Director ofCentralIntelligence

National Intelligence Estimate

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NIE 93.23lIIJuly 1993

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Former Yugoslavia

Volums II-,$upporting Analysis

Combatant Forces in the

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This National fnteWigence Estimatc representsthe views of the Direaor of Central Intelligencewith the odvice and assistance of theUS InteAigence Community.

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NIE 93.23 /II

Combatant Forces in theForrner Yugoslavial

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Volume ll-supporting Analysis

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Key Judgments

Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals and ethnic rivalries, thebelligerents in the former Yugoslavia are capable of continuing thefighting for at least another year.

The offensive capabilities of the Yugoslavto those of its neighbors:

I Arme:d Forces are superior

The capabilities of Yugoslav armored and mechanized forces surpass

those of neighboring republics; Belgrade would enjoy air supremacyin renewed fighting.

Except against Macedonia, limited logistic capabilities would con-

strain Yugoslav ground force operations beyond border areas[---l

Despite substantial improvements, Croatian Ground Forces lack heavyweapons and suffer from training and leadership weaknesses; Croatiahas virtually no air force:

. The Croatian Armed Forces can retake portions of Serb-held terri-tory but cannot completely defeat Serb forces.

. Croatian forces would have difficulty resisting Yugoslav airstrikes orfederalattemptstoseizeadditionalterritory.

The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) can hold virtually all its gains in Bosniaagainst local forces. It can take all remaining Muslim-held areas, butonly at significant military and political costs it prefers not to incur.

Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) can, with the help of the Croatianarmy, hold current g4lqr 4!_d take additional territory from theBosnian Government

The Bosnian Army can neither hold its territory against determined

offensives nor permanently retake lost ground without substantialexternal support, it will slowly deteriorate.

'"Yugclavia" and "Yugoslav" rcfcr to thc rump fcderal statc ccmprisirg Scrbia and Montencgro.

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Western InterventionWestern intervention to enforce an agreed p€ace plan, to create andprotect safehavens, or to enforce a partition of Bosnia could requiremilitary action to roll back territorial gains and/or disarm combatantforces. These roles would require a large-scale deployment of groundforces.[-_--l

The BSA.would resist a Western intervention to roll back Serbterritorial gains or disarm the BSA but would quickly disintegrate;some of its forces would begin sustained guerrilla action againstWestern forces:

. The BSA would harass but tolerate an intervention that left its forcesin place.f-l

The Bosnian Army views Western intervention as its best hope forsurvival; under some circumstances local Bosnian forces could clash

Croatian and HVO forces wouldlocal clashes could occur as they

avoid confronting Western forces, butexploited outside intervention for local

with Western forces, but they would be quickly overwhelmed.l-l

advantage.

In the event of Western military intervention in Bosnia, Belgradewould engage Western forces directly only if they attacked Yugoslavterritory or forces.[ -l

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Contents

PageKey Judgments lllSupporting AnalyiislntroductionThe Yugoslav Armed Forces: Adapting to New Realities

The Yugoslav Giound Forces

The Yugoslav Navy

The Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces

Yugoslav Cornbat Capabilities

The Croatian Armed Forces: Building on Modest Foundations t4The Croatian Ground Forces t4The Croatian Navy and Air and Air Defense Forces T7

Croatian Combat Capabilities 18

Krajina Serb Forces l9Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2l

The Bosnian Serb Army: Dominating the War 2rBosnian Serb Combat Capabilities 24

The Bosnian Army: Outgunned But Hanging On 25

Bosnian Army Combat Capabilities 27

Croatian Defense Forces 28

Annex A: Force Structure of the Yugoslav Ground Forces 33

Annex B: Force Structure of the Yugoslav Navy 37

Annex C: Force Structure of the Yugoslav Air and Air Defense tr'orces 39

Annex D: Force Structure of the Croatian Ground Forces, Navy, and 4lAir and Air Defense Forces

Annex E: Force Structure of the Bosnian Serb Army 43

Annex F: Force Stnrcture of the Bosnian Army 45

Annex G: Force Stmcture of the Croatian Defense Forces 47

Annex H: Chemical Warfare Capabilities 49

Annex I: Terrorism-A Nonconventional Response to Intervention? 5l

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Annex J: Paramilitary Terrorism in the Fonner Yugoslavia 53

Annex K: Impsct of Terrain and Weether on Military Operations 55

Annex L: Transportation, Energy, and CommunicetionsInfrastructure

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Supporting Analysis

Introduction

Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goalsand ethnic rivalries, the belligerents in theformer Yugoslavia can continue fighting forat least a year. The capabilities of theirforces, however, vary greatly. Even withinindividual armies some units may consist ofwell-trained, professional soldiers, while oth-ers are poorly trained militias that depend onreservists and irregulars. Moreover, neitherthe warring republics nor factional leaderswithin Bosnia have firm political or opera-tional control over these armed groupsj---l

The Yugoslav Armed Forces: Adaptingto New Realities

The Yugoslav military's capabilities aresuperior to those of the armed forces of anyother forrner Yugoslav republic, as well as itsneighbors, in large part because the federalmilitary has more men and equipment andthe only effective air force. Dissatisfied withthe military's inept performance in 199 l-92,senior Yugoslav officers have undertakenreforms intended to improve combat effec-tiveness. Ethnic splits and the poor perfor-mance of reservists demonstrated that reli-ance on citizen-soldiers was impractical andthat Belgrade needed to expand the capabili-ties of its standing army. Territorial lossesand economic constraints made cuts in themilitary imperative. The reforms haveincluded:

Modfying doctrine. The General Staff nolonger looks to the populace as a whole toconduct a long-terrn partisan war. It has

given the army responsibility for conduct-ing long-term light infantry and unconven-tional operations against an invading forceand has bolstered the ability of the GroundForces to fulfill these roles.

o Restructuring forces. Reflecting the loss of60 percent of Yugoslavia's territory andpopulation, the three services are reorga-nizing. Chains of command in each servicehave been altered. The army has cut man-power and completed the transition to acombined-arms structure to cut costs andboost the ground forces' effectiveness. Theground and air forces have more evenlydistributed their rnost capable weapons.Efforts are also under way to establish airdefenses and devise an appropriate role fora smaller navy with a much smaller coast-line to protect.

o Military professionalization. The armedforces seek to retain experienced troopsand increase training to maximize thecapability of existing military assets.Senior officers publicly state tha t a trainedforce composed of 50 percent regulartroops will have the discipline, mobility,and proficiency required to inflict unac-ceptable losses on an invader.[l

These efforts have had mixed r;;n ourjudgment the Ground Forces represent amore cohesive and unified Serb force whoseunits are better organized and equipped thanin 1991. The Air and Air Defense Forceshave reorganized and redistributed theirmost capable equipment, but their operations

War and Doctrine

Following the 1968 Warsaw Pact inva-sion of Czechoslovakia, Belgrade for-mulated an "All Peoples Defense" doc-trine rooted in Tito's partisan waragainst the Germans and ltalians dur-ing World War II. Federal armoredforces would blunt any invasi6n by asuperior military force and buy time forlishtly armed Territorial DdenseForces under republtc control to mobi-lize to conduct small-unit operations inYugoslavta's rugged interior. Key partsof the doctrine included universal mili-tary training, mass mobilization, andwidely distributed weapons stocks.When civil war erupted in June 199 I ,

the infrastructure for republic armieswas already in place.T - |

The .wartime experiences of 199 I and1992 led the Yugoslav General Staff tomodtfy its territorial defense concept,The constitution prohibits surrender;Yugoslavia's deterrent rests on thethreat of protracted war. The military,however, has taken responsibility forlong-term command and almost cer-tainly looks to mobilized lisht motor'ized and infantry brigades to fisht thewAr. The armed services believe thatunifying command under the GeneralStaff and employing regtlars instead ofpartisans will better enable Yugoslaviato resist an invasion. The push formilitary professionalization, the relega-tion of reserve units to a rear-areasecurity role, and eforts to sharpencombat efectiveness all aim at improv-ing the military's qlpability of fulfillingits expanded role.

would still be hampered by inadequate num-bers of trained and specialized personnel.Belgrade's Air Force is superior to that ofany of the other republics but could not holdout against A Western air offensive. TheNavy, although deprived of most of its facili-ties and half of its personnel, has resumedtraining and increased its readiness, but itsoffensive capabilities remain limited

The Yugoslav Ground ForcesManpon er. The Ground Forces have shrunkfrom approximately 140,000 men to 100,000.According to an untested source, the GroundForces currently suffer from a shortage oftechnical specialists-up to 50 percent ofsome skill categories, such as radar techni-cians. Politically motivated policies havedeprived the Ground Forces of needed pro-fessional officers. In late-January L993, allethnic Serb officers of the rank of major orbelow born in Bosnia and Herzegovina or theKrajina were ordered to report to the ethnicSerb forces in their home regions. Further-rnore, in early March non-Serb officers wereordered to leave the army by 1 April; thisorder reportedly was rescinded, but manyofficers had already left the army. Reducingthe size of the Ground Forces somewhatreduces the impact of these cuts, but theirarbitrary nature has caused shortages intechnical skills and small-unit lea,iershipthat will persist for several Vears. I I

Equipment. The Yugoslav Ground Forcesare not equipped to conduct sustained, effec-tive, mobile warfare by heavy forces againsta force with modern equipment. Althoughsatellite photography shows the GroundForces have more iterns of major equipment

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Yugoslav Armed Forces Command andControl

Belgrade overhauled the command struc-tures of all three armed services in 1992to strengthen political control andprofessionalism:

. About 70 senior Ground Forces officerswere dismissed, and the General Staff'srole in formulating national securitypolicy was sharply limited; most officerswelcomed the end of the overt politiciza-tion of the Ground Forces. Operationalcommand extends from the GeneralStatr through the three armies, to thevarious corps, to maneuver units.

. Belgrade streamlined the Navy's com-mand structttre. Ten of I3 admiralswere dismissed in mid-L992, reducingthe span of control and eliminatingsuperfluous posts. The chain of com-mand now runs from the Navy com-mander to subordinate sector and fleetcommanders. Three tactical groups havebeen created to operate in the area fromKotor Bay to the Strait of Otranto,

and tactical commanders have substan-tial authority to conduct small-scaleoperations.

. Belgrade trimmed senior officer ranksand shortened command lines in the Airand Air Ddense Forces. The GeneralStqff controls both forces through aheadquarters in Belgrade that com-mands air force, air defense, and logisticsupport corps. Reduced air defense ca-pabilities have probably led Belgrade toaccord local commanders substantialfreedom of action.[-]

Belgrade appears to use the formerYugoslavia's nationwtde command andcontrol system for communicating withSerb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovinaand Croatia. Belgrade has investedheavily in redundant, secure communica-tions, a capability that only a sustainedWestern attack could degradtT-1

than they can use, the bulk of these weap-ors-T-s41 55 tanks, M-60 armored person-nel carriers, and most of the artillery-embody technology from the 1950s and1960s. The Yugoslavs are retiring many oftheir oldest systems, such as WorldWar Il-era T-34 tanks and A- l9 artillery,although some of this equipment would beput back in service in an ernergency. Bel-grade's forces can field lirnited numbers ofT-72 and \{-8-1 tanks. \l-80 and BOVarrnored vehicles. as u'ell as modern rnultiplerocke: launci:e:s a:C ertillerr pieces, but

they lack such complernentary systems as

modern antitank missiles, targeting radars,and fire-control systems necessary for effec-tively coping with attacks by Western forces.

Training. Training is mediocre by Westernstandards. Attache reporting indicates thatsome units, either elites or those with consci-entious cornmanders, are well trained. Untillate 1992, however, field exercises lackedrealism and equipment inspections were su-perficial. Since then the army reportedly has

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Figure 2Yugoslav Armed Forces Headquarters, Corps, andAreas of Responsibility in Serbia and Montenegro

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Table IEstimated Yugoslav Ground ForcesManpower and Major EquipmentHoldings "

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corps operate as a logistic base, and unitsdown to the company level acquire, store,and distribute supplies; a network of depotsprovides maintenance seryices. Ammuni-tion-stored in nurnerous facilities above andbelow ground-appears to be in ample sup-ply, but many factories that supplied partsand services are no longer under Belgrade'scontrol. Yugoslavia's prewar position as amajor arms producer, its continuing oilimports, reporting on rnunitions retrievedfrorn the republics in 1991, and the GroundForces' currently low operational require-ments suggest that it has adequate stockpilesof weapons, munitions, and fuel for severalmonths of cornbat.n

Ground Forces' logistics are not designed tosupport highly mobile operations. Recentlogistic experience-in Slavonia in 1991 andin Bosnia in 1992-has been in support ofslow-moving infantry campaigns or staticsieges. These carnpaigns have been foughtalong rnajor highway networks. Fragmentaryreports from operations in 1991 and 1992indicate that frontline units track their sup-ply levels, order replenishrnents, and arrangedeliveries. While the Yugoslav GroundForces have sufficient transportation assets

to support its internal security mission, large-scale, mobile operations would require therequisition of civilian vehicles. Because thearmy has not practiced large-scale, mobileoperations, the General Staff probably haslittle idea of the fuel, ammunition, and spareparts requirements or the difficulty of keep-ing up with rapidly moving forces.

