nietzsche and eschatology

Nietzsche and EschatologyAuthor(s): Harry J. AusmusReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1978), pp. 347-364Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1201470 .Accessed: 28/11/2011 11:24

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Nietzsche and Eschatology

Harry J. Ausmus / Southern Connecticut

State College

In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche held that in dealing with any philosopher one should first raise the question: "What morality do they (or does he) aim at?"1 If this question were directed to Nietzsche's own philosophy, one would discover that it too "contains a hidden philosophical mythology," which "conceals a philosophy" where "every opinion is also a lurking-place, every word is also a mask."2 That Nietzsche's philosophy hides a disguised form of Joachimite theology of history may have been intuited by many, but it has only been suggested by few and fully evaluated by none.3 Such is the purpose of this essay, and its aim will be to show that Nietzsche's philosophy is a secularized Joachimite eschatology. In this regard, I am not suggesting that Nietzsche's philosophy can be equated with Joachim's, that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two. Rather, I would recom-

'Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 12:11. In order to facilitate footnoting, the following codes for the Levy edition of Nietzsche's work will be utilized: Thoughts out of Season (TS); The Dawn of Day (DD); The Joyful Wisdom (JW); Beyond Good and Evil (BG); The Genealogy of Morals (GM); Human, All-Too Human, vol. 1 (HAH 1); Human, All-Too Human, vol. 2 (HAH 2); The Will to Power (WP); The Anti-Christ (AC); Ecce Homo (EH); and Twilight of the Idols (TD). In addition, the following translations were used: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) (TP); Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1966) (SZ); Friedrich Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as Educator (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965) (SE); and Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1957) (UA).

2 HAH 2:192; see also BG, pp. 10-11, 258. Martin Heidegger has suggested a similar notion about Nietzsche's philosophy: "Univocal rejection of all philosophy is an attitude which always deserves respect, for it contains more of philosophy than it realizes" (see his essay, "Nietzsche as Metaphysician," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Solomon [Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973], p. 113).

3There have been several important books written on Nietzsche's philosophy in the past thirty years. Among the more important studies are F. A. Lea, The Tragic Philosopher: A Study of Friedrich Nietzsche (London: Methuen & Co., 1957); Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche:

? 1978 by The University of Chicago. 0022-4189/78/5804-0001$01.51

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The Journal of Religion

mend that there is essentially a similar structure in their respective philosophies and that Nietzsche's philosophy of history demonstrates, in fundamental agreement with the view expressed by Norman Cohn and Karl L6with, the ongoing tradition of Joachimism, the doctrine of eternal recurrence notwithstanding.4

Throughout the course of his life, Nietzsche was concerned with the nature of history. This can be witnessed from The Birth of Tragedy, which can readily be viewed as an essay on a historiographical problem, to the Nachlass, where he asserted: "In my own way, I am attempting a justification of history." Similar to both Augustine and Hegel, Nietzsche's view was essentially concerned with the problem of theodicy, with offering a cure for the "disease of history."5 And, in fundamental

Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (New York: Vintage Books, 1968); Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965). Of these, none mention the possible relationship between Nietzsche's philosophy and Joachim's. Kaufmann dealt with Nietzsche's view of history but only in the context of Nietzsche's Use and Abuse of History (see pp. 141-52). Danto, who rather immodestly subtitled his book "An Original Study," nowhere mentions the possibility of Nietzsche's "system" being based on historiosophy rather than philosophy per se, despite the fact that Danto has some expertise in philosophy of history. Furthermore, Danto rather confidently wrote: "I should not be dismayed ... were someone to say that any construction [of Nietzsche's philosophy] is misguided.... I should be amazed only were one to find a system diferent from the one I just sketched" (p. 230). If the reader will pardon my immodesty, I think, should Danto read this essay, he would be "amazed." Of those authors who have suggested a relationship between Nietzsche and Joachim, I know of only two: Norman Cohn, in his magnificent study of the impact of Joachimite philosophy, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1961), referred to Nietzsche only in passing and in the same context with Mikail Bakunin (p. 150); Karl Lowith, in his Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), is keenly aware of the relationship, but his evidence is not as substantial as it could be (see pp. 214-22). This essay, therefore, is in effect an extended footnote to L6with's suggestion, but with greater clarification and substantiation. However, as will be seen, I do not agree with Lowith's interpretation of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence. I am in fundamental agreement with Kauf- mann's assessment of Ldwith's book (Nietzsches Philosophie der Ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen) that his view is "untenable" (see Kaufmann, p. 319n).

"I maintain this despite Henry David Aiken's view: "Nor, as a naturalist who acknowl- edged the reality of this world as final and absolute, could he [Nietzsche] accept any form of Christian eschatology" ("An Introduction to Zarathustra," in Solomon, p. 129). Paul Tillich is much closer to an understanding of Nietzsche than Aiken: "If he [Nietzsche] calls this age 'decadent,' this implies a definite interpretation of history, in which his own appearance-the appearance of 'Zarathustra' before the 'great midday'-has a definite place. This sense of having a prophetic mandate, of standing at the most crucial moment of history, cannot be left out of the picture." Thus Tillich concluded: "It is in the light of this 'eschatological consciousness' that we must understand Nietzsche's attack on bourgeois society" ("Nietzsche and the Bourgeois Spirit," Journal of the History of ldeas 6 [June 1945]: 307-8).

n As Nietzsche wrote, "I leave those doubting ones to time, which brings all things to light; and turn at last to that great company of hope, to tell them the way and the course of their salvation, their rescue from the disease of history, and their own history as well, in a parable whereby they may again become healthy enough to study history anew ...." (UA, p. 71; cf. also UA, p. 70; TP, p. 527).

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agreement with both Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche maintained that

"history must solve the problem of history. . . ." Not surprisingly, therefore, in Human-All-Too-Human, he concluded that "historical philosophizing is henceforth necessary

... ."

