new cultural theory

8/12/2019 New Cultural Theory

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Implications of New Cultural Theory for Comparative Foreign Policy

Greg Ryan

Middle Tennessee tate !niversity

gfryan"mtsu#edu

Midwestern Political cience $ssociation

%&&' $nnual Conference

Panel(1)() Comparative Foreign Policy* New $pproaches

aturday+ $pril , )*&& am ( '*,& am
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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INTRODUCTION: BASIC ISSUES, METHOD AND OUTLINE

In his attempt to provide a new understanding of the wor-ings of the international

system+ $le.ander /endt claims that to understand state 0ehavior in the international system+

one must 0e aware of 0oth the constitutive effects of the international system that influence a

given state and the domestic factors at wor- within that state 1'''* %)2# 3is claim illuminates

two important criticisms that have 0een raised concerning the state of theory in the field of

international relations+ the ina0ility of rational choice attempts to e.plain much of what is

interesting and important pertaining to international relations Green and hapiro 1'',2 and the

poverty of analy4ing international relations at a single level of analysis# These two criticisms are

also relevant to foreign policy studies+ an outgrowth of international relations and decision

ma-ing studies nyder+ et al+ 1'5%2# Foreign policy studies are in some ways even more

comple. than international relations+ 0ecause of the necessity and comple.ity of analy4ing and

integrating factors 0oth inside and outside the state Gerner 1''6* 172# Most attempts to create a

general theory of foreign policy have either 0een weighted more toward internal factors such as

perception and cultural influences 8egg and Morrison 1')12 or e.ternal factors pertaining to

systemic influence /alt4 1'7'9 /endt 1'''2# The o0:ective of this study is to develop a model

of foreign policy analysis that gives e;ual consideration to 0oth the cognitive or constructivist

inside2 factors and systemic outside2 influences+ and also to illuminate the relationship 0etween

the two#

The model proposed in this study involves several specific varia0les of analysis# First+

instead of assuming that states are sociali4ed into an international system with a fi.ed nature as

do structural realists /alt4 1'7'2+ the proposed model


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1'',2# Factors influencing change include technological advances and evolving ideas of

community =ennedy 1')72+ and :ust as the prevailing system affects the foreign policy of states+

so may the actions of states cause changes in the nature of the international system# $n e.ample

of one such epoch in international relations is the period 0etween the Napoleonic /ars and the

First /orld /ar+ when the modern idea of the nation 0egan to crystalli4e and wars 0egan to 0e

fought 0etween ?peoples@ instead of 0etween ?-ings@ Palmer 1')5* 11'2#

The second factor in foreign policy decision ma-ing to 0e assessed is the political culture

of the state involved# /hile many domestic political considerations may have implications for

foreign policy+ such as 0ureaucratic politics $llison 1'719 Aestler 1'7%2 pu0lic opinion Russett

and Graham 1')'2+ interest group effects Aietrich 1'''2+ media effects Ba-o0sen 1''62+ and

regime type Mansfield and nyder 1''69 neal+ et al+ 1''59 /alt4 1'572+ this study will focus

on political culture and how it affects perception of situations# $ccording to ahlins 1')62+

culture is ?Dhistorically reproduced in action@ p#vii2# Arawing on the wor- of Clifford Geert4

1'7>2+ who proposed that culture should 0e understood as system of sym0ols+ ahlins articulates

a concept of culture that is 0ased on sym0ols which undergo reinterpretation during periods of

environmental change# In this way+ cultural system and cultural practice are lin-ed ewell+ Br#+

1'''2# This is the case+ according to Michel Foucault+ 0ecause ?Dit is part of the function of

memory and culture to 0e a0le to reactuali4e any o0:ects whatever that have already featured#

Repetition is always possi0le9 repetition with application+ transformation@ 1'))*,62# The

proposed model in this study see-s to integrate the two concepts related a0ove+ the transforming

nature of the international system and a mallea0le conception of culture+ so that foreign policy

may 0e 0etter analy4ed#


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/hat would corro0orating evidence for such a model loo- li-eE The answer that this

study proposes is a specific pattern of decision ma-ing that e.hi0its itself over time# $lso

important is a consideration of other factors that are 0elieved to affect decision ma-ing# y

analy4ing 0oth culturally influenced patterns of decision ma-ing and contending influences on

decision ma-ing in competition+ it is hoped that at the very least a 0etter understanding of

cultural effects on foreign policy can 0e gained# ne way to do this is 0y e.amining specific

decision opportunities within the pattern# This re;uires an in depth consideration of the factors

relevant in a specific society at a certain point in time+ thus marrying comparative politics and

international relations theory# Therefore+ comparative case study is an appropriate method for

demonstrating how factors may operate differently in different societies#

The framewor- that I am going to use to test my model is immediate e.tended deterrence+

a situation in which an attac-er contemplates military action against another country and a third

party commits itself to the defense of the country threatened with attac-# Prior research has

0een underta-en to compile case lists for immediate e.tended deterrence 8e0ow and tein 1'))9

3uth and Russett 1'),9 1'))2+ facilitating the tas- of selecting compara0le cases for analysis#

8e0ow and tein


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The cases are the Tur-ish decision to ac;uiesce to $merican pressure in 1'5, and the

Chinese decision to challenge Russian deterrence in defense of ietnam in 1'7'# oth cases are

confirmed 0y 0oth 3uth and Russett and 8e0ow and tein# The cases were chosen 0ecause the

decisions made in 0oth cases do not conform to the rational model of decision ma-ing+ they do

conform to a pattern of foreign policy decision ma-ing during a specified era and these patterns

of decision ma-ing stretch over a period lasting 0eyond the reign of any one leader# These and

their ;ualifications will 0e 0riefly e.plained 0elow in the following manner# First+ the general

historical elements of the Tur-ish and Chinese cultures in the form of patterns that have endured

over many centuries will 0e introduced# Then+ I will discuss the foreign policy decisions of the

Tur-ish and Chinese governments during a specific era of decision(ma-ing+ the First /orld /ar

until the conclusion of the Cold /ar+ that conform to a more specific pattern# Finally+ the

specific deterrence encounter decisions will 0e 0riefly analy4ed# The characteristics that I want to

focus on are the Tur-ish desire for identification with civili4ation and the Chinese need to

demonstrate the supremacy of their culture# oth of these cultural traits have grown out of the

historical and geographical characteristics uni;ue to each of these countries+ and as related

a0ove+ these traits have 0een illustrated in different ways at different times#

oth cases fall into the period 0etween the First /orld /ar and the end of the Cold /ar+

and it is the nature of this era that I will analy4e for its effects on the cultures and foreign policy

decisions of China and Tur-ey# This historical delineation is 0orrowed from 3untington+ who

suggests that during this period ?Dthe conflict of nation states was supplemented 0y the conflict

of ideologies+ first among fascism+ communism+ and li0eral democracy+ and then 0etween the

latter two@ 1''5*6%2+ and also Morgenthau+ who finds that international relations after the First

