new evidence on the cold war in asia

8/13/2019 New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia

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C OLD W AR I NTERNATIONAL H ISTORY P ROJECT BULLETIN , ISSUE 12/13

New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia




Le Duan and the Break with China

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Brothers in Arms

The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963



C OLD W AR I NTERNATIONAL H ISTORY P ROJECT BULLETIN , ISSUE 12/13 289

By Petr LuÁÁÁÁÁák

Planning for Nuclear War:

The Czechoslovak War Plan of 1964

The 1964 operational plan for the Czechoslovak People’s Army („eskoslovenská Lidova Armada, or

„SLA), an English translation of which follows, is the firstwar plan from the era of the NATO-Warsaw Pactconfrontation that has emerged from the archives of either side. It is “‘the real thing’—the actual blueprint for war atthe height of the nuclear era,” detailing the assignments of the “Czechoslovak Front” of forces of the Warsaw Pact.1

The plan was the result of the reevaluation of Soviet blocmilitary strategy after Stalin’s death. Unlike the recentlydiscovered 1951 Polish war plan (the only pre-Warsaw Pactwar plan to surface thus far from the Soviet side), whichreflected plainly defensive thinking,2 the „SLA plan adecade and a half later, according to the ambitiousimagination of the Czechoslovak and Soviet military

planners, envisioned the „SLA operating on the territoryof southeastern France within a few days of the outbreak of war, turning Western Europe into a nuclear battlefield.

The principles on which the Polish and Czechoslovak armies based their strategies in the 1950s and 1960smirrored Soviet thinking of the time. When did the changein military thinking in the Eastern bloc occur, and why?Further, it is necessary to ask when exactly did it take onthe characteristics contained in the plan of 1964? Naturally,

precise and definitive answers cannot be given until the

military archives of the former Soviet Union are madeaccessible. In the meantime, material from East-Central

European sources can at least hint at some of the answers.

The advent of nuclear weapons

During the first years after the formation of the East bloc, the Czechoslovak People’s Army concentrated on planning the defense of Czechoslovak territory. Thedesigns for military exercises held in the first half of the1950s reflect this priority. While plans and troop exercisesoccasionally included offensive operations, they almostnever took place outside of Czechoslovak soil. Advancinginto foreign territory was taken into consideration, but onlyin the case of a successful repulsion of an enemy offensiveand the subsequent breach of their defense. 3

The vagueness of Czechoslovak thinking vis-à-visoperations abroad is also apparent in the military carto-graphic work of this period. The first mapping of territoryon the basic scale of 1:50,000, begun in 1951, coveredCzechoslovak territory only. But, as late as the end of the1950s, the Czechoslovak cartographers were expected tohave also mapped parts of southern Germany and all of Austria. During the following years, the mapping wasindeed based on this schedule.4

The change from defensive to offensive thinking,

New Evidence in Cold War Military History

[Editor’s Note: Much of the military history of “the other side” of the Cold War is still shrouded in secrecy as large parts of the records of the former Warsaw Pact remain classified in the Russian military archives. To some extent,however, the more accessible archives of the Soviet Union’s former allies in Eastern and Central Europe have provided a “backdoor” into Warsaw Pact military thinking and planning. Versions of the minutes of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee, for example, are partially available in the German Federal Archives, the Central Military

Archives in Prague and Warsaw, the Bulgarian Central State Archives in Sofia, and the Hungarian National Archivesin Budapest.

In collaboration with its affiliate, the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, coordinated by Dr.Vojtech Mastny, CWIHP is pleased to publish the first Warsaw Pact era war plan to emerge from the archives of the

former East bloc. The document was discovered by Dr. Petr Lu Á< k in February 2000 in the Central Military Archives in Prague and is published below in full. Additional documentation, including the “Study of the Conduct of War in Nuclear Conditions,” written in 1964 by Petr I. Ivashutin, Chief of the Soviet Main Intelligence Administration, for Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov, Chief of the General Staff Academy,” and an interview about it with Col. Karel Štepánek,

who served in the Czechoslovak army’s operations room at the time the plan was valid, can be found on the PHP website (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php).

Earlier CWIHP publications on the history of the Warsaw Pact include: “Warsaw Pact Military Planning in CentralEurope: Revelations from the East German Archives,” CWIHP Bulletin 2 (1992), pp.1, 13-19; Vladislav M. Zubok,“Khrushchev’s 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evidence,” CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 199/1997), pp. 416-420; Matthew

Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army’ Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 19 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997); and Vojtech Mastny, “ ‘We are in a Bind:’ Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts atReforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969,” CWIHP Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 230-250.— Christian F. Ostermann]



290 C OLD W AR I NTERNATIONAL H ISTORY P ROJECT BULLETIN , ISSUE 12/13

which occurred after Stalin’s death, is connected with areevaluation of the role of nuclear arms. While Stalinhimself did not overlook the importance of nuclear weapons and made a tremendous effort to obtain them inthe second half of the 1940s, he did not consider them to

be an important strategic element due to their small number in the Soviet arsenal.5 As a consequence, his so-called“permanent operating factors” (stability of the rear, morale

of the army, quantity and quality of divisions, armament of the army and the organizational ability of army command-ers), which were, in his view, to decide the next war (if notany war), remained the official dogma until his death. Thisrather simple concept ignored other factors. First andforemost, it did not take into account the element of surprise and the importance of taking the initiative.

Only after the dictator died was there room for discussion among Soviet strategists on the implications of nuclear weapons which, in the meantime, had become thecornerstone of the US massive retaliation doctrine.6 Nuclear weapons were gradually included in the plans of the Sovietarmy and its satellite countries. In the 1952 combatdirectives of the Soviet Army, for instance, nuclear weapons had still been almost entirely left out. When thesedirectives were adopted by „SLA in 1954 and translatedword for word, a special supplement on the effects of nuclear weapons had to be quickly created and added.7

The extent to which the Czechoslovak leadership wasinformed of Soviet operational plans remains an openquestion. In any case, its members were in no way deterred

by the prospect of massive retaliation by the West. Alexej„epièka, the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defenseand later one of the few “victims” of Czechoslovak de-Stalinization, viewed nuclear weapons like any others, only

having greater destructive powers. In 1954, he stated that“nuclear weapons alone will not be the deciding factor inachieving victory. Although the use of atomic weapons willstrongly affect the way in which battles and operations areconducted as well as life in the depths of combat, thesignificance of all types of armies […] remains valid. On thecontrary, their importance is gaining significance.”8

Given the nuclear inferiority of the East, such casualthinking about the importance of nuclear weapons wastantamount to making a virtue out of necessity. However, itshould be noted, that although Western leaders frequentlystressed the radical difference between nuclear andconventional weapons, military planners in both the East

and West did their job in preparing for the same scenario–– a massive conflict that included the use of all means at their disposal.

There were, however, fundamental differences in theunderstanding of nuclear conflict and its potential conse-quences. In the thinking of the Czechoslovak and probablythe Soviet military leadership of the time, nuclear weaponswould determine the pace of war (forcing a more offensivestrategy), but not its essential character. Since nuclear weapons considerably shortened the stages of war,according to the prevailing logic, it became necessary to

try to gain the decisive initiative with a powerful surprisestrike against enemy forces. Contrary to the US doctrine of massive retaliation, the Soviet bloc’s response would havemade use not only of nuclear weapons but, in view of Soviet conventional superiority, also of conventionalweapons. Massive retaliation did not make planning

beyond it irrelevant. Contrary to many Western thinkers,10

Soviet strategists assumed that a massive strike would

only create the conditions for winning the war by theclassic method of seizing enemy territory.

The idea that in the nuclear era offense is the bestdefense quickly found its way into Czechoslovak plans for

building and training the country’s armed forces. From1954-55 on, the “use of offensive operations […] with theuse of nuclear and chemical weapons” became one of themain training principles, and the „SLA prepared itself almost exclusively for offensive operations.10 Defensiveoperations were now supposed to change quickly tosurprise counter-offensive operations at any price.11 Notsurprisingly, from 1955 on, military mapping now includedsoutheastern Germany all the way to the Franco-German

border, on a scale of 1:100,000—a scale that was consid-ered adequate for this kind of operation.

It should be noted that the Czechoslovak military staff proved reluctant to engage in the risky planning of operations involving the use of nuclear weapons on thefirst day of conflict. But complaints along these lines to thehighest representatives of the Ministry of NationalDefense were irrelevant since in the 1950s Czechoslovakianeither had access to nuclear weapons nor nuclear weapons placed on its territory.12

Deep into enemy territory

The introduction of nuclear weapons into East blocmilitary plans and the resulting emphasis on achieving anelement of surprise had a tremendous effect on the role of ground operations. Now the main task of ground forceswas to quickly penetrate enemy territory and to destroy theenemy’s nuclear and conventional forces on his soil. Thusthe idea of advancing towards Lyons by the 9 th day of theconflict, as outlined in the 1964 plan, did not developovernight. Until the late 1950s, exercises of„SLA offensiveoperations ended around the 10th day, fighting no further west than the Nuremberg-Ingolstadt line.13 These exercisedesigns show that the so-called Prague–Saarland line(Prague-Nuremberg-Saarbrücken) was clearly preferred to

the Alpine line Brno-Vienna-Munich-Basel.14

With the aim of enhancing the mobility of the army, theCzechoslovak military staff, upon orders from the Sovietmilitary headquarters, began a relocation of military forcesin 1958, which concentrated the maximum number of highlymobile tank divisions in the western part of the country.15

As a result of the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis, the militaryinstitutionalization of the Warsaw Pact led to the creationof individual fronts. Within this new framework, the„SLAwas responsible for one entire front with its own commandand tasks as set forth by the Soviet military headquarters.16




Even before these organizational changes wereofficially implemented, they had been applied in militaryexercises, during which the newly created fronts were to besynchronized. While the plans of the exercises and thetasks set for the participants cannot be considered an exactreflection of operational planning, they show that the time

periods by which certain lines on the western battlefieldwere to be reached had gradually been reduced and the

depth reached by Czechoslovak troops had been enlarged.In one of the first front exercises in 1960, the „SLA wassupposed to operate on the Stuttgart–Dachau line by the4th day of conflict. The operational front exercise of March1961 went even further in assuming that the Dijon-Lyonline would be reached on the 6th-7th day of the conflict.During the operational front exercise in September 1961, theCzechoslovak front practiced supporting an offensive bySoviet and East German forces. The line Bonn-Metz-Strasbourg was to be reached on the 7 th and 8th day. Anexercise conducted in December 1961 gave theCzechoslovak front the task of reaching the Besancon– Belfort line on the 7th day of operations.17 From the early1960s onward, massive war games with similar designs took

place in Legnica, Poland, in the presence of the commandsof the individual fronts. The assumed schedule andterritory covered in these exercises already reflected thevision of the 1964 plan.

In Warsaw Pact plans, Czechoslovakia did not play themain strategic role in the Central European battlefield—thatfell to the Warsaw-Berlin axis. For instance, during the jointfront exercise VÍTR (Wind), the Czechoslovak front,

besides taking Nancy (France), was “to be prepared tosecure the left wing of the Eastern forces [the WarsawPact– P.L.] against the neutral state [Austria– P.L.] in case

its neutrality was broken.”18

With a greater number of nuclear weapons in their possession by the late 1950s, the Soviets began toappreciate nuclear weapons not merely as “normal”weapons. For Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, nuclear weapons were both a tool to exert political pressure anda measure of military deterrent. To him, further demilitarization of the Cold War could be achieved throughcuts in ground forces.19 Nuclear weapons in turn acquiredan even more prominent role in planning for massiveretaliation.20 The Czechoslovak military leadership hintedat this as follows: “For the countries of the Warsaw Treatyand specifically of „SSR, it is important not to allow the

enemy to make a joint attack and not to allow him to gainadvantageous conditions or the development of groundforce operations, and thus gain strategic dominance.Basically, this means that our means for an atomic strikemust be in such a state of military readiness that theywould be able to deal with the task of carrying out anuclear counter-strike with a time lag of only seconds or tenths of seconds.”21

Flexible response à la Warsaw Pact

The US move from massive retaliation to flexibleresponse during the early 1960s did not go unnoticed bythe Warsaw Pact. According to its 1964 training directives,the „SLA was supposed to carry out training for the earlystages of war not only with the use of nuclear weapons

but, for the first time since mid-1950s, also without them. Ata major joint exercise of the Warsaw Pact in the summer of

1964, the early phase of war was envisaged without nuclear weapons.22

However, flexible response as conceived by theWarsaw Pact was not a mere mirror image of the Westernversion. The US attempt to enhance the credibility of itsdeterrent by acquiring the capacity to limit conflict to amanageable level by introducing “thresholds” and“pauses” resulted from an agreement between politicalleaders and the military, who assumed to know how to

prevent war from escalating into a nuclear nightmare. In theEast, by contrast, the concept was based only on amilitary—and perhaps more realistic—assessment that aconflict was, sooner or later, going to expand into a globalnuclear war. In the words of the „SSR Minister of NationalDefense Bohumír Lomský:

All of these speculative theories of Westernstrategists about limiting the use of nuclear arms andabout the spiral effect of the increase of their power have one goal: in any given situation to stay in theadvantageous position for the best timing of a massivenuclear strike in order to start a global nuclear war. Wereject these false speculative theories, and every useof nuclear arms by an aggressor will be answered witha massive nuclear offensive using all the means of theWarsaw Treaty countries, on the whole depth and

aiming at all targets of the enemy coalition. We haveno intention to be the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Although we do not believe in thetruthfulness and the reality of these Western theories,we cannot disregard the fact that the imperialists couldtry to start a war without the immediate use of nuclear arms … That is why we must also be prepared for this

possibility.23

In line with this crude thinking, the Czechoslovak, andmost probably the Soviet military conceived of only onethreshold, i.e. that between conventional and nuclear war.The Warsaw Pact hence stood somewhere betweenmassive retaliation and flexible response.

According to some contemporary accounts, it was inthis period that the term “preemptive nuclear strike”appeared in Warsaw Pact deliberations. A massive nuclear strike was supposed to be used only if three sources hadconfirmed that the enemy was about to employ nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, all exercises carried out in thefollowing years made it clear that the use of nuclear weapons was expected no later than the third day of operations. Exercises that counted on the use of nuclear arms from the very beginning of the fighting werecommon.24




The 1964 Czechoslovak war plan is therefore especiallyimportant. It shows how little the East-bloc planners

believed in the relevance of Western-style flexibleresponse. Not only did the plan not consider the

possibility of a non-nuclear war in Europe, but it assumedthat the war would start with a massive nuclear strike bythe West.

The Czechoslovak war plan of 1964

Considering the high degree of secrecy surroundingthese documents, only a few people in the 1960s had directknowledge of the 1964 Czechoslovak war plan. However,several sporadic accounts make at least some conclusions

possible. The plan was the first to have been drawn up bythe„SLA in the aftermath of the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis.According to the late Václav Vitanovský, then„SLA Chief of Operations, the plan came about as a result of directivesfrom Moscow.25 These directives were then worked intooperational plans by the individual armies. As Vitanovskýexplained, “When we had finished, we took it back toMoscow, where they looked it over, endorsed it, and saidyes, we agree. Or they changed it. Changes were maderight there on the spot.”26 The orders for the Czechoslovak Front stated that the valleys in the Vosges mountains wereto be reached by the end of the operation. Undoubtedly,this was meant to prepare the way for troops of the secondechelon made up of Soviet forces.