The method by which Nietzsche sought to accomplish this task was through what he called "critical history." The duty of this kind of history is to "bring the past to the bar of judgment, interrogate it remorselessly, and finally condemn it. Every past is worth condemning ... ." This, in short, is a prophetic stance, which Walter Kaufmann noted without relating it to Nietzsche's understanding of history.6 Indeed, it is his view of history that marks Nietzsche's radical break with all his precursors. Whereas, with Augustine, Heilsgeschichte was concomitant with but not identical with the historical process, and whereas, with Hegel and Marx, Heilsgeschichte was equated with the historical process, Nietzsche rejected both views and offered a new interpretation and a new division of the sacred and the profane. For him, the profane was in the past and present which deserve condemnation, while the sacred would only be found in the future. Eschatology is therefore not merely the ultimate end of Heilsgeschichte, but eschatology and Heilsgeschichte are identical--"sacred history" is in the future, not in the present or the past. It is in this context that Nietzsche can claim that a "lack of the historical [prophetic] sense is the hereditary fault of all philosophers. .. ."7

The manner in which Nietzsche delineated this view of history was

through an adaptation of Joachim of Flora's approach to history. That Nietzsche nowhere refers to Joachim is no argument against this interpretation, for Joachim's triadic, eschatological, and historico- pantheistic view permeated much of nineteenth-century thought.8 But

6As Kaufmann wrote, "... one may feel inclined to consider Nietzsche a prophet in the true sense." By a genuine prophet Kaufmann meant one in the tradition of Hosea and Jeremiah. Accordingly, he concluded: "It is in this sense that one can compare Nietzsche with the ancient prophets" (pp. 98-99). Further, as Lea maintained, "this is what constitutes his [Nietzsche's] unique distinction. In no other philosopher is mysticism of so high an order combined with absolute scepticism" (p. 168).

7 HAH 1:15. Strong has also suggested with qualification the significance of eschatology for Nietzsche's thought: "From his writing, he [Nietzsche] remains concerned with questions of an ultimate and almost eschatological nature

... " (p. ix; italics added). However, Strong neither recognized the similarity of Nietzsche's thought to Joachim's nor did he seriously consider the three-stage view of history developed below.

8As Frank Manuel wrote, "By the nineteenth century the triadic historical formula is so commonplace that one need not look for specific Joachimite influence" (Shapes of Philosophi- cal History [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967], p. 44; italics added); cf. also my article, "Schelling on History: 1841," Connecticut Review (Spring 1973), pp. 16-24; L6with's appendix in Meaning in History, entitled "Modern Transfigurations of Joachim- ism," pp. 208-13; and Michael Murray, Modern Philosophy of History: Its Origin and Destination (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 89-126.

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more significantly, Nietzsche does refer to and highly praises the

Emperor Frederick II, who was believed by some to be the Antichrist and by others to be the Joachimite novus dux. For example, in his

autobiography, Nietzsche wrote: "... I also shall found a city some day, as a memento of an atheist and genuine enemy of the Church, a person very closely related to me, the great Hohenstaufen, the Emperor Frederick II" (EH, p. 103). Again, in The Anti-Christ, he referred to Frederick as "that great free spirit, that genius among German Em- perors ... " In The Genealogy of Morals, he considered Frederick II to be even more significant than Frederick the Great.9 And in Beyond Good and Evil, Frederick II was lauded as the first of the great Europeans "according to my taste... " It is little wonder therefore that Nietzsche could identify with another Joachimite novus dux, Christopher Colum- bus: "... not for nothing have I lived for years in the city of Colum-

bus."'1 To maintain that these references are essentially mythological disguises of Nietzsche's own philosophy is not inconsistent with what he himself wrote: "There is a point in every philosophy at which the 'conviction' of the philosopher appears on the scene ... ."

A second and more basic similarity between Joachim and Nietzsche is that they both share a three-stage view of history." Identifying the Trinity with the actual historical process, Joachim divided history into three stages: the age of the Father, the age of the Son, and the age of the Holy Ghost. The first age roughly coincided with the Old Testament

period of history up to the time of Zechariah, the father of John the

Baptist. The second age covered the New Testament period, the Middle

Ages, and Joachim's own day. Calculating on the basis of forty-two generations from the time of Adam to the time of Zechariah, Joachim predicted that the third age would begin around 1260. Immediately prior to the third age would be a transitional period characterized by decline, decadence, and disintegration, by the rise of the Antichrist, and by the coming of the novus dux, whose purpose was to renovate society and religion in preparation for the coming of the age of the Holy Ghost.

9As Nietzsche put it: "... that much greater Frederick, the Hohenstaufen, Frederick II" (GM, p. 218).

"oChristopher Middleton, ed. and trans., Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 220, also p. 175; cf. also TP, p. 503; DD, p. 395.

"Concerning Joachim's philosophy, there are several excellent sources in English. Already mentioned are the works of Cohn and L6with. In addition, cf. Marjorie Reeves, Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1969); Delno C. West, ed., Joachim of Fiore in Christian Thought, 2 vols. (New York: Franklin & Co., 1975). For an extensive interpretation of the life of Frederick II, including his relationship to Joachimism, see Ernst Kantorowicz, Frederick the Second, 1194-1250, trans. E. O. Lorimer (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1931).

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Nietzsche and Eschatology This age would be an era of plenitudo intellectus, in which people will no

longer "look through a glass darkly," an age of monks and nuns bound

together, not by institutions, but by Christian love. The Law of the Old Testament, and the Gospel of the New, would be superceded by a New Eternal Gospel, an unwritten gospel on the hearts of everyone. In other words, Augustinian eschatology was transformed into a view of social utopia, in which history itself will bring salvation.12

Although Nietzsche's language is different, he too believed in a

three-stage view of history, consisting of the premoral, moral, and ultramoral ages.13 As he wrote in Beyond Good and Evil:

Throughout the longest period of human history-one calls it the prehistoric period -the value or non-value of an action was inferred from its consequences; the action in itself was not taken into consideration, any more than its origin. ... Let us call this period the pre-moral period of mankind; the imperative, "know thyself!" was then still unknown. In the last ten thousand years ... [there has arisen] .. a period which may be designated in the narrower sense as the moral one: the first attempt at self-knowledge is thereby made .... the origin of an action was interpreted in the most definite sense possible, as origin out of an intention.... Is it not possible, however, that the necessity may now have arisen of again making up our minds with regard to the reversing and fundamental shifting of values, owing to a new self-consciousness and acuteness in man-is it not possible that we may be standing on the threshold of a period which to begin with, would be distinguished negatively as ultra-moral ... ? [BG, p. 46]

Similar to Joachim, the second and the third ages are preceded by transitional periods. But before describing these stages of history, it is important to recall three of Nietzsche's basic presuppositions: his criticism of the real versus the apparent world, his distinction between religion and morality, and his understanding of progress.

