new v2 1 use of psa to support design and design modifications · 2010. 9. 13. · slide 12....

PSA applicationsPSA applications

Use of PSA to support design and design Use of PSA to support design and design modificationsmodifications

IAEA Training in level 1 PSA and PSA applications

Use of PSA to support design and design modifications

Slide 2.

ContentContent

Use of PSA to support NPP designUses, benefits and advantagesTechnical and methodological aspectsPrecautions and limitations

Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and backfittingactivities and plant modifications

Uses, benefits and advantagesTechnical and methodological aspectsPrecautions and limitations

ExamplesReferences

Use of PSA to support NPP designUse of PSA to support NPP designUses, benefits and advantagesUses, benefits and advantagesTechnical and methodological aspectsTechnical and methodological aspectsPrecautions and limitationsPrecautions and limitations

Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and backfittingbackfittingactivities and plant modificationsactivities and plant modifications

Uses, benefits and advantagesUses, benefits and advantagesTechnical and methodological aspectsTechnical and methodological aspectsPrecautions and limitationsPrecautions and limitations

ExamplesExamplesReferencesReferences


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Use of PSA to support design and design Use of PSA to support design and design modificationsmodifications

Two major areas of this application:Use of PSA to support NPP design

New design - new challenges - risk “optimized” designUse of PSA to support NPP upgrade and backfitting activities and plant modifications

The very first natural PSA application.One of the most important applications for PSAs of operating nuclear power plants is to identify potential safety improvements and to support the selection, design, installation, and licensing of plant upgrades.

Two major areas of this applicationTwo major areas of this application::Use of PSA to support NPP designUse of PSA to support NPP design

New design New design -- new challenges new challenges -- risk risk ““optimizedoptimized”” designdesignUse of PSA to support NPP upgrade and Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and backfittingbackfitting activities activities and plant modificationsand plant modifications

The very first natural PSA application.The very first natural PSA application.One of the most important applications for One of the most important applications for PSAsPSAs of of

operating nuclear power plants is to identify potential operating nuclear power plants is to identify potential safety improvements and to support the selection, design, safety improvements and to support the selection, design, installation, and licensing of plant upgrades.installation, and licensing of plant upgrades.


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Use of PSA to support NPP designUse of PSA to support NPP design

Uses, benefits and advantagesUses, benefits and advantages• Identification and resolution of plant vulnerabilities• Identification of important intersystem dependencies and

potential CCFs• Examination of risk benefits from different design options• Identification of accident scenarios and operator actions with

a high sensitivity to human error• Balance between preventive and mitigative measures• Optimisation of systems and components for safety and

availability• Qualitative knowledge and understanding of the contribution

of components and systems to accident sequences.

•• Identification and resolution of plant vulnerabilitiesIdentification and resolution of plant vulnerabilities•• Identification of important intersystem dependencies and Identification of important intersystem dependencies and

potential potential CCFsCCFs•• Examination of risk benefits from different design optionsExamination of risk benefits from different design options•• Identification of accident scenarios and operator actions with Identification of accident scenarios and operator actions with

a high sensitivity to human errora high sensitivity to human error•• Balance between preventive and Balance between preventive and mitigativemitigative measuresmeasures•• Optimisation of systems and components for safety and Optimisation of systems and components for safety and

availabilityavailability•• Qualitative knowledge and understanding of the contribution Qualitative knowledge and understanding of the contribution

of components and systems to accident sequences.of components and systems to accident sequences.


Slide 5.


Technical and methodological aspectsTechnical and methodological aspects

PSA requirementsThe scope of analysis should include at least a limited-scope Level 2 PSA.The PSA should determine the frequency of different plant damagestates that may occur and it should identify all important physical and functional dependencies that affect containment or confinement systems.The PSA should include initiating events, failure modes, event sequences and dependencies that may be introduced by new design features.Event Sequence Diagrams may be used to develop the accident sequences.

PSA requirementsPSA requirementsThe scope of analysis should include at least a limitedThe scope of analysis should include at least a limited--scope Level scope Level 2 PSA.2 PSA.The PSA should determine the frequency of different plant damageThe PSA should determine the frequency of different plant damagestates that may occur and it should identify all important physistates that may occur and it should identify all important physical cal and functional dependencies that affect containment or and functional dependencies that affect containment or confinement systems.confinement systems.The PSA should include initiating events, failure modes, event The PSA should include initiating events, failure modes, event sequences and dependencies that may be introduced by new sequences and dependencies that may be introduced by new design features.design features.Event Sequence Diagrams may be used to develop the accident Event Sequence Diagrams may be used to develop the accident

sequences.sequences.