/orld /ar was characteri4ed 0y a completely different moral climate than 0efore the war 1'5>*


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%6'2# There is little argument that the First /orld /ar was a watershed event in international

relations Miller 1'',* ,,2# This study will show that the characteristics of that war and their

effects on the international system initiated and sustained an environment that can 0e

differentiated from other periods of history+ and that these characteristics had a mar-ed impact

on culture and foreign policy decision ma-ing#

The following sections will first consider the nature of cultural and foreign policy studies

and the potential for com0ining these fields+ the ideological nature of the international system in

the %&thcentury+ patterns in Tur-ish and Chinese foreign policy and a comparison of the

decisions made in the immediate e.tended deterrence cases listed a0ove#

CULTURAL STUDIES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Aespite o0:ection to the use of culture as a factor influencing policy Haston 1'572+

several nota0le studies involving cultural factors $lmond and er0a 1'5>9 Inglehart+ 1'719

Thompson+ Hllis and /ildavs-y 1''&2 have 0een underta-en# These studies and the present one

can 0e understood as advocating the importance of culture 0ecause social entities are 0ased on

systems of interrelations among individuals Carrithers 1''%*%&2+ individuals use these systems

to operate in their environments Triandis 1'',*162+ all humans have the in0orn capacity to

0ecome cultural+ and that humans can only view reality through culturally constructed filters

Charon %&&1* 52# $s culture serves as a medium for organi4ing -nowledge and e.perience+ it

provides the a0ility to categori4e and discriminate 0ut not to distinguish myth from fact

Mantovani %&&&*%2# Regarding the focus on national culture in this study+ it is assumed that

national and ethnic cultures are more significant than other cultures due to ?Dtheir degree of


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regulation of 0ehavior+ attitudes+ and values+ and the consistency and clarity of regulation and

tolerance of other cultures@ Tse+ et al# 1'))*)%2#

The -ey 0uilding 0loc- that cultures are constructed on is the sym0ol# ym0ols provide a

means for attaining culture Charon %&&1*5%2 and for individual comprehension of the self+

others and the world itself Geert4 1'7>*%6&2# For the purpose of this study+ a sym0ol is defined

as ?Dany structure of signification in which a direct+ primary+ literal meaning designates+ in

addition+ another meaning which is indirect+ secondary+ and figurative and which can 0e

apprehended only through the first@ Riceour 1'7,* 1%(1>2# ym0ols+ then+ facilitate a collective

identity while simultaneously providing a fle.i0le construct for ma-ing sense of new information

and circumstances# They retain and e.pand their meaning through their fle.i0ility+ allowing

mem0ers of a culture to 0oth maintain an idea of shared history and confidence in the future of

society Csepeli 1''7*5'2#

New cultural theory+ stemming from the structural study of language aussure 1'6'2 and

the metaphorical ;uality of words Riceour 1'7,2+ see-s to ?Ddefine the pragmatic conte.ts

which sym0ols are employed for sa-e of revealing governing patterns that utilitarian

manipulation or principles or adaptation to the environment do not readily e.plain@ iernac-i

1'''*5'(7&2# In other words+ new cultural theory ta-es 0oth constancy and adaptation into

account in its e.planation of events over time# ne of the seminal efforts in the field of new

cultural theory that serves to demonstrate how cultural sym0ols allow for the adaptation and

maintenance of cultural attitudes is ahlins< Islands of 3istory 1')62# In his account of Captain

Coo-


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consecutive years during the month of a mythical festival involving a 0attle 0etween the

islanders their native deity+ and while these circumstances led to tragic death of Coo-+ they also

ena0led the grafting of Huropean monarchical traditions onto indigenous 3awaiian legends

leading to a conception of the 3awaiian monarchy which was more in line with conceptions in

the rest of the world# Coo- was perceived as the mythical deity who would die at the end of the

festival+ and his death confirmed that he indeed was a legendary god# In other words+ the Coo-

e.pedition provo-ed an evolution in 3awaiian society which reali4ed a new e.pression of an

older indigenous cultural construct while simultaneously 0ecoming more integrated into the

international system#

ecause foreign policy 0orrows from other disciplines+ many different influences on

foreign policy have 0een investigated+ including organi4ational structure $llison 1'719 Aeslter

1'7%2+ regime type neal et al# 1''59 Mansfield and nyder+ 1''62+ pu0lic opinion Russett and

Graham 1')'2+ interest groups Aietrich 1'''2+ and the media Ba-o0sen 1''62# 3owever+ while

some studies have given attention to psychological and sociological influences on decision

ma-ing+ such as the effects of pree.isting 0eliefs 3ere- 1')52+ personal stress M# 3ermann

1'7'2+ and group effects Banus 1'7%2+ foreign policy scholars generally have 0een reluctant to

use cultural theories or focus on cultural aspects of foreign policy decisions 3udson 1'5,*52#

This is unfortunate 0ecause+ as studies of national style indicate+ cultural analysis and

anthropological theory may 0e a useful tool 0oth for understanding how a country perceives its

role in the world rown and Is-owit4 1'77*1512+ and the marriage of cultural anthropology to

traditional foreign policy analysis has the potential of yielding 0etter e.planations of foreign

policy decisions =ra-au 1'),*%662# This is e.actly what this study intends to do#


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THE 20TH CENTURY AND THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY

The preceding section dealt with societal cultures and the impact that cultural

perspectives have on societal reaction to outside stimuli# Now the nature of the stimulus+ the

international system+ will 0e considered# The main contention here is that 0y the early part of the

twentieth century the international system had evolved 0eyond a specific Huropean conte.t and

had 0ecome a generali4ed system imposing conditions on all of the world


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states too- place outside Hurope involving conflict over colonial territory+ 0ut there was general

confidence that these conflicts could 0e contained Craig 1'57*1&2# The prevailing view was that

