new central asia the regional impact of international actors 48 to 89

8/12/2019 New Central Asia the Regional Impact of International Actors 48 to 89

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. New Central Asia : The Regional Impact of International Actors.: World Scientific Publishing Co., . p 48http://site.ebrary.com/id/10422057?ppg=48Copyright World Scientific Publishing Co.. . All rights reserved.May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher,except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

NATO s Partnership with Central Asia:

Cooperation a a carteSimon J Smith nd Emitan Kavalski

ntroductionOwing ro the Cold War context of its emergence, the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) has mainly be seen as a military defencealliance aimed at the protection of Western Europe from a Sovietinvasion. In connection witl1 that aim, NATO and the United Statesin particular) had a vested interest in preventing any one power fromdominating Europe. With regard to Central Asia, it is assumed herethat the aim of the Alliance is similar preventing any one powerfrom dominating tl1e region. Such understanding reflects NATO stransformation during the 1990s which indicated that tl1e Alliance didperceive itself not only as a mechanism of collective defence, but alsoasan organization indispensable ro the projection and maintenance ofinternational order Webber, 2002 .

In this respect, NATO s relationship with Central Asia evolves alongtwo interrelated levels. Firstly, NATO has an obvious involvement intl1e region as a result of its ongoing mission in Afghrustan. Secondly,NATO is encouraging the Central Asiru1 states ro make tl1e difficulttransition from autl1oritariru1 regimes to systems of governance tl1at aremore transparent, open, and equitable. This aim is assisted tl1rough tl1evarious programs for defence ru1d security sector reform developed bytl1e Alliance. Botl1 tl1ese levels indicate distinct instruments for interna-tional socialization tl1rough NATO programs, which are characterizedby explicit conditionality ofcompliance i.e., inclusion) ru1d punishment

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30 Simon] Smith and Emilian Kavalskii .e., exclusion) which reiterare its underlying objective of introducing

a pattern of peaceful state behavior (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 155).The claim here is that NATO's agency is becoming increasingly

marginalized in the dynamics of the new great game . The requiredqualification relates ro the difficulty of evaluating the Alliance s rolesin Central Asia independent of the agency of its key member state -the United States. Commentators have therefore insisted that onlythe United States and NATO can creare an effective system of security and support stability in this region (Rumer, 2005, p. 63). Irwould therefore seem that (as indicated in Chap. Eight) NATO's trajectories in Central Asia follow the destiny of Washington's agency.The assessment of this chapter proceeds by briefly outlining the trajectories of NATO's evolution (especially, in the post-Cold Warperiod). Ir then details tl1e various instruments employed by tl1eAlliance in its engagement of Central Asia. Such an analysis assists inteasing out NATO's strategies and tactics for dealing witl1 the complexity of the region. In this respect, the chapter evaluares tl1e statebuilding and regionalization effects of NATO in Central Asia.N TO odayIn the early 1960s, Stanley Hoffman (1963, p. 547) queried whetl1erthe Atlantic subsystem [would] remain an essential component, even

if tl1e Soviet U nion should give up all hopes of world expansion, evenif the communist camp should split into t\vo rival groups, i.e., even ifthe Cold War should stop being the relationship of major tension ?Although Hoffman's expectation of a fiiendly separation betweenthe American and European pillars of NATO seems to be comingtrue, the continuing persistence of the Alliance as an internationalactor is in itself evidence of tl1e resilience of its security communitynature (Deutsch et al. 1957). NATO's original role was tl1e protection of \Vestern Europe from a perceived imminent attack by tl1eSoviet Union and its allies from the \Varsaw Pact. Thus, the creationof the Alliance was driven by tl1e need to minimize the cost of defencethrough a collective security mechanism. In the hackneyed expressionofNATO's first Secretary-General Lord Ismay, its purpose was to keep


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NATO>s Pmtnuship vith Centml sia 31the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down ( cited inKavalski, 2008a, p. 157). However, with the dissolution of the SovietUnion, NATO's raison d )t1 e and the continued need of its securityumbrella were called into question. Many a commentator have suggested that the Alliance is bound to disappear in the absence of itsfounding enemy and questioned the logic behind the adoption of

a flexible (if not diluting) institutional adaptations. Without wishing to adjudicare on the validity of those claims, the assumption is thatinstead of disappearing, the complex transformation initiated byNATO in response to the challenges of the new world order (Bush,1991) ensured its viability as international (security) actor.Most notably these alterations were in the areas of enlargement,the shift to out-of-area - that is, out-of-Europe (Kavalski,2008a, p. 86) - operations, and the development of new capabilitiesto address current challenges. These institutional adaptations haveasserted initially the Alliance's centrality as a European and then as aglobal security actor. Consequently, NATO has sought to developpartnerships with states that are (to varying degrees) interested tobenefit from its outreach programs. These transformations have permitted the Alliance to pursue its order-promoting goals by differentiating between new, soon-to-be, would-be, and not-to-be members(Krahman, 2003, p. 4). These strategic adaptations implicare tl edeeper structure of values that maintains the legitimacy of the

Alliance (Webber, 2002, p. 44). In this context, NATO's engagementin Central Asia confirms that the Alliance 's entire agenda is pivotingfrom an inward focus on Europe toan outward focus (Burns, 2005).Thus, it is tl e stabilization of Afghanistan that holds the key toNATO's surge in the Central Asia tl1eater with over 56,000 troopscontributing to the ISAF mission.

Prior to assessing the various instruments of the NATO-CentralAsia relations, it is appropriate ro take a brief look at the analyticalcontexts within which they are positioned. As already hinted, realistapproaches were skeptical about NATO's continued longevity. Kennetl1Waltz, in particular, famously asserted that although NATO's days arenot numbered, its years are (Waltz, 1993 , p. 76). It would appear,however, that as a result of its expansion and transformation, tl e


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32 Simon] Smith and Emilian Ka valskiAlliance is here to stay. In other words, the end of the Cold War challenged but did not remove NATO's shared politico-military cultureand its institutionalized provision of collective security (Kavalski,2008a, p. 160). Therefore, the claim is that closer relations with theAlliance - 1'ega1dless ofwhether it is debased m not - is likely to

provide Eurasian states with a reassuring security guarantee(Sperling, 2003 , p. 17).

Thus, NATO's persistence projects a view grounded on theassumption that NATO's integrity and purpose have never dependedsolely on the existence of an external threat (.Moore, 2008). Thisapproach assumes that NATO has always been more than justa defensive Alliance and that , in fact, since its formation it has been groundedon a secondary function as well - that of a political community. Forinstance, .Manfred Worner (1990), the then NATO Secretary-Generalsuggested that (procedurally) NATO is a paragon of western standards: NATO is not simply an alliance of threat or intimidation. It isa model of partnership, success and a vision of a Europe of peace andfreedom . Building on its experience of providing a secure space forthe nurture and practice of liberal democratic values, the Alliance'spost-Cold War agenda gradually developed and asserted a moreexplicitly normative language about its purpose and practices(Kavalski, 2008a, p. 160).

Thus, institutional arguments, such as Rob de Wijk's (1998), propose that during the Cold War years, NATO transformed from a traditional military alliance for collective defence into a political-militaryorganization for security cooperation with an extensive bureaucracyand complex decision-making process . While the poli ical functionof l1e Alliance never developed to tl1e same extent as its military one,the opportunity which joint consultations offered for airing grievances, compromise and consensus-building played a key role in thedevelopment of l1e institutional form of a mutual defence pact (Kay1998 , p. 24). In other words, this political-military mixture not onlyhelped to defend Europe from the Soviet threat, but it also helped toreduce historical tensions and suspicions between the member states.This process of normative alignment was tl1e result of intense elitesocialization which utiated a NATO Spirit (Kavalski 2008a, p. 157).