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Precautions and limitationsPrecautions and limitationsDeterministic methods continue to be very effective to ensure safe plant designs. (success oriented approach - and what is PSA?)PSA methods have limited capability to estimate the reliability and risk contributions from software based systems for instrumentation and control, plant protection, and operator interfaces, that advanced designs rely on.The PSA for a new plant design may contain substantial uncertainties.

Deterministic methods continue to be very effective Deterministic methods continue to be very effective to ensure safe plant designs. (success oriented to ensure safe plant designs. (success oriented approach approach -- and what is PSA?)and what is PSA?)PSA methods have limited capability to estimate the PSA methods have limited capability to estimate the reliability and risk contributions from software based reliability and risk contributions from software based systems for instrumentation and control, plant systems for instrumentation and control, plant protection, and operator interfaces, that advanced protection, and operator interfaces, that advanced designs rely on.designs rely on.The PSA for a new plant design may contain The PSA for a new plant design may contain substantial uncertainties.substantial uncertainties.


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Use of PSA to support NPP modificationsUse of PSA to support NPP modifications

Uses, benefits and advantagesUses, benefits and advantagesOne of the major goals of PSA is to assess the level of safety of existing plants and to identify potential design weaknesses which may result in proposed plant improvements . If CDF is dominated by a limited number of accident sequences, effective backfits may be proposed to prevent or to mitigate these scenarios.Backfits may also be suggested if PSA results show that a plant does not meet recommended or established national or international probabilistic safety criteria.A plant specific PSA is an extremely valuable tool to examine each proposed measure, to assess benefits and weaknesses, and to provide inputs to cost-benefit analyses.

One of the major goals of PSA is to assess the level of safety One of the major goals of PSA is to assess the level of safety of existing plants and to identify potential of existing plants and to identify potential design design weaknessesweaknesses which may result in proposed plant which may result in proposed plant improvements . improvements . If CDF is dominated by a limited number of accident If CDF is dominated by a limited number of accident sequences, effective sequences, effective backfitsbackfits may be proposed to prevent or may be proposed to prevent or to mitigate these scenarios.to mitigate these scenarios.BackfitsBackfits may also be suggested if PSA results show that a may also be suggested if PSA results show that a plant does not meet recommended or established national or plant does not meet recommended or established national or international probabilistic safety criteria.international probabilistic safety criteria.A plant specific PSA is an extremely valuable tool to examine A plant specific PSA is an extremely valuable tool to examine each proposed measure, to assess benefits and each proposed measure, to assess benefits and weaknesses, and to provide inputs to weaknesses, and to provide inputs to costcost--benefit analysesbenefit analyses..


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Technical and methodological aspectsTechnical and methodological aspectsPSA requirements

• The minimum modelling requirements for this application include a detailed plant specific Level 1 PSA.

• The containment vulnerabilities are also important for this application.

• To the extent possible, the PSA should use plant specific data.

=> All the requirements for a “Living PSA” are to be considered.

PSA requirementsPSA requirements•• The minimum modelling requirements for this application The minimum modelling requirements for this application

include a detailed plant specific Level 1 PSA.include a detailed plant specific Level 1 PSA.•• The containment vulnerabilities are also important for this The containment vulnerabilities are also important for this

application. application. •• To the extent possible, the PSA should use plant specific To the extent possible, the PSA should use plant specific

data.data.

=> All the requirements for a => All the requirements for a ““Living PSALiving PSA”” are to be are to be considered.considered.


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Technical and methodological aspectsTechnical and methodological aspects (Cont.)(Cont.)