Morale. Yugoslav Ground Forces moralecurrently is poor. Some unit desertion ratesreportedly reached 40 percent during thel99l war. Officer morale is fragile. Whilemost junior and midlevel officers appear

I 991 1 993 PercentChange

Total rnanpower 140,000 100,000 -29Tanks (M-84, T-72,T-54/55, T-34)

2,000 1,300- - l0 to1,800 - 35

Armored vehicles(BRDM, BTR 50/60,M-60, M-Eo, M-9E0,TAB-72)

700- -29 toI,000 - 50I,400

Artillery (155-mm gun 3,600M-2, M-54; 152-mm gunD-20, M-94, ML-20,M- I 943; 130-mm fieldgun M-46; 128-mm multi-ple rocket launch er; 122-mrn howitzer D-30,M-1938, A-19, 2Sl; 105-mmhowitzer M-1, M-56)

" Because of additional work by the Interagency Ordcr-of-Battle Working Group since the publication of Volume I,sorne figures in thc tables in Volume II may diffcr margin-ally from those given in Volume I.

Thistableiril

been makin g a concerted effort to improvetraining standards and the realism of its fieldexercises. Recent imagery shows an increasein exercise frequency. For the most part, theYugoslavs have not emphasized high stan-dards or uniformity of training for enlistedpersonnel, and it will take another sixmonths to a year for the army to complete itsretraining program. Moreover, because theYugoslav Ground Forces are not known toexercise above the battalion level or to con-duct more than rninimal combined-armstrainitrB, their ability to carry out cornplex orlarge-unit tactical rnaneuvers would be verylirnitednLogistics. Yugoslav Ground Forces logisticsare fairly well organized, but they havesuffered from the country's breakup. Arrny

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confident and anxious to dernonstrateprofessional competence, the reduction ofarmy strength, uncertain career prospects,and, for those evacuated from Slovenia,Croatia, and Bosnia, the loss of homes havedamaged morale. Staff officers assigned toBelgrade reportedly try to avoid fieldassignments to protect personal privileges;others allegedly supplement their incomesthrough bribes and kickbacks. To somedegree, these problems have been countgtgd_by creation of a totally Serb army.

and government forces have producedlimited quantities of small arms andammunition, but supply problems haveseverely limited the scope ofmanttfact uring act ivi ty .

Ddense production elsewhere in theformer Yugoslavia has plummeted.Slovenian manufacture of APCy, tankparts, and electronics has beenundermined by the conversion of trade toa hard curuency basis and the collapse ofYugoslav tank production. Croatiamodified some civilian production sitesto turn out infantry weapons andrudimentary APCs, but Zagreb remainsalmost totally dependent on importedarms. Military production in Serbiaand Montenegro, chiefly small-caliberweapons, ammunition, and somecomponents for larger systems, continuesalthough supply problems limit output.

In the event of Western intervention, theseproblems would also be countered by theunifying effects of a foreign attack and theneed to defend the homeland. Press reportsindicate the army is trying to improve rnoraleby stressing Serb military tradition,patriotism, and threats to Serbia; byimproving living conditions; and byimproving military capabilities. However,these efforts are likely to have only limitedshort-term impact, and, barring outsideattack, morale witl improve significantly

YuSollav Defense Industries

Yugoslavia's breakup splintered thedefense industry, which had deliberrbeen scattered among the different rlics of the former Yugoslavia. Compsupply networks have been thorougldisrupted by the war. Production hasharply curtailed, particularly for Itsystems such as tanks, armored p€hcarriers (APCs), and aircrqft. Ammltion and small-arms plants continueoperate, but resumption of large-scamanufacture of arms and munitionsremains unlikely u'ntil hostilities en,

Approximately haU of prewar defentduction, includtng combat aircrqft, Iarmored vehicles, and heavy artiller.in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serb ?fl(transfer key assets from Bosnia /o Sachieved limited success. Most remafacilities are in areas now controlledCroatian Defense Forces or Bosniantroops. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, t

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Forces' size areadhere to hieh

l99 r l 993 PercentChange

Total rnanpower 16,000 7,500 -53Frigatcs (equipped withSS-N-2C Styx antishipmissiles, SA-N-4 SAMs,76-mm guns)

Missilc boats (fivecquipped withSS-N-2C, remainderwith SS-N-2 AlB, 57 -

mm guns, SA-7 SAMs)

13-14 -7 to- 13

l5

Torpedo boats (SA-7SAMs)

l0-ll -21 to-28

t4

Submarines

. Because of additional work by the Interagency Order-of-Battle Working Group since the publication of Volume I,some figures in thc tables in Volume II may differ margin-ally from those given in Volume I.

This table ir Fr'a.{---l

Navy personnel strength-at some 7,500men-is about one-half its prewar total, andconscripts now make up 75 percent of a forcethat was more than 60 percent regular. Liai-son services report critical personnel short-ages, particularly of operators for sophisti-cated electronic gear and weapons. Primarynavy assets include five coastal subrnarines(with two to three operational), five rninisub-marines, 17 to l8 missile-capable ships orcraft (including four frigates), about a dozenother patrol craft, coastal artillery, mobileantiship cruise missiles, and a large navalmine inventory

Yugoslavia has lost over 90 percent of itscoastline, including virtually all of its ship-

building facilities, and the Chief of the Navy

standards of professionalismn

Leadership. Although the Yugoslav federalconstitution asserts civilian control of themilitary, the armed forces remain an inde-pendent center of power. Currently, thesenior leaders of the Yugoslav Armed Forcesare loyal and generally capable. Stronglynationalistic and loyal to Serbian PresidentSlobodan Milosevic's governn)ent, Chief ofStaff Zivota Panic is a career soldier who has

reportedly worked to increase the army'sprofessionalism and avoid involvernent inpolitics. Training for junior and miClevelofficers is probably still mediocre, however,and local comrnanders almost certainly awaitinstructions rather than take the initiative.The near-cornplete Serbianization of thearmy, the dismissal of about 70 senior offi-cers in May 199 2, and the continuing retire-ment of over-age officers and NCOs in favorof younger, nationalistic Serbs have furthersolidified the army leadership's loyalty to theregime and made the army more cohesive.

The Yugoslav NavyManpbwer and Eqaipment. Despite signifi-cant personnel and logistic problerns, theYugoslav Navy poses a moderate mine, anti-ship rnissile, and submarine threat to surfaceforces operating within 50 nautical miles ofthe Montenegrin coast. Its overall warfarecapabilities<specially in antisubmarinewarfare-are limited. It cannot defendYugoslavia's coast against its most likely(Western) opponent, and it is now highlyvulnerable to qttack within its remainingfacilities.

Table 2Estimated Yugoslav Navy Manpowerand Major Equipment Holdings "

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has announced plans to scrap or sell much ofthe flee?. Senior officers plan to build newcoastal facilities and to modernize antishiprnissiles. However, there is no evidence thatany of this is happening. No further shipacquisition or construction is expected in thenear future, and the Yugoslav Navy proba-bly will decline due to a lack of maintenancecapability.

Trcining "rO

r"ristics.Although inactivefor the first nine months of 1992, the Navyhas since resumed training and limitedpatrols. The relocation of virtually the entirefleet at two bases in Boka Kotorska (Bay ofKotorFneither of which has adequate sup-port facilities----created serious logistic prob-lems during 1992, leaving many cornbatantsnonoperational. In its recent exercises, theNavy has been able to sortie most of its shipssimultaneously. Beginning in April 1993, theYugoslav Navy began short deployments ofsmall surface action groups to Bar portfacility, 30 nautical miles south of KotorBay. These deployments reflect a decision todisperse forces outside Kotor Bay-reduqingvulnerability to a surprise attack-whilebuilding up Bar as a limited logistic base.

Morale and Leadership. The Navy washardest hit by the breakup of the country.Croats dominated the naval officer corps,and most deserted at the outset of the war.Deprived of its senior leaders, the Navyalmost certainly suffers from shortages ofexperienced junior officers and NCOs. Amuch reduced role for the Navy and limitedpromotion prospgr!1have further under-mined morale.

The I'ugoslav Air and Air Defense ForcesEquipment and Logisrics. Almost all of theformer Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces

Table 3Estinrated Yugoslav Air and Air Defense ForcesManpower and Major Equipment Holdings

l99l r 993 PercentChange

Total manpower 34,000 20,000 - 4lFixed-wing aircraft

MiG.29 A, BMiG-2I A, B,D,F,J,L,N

153

Galeb-Jastreb 168 r67

Orao 105 45 -57Super Galeb -4Helicopters

Mi-8 Hip C 75 55-61 -18 to

-27Gazelle t32 76 -42

Surfacc-to-air missilelaunchers "

SA-2 30

SA-3 68

SA-6 t20

" Figures for surface-to-air missile launchers for l99l arenot available. Another 84 SA-9 launchers and four SA- l3launchers are under the control of the Yugoslav GroundForces, aS well as an undetermined number of shoulder-fired SAMs-including SA-7s, SA- l4s, and possiblySA-16s.

\-Thistabteiril

equipment is under the control of Belgrade.This includes 12 Mi G-29 Fulcrums and 500other fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft (ofwhich some 100 are in storage). The countrycan tap into large stores of fuel, supplies, andspare parts. L I

Ground-based air defense assets consist ofSA-2 and SA-3 strategic and 5A-6 tacticalsurface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and a widevariety of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) sys-tems. Yugoslov Ground Forces control SA-9and SA- l3 tactical SAMs, as well as SA-7,SA- 14, and probably SA- l6 rnan-portableSAMs. The former Yugoslavia produced the

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SA-7, was self-sufficient in amrnunition pro-duction, and prduced several types of AAApieces. Yugoslavia is likely to have stockpilesof spares and supplies for this equipment.Although spare parts for Soviet-built SAMequipment had to be imported, Yugoslaviaprobably has a stockpile of SAM equipmentsufficient to maintain its current inventoryfor the foreseeable future

.Manponer and Training. The Yugoslav Airand Air Defense Forces are rccovering frornsevere manpower shortages resulting fromthe breakup of the country. Training is at anormal pace, although at a more basic level,reflecting the need to train new personnel.Emphasis on NCO and training schools,coupled with special pay and allowance, hasincreased the number of qualified personnelin the Air Force. The Yugoslav Air ForceAcaderly, basic and advanced flight train-ing, and professional rnilitary educationschools are now relocated and graduatingnew classes. Pilot training is up from fewerthan 60 hours a year to over 100 hours, andsimulator time is now available for up to 120hours a year. Yugoslav pilots are generallycapable and well versed in the simple tacticalemployment of their weapon systems. How-ever, they do not fly complex maneuvers, usemultiship formations, or employ advancedcombat tactics

Ground-based air defense training has beenlimited primarily to 54.-6 units, which gener-ally train on a bimonthly basis. The SA-2sand SA-3s in the Belgrade area and incentral Serbia have been active only spor4di-cally.

Leadership and Morale. The Yugoslav AirForce is the most stridently nationalisticservice, and Belgrade purged few of its offi-cers in 1992. Its leaders are capable profes-sionals whose hardline views underlie the AirForce's increasingly independent stance ininternal political affairs. Senior Air Forceofficers apparently have widespread supportwithin their service, and their influence isgrowing within the rnilitary as a whole,according to several sources. Press reportssuggest that, while senior officers recogn izethe vulnerabilities of the air force and realize

. that Western air forces could quickly over-whelm it, they are deterrnined to resist anyattack on Yugoslavia as best they can.

Yugoslav Combat CapabilitiesThreat Perceptions, Yugoslav military lead-ers share the civilian leaders' view that theirnation is besieged by internal and externalfoes bent on thwarting Serb aspirations for alarger, unified Serb nation. They view thecurrent conflict as a struggle for ethnicsurvival that Yugoslavia was forced to fight:

. Military leaders have publicly assertedthat the West is trying to domin ate thepost-Cold War world. The United,Statesand Germatry, in their view, are using low-intensity conflict, political destabilization,support for secessionist movements inKosovo and the Sandzak, and the threat ofinvasion to dismember and subdue theSerb nation.

. Yugoslav military leaders realize that noneof the neighboring states poses a militarythreat to Serbia and Montenegro, but theysee continuing threats to ethnic Serbs liv-ing in the former Yugoslav republics andexpect renewed hostilities with Croatia.