With respect to the first, Nietzsche maintained that to posit a world of

12The immediate impact of this view of history was described by Cohn, while the long-range impact upon the philosophy of history specifically was demonstrated by L6with.

13L6with, in Meaning in History (p. 211), attempted to substantiate a relationship between Nietzsche and Joachim by referring only to the three metamorphoses in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," namely, the camel, the lion, and the child, each representing a stage in the Joachimite triadic vision of history. The camel represented the Old Testament age with emphasis upon "Thou shalt"; the lion represented the New Testament age with emphasis upon "I will"; and the child represented the third age of the Holy Spirit with emphasis upon "I am." While I can agree with L6with's comparisons, I can do so only after having discovered the greater amount of evidence as presented in this essay. Moreover, as already suggested and as will be demonstrated, L6with seemed to have missed entirely the significance of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence in the light of a third-age concept.

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appearance versus a world of the "beyond" has been one of the most fundamental lies of human history. That there is a consensus sapientium regarding this distinction, as Schopenhauer would hold, does not prove its validity.14 Such a distinction is derived from the desire to explain suffering and is the result of faulty reasoning: "This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;-this world is conditional: consequently there is an unconditional world;-this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;-this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being ... " (TP, pp. 310-11). This interpretation erroneously assumes that if concept A exists, then its opposite concept B must also exist. And, yet, this world of the "beyond," this world of x, has been used to criticize the "known world." This approach, according to Nietzsche, is the result of sickness, degeneracy, decadence, and even bad digestion. Consequently, he declared war on such a view: "there is only one world, and this is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning-A world thus constituted is the real world." But to abolish the world of beyond, the "true" and the "real" world, is also to abolish the world of appearance. In so doing, it is necessary to construct for mankind a new goal, a new purpose, a new aim. This is the task of Nietzsche's vision of history, which requires a clarification of his position on religion and morality.

Although Nietzsche is rather unsystematic in his usage of the word

"religion," he clearly distinguishes it from morality: "Religion, per se, has

nothing to do with morality ...""15 In fact, religion has been duped by

morality, which must be annihilated because it is "the life-denying instinct." The problem with morality is its implicit immorality, its will to power. According to Nietzsche, morality is only one of the many interpretations of life-there are no intrinsically moral phenomena.16 Therefore, to impose, arbitrarily, a morality upon life is to stand beyond good and evil themselves, to take a position of power, in short, to be "immoral." In this regard, Nietzsche was the first to discover that the word "good" originally referred to the "powerful," the masters.17 Because of their resentment of the masters, the "herd" perverted the

14TD, p. 10. For Schopenhauer's understanding of the consensus sapientium, see my article on "Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Language," in the Midwest Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Winter 1977): 170-73.

15WP, p. 127. And as Nietzsche wrote in Genealogy of Morals: ". .. I soon learned to separate theological from moral prejudices .. " (p. 14).

16TP, p. 43; WP, p. 214. Or, as he wrote, ". .. all history is indeed the experimental refutation of the theory of the so-called moral order of things. .. ." (EH, p. 134).

17Cf. Lea, p. 234.

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word into meekness, compassion, and feeling sorry for people.18 Accord-

ingly, morality is the "idiosyncrasy of decadents, actuated by a desire to avenge themselves with success upon life." Nietzsche concluded consequently that morality must be overcome so that the masters can "sit firmly on their thrones once more."

The problem of morality reveals the will to power, which is identical with the will to freedom and which is basic to Nietzsche's understanding of the idea of progress. He, of course, opposed the Darwinian view of

progress as well as the "inevitable" progress expressed by, for example, Condorcet. To argue that external circumstances will necessarily lead to the "good life" is "tantamount to condemning Life. .. ." Nevertheless, Nietzsche believed that progress is possible: "Herein lies buried one of the mightiest ideas that men can have, the idea of a progress of all

progresses.-Let us go forward together a few millenniums, my friend! There is still reserved for mankind a great deal of joy, the very scent of which has not yet been wafted to the men of our day! ... [For it will occur] ... some day, when head and heart have learnt to live as near together as they are now far apart" (HAH2, p. 285). Progress is possible precisely because will to power means growth, accumulation, appropria- tion, domination, increase, becoming more, "the morality of Develop- ment," "greater unities."'9 The primum mobile for progress is the individual ego, and more specifically the collectivized novus dux, which Nietzsche called the Ubermensch, the higher types: "... humanity as a mass sacrificed to the prosperity of the one stronger species of Man- that would be progress." These higher types are like creator gods, creating order out of chaos and sustaining the order. They are the "deviating natures" who will transvaluate all values, a new Renaissance type capable of producing a higher culture, while acting independently of the majority will. That this higher type may not succeed is, of course, a possibility, but not to hope for their success would be, to use Nietzsche's words, contrary to life: "... we all prefer that humanity should perish rather than that knowledge should enter into a stage of retrogression."

"8JW, p. 161. In opposition to the socialists of his day, Nietzsche wrote, "Morality has therefore always taught the most profound hatred and contempt of the fundamental trait of character of all rulers-i.e., their Will to Power. .... If the sufferer and the oppressed man were to lose his belief in his right to condemn the Will to Power, his position would be desperate.... The oppressed man would then perceive that he stands on the same platform with the oppressor, and that he has no individual privilege, nor any higher rank than the latter" (WP, pp. 50-51).

19WP, p. 103; TP, pp. 367-68; Lea, p. 264. As Nietzsche maintained: "... every strengthening and increase of power opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons-this idea permeates my writings" (TP, p. 330). And, in other words: "Folly, rascality increase: that is part of 'progress'" (TP, p. 394). Again: ". . . we must go forward,--that is to say step by step further and further into decadence (-this is my definition of modern 'progress')" (TD, p. 101).

