that is in the lawyer'spossession in connection with a representationseparate from the lawyer's own property, by conductincluding depositing the earnest funds in a personalaccount, and converting $9,993.55 of the funds, inviolation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct (2010); and

b. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit ormisrepresentation, by conduct including depositing theearnest funds in a personal account, and converting$9,993.55 of the funds, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).




COUNT VI

[Alleged neglect in alleged loan modification matter - Divkovic)

70. On January 24, 2012, Respondent and Branko Divkovic ("Divkovic") agreed

that Respondent would represent Divkovic in seeking a mortgage loan modification, and

22

attempting to prevent a foreclosure action by Divkovic's lender, Liberty Bank, in

connection with properties located at 2443 S. 50* Ave. in Cicero, Illinois, and 4010 Odell

Street in Harwood Heights, Illinois. Respondent and Divkovic agreed that Respondent

would be paid a flat fee of $2,500 to assist Divkovic in obtaining a modification of the

Divkovik's [sic] loans.


paragraph 70 to the effect that on January 24, 2012, he agreed to represent Divkovic, and to

the effect that part of the representation included providing advice to Divkovic regarding a

potential loan modification. Respondent denies the remaining allegations contained in the

first sentence of paragraph 70. Further answering, Respondent denies that Liberty Bank

was Divkovic's lender in connection with 2443 S. 50th Avenue in Cicero, Illlinois.

Respondent admits the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph 70 to the

effect that he accepted aflat fee of $2,500 from Divkovic. Respondent denies any remaining


71. On January 24, 2012, Divkovic gave Respondent his check number 597,

payable to Respondent in the amount of $2,500, as well as documents relating to his

mortgages and leases forthe Cicero property, which wasan apartmentbuilding.


72. In January and February 2012, Divkovic delivered to Respondent additional

documents related to his property and loans.


73. At no time did Respondent communicate with Divkovic's lender regarding

Divkovic's properties.

23

ANSWER: Respondent denies that there was one lender for all of Divkovic's

properties. Respondent admits that he did not contact lenders on behalf of Divkovic, but he

denies that his representation of Divkovic required him to do so. Respondent denies anyremaining allegations contained in paragraph 73.

74. On several occasions between January 24, 2012 and March 22, 2013,

Divkovic telephoned and visited Respondent's law office to request information regardingthe status of his matter. On none of these occasions did Respondent speak with Divkovic,

but Divkovic left messages requesting that Respondent contact him and provide

information regarding the status of his legal matter. Respondent received each messageshortly after it was sent.


paragraph 74. Respondent denies the allegations contained in the second and third

sentences of paragraph 74.

75. On March 22, 2013, Divkovic went to Respondent's office and did speak with

Respondent On that date, Divkovic expressed dissatisfaction with Respondent's

communication, discharged Respondent, andrequested that Respondent refund the $2,500

fee Divkovic had paid. Respondent agreed to refund thefee byMarch 27,2013.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained inparagraph 75.

76. At no time has Respondent refunded to Divkovic any portion of the $2,500

fee Respondent received on January 24,2012.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained inparagraph 76. Further

answering, Respondent states that no refund was or is required, because he earned the fees.

24

77. Between January 24, 2012 and March 27, 2013, Respondent did not provide

sufficient services to Divkovic to earn the fee of$2,500 Respondent received for thematter.

ANSWER: Respondent denies theallegations contained inparagraph 77.



a. failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptnessin representing his client, Divkovic, by conductincluding failing to take action to seek a loanmodification, violation [sic] of Rule 1.3 of the IllinoisRules of Professional Conduct (2010);

b. failure to keep a client, Divkovic, reasonably informedabout the status of a matter, by conduct including failingto inform the client he had taken no action to seek a

loan modification, in violation of Rule 1.4(a) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

c. failure to explain a matter sufficiently to permit a client,Divkovic, to make informed decisions regarding his

legal matter, by conduct including failing to inform theclient Respondent had taken no action to seek a loan

modification, in violation of Rule 1.4(b) of the Illinois

Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

d. failure to refund any advance fee payment that has not

been earned, upon termination of representation, by

conduct including failing to refund any portion ofDivkovic's $2,500 fee advance, in violation of Rule

1.16(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct

(2010).




25

COUNT VII

(Alleged misrepresentation and alleged creation offalse affidavit to ARDC)79. On March 28, 2013, the Administrator received a request for investigation

from Branko Divkovic relating to Respondent's handling of Divkovic's loan modification

matter. Based upon Divkovic's allegations, the Administrator docketed investigation

number 2013IN01512.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 79 based

upon information and belief.

80. On April 2, 2013, counsel for the Administrator mailed aletter to Respondent

asking that Respondent, within fourteen days, provide information regarding Respondent's

representation ofDivkovic. Respondent received the letter shortlyafter it was sent.

ANSWER: Respondent admits theallegations contained in paragraph 80.

81. On July 23, 2013, Respondent prepared an affidavit purporting to bethatof a

receptionist in Respondent's office, and purporting to affirm that Respondenthad met with

Divkovic "on multiple occasions for extended periods of time" and that Respondent had

"conducted himself in a courteous and professional manner when meeting with Mr.

Divkovic."

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 81, except

that he denies that the affidavit "purport[ed] to be that of a receptionist in Respondent's

office." Further answering, Respondent states that the affidavit was in fact the affidavit of

Terri Wurster, who was a receptionist and employee of Michael Realty, where Respondent

maintained an office at that time.

82. On July 23, 2014 [sic], Respondent directed Terri Wurster ("Wurster"), an

employee of a real estate office in which Respondent maintained office space, to sign the

26

affidavit described in paragraph 81, above. Respondent did so by placing the affidavit

under other documents, so thatWurster would beunlikely to see the statements contained

therein.


answering, Respondent states that on July 23, 2013, he asked Terri Wurster to sign the

affidavit described in paragraph 81, and she did so knowingly and voluntarily in

Respondent's presence.

83. The statements Respondent included in theaffidavit described inparagraphs

81 and 82, above, were false. In fact, Respondent had not met with Divkovic on multiple

occasions for extended periods oftime, andWurster had notwitnessed anysuch meetings.


84. At the time Respondent created the affidavit described in paragraphs 81 and

82, above, he knew the statements it contained were false.


85. At the time Respondent directed Wurster to sign the affidavit described in

paragraphs 81 and 82, above, he knew Wurster had not witnessed the events described in

the affidavit.


86. Immediately after signing the affidavit described in paragraphs 81 through

85, above, Wurster saw the full document, told Respondent that the statements were false,

and demanded that Respondent destroy the affidavit. Respondent did not do so.