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o The leaders are also concerned about therise of radical political Islam, which theybelieve could draw support frorn theIslamic world. They see little direct mili-tary threat from Turkey or other Muslimcountries, however.

The Yugoslav Armed Forces will respondforcefully to attacks on key Serb-occupiedterritory around Knin or in eastern Slavonia.They prefer to provide aid to BosnianSerb forces, however, rather than intervenedirectly in Bosnia]__--

The military regards Albanian nationalismand Muslim unrest as the principal domesticthreats. Approximately 12,000 army troopsand 25,000 militiamen are deployed inKosovo to cow the ethnic Albanian majority.Recently, officers have voiced concern overMuslim unrest in the Sandzak and suggestedthat foreigners may be encouraging armedrebellion there. The army also fears thatdomestic violence between extreme national-ists and rnoderate Serbs could fracture thearmed forces. Chief of Staff Panic has statedhe will at all costs avoid conflict with nation-alist paramilitary groups and Serb InteriorMinistry forces.l --lThe M ilitnry's Self-Perception. Confidentof their capabilities against internal oppo-nents or neighboring states, milit ary leadersknow they could not defeat a concertedWestern attack. Although they believe thatthe armed forces are improving, militaryleaders understand the strengths, weakness-es, and lirnitations of their services. High-ranking officers have publicly commented onthe threat technologically sophisticatedweapons pose to Yugoslav forces. Further-more, they have openly discussed shortagesof recruits and noted problems in rnorale,

trainitrg, and logistics. However, drawing onSerb historical experience, senior officersrepeatedly have expressed confidence thatany foreign attack will stiffen militarymorale and public resolve, enabling Yugosla-via to outlast an opponent not prepared tofight a prolonged war.[---l

Operational Capabilities. The arrny's intel-ligence, air-ground coordinatiotr, transport,and logistic capabilities are adequate againstcurrent foes, as are its redundant, securecommunications. The Air and Air DefenseForces would face no serious challenges fromMacedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herze-govina, or Albania. The Yugoslav Navywould play little or no role in operationsagainst these countries, although it couldsupport operations along the Croatian andAlbanian coast. Belgrade probably can con-duct simultaneous offensive military opera-tions in eastern Slavonia and limited actionin Kosovo or on the Prevlaka Peninsula.Should the conflict spread or become moredifficult and complex, Yugoslav capabilitieswould soon be stretched to their limits. Itsshortcomings would become more apparentas the army operated farther from its bases,

over increasingly rugged terrain, and againstdetermined resistance.l---l

Direct Intemention in Neishboring States.If they intervened in a neighboring state, theYugoslavs probably would perform best ineastern Slavonia, near their home bases. Theregion's relatively flat terrain and well-developed road network would enable Bel-grade to employ its armored and rnotorizedforces to their best advantage. The Novi SadCorps, which operated in Slavonia in the fallof 199 l, is headquartered less than 20 miles

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from the Croatian border, and the Mecha-nized Corps could travel from Belgradealong modern highways. During the 1991

campaign, the Yugoslavs demonstrated thecapability to use the region's roads and riversto support approximately 30,000 troops in

cornbat for about three months. However,the pace of an advance could be sloweddramatically by confusion and inadequatelogistics.

The Yugoslav Armed Forces would also beable to intervene effectively in Bosnia andHerzegovina and in Macedonia. The Yugo-slavs could quickly move the Novi Sad orUzice corps into the northern and easternareas of Bosnia held by the Bosnian Serbs.Superior training, equipment, and firepowerwould give the Yugoslav forces an over-whelming advantage against the Muslirns.As the army rnoved more deeply into Bosnia,increasingly rugged terrain would confine itsheavy forces to the relatively few roads,slowing resupply and making them morevulnerable to Muslirn and Croat guerrillaattacks. Casualties from heavy fighting innon-Serb areas, moreover, could underminepopular support at home and affect armymorale. Macedonia lacks an effective army.The Yugoslav army's Leskovac or Nis corpscould easily occupy the countrv{---_--l

The Yugoslav Arrned Forces have only amodest capability for direct intervention inthe Krajina region of Cro atia. Belgrade hascontingency plans for moving its forces andBosnian Serb troops to the Knin area in caseof a major Croatian offensive, but plans forthe Bosnian Serbs to do most of the fighting.Even this approach likely underestimates thedifficulties the Yugoslavs will encounter.Deploying the Uzice, Mechanized, or NoviSad Corps to Knin would require movingforces across more than 500 kilometers ofrugged terrain on a small number of roadsvulnerable to Muslim and Croat attacks.Because deploying and supporting heavyforces would be slow and difficult, Belgrade

1l se\ret

c05a,2I1 06', :L.e,t

may try to use paramilitary forces or air-strikes, instead of conventional ground forcesagainst a Croatian offensive. The Yugoslavarmy would be unlikely to undertake large-scale ground operations in the Krajina unlesslocal Serb forces were on the verge of col-lapse.

Yugoslav forces could invade Albania butwould have difficulty operating deep insidethe country because of rugged terrain onboth sides of the border. Moreover, Yugcslavroads in the region are mostly secondary, andonly three cross the border from Montenegroand Kosovo. The Yugoslavs could deploy thePristina or Podgorica Corps to the borderfairly rapidly, but the terrain and lack ofroads on the Albanian side would restrictany invasion to infantry operations and puni-tive airstrikes. Delivery of supplies would beslow and probably inadequate to supportsustained combat or penetrations far beyondthe Shkoder-Pri zen highway crossing north-ern Albania]----l

The Yugoslav military is much more capablethan the armed forces of Hungary, Romania,or Bulgaria. Yugoslavia has the militarycapability to disrupt cornmercial traffic onthe Danube River, deliver airstrikes on keyeconomic targets, and launch cross-borderattacks against its neighbors. AlthoughBelgrade is unlikely to attack any of theseneighbors, the threat of attack, particularlyfrorn the air, has made them cautious in theirsupport of UN sanctions and otherinitiatives

Supporting Local Serb Forces. Yugoslavia iscapable of rapidly assisting local Serb forcesin Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Krajina:

as well as Yugoslav tank and infantryreconnaissance platoons had been sent toeastern Bosnia to aid the Serb offensivearounil Muslim-held Srebrenica. Well-disciplined and organized, these troopsplayed a significant role in Bosnian Serboperations against Muslim forces.

o An array of sources report that Belgradehas piovided the Bosnian Serbs with fuel,transportatiotr, rnunitions, and other mili-tary assistance since the spring of 1992.The fuel has been especially important tothe Bosnian Serb war effort.

. In response to Croatia's late-January 1993offensive near Zadar, Belgrade sent 500Yugoslav army "specialists"-probablyspecial forces troops-to the Krajina.

Because of the small scale of operations,relatively small numbers of men or quantitiesof supply can tip the balance.r ___Respo.nding to Western Intewention, Anylarge-scale Western intervention in the for-rner Yugoslavia would radically changeBelgrade's strategic situation. Its reaction,however, would depend on the circumstancessurrounding the insertion of Western forces.Should Western forces arrive in Bosnia andHerzegovina with the consent of all parties toenforce a peace agreernent, for example,Belgrade would take quiet steps to irnprovethe defensive position of its forces. We judgeBelgrade would step up recruitment andtrainitrg, disperse its forces and supplies-including naval elements from Kotor Bay-and occupy alternate command sites.l

I

We judge Belgrade would not responddirectly to Western intervention to impose anend to the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovi-na. The Yugoslavs realize that sending their

a

ln

elite 63rd Airborne Brigade,men obased

f theat Nis,

bere( r2

C056'2 1?i-l C

arm)' into Bosnia and committing the airforce would quickly bring the war to Serbia.Belgrade would instead seek to escalate thecosts of intervention to Western forces. Yu-goslavia would covertly provide military sup-plies to the Bosnian Serbs to support aprotracted guerrilla war but would adopt aneutral position publicly. The Yugoslavswould also provide safehavens in Serbia and"volunteer" fighters as well as increase thereadiness of its forces. Belgrade would cali-brate its assistance to maxim ize Westernlosses while avoiding steps that could lead tomilitary action against Serbia.'

Belgrade would resist any Western attemptto intervene in Kosovo. The army's PristinaCorps, with up to 12,000 men, is based inKosovo, and 30,000 men in three othercorps-the Podgorica, Nis, and Leskovac-are in nearby Montenegro and southern

I ur-ySerbiaunits in Kosovo have supplies for 20 days ofcombat. Serb civilians in Kosovo are alsowell equipped with srnall arms. Ethnic Alba-nians in Kosovo, although lacking arms,would try to use any Western intervention toachieve their independence. Infantry battlesin rough terrain would dominate a conflict inKosovo; guerrilla operations involving allparties would continue after Yugoslav regu-lar forces in Kosovo were defeated throughWestern interventionn

Capability To Def,end Serbia andMontenegro. While initially capable of earlywarnitrg, Yugoslav air defenses would beable to inflict only rnarginal losses on aconcerted Western air offensive and couldnot stop the rapid destruction of fixed tar-gets. The loss of skilled technicians hasgreatly reduced the readiness and combatsustainability of the air defenses. Belgrade's

bct*L

radars and early warning systems would besusceptible to Western electronic counter-measures and standoff weapons; its Sovietsurface-to-air missile systems are vulnerableto Western countermeasures, tactics, andweapons. The rapid degradation or destruc-tion of these systems would leave antiaircraftartillery and shoulder-fired missiles as themajor threat to Western aircraft. Yugoslavpilots would be unlikely to down more than afew Western aircraft[_]

If hostilities appeared imminent, theYugoslav Navy probably would mine theMontenegrin coastline and defend theseminefields. Once hostilities commenced, thevulnerability of the Yugoslav Navy's basestructure and its inability to defend the coastsuggest that surface and submarine forcemight attack Western naval forces in theAdriatic, although the probability o f a suc-cessful attack would be low. L___l

Likely Mititary Strategy. Yugoslav militaryleaders neither expect nor desire a war withthe United States or a Western coalition butare prepared to fight if they have to. Whilernany senior officers claim that the UnitedStates is trying to encircle and subdueSerbia, they are also convinced that it'willtry to do so without resorting to force. Evenif the West uses force, they believe theUnited States and its allies lack the politicalwill to undertake a protracted guerrilla warand the long-term occupation of Yugoslavia.Therefore, we judge that the leadershipbelieves war would come only after aprolonged crisis and with ample warning.Belgrade would use such a period to mobil izeand disperse its forces; hide key assets; shift

l3\.,

c056211 06

\*.el

units to deceive US intelligence and mini-rnize the damage frorn initial enemy air-strikes; and prepare highways, railroads, andbridges for demolition

Yugoslav stiategy has long assumed anattack from the north across open plains, butBelgrade could rneet attacks from otherdirections. A ground approach by Westernforces through Bosnia and Herzegovina, a

third country, or from the coast of Montene-gro would Fqydqample warning to theYugoslavs

The Yugoslavs believe that the West wouldinflict heavy losses on their forces in war.Public statements of military leaders suggestthat they would expect a devastating, coordi-nated, all-out attack on the navy, air force,air defenses, and command and controlstructure, similar to Western operations inthe l99l Persian Gulf war. These leadersrealize they cannot match the mobility andfirepower of Western forces. Nevertheless,the Ground Forces would fight tenaciously.Instead of trying to hold land and fight a

conventional battle, they would seek to buytime for light infantry units to retreat to thehills of southern Serbia and northern Monte-negro. There, they would rely on civiliansupport and weapons caches to support con-tinued operations aimed at driving up thecosts of Western intervention. Although less

disciplined reservists and some conscripts arelikely to desert or perform poorly, the armyalmost certainly believes that military disci-pline and intense nationalism will drive mostof its forces to fight on in small groups,making use of broken terrain for conductinghit-and-run attacls. The Yugoslavs almostcertainly believe that a moderate but steadynumber of casualties would cause the Westeventually to leave Yugoslavia

Wectiveness Over the Long Term. Shouldthe Yugoslavs implement their defensivestrategy, their forces would break down intosmaller, independent units, Western fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and artillerywould rnake coordinated rnovements byYugoslav forces difficult, and Western forceswould probably dominate urban areas andmajor roads within a few weeks. fn therneantime, local Yugoslav commanderswould assurne control over available militaryresources, such as arnmunition stockpiles.Coordination among units would decline.Sorne regular units would probably continueto fight; other units would desert.,Over time,some units would become personal arrnies forlocal leaders or bandit gangs. Under theseconditions, a national army would no longerexist, but sorne of its elements would pose

significant local threats.