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That Nietzsche believed that there would not be retrogression can be demonstrated by the three-stage view of history which he shares with Joachim. The premoral age, or the stage of the "morality of custom," was characterized by cruelty, sexuality, and intoxication, "the oldest festal joys of mankind

... ." The people of this era lived in constant danger

while believing that punishment purifies and that their gods looked joyously upon suffering and cruelty. Indeed, in contrast to the modern world which wallows in its suffering, this ancient, barbarian, and noble caste "were more complete men," not because of their physical but their psychical power. Thereby, they "established the character of mankind.

..." Because they identified with nature, the first government was not derived from a social contract but rather through "a ghastly tyranny, a

grinding ruthless piece of machinery. .. ." Yet, in the midst of cruelty, suffering, and tyranny, these people knew how to rejoice. It is little wonder, therefore, that some of them were transformed into gods.

Whereas Joachim concentrates mainly on Old Testament society, Nietzsche held that the highest example of this first stage is found in the Homeric and pre-Socratic culture. Homer's great achievement was to have liberated the Greeks from Asian influences. He introduced the "grand style" whereby the Greeks, with their noble tastes, viewed their gods as the most perfect examples of themselves. Consequently, the gods and man were not in opposition to each other, and neither had reason to be ashamed of the other. If a Greek made a mistake, it was not considered a "sin" but the fault of the gods. Similar to that "deeply irreligious" Homer, the Greeks knew that "through art alone misery might be turned into pleasure." They even considered disease a god, thereby contributing to a healthy outlook on life.

Greek culture reached its apex during the time of Demosthenes and with the philosophies of Heraclitus, Democritus, and Protagoras, all of whom reflect a modern attitude. Heraclitus was especially appreciated for having shown that the "apparent" world is the only world. These and other pre-Socratic philosophers, such as the Sophists, were among the great "immoralists" and thus the greatest "realists" known in history because they were aware of the "agonal instinct" within themselves and consequently glorified their own abilities. Indeed, they knew the true meaning of tragedy.20 But the Greeks were always in danger of relapsing into "Asianism," and the Greek polis was too distrustful of the growth of culture. This was displayed in the "decadence" of Socrates and Euripides, who began to teach virtue and the means of achieving it. This led to the decline of Greece. Accordingly, the Greeks should be greatly

20 See explanation by Strong, pp. 154, 161.

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appreciated but not emulated, for "we must surpass even the Greeks!"21 With the death of Socrates, a transition period to the second stage of

history begins. Or, as Nietzsche wrote: "When Nero and Caracalla sat up there, the paradox arose, 'the lowest man is worth more than that man up there!' And the way was prepared for an image of God that was as remote as possible from the image of the most powerful-the god on the cross!" (TP, p. 468). The transition period lasted roughly from the time of Socrates to the third century A.D. During this period, there was only one bright light, Epicurus, who has "lived in all periods, and lives yet

... ." Hebrew-Christian morality, that great transvaluation of all

ancient values, begins to dominate in the era of "bad conscience." This condition, however, is like pregnancy, for without it "man would have remained an animal." 22

The second and moral stage of history, which Joachim called the Age of the Son, is characterized by the increasing dominance of slave morality and consequently, for Nietzsche, by an increase in decadence, degeneration, and decay: "The whole morality of Europe is based upon the values which are useful to the herd .. " The basic cause of this

morality is fear, specifically of those of a noble caste of mind, the masters.23 Indeed, the slaves' resentment against the masters is the source of the ideas concerning good and evil, with the masters being associated with the latter. Priests and ministers have provided the slaves with their ideology, which is expressed in such terms as "the triumph of righteousness," "the last judgment," and "the kingdom of God." Because of its implicit will to power, this ideology is further described in such terms as utility, dialectics, caution, patience, dissimulation, and mimicry. Thus, as Nietzsche would maintain, it is absolutely nonsensical to speak of good and evil, of intrinsic right or wrong, because the most essential and fundamental fact of all history is exploitation.

The historical foundation of slave morality is found in the Hebrew and Christian traditions. Having great praise for the history of Judaism, Nietzsche nevertheless maintained that Christianity was the "rational

21]W, p. 270; WP, p. 357. As Strong has rightly maintained on this point, "no matter how admiring his posture, Nietzsche never advocates 'returning' to the Greeks, nor making modern society over in their image" (p. 136); see also Strong, pp. 29, 34.

22 HAH 1:62; GM, p. 106. Interestingly, even in this frequently quoted metaphor, Nietzsche shows his trust in the idea of progress.

23BG, p. 124. By distinguishing between a master morality and a slave morality, Nietzsche is not attempting, like some Marxists, to set off one group of people against another group. For example, he wrote: "There is a master-morality and a slave- morality;-I would at once add, however, that in all higher and mixed civilizations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation of the two moralities; but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual misunderstanding of them, indeed, sometimes their close

juxtaposition--even in the same man, within one soul" (BG, p. 227).

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outcome" of Hebrew thought, making the individual "the judge of

everything and everyone; megalomania almost became a duty ... ." Both are responsible for the "holy lie" about a monotheistic God, and

Christianity in particular is intent upon "judaizing" the world. Here, a distinction between Christ, on the one hand, and Christianity and the Church, on the other, should be made. The message of Christ was to show people how they ought to live, without resentment, and with freedom and superiority, "not to defend one's self, not to show anger, not to hold anyone responsible. . .."24 This message, however, was

perverted by Paul, "one of the most active destroyers of primitive Christianity," and this perversion was continued by the Church. Con-

sequently, Nietzsche held that there was only one Christian and he died on the cross. He insisted, nevertheless, that genuine Christianity is still possible. But in order to accomplish this, one must also overcome Christ who, like Socrates, finally yielded to life-denying forces and willingly submitted to death: "The two greatest judicial murders in world history are ... concealed suicides."