27

87. Sometime between July 23, 2014 [sic] and October 30, 2013, Respondent, or

someone acting at his direction, attached the affidavit described in paragraphs 81 through

85, above to aletter to counsel for the Administrator, responding to counsel's April 2, 2013

letter requesting information regarding Respondent's representation of Divkovic, and sent

the letter to counsel for the Administrator. Counsel received the letter shortly after it wassent.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that between July 23, 2013 and October 30, 2013,

he caused the affidavit of Terri Wurster to be forwarded to counsel for the Administrator.

Respondent denies the remaining allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph

87, especially the allegation that paragraphs 81 through 85 accurately describe the affidavit.

Respondent admits the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph 87 based

upon information and belief.

88. The affidavit Respondent transmitted to counsel for the Administrator was

false. In fact, Respondent had not met with Divkovic on multiple occasions for extended

periods oftime, andWurster had notwitnessed anysuch meetings.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained inparagraph 88.

89. At the time Respondent sent the affidavit to counsel for the Administrator, he

knew that the statements it contained were false.




a. knowingly making false statements of material fact inconnection with a disciplinary matter, by conductincluding producing to the Administrator the affidavit of

28

Terri Wurster, when Respondent knew it containedfalse statements, inviolation ofRule 8.1(a) ofthe IllinoisRules ofProfessional Conduct (2010);

b. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit ormisrepresentation, by conduct including preparing afalse affidavit and by inducing Wurster to place hersignature on the affidavit without her knowledge of itscontents, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rulesof Professional Conduct (2010); and

c. conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice, by conduct including providing falseinformation regarding a disciplinary investigation tocounsel for the Administrator, in violation ofRule 8.4(d)of the Illinois Rule ofProfessional Conduct (2010).




COUNT VIII

(Alleged neglect inforeclosure matter - Soukup)

91. On December 19, 2012, Respondent and Gary Soukup ("Soukup") agreed that

Respondent would represent Soukup in matters relating to a foreclosure action which had

been filed against Soukup in the Circuit Court of Lake County, in the matter entitled, FDICv.

Gary V. Soukup, case number 12 CH 3672. Respondent and Soukup agreed that Respondent

would be paid a flat fee of $2,000 for his legal services in the matter.


29

92. On December 19, 2012, Respondent requested payment of his legal fee

within 24 hours, and told Soukup that Respondent would prepare and file an appearance,

answer and counterclaim on Soukup's behalf in case number 12 CH 3672.


93. On December 19, 2012, Soukup sent Respondent an e-mail message

requesting that Respondent provide Soukup with a copy of any pleading Respondent filed

on Soukup's behalf in case number 12 CH 3672. Respondent received the message shortly

after it was sent.

ANSWER: Respondent admits theallegations contained in paragraph 93.

94. On December 20, 2012, Soukup met with Respondent in a grocery store

parking lot, and gave Respondent his check number 1235 payable to Respondent in the

amount of$2,000 as their agreed-uponfee payment.

ANSWER: Respondentadmits the allegations contained in paragraph 94. Further

answering, Respondent denies that the $2,000 payment tendered by Soukup on December

20, 2012 was a payment for services in connection with a foreclosure matter.

95. At no time did Respondent file an appearance, answer, counterclaim or take

any other action on behalf of Soukup in case number 12 CH 3672.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 95. Further

answering, Respondent states that after consulting with Soukup regarding the foreclosure

case, he determined that Soukup did not have a meritorious defense to the foreclosure case,

and that he would not be able to represent Soukup's interests in the foreclosure case.

Further answering, Respondent states that he informed Soukup that he would not

represent him in the foreclosure matter, and that Soukup thereafter obtained other counsel.

30

96. On February 1, 2013, Soukup again sent Respondent an e-mail message

requesting that Respondent provide Soukup with a copy ofany pleading Respondent filed

on Soukup's behalf in case number 12 CH 3672. Respondent received the message shortly

after it was sent.


97. On February 6, 2013, Respondent telephoned Soukup and told him he had

filed an answer in the Circuit Court of Lake County in case number 12 CH 3672.


98. Respondent's statement to Soukup, described in paragraph 97, above, was

false. In fact, Respondent had filed no pleading on Soukup's behalf in case number 12 CH

3672.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that he had not filed any pleading on Soukup's

behalf in case number 12 CH 3672. Respondent denies all remaining allegations contained

in paragraph 98.

99. At the time Respondent made the statement described in paragraph 97,

above, to Soukup, he knew it was false.

ANSWER: Respondent denies that he made the statement described in

paragraph 97, or that he made any false statements to Soukup at any time. Respondent

denies any remaining allegations contained in paragraph 99.

100. In February 2013, Soukup discharged Respondent, requested a refund of his

$2,000 fee payment, and retained a new attorney to represent him in matters relating to

case number 12 CH 3672.

31

ANSWER: Respondent admits, upon information and belief, that Soukup hired an

attorney to represent him in matters relating to case number 12 CH 3672. Respondent

denies all remaining allegations contained in paragraph 100.

101. Between December 2012 and February 2013, Respondent did not provide

sufficient legal services to Soukup to earn the $2,000 legal fee he received.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that he did not provide legal services to Soukup

between December 2012 and February 2013 that would have justified a $2,000 legal fee.

Respondent denies all remaining allegations contained in paragraph 101. Further

answering, Respondent states that he earned the $2,000 fee he received from Soukup by

providing legal services to Soukup prior to December 2012.

102. At no time has Respondent refunded any portion of the $2,000 legal fee he

received from Soukup in December 2012.


Further answering, Respondent states that no refund was or is required.



a. failure to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, by conduct including failing to take action in furtherance of Soukup's defense in case number 12 CH 3672, in violation of Rule 1.2(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

b. failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, by conduct including failing to take action in furtherance of Soukup's defense in case number 12 CH 3672, in violation of Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

32

c. failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, by conduct including failing to inform Soukup of Respondent's failure to take action in furtherance of Soukup's defense in case number 12 CH 3672, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(3) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

d. failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, by conduct including failing to truthfully inform Soukup of Respondent's failure to take action in furtherance of Soukup's defense in case number 12 CH 3672, and falsely telling Soukup that Respondent had filed an answer on Soukup's behalf in case number 12 CH 3672, when Respondent had not in fact done so, in violation of Rule 1.4( a) ( 4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

e. conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation, by conduct including falsely telling Soukup that Respondent had filed an answer on Soukup's behalf in case number 12 CH 3672, when Respondent had not in fact done so, in violation of Rule 8.4( c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

f. failure to refund any advance fee payment that has not been earned, upon termination of representation, by conduct including failing to refund any portion of Soukup's $2,000 fee advance, in violation of Rule 1.16(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).