The Croatian Armed Forces: Building onModest Foundations

Croatia's Armed Forces have improved sub-stantially since 199 l. Croatia quicklycreated a general staff and rudirnentarynational guard in mid- 1991. Irnprovementsin command structure and training, as wellas the organization of regular units, haveincreased the Croatian army's local combatcapability. AccoiAing to several sources,President Tudjmotr, an ex-army general, andhis advisers now believe the army can ejectlocal Serb forces from selected areas of Serb-occupied Croati..

The Croatian Ground ForcesManpower and Organization. The GroundForces have expanded and reorganized toimprove their effectiveness. Croatian GroundForces consist of an estimated 60,000 to

l4bret

c05t.?I- _ a

I

Figure 3Croatian Armed Forces Headquarters and Operational Zones in Croatia

c056,211 06tE.*

t

80,000 men deployed in six operationalzones-the equivalent of regional militarycommands-and organized into 40 brigades,and 17 Home Guard regiments. The armyhas a core of 20,000 regulars augmented byconscripts and reservists on active duty and aready reserve of some 100,000. SevenGuards Mobile brigades, professionallymanned formations with arrnor, artillery,and air defense assets, are the most capableunits.[---l

The Ground Forces' ability to organize taskforces enhances the flexibility of Croatianforces. Operational zone comrnanders con-trol all maneuver and support units within aregion and can tailor task forces for specificmissions. In 1992, President Franjo Tudjmanordered the streamlining of the DefenseMinistry and General Staff. These changesimproved Zagreb's ability to plan operationsand shift forces. Experienced cornrnanders,fully effective battlefield command and con-trol structures, and an efficient administra-tive system are still lacking, however.

Equipment. The Croatian Ground Forceslack combat pow er. Zagreb captured approx-imately 250 tanks, 150 to 250 armored vehi-cles, and 200 to 300 artillery pieces fromfederal forces in 1991 . While fielded systemsinclude rnodern M-84 tanks, multiple rocketlaunchers, and SA-9 air defense systems, theGround Forces have too few tanks and infan-try fighting vehicles to engage in large-scalearmored combat or to defend against a majorarmored attack. The Croatians are also shortof spare parts and qualified maintenancepersonnel. The General Staff has subordi-nated artillery and combined-arms battalionsor companies to infantry brigades to support

Training. Efforts to improve the level ofGround Forces training have had mixedresults. Created in the midst of combat, theGround Forces have not had time to institu-tionalize the professionalism required tomanage and employ armed forces effectively.The army has officer training schools andcourses for noncornmissioned officers. TheCroatian Chief of Staff has publicly assert-od, however, that both the quality and lengthof training are inadequate and companiesand battalions reportedly are short of trainedofficers. In these circumstances, the GroundForces continue to rely on reservists whoreceived minimal training under the formerYugoslav army. Five military education cen-ters provide two months of basic training forconscripts, who then are supposed to undergoadditional months of specialized training.Training appears to be concentrated at thesrnall-unit level, and deficiencies in basiccombat skills and small-unit tactics will con-tinue to hamper operations.

Logistics. While adequate for defensive orlimited offensive operations, Croatian logis-tics could not support multiple offensives ona broad front. Early in 1992, Zagreb placedsupport services under the General Staff toinfantry operations. [--l

l6

c056,?I1 06

I

bring order and direction to the hapha zardsupply system. Spot shortages of arnmunitioncontinue to occur, but troops are generallywell provisioned. Medical services and sup-plies, moreover, appear fairly well organ izedand plentiful. The static, srnall-scale nature

, of the combat enables the army to stockpilemunitions and materiel before offensives;Guards Mobile brigades that spearheadoffensives have logistic priority. Transportshortages, inexperience with mobile supportoperations, and limited maintenance capabil-ities would undermine the army's ability tosupport either large-scale or rnobileoperations.' i

Morale. Croatian rnorale varies but is gener-ally good. Motivation is highest in elite units,and most regular troops believe they areembarked on a crusade to save Croatia.While the majority of the army is reliable,inadequately trained reserve brigades andHome Guard regiments have dissolved in theface of Serb attacks. The arrny alrnost cer-tainly would use them only for local opera-tions or to provide rear-area security. Never-theless, Chief of Staff Janko Bobetkorecently expressed confidence in the army'srnotivation, and senior officers claim thatsuperior Croatian morale would be a signifi-cant advantage in renewed conflict withYugoslav forces

Leadership. Leadership shortcornings limitCroatian tactical effectiveness. Senior offi-cers are capable professionals, and most fieldcommanders are experienced combat veter-ans; the growing ability to plan militaryoperations and the smooth functioning of theGeneral Staff testify to their skill. However,the Croatian army generally lacks trainedand capable junior officers and NCOs.Small-unit operations are poorly coordinatedand slapdash in execution, weaknesses that

Croatian Civil-M ilitary Relations

The Croatian Armed Forces are hishlyresponstve to the orders of CroatianPresident Franjo Tudjman. A formermajor general, Tudjman is the armedforces' Commander in Chief and per-sonally directs their activities. Tudi-man heads the Council of Defense andNational Security, whtch consists of theDdense and Foreign Ministers, theChid of Staff, and other senior deci-sionmakers. While command ostensiblyruns from the president through theDdense Minister to the General Staff,Tudjmon, in fact, exercises his author-ity directly through the General Staff.The Chief of Stqff, Gen. Bobetko, ts aTudjman loyalist who takes his ordersdirectly from the President. Bobetko, inturn, has operational control of themilitary through the service chiefs andoperational zone commanders

will remain until Zagreb raises the level oftraining and professional education of itsjunior leaders.F

The Croatian Navy and Air andAir Defense ForcesZagreb's naval, air, and air defense forcescannot dam age an adversary's forces signifi-cantly. The 5,000-man strong Navy hassome four to six combatants, only three orfour of which may be equipped with antishipmissiles, leaving the force largely dependenton guns and torpedoes. With virtually nocapability for extensive offensive operations,Zagreb undoubtedly will meet any navalthreat chiefly with mines and coastal artil-lery. Zagreb has been able to establish only

C05C'21 7rlI

SecretI

minimal air and air defense forces. The4,000-man Air and Air Defense Forces hus-band their two to five MiG-21s and usemodified crop dusters for rudimentaryground strikes. Transport capabilities haveimproved with the March 1993 acquisition offour MI-8 helicopters, bringing the totalinventory to l'l . Zagreb remains vulnerableto air attack, although Croatia, which hassome 100 SA-7 missiles and 15 to 2l SA-9launchers, is seeking additional air defensemissiles.i--

Croatian Combat CapabilitiesEjecting Serb Forces From Croatia. Zagrebcan retake portions of Serb-held territory butcannot completely expel local Serb troopsfrorn Croatia. Croat rnilitary operationswould be most successful in westernSlavonia, where local Serb forces are demor-alized and relatively weak. Croatian offen-sives spearheaded by Guards Mobile bri-gades are likely to achieve limited territorialobjectives, but the Krajina Serbs' over-whelming advantage in heavy weapons prob-ably would soon halt any Croatian advance.Zagreb's forces lack the heavy weapons,cornmand experience, and logistic capabili-ties needed to mount a major carnpaign toretake the entire region. j

I

Capabitity To Defend Croatia From SerbAttsclc Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces aretoo stretched to threaten Croatia, but theCroatian Arrned Forces would have diffi-culty coping with Yugoslav attacks intendedto punish Croatia or seize additional terri-tory. Croatia could not defend against puni-tive Yugoslav airstrikes and lacks the airdefenses and heavy forces needed to defeatan armored attack in eastern Slavonia. TheCroatian Defense Forces (HVO) andCroatian Arrned Forces probably could notdefend the Neretva River valley and lowerDalmatian coast against a deterrnined attackby Yugoslav armor, artillery, infantry, andairpowtt.-- __j

Ability To Hold Teruitory in Bosnia sndHerzegovin* Zagreb probably will retaincontrol over the bulk of the territoryCroatian forces currently control in Bosnia

l8

c056,?11 06

and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs occupyrnost of the territory to which they have laidclaim and are uninterested in seizing theCroat-majority regions und er Zagreb's con-trol. Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs cannotmount the multibrigade combined-armsoffensive needed to dislodge the HVO andCroatian Armed Forces frorn the ruggedterrain they hold in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Bosnian government forces are likely to seize

some additional territory in central Bosnia,where they have been able to concentratesufficient manpower to outweigh scattered,lightly armed HVO units. Zagreb almostcertainly will bolster the HVO with man-power and heavy weapons from the Croatianarmy to limit the Bosnian government's ter-ritorial gains. Zagreb would carefully weighthe political consequences of such interven-tion{----l

Wectiveness Over the Long Term. Croatianground forces are unlikely to match thefederal arrny's manpower, equipment, andmobility, although barring renewed hostil-ities against Belgrade, they will slowlyimprove. The international arms embargowill make it difficult for Zagreb to acquireheavy weapons and air defense missiles.Improved Croatian combat effectiveness,however, largely depends on enhancing coln-bat and leadership skills and strengtheningthe army's orga nizatioll. With adequatefunding and a respite from the fighting forsix to 12 months, Zagreb should be able tobolster its defensive strengths and offensivecapabilities. On the other hand, heavy fight-ing with Yugoslav forces would slow andperhaps reverse the processl

Likely Croatian Army Response to Western

Intenention The Croatian arrny could con-

tinue to improve its capabilities and maintainlimited pressure on Serb-occupied areas in

Bebcl

Croatia if the West were to intervene tosupport a negotiated settlement in Bosniaand Herzegovina, but a Western attack onSerb forces would tempt Zagreb to retakelost ground. Zagreb would probably be reluc-tant to incur Western ire by atternpting thewholesale expulsion of Serb forces fromCroatia after a diplomatic solution in Bosnia.Instead, the Croatian army probably wouldmaintain pressure and launch local offen-sives along the borders of Serb-held territorY,while Zagreb pressed for a diplomatic solu-tion. Zagreb would view a Western attack onthe Serbs, either in Bosnia or in Yugoslavia,as an opportunity to seize the Krajina andretake all of Slavonia. Unless restrained bythe West, Croatia almost certainly wouldattempt to do so.l

I

Krajina Serb ForcesThe self-proclaimed "Republic of SerbKrajina" created a serniautonomous militaryin the spring of 1992. Headquartered inKnin, Krajina Serb forces consist of anestimated 40,000 ex-Yugoslav Peoples

Arrny, ex-Territorial Defense Forces, police,

and volunteers organized into six corps, with26 brigades. The Krajina Serb Army fieldsnumerous heavy weapons, including 300tanks, 80 armored fighting vehicles, and 430artillery pieces, along with dozens of heavymortars, antitank guns, and light air defenseartillery. Most of this equipment is currentlyoperational, but the Krajina Serbs probablycannot maintain it over the long term with-out external assistance. Three FROGsurface-to-surface missile launchers wereseen in convoy in the possession of KrajinaSerb forces in mid-July. These may have

been providd !y ,ither Yugoslav or BosnianSerb forces. I

19 EtlcL

^r7-4 t1-tr Jc.'z-I co

] hTet\

Figure 4Krqjina Serb Forces Corps Heedguarters in Croatia

Tleercg 20

c056?11 06

Heavy weapons provide the Krajina SerbArmy an advantage over Croatian groundforces, but command, discipline, and organi-zational problems constrain its effectiveness.Political turrnoil within the Serb communityreportedly has prompted dissent within theofficer corps and disorg anization at the tacti-cal level. The Krajina Serbs have littleability to shift forces arnong widely sep-

arated areas. Largely mobilized reservists,these troops reportedly are ill disciplined andfight poorly. Krajina Serb authorities willcontinue to depend on the Bosnian SerbArmy for supplies and reinforcements. Act-ing in concert, the Krajina Serb forces andBosnian Serb Army or Yugoslav ArmedForces would pos e a significant threat to theCroatian Armed Forces.

---lForces in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Bosnian Serb Army: Dorninatingthe WarOrisins and Manpower. Formed in thespring of 1992 from Yugoslav Arrned Forcesunits based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, theBosnian Serb Arrny (BSA) is cornmanded bya former Yugoslav general, Ratko Mladic. Ithas approximately 60,000 to 80,000 menorganized into six corps and 58 brigades; 10

artillery and antiaircraft regiments, oneFROG surface-to-sqrface rocket battalion,and two antitank regiments to supply heavyfirepower. Sorne 30,000 Serb irregulars sup-plernent the'BSA. Since the beginning of1993, the BSA has been making a systematiceffort to standardize its brigades and inte-grate Territorial Defense Force fighters.Although its regular units are responsive toMladic's authority, many irregulars andpart-time fighters continue to conduct opera-tions on their own. The Bosnian Serbs also

3EErh

have the only fixed-wing combat capabilityin Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before theimplementation of the "no-fly zone," theyemployed their air force prirnarily in supportof their sieges.[---l

Equipment and Training. In March 1992,apparently on orders from Belgrade, theYugoslav army turned over most of its arms'and munitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina tothe Bosnian Serbs. The BSA receivedapproximately 400 to 7 50 tanks, approxi-mately 200 other armored vehicles, 700 to800 artillery pieces, and 450 heavy mortars,as well as 4bout 30 helicopters and 2l fixed-wing com,bat aircraft. Because almost allBSA troops were in the former Yugoslavarmy, they have little difficulty operatingtheir equipment, and their interoperabilitywith Yugoslav forces would be high. None-theless, BSA overall training levels appearlow. Centers for basic and advanced traininghave been reported at Manjaca and Bijeljins,but the BSA apparently rernains shortpfadequately trained troops.l Serbcombat operations suggests that BSA troopsuse simple but effective tactics and proce-dures appropriate for undertrainedpersonnel.