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NATO>s Pmtnuship 1vith Centml sia 33It is therefore, the institutional arrangements of the Alliance that provided a the skeletal framework, which held the western security community together, but the various webs which linked the communitytogether often rose above a tangible inter-institutional dimension, tothe sphere of cultural and social norms (Aybet, 2000 , p. 1).

In this respect, social constructivist approaches argue that the glueholding NATO together has always been more than just a commonenemy. Instead, a sense of shared goals and values has also contributed to the formation and persistence of NATO's strategic culture. Thus, the multilateralism on which the Alliance was forgeddeveloped its own socializing environment among the members andfacilitated the development of a practice of trust. The institutionalinteraction ofNATO made it possible to affect the preferences of participating elites by acquainting them with the preferences or beliefs,or environmental constraints of the others (Wallander et al. 1999,p. 12). Thus, realist and neo iberal scholars largely ignore NATO'svital role in shaping state preferences in ways that have served to promote both military cooperation and the growth of liberal democraticinstitutions and practices well beyond the borders of NATO(Moore, 2008). It is this ability ofthe Alliance to impact the interactions among its members on both societal and decision-making levelsthat Bradley Klein (1990, p. 319) calls the genius ofNATO :

By effectively wedding itself to tbe defense of distinctly modern,Western, Atlantico-centric cultural project, strategic discourse detlectedcriticism of the Alliance's otherwise obvious contradictions . . NATO'sstrategy was thus the only feasible means of securing that precarioushistorical construct called the \ 'estern way of life .

Bearing these perspectives in mind, the contention here is thatthe engagement with NATO's Central Asan agency can benefit fioman eclectic theoretical view. Such an eclectic approach is informedby (i) the understanding that d e disciplinary paradigms of international relations are commensurate and can be mediated; and (ii) thesuggestion that, on the one hand, rationalist theories are more compelling when they are combined with ideational insights into effects


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34 Simon] Smith and milian Kavalski

of norms and identities, while, on the other hand, the explanatoryvalue of constructivist propositions is expanded by a focus on power(Kavalski, 2008a, p. 5). Thus, NATO's involvement in Central Asiacan be explained through its willingness to defend the normativeunderpinnings of the Euro-Atlantic space from tl1e strategic threatsemanating from the region. The Alliance therefore finds itself balances between the provision of hard security and tl1e promotion ofliberal democratic norms. At the same time, such balancing act iscomplicated by NATO's intergovernmental character. Thus, NATO'sagency in Central Asia is often hampered not only by the idiosyncrasies of working in a volatile environment, but also by the difficulties of reaching an agreement between tl1e allies.

NATO s nstruments of EngagementRecognizing the need to upgrade its relations witl1 non-member, atits Brussels Summit in January 1994, the Alliance launched tl1ePartnership for Peace (PtP) program, which still provides the coreframework for NATO's relations witl1 Central Asia. The PtP is moreoften not discussed in the context ofNATO's subsequent decision toenlarge (as it initially was preoccupied with the post-communist transitions of tl1e countries in Central and Eastern Europe); thereby, it istraditionally described as a halfuray house to membership. Such tendency, however, overlooks its broader framework of relations. Thus,although enlargement was presupposed by tl1e PtP, its rationale was(and still is) serving purposes larger tl1aJ1 enlargement (Kavalski,2008a, p. 162). In other words, its development was a clear indication tl1at NATO realized its initial handicap to engage the countriesof l1e fonner Soviet Bloc since the 'politics of exclusion' was its -son d tre. [Thus], we have tl1e paradoxical outcome that it is NATOthe has practiced most effectively the 'politics of inclusion' witl1 tl1einstitutional innovations of the NACC, EAPC, and the PfPSperling, 2003, p. 15).The PtP offers participation in political and military bodies at

NATO Headquarters with respect to partnership activities . Therationale behind the initiative is to increase stability, diminish threats


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NATO>Pmtnuship 1vith Centml Asia 35to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spiritof practica cooperation and commitment to democratic principies".Furthermore, the initiative entails "field exercises", joint militaryactivities", and the capacity for "liaison officers" to participa e in thePartnership Coordination Cell (PCC) located at NATO's headquarters in .Mons, Belgium (NATO , 1994). The NATO Secretary-GeneralJaap de Hoop Scheffer maintains that the PfP "will ensure that theunique strategic value of [the Alliance] remains high. Today's globalchallenges require global answers. PfP [is] an important part of theresponse" RFE/RL Newsline, 5 November 2004).

The rationale for the partners depends on their relations with theAlliance. For NATO membership-aspirants, it is the prospect of accession; for the rest, it is either an interest in the promotion of stabilityderiving from their compatibility/concurrence with NATO securityinterests as defined in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts; or aninstrumental benefit from the import of know-how and expertisefrom NATO; or the value-added of legitimacy from inclusion(Kavalski, 2008a, p. 163). In this respect, PfP not only helps to institutionalize pa1 tnetship into a permanent fixture" of "associatedmembership" (Ulrich, 1999, p. 3), but also offers strategic incentivesfor a state's alignment with NATO by lowering the cost of securitycooperation. As Joshua Spero (2003 , p. 170) explains, PfP can therefor be perceived as an association of non-predatory bandwagoningstates" - i e., states which:

try to attain gains not through aggression, but from extending thebandwagoning state's value system. Encouraged by NATO, PfPstates have sought to institutionalize the values of cooperative security even if they do not actually seek formal NATO membership ...[The] objective of bandwagoning centers on the opportunity for astate to gain by joining the security system it values, the statedetermines that its costs to achieve security defensively might belower than to defend the existing arder, which may be more unfavorable. The security system comprises a stronger state or a coalition of stronger states and the bandwagoning state attempts toalign , usually during a time of geopolitical change, and not in a


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36 Simon] Smith and milian Kavalskimanner threatening to other states - especially those states outsidesecurity institutions.Such bandwagoning interactions are structured by a Partnership

Framework Document , which sets out the normative framework ofrelations by reaffirming the participant's commitments to the UnitedNations Charter, the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, and theHelsinki Final Act. Contained within such a comprehensive agendaare a series of compartmentalized initiatives that seek to address themore specific areas in which NATO has unique expertise and experience. The PfP is thereby construed as a multilateral framework forparticipating countries to implement tailor-made policies. The program provides partners with an extensive menu from which they canchoose those specific options that best suit their individual needs.

From the point of view of the Alliance, the PfP's strategic role oforder-promotion is thus an effect of its policy of inclusion of partners. Participation (or inclusion) advances a perception of a commonpurpose among the partners, which tends to facilitare their cooperation both with NATO and among themselves. In contrast, exclusion(non-participation in the PfP and other partnership initiatives) hinders the socialization of non-partners and instead subjects them to thepossibility of a coercive disciplining (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 162).

All five of the Central Asan countries are members of the PfP withTajikistan joining only in 2002, vvhile the rest have been involvedalmost from the beginning ofthe program in 1994. Yet, it has to beacknowledged that it is primarily since the launching of the Alliedoperations in Mghanistan that NATO has become aware ofthe essential role that the states of Central Asia can play with regard to the stability of the region (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008).Confirming this trend are the current discussions to position CentralAsia within a 26+5+l forum (i.e., NATO member states plus theCentral Asan republics plus Mghanistan). NATO proclaims thatcooperation with Central Asia manifests itselfin five key areas : security cooperation, defence and security sector reform, disaster preparedness and response, science and environmental cooperation, andaddressing issues of public awareness (NATO Backgrounder, 2007).