33

COUNT IX (Alleged conversion and alleged dishonesty in the Christos & Sophie Dimas matter)

104. In 2007, Christos and Sophie Dimas ("the Dimases"), were experiencing

financial difficulties and fell behind in their real estate mortgage payments to both MB

Financial Bank (for the restaurant property they owned on West Devon in Lincolnwood)

and to Bank of America (for their home on Madison Drive in Niles).


105. On October 14, 2008, MB Financial Bank filed a foreclosure complaint against

the Dimases' restaurant property in Lincolnwood. The matter was entitled MB Financial

Bank, N.A. v. Christos and Sophie Dimas et al., case number 2008 CH 38066 (Circuit Court of

Cook County, Chancery Division).


106. On July 1, 2010, Bank of America filed a complaint for foreclosure against the

Dimases' relating to their home property in Niles. That matter was entitled Bank of America,

N.A. v. Christos and Sophie Dimas et al., case number 2010 CH 28471 (Circuit Court of Cook

County, Chancery Division).


107. In 2010, Respondent and the Dimases verbally agreed that Respondent

would represent the Dimases in matters relating to both their restaurant and home,

including defending their interests in the two foreclosure cases. Respondent and the

Dimases never signed a written contract regarding the terms of Respondent's

representation of the Dimases. Instead, they agreed that Respondent would ask the

Dimases for money whenever Respondent wanted money.

34

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in the first two

sentences of paragraph 107. Respondent denies the allegations contained in the third

sentence of paragraph 107.

108. Beginning in 2012, Respondent began to dine at or visit the Dimases'

restaurant almost daily. At some of these visits, Respondent requested money from the

Dimases, either in the form of cash or a cashier's check made payable to him. Respondent

indicated that he was going to deposit the funds he received from the Dimases into

accounts with Bank of America and MB Financial Bank, to show the banks that the Dimases

were making, what Respondent called, a "good faith effort" to pay their mortgages, and that

he would also negotiate a settlement with those banks on the Dimases' behalf. The Dimases

agreed to Respondent's plan, with the hope that they would be able to refinance the

mortgages on both of their properties.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that he dined at or visited the Dimases' restaurant

in 2012. Respondent denies any remaining allegations contained in the first sentence of

paragraph 108. Respondent admits the allegations contained in the second sentence of

paragraph 108. Respondent denies the allegations contained in the third and fourth


109. Respondent's statements to the Dimases, that he would deposit money in

accounts with Bank of America and MB Financial Bank, and that he was entering into

settlement negotiations with the banks on the Dimases' behalf, were false, because at no

time did Respondent deposit the funds he received from the Dimases into accounts with

these banks, nor did he engage in any settlement negotiations with the banks on the

Dimases' behalf.

35


110. At the time Respondent made statements to the Dimases that he would

deposit money in accounts with Bank of America and MB Financial Bank, and that he was

entering into settlement negotiations with the banks on the Dimases' behalf, Respondent

knew that his statements to the Dimases were false, because Respondent knew that he was

not going to deposit money in accounts with these banks. Respondent also knew that [he]

had no intention of entering into settlement negotiations with these banks on the Dimases'

behalf.


111. Between 2012 and 2013, Respondent requested and received $111,500 in

cash from the Dimases, which the Dimases paid to the Respondent over the course of 16

installments.


112. Additionally, between October 29, 2012 and February 1, 2013, Respondent

received from the Dimases' Republic Bank cashier's checks numbered 140005258,

140005512 and 140005606, each of which had been made payable to Respondent in the

amounts of $5,000, $5,000 and $6,000, respectively. Check numbers 140005258,

140005512 and 140005606 represented some of the funds Respondent agreed to deposit

with Bank of America to help the Dimases in refinancing their property.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that between October 29, 2012 and February 1.

2013, Respondent received from the Dimases' Republic Bank cashier's checks numbered

140005258, 140005512 and 140005606, each of which had been made payable to

36

Respondent in the amounts of $5,000, $5,000 and $6,000, respectively. Respondent denies

any and all other allegations contained in paragraph 112.

113. Between October 30, 2012 and February 1, 2013, Respondent deposited

cashier's checks numbered 140005258, 140005512 and 140005606, into an account

ending in the four digits "3095" at BMO Harris Bank. That account was entitled "Milena

Durie" checking account and was used by Respondent for business and personal purposes,

and was not a separate, identifiable client trust account (At that time, Milena was

Respondent's wife.)

ANSWER: Respondent admits that BMO Harris Bank account ending in the four

digits "3095" was entitled "Milena Durie," and that it was not a trust account. Respondent

admits that Milena Durie was and is his wife. Respondent denies any and all other


114. On February 1, 2013, prior to any distribution of funds to or on behalf of the

Dimases, the balance in the BMO Harris Bank account number ending in "3905" fell to

$695.60, as Respondent had drawn funds from the account in payment of his business and

personal obligations.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that bank records produced by the Administrator

in this matter indicate that the balance in BMO Harris account number ending in "3905"

was $695.60 as of February 1, 2013. Respondent denies any and all other allegations

contained in paragraph 114.

115. As of February 1, 2013, Respondent used for his own business and personal

obligations at least $15,304.40 of the funds he had received from the Dimases.


37

116. At no time did the Dimases, or anyone on their behalf, authorize Respondent

to use any portion of those funds for Respondent's own business or personal purposes.


117. Between April 1 and April 16, 2013, Respondent received from the Oimases'

Republic Bank cashier's check numbered 140005814 and 140005859, each made payable

to Respondent in the amount of $6,000. Checks numbered 140005814 and 140005859

represented some of the funds Respondent agreed to deposit with Bank of America to help

the Dimases in refinancing their property.



paragraph 117.

118. Between April 1 and April 18, 2013, Respondent deposited check numbers

140005814 and 140005859, into an account ending in the four digits "7007" at Standard

Bank and Trust Company. That account was entitled "Nikola Durie, OBA Nikola Durie

Attorney At Law Business Checking account" and was used by Respondent for business and

personal purposes. It was not a separate, identifiable client trust account.


119. On May 3, 2013, prior to any distribution of funds to or on behalf of the

Dimases, the balance in Respondent's account number ending in "7007" was overdrawn by

-$2,924.73, as Respondent drew funds from the account in payment of his business and


ANSWER: Respondent admits that on May 3, 2013, the balance in account

number ending in "7007" was overdrawn by $2,924.73, and that he drew funds from the

38

account in payment of his business and personal obligations. Respondent denies any and

all other allegations contained in paragraph 119.

120. As of May 3, 2013, Respondent used for his own business and personal

obligations at least $12,000 of the funds he received from the Dimases.



to use any portion of the funds for Respondent's own business or personal use.


122. On or about May 24, 2014, Respondent received from the Dimases Republic

Bank cashier's checks numbered 140006966 and 140006967, both of which had been

made payable to Respondent in the amounts of $5,000 and $2,816.91, respectively. Checks

numbered 140006966 and 140006967 represented some of the escrow funds Respondent

agreed to deposit with Bank of America to help the Dimases in refinancing their property.



paragraph 122.