The 1964 plan remained valid until at least 1968 and probably for quite some time after.27 As early as the mid-1960s, however, a number of revisions were made. Accord-ing to contemporary accounts, the Soviet leadership fearedthat the Czechoslovak Front would not be capable of

fulfilling its tasks and, accordingly, reduced the territoryassigned to the „SLA. To support the objectives of the1964 plan, Moscow tried to impose the stationing of anumber of Soviet divisions on Czechoslovak territory in1965-66. In December 1965, the Soviets forced the Czecho-slovak government to sign an agreement on the storage of nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak soil. Implementation of

both measures only became feasible after the Sovietinvasion in 1968.28

DOCUMENTPlan of Actions of the Czechoslovak

People’s Army for War Period

“Approved”Single Copy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR

Antonín Novotný 1964

1. Conclusions from the assessment of the enemy The enemy could use up to 12 general military unitsin the Central European military theater for advancing inthe area of the Czechoslovak Front from D[ay] 1 to D[ay]7-8.

—The 2nd Army Corps of the FRG [FederalRepublic of Germany] including: 4th and 10th

mechanized divisions, 12th tank division, 1st

airborne division and 1st mountain division, —the 7th Army Corps of the USA including: the24th mechanized division and 4th armored tank division;

—the 1st Army of France including: 3rd mechanizeddivision, the 1st and 7th tank divisions, and up totwo newly deployed units, including 6 launchersof tactical missiles, up to 130 theater launchersand artillery, and up to 2800 tanks.

Operations of the ground troops could be supported by part of the 40th Air Force, with up to 900 aircraft,including 250 bombers and up to 40 airborne missilelaunchers.

Judging by the composition of the group of NATOtroops and our assessment of the exercises undertaken bythe NATO command, one could anticipate the design of theenemy’s actions with the following goals.

To disorganize the leadership of the state and toundermine mobilization of armed forces by surprise nuclear strikes against the main political and economic centers of the country.

To critically change the correlation of forces in its own

favor by strikes against the troops, airfields andcommunication centers.To destroy the border troops of the Czechoslovak

People’s Army in border battles, and to destroy the maingroup of our troops in the Western and Central CzechLands by building upon the initial attack.

To disrupt the arrival of strategic reserves in theregions of Krkonoše, Jeseníky, and Moravská Brána bynuclear strikes against targets deep in our territory and bysending airborne assault troops; to create conditions for asuccessful attainment of the goals of the operation.

Judging by the enemy’s approximate operative design,the combat actions of both sides in the initial period of the

war will have a character of forward contact battles.The operative group of the enemy in the southern part

of the FRG will force the NATO command to graduallyengage a number of their units in the battle, which willcreate an opportunity for the Czechoslovak Front to defeat

NATO forces unit by unit. At the same time, that wouldrequire building a powerful first echelon in the operativestructure of the Front; and to achieve success it wouldrequire building up reserves that would be capable of mobilizing very quickly and move into the area of military action in a very short time.




2. Upon receiving special instructions from the SupremeCommander of the Unified Armed Forces, the Czechoslo-vak People’s Army will deploy to the Czechoslovak Frontwith the following tasks:

To be ready to start advancing toward Nuremberg,Stuttgart and Munich with part of forces immediately after the nuclear strike. Nuclear strikes against the troops of the

enemy should be targeted at the depth of the lineWürzburg, Erlangen, Regensburg, Landshut.

The immediate task is to defeat the main forces of theCentral Group of the West German Army in the southern

part of the FRG, in cooperation with the [Soviet] 8th GuardsArmy of the 1st Western Front; by the end of the first day— reach the line Bayreuth, Regensburg, Passau; and by theend of the second day—move to the line Höchstadt,Schwabach, Ingolstadt, Mühldorf, and by the fourth day of the attack—reach the line Mosbach, Nürtingen,Memmingen, Kaufbeuren.

In the future, building upon the advance in thedirection of Strasbourg, Epinal, Dijon, to finalize the defeatof the enemy in the territory of the FRG, to force a crossingof the river Rhine, and on the seventh or eighth day of theoperation to take hold of the line Langres, Besançon.

Afterward develop the advance toward Lyon.To have in the combat disposition of the Czechoslovak

Front the following units: —the 1st and 4th Armies, 10th Air Army, 331st frontmissile brigade, 11th, 21st and the 31st mobile missilesupport base in the state of combat alert.

—the reserve center of the Army, the 3rd, 18th, 26th,and 32nd mechanized rifle divisions, 14th and 17th

tank divisions, 22nd airborne brigade, 205th antitank

brigade, 303rd

air defense division, 201st

and 202nd

air defense regiments with mobilization timetablefrom M 1 to M 3.

—the formations, units and facilities of thesupport and service system.

The 57th Air Army, arriving on D 1 from the Carpathianmilitary district before the fifth or sixth day of theoperation, will be operatively subordinated to theCzechoslovak Front.

If Austria keeps its neutrality on the third day of thewar, one mechanized rifle division of the Southern Group of Forces will arrive in the area of „eské Bud• jovice and jointhe Czechoslovak Front.

The following forces will remain at the disposal of theMinistry of National Defense: the 7th air defense army, 24th

mechanized rifle division and 16th tank division withreadiness M 20, reconnaissance units, and also units andfacilities of the support and service system.

Under favorable conditions two missile brigades andone mobile missile support base will arrive some time inadvance in the territory of the „SSR from the Carpathianmilitary district:

—35th missile brigade—excluding„eský Brod,excluding Ríèany, Zásmuky,

—36th missile brigade—excluding Pacov,excluding Pelhø imov, excluding Humpolec,

—3486th mobile missile support base—woods 5kilometers to the East of Svìtlá.

Formations and units of the Czechoslovak People’sArmy, on permanent alert, upon the announcement of combat alarm should leave their permanent location in nomore than 30 minutes, move to designated areas within 3

hours, and deploy there ready to carry out their combattasks.

Formations, units and headquarters that do not haveset mobilization dates, leave their locations of permanentdeployment and take up the identified areas of concentration in the time and in the order determined bythe plan of mobilization and deployment.

The following disposition of forces is possible in thearea of operations of the Czechoslovak Front for the entiredepth of the operation:

—in divisions–1.1 to 1.0 —in tanks and mobile artillery launchers–1.0 to 1.0 —in artillery and mine-launchers–1.0 to 1.0 —in military aircraft—1.1 to 1.0, all in favor of theCzechoslovak Front.

In the first massive nuclear strike by the troops of theMissile Forces of the Czechoslovak Front, the frontaviation and long-range aviation added to the front mustdestroy the main group of troops of the first operationsechelon of the 7th US Army, its means of nuclear attack,and the centers of command and control of the aviation.

During the development of the operation, the troops of the Missile Forces and aviation must destroy theapproaching deep operative reserves, the newlydiscovered means of nuclear attack, and the enemy

aviation.Altogether the operation will require the use of 131nuclear missiles and nuclear bombs; specifically 96 missilesand 35 nuclear bombs. The first nuclear strike will use 41missiles and nuclear bombs. The immediate task willrequire using 29 missiles and nuclear bombs. Thesubsequent task could use 49 missiles and nuclear bombs.12 missiles and nuclear bombs should remain in the reserveof the Front.

Building on the results of the first nuclear strike, thetroops of the Front, in coordination with units of the 1stWestern Front must destroy the main group of troops of the 7th US Army and the 1st French Army in cooperation

with airborne assault troops, force the rivers Neckar andRhine in crossing, and defeat the advancing deep strategicreserves of the enemy in advancing battle, and by D[ay] 7-8 take control of the areas of Langres, Besançon, andEpinal.

Upon completion of the tasks of the operation thetroops must be ready to develop further advances in thedirection of Lyon.

The main strike should be concentrated in thedirection of Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Strasbourg, Epinal,Dijon; part of the forces should be used on the direction of




7. Aviation.The 10th Air Force—the 1st fighter division, 2nd and 34th

fighter-bomber division, 25th bomber regiment, 46th

transport air division, 47th air reconnaissance regiment and45th air reconnaissance regiment for target guidance.

Combat tasks:With the first nuclear strike to destroy part of forces of

the 2nd Army Corps of the FRG, two command and targeting

centers, and part of the air defense forces of the enemy.Upon the beginning of combat actions to suppress

part of air defense forces of the enemy in the followingregions: Roding, Kirchroth, Hohenfels, Amberg, Pfreimd,

Nagel, and Erbendorf.To uncover and destroy operative and tactical means

of nuclear attack, command and control aviation forces inthe following regions: Weiden, Nabburg, Amberg,Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, Regensburg, and Erlangen.

During the operation to give intensive support tocombat actions of the troops of the front: on D[ay] 1—6group sorties of fighter bombers, from D[ay] 2 to D[ay] 5-8group sorties of fighter bombers and bombers daily, andfrom D[ay] 6 to D[ay] 8-6 group sorties of fighter bombersand bombers daily. The main effort should be concentratedon supporting the troops of the 1 st Army.

In cooperation with forces and means of the air defense of the country, fronts and neighbors—to cover themain group of forces of the Front from air strikes by theenemy.

To ensure the landing of reconnaissance troops andgeneral airborne forces on D[ay] 1 and D[ay] 2 in the rear of the enemy.

To ensure airborne landing of the 22nd airborne brigadeon D[ay] 4 in the area north of Stüttgart, or on D[ay] 5 in

the area of Rastatt, or on D 6 in the area to the east of Mulhouse.To carry out air reconnaissance with concentration of

main effort on the direction of Nüremberg, Stüttgart, andStrasbourg with the goal of locating means of nuclear attack, and in order to determine in time the beginning of operations and the direction of the advancing operativereserves of the enemy.

In order to fulfill the tasks set for the front, it will berequired to use the following weapons:

—for the immediate task—10 nuclear bombs; —for subsequent tasks—7 nuclear bombs; —for resolving unexpectedly arising tasks—2

nuclear bombs shall be left in the Front’s reserve.The 57th Air Force, consisting of the 131st fighter

division, 289th fighter-bomber regiment, 230th and 733rd

bomber regiment and 48th air reconnaissance regiment,arriving by D[ay] 1 from the Carpathian military district, isto remain under operative subordination to theCzechoslovak Front until the fifth to sixth day for 5army sorties.

The Army has a determined the limit of: combat sets of air bombs—3, combat sets of air-to-air missiles—2, combatsets of aviation cartridges—2, and fuel—3 rounds of army

refuelingCombat tasks:

—in cooperation with the 10th Air Force to findand destroy the means of nuclear attack of theenemy, its aviation and command and controlcenters with concentration of main efforts on thedirection of Nüremberg, Strasbourg;

—to support combat actions of the troops of the

Front when they force the rivers Naab, Neckar,Rhine, and when they counter-attack the enemy;

—to support combat actions of the 22nd airborne brigade in the areas of its landing; —to protect the troops of the front from air strikes by the enemy; —to carry out air reconnaissance withconcentration of the main effort on discoveringthe means of nuclear attack and deep operativeand strategic reserves of the enemy.

The 184th heavy bomber regiment of long-rangeaviation should use nuclear bombs in the first nuclear strike against headquarters of the 2nd Army Corps of theFRG, 7th US Army, 2nd/40 Corporal artillery battalion, 2nd/82Corporal artillery battalion, 5th/73 Sergeant artillery

battalion, and the main group of forces of the 4th mecha-nized division and 12th tank division of the 2nd Army Corpsof the FRG. Total use of nuclear bombs—16. Use of special combat ammunition—only with permission of theSupreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

8. Air Defense7th Air Defense Army of the country—2nd and 3rd air

defense corps.Combat tasks:

—in cooperation with air defense forces of theFront and the air defense of the neighbors in theunited air defense system of countries of theWarsaw Treaty to repel massive air strikes of theenemy with concentration of main effort on thedirection Karlsruhe, Prague, Ostrava.

—not to allow reconnaissance and air strikes of the enemy against our groups of forces, especiallyin the area of the Czech Lands, against aircraft onthe airfields, and against important political andeconomic centers of the country, as well ascommunications centers. The main effort should

be concentrated on protecting the areas of

Prague, Ostrava, Brno and Bratislava; —upon the beginning of combat actions, troopsof the Czechoslovak Front with anti-aircraftmissile forces to continue to defend mostimportant areas and objects of the country, withforces of fighter aviation to defend objects of theFront after the advancing troops.

Air Defense troops of the FrontCombat tasks:

—Upon the beginning of combat action of theFront, to take part in the general air defense




system of the Warsaw Treaty countries with allforces and resources to cover the main group of the Front’s troops.

—During the operation, in cooperation with the 7th

Air Defense Army, units of 10th and 57th Air Forceand the air defense of the 1st Western Front, tocover the troops of the front from the air strikes of the enemy in the process of their passing over the

border mountains, and also during the crossing of the rivers Neckar and Rhine to cover the missileforces and command and control centers.

9. The 22nd airborne brigade is to be ready to be deployedfrom the region of Prost• jov, Niva, Brodek to the regionnorth of Stüttgart on D[ay] 4 or to the region of Rastatt onD[ay] 5, or to the region to the east of Mulhouse on D[ay]6 with the task of capturing and holding river crossings on

Neckar or Rhine until the arrival of our troops.

10. Reserves of the Front. The 3rd, 18th, 26th, and 32nd mechanized rifle divisions of

the Southern Group of Forces, the 14th and 17th tank divisions are to concentrate in the regions designated onthe decision map in the period from D[ay] 3 to D[ay] 5.

The 6th engineering brigade by D[ay] 3 is to beconcentrated in the region of Panenský Týnec, and Bor,excluding Slaný, to be ready to ensure force crossing of therivers Neckar and Rhine by the troops of the Front.

The 103rd chemical warfare batallion from D[ay] 2 to bestationed in the region of Hluboš, excluding Pø íbram,excluding Dobø íš. The main effort of radiationreconnaissance should be concentrated in the region of Hoø ovice, Blovice, and Sedlèany.

Objects of special treatment should be deployed in theareas of deployment of command and control centers of theFront, the 331st front brigade, and also in the regions of concentration of the reserve divisions of the Front.

11. Material Maintenance of the Rear The main effort in the material maintenance of the rear

of the troops of the Front should be concentratedthroughout the entire depth of the operation in the area of the 1st Army’s advance.

To support the troops of the 1st Army, the 10th and 57th

Air Forces should deploy to the forward front base number 1 and the base of the 10th Air Force in the region to the

West of PlzeÁ by the end of D[ay] 2; troops of the 4th Armyshould deploy the forward front base number 2 in theregion to the south of Plzen.

Field pipeline is to be deployed in the direction of Roudnice, Plzen, Nüremberg, and Karlsruhe and used for

provision of aircraft fuel.Rebuilding of railroads should be planned on the

directions Cheb-Nüremberg or Domažlice-Schwandorf-Regensburg-Donauwörth.

Two roads should be built following the 1st Army, andone front road throughout the entire depth of the operation

following the 4th Army.The Ministry of National Defense of the USSR will

assign material resources, including full replacement of theammunition used during the operation for the troops of theCzechoslovak Front.

Support for the 57th Air Force should be plannedtaking into account the material resources located in theterritory of the USSR for the Unified Command.