Hurope was progressing toward a more advanced and a0undant civili4ation in which competition

would produce 0enefits for all Palmer 1'67* 55&2+ and even as late as mid(1'1, the possi0ility

of general was disregarded due widespread confidence in the effects of continental economic

integration# 3owever+ during the late nineteenth century Huropean intellectual and ethical ideas

were transformed 0y Aarwin


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lines hardened+ trenches were dug shell(poc-ed+ carcass strewn territory 0etween the opposing

trenches ac;uired the la0el ?no man


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Cassels 1''5* 1>)2+ and leaders reali4ed that to compete and survive in international politics

they had to espouse some sort of ideology# It is not surprising then that the two ma:or ideologies

of /ilson and 8enin came into immediate conflict following the war+ when the /estern $llies

sent armies to Russia in 1'1' to assist the enemies of the olshevi-s# Ideology was the prime

motivation for intervention+ and it initiated the enduring clash 0etween the capitalist /est and

the communist Hast that dominated international relations for most of the twentieth century+ the

genesis of the so(called Cold /ar chuman 1'5%*7'()&2#

The interwar period was mar-ed 0y the increasing significance and integration of the

international economy+ mutual suspicion 0etween the /est and the oviet !nion+ and the rise of

a third ideological alternative+ fascism# The failure of capitalism to solve national economic

crises was demonstrated in the international depression of the 1'>&s+ opening the door for

nationalistic appeals for a strong state# $s fascist regimes in Italy+ Germany+ pain and Bapan

consolidated power+ the /estern democracies and the oviet !nion vainly hoped that fascism

would destroy their international ideological rival+ and+ hence+ decided to largely appease fascist

regimes# Great ritain avoided supporting the democratically elected 0ut socialist leaning

Popular Front government in the panish Civil /ar+ while talin was eventually compelled to

supply aid to the Popular Front 0ecause it had 0ecome increasingly identified with international

communism !lam 1'5)*%,,2# General Franco'# Germany


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seemed to confirm talin


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civili4ation and how escalated violence during the twentieth century influenced Chinese methods

of demonstrating Chinese greatness#

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 20TH CENTURY

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that Tur-ish foreign policy from /orld /ar

I until the end of the Cold /ar was influenced 0y a com0ination of traditional Tur-ish ways of

dealing with the world and international social environment during that period# $s the focus of

this paper is that culture affects decision ma-ing+ the cultural history that e.erted influence on

decisions regarding the Cyprus crisis of 1'5, must first 0e related# This relevant characteristic of

Tur-ish cultural history is that the Tur-s+ unli-e most national groups+ have not 0een consistently

identified with a larger civili4ation 0ut instead have sought mem0ership in different civili4ations

at different times# Prior to the First /orld /ar this was demonstrated in the role the Tur-s

played in the ttoman Hmpire+ and following the war the Tur-s e.hi0ited this 0ehavior 0y

enthusiastically see-ing mem0ership in /estern international organi4ations and doing more than

was necessary to fulfill their o0ligations to those organi4ations#

everal scholars have commented on modern Tur-ey


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Given the Tur-ish nation%%2+ the Tur-s willingly accepted Islam 0ecause it gave them

?purpose@ and ?meaning@ =arpat 1'6'*>2# In other words+ the Tur-s were eager to su0merge

themselves within Islam 0ecause it was an advanced civili4ation+ materially and philosophically


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superior to Hurope G# 8ewis 1'7,* %)2+ and 0ecause Islamic civili4ation granted them full

citi4enship # 8ewis 1''>*)2# Partly due to their position on the frontiers of the ttoman

Hmpire+ the Tur-s made important military contri0utions to the growth of the empire+ eventually

esta0lishing themselves as its political leaders#

Jet for all their military and political success+ the Tur-s still loo-ed to the other mem0ers

of the empire for cultural identification# This is evidenced 0y the fact that early ttoman political

documents were in Persian =adafer 1''6*512+ and that even successful e.ploits of Tur-ish

military heroes were related within the conte.t of older $ra0ian military adventures =adafer

1''6*5>2# Nevertheless+ the Tur-s 0ecame increasingly integrated into the ttoman Hmpire+

su0merging their identity in the Islamic faith more than the other ethnic groups # 8ewis 1'66*

>%,2 and viewing themselves as the guardians of Islamic scripture $dnan($diver 1'61*11'2#

/hen the empire 0egan its decline in the seventeenth century+ the Tur-s were not -een to forsa-e

ttoman mem0ership+ despite the their pro.imity and resulting e.posure to an increasingly

powerful Hurope# Instead+ the overriding goal of 0oth the nineteenth century Joung ttoman

movement 0y Tur-s2 and the early twentieth century Joung Tur- movement was not to

esta0lish a separate Tur-ish state 0ut to restore the ttoman Hmpire to its former glory er-es

1'5,* %%1 and >&62# 3owever+ the coming of /orld /ar I and the ttoman alliance with the

Central Powers in the war led to ttoman disintegration+ and now the Tur-s were forced to

contemplate a new path in the world#

/hen the Tur-ish Repu0lic emerged out of the chaos and carnage of /orld /ar I and its

aftermath+ it was confronted 0y an international environment that dictated that a state could

0ecome identified with a group of states 0y gaining mem0ership in international organi4ations of

which these countries were a mem0er# For Tur-ey+ a nation that had historically sought


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affiliation with strong and esta0lished civili4ations+ it was clear that to 0ecome an accepted

mem0er of the /estern community+ it must gain mem0ership in /estern international

organi4ations# Considering Tur-ey2 and stated that all countries loo-ed to the /est for civili4ation Mango

1'''*>'52# The leading Tur-ish social theorist of the period echoed $tatur-+ claiming that

Tur-ey was at least as influenced 0y Hurope and Islam Gol-ap 1'6'*1572# Hven the repu0lic


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$sia Minor# Tur-ey was committed to the /est+ despite the fact that no other former mem0er of

the ttoman Hmpire followed suit # 8ewis 1'66*>1>2#

If Tur-ey1# Then Tur-ey+ at the

0ehest of the 8eague+ participated in economic sanctions against Italy in 1'>6+ damaging its trade

relations with that country Aanilov 1')1*%%2#

Though Tur-ey remained neutral for most of /orld /ar II+ the Tur-s :oined the $llies in

1',6 0ecause this would ma-e them eligi0le to :oin the !nited Nations# Tur-ey also sought

N$T mem0ership in 1','+ clearly seeing mem0ership in N$T as a sym0ol of mem0ership in

the /estern community Tachau 1'),*7,2# $fter 0eing initially re0uffed+ the Tur-s sought to

prove their loyalty to /estern aims 0y enthusiastically sending a Tur-ish contingent to :oin the

!N forces in =orea# Though Tur-ey suffered retaliation from its communist neigh0or ulgaria+

who forci0ly repatriated %6&+&&& Muslims to Tur-ey as act of revenge for Tur-ey


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to 0ase $merican nuclear missiles on their territory+ though this drew the ire of Tur-ey*11'2# imply put+ after /orld /ar II+ the Tur-s increasingly ?D

predicated their entire foreign policy on faith in the commitments from their allies# arious