123. On or about May 24, 2014, Respondent received from the Dimases JPMorgan

Chase Bank cashier's checks numbered 9249627157 and 9249627158, both of which had

been made payable to Respondent in the amount of $5,000. Checks 9249627157 and

9249627158 represented some of the funds Respondent agreed to deposit with Bank of

America to help the Dimases in refinancing their property.

39



paragraph 123.

124. On May 27, 2014, Respondent deposited cashier's checks 140006966,

140006967, 9249627157 and 9249627158 into an account ending in the four digits "3343"

at Centrust Bank. That account was entitled "Nicholas M. Durie, Attorney at Law, Business

Checking" and was used by Respondent for business and personal purposes, and was not a

separate, identifiable client trust account.


125. On August 25, 2014, prior to any distribution of funds to or on behalf of the

Dimases, the balance in Respondent's account number ending in "3343" fell to $60.70 as

Respondent drew funds from the account in payment of his business and personal

obligations.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that on August 25, 2014, the balance in account

number ending in "3343" was $60.70, and that he drew funds from the account in payment

of his business and personal obligations. Respondent denies any and all other allegations


126. As of August 25, 2014, Respondent used for his own business and personal

obligations at least $17,756.21 of the funds he received from the Dimases.



to use any portion of the funds for Respondent's own business or personal use.


40

128. Respondent's use of the funds identified in paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, above,

constitutes conversion of funds tendered by his clients.




129. Between 2012 and 2015, the Dimases frequently asked for proof of receipts

or account balances regarding the funds Respondent claimed to have been delivering to the

Dimases' banks. Respondent said he would give the Dimases the proof they requested at a

later time, but never did so.


130. Respondent's statement to the Dimases that he would provide the Dimases

proof of receipts or account balances was false, because Respondent never planned to

provide proof of payment to the Dimases. Nor did Respondent ever provide proof to the

Dimases, because no such proof existed since Respondent did not deposit the Dimases'

funds to the banks.


131. Respondent knew his statement to the Dimases, that he would provide the

Dimases proof at a later time of receipts or account balances, was false because Respondent

knew that he never planned to provide proof of payment to the Dimases. Nor did he

provide proof, because Respondent knew that no such proof existed, since Respondent

knew that he did not deposit the Dimases' funds with the banks.


41

132. On August 21, 2014, the Honorable Alfred Swanson entered an order in case

number 2008 CH 38066 approving the sheriffs sale of the Dimases' restaurant property in

Lincolnwood.


133. In the summer of 2015, a third-party purchaser bought the Dimases' former

restaurant property.

ANSWER: The allegations contained in paragraph 133 are not sufficiently clear

for Respondent to formulate an answer, and he therefore neither admits nor denies them.

134. Prior to Respondent's termination, Respondent never sent the Dimases a

billing statement


135. After Respondent's termination, in September and October 2015,

Respondent sent the Dimases three billing statements asking to for [sic] them to pay him a

total of $335,000 in purported attorney's fees. The billing statements were not detailed and

did not explain what work, if any, Respondent claimed to have done for the Dimases.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that he sent billing statements to the Dimases in

September and October 2015 showing an amount due of $335,000. Respondent denies any

and all remaining allegations contained in paragraph 135.



a. failure to hold property (the Dimases funds) of clients or third persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property, by depositing the Dimases funds in to his own accounts, withdrawing these funds and

42

b.

ANSWER:

then drawing the balance in his business checking account below the amount he received in connection with the representation of the Dimases, thereby converting that property to his own use, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, by conduct including knowingly misrepresenting to the Dimases that he was going to provide receipts or account balances at a later time, and knowingly using client or third party funds without authorization for his own business or personal purposes, and thereby converting that property to his own use, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

The allegations contained in paragraph 136 are not factual, but rather



COUNTX [Alleged conversion o/$125,000 in escrow funds in the Lucita Zamoras matter)

137. In or about September 2014, Lucita Zamoras ("Zamoras") entered into a real

estate contract to purchase the Dimases' restaurant property. Respondent, Zamoras and

the Dimases agreed that Respondent would represent both Zamoras and the Dimases in

matters related to the sale, and that Respondent would hold $125,000 in earnest money as

escrowee for the mutual benefit of the parties.


paragraph 137. Further answering, Respondent admits that he agreed to hold $125,000 in

earnest money as escrowee. Respondent denies any and all other allegations contained in

paragraph 137.

43

138. Between October 8 and December 10, 2014, Respondent received two checks

from Zamoras, check numbers 2036 and 104, both of which had been drawn on an account

at U.S. Bank and were made payable to Respondent, each in the amount of $25,000. The

proceeds of check numbers 2036 and 104 represented partial payment towards the

$125,000 in escrow funds that Zamoras had agreed to remit to Respondent in connection

with the agreement to purchase the restaurant


139. Between October 8, 2014 and December 10, 2014, Respondent deposited

check numbers 2036 and 104 into an account ending in "3343" at Centrust Bank. That

account was entitled "Nicholas M. Durie, Attorney at Law, Business Checking" and was used

by Respondent for business and personal purposes, and was not a separate, identifiable

client trust account.


140. On or about May 4, 2015, Respondent received from Zamoras U.S. Bank

account check number 1053, which had been made payable to Respondent in the amount

of $75,000. The proceeds of check number 1053 represented the final payment towards the

$125,000 in escrow funds Zamoras had agreed to remit in connection with the agreement

to purchase the restaurant.


141. On or about May 5, 2015, Respondent deposited check number 1053 into an

account ending in the four digits "2787" at JPMorgan Chase Bank. That account was entitled

"Nikola Durie" and was used by Respondent for business and personal purposes, and was

not a separate identifiable client trust account.

44


142. On June 5, 2015, Respondent had drawn from his account number ending in

"3343" and reduced the balance to below the $50,000 that Respondent had agreed to hold

as escrowee for the mutual benefit of the parties.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that as of June 5, 2015, his Centrust account

number ending in "3343" was overdrawn by $25.50. Respondent denies any and all


143. As of June 5, 2015, prior to any distribution of funds to or on behalf of the

Dimases, the balance in Respondent's Centrust account number ending in "3343" was

overdrawn by -$25.50 as Respondent had drawn funds from the account in payment of his

business and personal obligations.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that as of June 5, 2015, his Centrust account

number ending in "3343" was overdrawn by $25.50. Respondent denies any and all


144. On September 24, 2015, prior to any distribution of escrow funds on behalf

of Zamoras or the Dimases, the balance in Respondent's account number ending in "2787"

was overdrawn by -$1423.39, as Respondent had drawn funds from the account in

payment of his business and personal obligations.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that as of September 24, 2015, his account

number ending in "2787" was overdrawn by $1,423.39. Respondent denies any and all


145. As of September 24, 2015, Respondent had used all of the escrow funds he

received from Zamoras, in the amount of $125,000.