The major characteristic of the Church and Christianity is that it has kept man on a lower level. Taking root on the degenerating grounds of classical culture after Socrates, Christianity became a monumental

"pseudo-humanity," indeed "a crime against life." Through the medium of the Church, it has produced a morality which is impossible to follow and consequently lapses into that error of thought called "sin" in order to explain this incapacity. Through this notion of sin, Christianity "desires to destroy, break, stupefy, confuse,-only one thing it does not desire, namely, moderation, and therefore it is in the deepest sense barbaric, Asiatic, ignoble and un-Greek."25 The Church has simply promoted the Pauline perversion of the Gospel, and, as a consequence, everything that is called "Christian" today is precisely that which Christ had opposed. Accordingly, Nietzsche held that there should be constant warfare against this "most fatal and seductive lie" called Christianity.

On the other hand, Nietzsche does not totally denigrate the impact of Christianity and the Church. The Church, for example, has been and still is a "nobler institution" than the state. Given Nietzsche's belief that Christianity is "judaizing" the world, he can maintain, rather optimisti- cally, that the "mission of Europe" is being accomplished. More impor-

24AC, pp. 174, 181. As Nietzsche put it in another context, "Jesus said to his Jews: 'The law was for servants;-love God as I love him, and his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals"' (BG, p. 99).

25HAH 1:124. When reading Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity, the proper context should be kept in mind: "For thus it has always been and will ever be: one cannot do a thing a better service than to persecute it and to run it to earth.... This--I have done" (WP, p. 264).

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tant, Christianity is responsible for two significant developments: through its emphasis upon "truth," it called into question Christian morality itself; and by its emphasis upon a "second innocence," "one of the finest inventions of Christianity," a new hope is now possible.26

The overwhelming impact of Christianity, however, has led to decadence, pessimism, and fellow feeling in almost every area of life. Music, especially Wagnerian music, has become decadent. Education, based on Christian morality, gives precedence to the mediocre. Science still presupposes metaphysical beliefs. Philosophy has become so decadent that it can only await a "new order of philosophers," for, since Socrates, it has been dominated by morality to the point that even Kant, not to mention Schopenhauer, is an "underhanded Christian." And democracy and socialism are quite simply secularized forms of Christian morality.27 There is, however, a second tradition in the Western world that gives cause for hope, namely, the Renaissance: "It was the Golden Age of the last thousand years in spite of all its blemishes and vices."28 The Protestant Reformation made some progress, though it generally resulted in the democratizing of the Western world. But with the En- lightenment, with Montaigne, Fontonelle, Voltaire, and even Napoleon, the Western world was once again reunited with the Renaissance and with the "last centuries before Christ. .. ."

The most singular characteristic of the nineteenth century is the death of God, a cataclysmic event which can only result in all falling "into the decay of the modern state," where, as Zarathustra said, "the slow suicide of all is called 'life.' "29 The state becomes the "new idol," the coldest of monsters. As a consequence, Nietzsche maintained that the state has taken over the function formerly held by the Church and "we are still in the glacial stream of the Middle Ages ....",30 This has resulted in the

26 DD, p. 273; cf. also WP, pp. 4-5; BG, p. 3;JW, p. 164. In this context is also significant to note two other equally powerful statements by Nietzsche: "To love mankind for God's sake-this has so far been the noblest and remotest sentiment to which mankind has attained" (BG, p. 79). Again: "What ... has really triumphed over the Christian God? ... the Christian morality itself. . . ."(GM, p. 208).

27 TP, pp. 398, 461; BG, p. 127; GM, p. 88; WP, pp. 274-75; cf. also letter to Peter Gast, October 5, 1879, in Middleton, p. 170.

28 HAH 1:41, 220; letter to Franz Overbeck, October 1882, in Middleton, p. 195; and to Georges Brandes, November 20, 1888, p. 327.

29 SZ, p. 50; and esp. BG, p. 74, where Nietzsche wrote: "Once upon a time men sacrificed human beings to their God. ... Then, during the moral epoch of mankind, they sacrificed to their God the strongest instincts they possessed, their 'nature': .... Finally, what still remained to be sacrificed? ... Was it not necessary to sacrifice God himself... . To sacrifice God for nothingness-this paradoxical mystery of ultimate cruelty has been reserved for the rising generation. ..."

30SE, 40. As Nietzsche maintained: "The world has become skilled at giving new names to things and even baptizing the devil. It is truly an hour of great danger" (UA, p. 62). On this point, Nietzsche was in full agreement with Schopenhauer (see my article,

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"euthanasia of Christianity" in which there are no shepherds and only one herd. The spirit of God, therefore, has been replaced by the spirit of the rabble, and the "decadent type" has triumphed. But this condition will not last long. A superior culture will arise out of the rabble, and it will be accomplished in the same manner that the Renaissance was able to overcome the Middle Ages-through a "great amount of admitted immorality."

The third age, the ultramoral stage of history, is, similar to Joachim's, also preceded by a period of transition, the "intermediary period of nihilism," which is a necessary movement before the "only world" can be deified and called "good." Since history heretofore has had no meaning, the primary task of this transitional period is to introduce meaning into history for the first time. This is the phase of the "modesty of consciousness," in which emphasis upon the body begins to replace the older emphasis upon the soul, in which psychology, morality, nature, social institutions, history, and even God, are purified of the concepts of guilt, sin, and punishment.31 The major requirement for this purification is that the next centuries be centuries of war, a kind of secularized baptism by fire. These events will create the conditions for the dissolution of that covertly nihilistic religion, Christianity. And even socialism, that politicized Christianity which is a reactionary force preventing the coming of the new Renaissance, will wither away. All of this is a necessary phase in "mankind's transit into completely new conditions of existence."

The immediate future, therefore, is bleak. But precisely because we are aware of the impending catastrophe, it can be averted through the efforts of a higher type of man, the Ubermensch. 32 This new man will arise out of those democratic and socialist societies created by the mass man, the "last man."33 The Ubermensch are "free spirits" whose common characteristic is an "extravagant honesty" and who are the "wicked men," the "lords of the earth," who will create a Dionysian, "ecstatic nihilism"

"Schopenhauer's View of History: A Note," History and Theory 15, no. 3 [1976]: 144; and also, "Schopenhauer and Christianity: A Preliminary Investigation," Illinois Quarterly 36, no. 4 [April 1974]: 26-42).