Tur-ish governments had gone to greater lengths to cooperate with their alliance partners+ even

0eyond formal treaty o0ligations 3arris 1'76*5&2#

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 20TH CENTURY

The specific aspect of Chinese culture to 0e e.amined is China


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own country Michael and Taylo 1'65*6>2# Further evidence of Chinese superiority was the

adoption of Chinese manners and eti;uette 0y China,62# imilarly+ the Mongol and

Manchu invasions of China in the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively+ were more

nota0le for the ?sinici4ing@ of the con;ueror than for foreign domination of China# $fter

overrunning China in 1%7'+ the Mongols ;uic-ly incorporated Chinese governmental procedures+

court ceremonies and Confucian rites+ and esta0lished an office to write the history of previous

dynasties+ a tas- underta-en 0y every new Chinese dynasty Ro0erts 1'''*1&)2# The Manchus

reorgani4ed their civil administration along Chinese lines even 0efore completing the invasion of

China in the middle 15,&s and adopted the Chinese tri0utary system of foreign relations once in

power Ro0erts 1'''*1652# This situation has 0een descri0ed 0y one scholar as one in which the

Chinese came to 0elieve ?Dif we 0ring them into our country+ if we treat them the right way+

they will recogni4e+ they will ac-nowledge the virtues of our civili4ation and they will 0ecome

sinici4ed as a result of it@ 3arris 1''&* 1%1(1%%2#

This all changed with the arrival of /estern power in $sia# $lthough initial contacts

0etween panish+ Autch and Hnglish traders conformed to Chinese e.pectations+ ritish trade

representative 8ord McCartney


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the modern /est 1'5'*%62# Instead of ac-nowledging Chinese greatness+ the ritish resorted to

coercion to open Chinese mar-ets+ resulting in the pium /ar of 1),&(1),1# Relatively easy

ritish victory encouraged other Huropean powers to act ;uic-ly to e.tract their own concessions

from China# Bapan followed suit at the end of the nineteenth century+ defeating China in the ino(

Bapanese /ar of 1)',('6 and receiving Taiwan as a war pri4e# The first of half of the twentieth

century 0rought more humiliation at the hands of the /est and Bapan+ 0ut China never

completely a0andoned its ethnocentric outloo- Teng and Fair0an- 1'7>*>2# Clearly+ the Chinese

had to find some way to restore the greatness which they 0elieved was their natural right+ 0ut

howE

H.cluding the eruption of Chinese protest against foreign intervention in China that

culminated in the turn of the century o.er Re0ellion+ China generally was incapa0le of forming

a coherent foreign policy to resist foreign intrusion from the time of the pium /ar until the

1'>&s# $lthough China did not send any com0atants to Hurope during the First /orld /ar+ it

sent noncom0atant la0or 0attalions to assist the French# Following the war+ China lo00ied

delegates to the ersailles Conference to restore handong Province+ which had formerly 0een

controlled 0y Germany+ to Chinese sovereignty# Instead of awarding handong to China+ the

ersailles delegates gave it to Bapan# $lthough this led to large scale student demonstrations in

May 1'1'+ China1+ 3e0ei Province in 1'>7 and hanghai in 1'>)# The Chinese Communists+ on


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the other hand+ advocated resistance to Bapanese aggression as the most important national

o0:ective+ even as the Communists were struggling to survive against Nationalist military

campaigns# $s Bapan drove further into China in the late 1'>&s and early 1',&s+ 0oth Nationalist

and Communist Chinese 0ecame involved in active resistance to Bapanese aggression+ 0ut the

Communists gained a reputation as 0eing more successful# Many Chinese even came to 0elieve

the P8$ was a ma:or force in defeating Bapan in /orld /ar II !halley 1'))*5%2# /hatever the

facts+ the important point is that the Communists esta0lished a reputation among the Chinese

masses for aggressively opposing foreign intervention in China# This+ among other reasons+

persuaded many Chinese to support the Communists when the Chinese Civil /ar resumed after

1',6#

!pon victory and unification in 1','+ Mao edong and the communist leadership of the

People


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Chinese responses to those threats during the Cold /ar Gurtov and 3uang 1''%*%65(%6)2# This

pattern involved Chinese recognition of a perceived threat+ and then the underta-ing of a pre(

emptive attac- that would 0e followed 0y either a pause of negotiation or a prompt Chinese

withdrawal# The desired effect was to show pro0a0le aggressors that China had gained the

initiative or to ?teach the enemy a lesson#@ China employed this strategy in 1'6& against the

$mericans in =orea+ in 1'5% against India and again in 1'5' in 0order clashes with the oviets#

In the cases of =orea /hiting 1'5&2 and the 0order clashes with the oviets+ China calculated

that although the penalties might 0e severe+ it would 0e 0eneficial to ta-e military action# This

strategy provided an accepta0le means of territorial defense given the nature of limited threats to

China+ 0ut it also gave China the opportunity to demonstrate that it was a true leader in

worldwide communist revolution#

THE CASES COMPARED

The $merican attempt to deter a Tur-ish war against Greece over the Cyprus issue in

1'5, is the specific decision within the pattern to 0e analy4ed and compared# $lthough Russett

and 3uth identify Greece as the guardian state in this case+ historical accounts clearly show that

the !nited tates played a more significant role in the effort to deter the Tur-ish invasion all

1')%* >6&2# 8e0ow and tein do identify the ! as the guardian state and 0elieve it to 0e the

most impressive of the three cases they identified as 0eing successful immediate e.tended

deterrence encounters# The ! attempt to deter a Tur-ish attac- on Cyprus which conventional

wisdom held would automatically trigger a war with Greece2 came in the form of a letter from

President Bohnson which declared that the !nited tates would pull out of Tur-ey and e.pose it

to oviet invasion should Tur-ey initiate war over Cyprus# This communication+ forever after


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simply -nown as the ?Bohnson letter+@ caused Tur-ish president Inonu to immediately cancel

invasion plans# I am suggesting that Tur-ey


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Tur-ish case+ however+ I will demonstrate that China fighting 0ro-e out+ with a total of >&&

dead on 0oth sides# ritain sent troops to the Cypriot capitol of Nicosia soon after to contain

hostilities+ 0ut then 0oth Gree- and Tur- Cypriots demanded a0andonment of the Cypriot

constitution+ with Tur-ey advocating partition of the island# /aning resources led the ritish to

as- for ! intervention+ and the !N organi4ed a peace-eeping force !NFICJP2 to ta-e over at

the re;uest of the !# This did not deter 0oth Greece and Tur-ey from ma-ing plans to send

military forces to Cyprus to protect their respective populations on the island as fighting

continued in $pril and May of 1'5>#

$lthough the Tur-s lac-ed landing craft and were ine.perienced in amphi0ious

operations 3arris 1')6*1))2+ 0y late spring it seemed certain Tur-ey would nevertheless invade