Use of material resources should be planned asfollows:

—ammunition—45,000 tons —combustible-lubricating oil—93, 000 tons —including aircraft fuel—40, 000 tons —missile fuel: —oxidizer—220 tons —missile fuel—70 tons

Automobile transportation of the Front should be ableto supply the troops with 70, 000 tons of cargo during theoperation.

Transportation of the troops should be able to carry58, 000 tons of cargo.

By the end of the operation the troops should have80% of mobile reserves available.

In D[ay] 1 and D[ay] 2 hospital bed network for 10 to12 thousand sick and wounded personnel is to be de-

ployed. By the end of the operation the hospital bednetwork should cover 18% of the hospital losses of theFront.

12. Headquarters of the Front should be deployedfrom the time “X” plus 6 hours—5 kilometers to the east of Strašice. The axis of movement—Heilbronn, Horb, Epinal.

Reserve Command Post–forest, to the north of

BrezováAdvanced Command Post – forest 5 kilometers to theeast of DobÍany

Rear Command Post—Jince-ObecniceReserve Rear Command Post—excluding Dobø any,

Slapy, excluding Mníšek Headquarters of MNO—object K-116, Prague.

Minister of National Defense of the „SSR General of the Army [signed] Bohumír Lomský

Head of the General Staff of Czechoslovak People’s ArmyColonel General [signed] Otakar RytíÍ

Head of the Operations Department of the General Staff Major General [signed] Václav Vitanovský

11 October 1964

[Rectangular seal:]Ministry of National DefenseGeneral Staff—Operations Department

Section: Operations Room




. . . . . . . .

Petr Lu Á< k received his PhD in Modern History from

Charles University (Prague). He works for the NATOOffice of Information and Press.

1 Vojtech Mastny, “Introduction: Planning for theUnplannable,” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php.

2 According to the 1951 plan, the Polish army was notsupposed to leave Polish territory and no reference wasmade to nuclear weapons. The document is located at theCentral Military Archives in Warsaw; copy at the Library of Congress, microfilm (o) 96/6398, reel W-15.

3 According to these theoretical considerations, the„SLA was to reach the Alps 17 days after rebuffing an

enemy attack. See the exercises of the „SLA air forcecommand of July 1952” on the topic “Air support for striking operations of the army,” Vojenský historickýarchiv Vojenského ústredního archivu (Military HistoricalArchive of the Central Military Archive, Prague, CzechRepublic—VHA VUA), fond Ministerstvo národní obrany(MNO—Ministry of National Defense), 1952, box 280, sig83/1-4, c.j. 46577.

4 During the entire existence of the East bloc, the?SLA used the largest scale of 1:25,000 exclusively to mapthe territory of Czechoslovakia and some operationallydifficult areas in Western Europe, i.e. the Rhine and Mainriver valleys and other major rivers in West Germany. See

summary of maps of the 1:50,000 scale in the 1946 system.Planned outlook of cartographic works at 1:50,000 foreignterritory, VHA VUA, MNO/Operations, 1952, box 369, sig.97/2, c.j. 2131.

5 On Stalin’s view of nuclear weapons generally seeDavid Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven: YaleUP, 1994).

6 The change in strategic thinking and ensuingdiscussions among Soviet strategists, taking place in the

journal Vojennaja mysl [Military Thought], are described inHerbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear

Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking (New York: Praeger, 1959) and RaymondL. Garthoff Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York:Praeger, 1958).

7VUA, MNO, 1954, box 22, sig. 80 5/1–57, c.j. 0037.8 Statement of the Minister of National Defense, Alexej

„epicka, in an analysis of the joint troop exercises on 29September 1954, VHA VUA, MNO, 1954, box 446, sig. 832/

1–130, c.j. 3600–GS/OS.9 For US 1954 plans for nuclear war, see David Alan

Rosenberg, “‘A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of TwoHours:’ Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55,” International Security 6: 3(Winter 1981/82), pp.3-38.

10 Guidelines for the operational preparation of generals, officers and the staff of all types of services for the training period of 1955/56, VUA, MNO, box 596, sig. 83,c.j. 5800.

11 “Analysis of the command-staff exercises of June1958,” VHA VUA, MNO, box 310, sig. 17/2 – 28, c.j. 4813– OS. Theses on the organization of the defense operationscommand at the level of army divisions,” VHA VUA, MNO,1957, box 327, sig. 17/7–32, c.j. 2395–08/1957. VHA VUA,MNO, 1957, box 326, sig. 17/1–13, c.j. 1803–OU.

12 “Guidelines for operational–tactical preparations of the generals, officers and staff of all types of forces,” VHAVUA, MNO, 1958, box 310, sig. 17/3–8, c.j. 5000–08/1958.— With regard to the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons inCzechoslovakia, not until August 1961 and February 1962were two preliminary Soviet-Czech agreements wereentitling the Soviet Union to dispatch nuclear warheadsimmediately to Czechoslovakia in the event of anemergency. After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, those

two agreements were supplanted by a much more far-reaching “Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat Readinessof Missile Forces,” which was signed by Soviet DefenseMinister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky and his Czechoslo-vak counterpart, Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, inDecember 1965. See Mark Kramer, “The “Lessons” of theCuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations,”CWIHP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 348-354.

13 “The design of the mutual and two-tiered exercise of the commanders and staff in March 1958,” VHA VUA,MNO, 1958, box 311, sig. 17/3–28, c.j. 1730; “Analysis of the military staff exercises from June 1958,” VHA VUA,

MNO, 1958, box 311, sig. 17/2–28, “Analysis of theoperational exercises of the commanders of April 1959,”VHA VUA, MNO, 1959, box 300, sig. 17/3–8, c.j. 9083

14 This is also reflected in the recommendations of theCzechoslovak military cartographers and strategists in1959. See “Zapadnyi teatr vojennych dejstvij,” VHA VUA,MNO, 1959, box 300, sig. 17/7-9, c.j. 8576–OS/59.

15 See “Principles for the new relocation of theCzechoslovak People’s Army,” VUA, MNO, box 312, sig.18/3-14, c.j. 3764–OS/1958. See also sig. 18/3/67, c.j. 4395/OS.

—————

Received: 20.10.1964

No. 008074/ZD-OS 64, 17 sheets

Executed in one copy of 17 sheetsExecuted by Major General Jan Voštera

[signed] Gen. Voštera

14 October 1964

[Source: Central Military Archives, Prague, Collection Ministry of National Defense, Operations Department,008074/ZD-OS 64, pp. 1-18. Obtained by Petr Lunák and translated from the Russian by Svetlana Savranskaya(National Security Archive), and Anna Locher (Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zurich).]




16 The formation of the front included almost allCzechoslovak ground troops: 15 mobilized divisionsarranged into 3 armies, the air force, an airborne brigadeand the accompanying technical and rear equipment. Thecommand was given to the general staff of the „SLA; thechief-of-staff became the commander of this front.

17 “Analysis of joint exercises at the Ministry of National Defense in 1960,” VUA, MNO, 1960, box 394, sig.

6/5, c.j. 17989-OS/1960, VUA, MNO, 1961, box 347, sig. 17/1–4, c.j. 1659/OS–1961; VUA, MNO, 1961, box, 347, sig. 17/2–24, c.j. 4135; VUA, MNO, 1961, box 348, sig. 17/2–31, c.j.4922/21.

18 “Exercise Wind (Voter),” VHA VUA, MNO, 1962, box304, sig. 17 2/13, c.j. 12650/1962. VHA VUA, MNO, 1962,

box 305, sig. 2–15, c.j. 12130.19 See Matthew Evangelista, ‘Why Keep Such an

Army?’ Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions, CWIHP WorkingPaper 19 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997).On Khrushchev see also Vladislav Zubok and HopeHarrison, The Nuclear Education of Nikita Khrushchev,” inJohn Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May andJonathan Rosenberg, eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), pp. 141-168.

20 See Evangelista, ‘Why Keep Such an Army;’Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev’s 1960 Troop Cut: NewRussian Evidence,” CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 199/1997),

pp. 416-420.21 “Lecture On the Character of Present-day War,”

VUA, MNO, 1961, sig. 4 1–6, c.j. 16196–NGS.22 Based on experiences with the Sputnik exercises, one

of the main tasks for the exercise season of 1965/66 was setto be the training of operations without the use of weaponsof mass destruction. See “Guidelines for the preparation of

generals, officers and warrant–officers of the Ministry of National Defense in 1965,” VUA, MNO, 1964, box 269, sig.17/1-5, c.j. 1400/19.

23 “Exercise Sputnik,” VUA, MNO, 1964, box 270, sig.

17/2–3, c.j. 11500/108–54/1964.24 “Conclusions from the Exercise October Storm on 16-

22 October 1965,” VUA, MNO, 1965, box 242, sig. 4/4, c.j.17841.

25 In the 1960s, Václav Vitanovský was considered aguru of Czechoslovak military thinking. In 1964 he pub-lished a textbook on the theory of strategy and doctrine.He was deposed already in 1967 for coming into conflict

with the Soviet generals, who pressed the Czechoslovak military headquarters to raise military expenditures andnumber of troops.

26 Interview with General Major Václav Vitanovský of 20 November 1990, Institute of Modern History, Prague,Collection of the “„SFR’s Government Commission for theAnalysis of the Years 1967-70,” R–105. Unfortunately, half of the interview has been lost. Colonel Karel Štepánek,Chief of the Operations Room at the General Staff at thetime and another participant in the preparation of the 1964

plan, also confirmed this procedure in an interview with theauthor.

28 The mapping of Western Europe during the 1970sand 1980s also seems to confirm that the 1964 plan wasvalid until the second half of the 1980s. It is apparent fromthe plan of map renewal in the 70s and 80s for individualWarsaw Pact countries, that the „SLA was still responsiblefor the same area as during the 1960s. The same goes for the scale of 1:100,000. See plan “ Utocnenija sovmestnychrabot geograficeskich sluzb armij gosudarstv-uscastnikovVarsavskogo dogovora po obnovlenii topograficeskich kartna 1972–1975 gody,” VHA VUA, fond Varsavska smlouva(VS), Topo, c.j. 004/75–12; also see plan “Utocnenijaucastnikov Varsavskogo dogovora po obnovleniitopograficeskich kart na 1976–1980 gody,” VUA, VS, Topo,

c.j. 5643/429 See Mark Kramer, “The “Lessons” of the CubanMissile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations,” pp.348-354.




“Operation Atom”

The Soviet Union’s Stationing of Nuclear Missiles

in the German Democratic Republic, 1959

By Matthias Uhl and Vladimir I. IvkinOn 26 March 1955, Nikita S. Khrushchev, First

Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU) and Nikolai A. Bulganin, Chairman of the SovietUnion’s Council of Ministers, signed government decreeno. 589-365. Their signatures set in motion one of the mostsecret military actions of the Cold War—the stationing of strategic nuclear missiles on the territory of the GermanDemocratic Republic (GDR).1

Recently declassified documents and internal materialsfrom the Russian Federation’s Strategic Missile Commandnow reveal that the first stationing of Soviet strategicmissiles outside the borders of the USSR did not occur—as

previously assumed by most historians and observers—inCuba in 1962, but in the GDR nearly three years earlier.While the stationing of the missiles in Cuba provoked aglobal crisis, the Western governments, in their officialstatements in 1959, acted as if unaware of the develop-ments in East Germany. Documents from the West Germanforeign intelligence service ( Bundesnachrichtendienst — BND), now available in the German Federal Archives inKoblenz, show that at least the intelligence agencies of theFederal Republic of Germany (FRG), the United States,Great Britain, and France knew about the missile stationing.Both blocs apparently succeeded in addressing the tense

military situation outside the public eye through a combi-nation of secret diplomacy and calibrated pressure.This essay provides an overview of the most impor-

tant events and presents aspects of this military episodethat have received little attention to date. Many of therelevant documents are still classified in Russian, Germanand US archives, or are considered to be lost, so thefollowing is only a tentative assessment. It is difficult to

put these events in the context of larger political develop-ments because the internal deliberations about theoperation are not yet known.

By 1955, more than 300 of the German missile special-ists who had been brought to the USSR in the early

postwar years had left the Soviet Union. They had beenincluded in the missile building program that had existedsince 1946 as a vital part of the Soviet Union’s effort todevelop and produce long-range ballistic missiles usingGerman technology. The German scientists’ legacy was the

production of a Soviet version of the German V-2, whichthe Soviets called R-1.2 The entire Soviet missile programwas subsequently built on the success of the R-1 series.The next step in its development, the R-2, already had arange of 600 kilometers. The first missile of genuinelySoviet production was the R-5, which was successfully

tested in March 1953. It had a range of 1,200 kilometers andcarried a warhead weighing 1.42 tons.3

It was necessary to equip the missile with an atomicwarhead in order to make it a new strategic weapon. On 10April 1954, the Soviet government gave its military-industrial complex the assignment of developing just sucha weapons system. Given that the atomic bombs availableat the time were too heavy to be delivered by a missile, thefirst step was to reduce the weight of the warhead. Aspecial department of the Nuclear Weapons DevelopmentCenter “Arzamas-16” headed by Samuel G. Kocarjanc took the lead on this aspect of the project. The nuclear warheadwas to be delivered by a modified version of the R-5. Thedraft construction plan of the new R-5 was drawn up by the“Special Construction Office No. 1” (OKB-1) of theScientific Research Institute No. 88 (NII-88), which, at thattime, was the only Soviet research institution that devel-oped long-range ballistic missiles. The well-known missile

builder Sergei P. Korolev headed the scientific aspects of the project, and D. I. Kozlov was charged to head theconstruction of what was officially called “Production8K51.” The project progressed rapidly, and in January 1955,the first flight tests took place at the Soviet Ministry of Defense’s central testing site in Kapustin Yar.4 The tests

revealed several technical adjustments still necessary tomake the R-5M a reliable carrier of nuclear weapons.The second phase of the testing began in January

1956. By that time, Soviet technicians had succeeded indelivering atomic warheads on missiles. The operation had

been code-named “Baikal.” Initially, the troops responsiblefor testing the new weapon launched four missilesequipped with complete warheads, except for thecomponents necessary to start a nuclear chain reaction. On2 February 1956, the Soviets successfully completed theworld’s first launching of a battle-ready nuclear missile.After a flight of 1,200 kilometers, the missile reached its

planned target area in the Aral region’s Karakum Desert

[ Priaral’skie karakumy]. The detonation device for starting the chain reaction functioned properly, causing thefirst explosion of a missile equipped with a nuclear warhead. The strength of the detonation was measured atthe equivalent of 0.4 kilotons (KT) of TNT. Soon thereafter,the engineers and technicians increased this strength to300 KT, more than twenty times the power of the bombdropped on Hiroshima. At that point, the missile and thewarhead comprised a new weapons system that allowedthe destruction of strategic objectives. The Soviet Ministryof Defense added the R-5M to its missile arsenal as early as




21 June 1956.5

The new weapon, officially called a first-generationmid-range strategic missile, had a length of 20.8 meters, adiameter of 1.65 meters, and a weight of 28 tons. Themissile was driven by a liquid propulsion system that usedliquid oxygen and alcohol, which created a thrust of 44tons and was therefore able to carry the 1,400 kilogramwarhead up to a maximum distance of 1,200 kilometers. The

missile would hit its target after a maximum flying time of 637 seconds. The navigational system of the missilefunctioned on the basis of inertial navigation and wasguided by radio transmission to correct deviations from themissile’s proper flight path. The average margin of error of 1.5 kilometers was considered to be sufficiently accurate. Itallowed the destruction of important political and economiccenters as well as larger “soft” military targets.6