45

ANSWER: Respondent admits that as of September 24, 2015, he had used the

funds he had received from Zamoras, in the amount of $125,000. Respondent denies any

and all remaining allegations contained in paragraph 145.

146. At no time did Zamoras, the Dimases, or anyone on their behalf, authorize

Respondent to use any portion of the escrow funds for Respondent's own business or

personal use.


147. Respondent's use of the escrow funds constitutes conversion of those funds.

ANSWER: The allegations contained in paragraph 14 7 are not factual, but rather



148. At the time Respondent converted the escrow funds described above, he

knew he was using the funds he was obligated to hold in escrow.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 148, except

the allegation that he converted any funds, which is a legal conclusion and does not require

an answer. To the extent that an answer to that allegation is required, Respondent denies

that allegation.



a. failure to hold property (the Zamoras / Dimas escrow funds) of clients or third persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation set>arate from the lawyer's own property, by drawing the balance in his business checking account below the amount he received in connection with the representation of Zamoras and the Dimases, thereby

46

converting that property to his own use, in violation of Rule 1.15 (a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

b. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or representation, by knowingly using client or third party funds without authorization for his own business or personal purposes, by drawing the balance in his business checking account below the amount he received in connection with the representation of Zamoras and the Dimases, and thereby converting that property to his own use, in violation of Rule 8.4( c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).




COUNT XI (Alle9ed conversion o/$55,040.41 in escrow funds in the David Friedman matter)

150. In or about August 2015, after Zamoras' unsuccessful attempt to purchase

the Dimases' restaurant property, David Friedman ("Friedman") also entered into a real

estate contract in an attempt to purchase the Dimases' restaurant property in Lincolnwood.

Friedman was represented by attorney Linda Nagle in the proposed transaction. At that

time, Respondent agreed to represent the Dimases in matters related to the sale, and to

hold $125,000 in earnest money as escrowee for the mutual benefit of the parties.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in the first sentence of

paragraph 150. Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the

allegations of the second sentence of paragraph 150. Respondent admits that as of August

2015, he was representing the Dimases in connection with the sale of their restaurant, and

47

that he agreed to hold escrow funds in relation to the sale. Respondent denies any and all

other allegations contained in paragraph 150.

151. On or about August 17, 2015, Respondent received from Friedman's U.S.

Bank account, check number 2040, which had been made payable to Respondent in the

amount of $125,000. The proceeds of check number 2040 represented the $125,000

escrow funds Friedman agreed to remit in connection with the agreement to purchase the

Lincolnwood restaurant


152. On August 18, 2015, Respondent deposited check number 2040 into an

account ending in "3343" at Centrust Bank. That account was entitled "Nicholas M. Durie,

Attorney at Law, Business Checking" and was used by Respondent for business and

personal purposes, and was not a separate, identifiable client trust account


153. On May 27, 2016, prior to any distribution of escrow funds to or on behalf of

the Dimases, the balance in Respondent's account number ending in "3343" fell to

$69,959.59, as Respondent drew funds on the account in payment of his business and


ANSWER: Respondent admits that on May 27, 2016, the balance in his account

ending in "3343" was $69,959.59. Respondent denies any and all other allegations


154. As of May 27, 2016, Respondent used for his own business and personal

obligations at least $55,040.41 of the escrow funds.

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ANSWER: Respondent admits that as of May 27, 2016, he had used $55,040.41 in

funds derived from David Friedman's check. Respondent denies any and all other


155. At no time did Friedman, the Dimases, or anyone on their behalf, authorize

Respondent to use any portion of the escrow funds for Respondent's own business or

personal use.


156. Respondent's use of the escrow funds constitutes conversion of those funds.




157. At the time Respondent converted the escrow funds described above, he

knew he was using the funds he was obligated to hold in escrow.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 157, except

the allegation that he converted any funds, which is a legal conclusion and does not require

an answer. To the extent that an answer to that allegation is required, Respondent denies

that allegation.



a. failure to hold property (the Friedman / Dimas escrow funds) of clients or third persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property, by drawing the balance in his business checking account below the amount he received in connection with the representation of Friedman and the Dimases, thereby

49

converting that property to his own use, in violation of Rule 1.lS(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

b. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or representation, by knowingly using client or third party funds without authorization for his own business or personal purposes, by drawing the balance in his business checking account below the amount he received in connection with the representation of the Dimases, and thereby converting that property to her own use, in violation of Rule 8.4( c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).




COUNT XII (Alleged failure to cooperate with an ARDC investigation)

159. On December 28, 2015, the Administrator received a request for

investigation from Christos Dimas and Sophie Dimas ("the Dimases") requesting that the

ARDC conduct an investigation into allegations that Respondent converted client funds that

the Dimases had given Respondent Based upon the information, the Administrator

docketed investigation number 2015IN05483.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 159 not

based on upon his personal knowledge, but upon information and belief.

160. Between December 28, 2015 and February 3, 2017, the Administrator made

at least three requests as part of investigation number 2015IN05483 to Respondent that he

produce his client file related to his representation of the Dimases. During this time,

so

Respondent did not give the Administrator the client file or any documents related to

investigation number 20151N05483.


Further answering, Respondent states that he was locating and assembling documents

responsive to the Administrator's requests during that time, and that he produced those

documents through his counsel on March 21and22, 2017.

161. On February 3, 2017, the Administrator issued a subpoena that required

Respondent's appearance for a sworn statement and the production of documents at the

Chicago office of the Commission on March 8, 2017, regarding the Dimases' allegations.

Shortly thereafter, Respondent's counsel accepted service of the subpoena by mail.


162. On March 2, 2017, Respondent's counsel contacted counsel for the

Administrator and requested to continue the March 8, 2017 return date on the subpoena.

At that time, counsel for the Administrator agreed to reset Respondent's subpoena to the

date of March 23, 2017.


163. On March 3, 2017, counsel for the Administrator mailed a letter to

Respondent's counsel's address that confirmed the continued return date of March 23,

2017. Respondent's counsel received this letter shortly thereafter.


164. On May 21 and May 22, 2017, Respondent's counsel sent documents related

to investigation number 2015INOS483 to counsel for the Administrator.

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Further answering, Respondent states that the materials were sent on March 21 and March

22, 2017.