L____j

Logistics. The BSA is largely self-sufficientin ammunition and most military consum-ables, but relies on Yugoslavia for fuel,transportatior, spare parts, and maintenancesupport. There is some evidence of ammuni-tion deliveries frorn Yugoslavia, but thequantities are insufficient to support the levelof fighting in the region. Storage facilities atBanja Luka and Han Pijesak reportedly holdlarge quantities of arnrnunition and are sup-plemented by storage facilities scattered

2l i--_l

c056.?11 06

Cradacac

Tuzla

an Pijesak

SARA'EVO

Vlas{ni." d \l- . o Drina

Bijeljina'

Corp.s . ..

Srebreni

a

tZenica

Kisetjak'

o

Corazde

3 Romaniia** Corps- Zepa

'Adriatic

5ea\.":r't

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settia and Montetpgto nat'i asserrao0E forrnatin of a Pht indePerdsnt

. strtc. hn olb enU'ty ha not bcfi .'fonnalt lecoghed as a state Itte Unitod Stetea

7293tr {ROO38g) 7-93

F

ffia

0

Army headquafters

Corpu headquarters

Corps boundary

llo Kilcrctcn#O 40 Mifes

22

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l

throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conse-quently, we believe that the BSA has amplereserves of ammunition for current levels ofcombat.[----l

The BSA has received regular truck ship-ments of fuel from Yugoslavia, which webelieve indicates it may have little in stor age.The BSA's truck fleet is stretched thin, isshort of fuel tanker trucks, and requires

Teclc\

parts and support from Belgrade. Theseproblerns have sometimes caused local short-ages and make it difficult for the BSA toshift or concentrate forces rapidly. IfBelgrade followed through with its promiseto cut off aid to the Bosnian Serbs, the BSAwould gradually lose its mobility and unitswould be left to live off local stockpiles.Medical support appears adequate. The BSAhas at least one depot repair base, southwestof Sarajevo at HadziciJ-l

Morale. Morale varies greatly among BSAunits and appears fair but fragile. Bettertrained units, such as engineers, appear tohave the best morale. Many Serb fighters arenot professionals and have never faced awell-armed or highlv capable enemy. Deser-tions are common, particularly among troopsserving away from their homes. Moraleamong Serb troops in eastern Bosnia fellsharply when they faced determined Muslimattacks in January 1993. Most BSA unitswould fall apart under a rgq!4ined Westerncombined-arms attack

Leadership. BSA leaders are capable butcautious and unwilling to risk their forces.Many officers are veterans of the formerYugoslav army. They have a clear under-standing of their forces' capabilities andlimitations and gear their operations accord-ingly. As a result, the Serbs avoid directlyattacking Bosnian army positions-whichwould risk heavy casualties and strain thelogistic system. They prefer to surroundMuslim-held areas and use their advantagein heavy weapons to shell them into submis-sion. Coupled with their territorial objec-tives, this approach gives the war a slow-moving, siege-prone character.

23

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Bosnian Serb Combat CapabilitiesForcing a Military Decision in Bosnia andHerzegovinu The BSA can conquer mostrernaining Muslim-held areas of Bosnia andHerzegovins, but onll' at a political and

military price it is unwilling to pay. Becausethe Serbs control much of the flow of civiliansupplies into Muslim areas they could starveboth residents and defenders. The Serbs canconcentrate their forces and firepower andreduce Muslim pockets one at a time, as theyhave been doing in eastern Bosnia since earlyFebruary 1993. They could follow this strat-egy until only Tuzl4 Bihac, and Sarajevo areleft. The Serbs would then be capable oftaking these towns one at a tirne by siege.This approach would take many rnonths,involv e a level of casualties greater than theBSA has been willing to accept, and incur ahigh risk of Western intervention. Conse-quently, the Serbs probably will not try totake by force all of Muslim-held Bosnia andHerzegovina but will maintain pressure on

them.l I

Ability To Hotd Teruitory. The BSA canhold virtually all its territory against attacksby any local opponent. Muslim attacks havepushed back Serb forces and taken Serb-heldland, but these gains have been rnarginal ortemporary. The BSA is the most mobileforce in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its capabil-ity to shift and reinforce units-albeitslowly-and call on Belgrade for ernergencyaid, 8s it did to repel Muslim attacks alongthe Drina River in early 1993, gives it a

virtually unmatchable operationaladvantage.

Likely Response to Western Intewention.The BSA would resist Western interventionin Bosnia and Herzegovina charged withrolling back Serb territorial gains or disarm-ing the BSA but would quickly disintegratein the face of a determined Western opera-tion. Limited mobility would make it diffi-cult for units to avoid coordinated air and

Bosnian Serb Civil -M ilitary Relations

Nominally controlled by the civiliangovernment of the Serb Republic ofBosnia and Herzegovino, the BSA fslargely an independent institution underGeneral Mladic's control. PresidentRadovan Karadzic has complainedthat:

. The BSA does not follow his ordersand has told him that he does notcommand the army.

o The army does not provide him withfull informatton about its own plansand activities and withholds intelli-gence information from him.

. The BSA dismiJreJ officers appointedby him whom it does not findacceptable.

Vice President Nikola Kolievic consid-ers Mladic dangerous.l

I

Mladic appears to have established aneffective command and control system.Information flows reasonably smoothly,and the BSA has demonstrated thecapability to plan and execute opero-tions effecttvely. The Serb commandsystem's greatest weakness is logistics.Local commanders sometimes have togo outside BSA channels to overcometemporary supply shortages.

24

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l

ground attacks by Western forces, and unitsattempting to resist would be overwhelmedquickly. Inadequate intelligence and commu-nications would make it almost impossiblefor BSA units to support one another. Real-izing they were no match for Western forces,large numbers of BSA soldiers would surren-

'der, desert, or flee to Yugoslavia, in ourjudgment. Similarly, the Bosnian Serb airforce would be easily overwhelrned by West-ern airpower. Thousands of other BosnianSerbs would, however, conduct guerrilla war-fare against Western occupation forces,probably with support from Belgrade.

Wectiveness Oyer the Long Term. If a politi-cal settlement ends the fighting in Bosniaand Herzegovina and sets territorial bound-aries, the BSA will gradually decline into a

small militia. Whether it formally annexesthe Bosnian Serb areas or not, Belgrade islikely to view them as Yugoslav territory.The Yugoslav army probably would absorbthe BSA's best units and weapons, dischargethe irregulars, and convert many of theremaining troops into reservists. The formerBSA units would still be stationed in Bosniato guard the frontiers

The Bosnian Army: Outgunned ButHanging OnOrisins and Numbers. The Bosnian Armywas formed in the spring of 1992 when thegovernment in Sarajevo took control of thevarious militia, reserve, and paramilitaryunits in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Althoughmostly Muslim, the Army also includesCroat and Serb personnel. With the additionof volunteers and a small number of foreignIslamic fighters, the Bosnian Army now hasperhaps 100,000 to 120,000 2 men, org anized

2 This figure includes personnel previouslllgryrdgrcd as irregu-lars outside the Army's formal structurel

I

TEcrlt-

in six corps and over 70 brigades. Almostentirely infantry, its units vary widely inmanpower, organization, and military capa-bility. Despite the title-The Army ofBosnia and Herzegovina-units are-notfirmly controlled by Sarajevo. Because unitsare cut off from one another and fighting inisolated pockets, local commanders are virtu-ally autonomous. As a result, the BosnianArmy is essentially a local defense force,with rnost units incapable of shifting areas ofoperation or undertaking coordinated tacti-cal maneuvers.

Equipment and Training. Bosnian forces arepoorly trained and have little equipment. Inthe spring of 1993, the entire Army had only25 tanks and fewer than 200 artillery piecesand heavy mortars; there is a continuingshortage of rifles. The government forceslack a formal training system; troops appearto rely on skills learned in the formerYugoslav army or practical experience,

Logistics. Government forces are short ofvital military supplies and are unable todistribute adequatelf irerns needed forcombat:

The most critical shortage is oi arunu;ri-tion. In March 1993 the defeniers cfSrebrenica reported grave shortags ci al^

types of ammunition, but erpeciai!1 ar-iil-lery rounds. In one brigade. acco:dir:g :c zmilitary debriefing, each solCier \* as

limited to 70 rounds of rifle amn:u::i:il:per week during the fall of 199?.

Medical supplies are scarce. lv{edicai :ienssought in late 1992 included sterile gloves.

thermometers, and bandages, 3s well as

antibiotics and other medications.

25 Secret

-=;^'ir^;Jv-VQ4

I

TRrRI

Figure 6Bosnian Army Headquarters, Corps, andAreas of Responsibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina

SEcr€L 26

c0562r706$

This table iFe?d-

Serb blockades make regular resupply ofisolated units extremely difficult; in easternBosnia, supplies are often delivered by rnuleconvoys.[_______-]

Sarajevo has sought both to buy weaponsand amrnunition abroad and to make them inBosnia and Herzegovina. All imported armsenter Bosnia and Herzegovina throughCroatian-held territory, and Zagreb haltedthese shipments in the spring of 1993. By itsown count, &S of February 1993 Sarajevohad imported some 25,000 rifles, about 100rnortars, 15 million rounds of rifle ammuni-tion, and 47,000 mortar rounds. Given thescope of the fighting and shortags, thesesupplies have been inadequate. In January1993 the Bosnian Government still soughtanother 100,000 assault rifles with 7 50 mil-lion rounds of ammunition, 8s well as mor-tars and artillery pieces, oD the internationalarms market. Factories in government-heldareas, particularll' around Sarajevo, haveproduced some weapons and several million

lSeerct-

rounds of rifle ammunition, but production isreportedly slowing as stocks of parts andexplosives are exhausted.F

Morale. Bosnian Army morale appears to begood. Government forces fight tenaciously onthe defensive and have frequently attackedsuperior Serb forces; desertions do notappear to be a serious problem. They arernotivated by the knowledge that they aredefending their homes and farnilies and bythe desperation of their position. Becausethey know the consequences of losing, Bov-ernment forces will retain their cohesion andcontinue fighting stubbornly. In some bat-tles, such as the one around Jajce in the fallof 1992, trapped army units slood and foughtto the last man.l

_l

Leadership. The Bosnian Army is command-ed by officers of the former YugoslavPeoples Army, and additional leaders haveemerged during the war, partially compen-sating for the Army's lack of professionalofficers and NCOs. Fragmentary evidenceindicates that these leaders have emerged bycombining combat performance, bravery,and charisma. Although this process hasgiven the government forces a cadre of effec-tive local leaders whorn troops will follow,the Army has been unable to develop system-atic procedures for identifying and trainingprofessional officers. The local nature ofleadership and troop loyalties hinders effortsto coordinate actions, makes replacing unitleaders difficult, and makes enforcing cease-fire agreements difficult. l____ ,

Bosnian Army Combat CapabilitiesAbility To Hold or Retake Tewitory. TheArmy cannot hold territory against deter-rnined Serb offensives. Because many

27 lscrct-

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r S*L

government units are either trapped in Serb-surrounded areas or lack mobility, Sarajevois unable to shift its forces to counter a Serbadvance. Because they are outgunned andlow on ammunition, government forces canrarely reply to Serb artillery, counter Serbarmor, or stop Serb infantry attacks withmassed firepower. Except in cities likeSarajevo, where the prospect of street fight-ing deters an all-out Serb attack, the BSAcan continue to take government-held areasone at a time. The government forces haveseized terrain from HVO forces that lackCroatian army suppot,]

|

Similarly, the Bosnian Army cannot perma-nently retake ground from the Serbs. Localgovernment units have frequently attackedSerb-held areas near Sarajevo and in easternBosnia, taking and holding ground for shortperiods. Invariably, however, the Serbsregroup, counterattack, and eject theBosnian forces. Bosnian units have frequentlyattacked to cut Serb supply lines, especiallythose in northern Bosnia and near Sarajevo,but they have been unable to hold theirground for more than a few days.n