Even before the successful conclusion of the tests, theSoviets began working on designs for a deployment of theweapon. The planners in the Soviet Ministry of Defenseresponsible for the project were aware that the R-5, with arange limited to 1,200 kilometers, still had to be stationedoutside the territory of the Soviet Union if the mostimportant political, military, and economic centers of Western Europe were to be in reach. Between 1953 and1955, special groups from the Soviet Ministry of Defensegathered information on potential deployment locations for R-1, R-2 and R-5 missiles during reconnaissance trips to

Romania, Bulgaria and the GDR. Due to the limited effec-tiveness of these weapon prototypes in a conflict situation,the military leaders decided against implementing these

plans. The plans were, however, the starting point for the planned stationing of the R-5M missile outside the SovietUnion.7

In March 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Defense presented draft decree no. 589-365 for the USSR Council of

Ministers’ decision. The draft called for stationing battle-ready missile brigades of the Supreme High CommandReserve (RVGK) in the Trans-Caucasian Military Zone, theFar Eastern Military Zone, in the GDR and in Bulgaria.While the Soviet Foreign Ministry was instructed to obtainthe agreement of the Bulgarian government for stationingmissiles on its territory, this procedure was not followed inthe GDR. There the missile brigade was apparently to beintegrated into the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,which were considered to have extraterritorial status. TheSoviet Union therefore saw no reason to consult with itsally about the intended stationing.8 In fact, as far as can bedocumented, the Soviet military apparently kept thestationing of the R-5M in the GDR a secret from their EastGerman ally.9

Although Khrushchev and Bulganin signed thedecree on 26 March 1955, its implementation was delayedrepeatedly. The most important causes for this delay wererepeated problems in producing the R-5M in sufficient

Announcing

The Machiavelli Center (CIMA)

After many years of close but informal cooperation, last year a group of Italian Cold War

historians decided to set up a formal arrangement in order to coordinate their research projects

and link their efforts to the international programs studying the same historical period. This led

to the creation of an inter-university center, The Machiavelli Center (CIMA), which unites a

number of departments from the Universities of Florence, Padua, Pavia, Perugia, Roma Tre,

and Urbino. The project centers around the activities of the Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato of

the University of Florence. Planned activities include conferences, publications and internships.

Those interested to know more about its activities can write to [email protected], [email protected],

[email protected]. See also the CIMA website at http://www.machiavellicenter.net.




stationing the missiles and their crews was nearingcompletion, and in November-December 1958, the 72nd

Engineer Brigade prepared for its transfer to the GDR. Sinceonly enough space existed thus far for two divisions, thethird division was transferred to Gvardeysk in theKönigsberg region. The remaining staff of the brigade, the635th and 638th Missile Units as well as the 349 th and 432nd

Mobile Missile Technical Bases, began their secret

transport of soldiers and equipment to the GDR.19

Efforts to maintain secrecy, such as firing all Germanworkers in the Vogelsang and Fürstenberg garrisons, wereincreased.20 Nonetheless, at the end of January 1959, agentV-9771 reported to his contact in the BND the arrival of

parts of the 635th Missile Unit. He reported that a transportof the Soviet Army had arrived at the train route betweenLychen and Fürstenberg. At the center of the transport,soldiers had moved “very large bombs” with the help of caterpillar tractors. It seems clear that this was the move-ment of R-5M components. Avoiding the main roads, theequipment, now covered in tarpaulin, was then taken to the

back side of the Kastaven Lake military base near Fürstenberg.21

The staff of the brigade as well as the 349th MobileMissile Technical Base were stationed with the 635 th

Division in Fürstenberg, in the immediate vicinity of thecommand center of the Second Soviet Tank Guard Army.The 638th Division and its accompanying 432nd MobileMissile Technical Base were stationed twenty kilometersaway, in the neighboring village of Vogelsang.22 Each of the two missile divisions controlled two artillery battalions,

outfitted with a launching ramp for firing the R-5M,including the necessary ground equipment. Each launchingramp was equipped for three missiles at that time; in totalfour launching units and 12 missiles were ready for deployment in the GDR. In addition to the aforementionedequipment, each division had a transport battalion, a unitto fuel the missiles, and a guidance battalion. This lastgroup had the task of increasing the accuracy of the missilethrough the use of radio control. To this end, the guidance

battalion employed a guidance device designed to reducethe missile’s tendency to veer to one side or the other.23

The missiles, however, were not fully ready for battle.They still lacked the necessary nuclear warheads, whicharrived in the GDR only in mid-April 1959. The warheads,officially labeled “generators” for the trip, were brought bytrain under heavy guard to the military airport at Templin.In the nights thereafter, they divided the Mobile MissileTechnical Bases among the bunkers designed for them inthe area around Vogelsang and Fürstenberg. On 29 April,an incident occurred that is not described in any detail inthe material available at the time this article was written. Butit is clear that during the transport of the nuclear weapons,the head of the 432nd Mobile Missile Technical Base, Lt.-Maj. S. I. Nesterov was demoted and relieved of commandon the spot by Lt.-Gen. M. K. Nikolski, the head engineer

for the 12th Central Division, responsible for the war-heads.24

Once the nuclear warheads had arrived, the 72nd RVGK Reserve Brigade was finally ready for battle. At the

beginning of May 1959, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, M. V. Zakharov, personally toldKhrushchev that the missiles were ready for use.25 At that

point, the brigade, which reported directly to Khrushchevand the General Staff, was in position to report that it wasready to “assume the planned launching position and fulfillthe designated tasks.”26

Since the relevant documents are not accessible, onecan only speculate as to the possible targets assigned to

the missile brigade. It seems likely, however, that four missiles were aimed at the UK. The US-British “Thor”missiles stationed in Yorkshire and Suffolk were to bedestroyed by the Soviet nuclear missiles in the case of acrisis. For the first time, moreover, the most important USair bases in Western Europe were also within range of theSoviets’ weapons. The bombers stationed in WesternEurope carrying US nuclear weapons, the most importantelement in the strategy of massive retaliation, were thus in

R-5M Missile

Picture Courtesy of Matthias Uhl




danger of a surprise attack. A third military option was alsoconceivable: Western Europe could be cut off from its US

protector in the event of war by the destruction of theAtlantic harbors. It is also certain that missiles were aimedat population centers in Western Europe, such as London,Paris, Bonn and the Ruhr, and Brussels.27 The establish-ment of another Soviet missile base in Albania could havecompleted the Soviet’s strategy. From this base in the

harbor city of Vlorä, Rome and NATO’s Southern EuropeanHeadquarters in Naples could be targeted.28

Although a formidable number of the Soviet Union’s battle-ready nuclear missiles were located in GDR territoryat the time,29 this fact alone should not be viewed as anaggressive move on Khrushchev’s part. His central interestwas to improve the Soviets’ strategic position in the caseof a potential conflict. At the time of the Suez Crisis, Soviet

politicians and military planners had to recognize that theydid not have the military capacity to threaten WesternEurope in order to exert pressure in the case of a crisis.This strategic disadvantage, which the Soviets considereddecisive, was to be eliminated through the stationing of R-5M nuclear missiles in the GDR. At the same time, it can

be assumed that the nuclear forward guard of the USSR was supposed to reduce the US nuclear advantage thathad existed up to that point. Since the Soviet Union wasnot in a position militarily to match the alleged threat of theStrategic Air Command, it responded by stationing nuclear missiles.

Meanwhile, the brigade in the GDR perfected itsreadiness through repeated launch drills. For securityreasons, training took place only at night. Since theunit was very motivated politically and also enjoyedcomparatively comfortable material conditions, they

succeeded in reducing the preparation time for a launchfrom thirty to five hours. This increased performanceguaranteed a high state of readiness, but technical

problems repeatedly emerged. The substitute used for thehighly volatile fuel component liquid oxygen continued tocaused problems. Without refueling, the missiles were notmission-ready for longer than thirty days.30

After the BND had gathered the first bits of informa-tion about the stationing of the 72nd Engineer Brigade at the

beginning of 1959, the information flow increased in thespring of that year. The continued construction work exclusively carried out by Soviet units, the strict cordon-ing-off of the construction sites, and the forest surround-

ings necessary for hiding the missile troops, as well as theclose military observation by machine gun posts—all of this caused the local population to speculate frequentlythat the Russians were building missile-launching bases inthe area. The BND informants in the area quickly passedthese rumors on to the intelligence organization’s center inPullach.31 But the West German intelligence service was byno means the only such agency active in the area wherethe 72nd Missile Brigade was stationed. US, British andFrench intelligence agencies, as well as two others thathave yet to be identified, attempted to gather information

about the unusual activities in the Fürstenberg/ Vogelsangregion.32 Despite this concentration of intelligence agentsfrom NATO countries on such limited territory, thedocumentary evidence thus far available suggests thatinformation on the nuclear missile deployments may nothave reached top-level policymakers in the US until late1960. It was not until then that US intelligence agencieshad even reached firm conclusions on the GDR deploy-

ment. Indeed, the CIA believed that Soviet missiles werestill in the GDR as of early 1961!33

The Soviet missile base in the GDR providedKhrushchev with an important means to back up his Berlinultimatum—whether or not its deployment was knownamong Western policymakers. The Soviet leader reiteratedthis threat in a conversation in Moscow on 23 June 1959with W. Averell Harriman: “It would take only a few Sovietmissiles to destroy Europe: One bomb was sufficient for Bonn and three to five would knock out France, England,Spain and Italy. The United States would be in no positionto retaliate because its missiles could carry a warhead of only ten kilograms whereas Russian missiles could carry1,300 kilograms.”34

The Western military alliance hence had to make itclear to the Soviets that there would be no compromise onthe status of Berlin. The core of this tactic was NATO’s1959 contingency plan “Live Oak,” designed to assureWestern Allied rights in Berlin. The crisis scenario devel-oped in the context of “Live Oak” foresaw a continualescalation of military force applied in Berlin in the case of amilitary conflict. The possibilities ranged from an armedinvasion of the GDR by US military units to reach Berlin tonuclear retaliatory strikes.35

Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine at this time

whether the presence of the battle-ready Soviet missiles inthe GDR played any role in this contingency planning of the Western plans and tactics in the Geneva negotiationsthat began in May 1959. Uncertainty about Soviet missiledeployments (whether Intercontinental or Intermediate-range ballistic missiles) heightened Western concerns thata political crisis over Berlin that turned into a militaryconfrontation could put the UK and Western Europe atrisk.36 Certainly that problem made negotiations seem moreurgent. But that uncertainty had been in the air for months

before the completion of the GDR deployment. It seemshighly doubtful that IRBM deployments in the GDR had animpact on decisions on the Berlin negotiations, especially

when one considers that the intelligence community didnot complete its assessment of the data on the GDR untilthe last days of the Eisenhower administration.37

Khrushchev, however, probably did not intend anescalation of the crisis to reach the point of a war. TheSoviet premier’s tactics in the Berlin Crisis were much more

bluff-oriented. For Khrushchev, the nuclear missiles in theGDR might have served as a special “trump” in the game of

power poker. At no point, however, was the Soviet leader prepared to risk a World War III over Berlin.38 When herecognized that a military conflict would develop in the




case of continued confrontation, Khrushchev moved to pull back his missiles stationed in the Soviets’ frontguard—perhaps intended (but not noticed) as a visiblesymbol of a relaxation of tensions.

In August 1959, the missile unit left its positions in theGDR in great haste. The officers and the soldiers of theunit, many of whom had hoped to be stationed in the GDR for a long term and had already begun to develop plans for

a life in East Germany, were taken completely by surprise by the order to relocate. Within the span of a few weeks,the missiles were moved to the area around Kaliningrad onthe Baltic coast. Paris and London were once again outsidethe range of the R-5M.39

Even today, most of the officers and soldiers of the72nd Engineer Brigade who took part in the stationing andwithdrawal are unable to explain the hasty retreat of themissile unit. They suspect, however, that the retreat to theSoviet territory was based on political motives.40 In fact,the withdrawal occurred just as Eisenhower andKhrushchev announced their decision to exchange visits,with Khrushchev to visit the US in September. Withdétente in the air, the Soviet leader may have worried that itwould be awkward for Soviet policy if the US discoveredthe missiles in Germany. Given that two years later theSoviet leader launched “Operation Anadyr,” the stationingof Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba, Khrushchev’s motivesin deploying and removing nuclear missiles in the GDR raises intriguing questions—which only further access tothe relevant archives will help to answer. Was “OperationAtom” a prelude to “Operation Anadyr”?

DOCUMENT

STATEMENT BY THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST

PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

ON THE TRANSFER OF THE

72ND ENGINEER BRIGADE TO

EAST GERMANY,

26 MARCH 1955

Top SecretReturn to Group Number 1 of the Special Division of

the Administrative Section of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union within 24 hours required

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union and Council of Ministers of the USSR

Decision of 26 March 1955Top SecretMoscow, The Kremlin

About Measures to Increase the Battle-Readiness of the Engineer Brigades of the Supreme Command ReserveUnits.

With the goal of increasing the battle-readiness of theengineer brigades of the Supreme Command’s ReserveUnits, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of theSoviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have decided that:

The Defense Ministry of the Soviet Union (ComradeZhukov) is assigned with carrying out the followingmeasures:

1. From 1955 to 1956, four engineer brigades of theSupreme Command Reserve Units are to be transferredto areas that correspond with the plans for their battledeployment:

A. The 72nd RVGK [ Rezerv VerchovnogoGlavnokomandovanija —Reserve of the HighCommand] Engineer Brigade is to be transferred to theterritory of the GDR and is to be incorporated into thetroops of the Soviet military forces in Germany;

B. The 73rd RVGK Engineer Brigade is to betransferred to the territory of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, and the Foreign Ministry of the USSR (Comrade Molotov) is to gain the agreement of theBulgarian government to this stationing;41

C. The 90th RVGK Engineer Brigade is to betransferred to the territory of the Trans-CaucasianMilitary Zone;

D. The 85th RVGK Engineer Brigade is to betransferred to the Far Eastern Military Zone

2. The 72nd, 73rd, 85th, 90th and 233rd Engineer Brigades of the RVGK are to be brought up to full

strength and are to be fully staffed, and armed with thenecessary special weaponry and technology.3. The 80th RVGK Engineer Brigade is to be

transformed into a training unit for engineer brigadesRVGK, and will be responsible for training the newnon-commissioned officers and soldiers for allengineer brigades, as a substitute for those released tothe reserves.

It is to be guaranteed that the training unit for RVGK engineer brigades can be transformed into

battle-ready engineer brigades RVGK. In this instance,the specialists necessary for training the replacementscoming from the reserves are to be left out of the

transformation process. The training unit for RVGK engineer brigades is to be stationed on the territory of the Central State Artillery Range.42

4. The size of the Soviet Army is to be increased by 5,500 men in order to guarantee that the measureslisted in points 2 and 3 are carried out.

5. In the period 1955-56, the Ministry of Defenseof the USSR is allowed to use 30 R-1 and 18 R-2missiles that have passed their maximum guaranteedstorage life in the reserve of the Ministry of Defense to




improve the battle training of the 7 engineer brigades.