165. Also on May 22, 2017, the day before the continued return date for

Respondent's appearance for a sworn statement, Respondent's counsel contacted counsel

for the Administrator and requested, for a second time, to continue the return date on the

subpoena. Respondent's counsel also provided a doctor's note on Respondent's behalf. In

that correspondence, Respondent's doctor stated that Respondent was fatigued and

experiencing dizziness.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in the first and second

sentences of paragraph 165. Respondent admits the allegations contained in the third

sentence of paragraph 165, but further answering, Respondent denies that those

allegations contain a complete description of the contents of the letter he provided to the

Administrator.

166. Respondent's appearance has never been rescheduled for a date after March

23, 2017, nor has it been waived or excused.


Further answering, Respondent states that the Administrator did not reschedule the sworn

statement, despite Respondent's request.



a. failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority, by not responding to the Administrator's multiple requests for production of the

52

ANSWER:

client file, as well as for failing to appear on March 8, 2017 and March 23, 2017, pursuant to the Administrator's subpoena, requesting Respondent's appearance for a sworn statement, in violation of Rule 8.l(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

The allegations contained in paragraph 167 are not factual, but rather



COUNT XIII (Allegedly violating Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 by filing allegedly frivolous bankruptcy petitions in the matters of In re EHC, LLC and Jn re L]BV, Ltd. allegedly to delay

judgment from a creditor)

168. On June 22, 2015, attorneys representing 36 Holdings LLC ("36 Holdings")

filed a foreclosure case alleging that EHC, LLC ("EHC"), LJBV, Ltd. ("LJBV"), Robert Voegel

and Marlene Voegel had signed a promissory note on April 15, 2010 and owed at least

$4,785,000 to 36 Holdings in past-due mortgage payments regarding four non-residential

properties. That matter was entitled 36 Holdings, LLC. v. EHC, LLC., et al., docket number

2015-CH-09675 (Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division).


paragraph 168 through and including the phrase "$4,785,000 due to 36 Holdings.''

Respondent denies the remaining allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph

168, and, further answering, states that 36 Holdings was not the original lender on the

promissory note, and that the Voegels and their business entities did not owe $4,785,000 in

past due payments, but rather that 36 Holdings had accelerated the debt. Respondent

admits the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph 168.

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169. On June 26, 2015, 36 Holdings filed a motion requesting that since the

defendants were in default and owed past-due mortgage payments, the court appoint a

receiver in the case to take control and possession of the relevant properties. 36 Holdings

scheduled a hearing on that motion for July 28, 2015, which the court later continued the

motion and eventually granted on October 22, 2015.


170. Prior to the court's ruling on 36 Holdings' motion to appoint a receiver,

between September 25, 2015 and October 5, 2015, Respondent filed an appearance on

behalf of defendants Marlene Voegel ("Marlene"), Chicago Trust Company ("Chicago Trust")

and EHC in case number 2015-CH-09675.


171. During that time, Respondent also filed two motions for substitution of judge

in case number 2015-CH-09675 on behalf of Marlene and Chicago Trust, which the court

granted on October 2 and October 8, 2015, respectively.


172. On October 22, 2015, the Honorable Michael Tully entered an order granting

36 Holdings' June 26, 2015 motion and appointing a receiver in the chancery case in case

number 2015-CH-09675.


173. Also on that day, in an effort to delay the chancery case, Respondent filed two

Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions with the United States bankruptcy court on behalf of EHC

and its related entity, LJBV. The matters were docketed as In re EHC, LLC and In re L]BV,

Ltd., case numbers 15 B 35952 and 15 B 35961, respectively.

54

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 173,

except for any and all allegations contained in the words "in an effort to delay the

bankruptcy," which allegations Respondent denies.

17 4. At all times alleged in this complaint, the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy

Procedure 1007 required that debtors file a list of creditors with their bankruptcy petitions.

The Rule also required that debtors sign their petitions and include bankruptcy schedules

and statements of financial affairs in their bankruptcy petitions.

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies paragraph 17 4, and, further

answering, states that the terms of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007 speak for

themselves.

175. When Respondent filed the two Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions on behalf of

EHC and LJBV, he did not disclose that EHC and LJBV were related to each other.

Respondent also did not list either entity's creditors, did not file bankruptcy schedules or

statements of financial affairs for either of the debtors and failed to disclose that the two

debtors were related to each other. Further, Respondent, not the debtors, EHC or LJBV,

signed the petitions.


Further answering, Respondent states that he was awaiting further information from the

Voegels concerning EHC's and LJBV's affairs, and that he intended to amend the petitions

when he received that information. Further answering, Respondent states that his omission

of a statement of the relation between EHC and LJBV was not intentional.

176. At all times alleged in this complaint, 11 U.S.C., section 1112(b ), of the

bankruptcy code provided that:

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"if the debtor's only purpose for filing the case is to delay (or defeat) a single judgment creditor, and the case has little or no ability to benefit the creditor body as a whole, the debtor has not filed the Chapter 11 in good faith."


177. At all times alleged in this complaint, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure

Rule 9011 provided in part:

(b) Representations to the Court.

By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation ...

(c) Sanctions.

(l)(A) if warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies paragraph 177, and, further

answering, states that the terms of Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

speak for themselves.

178. At all times alleged in this complaint, the United States Bankruptcy Court,

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Administrative Order 15-07 stated that:

"if a case is related ... to a case previously pending under Chapter 11 or any presently pending case, it shall be assigned to the judge of the previously assigned case."

56

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies paragraph 178, and, further

answering, states that the terms of Administrative Order 15-07 speak for themselves.

179. Respondent violated Rule 1007 by not listing EHC's or LJBV's creditors and

by not filing bankruptcy schedules or statements of financial affairs when he filed the two

Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions under case numbers 15 B 35952 and 15 B 35961. Further,

Respondent signed the petitions, not the debtors, EHC and LJBV.

ANSWER: The allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 179 are

not factual, but rather state legal conclusions. Therefore, no answer is required. To the

extent an answer is deemed required, Respondent denies the allegations contained in the

first sentence of paragraph 179. Respondent admits the allegation that he signed the

petitions, and he denies all remaining allegations contained in paragraph 179.

180. Respondent also violated Administrative Order 15-07 when he did not

disclose on the petitions that the debtors, EHC and LJBV, were affiliated with each other.




181. At no time during the pendency of case numbers 15 B 35952 and 15 B 35961

did Respondent amend the bankruptcy petitions to include the items he omitted, or file

motions seeking additional time within which to do so.


182. Respondent knew that filing the bankruptcy petitions would delay chancery

case number 2015-CH-09675, and he filed those petitions solely to delay that case.

57


183. On November 6, 2015 and November 7, 2015, both the United States Trustee

and 36 Holdings, respectively, filed motions in case number 15 B 35952 to dismiss EHC's

Chapter 11 bankruptcy matter, based on Respondent's filing of the incomplete bankruptcy

petitions with the intent to delay the chancery case. They both scheduled their motions to

be heard on November 17, 2015. Shortly thereafter, Respondent received notice of both

motions to dismiss.


paragraph 183, through and including the word "matter." Respondent neither admits nor

denies the remainder of the first sentence of paragraph 183, as the motions referred to

speak for themselves. Respondent admits the second and third sentences of paragraph 183.