The evaluation process for a design change requires the evaluation of the impact of the change in each of the following areas of the PSA

Initiating events

Safety function/success criteria definition

System modeling

Data analysis

Human reliability analysis

The evaluation process for a design change requires the The evaluation process for a design change requires the evaluation of the impact of the change in each of the following evaluation of the impact of the change in each of the following areas of the PSAareas of the PSA

Initiating eventsInitiating events

Safety function/success criteria definitionSafety function/success criteria definition

System modelingSystem modeling

Data analysisData analysis

Human reliability analysisHuman reliability analysis


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Use of PSA to support NPP modificationsUse of PSA to support NPP modificationsPrecautions and limitationsPrecautions and limitations

PSA can only be used to identify which safety improvements are most effective to reduce overall plant risk within the limitations of the PSA models and scope of analysis.Modified procedures and training are often suggested as alternatives to plant hardware modifications.Decisions about proposed plant improvement options should be based on a thorough review of the PSA event sequences and examination of different measures of importance.

PSA can only be used to identify which safety PSA can only be used to identify which safety improvements are most effective to reduce overall improvements are most effective to reduce overall plant risk within the limitations of the PSA models plant risk within the limitations of the PSA models and scope of analysis.and scope of analysis.Modified procedures and training are often Modified procedures and training are often suggested as alternatives to plant hardware suggested as alternatives to plant hardware modifications.modifications.Decisions about proposed plant improvement Decisions about proposed plant improvement options should be based on a thorough review of the options should be based on a thorough review of the PSA event sequences and examination of different PSA event sequences and examination of different measures of importance.measures of importance.


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Use of PSA to support NPP modificationsUse of PSA to support NPP modificationsPrecautions and limitations Precautions and limitations (Cont.)(Cont.)

Options should not be based on limited examination of a single issue unless that issue completely dominates the total plant risk profile.Recommended improvement options should consider the inherent uncertainties in the PSA methods, models, and results.Selection of practical backfits to achieve full compliance with national or international probabilistic safety criteria may be rather difficult for some plants if the PSA does not identify any dominant contributors to risk.

Options should not be based on limited examination Options should not be based on limited examination of a single issue unless that issue completely of a single issue unless that issue completely dominates the total plant risk profile.dominates the total plant risk profile.Recommended improvement options should Recommended improvement options should consider the inherent uncertainties in the PSA consider the inherent uncertainties in the PSA methods, models, and results.methods, models, and results.Selection of practical Selection of practical backfitsbackfits to achieve full to achieve full compliance with national or international compliance with national or international probabilistic safety criteria may be rather difficult for probabilistic safety criteria may be rather difficult for some plants if the PSA does not identify any some plants if the PSA does not identify any dominant contributors to riskdominant contributors to risk..


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ExamplesExamples

Use of PSA to support NPP designPSA is nowadays used to supplement deterministic criteria and analyses in the design process for new reactor concepts in the United States (e.g. AP-600 , ABWR), for the joint French-German project EPR], for the European EP1000,The final PSA may be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the supporting documentation for the plant design and licensing criteria In The Netherlands the development of a Level 3 PSA is required as part of the siting procedures. Should the construction of a new nuclear power plant be contemplated, first, a generic PSA would support the early stages of the siting and licensing. Finally, a full scope Level 3 PSA would be necessary to demonstrate that the combination of site and plant design fulfils the Dutch probabilistic safety criteria for The Netherlands

Use of PSA to support NPP designUse of PSA to support NPP designPSA is nowadays used to supplement deterministic criteria and PSA is nowadays used to supplement deterministic criteria and analyses in the design process for new reactor concepts in the Uanalyses in the design process for new reactor concepts in the United nited States (e.g. APStates (e.g. AP--600 , ABWR), for the joint French600 , ABWR), for the joint French--German project German project EPR], for the European EP1000,EPR], for the European EP1000,The final PSA may be submitted to the regulatory body as part ofThe final PSA may be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the the supporting documentation for the plant design and licensing critsupporting documentation for the plant design and licensing criteria eria In The Netherlands the development of a Level 3 PSA is required In The Netherlands the development of a Level 3 PSA is required as as part of the siting procedures. Should the construction of a new part of the siting procedures. Should the construction of a new nuclear nuclear power plant be contemplated, first, a generic PSA would support power plant be contemplated, first, a generic PSA would support the the early stages of the siting and licensing. Finally, a full scope early stages of the siting and licensing. Finally, a full scope Level 3 Level 3 PSA would be necessary to demonstrate that the combination of siPSA would be necessary to demonstrate that the combination of site te and plant design fulfils the Dutch probabilistic safety criteriaand plant design fulfils the Dutch probabilistic safety criteria for The for The NetherlandsNetherlands


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Examples Examples (Cont.)(Cont.)

Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and backfittingactivities and plant modifications

Some plants in Spain have used PSA as an input to the study of compliance with the Appendix R of 10CFR50 and the consequential plant upgrading related to fire safety.The PSA reference studies in Germany have triggered upgrading and backfitting activities to improve NPP safety design. Level 1+ PSAs are being performed for all nuclear power plants in operation in the framework of the periodic safety review (PSR). Regulatory Guides have been developed to support this application.

Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and backfittingbackfittingactivities and plant modificationsactivities and plant modifications

Some plants in Spain have used PSA as an input to the Some plants in Spain have used PSA as an input to the study of compliance with the Appendix R of 10CFR50 and study of compliance with the Appendix R of 10CFR50 and the consequential plant upgrading related to fire safety.the consequential plant upgrading related to fire safety.The PSA reference studies in Germany have triggered The PSA reference studies in Germany have triggered upgrading and upgrading and backfittingbackfitting activities to improve NPP safety activities to improve NPP safety design. Level 1+ design. Level 1+ PSAsPSAs are being performed for all nuclear are being performed for all nuclear power plants in operation in the framework of the periodic power plants in operation in the framework of the periodic safety review (PSR). Regulatory Guides have been safety review (PSR). Regulatory Guides have been developed to support this applicationdeveloped to support this application..


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Examples Examples (Cont.)(Cont.)

Prioritization of Safety Enhancement Measures (SEM) in PaksThe first PSA study for unit 3 has already contained suggestions for activities in order to decrease the CDF value, i.e. to increase the safety condition of the unit and the whole plant. The main findings of the project were importance of:

replacing of the AEFW System into the confinement because of high probability of loss of feedwater by damage of both the FWS and the AEFWS pipelines due to common cause failures in the machine hall;implementation of primary circuit feed-and-bleed.Some of the planned measures were cancelled (e.g. the 13th diesel generator).

Prioritization of Safety Enhancement Measures Prioritization of Safety Enhancement Measures (SEM) in (SEM) in PaksPaksThe first PSA study for unit 3 has already contained The first PSA study for unit 3 has already contained suggestions for activities in order to decrease the CDF value, suggestions for activities in order to decrease the CDF value, i.e. to increase the safety condition of the unit and the whole i.e. to increase the safety condition of the unit and the whole plant. The main findings of the project were importance of:plant. The main findings of the project were importance of:

replacing of the AEFW System into the confinement replacing of the AEFW System into the confinement because of high probability of loss of because of high probability of loss of feedwaterfeedwater by by damage of both the FWS and the AEFWS pipelines damage of both the FWS and the AEFWS pipelines due to common cause failures in the machine hall;due to common cause failures in the machine hall;implementation of primary circuit feedimplementation of primary circuit feed--andand--bleed.bleed.Some of the planned measures were cancelled (e.g. Some of the planned measures were cancelled (e.g. the 13the 13thth diesel generator).diesel generator).