Likely Response to Western Intertention,The Bosnian Army would welcome Westernintervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Sarajevo undoubtedly views Western actionas its best chance for survival. Interventionand an end to Serb attacks would greatlyreduce pressure on the Army, which wouldalmost certainly use the breathing room torest, train, and rearm. The Bosnian Arrnywould also try to occupy areas vacated byretreating BSA units and would probablystep up guerrilla attacks on Serb forces.Should Western peacekeepers try to stopthese actions, the government forces proba-bly would respond violently, while trying tomake their acts appear to be the work ofSerbs

Wectiveness Over the Long Term. If theWest does not intervene, the Bosnian Army'scapabilities will steadily deteriorate. As theSerbs continue to take government-heldareas, centralized command and control willbe lost, and the Bosnian Army probably willbecom e a series of locally controlled com-mands. In such a situation these forces willturn increasingly to uncoordinated small-unit operations. Determined ethnic cleansingby the Serbs, however, would reduce theMuslim population and make operationssteadily more difficult. | |

Croatian Defense ForcesOrisins and Numhers. Aided by Zagreb,Bosnian Croats organized the HVO in thespring of 1992. Originally a loose collectionof Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) activ,ists, local citizens, and ex-TerritorialDefense Forces personnel, HVO unit organi-zation grew stronger with the influx of for-mer Yugoslav Peoples Army officers andtroops, 4s well as Croatian arrny officers andpersonnel. Croatian Defense Forces now con-sist of an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 mendivided among four operational zones andorganized in 28 brigades. Locally recruitedHVO units rely on the Croatian ArmedForces for support and assistance and gener-ally coordinate their activities with Zagreb,but they retain substantial operational inde-pendence.f---l

Equipment and Training. The HVO is aIight infantry force whose equipment andtraining are inadequate for offensive opera-tions without major reinforcements. SeniorCroatian officials have acknowledged arm-ing the HVO, and reports indicate the HVOhas enough small arms. An HVO brigademay have as many as four to five tanks orarmored vehicles and eight to 12 artillery

fSEcrcL 28

c0552r1 06

a

Figure 7Croatian Defense Forces GrvO) Headquarters andOperational Zones in Bosnia and Herzegovina

29 secret

c05 b2r1 06b;.t

t

pieces or heavy mortars, but most units havefewer.the HVO recently estab ain-ing course, but most training is provided inindividual units with widely varying quality.

Logistics. HVO logistics are makeshift butreasonably effective. Spot munitions short-ages have been reported, and food distribu-tion reportedly is a continuing problem.Units are generally well equipped with smallarms, amrnunition, and equipment, due toZagreb's direct support for the HVO. HVOactivities are coordinated with the CroatianGeneral Staff, and the Croatian arrny truckssupplies directly to HVO units. Adequate foroperations close to support bases, the currentlevel of logistic capability would not permitHVO forces to undertake mobile or extendedoperations.

I

Morale and Leadership. Morale in HVOunits appears to be uniformly good becausethe troops are defending their homes, farn-ilies, and property. This strong commitmentenables Croatian troops to overcome some ofthe deficiencies in their training. Despitesome probleffis, especially in central Bosnia,HVO forces appear relatively disciplined andreasonably effective. Some brigades proba-bly are led by Croatian Armed Forces offi-cers.3 Like the Croatian Armed Forces, theHVO almost certainly has an inadequatenumber of trained, effective junior officersand Ncos-shortagbs that will continue tolimit its tactical operations.--t The Acting Assistant Setetary cf State Ior Intelligence andResearch believes that, while some Hl/O brigades may be ledby Croatian ArryC{-lprces eficers, there is no specific evidenceto support this.

HYO Combat Capabilities. Supported bythe Croatian Armed Forces, HVO forces canhold rnost of the land they currently occupyagainst the Bosnian Serb Army or Bosnianforces. Rough terrain, fluid and discontinu-ous frontlines, and the small-scale, relativelystatic nature of most combat enable theHVO both to harass Serb for.ces and tosecure communications lines with scatteredartillery outposts. In the unlikely event thatBSA or Bosnian operations endangeredCroatian control of occupied portions ofBosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian arrnyregulars would immediately reinforce threat-ened sectors. In early May 1993, for exam-ple, after heavy fighting broke out betweenthe HVO and Bosnian units around Mostar,Croatian President Tudjman orderedapproximately 3,000 regular Croatian armytroops sent to Bosnia to reinforce the HVO,according to a generally reliable source.

Acting alone, the HVO cannot take addi-tional territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Croatian Defense Forces lack the transport,cornrnunications, logistic support, and com-mand structure needed to undertake mobileoperations across a broad front. HVO unitsreportedly are also reluctant to eng ageenemy forces beyond their home regions. Inadditior, they are no match for better armedBosnian Serb Army units and probably inca-pable of withstandine heavy attack by Serbarmor or artillery. The HVO's manpower,mobility, and heavy weapons would be inade-quate to overcorne Bosnian forces, should theHVO attempt a large-scale offensive. f----l

Secret 30

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1

Wectiveness Over the Long Term. The mili-tary capabilities of the HVO will improvemodestly over tirne. Zagreb aims to holdportions of Bosnia and Herzegovina princi-pally with HVO troops and probably willtake small steps to bolster their capabilities.Combat skills will improve if the HVO insti-tutionalizes basic training, and the shortageof junior officers and NCOs can be redressedif the Croatian army increases professionaltraining. Acquisition of substantial amountsof armor and artillery is unlikely, but Zagrebmight provide the HVO with rnore lightantitank weapons and mortars. In the eventof heavy Serb-Croat fighting in Bosnia, the

Bosnian Croats will mobilize additional man-power but would still rely on the Croatianarmy to hold off the Serbs or Bosnian Gov-ernment forces

Likely Response to Western Intemention.Croatian Defense Forces would exploit thepresence of Western combat forces to solidi-fy their control of territory in Bosnia andHerzegovina. Croatian Defense Forces arelikely to view foreign intervention against theSerbs as disabling their strongest enemy.They almost certainly would take advantageof the likely disintegration of the Bosnian

3l

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1

Serb Army to assert control over the remain-ing contested portions of western Herze-govina, to ritake territory around Jajce andKupres, and to improve defensive positionsastride Serb supply lines in northern Bosnia.They will not surrender their weapons andare likely to resist Western efforts to disarrnthe HVO or reintroduce Sarajevo's authorityin areas they currently occupy.

32

I _ 5 5 2\= ,l)

tSecret

Annex AForce Structure of theYugoslav Ground Forces

Yugoslavia's most capable ground forces aredeployed opposite Croatia and in areas ofpotential domestic unrest. The bulk of theGround Forces' striking power-tanks, fight-ing vehicles, and heavy artillery-resides in65 maneuver brigades. The I I armored andrnechanized brigades are its most capableunits. Eight are in northern Serbia for possi-ble use against Cro atia or to contain conflictin Vojvodina or the Sandzak; two more arein Kosovo. According to an untested source,the government recently created a specialcorps to control a military police brigade andcomrnando troops in Belgrade, ry-horq rnissionwe judge to be regime security.[_]

The Ground Forces are striving to extractrnaximum combat power from existingforces. Yugoslav army corps do not havecommand and control structures intended tocontrol mobile operations. The corps arestatic area defense commands assignedarmored, mechanized, infantry, and artillerybrigades consonant with their missions.r

I

I lGround Forces areTeiiilng Wffira equipmsnt-forexample, T-34 tanks, M-46 tank destroyers,and A- 19 artillery-and are redistributinghundreds of newer heavy weapons withdrawnfrom Slovenia and Croatia. The GroundForces have taken control of the TerritorialDefense Forces and assigned to rear area andlocal defense missions their estimated400,000 personnel who would be available inwartime. -

Yugoslavia's Ground Forces could not sur-vive a Western attack as a conventionalarmored force, but we judge Belgrade wouldbe able to mobilize and disperse a guerrillaarmy. The General Staff has transferred 24cadre light infantry brigades from the Terri-torial Defense Forces and created rnotorizedbrigades equipped with small arms and mor-tars for extended combat. Multiple garrisonsand depots, decen tralized mobilizationpoints, and extensive munitions stockpileswould present foreign forces with fewconcentrated targets. Centr alized conscrip-tion and recruiting will enable authorities to

33 Tgcret

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-Secrq 34

c05621106a

call up additional manpower with warning ofwar. In our judgment, reservists would gen-erally report in response to a direct threat toYugoslavia, and the army's field forces couldswell to well over 200,000, augmented bythousands of reservists or local defenseforces. Fragmentary evidence indicatesrecent mobilization drills have been wellorganized and effective

35 ts?r.L

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Annex B

Secret

Force Structure of theYugoslav Navy

Belgrade is struggling to align the Navy intoan effective force, but the Navy has littleoffensive capability. Only four frigates, eightto nine patrol boats, and two to three ope ra-tional submarines possess m<,'dern weaponsfor use against Western forces. Althoughthese forces are designed for offshore raid-ing, the Navy has lost the tunnels, ports, andother safehavens upon which its former doc-trine of hit-and-run attacks rested. The Navyalso lacks the sensors, weapons, and plat-forms for over-the-horizon attacks. In ourjudgment, in operations short of war, theNavy will restrict its operations to theMontenegrin coast-mining those waters ifthe West intervened against the BosnianSerbs. If the West attacked Yugoslavia, theNavy would attempt to attack Western navalforces in the Adriatic with submarine andsurface forces]--l

Yugoslav authorities control over 4,800 oper-ational naval mines, including acoustic, bot-tom influence, and moored contact rnines.According to attache reportirg, plans call forlaying 3,000 mines off the Montenegrincoast.l-

,

The Ground Forces' Maritime Commandpossesses artillery and antiship missiles forcoastal defense. themis sile reg imen tffiffi a tedl2 SS-C-3 launchers and 48 missiles, is

located near thepal facility near

Tivat naval base theaa

rlncl-Kotor Baysome missiles may also be

deployed in the vicinity of the port at Bar.The Ground Forces also have two regimentsof 36 to 40 M-46 130-mm field guns forcoastal defense, and imagery shows half ofthese guns are at Tivat. The remainder,along with a substantial but unknown num-ber of World War Il-era 88-ffifr, 90-mm,and 94-mm antiaircraft guns deployed as

coastal artillery, are scattered in othercoastal positions

Yugoslavia's naval aviation capabilities arelimited. The prewar air force had threesquadrons trained for antiship operations.These units probably are deployed atIvangrad and Podgorica, but there is littlecontinuing training in an antiship role.Although the Air Force has early versions ofthe TV-guided Maverick missile and report-edly has Soviet-made AS-7 Kerry air-to-ground missiles, it would depend primarilyon gravity bombs and unguided rockets toattack foreign shipping.

37 s.l..t

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1c5621106

Annex CForce Structure of the YugoslavAir and Air Defense Forces

Belgrade is restructuring the Air Force toboost the capabilities of a shrunken force.The service reportedly now comprises a sin-gle air corps with subordinate brigades atBatajnica, Kraljevo, Podgorica, and Pristina.lts inventory includes:

.. Five fighter-bomber squadrons.

. Six fighter squadrons.

. Two reconnaissance squadrons.

o Five attack helicopter squadrons.

o Three transport/utility squadronrl I

The Air Force inventory remains a genera-

tion or more behind that of Western forces.Its most effective platforms are the 12 high-performance, all-weather MiG-29s equippedwith older AA-8 and more recent AA- l0 andAA- 1 I missiles. the AirForce has stored more than 100 outdatedGaleb-Jastreb fighter-bombers. The prirnaryair-to-air platforlns are the I l l MiG-21fighters equipped with AA-2 and AA-8missil.t" -.-Air Force operations have not significantlyaffected the military situation on the ground.Commanders have been reluctant to expose

Gazelle and Hip C attack helicopters toground fire and relied on MiG-21s, Oraos,and Super-Galebs for close air support in

earlier fighting. Croat and Muslim troopshave openly acknowledged the psychologicaleffect of attacks to which they could notrespond. Their rnilitary impact has been

undermined, however, by the small scale ofmost ground combat, the proximity of theengaged forccs to each other, and the coverafforded by difficult terrain. The effective-ness of airstrikes has been reduced by limitedsupplies of smart munitions and the propen-sity to attack from high altitude]---l

The limited number of modern combat air-craft and dated air-to-air weapons would notallow the Yugoslav Air and Air DefenseForces to withstand a Western coalition aircampaign. However, they would be quitecapable against neighboring air forces. Theirpilots are proficient at simple intercepts andnight operations but lack the training andequiprnent to conduct effective operationsagainst NATO air forces. fn our judgment,

air combat would reveal widespread short-cornings in defensive maneuvering, the use ofcountermeasures, and beyond-visual opera-tions. The Yugoslav Air and Air DefenseForces do, however, enjoy the advantages ofsirnple operating systems, dispersal in ruggedterrain, stockpiles of war material, and a

legacy of self-sufficiency. The General Staffis cornpetent and has completed an overhaulof its air defense doctrine. I

The Air Defense Forces field a range ofstrategic and tactical surface-to-air missiles.