184. On November 17, 2015, a hearing was held regarding the Trustee's and 36

Holdings' motions to dismiss. At the hearing, Respondent argued to the bankruptcy court

that the state court had been wrong to appoint a receiver to the foreclosure case. On

November 25, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered its order granting the motion to dismiss.


paragraph 184. Respondent admits that during the hearing, he referred to the state court's

appointment of a receiver, but he denies that that was all he said. Respondent admits the

allegations contained in the third sentence of paragraph 184.

185. On November 19, 2015, 36 Holdings filed a motion in case number 15 B

35961 to dismiss LJBV's bankruptcy matter because the petition that Respondent filed on

behalf of LJBV was incomplete and was filed to delay the pending chancery case. 36

58

Holdings scheduled the motion for December 17, 2016. Shortly thereafter, Respondent

received a copy of the motion but did not file a response to it.


paragraph 185, through and including the word "matter." Respondent neither admits nor

denies the remainder of the first sentence of paragraph 185, as the motions referred to

speak for themselves. Respondent admits the allegations contained in the second and third


186. November 25, 2015 [sic], as a result of the November 17, 2015 hearing, the

bankruptcy court entered an order granting 36 Holdings' and the Trustee's motions to

dismiss EHC's bankruptcy petition in case number 15 B 35952. In response to

Respondent's argument at the November 17, 2015 hearing, the bankruptcy court noted in

its order that it would not intervene or decide issues regarding the pending chancery case.

Shortly thereafter, Respondent received a copy of the court's November 25, 2015 dismissal

order.


187. Following the dismissal of EHC's bankruptcy petition, 36 Holdings filed a

motion in case number 2015-CH-09675 for approval of the receiver's bond and scheduled

the motion to be heard on December 1, 2015. Shortly thereafter, Respondent received

notice of the motion.


188. On December 1, 2015, a week after EHC's first bankruptcy case was

dismissed, and the day that 36 Holdings' motion for approval of the receiver's bond was set

to be heard, Respondent, with the intent of further delaying the chancery case, filed a

59

second bankruptcy petition for EHC. The matter was docketed as In re EHC, LLC case

number 15 B 40866.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 188 except

for any and all allegations contained in the words "with the intent of further delaying the

chancery case," which allegations Respondent denies.

189. Like EHC's first bankruptcy petition, the second bankruptcy petition

Respondent filed also did not include bankruptcy schedules required by Federal Rule of

Bankruptcy Procedure 1007. Also in EHC's second bankruptcy petition, Respondent

incorrectly listed the related case, EH C's first bankruptcy petition, as 15 B 25952, instead of

the appropriate case number of 15 B 35952, and failed to disclose that EHC's second

bankruptcy petition under case number 15 B 40866 was also affiliated with the pending

LJBV bankruptcy matter. Respondent's listing of incorrect case numbers would have led to

two different judges presiding over both LJBV's bankruptcy case and EHC's second

bankruptcy case, even though the cases were related, which would have been inconsistent

with the requirements of Administrative Order 15-07.


paragraph 189. Further answering, Respondent states that he was awaiting further

information from the Voegels concerning EHC's and LJBV's affairs, and that he intended to

amend the petitions when he received that information. Respondent admits the allegations

contained in the second sentence of paragraph 189, but denies that any of the conduct

described therein was intentional. Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations

contained in the third sentence of paragraph 189, as they are allegations concerning

potential, and not actual, events.

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190. Respondent filed EHC's second bankruptcy petition with the intent to delay

the chancery matter in case number 2015-CH-09675. Respondent knew that filing EHC's

second bankruptcy petition would delay the chancery matter in case number 2015-CH-

09675.


191. Respondent incorrectly listed EHC's first bankruptcy petition case number

and failed to disclose that EHC's second bankruptcy petition was also affiliated with the

pending LJBV bankruptcy matter. Respondent knew that his omissions would have led to

two different judges presiding over both LJBV's bankruptcy case and EHC's second

bankruptcy case, even though the cases were related in violation of United States

Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Administrative Order 15-

07.


192. Respondent failed to include the bankruptcy schedule in the second

bankruptcy petition he filed for EHC in case number 15 B 40866. Respondent knew that

this second filing was also incomplete, like the first petition, because it lacked the same

things that he had omitted from EH C's first bankruptcy petition in case number 15 B 39592.




when he received that information.

61

193. At no time during the pendency of case number 15 B 40866 did Respondent

amend EHC's second bankruptcy petition to include the items he omitted, or file motions

seeking additional time to do so.




when he received that information. Further answering, Respondent states that he was,

contemporaneous with the bankruptcy filings, also working on a sale of property that

would, had it closed, have caused EH C's and LJBV's debt to 36 Holdings to be paid.

194. On December 17, 2015, Respondent was present, and agreed to, the court

setting a hearing date of January 7, 2016 regarding the trustee's motion to dismiss LJBV's

bankruptcy in case number 15 B 35961.

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 194,

except the allegation that he "agreed to" the January 7, 2016 hearing date. Further

answering, Respondent states that he asked that another date be set, because January 7,

2016 was a religious holiday for him. Further answering, Judge Cox denied that request, at

which point Respondent had no option but to accept Judge Cox's scheduling order.

195. On January 7, 2016, a hearing was held regarding the trustee's motion to

dismiss LJBV's bankruptcy matter in case number 15 B 35961, and the bankruptcy court

entered an order on January 22, 2016. In that order, the court dismissed LJBV's bankruptcy

matter in case number 15 B 35961, concluding that Respondent violated 11 U.S.C. Section

1112(b) of the bankruptcy code for filing bankruptcy petitions to delay the chancery case

in case number 2015-CH-09675.

62


paragraph 195.

196. On January 27, 2016, three attorneys filed additional appearances for EHC in

case number 15 B 40866. On February 10, 2016, those attorneys also filed amended

statements and schedules of financial affairs on EHC's behalf.


Further answering, Respondent states that the attorneys who filed their appearances on

January 27, 2016, handled all aspects of case number 15 B 40866 on behalf of EHC from

that date forward, and Respondent took no further action in the case on EH C's behalf.

197. On February 16, 2016, 36 Holdings filed a motion to dismiss EHC's second

bankruptcy petition in case number 15 B 40866. 36 Holdings scheduled the motion to be

heard on February 24, 2016 and gave notice of that hearing date to all of the parties,

including Respondent. The court later continued the motion and ruled on it on April 12,

2016.