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N TO>Pmtnuship vith Centml sia 37The initiative contained within the first two areas - security cooperaran and defence and security sector reform - impact most dramatically on NATO's state-building and regionalization strategy inCentral Asia. With the start of the war in Afghanistan , these issueareas have been d1e main concern for all players involved the newgreat game and have, in many ways, become fundamentally juxtaposed to one another. In other words, addressing NATO's strategicinterests in Central Asia has often conflicted wid1 the objectives ofdemocracy promotion. It is important ro highlight this juxtapositionas its dilemmas undermine the Alliance's leverage in the region.

The broader pattern of relations bet\veen NATO and the CentralAsan states indicares that regional actors tend to be swayed intocooperation only if they stand ro gain in terms of military training andresources (which are often used to strengd1en the hold on power ofregional regimes). Although some states has embraced PtP more thanothers, it is fair to conelude that none of the five Central Asan stateshas come clase to the levels of reform enacted by even the laggardsamong the Central and East European countries. Consequendy, thenature of PtP cooperaran reflects the extent to which local regimesare willing to concede some practices in arder to gain access toNATO's expertise in military affairs. What has made this situationeven more challenging for NATO is the proliferation of externaagency in the region which puts it in a position to contend for theattention of Central Asan states. At the same time, the need to maintain the viability of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan has diminishedthe Alliance's insistence on its normative agenda due to the need tosafeguard critica security interests.

In this respect, NATO has worked with Central Asan governments on developing mutual understanding through the PartnershipAction Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T. The Alliance propases thatPAP-T "facilita es greater intelligence sharing and cooperation inareas such as border security, terrorism-related training and exercises,the development of capabilities for defense against terrorist attack andfor managing the consequences of such an attack" (NATO, 2008a).In terms of state-building and regionalization in Central Asia, itis NATO's focus on defence and security sector reform that are


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especially relevant. NATO's key instrument in this regard is the PfPPlanning and Review Process (PARP). PARP is a wide-ranging initiative that aims to tackle issues ranging from interoperability betweenlocal military forces and NATO forces to reforms that encourage democratic control over military and defense institutions. PARP is negotiated individually with each partner country and it aims to developa planning and review process, designed to provide a basis for iden

tif)ring and evaluating forces and capabilities which might be madeavailable for multinational training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces (NATO Handbook, 2002).

The Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building(PAP-DIB) is NATO's leading initiative with regard to helping otherstates democratically reform their defense and security institutions.The underlying assumption of the Alliance is that regional stabilitywill only be achieved when defense and security structures are putunder transparent civilian control (NATO, 2007). Finally, the PfPTrust Funds have been put in place in arder to help the Central Asanstates tackle issues concenng the demilitarization ofweapon stockpilesas well s removing dangerous ordinances such as anti-personnellandmines. According to NATO, between 2000 and 2008, over 40 millionEuros have gone towards Trust Fund projects.

Ideally, NATO would like to see all Central Asan republics to signIndividual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs). These two-year plans,launched at NATO's 2002 Prague Summit, have been developed inarder to bring together all the various cooperation mechanismsthrough which a Partner country interacts with the Alliance (NATO,2008c). Ald10ugh, none of d1ese states has the intention of joiningthe Alliance, IPAPs are seen s a more determined commitment onbehalf of the partner country to undertake the prescribed reformprocess. However, to date only Kazakl1stan has signed an IPAP wid1NATO (2006).

Thus , the key words in understanding the PfP socializationdynamic are interoperability and self-differentiation. The interoperability concept advances not only the required defense adaptationsof the partners, but also harmonization of their operational andpolitical planning. Self-differentiation, on the other hand, allows the


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NATO>s Pmtnuship vith Centml sia 39partners to define their own place in the program - aspirants andnon-aspirants - as well as the intensity of their partnership with theAlliance (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 164). However, as the case of CentralAsia indicares the instrumental export of know-how and theideational export of values, which frame NATO's partnership activities in the region, are not necessarily assured to promote socializationinto (let alone, internalization of) the promoted patterns of behaviorin an environment where the Alliance is vying for the attention ofregional states. Attesting to the dynamics of a new great game inCentral Asia, Kazakhstan's ambassador has revealed that his countrydoes not discriminare, whether it is north or south or east or west[that provides the assistance] .. . if it serves our needs we are happy"

(Idrissov, 2008 ). Central Asia therefore provides a qualitatively newcontext for NATO's post-Cold War agency.

The Effectiveness of NATO as an Enabler of ReformNATO's main contribution to state-building is its experience incivil- military relations. The reality of the new great game , however,has ushered a situation in which the Central Asian states can choose

a carte from NATO's menu of options as they see fit. Consequendy,the Alliance's partnerships in the region have been termed not verymeaningful in practica terms" (NATO Parliamentary Assembly,2008 ). Such a conclusion raises the question "whed1er NATO itselfcan adequately adapted to the dramatically changed 21st-centuryenvironment by going sufficiendy beyond its core Atlantic orientation (Spero, 2003 , p. 180).

NATO has engaged Central Asia wid1 a flexible attitude (and witha somewhat optimistic hope) that such a dialog can initiate a genuinereform process. Ald10ugh tl1ere are certain multilateral dimensions toNATO's engagement with tl e region, tl e reality is tl1at all the relationships tl e Alliance has built with the Central Asian states are primarily focused on d e individual needs of the respective countries.When it comes to leverage, the only too that NATO really has isthe threat of disengagement. So far dlis has not occurred and wid tl epersisting insecurity of Mghanistan, it seems unlikely to happen in the


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near nrture. Instead, more often the case is that individual CentralAsan states have opted to reduce the depth of their relations withNATO more than the other way round.

It is perhaps best ro consider NATO's involvement and approachto Central Asia in terms of three distinct periods. The first period runsfrom the f ll of the Soviet Union up until l l September 2001(9/ l l . Although NATO was active in the region through its PfPprogram from the early 1990s, Central Asia was marginal to itsagenda of securing the peacenrl transition of the Central and EastEuropean states into \Vestern security structures. Moreover, theAlliance appeared "disappointed by the lack of progress and perspective" (Roy, 2000 , p. ix). Thus, it was s a result of the war on terror and the invasion of Afghanistan that Central Asia moved to thecerlter ofNATO's strategic attention. This interest not only stemmedfrom the need to secure supply roots for the ISAF mission, but alsotargeted the proliferation of terrorism and Islamic extremism in theregion.

Therefore, this second period - lasting from 9/11 until the USled invasion of Iraq in 2003 - was a time of relative cooperation, notonly between NATO and the individual Central Asan states, butmore broadly between the West (broadly defined) and Russia andChina. It is the experience of non -predatory bandwagoning" thatconvinced some commentators to insist that the "original strategicrationale for the PfP, enhancing stability among, and practica cooperation with the countries along NATO's periphery, has become evenmore compelling in the context of NATO's further enlargement, thewar on terrorism, growing Western interest in Southwest and CentralAsia, and the rise of authoritarian and neoimperialist sentiments inRussia" (Simon, 2004). This provided a facilitating environment forNATO to establish its presence in the region. However, the fact thatthis cooperation was taking place in the context ofboth a war on terror and a war in Afghanistan indicares that attention was concentrated more on securing local support for military operations such sPAP-T and PARP and less on reform initiatives such as PAP-DIB.