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ReferencesReferencesINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Application and Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Operations, IAEA-TECDOC-873, Vienna (1996).HAAG, C., SCHULZ, T., SCOBEL, J., SANCAKTAR, S., “The use of PRA in designing the Westinghouse AP600 plant”, (Proc. PSA ’96 — International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Park City, 1996), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).HAAG, C., SCHULZ, T., SCOBEL, J., SANCAKTAR, S., “Insights gained from the Westinghouse AP600 PRA”, (Proc. PSA ’96 — International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Park City, 1996), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).SALTOS, N. T., EL-BASSIONI, A., “ Use of PRA in the AP600 design certification review”, (Proc. PSA ’99 —International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).CARON. J. L., ELLIA-HERVY, A., FEIGEL, A., SOURSOU, E., KOLLASKO, H., “The station blackout mitigation concept in the design of the EPR”, (Proc. PSA ’96 — International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Park City, 1996), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).GERMAN REACTOR SAFETY COMMISSION (RSK), Gemeinsame Empfehlungen von RSK und GPR fürSicherheitsanforderungen an zukünftige Kernkraftwerke mit Druckwassereaktor, Bundesanzeiger Nr. 127, Bonn (1995). BASSANELLI, A., SCHULZ, T., “Application of European utility requirements (EUR) for the development of the PSA for the European passive plant”, (Proc. PSA ’99 — International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).NA, J. H., OH, H. C., LEE, J.S., LEE, B.S., “Probabilistic safety assessment for integrated design process for KNGR development”, (Proc. PSA ’99 — International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Application and Development INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Application and Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Operations, IAEAfor Nuclear Power Plant Operations, IAEA--TECDOCTECDOC--873, Vienna (1996).873, Vienna (1996).HAAG, C., SCHULZ, T., SCOBEL, J., SANCAKTAR, S., HAAG, C., SCHULZ, T., SCOBEL, J., SANCAKTAR, S., ““The use of PRA in designing the Westinghouse AP600 The use of PRA in designing the Westinghouse AP600 plantplant””, (Proc. PSA , (Proc. PSA ’’96 96 —— International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety AssessmenInternational Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Park City, 1996), t, Park City, 1996), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).HAAG, C., SCHULZ, T., SCOBEL, J., SANCAKTAR, S., HAAG, C., SCHULZ, T., SCOBEL, J., SANCAKTAR, S., ““Insights gained from the Westinghouse AP600 PRAInsights gained from the Westinghouse AP600 PRA””, , (Proc. PSA (Proc. PSA ’’96 96 —— International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety AssessmenInternational Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Park City, 1996), American t, Park City, 1996), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).SALTOS, N. T., ELSALTOS, N. T., EL--BASSIONI, A., BASSIONI, A., ““ Use of PRA in the AP600 design certification reviewUse of PRA in the AP600 design certification review””, (Proc. PSA , (Proc. PSA ’’99 99 ——International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety AssessmentInternational Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear , Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).CARON. J. L., ELLIACARON. J. L., ELLIA--HERVY, A., FEIGEL, A., SOURSOU, E., KOLLASKO, H., HERVY, A., FEIGEL, A., SOURSOU, E., KOLLASKO, H., ““The station blackout mitigation The station blackout mitigation concept in the design of the EPRconcept in the design of the EPR””, (Proc. PSA , (Proc. PSA ’’96 96 —— International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Park City, 1996), American Nuclear Society, Inc., LaAssessment, Park City, 1996), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1996).Grange Park, Illinois (1996).GERMAN REACTOR SAFETY COMMISSION (RSK), GERMAN REACTOR SAFETY COMMISSION (RSK), GemeinsameGemeinsame EmpfehlungenEmpfehlungen von RSK und GPR von RSK und GPR ffüürrSicherheitsanforderungenSicherheitsanforderungen an an zukzuküünftigenftige KernkraftwerkeKernkraftwerke mitmit DruckwassereaktorDruckwassereaktor, , BundesanzeigerBundesanzeiger Nr. 127, Bonn Nr. 127, Bonn (1995). (1995). BASSANELLI, A., SCHULZ, T., BASSANELLI, A., SCHULZ, T., ““Application of European utility requirements (EUR) for the develApplication of European utility requirements (EUR) for the development of the opment of the PSA for the European passive plantPSA for the European passive plant””, (Proc. PSA , (Proc. PSA ’’99 99 —— International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, IncAssessment, Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).NA, J. H., OH, H. C., LEE, J.S., LEE, B.S., NA, J. H., OH, H. C., LEE, J.S., LEE, B.S., ““Probabilistic safety assessment for integrated design process foProbabilistic safety assessment for integrated design process for r KNGR developmentKNGR development””, (Proc. PSA , (Proc. PSA ’’99 99 —— International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety AssessmenInternational Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, t, Washington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La GrangeWashington, DC, 1999), American Nuclear Society, Inc., La Grange Park, Illinois (1999).Park, Illinois (1999).


Slide 16.

References References (Cont.)(Cont.)

TOKMACHEV, G., “Application of PSA to resolve design and operational issues for VVER”, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, 1998.

PNACEK, I., KOVACS, Z., “PSA applications for safety upgrading of J. Bohunice V1 NPP”, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, 1998.