198. On April 12, 2016 the court granted 36 Holdings' motion to dismiss EHC's

second bankruptcy petition in case number 15 B 40866. The order also reflected that the

debtor, EHC, was prohibited from filing another bankruptcy petition for 180 days.


199. On April 22, 2016, 36 Holdings filed a motion for sanctions against EHC, LJBV,

Respondent and EHC's additional attorneys in case number case number 15 B 40866,

scheduled the motion to be heard on May 5, 2016, and gave notice of the motion to all

parties, including Respondent.

63


200. On May 5, 2016, a hearing was held regarding the April 22, 2016 motion for

sanctions. On September 7, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting 36

Holdings' motion for sanctions, but only against Respondent, in case number 15 B 40866.

The court then gave 36 Holdings until September 23, 2016 to file a proposed findings [sic]

of fact and conclusions of law, generally stating the facts and conclusions that had occurred

in that bankruptcy proceeding. The court also gave Respondent until October 17, 2016 to

file its [sic] proposed findings of fact.


201. On September 21, 2016, 36 Holdings filed its proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law in case number 15 B 40866. But on October 17, 2016, the day

Respondent's submission was due, Respondent filed a motion for an extension of time to

file the proposed findings but did not provide an explanation for why he was requesting

additional time. Respondent scheduled the motion to be heard on November 3, 2017.

Shortly thereafter, 36 Holdings received a copy of the motion.


paragraph 201. Respondent admits that on October 17, 2016, the date previously set as the

due date for his filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, he filed a motion

for extension of time to file the proposed findings, and that he further requested that a

pretrial conference be set. Respondent denies any and all remaining allegations contained

in the second sentence of paragraph 201. Further answering, he states that the motion for

extension of time contains a clear description of communications he had had with 36

Holdings' counsel concerning a possible settlement of the matter, and a clear statement

64

that he was seeking additional time to hire separate counsel to represent him in the matter.

Respondent admits the allegations contained in the third and fourth sentences of

paragraph 201.

202. As of November 3, 2017, Respondent had not filed a proposed findings [sic]

of fact and conclusions of law in case number 15 B 40866. On that day, the court denied

Respondent's motion for additional time.


203. On January 6, 2017, the bankruptcy court entered an order in case number

15 B 40866 finding that Respondent had violated Rule 9011 by presenting EHC's and

LJBV's bankruptcy petitions to delay the chancery case. The court also ordered that

Respondent pay the attorney's fees and costs that 36 Holdings had incurred as a result of

all three of the bankruptcy cases that Respondent had filed, 15 B 35952, 15 B 35961and15

B 40866. The bankruptcy court then granted 36 Holdings until February 11, 2017 to submit

a petition outlining the fees and costs it incurred in the three bankruptcy matters, and gave

Respondent until March 22, 2017 to respond to 36 Holdings' petition.


204. On January 26, 2017, 36 Holdings filed its petition outlining the fees and

costs it incurred in the bankruptcy matters, but at no time thereafter did Respondent file a

response to the petition.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that on January 26, 2017, 36 Holdings filed a

petition regarding its fees and costs, and that Respondent did not file a written response.

Respondent denies all remaining allegations contained in paragraph 204.

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205. On March 27, 2017, in another attempt to delay, Respondent filed a motion to

disqualify the bankruptcy court for allegedly violating Respondent's religious freedoms

when it set a hearing date in the LJBV, Ltd. bankruptcy case on the Eastern Orthodox

Christian Christmas Day of January 7, 2016. Respondent had not objected to the January 7

date at the time the hearing date was set, nor did he object to it at any time prior to filing

the motion to disqualify.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that on March 27, 2017, he filed a motion seeking

Judge Cox' recusal on the ground of religious freedom with reference to the scheduling of

the January 7, 2016 hearing. Respondent denies any and all remaining allegations


206. On April 21, 2017, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying

Respondent's motion to disqualify, granting EH C's motion for sanctions against Respondent

for filing the bankruptcy petitions to delay the chancery case and sanctioning Respondent

to reimburse 36 Holdings' attorney's fees, pursuant to its January 2017 petition, in the

amount of $125,764.50 plus its expenses in the amount of $3,045.20, for a total of

$128,809.70.


207. As of filing this complaint, Respondent has not complied with the April 21,

2017 court order to reimburse 36 Holdings.

ANSWER: Respondent states that as of the date the instant Complaint was filed,

he had moved for reconsideration of the April 21, 2017 order, and, after that motion was

denied, he had filed an appeal to the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois. Further answering, Respondent states that his pursuit of the motion and appeal

66

were lawful, and that it would not have been appropriate to "compl[y] with the April 21,

2017 order while he was contesting and appealing its terms. Respondent denies any and all




a. bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue therein, without a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law, by conduct including filing frivolous bankruptcy petitions for EHC and LJBV, with the intent to delay 36 Holdings chancery case, where Respondent purposefully omitted EHC's and LJBV's signatures on the bankruptcy petitions, did not disclose on those petitions that EHC and LJBV were affiliated with each other, did not file bankruptcy schedules or statements of financial affairs along with the petitions before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District, Eastern Division, thus leading the bankruptcy court to dismiss the petitions, in violation of Rule 3.1 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

b. using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, by conduct including filing frivolous bankruptcy petitions for EHC and LJBV, with the intent to delay 36 Holdings chancery case, where Respondent purposefully omitted EHC's and LJBV's signatures on the bankruptcy petitions, did not disclose on those petitions that EHC and LJBV were affiliated with each other, did not file bankruptcy schedules or statements of financial affairs along with the petitions before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District, Eastern Division, thus leading the bankruptcy court to dismiss the petitions, in violation of Rule 4.4(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and

67

c. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, by conduct including filing frivolous bankruptcy petitions for EHC and LJBV, with the intent to delay 36 Holdings chancery case, where Respondent purposefully omitted EHC's and LJBV's signatures on the bankruptcy petitions, did not disclose on those petitions that EHC and LJBV were affiliated with each other, did not file bankruptcy schedules or statements of financial affairs along with the petitions before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District, Eastern Division, thus leading the bankruptcy court to dismiss the petitions, thus leading the bankruptcy court to dismiss the petitions, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).




RESPONDENT'S DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO COMMISSION RULE 231

1. Respondent is admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois. He is also

admitted to the General and Trial Bars for the District Court for the Northern District of

lllinois.

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2. Respondent holds no other professional licenses other than his license to

practice law.

James A. Doppke, Jr. Robinson Law Group, LLC 321 S. Plymouth Ct., 14th Floor

Chicago, IL 60604

(312) 676-9878 [email protected]

Respectfully submitted, Nikola Durie, Respondent

BY: James A. Doppke, Jr. One of his attorneys

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nikola duric, respondent, by his attorney, james a. … the matter of: nikola duric, before the...

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