The third period - beginning fiom 2003 onwards - witnesseda dramatic decrease in NATO's influence in state-building and


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N TO>Pmtnuship vith Centml sia 41regionalization in Central Asia. The strategic shift of attention to theoccupation of Iraq, the color revolutions in Georgia and theUkraine, but most notably the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstanwere perceived, sent a direct message to the other Central Asan rulersas threatening the survival of their re gimes (Rumer, 2006, p. 149 ). Inthis context, while NATO still requires support for its mission inAfghanistan, regional regimes are much less inclined to accept externally set conditions on their support (Tynan, 2009). Consequently,NATO member states will have to continue to temper their criticismof democratic shortcomings in order to safeguard strategically important fixed assets (Cooley, 2008c, p. 1174).NATO s pproach to RegionalizationAs stated, there has been a push to link NATO 's partnerships inCentral Asia to Afghanistan under the 26+5+1 framework. TheAlliance identifies this as opening up an alternative relationship for tl eCentral Asan republics witl South Asia. Thus , in the area of regionalization, NATO's central aim seems to be convincing regional statesthat they have other options aside from Russia and China. \VhereNATO has had more success with regionalization programs has beenin the area of disaster response, scientific and environmental projects,and information sharing. An instance of this trend is the Virtual SilkHighway project - which has extended internet access to researchfacilities in the region. However, NATO alone is not a driving forcebehind Central Asan regionalization. NATO sees itself as one aspectof the West's much broader multidimensional policy which includes asecurity aspect and it also encompasses economic, social, and governance aspects. In this respect, owing to the bilateral nature of the PfPprocess, the following sections offer sketches of NATO's relationswith tl e individual Central Asan states.

KazakhstanIn a commentary, Roger McDermott has suggested that tl1e relationship between Kazakhstan and NATO has deepened considerably


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42 Simon] Smith and milian Ka lskias a result o f9 / l l Kazakhstan's role in Peace Support Operations(PSO) in Iraq and Nazarbayev's capitalization on the rupture inNATO's relations with neighboring Uzbekistan (McDermott,2007b , p. 17). Maybe more to the point is that Kazakhstan hasbeen very adept at extracting exactly what it wants from all themajor actors (Russia, China, and the United ates) in the region,while at the same time not upsetting any one of them in a way thatwould risk ongoing relations. While Kazakhstan may be NATO'sanchor in Central Asia , it would be over presumptuous to

assume that the cooperation achieved to date is anything more thanone based on the self-serving nature described above (McDermott,2007b , p. 16).

Kazakhstan, unlike any other states in the region, does participatein the full spectrum of PtP programs (NATO Backgrounder,2007). The most important of which is tl e IPAP it signed in 2006.Some NATO representatives have called it the best IPAP among tl eAlliance Partner countries (McDermott, 2007b, p. 14). Kazakhstanhas a representation at PCC. According to NATO documentation,Kazakhstan has attempted to pass on the experience it has gainedthrough cooperation through the PARP to otl1er states in tl e region.There is no reason to believe tl1at the nature of tl e NATOKazakhstan relationship will alter drastically in the future. NATO is alltoo aware of the country's proximity to Russia and the relationshipthe two former Soviet actors retain.

UzbekistanUzbekistan is a prime example ofNATO's difficulties in Central Asia.A recent report described the Alliance's relationship in the country as

virtually non-existent or at least on standby (NATO ParliamentaryAssembly, 2008, p. 76). This has been the case ever since 2005 tl ebrutal suppression of the Andijan uprising in 2005. This event hasclearly indicated NATO's quandary of training local armed forces,which are then used against regional populations. The sense of guiltyby association has been exacerbated by tl e demands of fighting aglobal war on terror .


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N TO>Pmtnuship vith Centml sia 43Once again, the lack of any real leverage over Uzbekistan has

meant that the only way NATO can encourage reforms is throughnegative incentives. In the case of Uzbekistan, this has meant "strictmnimum co-operation with the most reprehensible regimes" (NATOParliamentary Assembly, 2008, p. 78). Uzbekistan's cooperationbefore the Andijan crisis was improving. t had agreed to a PARP,which asted from 2002 until 2005. Ir even had been developing anIPAP with NATO. Uzbekistan, however, still maintains representation at d e PCC.

TajikistanBeing the weakest state in Central Asia, Tajikistan is adversely conducive to spillover from Mghanistan with regard to security andissues such as illegal nade and drug-trafficking. It has set aside aninfantry platoon to support pfp activities within Tajikistan"

(NATO , 2009a). Border security is ofprimary concern to Tajikistan.This is especially the case with its 1,200-km long border withAfghanistan. Therefore much of Tajikistan's cooperation withNATO focuses on border security. Tajikistan was the last CentralAsan state to join the pfp in 2002. In 2004, Tajikistan signed a transit agreement with NATO and Dushanbe airport has played host toFrench military aircraft. Tajikistan has also had a small role to play inthe building of infrastructure within Mghanistan and helped tosecure passage across the Panj River. Through the NATO TrustFunds scheme, it has also contributed ro destroying 1,200 anti-personnellandmines. However, Tajikistan is yet to agree a PARP withNATO and it currendy has no representation at SHAPE.

However, there are current signs that this relationship may beslowly developing. On 11 February 2009, the Tajik President visited NATO headquarters. Discussions centered on border securityissues but interest has been tangible in the desire to develop deepercooperation, possibly even an IPAP. The NATO spokesman JamesAppathurai commented that discussions related to a range of areasof cooperation based on the Individual Action Partnership Planwhere NATO might provide further assistance to Tajikistan"


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44 Simon] Smith and milian Ka lski(Appathurai, 2009). Recently, Tajikistan has also agreed to allow "tl1etransit of non-military cargo to Mghanistan by land (Kozhevnikov,2009). Yet, NATO has remained wary of the uncertainty and multivector nature of foreign policy in Central Asia.

KyrgyzstanKyrgyzstan's cooperation witl NATO has been somewhat mixed. Onthe one hand, it is tl e only country, along with Kazakhstan, to haveagreed a PARP with the Alliance (2007). Until 2009, the countryhosted a US airbase used in operations in Mghanistan. Kyrgyzstan hasalso set aside units for PfP operations, which have been especiallyactive in counter terrorism tl1rough the PAP-T. Bishkek has also beeninvolved in crisis management and civil emergency planning operations. But despite tllis active cooperation, Kyrgyzstan's motives havebeen acutely driven by financia incentives - both before and afterthe 2005 Tulip Revolution.

The Tulip Revolution makes Kyrgyzstan a unique case in CentralAsia. Although this revolution has been "disappointing" in terms ofliberal democratic reforms, it instances Western willingness to sacrifice stability for tl e sake of democracy" (Rumer, 2006, p. 148). Thereis an argument tl1at Western support for this revolution has causedother regimes in the region to shrink away from any cooperation witlNATO because of tl e interference perceived in the demands forrobust liberal democratic refonns. This dynamic indicares theAlliance's difficult balancing act - trying to walk tl e tightrope ofpushing concrete reforms while seeking security cooperation inreturn.

TurkmenistanTurkmenistan s commitment to neutrality in tl e region has meantthat it rejects involvement with security alliances and internationalorganizations. In this respect, until the death ofPresident SupramuratNiyazov, Turkmenistan's cooperation with NATO through the PfPwas only rhetorical. t has engaged in almost no cooperation tl1rough


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N TO>Pmtnuship vith Centml sia 45the PfP programs concerning interoperability and security sectorreform. However, its long border with Mghanistan has givenTurkmenistan an incentive to work with the Alliance on border security issues in the post-9/11 period. Somewhat paradoxically,Turkmenistan does have representation at the PCC. Furthermore,there has been some cooperation in the fields of civil emergency planning, scientific, and environmental affairs. Also, Turkmenistan hasrecently participated in a NATO-Russia Council pilot project" oncounter-narcotics aimed at Mghan and Central Asan personnel(NATO, 2009b).