LIOUBARSKI, A., “NVNPP-5 plant modifications that have been performed based on PSA results. Living PSA model development”, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, Spain, 1998.FAIG, J., “PSA applications at Asco NPP”, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSAApplications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, Spain, 1998.BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR UMWELT, NATURSCHUTZ UND REAKTORSICHERHEIT, Bekanntmachung derLeitfäden zur Durchführung von Periodischen Sicherheitsüberprüfungen (PSÜ) für Kernkraftwerke in derBundesrepublik Deutschland vom 18. August 1997, Bundesanzeiger Nr. 232a, Bonn (1997).BUNDESAMT FÜR STRAHLENSCHUTZ (BfS), FACHARBEITSKREIS PROBABILISTISCHE SICHERHEITSANALYSE FÜR KERNKRAFTWERKE, Methoden zur probabilistischen Sicherheitsanalyse fürKernkraftwerke, BfS-KT-16/97, Salzgitter (1997).BUNDESAMT FÜR STRAHLENSCHUTZ (BfS), FACHARBEITSKREIS PROBABILISTISCHE SICHERHEITSANALYSE FÜR KERNKRAFTWERKE, Daten zur Quantifizierung von Ereignisablaufdiagrammenund Fehlerbäumen, BfS-KT-18/97, Salzgitter (1997).

TOKMACHEV, G., TOKMACHEV, G., ““Application of PSA to resolve design and operational issues for Application of PSA to resolve design and operational issues for VVERVVER””, paper presented at , paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Toothe IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, 1998.ls to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, 1998.

PNACEK, I., KOVACS, Z., PNACEK, I., KOVACS, Z., ““PSA applications for safety upgrading of J. PSA applications for safety upgrading of J. BohuniceBohunice V1 NPPV1 NPP””, paper presented at , paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Toothe IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, 1998.ls to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, 1998.

LIOUBARSKI, A., LIOUBARSKI, A., ““NVNPPNVNPP--5 plant modifications that have been performed based on PSA resu5 plant modifications that have been performed based on PSA results. Living PSA lts. Living PSA model developmentmodel development””, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications and Tools Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, Spain, 1998.to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, Spain, 1998.FAIG, J., FAIG, J., ““PSA applications at PSA applications at AscoAsco NPPNPP””, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSA, paper presented at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on PSAApplications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, Spain, 199Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety, Madrid, Spain, 1998.8.BUNDESMINISTERIUM FBUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜÜR UMWELT, NATURSCHUTZ UND REAKTORSICHERHEIT, R UMWELT, NATURSCHUTZ UND REAKTORSICHERHEIT, BekanntmachungBekanntmachung derderLeitfLeitfäädenden zurzur DurchfDurchfüührunghrung von von PeriodischenPeriodischen SicherheitsSicherheitsüüberprberprüüfungenfungen (PS(PSÜÜ) ) ffüürr KernkraftwerkeKernkraftwerke in in derderBundesrepublikBundesrepublik Deutschland Deutschland vomvom 18. August 1997, 18. August 1997, BundesanzeigerBundesanzeiger Nr. 232a, Bonn (1997).Nr. 232a, Bonn (1997).BUNDESAMT FBUNDESAMT FÜÜR STRAHLENSCHUTZ (R STRAHLENSCHUTZ (BfSBfS), FACHARBEITSKREIS PROBABILISTISCHE ), FACHARBEITSKREIS PROBABILISTISCHE SICHERHEITSANALYSE FSICHERHEITSANALYSE FÜÜR KERNKRAFTWERKE, R KERNKRAFTWERKE, MethodenMethoden zurzur probabilistischenprobabilistischen SicherheitsanalyseSicherheitsanalyse ffüürrKernkraftwerkeKernkraftwerke, BfS, BfS--KTKT--16/97, Salzgitter (1997).16/97, Salzgitter (1997).BUNDESAMT FBUNDESAMT FÜÜR STRAHLENSCHUTZ (R STRAHLENSCHUTZ (BfSBfS), FACHARBEITSKREIS PROBABILISTISCHE ), FACHARBEITSKREIS PROBABILISTISCHE SICHERHEITSANALYSE FSICHERHEITSANALYSE FÜÜR KERNKRAFTWERKE, R KERNKRAFTWERKE, DatenDaten zurzur QuantifizierungQuantifizierung von von EreignisablaufdiagrammenEreignisablaufdiagrammenund und FehlerbFehlerbääumenumen, BfS, BfS--KTKT--18/97, Salzgitter (1997).18/97, Salzgitter (1997).

new v2 1 use of psa to support design and design modifications · 2010. 9. 13. · slide 12....

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