The Secretary of the Central CommitteeThe Chairman of the of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion, Council of Ministers of the USSR,

N. Khrushchev

N. Bulganin

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federa-tion (AP FR), Moscow, Register 93 (Documents with

Decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for theYear 1955) as printed in Pervoe raketnoe soedinenievooruzennych sil strany: Voenno-istoriceskij ocerk (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 208-209. Translated from

Russian for the CWIHP by Matthias Uhl.]

Dr. Matthias Uhl recently defended his dissertationon “ Stalin’s V-2: The Transfer of German MissileTechnology to the USSR and the Development of theSoviet Missile Production, 1945-49.” He is currently aresearch fellow at the Berlin office of the Institute for Contemporary History (Munich), working on a larger documentation project on the 1958/62 Berlin Crisis.

Dr. Vladimir I. Ivkin is a Russian historian.

1 See “Decision of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Nr. 589-365,” Top Secret , 26

March 1955, printed in Pervoe raketnoe soedinenievooruzennych sil strany: Voenno-istoricesky ocerk (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 208-209. The original is locatedin the Archiv Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii [Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow, AP RF],Register 93 (Documents with Decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for 1955).

2 On the activity of the German missile specialists inthe Soviet Union, see Jürgen Michels, Peenemünde und

seine Erben in Ost und West: Entwicklung und Weg deutscher Geheimwaffen, (Bonn: Bernard & Gräfe, 1997);Ulrich Albrecht, Andreas Heinemann-Grueder and ArendWellman, Die Spezialisten: Deutsche Naturwissenschaftler

und Techniker in der Sowjetunion (Berlin: Dietz, 1992). Theauthor is currently working on a monograph on the sametopic that will soon appear under the title: Stalins V-2: Der Transfer der deutschen Raketentechnik in die UdSSR,1945-1955.

3 See Raketno-kosmiceskaia korporacia “Energiia”imeni S. P. Koroleva (Moscow: RKK “Energija”, 1996), pp.31-51; T. Kochran, U. Arikin, R. Norris and Dz. Sends,

Jadernoe vooruzenie SSSR (Moscow: IzDAT, 1992), pp.230-233.

4 See M. A. Pervov, “Ballisticeskie rakety velikojstrany” Aviacija i kosmonavtika: Vcera, segodnja, zavtra,no. 7 (1998), pp. 17-23; see also A.V. Karpenko, A. F. Utkinand A. D. Popov, Otecestvennye strategiceskie raketnyekompleksy (Sankt-Peterburg: Nevskij bastion: Gangut,1999), pp. 38-44.

5 See Strategiceskoe jadernoe vooruzenie Rossii(Moscow: IzdAT 1998), pp. 160-161, see also B. E. Certok,

Rakety i ljudi (Moscow: Masinostroenie 1995), pp. 389-390; Jadernye ispytanija SSSR (Moscow: IzdAT 1997), p.147; Chronika osnovnych sobytij istorii Raketnych vojsk

strategiceskogo naznacenija (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), p. 35.6 See Raketnye kompleksy, p. 43f. see also S. G.

Kolesnikov, Strategiceskoe raketno-jadernoe oruzie(Moscow: Arsenal-Press, 1996), p. 19-20.

7 See M. A. Pervov, Raketnoe oruzie Raketnych vojsk strategiceskogo naznacenija (Moscow: Violanta, 1999), p.51.

8 See “The Decision of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,” no. 589-365, Top Secret, 26 March1955, printed in Pervoe raketnoe, pp. 208-209.

9 During my interview with General Heinz Kessler, whowas the Defense Minister for the GDR from 1985 to 1989,on 24 October 1999, Kessler stated: “The Soviet Armyleadership did not give the GDR military leadership anyinformation about the stationing of missiles in Vogelsangand Fürstenberg. In my position at the time as head of theGDR air force, I had no knowledge of any action of thattype. Neither the GDR Defense Minister at the time, WilliStoph, nor his first assistant, Lieutenant-General HeinzHoffmann had received any information, as far as I know. Inaddition, in my later position as Defense Minister, this 1959

event was never mentioned in any way by the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany or the SupremeCommand of the Warsaw Pact. This type of behavior matches my later experiences. The Soviet military, for example, never told us which Soviet installations in theGDR had nuclear weapons in storage during my time in that

position.”10 See Sozdateli raketno-jadernogo oruzija i veterany-

raketaikij rasskazyvajut (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 250-252, see also Voennyj enciklopediceskij slovar’ Raketnychvojsk strategiceskogo naznacenija (Moscow: Naucnoeizdatel’stvo “BRE”, 1999), p. 619.

11 See Pervoe raketnoe, p. 124-125

12 See Draft Decision for the Council of Ministers of the USSR, “About the Production of a Trial Series of Long-Range Missiles V-2 and Measures to Their Further Improvement,” not dated (probably August 1946), RussianState Archive for Economics [RGAE], Moscow, Register 8157, Section 1, document 1149, sheet 126-128.

13 See Ju. A. Jasin and N. K. Monachov, “Pervajaotecestvennaja” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, no. 3(1998), p. 5; see also Raketnye vojska strategi’eskogonaznacenija: Voenno-istoriceskij trud (Moskva: RVSN,1994), pp. 51-53; M. V. Sacharov, Die Streitkräfte der

. . . . . . . .

—————




UdSSR: Abriß ihrer Entwicklung von 1918 bis 1968(Berlin: Militärverlag d. DDR, 1974) p. 637.

14 See Pervoe raketnoe, pp. 11-13, see also M. A.Pervov, Mezkontinental’nye ballisticeskie rakety SSSR i

Rossii: Kratkij istoriceskij ocerk (Moscow: [publisher notidentified],1998), p. 29–30.

15 See Standortkartei der Militärischen Auswertungdes BND: “Allgemeine Beobachtungen in Vogelsang, 22.

Mai 1958 bis 11 August 1958”, [Card Catalog of the BND’sMilitary Evaluations: General Observations in Vogelsang],Federal Archives, Koblenz [henceforth BA Koblenz],Collection B 206/114, sheet 18-19.

16 Ibid, sheet 18.17 Ibid., report E 14136, mid-September 1958, BA

Koblenz, collection B 206/114, sheet 20.18 See information sent to the author by the BND on 22

April 1998 and 4 May 2000.19 A. Bondarenko, “Osobaja tajna Vtoroj armii,”

Aviacija i kosmonavtika: Vcera, segodnja, zavtra, no. 7(1998), pp. 24-25; also see Pervoe raketnoe, p. 13.

20 Card Catalog of the BND’s Military Evaluations:General Observations in Fürstenberg, report E 21235, lateJanuary, 1959, BA Koblenz, B 206/109, Sheet 6.

21 Ibid, sheet 6. The Soviets’ procedures for unloadingtheir cargo, which corresponded exactly to the instructionsfor transporting missiles of the R-5M category, alsoindicates that it was actually missiles being delivered atthat time. See “Security Instruction to the Troop Section

des BND: Allgemeine Beobachtungen in Fürstenberg, Meldung von USAREUR (United States Army in Europe),April 1959, BA Koblenz, collection B 206/109, sheet 6;“Meldung von Aster,” ibid; Standortkartei der

Militärischen Auswertung des BND: Allgemeine Beobachtungen Baustelle VOGELSANG - BURGWALL, Meldung von Narzisse, September 1959, BA Koblenz,collection B 206/114, sheet 1. ASTER is the BND’s code

name for the British intelligence agency, and the informa-tion delivered to the BND by the French Foreign Intelli-gence Service was classified under the codename

NARZISSE. In addition, there are the code names DIANAand BSSO, which have not yet been positively linked to a

particular foreign intelligence service.33 Editor’s Note: See “Intelligence Note: Deployment of

Soviet Medium Range Missiles in East Germany,” Memo-randum from Hugh S. Cumming Jr (INR) to the Secretary of State, 4 January 1961, National Archives, Record Group 59,Lot 65D478: Records of the Special Assistant to theSecretary of State for Atomic Energy/Country and SubjectFiles Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962, box 5,1961/USSR/Intelligence Reports.—I would like to thank William Burr (National Security Archive) for bringing thisdocument to my attention.

34 Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford UP, 1997), p. 242.

35 See William Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope: TheEisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, from 1958to 1959,” Diplomatic History, 18:2 (Spring 1994), pp. 177-205; see also “Geheimoperation Fürstenberg” Der Spiegel ,

p. 46; see also Christian Bremen, Die Eisenhower-Adminis-tration und die zweite Berlin-Krise 1958-1961 (Berlin: de

Gruyter, 1998); John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, ErnestR. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds. Cold War States-men Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 111-115.

36 Whatever data the West might have had on Sovietdeployment in East Germany did not lead to a clear clamor among the Western European NATO members for corre-sponding MRBMs—only Turkey and Italy respondedfavorably responded to Eisenhower’s offer for them. SeePhil Nash, The Other Missiles of October (Chapel Hill: TheUniversity of North Carolina Press, 1997).

37 See footnote 33.38 See Michael Jochum, Eisenhower und

Chruschtschow: Gipfeldiplomatie im Kalten Krieg 1955-1960 (Munich, et al.: Schoenigh, 1996), p. 107; VladislavZubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’sCold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 199.

39 See Pervoe raketnoe, pp. 122, 135; see also Slovar RVSN , p. 440.

40 Ibid., pp. 126, 135.41 The Bulgarians may have refused to grant their

permission, because there are no references to a stationingof the 73rd Engineer Brigade RVGK in Bulgaria.

15644 for Testing the R-5M and Other Analog Varieties,”31 July 1954, RGAE, Register 397, Section 1, Document 201,Sheets 101-112.

22 See Pervoe raketnoe, p. 13.23 See Pervov, Raketnoe oruzie, p. 51; also see Slovar

RVSN, p. 204-5.24 See Pervoe raketnoe, p. 133-34.25 See Bondarenko, “Osobaja tajna Vtoroj armii” p. 25.26 Voenacal’niki Rakenych vojsk strategiceskogo

naznacenija (Moscow: CIPK, 1997), p.88.27 See Wolfgang Bayer “Geheimoperation

Fürstenberg,” Der Spiegel , no. 3, 16 January 2000, p. 42-44;also see Bondarenko, “Osobaja tajna Vtoroj armii” p. 25-26.

28 See Das Albanien des Enver Hocha, “Arte” TVProduction, 1997.

29 See Raketnyj scit otecestva (Moscow: CIPK, 1999), p. 68. In 1959, the missile troops of the Soviet Union hadonly 32 battle-ready atomic missiles at their disposal. All of

them were R-5M model types. By 1960, they had twointercontinental missiles, model R-7A, as well as 36medium-range missiles, model R-5M, and 172 R-12 missiles.

30 See Bondarenko, “Osobaja tajna Vtoroj armii” p. 26; Pervoe raketnoe, p. 120–22.

31 See Standortkartei der Militärischen Auswertung des BND: Allgemeine Beobachtungen in Vogelsang,

Februar-Juni 1959 [Card Catalog of the BND’s MilitaryEvaluations: General Observations in Vogelsang, February– June 1959], BA Koblenz, B 206/114, Sheets 25–29.

32 See Standortkartei der Militärischen Auswertung




42 The Central State Artillery Grounds were establishedon 13 May 1946 and located in Kapustin Yar.

Our country is undergoing a truly revolutionary upsurge. The process of restructuring is gaining pace; We started by elaborating

the theoretical concepts of restructuring; we had to assess the nature and scope of the problems, to interpret the lessons of the past,and to express this in the form of political conclusions and programs. This was done. The theoretical work, the re-interpretation of what had happened, the final elaboration, enrichment, and correction of political stances have not ended. They continue. However,

it was fundamentally important to start from an overall concept, which is already now being confirmed by the experience of past years, which has turned out to be generally correct and to which there is no alternative. […]

We intend to expand the Soviet Union’s participation in the monitoring mechanism on human rights in the United Nations and

within the framework of the pan-European process. We consider that the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague withrespect to interpreting and applying agreements in the field of human rights should be obligatory for all states.

Within the Helsinki process, we are also examining an end to jamming of all the foreign radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union.On the whole, our credo is as follows: Political problems should be solved only by political means, and human problems only in a

humane way. [...]

Now about the most important topic, without which no problem of the coming century can be resolved: disarmament. [...]Today I can inform you of the following: The Soviet Union has made a decision on reducing its armed forces. In the next two

years, their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 persons, and the volume of conventional arms will also be cut consider-

ably. These reductions will be made on a unilateral basis, unconnected with negotiations on the mandate for the Vienna meeting. By agreement with our allies in the Warsaw Pact, we have made the decision to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslo- vakia, and Hungary, and to disband them by 1991. Assault landing formations and units, and a number of others, including assault

river-crossing forces, with their armaments and combat equipment, will also be withdrawn from the groups of Soviet forces situated

in those countries. The Soviet forces situated in those countries will be cut by 50,000 persons, and their arms by 5,000 tanks. Allremaining Soviet divisions on the territory of our allies will be reorganized. They will be given a different structure from today’s

which will become unambiguously defensive, after the removal of a large number of their tanks. [...]By this act, just as by all our actions aimed at the demilitarization of international relations, we would also like to draw the

attention of the world community to another topical problem, the problem of changing over from an economy of armament to an

economy of disarmament. Is the conversion of military production realistic? I have already had occasion to speak about this. Webelieve that it is, indeed, realistic. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready to do the following. Within the framework of the economic

reform we are ready to draw up and submit our internal plan for conversion, to prepare in the course of 1989, as an experiment, theplans for the conversion of two or three defense enterprises, to publish our experience of job relocation of specialists from the

military industry, and also of using its equipment, buildings, and works in civilian industry, It is desirable that all states, primarily the

major military powers, submit their national plans on this issue to the United Nations. […]Finally, being on U.S. soil, but also for other, understandable reasons, I cannot but turn to the subject of our relations with this

great country. [...] Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America span 5 1/2 decades. The world haschanged, and so have the nature, role, and place of these relations in world politics. For too long they were built under the banner

of confrontation, and sometimes of hostility, either open or concealed. But in the last few years, throughout the world people wereable to heave a sigh of relief, thanks to the changes for the better in the substance and atmosphere of the relations between

Moscow and Washington. […]

We acknowledge and value the contribution of President Ronald Reagan and the members of his administration, above all Mr.George Shultz. All this is capital that has been invested in a joint undertaking of historic importance. It must not be wasted or left

out of circulation. The future U.S. administration headed by newly elected President George Bush will find in us a partner, ready— without long pauses and backward movements—to continue the dialogue in a spirit of realism, openness, and goodwill, and with a

striving for concrete results, over an agenda encompassing the key issues of Soviet-U.S. relations and international politics.