Desisting from closer cooperation witl Turkmenistan has beenNATO's primary leverage approach to the country. Turkmenistan'shuman rights record is widely regarded to be tl e worst from any ofthe countries in tl e region. Thus, with minimal influence, NATO hasnot been able ro con ribute to the reduction of autocratic policies andhuman rights abuses. There are some signs that PresidentBerdymukhammedov wants ro develop closer ties with NATO. Forthe moment, however, Turkmenistan insists on maintaining its formalneutrality, which prevents NATO's involvement in its security sectorreform.

onclusionThe chapter has outlined NATO's difficult relations with CentralAsia. In summary, it has been an ambiguous order-promoting actor inthe region. As a security organization, NATO has the builtin difficulty of trying to persuade autocratic regimes ro loosentheir grip on power, while at the same time insisting on their cooperation in order to access bases, transit routes, and over-flight rights forits operation in Mghanistan. Added to tllis dilemma, NATO also hasto be mindful tl1at in training the security forces of these regimes, itdoes not open itself to accusation of inadvertently contributing tohuman rights violations. With the West's perception of the greaterCentral Asan region skewed by tl e lenses of tl e need to succeed"in Mghanistan, local regimes find themselves able ro leverage externademands for democratic reform against the ongoing need for transpon


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6 Simon] Smith and Emilian Kavalskicorridors. This situation appears to serve Central Asan leaders well intheir consolidation of power, but ir does detraer from NATO's longterm interests.

On the one hand, engaging autocratic regimes by trainingtheir armed forces has put the Alliance in the precarious position ofinadvertently contributing to human rights violations. On theother hand , the demands of the war on terror and the need toprovide supply routes for its ISAF mission demands that NATOstays actively involved in the region. At the same time, a constraining factor for NATO's agency has been the realization that itsinvolvement in the region is not assisted by the carrot of membership - neither as an offer, nor as a regional desire. Such environment has forced upon the Alliance a flexible cooperaran lacarte which does not lead to the type of refonns that NATOexpects.

Some have insisted therefore if the underlying logic of the PfP'sprospect of 'joining the \Vest' is to be an effective engine for con

duct in accordance with 2lst-century standards, it needs to bedrained not of its democratizaran element, but of grounds for suspicion that its true intent is subversive S imons, 2008, p. 140) .Finally, NATO's ability to impact Central Asan dynamics has beenaffected by the involvement of other actors in the region. In particular, Russia and China have proven to offer viable alternatives. Inthis respect, it seems that the fundamental question for NATO ishow does it protect its short-term needs and interests while pursuing its long-term objective of promoting fundamental politicalrefonn. This seems to be the leading policy conundrum that NATOneeds to address - one on which NATO's agency in Central Asiadepends.

elate bsitesEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council : http:j www.nato.intjissues/eapc/index.html.lnternational Security Assistance Force (Mghanistan ): http://www.nato.int/

isaf/index.html.


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N TO>Pmtnuship vith Centml sia 47NATO website: http://ww\v.nato nt/home .htm.NATO s Partnership for Peace Program: http://www.nato.int/issues/pfu/

index.html.NATO Parliamentary Assembly: http://www.natopa.int/.NATO Review: http: / /www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/

analvsis2.html.PtP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes:

http: onsortium.pims.org.


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The OSCE in the New Central Asia

aria Raquel Freire

ntroductionEstablished during the Cold War as a framework for dialog andcooperation, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in EuropeCSCE) had to reformulate its aims and procedures after dissolution

ofthe Soviet Union . Its constitutive purpose ofbridging the divisionsbetween East and West disappeared, and with it its very raison d)t1 e.The post-Cold War decade brought with it profound changes in theinternational system as well as new challenges requiring nuancedapproaches and innovative responses. The CSCE adjusted to the newinternational setting by redefining its goals and procedures, andestablishing new instruments. As a part of this process, in January1995 , it transformed itself into the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE).

As an organization for peace and cooperation, the OSCE pursuesa comprehensive, indivisible, and cooperative approach to security.Inaugurated with the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, thisunderstanding ofsecurity was further reinforced after the end of bipo-larity as an acknowledgment of the underlying insufficiency ofmilitary approaches to respond to the most pressing challenges in theinternational arena. This process of institutional maturity appeared todemonstrate the organization s tlexibility and adaptation to rapidlychanging circumstances. At the same time, and despite the manydifficulties and changing circumstances, the OSCE has been able tomaintain the viability of its founding principies. In fact , these remain

9


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50 Mrn ia qttel Freeembedded in bod1 its documents and its work: (i) political-militaryissues; (ii) economic, scientific, and environmental matters; and(iii) human aspects, which constitute d e core area of OSCE action.

It has to be reminded that the security complex wid1in which theCentral Asan countries (mis)alignments take place provides a difficultenvironment for the exercise of any externa agency. Thus, in a broadstrategic sense, the context provided by the Central Asan countriespresents a volatile security environment, caused by weak civic andstate institutions in the individual states of the region; socioeconomiccrises; and edmic, religious, and political tensions" (Perovic, 2005,p. 62). At d e same time, Central Asan states demonstrate differentiatedunderstandings about the definition and necessity of cooperativeefforts to address shared problems.

Drawing on this broad context, this chapter assesses d e OSCE'sinvolvement in Central Asia. It queries whed1er the new (post-ColdWar) OSCE offers an adequate institutional fiamework to addressregional challenges. The chapter starts by analyzing the OSCE asa normative actor and evaluares its relevance as a security promoter,contributing to the establishment of a Central Asan security commu-nity. Such an investigation analyzes how the normatively groundedprincipies of d e organization have been employed in Central Asia andfor 11ighlighting d e centrality of regional cooperation. Consequendy,the chapter assesses the activities and limitations of the OSCE inCentral Asia looking at the logic of its involvement, d e organization scommitments and activities, and local perceptions abotlt its role.Despite d e orgar1ization's potential, the chapter argues d1at the OSCEhas been unable to define and empower an efficient regional strategy.Ir concludes by looking at d e projected trajectories for d e OSCEinvolvement in Central Asia. In this respect, d e investigation makessevera critica suggestions for improving its effectiveness in the region.

The OSCE in Central Asia A Normative ctorwith a Comprehensive Security gendaSince the establishment of the CSCE in 1975, the notion of securitywithin the institutional, policy, and discursive framework of the


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The OSCE in the New entml Asia 5OSCE has been defined in broad terms, concerning not only militaryaspects - the traditional realist-centered understanding that prevailedthroughout the Cold War - but also political, economic, enviren-mental, and social aspects. This broader understanding of security,which has been advanced through the Europeanization of postCold War Europe, demonstrates the OSCE s innovative approachalready at the time ofthe Helsinki consultations (Buzan et al., 1998).

Aiming at an inclusive approach to security, the OSCE has linkedthe collective and the individual levels of security through thecommitments and principies enshrined in its different areas of activity.As a result, the OSCE s comprehensive approach to security relatesthe maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity andcooperation with peaceful interstate relations (Freire, 2003, p. 10).Such conceptualization also reflects the complex context where relations take place, at the bilateral or multilateral levels, and respondingto a multiplicity of challenges, by pressuring, facilitating, directing, orat least, conditioning change. Security in the OSCE area reflectsshared notions about democratization and stability-building throughthe initiation of cooperation as a first step toward the establishmentof a security community. At the same time, the issue of security isperceived as transformative not only regarding specific issue-areas butalso regarding different decision-making actors and involving (nter)national governmental and non-governmental agents.