39 but**t.

c0562r106\Sec)\

e SA-2 and seven

SA-3 battalions defend Belgrade and air-bases and defense industries south of thecity. Four additional SA-3 battalions protectkey airfields elsewhere in Yugoslavia. TheYugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces controlfive deployed 5A-6 regirnents, and theGround Forces control .84 FA-a launchgrsand four SA- l3 launchers

40

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Annex t)Force Structure ofNavy, and Air and

the Croatian Ground Forc€srAir Defense Forces

Although Zagreb is attempting to increasemobility and firepower, the Croatian GroundForces generally remain a territorial defenseforce. Despite the creation of Guards Mobilebrigades, most of the force c.onsists of rela-tively immobile, lightly armed infantry bri-gades and Home Guard regiments suitedprincipally for local defense. Insufficientweapons, as well as the limited training, poordiscipline, and the frequent morale problemsamong mobilized reservists, will continue toconstrain the Ground Forces' capacity toundertake multibrigade offensive operations.

I

Croatian brigades, the basic combat unit,vary in strength and capability. Units rangein size from 1,000 to 3,000 men. GuardsMobile brigades, the most stand ardized andcapable units, have the greatest firepower-four infantry battalions, a tank company orbattalion, and organic air defense-and a

reduced logistic structure to heighten mobil-ity. Two brigades are opposite Serb forces inwestern Slavonia, and the remainder shiftacross operational zones as needed. Infantrybrigades, the Ground Forces' backbone, havedifferent amounts of armor, artillery, andair defense weapons and probably are taskorganized. Home Guard regirnents, designedfor static defense, are equipped with smallarms, light artillery, and mortatt.---

The Croatian Ground Forces are attempting,with mixed success, to extract maximulncombat power from available resources. The

General Staff has created a core of reliable,effective, and better armed troops in theGuards Mobile brigades. Moreover, aninflux of former Yugoslav Peoples Armyofficers and the overhaul of the GeneralStaff have strengthened planning. Recentoperations show improvements in the GroundForces' use of terrain and fire support. Itscapabilities as a maneuver force are unlikelyto show substantial improvement, however,until Zagreb successfully addresses short-comings in small-unit leadership and a con-'tinuing

inability to coordinate operationseffectively[--l

The Croatian Navy is the smallest fleet inthe Adriatic and will continue to maintain a

low operational profile. The fleet is dividedinto operational sectors headquartered atPula, Sibenik, and Kardeljevo (Ploce). Keycombatants (Koncar- and Osa-class guidedmissile boats) probably are sailing from Split.

4T \,

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-]I

I

Operational readiness has improved, but pa-trols remain short and close to shore andshortages of parts and technicians continueto undermine weapons effectiveness. Croatiaprobablv intends in the future to patrol thesouthern Adriatic from refurbished navalbases at Vis and Lastovo Islands. Its currentorientation is defensive, however, and evi-dence exists that Zagreb plans to rnine keysections of its coastline if the federal navyattacks

The Croatian Air Force and Air DefenseForces operate almost as a "flying club" oflittle rnilitary utility. No strategic air defenseexists, and most air defense weapons areintegrated within Ground Forces units. [ |

42

l,-1 56211 O6}ecret

Annex EForce Structure of theBosnian Serb Army

The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) is organizedthe same way as the former YugoslavPeoples ArmV (JNA), from which it inheritedmost of its units and equipment. The BSAhas six corps-sarajevo-Romenija, IKrajina, II Krajina, Herzegovina, EasternBosnia, and Drina-five of which are

renamed JNA corps. Each corps is based on

two to four rnotorized brigades, usually sup-plemented by light infantry, an antitankbrigade, and an artillery brigade; there are

only two armored brigades attached to theBSA corps. Motorized, armored, and lightinfantry brigades usually have threemaneuver battalions; a mortar platoon; and

engineering, signal, rnedical, and service pla-

toons. The army's surface-to-surface FROGrocket battalion and four SA-2 battalions, alllocated around Banja Luka, are not attached

to any of the corps.f--l

The BSA has not undertaken a reform pro-gram similar to the Yugoslav army's, largelybecause its structure is adequate for imrnedi-ate goals. Bosnia's rugged terrain and poor

road network put armored forces at a disad-vantage; consequently, the BSA's corps

structure provides sufficient resources formoving and concentrating forces withoutsacrificing the infantry component essential

for success in the Bosnian hills. In addition,continuing combat operations and a shortage

of manpower preclude the BSA from with-drawing frontline units for reorganizing and

retraining

43

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c056211 06b""rrt-

Annex FForce Structure of theBosnian Army

Bosnian Army organization reflects its hastyformation in the spring of 1992. Formally,the arrny is organized into six corps: I(Sarajevo), II (Tu zla), Ul (Zenica), IV(Mostar), V (Bihac), and VI (i(onjic), with atotal of more than 70 brigades. Unlike theBSA, however, neither corps nor brigadeshave a standard organization. Sorne brigadesreportedly have as Inany as 4,000 ';o 5,000men, while others have fewer than 1,000,

Because the corps operate in isolated pock-ets, they have become largely independent ofone another. Each corps consists rnostly of

men from a particular geographic area, mak-ing it dedicated to local defense but reluctantto help units only a few miles away. More-over, the Bosnian government has little morethan norninal control over the corps, makingit difficult to order and carry out coordinatedoperations. This has worked to the Serbstadvantage, enabling them to defeat BosnianArmy strongholds one by one, while mini-mizing the risk of surprise attack in the rear.

tlll

45 -See4t

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Annex GForce Structure of the CroatianDefense Forces

The Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) has fewstand ardized units, and most of its combatformations are incompletely equipped. Bri-gades, consisting of three to six infantrybattalions, an antitank batteiy, a mortarbattery, and support platoons, are the basicmaneuver unit. Brigade size varies from a

few hundred to several thous.and men, andfew have the complete table of org anizationand equipment. The average brigade proba-bly has 2,000 to 3,000 men, equipped withlight artillery, various mortars, and antitankweapons. Sorne units probably have a hand-ful of T- 541 55 tanks and lo, arrnored vehi-cles,' but antitank weapons are generally inshort supply, and none of the HVO brigadeshas organic air defense.

HVO lines of command vary, and brigadecommanders almost certainly have broadindependence within their area of responsi-bility. In one of four HVO operational

zones-comparable to corps-brigades aresubordinate to operational groups. Echelonsabove brigade, however, ate not mobile com-mand and control structures and appear tobe principally static area defense commands.Most units take orders from Croatian Demo-cratic Union (HDZ) leader and HVO chiefMate Boban, but the Bosnian governmenthas operational control over four to sevenHVO brigades. Press t-_-_---teportingindicate joint Hvo-Bosnian Army localcommands have been formed in Bihac andalong the northern corridor, and otherreporting indicates that the two forces con-tinue to plan joint operations.l----l

47 b.?TrL

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c05621106

Annex HChemical Warfare Capabitities

Before it broke up, Yugoslavia had the rnostsophisticated defensive chemical warfare(CW) industry in Eastern Europe and pro-duced individual protective equipment, vari-ous CW agent detection devrces. and some

,

decontamination equiprnent,l I

| |the formerproduced chemical warfare agents and muni-tions at two locations-Mostar andKrusevac. These agents include the nerveagent sarin, the blister agent mustard, andtear Bas, as well as the psychotropic agentBZ. All offensive CW production plants thatwe have identified are under the control ofthe Yugoslav military

We assess that Belgrade has at least a smallstockpile of delivery vehicles for chemicalweapons. Reporting indicates that Yugosla-via has produced 155-rnm artillery shells, aswell as 128-mm and 262-mm rockets withCW agent fills. Approximately 1,000 roundsof each caliber were produced, and 4,800

122-mrn artillery shells are available forfilling if agent production is resumed. As of1990, total production was estimated at 5

tons of sarin, I ton of rnustard, and 100 tonsof tear gas. It is not clear what type ofchemical weapons employment doctrine Bel-grade mieht use.{---l

The Bosnian gov-n-r"*as a lirnited chem-ical capability based on commercially pro-duced chlorine and phosgene gases. Up to1,500 tons of phosgene and chlorine havebeen produced in a chemical plant nearTuzla. While the Bosnian government lackschemical artillery munitions, these gases

could be released from canisters. Yugoslavarmy gas masks provide protection fromthese gases, so the threat is chiefly to civil-ians. Desperate Bosnian defenders may be

tempted to use these gases in a propagandaploy to gain international attention.

49

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c05621106

Annex ITerrorism \ NonconventionalResponse to Intervention?

The international terrorism threat to US andother Western interests has grown with USparticipation in humanitarian aid missions toBosnia and would increase with direct US orWestern military intervention, BosnianMuslims and Serb radicals currently repre-sent the primary potential threats,]

|

As long as Serbs are winning the war inBosnia, we believe that Serbia has little togain by conducting or sponsoring terroristacts in the United States and Europe. Thethreat of Serb-sponsored terrorisrn againstthe United States and other Western coun-tries would grow, however, if the Serbs per-ceived an increasingly anti-Serb slant inWestern efforts to resolve the confli.,f__I

The greatest threat would corne from inde-pendent Serb paramilitary groups-particu-larly those led by "Arkan," "CaptainDragar," Vojislav Seselj, and DragoslavBokan. They all have access to arms andexplosives, and some are skilled at eludingpolice and traveling under false documents.They are capable of carrying out terroristacts against US interests in the formerYugoslavia, Western Europe, and possiblythe United States, although probably notagainst well-defended diplomatic or militaryfacilities. Some members of Arkan's groupmay be planning terrorist attacks in the

U4tlg{ Slelqq g1rdlfqqle1 n _Eu rope.

Since the bombing of the World Trade Cen-ter in New York, Serbs outside Serbia havemade numerous terrorist threats. These indi-viduals probably are capable of mountinglow-level attacks against US facilities, likethe summer 1992 firebombings against theUSIS library in Belgrade and the vandalismin February 1993 against the USIS andGerrnan libraries

There is no evidence that the Serbian gov-ernment is developing an infrastructure toattack well-defended targets in Europe. Theformer Yugoslav intelligence service, how-ever, was known to assassinate dissidentsabroad, and the current Serbian serviceundoubtedly has inherited that capability.

Over the long term, Bosnian Muslims, whoare likely to be the biggest losers and toblame the West, may become the biggestthreat. They have links to Iranian-supportedHizballah-which reportedly has a cell inBosni a-and other Middle Eastern terroristgroups that pose a substantial threat to theUnited States. A delegation from theBosnian cell attended Hizballah's foreignpolicy conference in Beirut in August 1992,

-

-] I

I

lIn addition, we estimate thatffi Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC) personnel are training Muslimfighters in Bosni a. -

'

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We believe that Palestinian terrorist groupsthat either maintained relations with or oper-ated in Yugoslavia before the war will takeinto account developments in the MiddleEast, their own political agendas, and statesponsors' reactions before attacking US tar-gets. The Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine-General Command (PFLP-GCFwhich is developing close ties to Iran-is thePalestinian terrorist group most likely tostage attacks on behalf of Bosnian Muslims.Other Palestinian terrorist org anizationswith a presence in Yugoslavia-includingthe Abu Nidal organization, Abu Abbas'sfaction of the Palestine Liberation Front(PLF), and remnants of the Fatah SpecialOperations (or Hawari) Group-have not yetconsidered the conflict in Bosnia an impor-tant part_ef,1bgg political or operationalagend"rt_____j

Of the groups involved in the fighting inBosnia, the Croats, in our view, currentlyhave less rnotivation to undertake terroristacts than either the Bosnian Muslims or theSerbs. Nonetheless, observers note that thereis strong anti-UN sentiment among the Cro-atian people, and Croat extremist groups andparamilitary forces are capable of using ter-rorism or supporting terrorist groups as ameans of venting their frustration with theUN force's inability to bring about a com-plete Serb withdrawal from eastern Croatia.Croat groups have conducted terrorist acts inthe past -121tm4rily against official Yugoslavtargets. i

i

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Annex JParamilitary Terrorism inthe Former Yugoslavia

The majority of paramilitary groups con-ducting terrorism in Bosnia and Croatia arearmed wings of established ultranationalistpolitical parties in Serbia and Croatia. InCroatia, the most visible and violent nationalorganization is the HOS, the armed factionof the Croatian Party of Rights. HOS leaderDobislav Paraga has been an outspokenopponent of efforts by the Zagreb govern-

ment to negotiate with Serbia. HOS forceswere heavily involved in the fighting in west-ern Herzegovina and are accused of detain-ing and mistreating Serbian civilians. Asearch of Croatian Party of Rights head-quarters in Zagreb uncovered 3 tons ofweapons and explosives. Several HOS lead-ers, including Paraga, Ante Djapic, MileDedakovic, and Ante Prkacin, have been

charged with terrorism and with calling forthe forceful overthrow of the Croatiangovernment.f----l

Three well-known Serbian paramilitaryorganizations are responsible for much of theterrorism associated with Serbia's attempt toannex lands in Bosnia and Croatia. The sizeof these forces is undeterrnined. They oper-ate sporadically and are reportgg_ln qostmajor areas of ethnic fighting. i

i

The Serbian Chetnik Movement (SCP), theparamilitary wing of the ultranationalistSerbian Radical Party (SRS), is led by Vojis-lav Seselj. Seselj is a rnember of both theSerbian and Yugoslav parliaments. Seselj'sSCP troops are known for ethnic cleansing in

Croatia and Bosnia. Ceko Dacevic, a notori-ous local chieftain of the SCP in Montene-gro, was arrested by authorities in Pljevlja.Dacevic is suspected of orchestrating bomb-ings and assaults against Muslirn homes andbusinesses in the Sandzak region.