We are talking first and foremost about consistent progress toward concluding a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategicoffensive weapons, while retaining the ABM Treaty; about elaborating a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons—here,

it seems to us, we have the preconditions for making 1989 the decisive year; and about talks on reducing conventional weapons and

armed forces in Europe. We are also talking about economic, ecological and humanitarian problems in the widest possible sense. [...] We are not inclined to oversimplify the situation in the world. Yes, the tendency toward disarmament has received a strong

impetus, and this process is gaining its own momentum, but it has not become irreversible. Yes, the striving to give up confrontationin favor of dialogue and cooperation has made itself strongly felt, but it has by no means secured its position forever in the practice

of international relations. Yes, the movement toward a nuclear-free and nonviolent world is capable of fundamentally transformingthe political and spiritual face of the planet, but only the very first steps have been taken. Moreover, in certain influential circles,

they have been greeted with mistrust, and they are meeting resistance. […]

[Source: CNN.com]

(continued from page 198)




Lee Harvey Oswald’s Letter Requesting USSR Citizenship

[Editor’s Note: At the 1999 Cologne summit, Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented US President Bill Clinton with some 40 documents pertaining to the November 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The document printed below—Lee Harvey Oswald’s handwritten 16 October 1959 letter requesting Soviet citizenship—and the other documents were made accessible to the public later that year. Engaging in “archival diplomacy,” the Russian presi-dent had selectively released historical documents on other occasions, such as in the mid-1990s when he brought top

secret Politburo documents on the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary to Budapest or provided the South Korean government with high-level Soviet documents on the Korean War. The documents on the JFK assassination includeSoviet envoy Anastas

Mikoyan’s emotional cable on his meeting with

Jacqueline Kennedy at the funeral of the slain

president; and a personal letter from Jacqueline

Kennedy to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, dated 1 December 1963, inwhich Mrs. Kennedy

emphasized “how muchmy husband was con-cerned about peace and how important therelations between youand him were to him inthis concern.” Much of the documentation dealswith Moscow’s and Washington’s concernover the political fall-out of the assassination for Soviet-American rela-

tions in light of allega-tions that Oswald had had a Soviet connection,though his request for citizenship was denied in1959. (“Judging fromeverything,” Mikoyancabled to Moscow, “theUS government does not want to involve us in thismatter, but neither does it want to get into a fight with the extreme right-ists.”) The documents areavailable at the National

Archives (College Park, MD). CWIHP has published the documents(and translations) on itswebsite at http:// cwihp.si.edu. —ChristianF. Ostermann]




New Evidence on the Iran Crisis 1945-46

From the Baku Archives

[The following documents were provided to CWIHP by Dr. Jamil Hasanli (Baku State University). Hasanli,

who has conducted extensive research on Soviet policies with regard to Iranian Azerbaijan in the early Cold War,

obtained these documents from the State Archive of Political Parties and Social Movements of the Republic of

Azerbaijan in Baku. Only a sample of a much larger collection to be published in future issues of theCWIHP Bulletin

and CWIHP Working Papers, these documents allow unprecedented insight into Stalin’s systematic efforts to sponsor a

separatist movement in Northern Iran. Some of the documents have also been consulted by Dr. Fernande Scheid (Yale

University), who presented her findings for the first time at the September 1999 CWIHP Conference on “Stalin and the

Cold War” at Yale University and who is the author of a forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper. Previous CWIHP publica-

tions on the subject, based on Russian archival materials, include Natalia Egorova, The ‘Iran Crisis’ of 1945-1946: A

View from the Russian Archives (CWIHP Working Paper No. 15, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997).

Hasanli contributed the documents in the framework of a new initiative on “The Caucasus in the Cold War,”

co-sponsored by the National Security Archive and CWIHP. The initiative aims at unearthing new evidence from

archives in the Southern Caucasus on important Cold War issues, such as Stalin’s plans for territorial expansion in

1945-46 with regard to Turkey and Iran; ethnic cleansing in the Caucasus in the context of Stalin’s imperial calcula-tions; “flashpoints” in the Southern Caucasus during de-Stalinization (e.g., Tbilisi, March 1956); and the collapse of

the USSR (irredentist movements in Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, and clashes between Soviet troops and

nationalist protesters in April 1989 in Tbilisi and in January 1990 in Baku).

In a first step towards planing collaborative exploration of the archives, the “The Caucasus in the Cold

War” initiative brought together some thirty Georgian, Armenian, Azeri, US and Russian scholars and archivists

for a workshop in Tbilisi in October 2000 to discuss archival holdings and research agendas. Among the most note-

worthy issues brought out by the discussion was the signifigance of inter-ethnic tensions in the immediate post-World

War II period (which later exploded as the Soviet Union collapsed). Workshop participants also made clear that in

Cold War historiography on topics such as the territorial disputes and war scares between Iran and Soviet Azerbaijan

(1945-46) and between Turkey and Soviet Georgia and Armenia (1945-47), concurrent tensions within and among the

Soviet Caucasus Republics during that period have often been overlooked. Placing regional ethnic and inter-republic

tensions within the larger Cold War context will likely be a major theme of the new initiative. For further information

on the Caucasus Initiative, contact CWIHP or Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya at the National Security Archive (phone: 202-994-7000).

Hasanli’s work in the Azeri archives on the 1945-46 crisis first came to CWIHP’s attention in connection

with a National Security Archive project on “Iran and the Cold War.” Together with the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s

Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), it was agreed to organize a series of workshops to gather

sources and perspectives from various countries on the subject of “Iran, the Great Powers, and the Cold War.” In

September 1999, the National Security Archive organized a panel on the 1945-46 crisis at an Iranian studies confer-

ence in Tehran. This was followed in June 2000 by a major international conference in Tehran on the oil crisis of 1951-

54, hosted by a new Iranian institute affiliated with the Foreign Ministry, the “Center for Documents and Diplomatic

History.” The conference agenda included the controversial overthrow (with U.S. and British intell igence support) of

Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and the reinstallation of the Shah in August 1953. The meeting, which received

wide media publicity in Iran, coincided with the leaked publication of a classified CIA history of the coup. It was at the

June 2000 session that Hasanli presented his findings from the Azeri archives on the earlier crisis, and agreed to

cooperate with the Archive and CWIHP on both the Iran and Caucasus projects. CWIHP is planning to publish Iranian

documentation (translated from Farsi) on the 1945-46 Azerbaijan crisis obtained in Tehran, as well as further materi-

als from the Baku archives, in future issues of theBulletin. For further information on the Iran project, contact its

director, Malcolm Byrne, by e-mail at [email protected] or by telephone at 202-994-7000. – Christian F. Ostermann.]




DOCUMENT No. 1

Decree of the [USSR] State Defense

Committee No. 9168 SS,

Regarding Geological Prospecting Work

for Oil in Northern Iran,

21 June 1945

COPY

TOP SECRET

The State Defense CommitteeDecree of the GOKO [State Defense Committee] No. 9168SSof 21 June 1945Moscow, the Kremlin

Geological Prospecting Work for Oil in Northern Iran

With the objective of geological prospecting anddrilling work for oil in northern Iran, the State DefenseCommittee DECREES:

1. Organize within the “Azneft’” [Azerbaijani Oil]Association of the Narkomneft’ [the People’s Commissariatfor Oil] a Hydrogeological Directorate and entrust to thisorganization the supervision of geological prospecting for oil deposits in northern Iran.

2. To conduct this prospecting work in northern Iranhold Narkomneft’ (Cde. Baybakov) and Azneft’ (Cde.Vezirov) responsible for supplying the necessary quantityof workers from the oil industry for drilling and prospecting

teams and sending them to the place of work in the form of a hydrogeological detachment created in the staff of theSoviet troops in Iran (Qazvin).

3. Establish a mission for the hydrogeological detach-ment to conduct the following work in northern Iran:

a) Drilling

10 pumps in 7 areas, including 3 stationary pumps(deep rotary drilling) in the areas of Shakhi, Bandar-Shah,and Mianeh;

4 stationary pumps (deep structural search drilling) inthe areas of Shah, Bolgar-Chay, and Khoy;

3 mobile drilling units for structural search drilling inthe areas of Bandar-Shah, Shaha-Babol’ser, and Pahlavi;

b) Geological Survey – one expedition comprising 10teams in the areas of: the Gorgan Steppe, Ashraf-Shaha-Amol’, Khorramabad, Bolgar-Chai, Jul’fa-Zanjan, Tabriz-Ardebil’, and Ku-I-Gitcha-Siyakh-Ku;

c) Geological Prospecting – one expedition of 3 teams(gravimetric “Issing”, variometric and resistivity prospect-ing) in the areas: Gorgan Steppe, Mazanderan and Rashtlowlands, and along entire southern shore of the CaspianSea from the border with the Turkmen SSR to the border with the Azerbaijan SSR.

Hold the Narkomneft’ (Cde. Baybakov) and Azneft’

(Cde. Vezirov) responsible for transferring the requireddrilling and prospecting equipment by 1 September 1945 toconduct the work to the required degree and [for] begin-ning drilling and prospecting work in September of 1945.

4. Hold the Narkomneft’ (Cde. Baybakov) responsiblefor organizing and dispatching by 1 August 1945: ageological survey expedition of 10 teams; a well-loggingand electrometer team; a geophysical expedition of 3 teams(gravimetric “Issing”, variometric ((2 instruments)) andresistivity prospecting) by removing these teams from thefollowing regions: the gravimetric “Issing” [team] fromBaku; the variometric [team] (2 instruments) from theMiddle Volga Branch of the Narkomneft’ GeophysicalTrust; the resistivity [team] from the area of Krasnodar.

5. With the objective of equipping the hydrogeologicaldetachment with the necessary equipment, instruments,and material hold [the following] responsible:

a) the Narkomneft’ (Cde. Baybakov) is to allocate andship to the Hydrogeological Directorate in August 1945: 5sets of pumps, drilling equipment, and a rotary drillinginstrument; 4 sets of ZV-750 frames, drilling equipment, andthe instrument for them; 3 sets of rods (1200 meters) and an

instrument for KA-300 pumps, and other necessaryequipment and materials for the work of thehydrogeological detachment;

b) the Narkomvneshtorg [People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade] (Cde. Mikoyan) is to allocate to thehydrogeological detachment in June-July 1945 15 truck-tractors and 120 trucks from imports from the unassembledones in Iran;

c) the Commanding General of the TranscaucasusFront, Cde. Tyulenev, is to allocate to the hydrogeologicaldetachment the necessary office space and living quarters

in Qazvin and at work locations, and also render aid with personnel from military units in assembling the 120 vehiclesallocated to the hydrogeological detachment;

d) the USSR NKO [People’s Commissariat of Defense](Cde. Vorob’yev [Marshal of Engineer Troops, M. P., Chief of Engineer Troops of the Soviet Army]) is, by 1 August1945, to transfer to the disposition of the hydrogeologicaldetachment in Iran two complete AVB-2-100 mobile drillingunits in working order: a drilling machine AVB-2-100, a ZIS-5 water tanker, a 1.5 ton vehicle with an instrument and one




UA-125 frame with three drilling teams;

e) the USSR NKO ( [General of the Army, Chief of theRear of the Soviet Army] Cde. Khrulev) is to send to thehydrogeological detachment in working order 5 MAK 12-ton vehicles, 7 logging truck trailers, and 15 Willysvehicles, and also provide for the repair of drillingequipment and automotive transport in repair shops of the

Soviet transport directorate in Iran.

6. Hold the Commanding General of the TranscaucasusFront, Cde. Tyulenev, responsible for rendering aid to thehydrogeological detachment in drilling and geological

prospecting work [by] providing a guard force, an escortfor the expeditions, providing cartographic materials, andalso providing personnel of the hydrogeological detach-ment with clothing and appropriate documents.

7. Hold the Narkomfin [People’s Commissariat of Finance] (Cde. Zverev) responsible in the 3rd and 4th

quarters of 1945 with allocating to the Narkomneft’ 8 millionrubles, including 2,400,000 in rials for the HydrogeologicalDirectorate of the Azneft’ Association to obtain transportequipment and materials and for the maintenance of

personnel.

8. Permit the NKVD of the Azerbaijan SSR to issue permission for entry into Iran of personnel sent by the Narkomneft’ and the Azneft’ Association for the businessof the Hydrogeological Directorate.

9. Confirm as Chief of the Hydrogeological DirectorateCde. Melik-Pashayev, V. S.; Chief of the Hydrogeological

Directorate in the staff of the Soviet troops in Iran; Cde.Geydarov, N. G.; and as Deputy Chief of theHydrogeological Directorate Cde. Kornev, A. N.

10. Hold Narkomneft’ (Cde. Baybakov) and the AzneftAssociation (Cde. Vezirov) responsible for personallyexercising control over the supply of the hydrogeologicaldetachment with personnel, engineering and technicalworkers, and provisioning with equipment and materials tocarry out drilling and geological prospecting work innorthern Iran.

11. Hold the Secretary of the CP(b) CC of Azerbaijan,

Cde. Bagirov, responsible for rendering theHydrogeological Directorate of the Azneft’ Association all

possible aid and observing the geological prospectingwork for oil in northern Iran.

Chairman of the State Defense CommitteeI. Stalin

Attested: [not signed]

[Source: State Archive of Political Parties and Social

Movements of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku (GAPPOD

AzR), f.1, op. 89. d.104. Obtained by Jamil Hasanli.

Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

DOCUMENT No. 2

Decree of the Politburo of the

Central Committee (CC) of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to

Mir Bagirov, CC Secretary of the Communist

Party of Azerbaijan,

on “Measures to Organize a Separatist

Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other

Provinces of Northern Iran,”

6 July 19451

TOP SECRET

To Cde. Bagirov

Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement inSouthern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces in Northern Iran

1. Consider it advisable to begin preparatory work toform a national autonomous Azerbaijan district [oblast’]with broad powers within the Iranian state.

At the same time develop a separatist movement in the provinces of Gilyan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, and Khorasan.

2. Establish a democratic party in Southern Azerbaijanunder the name “Azerbaijan Democratic Party” with theobjective of guiding the separatist movement. The creationof the Democratic Party in Southern Azerbaijan is to bedone by a corresponding reorganization of the Azerbaijani

branch of the People’s Party of Iran and drawing into itsupporters of the separatist movement from all strata of the

population.

3. Conduct suitable work among the Kurds of northernIran to draw them into the separatist movement to form anational autonomous Kurdish district.

4. Establish in Tabriz a group of responsible workers toguide the separatist movement, charging them withcoordinating [kontaktirovat’] their work with the USSR General Consulate in Tabriz.

Overall supervision of this group is entrusted toBagirov and Yakubov.

5. Entrust the Azerbaijan CP(b) CC (Bagirov andIbragimov) with developing preparatory work to hold




elections in Southern Azerbaijan to the 15th Convocation of the Iranian Majlis, ensuring the election of deputies whoare supporters of the separatist movement on the basis of the following slogans:

a) Allotment of land to the peasants from state andlarge landowning holdings and awarding long-termmonetary credit to the peasants;

b) Elimination of unemployment by the restoration andexpansion of work at enterprises and also by developingroad construction and other public works;

c) Improvement of the organization of public amenitiesof cities and the public water supply;

d) Improvement in public health;

e) Use of no less than 50% of state taxes for localneeds;

f) Equal rights for national minorities and tribes:opening schools and publication of newspapers and booksin the Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrianlanguages; court proceedings and official communicationsin local institutions in their native language; creating a

provincial administration, including the gendarmerie and police, from local national elements; formation of regional,district, and city enjumens [and] local self-governing

bodies.

g) Radical improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations.

6. Combat groups armed with weapons of foreignmanufacture are to be created with the objective of self-defense for pro-Soviet people [and] activists of theseparatist movement of democratic and Party organiza-tions.

Entrust Cde. [Nicolai] Bulganin together with Cde.Bagirov with carrying out this point.

7. Organize a Society for Cultural Relations BetweenIran and the Azerbaijani SSR to strengthen cultural and

propaganda work in Southern Azerbaijan.