The OSCE model follows a set of norms and values d1at underpinthe promotion of security within the OSCE-space by (i) championingthe rule oflaw and respect for human rights and fundamental fieedom;(ii) instigating confidence-building measures and transparency incivil-military relations; and (iii) initiating sustainable economic development and environmental protection. These principies apply equallyto all members and define the OSCE s comprehensive, indivisible, andcooperative understanding of security. In other words, it is:

comprehensive (it links classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural, and human rights factors), indivisible (onestate's security is inseparable from that of other states), and cooperative


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52 Mrn-ia aqttel Free(security is based on confidence and cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateralinstitutions).

(Adler, 1998, pp. 119- 120).Building on the now hackneyed definition of security community asa group [that] has become integrared, where integration is defined

as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal orinformal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespreadto assure peaceful change among members of a group with 'reasonable certainty' over a ' long' period of time (Deutsch et al. 1957,p. 5 ), Adler and Barnett (1998, p. 30) have advanced its understanding by defining a security community as a transnational regioncomprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependableexpectations of peaceful change . Achieving even low levels of intraregional cooperation in Central Asia is not an easy task. The OSCEapproach toward the region has tended to reflect the (WestEuropean) liberal democratic model - i.e. , tl1e OSCE's understanding of security is informed by the promotion of rules and norms(Warkotsch, 2007, p. 491), which seek to lay the foundation for aliberal transnational collective understanding in the area fromVancouver to Vladivostok (Adler, 1998, p. 121 ). This normativeapproach has underpinned tl1e OSCE's work since its inception - asis evidenced by its efforts at creating a sense of community, fosteringdialog between East and West during tl1e Cold War and generatingsupport for nascent civil societies (Adler, 1998, p. 121).

Nevertl1eless, despite the fact that the OSCE member states arepolitically committed to the organization's principies, this does notmean that members uphold tl1ese norms equally and universally. Withregard to Central Asia, the countries of the region fonn a heterogeneous set of actors, with distinct political cultures, different levels ofsocial and economic development, and differentiated foreign policygoals. Simultaneously and as a parallel to existing differences, thecountries in the area share concerns about the growing threats fromIslamic terrorism, illegal trafficking, transnational organized crime,


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The OSCE in the New entml sia 53and other illicit activities which contribute to insecurity in the region.In addition, ro quote Warkotsch (2007):

The social fabric of Central Asan societies is made up from an ntermixture of traditional instimtions like family, kinship and clan affiliations and loyalties. The underlying culture of these netvvorks is notdemocratic, but authoritarian, patrimonial, and personal - none ofthem compatible with Western governance norms.

(Warkotsch, 2007, p. 499).The issue is that contrary to what could be expected, the main oppo-nents to democratization are in many instances not faith-basedgroups , but secular authoritarian reg mes (Roy 2005, p. 002).Central Asia is an intracontinental corridor exposed to differentinfluences which impact on its development policies, security-buildingoptions, and strategic alignments. Moreover, Soviet modes of rule arestill very much present in Central Asan states. At the same time, thecurrent period of imitative democracy is a part and parcel of acomplex borrowing mechanism that attempts to come to terms withthe status and experiences of independence. This seems to haveallowed an excessive personalization of decision making - i.e., thedevelopment of personality cults - which shifts on a spectrumbetween outright despotism and soft authoritarianism. In practice,the triad between individual-society-state does not exist in a numberof Central Asan states and civil society appears to be absent. Therealso seems to be additional difficulties in introducing new governingpractices in the region as a result of the availability of ( claslng) modelsof development, in particular the ones peddled by Russia and China,as well as diverse political , religious, and clan affiliations and theirimpact on state-elites (Imanaliev, 2008). These dynamics provide thecontext for the OSCE s involvement in Central Asia.The OSCE in Central Asia: Involvement and PurposeStretching from Vancouver to Vladivostock, with a membership of56 states and a constrained access to resources, the OSCE s main


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54 Mrn ia qttel reezones of operation have been in the countries of former Yugoslaviaand the states that emerged from the dissolution ofthe Soviet Union.The OSCE's expanded agenda - linking the organization's threedimensions (politico-military, economic and environmental, andhuman) in a combined approach - is present at the decision-makingleve , in the activities of its main institutions, such as the Office forDemocratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the HighCommissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) , the OSCERepresentative on Freedom of the Media, and the Office of theOSCE Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities(OCEEA) , as well as in the mandates of its field offices. These have,in fact, become the fundamental vehicles for the implementationof OSCE commitments, through increased contacts between thedifferent OSCE Missions, which enhances the leve of sharing ofgoodpractices and facilitates the development of alternative approaches tocommon problems (Freire, 2005, pp. 193- 194). This type ofregionalnetworking for the promotion of the organization s guiding principieshas proven problematic in Central Asia.The five Central Asan republics became CSCE member states in1992 , shortly after their independence. Thus, with the exceptionof Tajikistan [due to the outbreak of civil war in May 1992], thecountries of Central Asia have all in all peacefully gone through thecollapse of the Soviet Union and their separation from each other(Salber, 2001 , p. 276). In this respect, from the point ofview oftheOSCE, the overall situation in the region indicates that - despitelocal specificities and the particular case of Tajikistan - most of theproblems are shared, and demand the enactment of a regionalapproach. This is an aspect often highlighted in the organization'sdocuments, but as it will be explained, it does not mean that theOSCE has a clear strategic approach to Central Asia.

The OSCE's involvement in Central Asia dates back to the mid-1990s, when it set up the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan (in February1994) in support of poli ical reconciliation, democracy-building, andrespect for human rights. In 1995, it opened tl e Central Asan LiaisonOffice (CALO) with headquarters in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), whosegoal was to bring tl e Central Asan states closer to tl e organization.


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The OSCE in the New entml sia 55The CALO's tasks involved the promotion of contacts and exchangeof informaran as well as the implementation of human developmentprojects in collaboration with the ODIHR, particularly on genderissues, migration, and election assistance. In December 2000 , CALOwas renamed as the OSCE Center - a change, which had to indicarethe enhanced presence of the OSCE in Central Asia. By that time, theorganizaran had already opened field offices in J anuary 1999 inAshgabad (Turkmenistan), Astana ( Kazakhstan) , and Bishkek(Kyrgyzstan). These developments were reinforced by the decision toestablish OSCE Offices also in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (fiom April2000); torename the Center in Almaty as OSCE Center in Astan a, from J une2007 (the OSCE keeps nevertheless a small presence in Almaty); andto rename the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan as the OSCE Center inDushanbe (in October 2002) and more recently as the OSCE Officein Tajikistan (June 2008) with five field delegations mandated tofollow the regional poltica and security situation , in Guam, Khujand,Kulyab, Kungan-Teppa, and Shartuz. Such transformations, ashas been evidenced by the experience of the OSCE mission toTajikistan, underline the "substantial changes in the socio-politicaland socio-economic life" of tl e region as well as the willingness ofCentral Asan states ro further strengtl1en co-operation with theOSCE (PC Decision 852, June 2008 ).