Bames %&&%*1&52+ possi0ly on Bune 5 ilge 1'76* 1512# In order to prevent the first ever war

0etween N$T mem0ers+ possi0ly provo-ing oviet intervention+ in Bune $merican president

Bohnson sent Tur-ish president Inonu a letter stating that if Tur-ish intervention on Cyprus did


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provo-e oviet intervention+ N$T would not 0e o0ligated to protect Tur-ey all 1')%* >612#

In reaction to the ?Bohnson letter+@ Tur-ey cancelled plans to invade Cyprus#

To understand why Tur-ey cancelled the planned invasion of Cyprus+ the nature and seriousness

of the $merican threat+ and the potential oviet threat on which it was 0ased+ must first 0e

evaluated# Bohnson certainly sought to deter Tur-ish intervention on Cyprus+ 0ut it was only a

threat contingent upon oviet action# $t the time+ a oviet move against Tur-ey or any other

state in /estern Hurope was unli-ely# The only country the oviet !nion openly invaded during

the entire Cold /ar was $fghanistan+ a non(N$T mem0er#2 Instead+ it was typical for the

oviets to maintain a low profile in these types of disputes while providing aid to the party it

favored 3osmer and /olfe 1')>* 166(1652# In fact+ when hostilities flared again on Cyprus in

$ugust of 1'5,+ Ma-arios as-ed for oviet intervention and was re0uffed Cohen 1'',*

%),(%)62# 3owever+ in eptem0er Russia did give the Gree- Cypriots anti(aircraft weapons+

conforming to its 0ehavioral pattern in these situations# Hven then+ the oviets also may have

sought to reassure Tur-ey that these weapons could 0e used for defensive purposes only

/ynfred and Gil0ert 1'5'* %%2# In light of these facts+ the threat of oviet invasion against

Tur-ey in response to Tur-ish actions against Cyprus seems du0ious indeed#

$s unli-ely as oviet intervention was+ it is even less li-ely that the ! would have

refused to help Tur-ey if oviet intervention occurred# For two decades it had 0een an

overarching goal of ! foreign policy to defend /estern Hurope from oviet e.pansion+ would

the ! have a0andoned /estern Hurope to punish Tur-eyE $lso+ while the ! was the leading

mem0er of N$T+ it could not force other states to comply with a decision that would have 0oth

violated the N$T charter and represented a direct threat to the security of /estern Hurope# In

addition to stating that ! support of Tur-ey was uncertain in the event of Tur-ish action against


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%7

Cyprus and resultant oviet intervention+ Bohnson also stated that Tur-ey had no right to use

weapons against Cyprus that were provided 0y the ! for defensive purposes only# Could this

have compelled Tur-ey to stand downE In a material since+ it is unli-ely# Tur-ey already

possessed the weapons and could have made future weapons purchase from /estern Hurope if

the ! cut off aid# 3owever+ the psychological conse;uences of the ! potentially cutting of aid

may have affected the Tur-ish attention+ as one scholar commenting on the ! suspension of aid

to Tur-ey following the 1'7, Cyprus crisis claims that suspension ?Dwould leave deep

psychological scarsDthat would haunt the relationship for a long time to come@ 3arris

1'76*7%2#

$s 0oth oviet intervention and corresponding $merican a0andonment were 0oth

unli-ely+ other reasons+ including psychological ones+ must 0e considered# President Inonu'%2# This may provide an answer to why

Tur-ey cancelled the invasion of Cyprus in 1'5,# Instead of acting ?naively@ as one scholar

claimed Celi- 1'''* .iii2+ Tur-ey may have simply 0een acting as it had in the past+ placating a

strong country of the civili4ation with which Tur-ey wished to 0e identified# Inonu himself was

li-ely to have this attitude+ as he was more westerni4ed than past Tur-ish leaders ol-an and

It4-owit4 1'',* 1)'(1'&2 and refused to ?D;uestion the N$T alliance+ for to do so would

have meant ;uestioning the very foundations on which the Tur-ish regime rested@ $hmad1''>*

,&72#

If Tur-ey was compelled 0y psychological reasons to forego an invasion that would not

have li-ely 0een credi0ly opposed 0y the ! and other /estern powers+ what would China do in


28/41

%)

a situation vis(L(vis the oviet !nion in which the oviet threat of action against China was

more dangerous and more credi0leE It is this that now must 0e considered# Though the Chinese

have fre;uently committed 0order incursions into ietnam throughout history+ China and

ietnam maintained a close relationship from 1',' to 1'76 due to their common interest in

defeating /estern imperialism# Their common front wea-ened somewhat 1'5' due to the death

of 3o Chi Minh+ who had 0een particularly adept at maintaining good relations with China and

Russia+ and further deteriorated with ietnamese victory in the outh in 1'76# This is 0ecause

ietnam increasingly tilted toward the oviet !nion in the ino(oviet split 0ecause ?DMoscow

was very powerful+ strongly anti(Chinese and very far awayD@ allowing ietnam ?Dto preserve

its con;uests and -eep as independent as possi0le@ Griffith 1')%*1,12#

Throughout the second half of the 1'7&s+ China and ietnam maneuvered to dominate

outheast $sia+ with ietnam fearing traditional Chinese encroachment and China see-ing to

prevent encirclement 0y Russia and ietnam# ietnam negotiated a ?Treaty of Friendship and

olidarity@ with 8aos in $ugust 1'77+ as the PRC sought to foster a strong Cam0odia+ controlled

0y the =hmer Rouge+ to resist ietnamese hegemony in Indochina Jahuda 1')>*%%52# In

Aecem0er 1'77 ietnam 0egan military operations against Cam0odia in response to =hmer

Rouge 0order incursions+ leading to total withdrawal of all Chinese aid to ietnam in 1'7)# In

Novem0er 1'7) ietnam and the oviet !nion signed a ?Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship+@

e.plicitly involving economic assistance and naval refueling rights+ 0ut the implicit intent of the

treaty was containment and deterrence of China agoria and imon 1')%*16)2# Though the

treaty did not ma-e any stipulation for military assistance in case of attac-+ 0oth oviet leader

re4hnev and ietnam


29/41

%'

decide how to respond to the treaty+ and Aeng iaoping and others ultimately decided to mount a

preemptive stri-e against ietnam along the lines of earlier Chinese 0order dispute responses#