Zeljko Raznjatovic, a common crirninal whois on Interpol's watch list for violent crimi-nals, has adopted the alias "Arkan" andleads a pardrnilitary band based in Belgrade.Arkan's group reportedly trains near Ilokand Erdut in Sector East of the UN Protec-tion Force Zone. The group has expellednon-Serbs from their homes and businessesand has stolen propetrt-

The paramilitary wing of the SerbianNational Renewal Party (SNO), called theWhite Eagles, is led by Dragoslav Bokan.The White Eagles gained notoriety for mur-dering Muslim civilians during the assault on

Visegrad in April 1992. Bokan is a closeassociate of SNO leader Mirko Jovic. Jovicand the SNO have been associated withseveral other paramilitary formations,including the Ravna Gora Youth, theSerbian Falcons, and Dusan the Strong.

__l

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Annex KImpact of Terrain and Weatheron Military Operations

Clirnatic OverviewThe former Yugoslavia has two widely vary-ing geographic and climatic regions, each

with a differing impact on military opera-tions. The climate of the coast is Medit erra'nean, with hot, dry summers and cool, wetwinters. The interior highlands and northernplains differ from the coast in thai precipita-tion is spread rnore evenly throughout theyear, temperatures are slightly colder, andsnow occurs frequently during winter. Themean relative humidity varies regionally,seasonally, and diurnally, dependJng primar-ily on elevation, exposure, and proxirnity towater bodies. Surface winds are usually lightand variable throughout the year. Air opera-tions are barely hindered at any time duringthe year along the coast or during the sum-rner in the highlands and northern plains.

During the late fall through early springthese higher elevations experience conditionsthat could hamper air operations nearly 50percent of the time.l

Potential Impact on Ground OperationsThe Northern Plain The northern region,which runs in a northwest-southeast axis forsome 480 km-roughly corresponding to thearea between Zagreb and Belgrade-accounts for approximately 20 percent of theformer Yugoslavia. This area-with a maxi-mum width of 21 0 krn-is generally low and

flat and is bounded on its southern extent bythe Sava River plain. It is well suited forlarge-scaie. rapid ground operations.

----

Weather does not provide a significant obsta-cle to rnilitary activities in this region.Intensely hot summers with long dry spellsare common. In winter, sometimes for pro-

longed periods, bitterly cold winds can resultin temperatures well below freezing-aver-age minimum January ternperatures ate

. about -3oC and maximum about 3"C-butsnow is not cornmon. July temperatures can

range between l6oC and 29oC. Summerrains that fall in the form of heavy thunder-showers can tejrnporaTily inhibit some opera-

tions, howevtt.l I

The Soathern Mountains'. The region to thesouth of the Sava River includes Croatia'sDalmatian coast, virtually all of Bosnia, and

southern Serbia. This region-whichaccounts for the remaining 80 percent of the

forrner Yugoslavia-is characterized by

numerous mountain ridges and peaks, nar-row steep-sided valleys, and scattered level

basins. The highest elevations-a maximumof 2,820 rneters<an be found in the west-

ern portion of the area, but average eleva-

tions range between 1,500 and 2, 100 meters.

Although ideally suited for irregular opera-tions, the varied and channelizing terrainrnakes the region unsuitable for large-scaleground operations by he avy forces,[-l

Unlike the northern plain, weather in thisregion does limit military operations. Heavyprecipitation in the form of rain and snow is

common in this area The western region is

55

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wetter, with rain throughout the year-meanannual precipitation is about 180 millime-ters. Winter snows and ice-which last forabout three months-can close many roadsthroughout Bosnia and slow movements inCroatia and Serbia. Spring thaws in themountains may also cause some local flood-ing. Mean temperatures are also lower be-cause of altitude, with 54 temperatures de-creasing by about 20 C for every 300-meterincrease in altitude.f_*----l

I

Potential Climatic Impacts on AerialOperationsWinter months are the worst for conductingaerial operations in the former Yugoslavia.Cloud cover is especially persistent in theinterior highlands and northern plains duringthe late fall, winter, and early spring(October through March), often impedingoperations 50 percent of the tirne. Weatherconditions are much better along the coastyear-round, however, although ceilings andvisibilities are sometimes restricted in latefall and winter by fog, rain, and snow. At theend of winter and in early spring, windssometirnes of gale force and lasting days canoccur along the Adriatic coast. Overall, theperiod May through August is best for aerialoperations. I I

Winte, foJln, to Febraary). Winters aregenerally mild and rainy along the coast, butit can be very cold in the higher mountains.Snow is common inland from Decemberthrough March but is rare along the coast.Over the plains in the northeast, winters are

cold with light precipitation, falling quiteoften as snow. Frequent low-pressure sys-tems moving through the area make cloudcover greatest in winter. Maximum precipi-tation associated with these lows occurs infall and early winter.

Sprins (March to May). Cloudiness eitherstays the same as in winter or decreases,depending on location. Vertical developmentin the clouds increases as ihe months pro-gress. Precipitation is generally plentifulbecause migratory low-pressure systems arenumerous. Most precipitation falls as heavyshowers or in short periods of heavy continu-ous rain or snow.

Summer (June to August). The best weatheroccurs during the summer because the fre-quency of migratory weather systems is at aminimum and visibility remains good untilearly fall. Coastal areas have land and sea

breezes with the sea breeze, the stronger ofthe two, sometimes reaching 2I knots. Mostprecipitation comes from afternoon orevening thunderstorms.

Fatl (Siptember to Noviember). The numberof low-pressure systems crossing overYugoslavia begins to increase during the fall,bringing increased cloudiness, and decreasedvisibility occurs. Skies are generally cloudiestin the afternoon. Restricted visibility occursmost often in late fall, associated with theincrease in rain and snow. I I

56

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Annex LTransportation, Energl, andCg-munications Infrastructure

OverviewAs a result of the breakup of the formerYugoslavia, the Croatian-Serbian war, andthe ongoing conflict in Bosnia, rnuch of theregion's already strained infrastructure hasbeen seriously degraded:

. The former Yugoslavia had a relativelywell-developed communications infrastruc-.ture. The civil Post, Telephone, andTelegraph (PTT) authorities maintained a

network of buried coaxial cable and line-of-sight microwave radio relays that facili-tated civil telecornmunicatiors, while pro-viding channels to rnilitary subscriberswhen necessary. In addition, the formerYugoslav Peoples Arrny operated its owndedicated microwave radio relay network,supported by buried cable and high-frequency radio nets. Shortly before thedissolution of the Yugoslav state, civil net-works were being upgraded with advanceddigital switches, cellular networks, andfiber-optic transmission systems, Serbia,Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia are cur-rently operating inherited telecomrnunica-tions infrastructure to support theirnational requirements; telecommunicationssystems in Bosnia and Herzegovina arebadly damaged and operate onlyintermittently.

. The energy infrastructure-which was

able to satisfy much of Yugoslavia's energyneeds-included a wide variety of hydro-electric and standard coal- and oil-fired

generating facilities. War damage, sanc-' tions, and mismanagement have reducedcapacity in some areas. For example,Croatia's Dalmatian coast has been virtu-ally cut off from the rest of the nationalgrid since 1992 when Serb forces destroyedkey transport lines-resulting in severeshortages. Sorne parts of Bosnia have beensimilarly cut off. Rerouting power suppliesto these areas will require expensive infra-structure irnprovements.

o The former Yugoslav transportation net-work is also in poor condition. Despite itsrole as a key avenue for north-south trafficthrough the Balkans, rnuch of the road andrail network has not been adequately main-tained. War damage-particularlydestroyed bridges, and tunnels-has furtherreduced capacity.l

I

SerbiaSerbia's civil telecommunications networklags behind comparable Western systerns.International communications with Serbia isprovided by cable and microwave links, as

well as by the INTELSAT satellite station atIvanjica, opproxirnately 70 miles south ofBelgrade. The army has access to the formerYugoslav Peoples Army military microwavenetwork for national-level military cornmuni-cations. Tactical comrnunications are a mix-ture of frequency-hopping radios capable ofhigh-speed digital encryption and frequencysy'nthesis and older FM radios lacking these

advanced capabilities. - :

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Serbia's energy infrastructure includes acombination of hydroelectric and therrnalfacilities, but the Serbian power network canbest be described as average-plants with acapacity in excess of 5,000 MW supply thenational grid. Sizable deposits of lignite coalare located in Serbia. Bituminous coalreserves are concentrated in Serbia. j

I

Serbia's roads and railways are at best inonly fair condition. Serbia also has a fairlyextensive system of water transport feeciinginto the Danubr.l

BosniaBosnia's civil telecommunications infrastruc-ture has been severely damaged in the fight-ing. The network relied primarily uponmicrowave radio relay. No major satelliteearth stations are located in Bosnia, althoughmaqy private concerns operate portableuplink stations. The Bosnian government hasbeen forced to rely on ham radio operators tocommunicate with enclaves cut off fromSarajevo.j

Bosnia produced enough electrical power-1,900 MW-to serve itsetf and part ofCroatia's Dalmatian coast before the war.Large coal-fired power plants are locatednear Tuzla and in the Zenica-Sarajevoregion. Several large hydroelectric facilitiesare situated along the Neretva River nearMostar and near Jajce along the VrbasRiver. Bosnia holds about a third of coalreserves in the former Yugoslavia but has nosignificant deposits of oil or gas. A large coalfacility is located near Zentca where a coaldeposit of 66 million tons was identified.

Bosnia's transportation infrastructure is inneed of significant repair. More than 60 per-cent of the roads are unpaved. Paved routesthat serve industrial centers are in poorcondition. The war has destroyed numerousbridges and tunnels and rendered Bosnia'srail network larsely unusable{--l

CroatiaInadequate by Western standards, some keyCroatian facilities have been upgraded withsatellite earth stations, digital switches, andfiber-optic transmission systems. A cellularcommunications system has operated inZagreb since 1991. Digital exchanges capa-ble of handling Telex and Fax links beganoperating between Zagreb and Split in 1990.A digital telephone exchange and opticalcable link also carne on line connectingZagreb and the industrial center of Sisakthat year. Direct international dialing isavailable in Zaeryb. alt\ough connectionstend to be spotty

The well-developed Adriatic port system is

the keystone of the country's transportationnetwork, but Croatia's road network is belowWestern standards. Primary roads'are hardsurfaced but have only two lanes with a

passing shoulder. A few superhighways existimmediatel), around Zagreb and along seg-

ments of the Zagreb-Belgrade route. Inlandwaterways-the Danube and the Sava-playa key role in regional economic transport.

Often unreliable, Croatia's internal electricpower network satisfied about half of its4,000-MW requirements. The war has seri-ously degraded Croatia's electrical power

58

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industry, however, severing transmissiongrids connecting hydroelectric and oil-firedgenerating facilities in the northern andsouthern regions of the country. The nationhas significant oil and gas reserves, but few

, proved coal reserves. Croatian petroleum

reserves, some 150 million barrels-rnost ofwhich are in Serb hands, represent 66 per-

cent of known former Yugoslav reserves andcould meet about 75 percent of Croatianneeds]

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TVarning Notice

Netional SecurityInformation

Unauthorized DisclosureSubject to Criminal Sanctions

Information available as oI 22 July 1993 was used

in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimete.

The following intelligence organizations participatedin the preparation of this Estimate:

The Central Intelligence AgencyThe Defense Intelligence AgencyThe National Security AgencyThe Bureau of Intelligcnce and Research,Department of State

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the ArmyThe Director of Naval Intelligence,Department of the NavyThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,Department of the Air ForceThe Director of Intelligence,Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by theNational Foreign Intelligence Board.