8. To draw the broad masses into the separatistmovement, [we] consider it necessary to create a “Societyof Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan” in Tabriz with branches inall regions of Southern Azerbaijan and Gilyan.

9. Entrust the CC CP(b) of Azerbaijan with organizing publication of an illustrated magazine in Baku for distribu-tion in Iran and also three new newspapers in SouthernAzerbaijan.

10. Commit the OGIZ [State Publishing House](Yudin)

to allocating three flat-bed printing presses for the use of the CC CP(b) of Azerbaijan to create printing resources[tipografskaya baza] for the Democratic Party of SouthernAzerbaijan.

11. Commit the Narkomvneshtorg [People’s Commis-sariat for Foreign Trade] (Cde. [Anastas] Mikoyan) with

providing good paper for the publication of the illustrated

magazine in Baku and also the three new daily newspapersin Southern Azerbaijan; the total press run is to be no lessthan 30,000 copies.

12. Permit the NKVD of the Azerbaijan SSR, under theobservation of Cde. Bagirov, to issue permission for departure to Iran and return from Iran of persons beingsent on business connected with putting these measuresinto effect.

13. To finance the separatist movement in SouthernAzerbaijan and also to hold elections to the 15th Convoca-tion of the Iranian Majlis; to create in the CC CP(b) of Azerbaijan a special fund of one million foreign-currencyrubles (“for conversion into tumans”).

6 July 1945CC VKP(b) Politburo

[Source: GAPPOD AzR, f. 1, op. 89, d. 90, ll. 4-5. Obtained

by Jamil Hasanli. Translated for CWIHP by Gary

Goldberg.]

DOCUMENT No. 3

Secret Soviet Instructions on Measures to

Carry out Special Assignments throughout

Southern Azerbaijan and the

Northern Provinces of Iran,

14 July 1945

Strictly Secret

Measures to carry out special assignments throughout

Southern Azerbaijan and the northern provinces of Iran

I. The Question of Creating the Azerbaijani DemocraticParty

1. Immediately organize [the] transport of Pishevariand Kombakhsh to Baku for talks. Depending on theresults of the talks keep in mind [the] transport to Baku of Padekan [sic! “Padegan” in other documents], the Chair-man of the District Committee of the People’s Party of Azerbaijan.




2. To create organizing committees in the center (Tabriz) and elsewhere [na mestakh], within a month selectcandidates from authoritative democratic elements from theintelligentsia, middle-class merchants, small and averagelandowners, and the clergy in various democratic parties,and also from non-party members and bring them into theorganizing committees of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party.

The first priority is to create an organizing committeein Tabriz which, via the existing democratic press Khavar

Nou, Azhir, Dzhodat and others, will publish an appeal toorganize an Azerbaijani Democratic Party and print leaflets.

3. With the appearance of the appeal, initiative groupselsewhere will speak out in the press in its support andcreate Azerbaijani Democratic Party committees from themost active organizations of the People’s Party and other democratic organizations and elements.

Do not permit a mechanical renaming of organizationsof the People’s Party to committees of the AzerbaijaniDemocratic Party. Recommend that the Tabriz districtcommittee and its local organizations of the People’s Partydiscuss the appeal of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party,decide to disband the organizations of the People’s Partyand enter its members in the Azerbaijani Democratic Party.

4. After establishing the organizing committee of theAzerbaijani Democratic Party in Tabriz the first priority is tocreate local committees of the Azerbaijani Democratic Partyin the following cities: Ardebil’, Rezaye, Khoy, Mianeh,Zanjan, Maraghe, Marand, Mahabad, Maku, Qazvin, Rasht,Pahlavi, Sari, Shakh, Gorgan, and Mashhad.

Send representatives of the central organizingcommittee to organize the committees in these cities.Systematically place positive responses and calls to jointhe Azerbaijani Democratic Party in the democratic press.

5. Create a press agency in the organizing committee of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Tabriz under the name“Voice of Azerbaijan”.

6. Organize the drafting of programs and a charter for the Tabriz organizing committee.

II. Ensuring the Election of Deputies to the 15th

Convocation of the Majlis

1. Begin talks with deputies of the Majlis who aresupporting them during the elections to the Majlis for thisconvocation with the object of nominating these deputiesto the 15th Convocation under the condition that they fightfor the implementation of the slogans of the AzerbaijaniDemocratic Party.

2. Begin work to nominate candidates for deputy to the

Majlis from democratic elements who would fight for theimplementation of the slogans of the Azerbaijani Demo-cratic Party.

3. Review the list of deputies recommended by theEmbassy in light of [these] new tasks.

4. Organize a broad popularization of the selected

candidates for election to the Majlis in the press and their contacts [and] meetings with voters.

5. Support meetings, demonstrations, strikes, and thedisbanding [razgon] of electoral commissions unsuitablefor us with the objective of ensuring our interests in theelections.

6. In the process of preparing for the elections,compromise and expel from the electoral districts of northern Iran candidates nominated by reactionary circles[who are] actively operating against the candidates of thedemocratic movement.

7. Demand the replacement of unsuitable reactionary-minded leaders of local bodies [vlasti].

III. Creation of the “Society of Friends of SovietAzerbaijan”

1. In the matter of organizing the “Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan”, use the delegates participating in the

jubilee celebration of the 25th anniversary of the AzerbaijanSSR.

2. Recruit the workers of our consulates, militarycommandants, and their active [Party] members into theorganization of the Society.

3. The organizing group of the “Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan” in Tabriz is to draw up the charter of theSociety.

4. To widely attract the population to the “Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan”, use the press to systemati-cally illustrate the achievements of the economy, culture,and art of Soviet Azerbaijan and the historical friendship of the peoples of Southern Azerbaijan and the peoples of

Soviet Azerbaijan.

IV. The Organization of the Separatist Movement

1. Organize work to develop a separatist movement tocreate: an Azerbaijani Autonomous District [and] a KurdishAutonomous District with broad powers.

In Gorgan, Gilyan, Mazandaran, and Khorasan provinces organize the separatist movement along local[korennyye] questions, in particular:




in Gilyan Province:

The organization of public services and amenities inthe cities of Rasht [and] Pahlavi, leaving no less than 50%of the tax proceeds collected from the province for this

purpose;

in Gorgan Province:

Study in the native Turkmen language in the schools;replacement of the local organization, gendarmerie, and

police with Turkomans, leaving no less than 50% of the tax proceeds collected from the province for public services,amenities, and health in Gonbad-e-Kavus, Gorgan, andBandar Shah.

in Mazandaran and Khorasan Provinces:

1. Return of land to small and average landownerstaken by Reza Shah (amlyak lands).

2. Leaving no less than 50% of tax proceeds collectedfrom the province for public services and amenities of thecities of Sari, Shah, Mashhad, and New Quchan.

Additionally, bring to light locally such questions soas to organize a separatist movement in the above prov-inces.

Raise the demand to conduct land reform not only inSouthern Azerbaijan but in [regions] regions of thenorthern provinces of Iran.

V. Organization of Enjumens

1. After creating the organizing committees of theAzerbaijan Democratic Party at the same time as work isconducted to elect deputies to the 15 th Convocation of theMajlis, develop a campaign to organize enjumens, usingthe electoral enthusiasm of the population for this purpose.

VI. Organization of Press Organs

1. To organize all the agitation work via the press,establish a publishing house for new magazines in thecities of Rasht, Rezaye, and Mahabad in addition to theexisting newspapers.

[illegible signatures]

14.7.45

[Source: GAPPOD AzR), f. 1, op. 89, d. 90, ll. 9-15.

Obtained by Jamil Hasanli. Translated for CWIHP by

Gary Goldberg.]

1 See also the top secret 11 June 1945 draft decree of the CC CPSU for “Measures to Organize a SeparatistMovement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of

Northern Iran.” Handwritten across the upper left-handcorner: “One copy for Yemel’yanov.” Distribution: 1-2 Cde.Molotov; 3-4 Cde. Bagirov;5- Cde. Kavtaradze.

—————




normalized only after the confidence between the twocountries had been fully restored. Nevertheless, Titoquickly seized the opportunity provided by the Sovietapproach. He recognized the potential for an ideologicalvictory in a conflict that cost him dearly since 1948 and had

banished him and his regime from the Communist commu-nity. In his letter, he therefore dismissed the relevance of Djilas to the Yugoslav decision-making in 1948. In a

masterfully ambiguous sentence, he then added, ‘ As withregard to the extent of Beria’s guilt, you know best his

role in the whole affair and we have no reason to repudi-

ate your assertions.’ Tito clearly suggested that thecurrent Soviet leadership had sat together with Beria in the

politburo and thus shared responsibility for the break. Italso implicated the one person who was never mentionedin the letters but had unquestionably been in charge in1948—Joseph Stalin. Consequently, the conflict could only

be blamed on the Soviet Union.The correspondence is remarkable for the extreme care

in the choice of ideologically “correct” formulations. Thiscan be attributed to the highly ideological character thatthe conflict between the two countries had acquiredimmediately after the rift in 1948. Both the Yugoslav and theSoviet leaders descended from a Stalinist heritage thatcommanded strict adherence to pamphlet-like formulations.Any divergence from truths declared in “correct” and rigidlinguistic frameworks was looked upon as a betrayal of the“cause.” Neither Tito nor Khrushchev could afford toneglect this aspect. At stake were the prestige of both

parties within the Communist movement and the responsibility for the great schism. The fear that the other sidemight make letters public, certainly contributed to theabundant use of ideologically “correct” proclamations.

Khrushchev’s fourth letter in particular underlined theimportance of the ideological context. The sole purpose of this letter was to inform Tito of disciplinary actions takenagainst editors who “allowed” accusations againstYugoslavia, a staple of official Soviet policy ever since1948, to be reprinted in the latest edition of the publication“The Historical Materialism.” This gesture was an offer of truce in the ideological confrontation, an ultimate sacrificein the existing Communist paradigm. As such, it wasexpected to serve as the final proof of Soviet sincerity.

The letters are also striking for the complexity of thelanguage used by the two leaders. An abundant use of indirect speech and complicated syntax served to conceal

the true meanings, as demonstrated by the above-quotedstatement on Beria in Tito’s letter. Very often, however, amulti-faceted syntax helped to brush over essentialdisagreements. Undoubtedly, both Tito and Khrushchevwere well aware of the huge gulf that still existed betweenthem. In an effort to reach some basic common understand-ing, necessary for the reestablishment of communication

between them, both leaders had to be careful to avoidconfrontational language as much as possible. Take for example the statement in Tito’s letter on the character of normalization between the two countries: “With regard to

contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet

Union and the CC of the League of Communists of

Yugoslavia, in principle, we are not against them. The

League of Communists of Yugoslavia never discards

cooperation with all those organizations and movements

that wish to fight for peace in the world and cooperation

between nations, in particular not with socialist move-

ments and parties. However, before some progress in

normalization of government relations is achieved, themeeting you are suggesting would not prove efficient in

eliminating everything that instigates material and

political damage to both countries.” In a response,Khrushchev’s formulation was equally multi-faceted:“ Expressing our agreement with your proposal that

normalization of our relations should start with the

government relations, at the same time we believe that

fundamental interests of our countries, interests of the

international workers’ movement, and the great cause of

peace and socialism obligate our parties to invest all

efforts so that established friendly relations are not

limited to government relations only.”More importantly, however, the complex language

resulted from efforts by both sides to avoid admission of the initiative for the normalization. In the eyes of theCommunist fraternity, such an admission would meanacknowledging responsibility for the conflict. InKhrushchev’s first letter—which, after all, initiated thecorrespondence— statements of a position were often

preceded by formulations such as, “… there exist some

conditions for the improvement of relations…” or “…unfriendly relations developed between our countries

create certain damage … to the interests of the peoples of

our countries…” Most illuminating, perhaps, is a phrase

meant to be above suspicion: “ In light of new facts that have emerged …” Expressions, such as “… proceeding

from your statement …” were used extensively. Both Titoand Khrushchev thus articulated their positions asresponding to other side’s initiative or statement. In hisfirst letter, Khrushchev cleverly preceded his proposal withthis sentence: “ President of Yugoslavia Tito and other

leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and

the Government of FNRJ have in their speeches on

numerous occasions expressed their desire for improved

relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.” Thatwas followed by the phrase, “With the existence of these

shared ambitions…” Linguistic complexities as found in

these letters are therefore critically important for under-standing the atmosphere, motivations, and the truemeaning of the exchanges between Khrushchev and Tito.In an effort to present these complexities in full, thetranslation of the letters (below) veers conscientiously,from time to time, away from the correct English languagesyntax.

The Tito-Khrushchev letters had important implica-tions: First, the letters established a dialogue between theSoviet and Yugoslav leaderships for the first time since the

break-up of their relations in 1948. Second, this initial




into many aspects of the Cold War. This underlines theimportance of projects, such as the Yugoslavia Initiative,aimed at reintegrating the wealth of Yugoslav archivesand Yugoslav historiography into the internationalscholarship of the Cold War.

DOCUMENT No. 1

Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev,

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to

Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee

of the League of Communists Of Yugoslavia, 22

June 1954

To the Central Committee,League of Communists of Yugoslavia

To Comrade Tito

The Central Committee [CC] of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] discussed questions on therelations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, and addition-ally analyzed the circumstances that brought about the

break between the CPSU and the CPY [Communist Party of Yuogslavia]2 and the rapid deterioration of relations

between our countries.As a result, the CC CPSU concluded that there exist

some conditions for the improvement of relations betweenour countries and for the establishment of contacts

between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet Union

and the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY].

The CC CPSU proceeds from the fact that unfriendlyrelations that developed between our countries createcertain damage both to the interests of Yugoslavia and tothose of the Soviet Union, and to the interests of the

peoples of our countries, linked by centuries of friendshipand joint struggle for liberation. However, from the point of view of essential interests of both countries, it is evidentthat there exist no serious contradictions that could

become a source of hostility and constant acrimony between our countries and peoples.

The CC CPSU proceeds also from the fact that thegovernments of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia haverecently undertaken certain steps towards normalization of relations between our countries.3

President of Yugoslavia Tito and other leaders of theLeague of Communists of Yugoslavia and the governmentof FNRJ [Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia ]4 have intheir speeches on numerous occasions expressed their desire for improved relations between Yugoslavia and theSoviet Union. This fully coincides with the wishes of theSoviet leaders.

With the existence of these shared ambitions, not onlydiplomatic relations but also balanced economic andcultural ties between our countries could be improved,

based on full equality and mutual gain.In light of new facts that have emerged, the CC of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it feasiblefor us to reconsider also the issue of relations between our Parties.

From our side, we deem regrettable the circumstancethat at the time, both sides did not use all availableopportunities in an effort to regulate all contentious issuesand grievances that emerged in 1948, all the more so assome facts, which were the immediate causes for the break

between the CC CPSU and the CC CPY, now look different.For example, as it is now exposed with regard to the

position of Soviet advisors in Yugoslavia and the availabil-ity to them of various pieces of information, there were novalid foundations for the resulting dispute and accusationsagainst Yugoslavia.

As the investigation against the agent of internationalimperialism, [former secret police chief Lavrenty] Beria,demonstrated, it is important to accentuate explicitly thathis associates from the intelligence apparatus, without theknowledge of the CC and the government of the USSR, andfor the purpose of provoking, have allowed themselves [to

perform] inexcusable acts of recruiting individual citizens of Yugoslavia for intelligence purposes. Such a provocationof the enemy, now uncovered, inflicted huge damage torelations between our parties and countries.