31TP, p. 402; GM, pp. 166, 183; TD, p. 42; DD, p. 19. Speaking of "this period of Nihilism and destruction," Nietzsche wrote: "The value of such a crisis is that it purifies... thus taking the first step towards a new order of rank among forces from the standpoint of health: recognizing commanders as commanders, subordinates as subordinates ... ." (WP, p. 53).

32 HAH 1:229; TP, pp. 471, 504, 537; TD, p. 272. 13 To mention only a few notable sources for this assertion, see AC, pp. 176, 220; HAH

1:4, 40-41; and esp. the following: "A stronger type in which all our powers are synthetically correlated-this constitutes my faith. ... Apparently, everything is decadence. We should so direct this movement of decline that it may provide the strongest with a new form of existence" (TD, p. 260).

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Nietzsche and Eschatology which will bring about this new order of life.34 Having the power of a "Roman Caesar with Christ's soul," these "exceptional men" will convert the suffering and passion of mankind into "sources of joy."35 Like creator gods, they will attempt to humanize the world, to transform institutions into better institutions of higher culture, and to develop a greater knowledge of the "instincts" in order to become more properly adapted to the environment.36 As Nietzsche would say, what is necessary is to transform the belief "it is thus and thus" into the will "it shall become thus and thus." In this manner, the weak nihilism of the present stage of history will be superseded by a new eternal gospel, what Nietzsche called the "Evangel of the Future," creating an entirely "new world" where "everything is innocence

... ."

If one is looking forward to the coming of a new, higher order, whether it be a transcendent heaven or an imminent future age, then not surprisingly Nietzsche, similar to the saints of all higher religions, can denigrate almost everything within the past and present stages of human history (nil admirari). In agreement with Voltaire, there have been a few moments of light in the "spirit" of the Greeks, the Renaissance humanists, and, for Nietzsche, Napoleon. The actual ideas and institutions of these eras were nevertheless inadequate. The third age, however, will set everything in correct perspective, and one will no longer "look through a glass darkly." And the "spirit" of individualism found in these eras will be completed and fulfilled in Nietzsche's third age.

The third age, like Joachim's Age of the Holy Spirit, will complete the transvaluation of all values, by which the individual will arrive at a perfection which could not otherwise be achieved. This age is "beyond good and evil," beyond the "human-all-too-human," the "great noon" of humankind in which there are no shadows, in which a person's words and deeds will be identical because one's character will be one's destiny, without feelings of guilt and sin. Indeed, it will be "our great distant human kingdom, the Zarathustra kingdom of a thousand years." And Nietzsche can say: "We know a new happiness ... "--redemption will have occurred when this new age arrives. In such an age, the state and the Church would either be drastically transformed, or there would

34DD, p. 28; TP, p. 544; WP, pp. 7, 108, 384. Nietzsche himself conceived of establishing such a community of individuals (see Middleton, p. 74;JW, pp. 343, 351, 391). Nietzsche clearly believed himself to be preparing the way for the coming of the Ubermensch (see HAH 1:13, GM, p. 207; TD, p. 270). The obvious religiosity of such a view can be witnessed in TP, pp. 458, 517, 531, 538, and esp. WP, p. 249.

35 TP, p. 513; HAH 2:217. As Nietzsche believed, ". . the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not-or scarcely-out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the super-abundance of power" (BG, p. 228).

36 BG, p. 82; TD, p. 96; TP, p. 329; WP, p. 100; HAH 1:40-41. Interestingly, Nietzsche equates the word "instinct" with the word "faith" (cf. BG, pp. 111-12, 162; GM, p. 123; and also Strong, p. 258).

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actually be no need for them.37 Whatever the status of the state and Church, the inhabitants of this age will be "free spirits," freed, that is, from all beliefs and convictions, similar to the philosophical position of the "critical" historian mentioned above. Just as Joachim predicted that the third age would be an age of plenitudo intellectus, Nietzsche looked forward to that day in which the individual will embody knowledge itself and knowledge will become instinctive, thereby creating the highest culture possible. It will be an age in which all will love each other, in which one will feel unhistorically (i.e., nonneurotically), in which the end of history is no history.38 Accordingly, Nietzsche is not predicting that in the ultramoral stage there will be no morality but only the overcoming of the old morality, for "replacement of morality by the will to our goal" becomes the basis of the new morality. Presumably, this new morality would be similar to the Renaissance emphasis upon virtu", but "free from all moralic acid ... ."

The third age is, furthermore, the age of the resurrected body, with emphasis upon one's diet because the word "soul" is simply another word for the body. "Resurrection" refers not to life after death but rather to entrance into the "true life," in which one comes to respect one's self as one's body. It will be an age of cheerfulness, of laughter, of freedom, which means a realization of one's powers, in which one will follow one's instincts, which is to say, one's own faith. In other words, it will be a "fellowship of joy" where every man and woman will be his or her own adherent, following his or her own categorical imperative.39 Death will be overcome or, as Nietzsche said, it will be "transformed into a means of victory and triumph." Genuine Christianity would thus be established, resulting in a new justice, a new philosophy, a new morality, a new concept of God.40 In short, this age constitutes "the innocence of

7 My uncertainty on this point is due in large part to Nietzsche's own unclearness. In general, it would be safe to assume that he looked forward to the total abolition of both state and Church. For the difficulty, cf. SZ, p. 51; SE, pp. 65-66; HAH 1:37, 349; HAH 2:345; TP, p. 411; and also Strong, pp. 59, 195; Lea, pp. 305-6.

"8In UA, p. 6, Nietzsche wrote: "But in the smallest and greatest happiness there is always one thing that makes it happiness: the power of forgetting, or, in more learned phrase, the capacity of feeling 'unhistorically' throughout its duration." Again, in SZ, p. 280: "In my home and house, nobody shall despair. .. ." Note also SZ, p. 178; WP, p. 146;JW, p. 280; TD, p. 271; BG, p. 98; TP, p. 523; HAH 1:67; HAH 2:337; GM, pp. 93-94.

39JW, p. 268; HAH 1:312; TP, p. 419; Middleton, p. 168. It is in this context that Nietzsche recommended a kind of self-imposed behavioristic technique (see DD, pp. 83, 159, 275, 363; also Strong, p. 274).