Though Aeng 0elieved oviet intervention might 0e provo-ed+ he predicted oviet attac-s would

0e limited Chen 1')7* )72#

$s Chinese leaders were deciding to punish ietnam+ ietnam overran Cam0odia# Aeng

visited the ! to complete diplomatic normali4ation 0etween the two countries+ and while there

told President Carter that China would launch a limited attac- on ietnam Carter 1')%*%&52#

Aeng(1162# $s the short and 0rutal war ended 0etween

si.ty and seventy thousand -illed2+ it was clear that ietnam was gaining the advantage#

$s if ietnamese opposition wasn


30/41

>&

%% Fe0ruary oviet aircraft were overflying the 0attlefield+ additional oviet ships were en route

to the outh China ea+ a oviet military delegation arrived in 3anoi and 0oth 3anoi and

Moscow stated Russia would fulfill treaty o0ligations if Chinese action continued# y the second

wee- of hostilities+ oviet ships and aircraft carrying military aid arrived in ietnam+ and Pravda

warned that the war might ?e.pand@ unless China withdrew Baco0sen 1')1*1&%2#

From a strictly military standpoint+ it is difficult to see why China undertoo- its punitive

invasion of ietnam# The P8$ was far from a modern force+ and encountered su0stantial

organi4ational+ logistical+ and communications pro0lems during the operation hort 1')%* >>%2#

ietnam had a 0attle tested+ superior fighting force and the oviet !nion had an immense

technological advantage+ particularly in aircraft and missiles# To understand why China attac-ed

ietnam one must loo- 0eyond the military 0alance of power# In response to ;uestions 0y

/estern military e.perts concerning the prudence of the operation+ one scholar claims that China

0elieved its credi0ility was at sta-e and wanted to ?Dshow the world that China did not fear war

or the threat of oviet intervention 3su 1')>*%72# $nother commentator claims China attac-ed

ietnam to ?Dreassert the traditional Chinese prerogative of ?chastising the 0ar0arians within

the traditional Chinese areas of hegemony@ Benc-s 1'7'* )&>2# The fact that China retreated

does not mean the Chinese were not ris- acceptant# The possi0ility of uncontrolled escalation

was present throughout the conflict+ as it was in the =orean /ar+ ino(Indian /ar and the !ssuri

River clashes with the oviets in 1'5'# China


31/41

>1

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The implications of this study fall into three 0road categories# First+ this study can

provide a model for overcoming the division 0etween nomothetic historical2 and ideographic

anthropological2 studies# y ta-ing 0oth time and place into account+ the proposed model

allows for 0oth change and constancy in yielding answers to ;uestions regarding why societies

ma-e the policy choices that they do# $lso+ the model provides possi0le solutions to some of

international relations theory* 1>&2# y creating a model that heavily relies on actor specific

information+ it is hoped that foreign policy studies can 0e made more useful for foreign policy

practitioners# More specifically+ this study contri0utes to the general understanding of immediate

e.tended deterrence and in what cases it will 0e effective# The immediate e.tended deterrence

studies noted a0ove 3uth and Russett+ 1'),9 1'))9 8e0ow and tein+ 1'))2 focus on the actions


32/41

>%

and outloo- of the defending party+ not the attac-ing party# This study focuses solely on the

perceptions of the attac-ing party# This is important for those practicing immediate e.tended

deterrence the defending party2 0ecause the effectiveness of a particular deterrence strategy is

dependent on the intentions of the adversary against whom the strategy is underta-en $.elrod

1'),* >&2# /ithout a particular understanding of how a potential adversary is interpreting the

deterring signals it sends+ a defending state is more li-ely to fail in its efforts to deter an attac- on

a friendly third party#

This is particularly relevant to decision ma-ing in $merican foreign policy 0ecause of the

! role as glo0al superpower# $lthough foreign policy issues such as terrorism are increasingly

important+ much of $merican foreign policy involves preventing or moderating conflict in

various regions of the world# $s different crises arise+ an enhanced understanding of a specific

country


33/41

>>

/R= CITHA

$dnan($divar+ $0dulha-# 1'61# ?Interaction of Islamic and /estern Thought in Tur-ey+@ NearHastern Cultures and ociety+ T# Cuyler Joung+ ed# Princeton* Princeton !niversity Press#

11'(1%'#

$hmad+ Fero4# 1''># The Ma-ing of Modern Tur-ey# 8ondon* Routledge#

((((1'77# The Tur-ish H.periment in Aemocracy+ 1'6&(1'76# oulder* /estview Press#

$l-er+ 3ayward# 1''%# ?The 3umanistic Moment in International tudies* Reflections on

Machiavelli and las Casas+@ International tudies Kuarterly+ >5+ >,7(>71#

$lmond+ Ga0riel and ydney er0a#1')'# The Civic Culture Revisited# New0ury Par-+ C$*

age Pu0lications#

((((1'5># The Civic Culture# Princeton+ NB* Princeton !niversity Press#

$llison+ Graham T# 1'71# Hssence of Aecision* H.plaining the Cu0an Missile Crisis# oston*8ittle rown#

$.elrod+ Ro0ert# 1'),# Hvolution of Cooperation.New Jor-* asic oo-s#

all+ George# 1')%# The Past 3as $nother Pattern# New Jor-* /#/# Norton and Company#

er-es+ Niya4i# 1'5,# The Aevelopment of ecularism in Tur-ey# Montreal* McGill !niversityPress#

ianco+ 8ucian# 1'71# rigins of the Chinese Revolution+ 1'16(1','# tanford* tanford!niversity Press#

iernac-i+ Richard# 1'''# ?Method and Metaphor+@ eyond the Cultural Turn+ ictoria onnelland 8ynn 3unt+ eds# er-eley* !niversity of California Press# 5%(',#

ilge+ uat# 1'76# ?The Cyprus Conflict and Tur-ey+@ Tur-ey6(1)6#

irn0aum+ Hlea4ar# 1'75# ?Tur-ey* from Cosmopolitan Hmpire to Nation(tate+@ Introduction to

Islamic Civili4ation+ R#M# avory+ed# Cam0ridge* Cam0ridge !niversity Press#

loodworth+ Aennis# 1'55# The Chinese 8oo-ing Glass# New Jor-* Farrar+ trauss+ and Girou.#

rown+ 8# Carl and Norman It4-owit4# 1'77# ?$ Fresh 8oo- at National Character tudies in the