On the other side, the CC CPSU is of the opinion thatthe leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia didnot take advantage of all opportunities to avoid conflictwith the CC CPSU either. Thus, for example, non-Marxist

statements and anti-Soviet outbursts by [Milovan] Djilasdid not, at the time, meet with resistance from the leader-ship of the CC CPY. Djilas, this pseudo-Marxist, a manestranged from the cause of Communism, who propagatedthe liquidation of the party, has abundantly contributed tothe deterioration of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Theexclusion of Djilas from the CC LCY and condemnation of his views hostile to Marxism-Leninism facilitate theimprovement of relations between the CC CPSU and the CCLCY.

The CC CPSU takes into account the fact that leadersof the League of Communists of Yugoslavia have statedand continue to assert that communists of Yugoslavia are

guided by teachings of Marxism-Leninism, that they areintent on continuing the building of socialism in their country, and regard preservation and strengthening of

peace as indispensable. In light of this, there can be noexcuse for the existence of a state of rift and acrimony

between parties whose endeavors must be based on principles of Marxism-Leninism and the principle of non-interference into the affairs of others.

In such case, there truly exist objective conditions, notonly for the improvement of political, economic, andcultural relations between our governments, but also for




the establishment of contacts between the CC of theCommunist Party of Soviet Union and the CC of the Leagueof Communists of Yugoslavia.

It is thoroughly understandable that elements of mistrust and prejudice, accumulated in previous years,cannot disappear overnight. Time will be needed, as well as

patience and mutual good will, for an understanding to bereached. However, the shared fundamental interests of our

countries, our peoples, and of the grand cause of peaceand socialism must overcome various subjective momentsand opinions.

We would like to know the opinion of the CC of theLeague of Communists of Yugoslavia on the above-addressed issues.

From its side, the CC CPSU is ready to hear anddiscuss the view of the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on issues regarding relations between our governments, as well as those regarding relations betweenthe CPSU and the LCY.

To this end, we would regard as constructive ameeting of leading representatives of the CC CPSU and theCC LCY aimed at exchanging views on the above-men-tioned issues. If you are in agreement with this proposal,the meeting could take place in the nearest future either inMoscow or in Yugoslavia, according to your convenience.

Secretary of the CC CPSU N. Khrushchev

22 June 1954

[Source: Arhiv Jugoslavije [National Archives of

Yugoslavia], Arhiv CK SKJ [Central Committee of the League

of Communists of Yugoslavia Collection], 507 / IX, 119/I–48.

Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Svetozar Rajak.]

DOCUMENT No. 2

Letter (Cable) from the

Central Committee of the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union to Tito and

Central Committee of the League Of

Communists Of Yugoslavia,

24 July 19545

Received by Telegraph

To the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

To Comrade Tito

The CC CPSU has received with satisfaction thecommunication from Comrade Kardelj stating that the

leadership of the CC LCY looks positively on suggestions proposed in the letter from the CC CPSU of 22 June 1954.We are confident that this road corresponds to the vitalinterests of our peoples and our Communist Parties. Weacknowledge that the Yugoslav comrades could be in a

position to respond to our letter in the nearest future.The CC CPSU is aware of the great importance of the

question of Trieste to Yugoslavia. We too consider it

propitious that it be resolved in accordance with justifiedinterests of Yugoslavia. Should, for Yugoslavia, there exista possibility of a resolution of this question in the nearestfuture then it is perfectly obvious and understandable tous that it must not be encumbered by premature publica-tion of our negotiations.

24 July 1954 CC CPSU

[Source: Arhiv Jugoslavije, Arhiv CK SKJ, 507 / IX, 119/I

– 49. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Svetozar Rajak.]

DOCUMENT No.3

First Letter from Tito and the Executive

Committee [Politburo] of the CC LCY to

Nikita Khrushchev and Central Committee

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

11 August 1954

To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet UnionTo Comrade Khrushchev

A session of the extended Executive Committee of theLeague of Communists of Yugoslavia has deliberated theletter from the CC CPSU on the need for normalization of relations between our governments. In principle, we agreewith most of its contents, in particular with the statementon the damage being done to both countries from theexistence of the present abnormal state of relations andcontinuous tension between us.

We, too, nourish a desire for the necessity for elimina-tion of elements that obstruct normalization between our governments and poison the atmosphere between our

peoples, which ultimately contributes to the worsening of already tense situation not only in this part of Europe, butalso in the world in general.

The very slow progress of normalization, to date,demonstrates the need for serious efforts in bringing clarityinto our relations, and persistence in gradually removingnegative elements that have accumulated since 1948, whichcontinue to aggravate our relations thus creating an even

bigger rift between our two countries.




the proposal for improvement of relations betweenYugoslavia and the USSR, presented in the letter from theCC CPSU of 22 June.

Your opinion regarding the necessity of investinggreater effort towards full clarification of our relations andelimination of negative elements still spoiling thoserelations is receiving full support from our side.

We agree that normalization and improvement of

relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia should not beconditioned upon [consensus regarding] issues of internaldevelopment and ways of resolving them. We also agreethat development of these relations should support theenhancement of the international positions of our coun-tries. We underline with satisfaction the existence of unanimity of views on a variety of foreign policy issues,such as: equality and non-interference into affairs of other countries, acceptance of the possibility of peacefulcoexistence and cooperation between countries withdifferent political systems, struggle for prevention of war and consolidation of peace. As is well known, the policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at the consolidation of peace inEurope and the whole world. We do not doubt thatYugoslavia will contribute towards the goal of the consoli-dation of peace.

As there now emerges a unity of outlook recognizingthe necessity of radical improvement of relations betweenour countries, based on the exchange of views between us,we believe it possible also to proceed toward mutual,

practical elimination of negative occurrences that obstructrapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR. We areready, in every way, to ensure that every proposal fromyour side, aimed at strengthening friendship and coopera-tion between the USSR and Yugoslavia receives due

attention from Soviet government organs. From our side, inthe interest of normalization of relations between Yugosla-via and the USSR, we have explicitly confronted theAssociation of Yugoslav Patriots6 with the question of theappropriateness of the continuation of their activity.

We hope that rapprochement between the USSR andYugoslavia will reflect favorably on relations betweenYugoslavia and countries with which Yugoslav relationsdeteriorated after 1948. The CC CPSU will inform theleaderships of the fraternal parties of your expressed wishto normalize relations with those countries. We believe thatsuccess in this respect will be achieved sooner, shouldnecessary steps be undertaken from your side as well.

We wish to know what further practical measures,according to you, need to be undertaken in the nearestfuture, on both sides, for the purpose of contributingtoward the establishment of mutual understanding andgenuine cooperation between our countries.

As it can be understood from your letter, in principle,you are not against the renewal of contacts between theLCY and the CPSU, but regard the meeting betweenrepresentatives of two parties to be premature. We do notinsist on such a meeting at this moment, as the alreadyexchanged letters represent a foundation for the clarifica-

tion of our relations. At the same time, we are of theopinion that lengthy postponement of the meeting betweenrepresentatives of the CPSU and the LCY would beinopportune because personal contact would undoubtedlyassist in the speeding up of normalization of relations

between the CPSU and the LCY, and between our govern-ments. Expressing our agreement with your proposal thatnormalization of our relations should start with government

relations, at the same time we believe that fundamentalinterests of our countries, interests of the internationalworkers’ movement, and the great cause of peace andsocialism obligate our parties to invest all efforts so thatestablished friendly relations are not limited to governmentrelations only.

In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union aspires towardestablishing and maintaining normal relations with allcountries, including the capitalist ones, irrespective of their socio-economic system. By sending you a proposal for therenewal of our relations, we considered it self-evident thatin the course of their harmonization a full normalization of relations between our governments would be achieved.But, we have always believed and believe that normaliza-tion of relations between governments should only betaken as a beginning, and that there exist objectiveconditions not only for the improvement of bonds betweenYugoslavia and the USSR, in accordance with universallyaccepted norms of relations between states, but for achieving mutual understanding and cooperation betweenthe CPSU and the LCY.

The resolve to protect the socialist character of theYugoslav state, expressed in your letter, represents animportant prerequisite for establishment of mutual under-standing and sincere cooperation between our parties.

Unlike all other parties, the struggle for the victory of socialism and the building of a communist society are theultimate goals of true Marxist parties. To reach these greatgoals, they could and should attain mutual understanding.Cooperation of our parties, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, is vital not only to the interests of theSoviet Union and Yugoslavia, but in the interest of consolidating the international workers’ movement andunifying all forces fighting for the victory of socialism. TheCommunist Party of the Soviet Union, created by greatLenin, considers these principles to be above all else.

Relating to your opinion with regard to those respon-sible for the break-up in 1948, we too believe that this

question is not important if both you and we have agreedthat we should aspire towards the improvement of political,economic, and other relations between our countries. Inregard to the mention in your letter of decisions of the Fifthand the Sixth Congresses of the LCY, we deem it importantto openly state our opinion. We believe that decisions of the Fifth Congress reflected mostly the relations betweenour parties as they were then constituted, and confirm our regret, as expressed in our letter of 22 June, that allopportunities available have not always been used toavoid misunderstandings. With regard to the decisions of




the Sixth Congress, they appeared in different circum-stances, and one cannot deny that they had the imprint of then existing hostility and grave, often unjust, mutualaccusations to which the logic of confrontation in thoseyears had led both sides. One should admit that, unfortu-nately, such accusations still appear from time to time in

both the Yugoslav and the Soviet press, as an alreadyknown result of relations between our countries in those

years. From our side, we are taking measures to ensure theneeded clarification of questions related to Yugoslavia inthe Soviet press, journals, and books.

We are fully aware that elements of mistrust and prejudice, accumulated in previous years, cannot disappear at once. But, at the same time, we are firmly convinced thatnow that the existence of mutual good will and aspirationstowards improvement of our relations based on equalityand mutual advantage has been manifested, the cause of the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples coming together ismoving forward because thus demand the interests of bothcountries and interests of peace and socialism.

The Secretary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet UnionMoscow, 23 September 1954

N. Khrushchev

[Source: Arhiv Jugoslavije, Arhiv CK SKJ, 507 / IX, 119/I-51.

Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Svetozar Rajak.]

DOCUMENT No. 5

Fourth Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev,

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

to Tito and the Executive Committee

of the Central Committee of the League of

Communists of Yugoslavia,

27 September 1954

To the Executive Committee,Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

To Comrade Tito

We consider it important to inform you of an inappro- priate formulation, which is at the same time contradictoryto directives from the CC CPSU, that was allowed to passthrough in the book “Historical Materialism” (Second edition),

published by GOSPOLITIZDAT7 in June 1954. In this book,contrary to our intentions, and as a result of an oversight bythe author and GOSPOLITIZDAT, a disturbing provocation

appeared aimed against the leadership of Yugoslavia.The CC CPSU has discussed the question of this

gross error, allowed in the book “Historical Materialism,”and has made an appropriate decision by harshly punish-ing those responsible for the violation of directives of theCC CPSU on the character of material on Yugoslavia that is

published in the USSR. Enclosed please find the transcriptof that decision.

We hope that from your side the case of the book “Historical Materialism” will be correctly understood and

judged as an irrelevant misunderstanding.

The Secretary,Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union

N. Khrushchev

Moscow, 27 September 1954

[Source: Arhiv Jugoslavije, Arhiv CK SKJ, 507 / IX, 119/I-

52. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Svetozar

Rajak.]

Svetozar Rajak (London School of Economics) has done

extensive research in The National Archives of Yugoslavia.

1 This article is a result of research conducted by theauthor for his doctoral thesis on “Yugoslav-Sovietrelations between 1953 and 1958” at the Department of International History of the London School of Economicsand Political Science (LSE). The author wishes to expressgratitude to Odd Arne Westad (LSE), the staff of the

National Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, and theArchives of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia for exceptional collaboration and assistanceduring difficult times of political turmoil. At the same time,he is indebted to a number of scholars in Belgrade, aboveall to Ljubodrag Dimic (Department of History, Universityof Belgrade).

2 Communist Party of Yugoslavia, renamed as Leagueof Communists of Yugoslavia, at its Sixth Congress in 1952.

3 In summer and autumn 1953, the USSR and Yugosla-via exchanged ambassadors.

4 FNRJ—Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija[Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia], the official name

of Yugoslavia at the time.5 For reasons of authenticity, the author has pre-sented this Soviet-Yugoslav exchange of communicationas first, second, etc. letter according to the depictiongiven by Tito himself when presenting them in November 1954 to the Central Committee of the League of Commu-nists of Yugo-slavia. Each document is annotated on topof the first page accordingly, in Tito’s handwriting.) The

presentation of the Khrushchev letters is based on their Serbo-Croatian translation

6 Moscow-based association of Yugoslavs who

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The 2001 National History Day Summer Institute brought twenty-five teachers from across the nation to theUniversity of Maryland to examine New Directions In Cold War History. The teachers came from very

diverse backgrounds and schools, but they all came to develop their teaching skills and share their knowledge withtheir peers. Judging from the participants’ tremendously positive response, the institute confirmed both the needfor, as well as National History Day’s ability to provide, assistance and training to teachers. “In terms of content,accessibility of speakers, practical applications for the classroom, and excitement, this is the best workshop I’veever attended!” said one participant. The institute was produced in association with The Cold War InternationalHistory Project and was graciously supported by the Annenberg/CPB Channel, funder of A Biography of

America and he Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund.

Many times the focus of learning is concentrated on student rather than teacher development, but NationalHistory Day is working to reform history education by developing the skills of both teachers and students. Theobjectives of the institute were two-fold: to provide teachers with the latest in historical scholarship to bring themup to speed on the literature; and to provide teachers with practical applications for the classroom, particularlyinstruction regarding the importance and use of primary sources. To accomplish these goals National History Dayworked closely with scholars from across the country to provide a hands-on learning experience for the teachers.“The institute really exceeded my expectations and I’m grateful to have had this unique experience, said a 2001 participant. “I’m significantly more knowledgeable now about the 20th century and Cold War history than I had been. Now, I can enhance my good teaching methods with a deeper knowledge of the Cold War and primarysources.”

Prominent scholars and collections specialists such as Robert Hutchings of Princeton University (formerly Direc-tor for European Affairs, National Security Council, 1989-1992; Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, 1992-1993), Bill Brands of Texas A&M University and Christian Ostermann of the Cold War International HistoryProject introduced participants to the latest in historical scholarship and imaginative approaches for engagingstudents in the study of the history of the Cold War. In addition, the teachers visited historic sites and agencies.At the National Archives the teachers looked at the original Marshall Act and the most requested document in thearchives – a picture of President Nixon and Elvis Presley in the Oval office. Teachers spoke with archivists andeducators about the multitude of presidential documents and lesson plans available on line at the National Archive’swebsite (www.nara.gov/education). Jan Scruggs, Founder and President of the Vietnam Veterans MemorialFund, gave a special tour of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

supported the COMINFORM Resolution against Tito in1948 and have since emigrated to the USSR. It was run bythe KGB. The CPSU CC member charged with overseeingthis association was Mikhail Suslov. These “true Yugoslav

communists and patriots” served as the “Fifth column” in theSoviet propaganda campaign and covert operations againstYugoslavia after 1948.

7 State Publishing House for Political Publications.

Teachers Become Students at Summer Institute