40 WP, pp. 133-34, 140, 175-76, 181, 291; HAH 1:127, 150, 217;JW, p. 223; TD, p. 263; WP, pp. 324, 340, 388-89, 512, 534; HAH 1:248; TD, p. 22. Sounding very much like Karl Barth, Nietzsche wrote, "God conceived as an emancipation from morality, taking into himself the whole fullness of life's antitheses and, in a divine torment, redeeming and justifying them: God as beyond and above of the wretched loafers' morality of 'good and evil' " (TP, p. 533); see also Barth's The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 86-87.

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all existence." The movement toward this fulfillment would begin in Europe and eventually spread to the rest of the world: ".. . when Israel shall have changed its eternal vengeance into an eternal benedic- tion of Europe: then that seventh day will once more appear when old Jehovah may rejoice in Himself, in His creation, in His chosen people- and all, all of us, will rejoice with Him!" (DD, pp. 213-14). What was almost totally profane in the previous two ages will be transformed into the totally sacred.

In order to fulfill the apocalyptic prophecy of the coming third age, and in order to be consistent with Joachim's interpretation of history, the archetypes of the prophetic precursor and the Antichrist must be discovered. Both are to be distinguished from the novus dux, a position which Nietzsche reserved for the Obermensch. For example, Joachim considered Saint Benedict as a precursor of the third age because of his emphasis upon asceticism and monasticism, but he was not considered to be the novus dux. Clearly, Nietzsche, as well as Zarathustra, plays this role: "... only after my time could we once more find hope, life-tasks, and roads mapped out that lead to culture--I am the joyful harbinger of this culture." Simultaneously, Nietzsche reserves for himself the role of Antichrist. Writing to Malwide von Meysenbug in 1883, he said: "Do you know a new name for me? The language of the church has one-I am .. . the Anti-Christ." Significantly, one of his major works has the same title. It is not surprising, therefore, when Nietzsche announced that he himself, like "the Crucified," had divided the history of mankind: "... I am afraid that I am shooting the history of mankind into two halves." Although he preferred not to be called a "saint," he nevertheless believed that he represented something "holy" and could consequently begin his autobiography with "On the first day of the year one. .4

..41 By

fulfilling both the roles of Antichrist and precursor, by being "at once a decadent and a beginning," Nietzsche has paved the way for the coming of the collectivized novus dux, the Ubermensch. The one major doctrine which he bequeaths to his progeny is his incomplete but nevertheless significant doctrine of eternal recurrence: "Its place in history ... [is] ... a mid-point."

This is doubtless the most curious and controversial idea to be found in Nietzsche's philosophy, but it can only be understood in light of the third age described above. For example, it is in view of the third age that Nietzsche can remark that this doctrine is "the religion of religions"

41See L6with, p. 211. Although L6with cited this from EH, I was unable to locate it. However, there are numerous other similar passages by Nietzsche (see EH, pp. 131-32; WP, pp. 2, 102; Middleton, p. 132; also L6with, "Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recur- rence,"Journal of the History of Ideas 6 [July 1945]: 284).

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The Journal of Religion which will require many generations before it can become fruitful.42 For this reason Nietzsche could be both ecstatic about the idea and yet could also cautiously recognize only the probabilities of it, referring to it

merely as a "prophecy."43 Indeed, as Nietzsche wrote: "To endure the idea of recurrence one needs: freedom from morality. . ." But freedom from morality can only be found in the ultramoral stage of history. Thus, the doctrine of eternal recurrence has been eschatologized also.

Consequently, it is a misunderstanding of Nietzsche's philosophy to discuss the doctrine of eternal recurrence as compatible with either the Hebrew-Christian linear view or a Greek cyclical view of history. In the third age, neither view is applicable.44 And despite Nietzsche's desire to make it so, it is fruitless to consider this doctrine from a scientific point of view because only the purified and redeemed science of the third age can

adequately deal with the topic.45 Nor is it adequate to assert that the doctrine can be existentialized in any age, for the doctrine can only be existential in the third age.46 Therefore, the doctrine of eternal recurrence can only be understood in connection with his view of soteriology, for, as Nietzsche believed, after this idea starts to prevail "a new history will begin." It is not a doctrine for the present age.

42 TD, pp. 255-56. It should be emphasized here that Nietzsche in no way considered his

understanding of the doctrine of eternal recurrence to be complete and finished. As he wrote: "For the mightiest thought of all many millenniums will be necessary,-long, long, long will it remain puny and weak!" (TD, p. 256; cf. also Rose Pfeffer, "Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's Philosophy," Review of Metaphysics 19, no. 2 [December 1965]: 289n.; also

Strong, p. 289). 43TP, pp. 544-45; TD, p. 253. Hans Vaihinger has suggested the fictional probability of

the doctrine: "Nietzsche has so little against such myths [i.e., Christian myths] that he makes a demand for a 'myth of the future.' . . . As a test of such a future-myth we can interpret the idea of 'eternal recurrence.' True enough, Nietzsche meant this at first as hypothetical, then as dogmatic, but, in the end, he himself appears to have interpreted it merely as a useful fiction. In this sense he says of this idea: 'Perhaps it is not true.' And it is thus possible that O. Ewald (Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen) was right in interpreting this thought as a pedagogical-regulative idea, as G. Simmel also does. The idea of the 'superman,' too, is a heuristic-pedagogical-Utopian fiction of this sort" ("Nietzsche and his Doctrine of Conscious Illusion," in Solomon, p. 103n.); cf. with Kaufmann (n. 3), p. 126n.

44SeeJW, pp. 151-52; Tillich, p. 307; Strong, pp. 265, 267, 276; cf. esp. Ivan Soll, "Reflections on Recurrence: A Re-Examination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, Die Ewige Wider- kehr des Gleichen, in Solomon, pp. 336-37.