These changes are also indicative of a different kind of OSCEinvolvement as a result of the improved situation in Central Asia -i.e., its perceived relative stability in comparison to the early l990s. Atthe same time, such an enhanced and individualized presence hasarguably strengtl1ened the OSCE's role in the region. Such increasein the visibility of l e OSCE had to indica e tl1at ir no longer regardsthe region as merely a part of the larger reconfiguraran of a postcommunist 'security space'" (Allison, 2004 , p. 466). Usually tl ereferences to Central Asia in tl e organizaran s main documents havetended ro be broadly formulated - tl10ugh always emphasizing tl eOSCE's normative character - appealing to the promotion ofthe OSCE's commitments and principies in the area, with a clearfocus on enhancing the dynamics of regional integraran. OSCE'sprincipies cut across tl e tl1ree main dimensions of its activity, including


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56 Mrn ia qttel Freethe politico-military dimension with counter-terrorism activities,concerted actions to combat violent extremism, organized crime,drug and arms trafficking; in the human dimension, the monitoringof electoral processes, along with democracy promotion , respect forhuman rights and fundamental freedoms; and increased cooperationin economic and environmental issues, with particular focus on waterresources and energy assets.

This concern with a more diversified and even-handed approach toeconomic, environmental and security issues has been taken intoaccount by the organization, but without neglecting its focus on thehuman dimension of its initiatives. As the OSCE has proclaimed:"While maintaining the attention paid to the human dimension, wewill strive to achieve a better balance among the three dimensions ofthe OSCE s approach to security, both at policy and project levels",but "making clear to the Central Asian countries that this would notbe achieved at the cost of their commitments within the humandimension" (Porto Ministerial Council, 2002, pp. 23 , 70; see alsoBucharest Ministerial Council, 2001, p. 49; Sofia Ministerial Council,2004 , p. 97). However, in 2006 such commitments provoked a waveof criticism by four of the Central Asian states - namely, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - which demanded thatthe OSCE pay more attention to economic issues, especially to theexpansion of existing transport infrastructure that would increasethe connectedness of the landlocked economies of the region ( seeReport to the .Ministerial Council on OSCE .Migration Activities,2006 . In the face of such expectations, it seems obvious that theOSCE has to make an explicit and coordinated effort to indicate thatit is not a financia institution, per se. Such clarification can assist instriking a more realistic balance bet\veen the orgarzation's capabilitiesand Central Asian expectations.

In 1993, shortly after tl1e Central Asian republics became membersof l1e CSCE, a section of l1e Ro me Council document was dedicatedto tl1e integration of new members, focusing primarily on the establishment of institutional links bet\veen the organization and thesegovernments. Surprisingly, the documents fiom the Budapest Summitin 1994 and the Budapest .Ministerial Council in 1995 do not make


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58 Mrn ia qttel FreeIn this complex setting, the following section investigares the

centrality of regional cooperation to the OSCE agenda, looking at theCentral Asian differentiated readings of the concept of region andhow these affect (and have affected) the OSCE's normative and operational approach. In this way, the section provides a background foranalyzing whether the OSCE constitutes an adequate institutionalframework for addressing the regional challenges of a heterogeneousCentral Asia, particularly in the face of a multiplication of (if not,overlap between) different international fma in the region.

The Regionness of Central Asia?Commentators usually point out that Eurasian integration, initiallyadvocated by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev and subsequentlyendorsed by Russia's President Putin, is a concept on paper only(Rywkin, 2006, p. 196) . According to Muratbek Imanaliev, CentralAsia is a place of complex nationalisms, witl different systems ofgovernance, distinct self-perceptions and decision-making behaviorboth in domestic and international affairs. For example, Turkmenistansees itself as a Caspian state and prioritizes its relations with Iran andAzerbaijan, while Tajikistan directs its attention to Soutl1 Asia (seeChap. Eleven), whereas Kazakhstan perceives itself as a Eurasiancountry, and the only true bridge between Central Asia and the West(Imanaliev, 2008). In tllis respect, tl e perception of Central Asia as ahomogeneous region is often bitterly contested . More recently,moves by Kazakhstan to revive the idea of Central Asia's regionnesshave once again been confronted, this time by Uzbekistan's reticence.As Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov observed, concerning tl efour-sided, or even five-sided consortium, we still are determined [tocrea e it], but for now tllis will not happen beca use again we havedifferent opinions (cited in Pannier, 2008a).

In this regard, Central Asia is often seen as a graveyard for regionalcooperation initiatives. Thus, [ t ]he list of failed cooperationattempts [in the region] speaks volumes (Gleason, 2006, p. 53).This process appeared to be set in motion witl the establishment ofthe Commonwealth oflndependent States (CIS ) which was expected


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The OSCE in the New Centml sia 59to play an aggregating role after the fall of the Soviet Union.Consequendy, following tl e ups-and-downs of intra-regional dynamics,the establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organization(CSTO ) - bringing together Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia - has been prometed by Moscowasan alternative to the nearly defunct CIS as a reassertion of Russia'scentrality in Central Asia (Allison, 2004 , p. 469). At the time of theMadrid Ministerial (November 2007), Russia had even indicated aninterest in promoting a form of civil-military cooperation under theaegis of the OSCE by requesting the inclusion of a statement in thefinal document acknowledging the existing collaboration betweenthe OSCE and CSTO.

Russia pursues in this way the role of a security manager forCentral Asia, intent on consolidating its hegemonic position in theregion (Blank, 2008a, p. 79). To some extent, CSTO has been functioning as a counter-balance to the involvement of the United S atesand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition,Russia is promoting the legal grounds for permanently stationingRussian forces and bases in Kyrgyzstan , Tajikistan, and possiblyUzbekistan; ostensibly ro defend these regimes against terrorism(Blank, 2008a, p. 79). However, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan arenot members of CSTO which, given Uzbekistan's military clout inthe region, is a significant shortcoming for the Kremlin. Thus, irwould seem unlikely tl1at cooperation under the CSTO will domuch ro foster a regional security identity or ro address the mostpressing challenges for regional security management (Allison,2004, p. 473).

Other Russian initiatives in the region involve (i) the Central AsianCooperation Organization (CACO) - founded in 1994 - includingKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and(ii) the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) - set up in 2001and bringing Russia and Belarus together with Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In 2005, EAEC and CACO were merged.Furthermore, in 2003 with a clearer economic oudook, the SingleEconomic S pace (SES) was established including Belarus,Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.


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60 Mrn ia Raqttel FreeSuch a proliferation of membership in different regional institu

tional arrangements has tended to make their cooperation initiativesdevoid of substance. On the one hand, the multilevel participation ofstates in these different institutional arrangements embeds them in acomplex policy management, while on the other hand it preventsthese organizations from becoming effective forums for Central Asiancooperation. In a nutshell, such a multiplicity of interactions andinterests together with competing security demands, have renderedregional integration a difficult process. In addition, the personalizedauthoritarian style of governance in Central Asia fl rther impairs thepromotion of regional cooperation. As some commentators havepointed out, regional "presidents, who are unwilling to share domesticpolitical power with other actors through a more pluralist system, oreven subject themselves to parliamentary scrutiny, seem no moreready to share power internationally with regional organizationsthough pooling some elements of their jealously guarded state sovereignty" (Allison, 2008, p. 186).