Near Hastern Conte.t+@ Psychological Aimensions of Near Hastern tudies+ 8# Carl rown and

Norman It4-owit4+ eds# Princeton+ NB* Aarwin Press# 167(156#


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>,

ueno de Mes;uita+ ruce# 1')1# The /ar Trap# New 3aven* Jale !niversity Press#

u4an+ arry and Richard 8ittle# %&& International ystems in /orld 3istory* Rema-ing thetudy of International Relations# .ford* .ford !niversity Press#

Cahen+ Claude# 1'5)# Pre(ttoman Tur-ey# New Jor-* Taplinger Pu0lishing Company#

Carley+ Patricia# 1''5# ?Tur-ey


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>6

Haston+ Aavid# 1'57# ?The Current Meaning of ehavioralism+@ Contemporary Political

$nalysis+ Bames C# Charlesworthy+ ed# New Jor-* The Free Press#

Hrden+ Aeni4# 1'7,# ?Tur-ish Foreign Policy Through the !nited Nations#@ Ph#A dissertation+

!niversity of Massachusetts# A$ >5+ p1&772

Fair0an-+ Bohn =ing# 1'5'# Trade and Aiplomacy on the China Coast# tanford* tanford

!niversity Press#

Fair0an-+ Bohn =ing+ and Hdwin # Reischauer and $l0ert Craig# 1'56# Hast $sia* The Modern

Transformation olume Two2# oston* 3oughton Mifflin Company#

Foucault+ Michel# 1'))# Politics+ Philosophy+ Culture* Interviews and ther /ritings+

1'77(1'),# New Jor-* Routledge#

Geert4+ Clifford# 1'7># The Interpretation of Cultures# New Jor-* asic oo-s+ Inc#

George+ $le.ander# 1''># ridging the Gap* Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy# /ashington+A#C#* ! Institute of Peace Press#

Gerner+ Ae0orah# 1''6# ?The Hvolution of the tudy of Foreign Policy+@ Foreign Policy$nalysis* Continuity and Change in its econd Generation# Neac-+ 8aura+ Beanne $#=# 3ey+ and

Patric- B# 3aney+ eds# New Bersey* Prentice 3all# 17(>%#

Gil-s+ $nn# 1''%# The rea-down of the ino(ietnamese $lliance+ 1'7&(1'7'# er-eley+ C$*!niversity of California Press#

Gol-ap+ iya# 1'6'# Tur-ish Nationalism and /estern Civili4ation# New Jor-* Colum0ia!niversity Press#

Green+ Aonald P#+ and Ian hapiro# 1'',# Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory* $ Criti;ue of$pplications in Political cience# New 3aven* Jale !niversity Press#

Griffith+ /illiam# 1')%# ?International Politics and the ino(oviet Aispute+@ The ino(oviet

Conflict+ 3er0ert Hllison+ ed# eattle* !niversity of /ashington Press#1>1(,6#

Gurtov+ Melvin and yong Moo 3wang# 1''%# China !nder Threat# altimore* Bohns 3op-ins

Press#

3aas+ Hrnst#1''7# Nationalism+ 8i0eralism+ and Progress# Ithaca+ NJ* Cornell !niversity Press#

3arris+ George # 1')6# Tur-ey* Coping with Crisis# /estview Press#

(((( 1'76# ?Tur-ey and the !nited tates+@ Tur-ey


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>5

3arris+ tuart# 1'' ?China etween Two /orlds+@ Cultural Hncounters+ Ro0ert Cecil and

Aavid /ade+ eds# 8ondon* ctagon Press# 11'(1>,#

3ere-+ G#M# 1')5# ?The Instrumentality of $ttitudes* Toward a Neofunctional Theory+@ Bournal

of ocial Issues+ ,%# ''(11,#

3ermann+ Margaret# 1'7'# ?/ho ecomes a Political 8eaderE ome ocietal and Regime

Influences on the election of 3ead of tate+@ Psychological Models in International Politics+8## Fal-ows-i+ ed# oulder* /estview Press# 16(,)#

3osmer+ tephen+ and Thomas /# /olfe# 1')># oviet Policy and Practice toward Third /orld

Conflicts# Toronto* A#C# 3eath and Company#

3otham+ Aavid# 1'7%# The Tur-s# 8ondon* Bohn Murray Pu0lishers 8td#

3su+ Immanuel C#J# 1')># The Rise of Modern China Third Hdition2# .ford* .ford!niversity Press#

3udson+ G#F# 1'5,# ?China and the /orld* $ ummary of Intellectual and $rtistic Influences+@

The 8egacy of China+ Raymond Aawson+ ed# .ford* .ford !niversity Press# >,&(>5%#

3untington+ amuel# 1''5# The Clash of Civili4ations and the Rema-ing of /orld rder# New

Jor-* imon and chuster#

3uth+ Paul and ruce Russett# 1'),# ?/hat Ma-es Aeterrence /or-E Cases From 1'&& to1')&+@ /orld Politics+ >5+ ,+ ,'5(6%5#

((((1'))# ?Aeterrence Failure and Hscalation to /ar+@ International tudies Kuarterly+ >%+ 1+%'(,5#

Inglehart+ Ronald# 1'71# ?The ilent Revolution in Hurope* Intergenerational Change in Post(Industrialist ocieties+@ $merican Political cience Review# 56* ''1(1&17#

Banis+ Irving# 1')%# Groupthin-* Psychological tudies of Policy Aecisions and Fiascos# oston*

3oughton Mifflin#

Inonu+ Ismet# 1'55# ?Correspondence etween President Bohnson and Prime Minister Inonu+

Bune 1'5,+ $s Released 0y the /hite 3ouse+ Banuary 16+ 1'55+@ Middle Hast Bournal# ol# %&+

No# ># >)5(>'>#

Baco0sen+ G#C# 1')1# ino(oviet Relations ince Mao* The Chairman>+ pp#%&6(%16#


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>7

Bames+ $lan# %&&%# =eeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1'5>(5,# New Jor-* Palgrave#

Banus+ Irving# 1'7%# ictims of Groupthin-# oston* 3oughton Mifflin Company#

Benc-s+ 3arlan# 1'7'# OChina(%7%#

8e0ow+ Richard Ned and Banice Gross tein# 1'' ?Aeterrence* The Hlusive Independent

aria0le+@ /orld Politics+ $pril+ >>7(>5'#

8egg+ =eith and Bames Morrison#1')1# ?The Formulation of Foreign Policy 0:ectives+@Perspectives on /orld Politics# Michael mith+ Richard 8ittle+ and Michael hac-leton+ eds#