45 Thus, L6with missed the eschatological nature of Nietzsche's doctrine when he wrote: "... wherever he [Nietzsche] tries to develop his doctrine rationally it breaks asunder in

two irreconcilable pieces: in a presentation of eternal recurrence as an objective fact, to be demonstrated by physics and mathematics, and in a quite different presentation of it as a subjective hypothesis to be demonstrated by its ethical consequences. It breaks asunder because the will to eternalize the chance fact of the modern ego does not fit into the assertion of the impersonal eternal cycle of the natural world" (L6with, "Nietzsche's Doctrine," pp. 283-84). Both Ivan Soll and Arnold Zuboff miss this point as well (see Solomon, pp. 342 and 357, respectively).

46Thomas J. J. Altizer has attempted one of the better existential interpretations of Nietzsche's doctrine by associating it with the studies of Mircea Eliade. As he concluded, "Finally, Yes-saying and Eternal Recurrence are identical: the deepest affirmation of

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The ecstatic moment in 1881 in which Nietzsche discovered the

significance of the doctrine of eternal recurrence is itself an example of that doctrine. He described it as being "six thousand feet beyond men and time." Because of this experience, he can warn against seeking "distant and unknown states of bliss" since he himself had already had a momentary foretaste of that bliss. To recognize the psychological implications of eternal recurrence is itself "a tremendous moment. .. ." And to strive for such a "moment" is the new goal of each individual because the "redemption of mankind will reach its last act in your- selves.""47 That all will not achieve this redemption, however, is clear: "The history of the future: this thought [eternal recurrence] will tend to

triumph ever more and more, and those who disbelieve it will be forced, according to their nature, ultimately to die out. .... He, alone, who will

regard his existence as capable of eternal recurrence will remain over: but among such as these a state will be possible of which the imagination of no utopist has ever dreamt!" (Explanatory Notes, in AC, p. 253). The doctrine of eternal recurrence will become, to use Joachim's phrase, the "unwritten gospel on the hearts of everyone." Or, in other words, the "kingdom of God" will be within those who achieve this age.48 In the meantime, however, one should live "as if" he would live again-"for in

any case you will live again!" Here, one is reminded not of a Greek

cyclical view of history, which Nietzsche rejected,49 but rather of the words of Jesus: ".... this do, and thou shalt live" (Luke 10:28). To "live" is to live in ecstasy, in a state of consciouslessness, whereby the end of history is not to have history, in which the child of innocence becomes a "self-propelled wheel... .." In this manner, history will have solved the problem of history.

That Nietzsche was in many cases accurate in his criticism of the ecclesiastical concepts of faith and of love can be doubted only by the

existence can only mean the willing of the eternal recurrence of all things, the will of this life, of this moment, of this pain, in such a manner as to will that it recur eternally, and recur eternally the same. We find here no metaphysical cosmology, no Weltanschauung, no idea of eternal recurrence; but rather the deepest existence (Dasein) in the Now, in the Here and There, in the Center that is everywhere" (Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963], p. 189). What Altizer fails to point out is that the "Center" for Nietzsche is eschatological, is in the future. In the present state of history, there is no meaning to history-the meaning is yet to come. Karl Jaspers has provided a similar interpretation, but he seems to be more concerned in bolstering his own philosophy of Existenz rather than in interpreting Nietzsche on this point (Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965], pp. 352-70).

`DD, p. 83. Nietzsche opposed the idea of a cosmic final purpose-there are only individual purposes (cf. WP, pp. 48-49; TP, p. 403; Middleton, p. 199).

48See WP, pp. 133-34, 136; AC, pp. 172, 182. 49TD, p. 247; cf. also Strong, pp. 184, 265.

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most ardent enthusiast of the Church. But that he retained the hope imparted to him by the Hebrew-Christian tradition, and more specifically the Joachimite tradition, is clear. Just as the Hebrew-Christian God created the world ex nihilo, Nietzsche seeks a new age created ex nihilism. In this respect, Nietzsche was most unclassical in his approach, for, as Karl L6with has rightly maintained, "no Greek was concerned with man's distant future."50 What Nietzsche desired was the fulfillment of a

hope brought about through the individual's own striving, not by "inevitability" or by the collective actions of the "last man." Through the individual, humanity as a whole could achieve a new world: "Mankind must set its goal above itself-not in a false world, however, but in one which would be a continuation of humanity" (Explanatory Notes, in AC, p. 269). The third age, therefore, is only a greatly to be hoped for possibility.5' And herein lies Nietzsche's greatest weakness-he was unable to endure and to affirm life without hope.52 For this reason, he too-was a "preacher of death." To believe in a "beyond," whether a transcendental heaven or a heaven on earth, whether an inevitability or only a possibility, is in either case an "imaginary teleology...." Accord-

ing to Nietzsche, history will be justified through Dionysian "hope." But, if so, Nietzsche was by his own definition a weak, not a strong, nihilist.

Nietzsche was closer to the truth than he himself imagined when he wrote: "The whole world still believes in the literary career of the 'Holy Ghost,' or is still influenced by the effects of this belief

... " Unwittingly,

Nietzsche himself was captured by the apocalyptic images of a Joachim- ite third age of the Holy Spirit.53 As a consequence, his philosophy is a product of that "slave" morality which he abhorred so much. It is for this reason that Nietzsche's name has been associated with other believers in a third-age concept, such as the National Socialists. The words he wrote against Strauss, therefore, are equally attributable to himself: "The Philistine as founder of the religion of the future-that is the new belief in its most emphatic form of expression. The Philistine becomes a dreamer

... " Nietzsche is to be appreciated, however, for having shown

that the last god to be overthrown is the god of "hope." 5oL6with, Meaning in History, p. 221. References to the idea of "hope" in Nietzsche's

works are legion. I will cite only a few prominent ones: HAH 1:3;JW, p. 331; SZ, pp. 44, 293. That Nietzsche occasionally had contrary feelings can be seen in Middleton, pp. 139, 148.

51As Nietzsche wrote, "There is absolutely no knowing what history may be some day" (JW, p. 74).

52For, as he wrote, "... man will wish nothingness rather than not wish at all" (GM, p. 211); see also GM, p. 121.

53 See Middleton, p. 177; TP, p. 434; and Lea, pp. 324-25. Herein lies one of the major differences between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The latter yielded to "Christendom," at least through adopting the Joachimite tradition, whereas the former would have con- demned it. In this respect, Nietzsche never really attained the position of a "critical historian."

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nietzsche and eschatology

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