These dynamics underpin the instability that appears to defineCentral Asian affairs. Regional states are "characterized by large-scaleeconomic inequalities and widespread poverty that may contribute todestabilization pressures in the region" (Linotte, 2002 , p. 176).Thus, despite assertions d1at regional integration would encouragegeopolitical maturation and [provide] a platform designed topromote the mutual national interests of the states in the region"(Shaikhutdinov, 2007, p. 57), d e different contexts of Central Asianstatehood undermine attempts at initiating patterns of relationspremised on the basis of shared concerns. t is on this complex background that the OS E activities in Central Asia have been developedand have to be assessed. Thus, after contextualizing the myriad ofinstitutions operating in the region , it is fundamental to analyze theparticularities of the OSCE, including its potential and contributions.Building on the organization's normative underpinnings, politicalcommitments and operational capabilities, the next section addressesthe dual exercise of combining the national and regional dimensionsin a unified strategy, paving the way for an assessment of the OSCEinvolvement in Central Asia.


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The OSCE in the New entml sia 61The OSCE s Regional Approach: Balancing In- ountryActivities with Broader ooperation Formats - WorkingToward a Central Asian Security Community?The heterogeneous character of Central Asia demands from theOSCE a careful negotiation of regional idiosyncrasies so that ir canbe able creare the facilitating conditions that might prompt theemergence of a regional cooperative environment. In this respect,the OSCE seeks to promote a balanced approach to Central Asiawhich would not provoke an escalation in intra-regional tensions,nor would strain the relations of Central Asan states with externalactors. Thus , as a result of its unique constitutive nature , the politically binding character of its decisions, and its reliance on soft power,the OSCE is simultaneously a strong and weak organization inCentral Asia.

From 2000 onwards, the references ro an OSCE strategy forCentral Asia has identified an action-oriented role for the OSCE inthe region [ . .. ] starting from a comprehensive security policyapproach which also addresses socio-economic and environmentalrelated risks to security and stability (OSCE Vienna, 2000 , p. 34).This vague formulation has been narrowed down to specific arcas ofintervention, including policing, border security, anti-trafficking andcountering both the financing of and terrorism-related activities,small anns and light weapons; water management, labor migration;democracy building, civil society, legislative reform, freedom ofthe media, election monitoring, and education programs. H owever,concrete guidelines for empowerment have remained too broad,making the assessment of OSCE effectiveness subject ro contesteddebates. With regard ro democratization, for example, the OSCEdefines Central Asia as a region undergoing political and economictransition (OSCE Porto, 2002 , p. 71). However, there has been agrowing recognition of difficulties in initiating compliance withOSCE standards as a result of regional challenges to the meaning,purpose, and objectives (if not d e very necessity) of democratization.Consequently, despite tl e identification of broad issue-areas forOSCE involvement, its regional strategy remains unclear.


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62 Mrn-ia aqttel FreeFor the OSCE and many of its Participating States the notion of aregional approach is attractive - and for good reasons. The conceptsounds fascinating, not to say magical. lt sounds like the key toa solution to a complex task, it sounds like synergy, like combined efforts[ ... ] Countries which are the object and beneficiaries of such anapproach might look at things in a different way They might perceiveit as the reflection of the incapacity to understand their individualneeds and ambitions, or worse: an unwillingness to do so.

(Salber, 2001 , p. 273).In effect, despite the commitments made, the OSCE's regionalapproach to Central Asia has not seemed efficient in tenns of creatingcooperative synergies. A regional diplomat has explained this situationas an abject failure for the organization ( cited in The Economist2003). Thus, although d1e OSCE has ascertained the significance ofits regional approach, it appears that the combination between a lackof coherence and the absence of incentives that would convinceCentral Asian states to enmesh in regional cooperation activities stillundermines its agency (Freire, 2005, p. 199 . It seems that thepremium which Central Asian leaders put on regime security takesprecedence over western-inspired processes of regional securitycooperation or even to the security aspect of sorne new regionalinitiatives oftheir own (Allison, 2004, p. 483 ). Hence, to pursue itsambitious goal of security community promotion, the OSCE needs todevelop an innovative and comprehensive approach, building onbilateral agreements and fostering an understanding of the regionwide nature of Central Asian challenges.

The promotion of good governance, with a focus on issuer relatingto d1e human dimension ofits iitiatives- particularly democratization,the rule of law and human rights - has been a key area for OSCEintervention, through its involvement in the reformation of the judiciary, including penal reform, prison regimes, and law enforcementagencies; the adaptation of national legislation to international standards, addressing issues such as the fight against corruption andviolation of fi.mdamental freedoms and human rights, and the creation


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The OSCE in the New entml sia 63of legal precepts ro address legislative gaps. Many projects, whichhave been initiated by the OSCE alone or in collaboration with otherinternational organizations, have had mixed results. For example, theEuropean Commission and the ODIHR have signed an agreement ona joint program for advancing human rights and democratization inCentral Asia (Freire, 2005, p. 200).

Environmental issues have been on the OSCE's agenda, given theparticular relevance of radioactive waste management, natural disasterpreparedness, water conflict prevention, access to environmentalinformation, land degradation and erosion, and support to municipalcommunal services. Following the organization's integrated logic,the OSCE's field presence seeks to address the various dimensions ofactivity in an interrelated manner, combining efforts regardinglegislative adaptation, raising awareness toward environmental problems,focusing on the work of NGOs and media development, andpromoting cross-border youd1 initiatives as concrete examples of theinterconnection between the building of security, democratization,and economic development (Pannier, 2008b). However, these utiativeshave been accompanied by many difficulties. s sorne have noted:

The context is very different from Cold \"'ar times, and there is nowa great deal of pragmatism, which in differentiated and asymmetricaldealings might render cooperation possible or mrn relations evenmore complicated. s a fragmented area there has been difficulty ingathering Central san countries around pressing issues and externaplayers might reinforce this by supporting country specific projects,though with ambivalent results. The problems with the sharing ofwater and fossil energetic resources are a good example.

(Interview, 2008f) .For instance, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have recurrent tensions as aresult of resource problems - namely water and gas. Both countriescompete for the limited amount of water fiom the Syr-Dara [river](Sharipzhan, 2008). Such issues are acknowledged by regional actorsas a greater source of conflict than edmicity or religion and therefore


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6 Mrn ia aqttel Free

they require additional attention by the OSCE (Interview, 2008a-e).At the same time, the deep socio-economic and cultural differencesamong the Central Asan states along with their political unwillingnessto cooperate (Herzig and .Melvin, 2003, p. 182) have further undermined the operational effectiveness of the OSCE.

Apart from the challenging contexts provided by the Central Asancountries, the OSCE has also been suffering from its own limitations.As is often pointed out, its power of persuasion has no enforcementcapacities and meager financia means (fl rther compounded by thenon-legally binding nature of its decisions). As a result, the OSCE s"capacities are limited, making its actions very disperse and withoutsubstantive impact. In the eyes of Central Asan countries the issue ofdemocratization is an instrument of pressure and interference ininterna affairs" (Interview, 2008f). This depreciation has beenevident both with regard to decisions taken at the level of field operations and headquarters as well as with regard to the stance withinand toward the organization taken by member states. For instance,this perception of the organization's inability to deliver on its objectives has been exemplified by the low key representation d1at somecountries (in particular European countries and the United States)send to the OSCE s most important meetings - such as the annual.Ministerial Council - which signals the reduced importance whichsome member states attach to the organization. Furd1ermore, therequirement for decision making by consensus toged1er with thepolitically binding nature of the commitments endorsed by all participating members underscores the tendency toward vagueness andpolitical unwillingness, which hinders the implementation of theorganization s objectives (Freire, 2005 ). In this respect, conflictingperceptions about the OSCE among regional publics and state-elitesushers in an evaluation of its activities based not on its mandate, buton what it is understood that the OSCE should be doing.

Is There an OS E Strategy Toward Central AsiaThe analysis made so far has indicated d e underpinning valuesshared by the different OSCE s field presence in Central Asia.


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