8ondon* Croon 3elm 8td# 6,(5%#

8ewis+ ernard# 1''># Islam and the /est#.ford* .ford !niversity Press#

((((1'66# ?Tur-ey* /esterni4ation+@ !nity and ariety in Muslim Civili4ation+ Gustav vonGrune0aum+ ed# Chicago* !niversity of Chicago Press# >11(>>,#

8ewis+ Geoffrey# 1'7,# Modern Tur-ey# New Jor-* Praeger


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8i:phart+ $rend# 1'71# ?Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method+@ $merican Political

cience Review+ 56+ No#>+ 5)%(5'>#

8uard+ Hvan# 1'75# Types of International ociety# New Jor-* The Free Press#

Mango+ $ndrew# 1'''# $tatur-* The iography of the Founder of Modern Tur-ey# New Jor-*verloo- Press#

Mansfield+ Hdward+ and Bac- nyder# 1''6# ?Aemocrati4ation and /ar+@ Foreign $ffairs+ 7,+No# >+ 7'('7#

Mantovani+ Giusseppe# %&& H.ploring orders* !nderstanding Culture and Psychology#

Philadelphia* Taylor and Francis#

Mardin+ erif# 1'')# ?ome Notes on Normative Conflicts in Tur-ey+@ The 8imits of ocial

Cohesion+ Peter 8# erger+ ed# oulder+ Colorado* /estview Press# %&7(%>1#

Mayer+ $rno# 1'6'# Political rigins of the New Aiplomacy+ 1'17(1'1)# New 3aven* Jale

!niversity Press#

Michael+ Fran4 and George Taylor# 1'65# The Far Hast in the Modern /orld# New Jor-* 3enry

3olt and Company#

Miller+ 8ynn# 1'',# Glo0al rder* alues and Power in International Politics# oulder+ C*

/estview Press#

Morgenthau+ 3ans# 1'5># Politics $mong Nations Third Hdition2# New Jor-# $lfred $# =nopf#

Mosse+ George# 1'))# The Culture of /estern Hurope* The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries#oulder* /estview Press#

neal+ Bohn+ Frances neal+ eev Mao4+ and ruce Russett# 1''5# ?The 8i0eral Peace*Aemocracy+ Interdependence+ and International Conflict+@ Bournal of Peace Research+ >>+ 11(%)#

Palmer+ R#R# 1')5# ?Frederic- the Great+ Gui0ert+ ulow* From Aynastic to National /ar+@Ma-ers of Modern trategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear $ge+ Peter Paret+ ed# Princeton*

Princeton !niversity Press#

((((1'67# $ 3istory of the Modern /orld econd Hdition2# New Jor-* $lfred $# =nopf#

Pope+ Nicole and 3ugh Pope# 1''7# Tur-ey !nveiled* $tatur- and $fter# 8ondon* Bohn Murray#

Poulton+ 3ugh# 1''7# Top 3at+ Grey /olf+ and Crescent* Tur-ish Nationalism and the Tur-ish

Repu0lic# New Jor-* New Jor- !niversity Press#


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Reischauer+ Hdwin and Bohn =ing Fair0an-# 1'5 Hast $sia* The Great Tradition# olume 12#

oston* 3oughton Mifflin Company#

Ricoeur+ Paul# 1'7,# ?tructure+ /ord+ Hvent+@ The Conflict of Interpretations* Hssays in

3ermeneutics+ Aon Idhe+ ed# Hvanston+ Ill#* Northwestern !niversity Press# 7'(')#

Ro0erts+ B#$#G# 1'''# $ Concise 3istory of China# Cam0ridge+ Mass#* !niversity of 3arvard

Press#

Rosecrance+ Richard# 1'5># $ction and Reaction in /orld Politics# oston* 8ittle+ rown and

Company#

Russett+ ruce and Thomas /# Graham# 1')'# ?Pu0lic pinion and National ecurity Policy*Relationships and Impacts+@ 3and0oo- of /ar tudies+ Manus Midlars-y+ ed# 8ondon* $llen and

!nwin# %>'(%6'#

ahlins+ Marshall#1')6# Islands of 3istory# Chicago* !niversity of Chicago Press#

artori+ Giovanni# 1'7 ?Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics+@ $merican Politicalcience Review+ 5,+ No# ,

aussure+ Ferdinand de# 1'6'# Course in General 8inguistics edited 0y Charles ally and $l0ertechehaye+ translated 0y /ade as-in2# New Jor-* The Philosophical 8i0rary Inc#

chuman+ Frederic-# 1'5%# The Cold /ar* Retrospect and Prospect# aton Rouge* 8ousiana

tate !niversity Press#

nyder+ Richard and 3# /# ruc- and urton apin# 1'5%# Foreign Policy Aecision(Ma-ing* $n

$pproach to the tudy of International Relations# New Jor-* The Free Press of Glencoe#

Tachau+ Fran-# 1'),# Tur-ey* The Politics of $uthority+ Aemocracy+ and Aevelopment# New

Jor-* Praeger#

Teng+ su(Ju and Bohn =# Fair0an-# 1'7># China


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,&

!halley+ tephen+ Br# 1'))# 3istory of the Chinese Communist Party# tanford+ C$* 3oover

Institution Press#

!lam+ $dam# 1'5)# H.pansion and Coe.istence* The 3istory of oviet Foreign Policy+

1'17(1'57# New Jor-* Praeger#

ali+ Ferenc# 1'7%# The Tur-ish straits and N$T# tanford* 3oover Institution Press#

(((( 1'71# ridge $cross the osporous* The Foreign Policy of Tur-ey# altimore* Bohns3op-ins Press#

ol-an+ ami- and Norman It4-owit4# 1'',# Tur-s and Gree-s* Neigh0ors in Conflict#

3untingdon+ Hngland* The Hothen Press#

((((1'7'# Theory of International Politics# Reading+ M$* $ddison /esley#

((((1'57# Foreign Policy and Aemocratic Politics* The $merican and ritish H.perience# NewJor-* Colum0ia !niversity Press#

/e0er+ Cynthia# 1''6# timulating overeignty* Intervention+ the tate and ym0olic H.change#

Cam0ridge* Cam0ridge !niversity Press#

/endt+ $le.ander# 1'''# ocial Theory of International Politics# Cam0ridge* Cam0ridge

!niversity Press#

/hiting+ $llen # 1'5 China Crosses the Jalu# New Jor-* The Macmillan Company

/ynfred+ Boshua and tephen Gi0ert# 1'5'# $rms for the Third /orld* oviet Military $id

Aiplomacy# altimore* Bohns 3op-ins !niversity#

Jahuda+ Michael# 1')># China


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