neutrality and speaking out: challenges and implications
TRANSCRIPT
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Neutrality and Speaking out:
Challenges and Implications in the Biafra war
Jennifer Ibe
Supervised by Daniel Strand, PhD
Masters in humanitarian action and conflict
Department of Theology, Uppsala University
Master’s Thesis, 15ECT
May 2020
This thesis is submitted for obtaining the master’s degree in International Humanitarian Action and Conflict. By
submitting the thesis, the author certifies that the text is from his/her hand, does not include the work of someone
else unless clearly indicated, and that the thesis has been produced in accordance with proper academic practices
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Abstract
The principle of Neutrality and obligation to speak out when against inhumanity are part of the
very fundamental humanitarian principles that every aid organization working in disaster should
aide to. However, both principles are very complex and often controversial to abide to especially
when there exists other influences in humanitarian settings like culture, politics or lack of proper
coordination. Neutrality and Speaking out can be powerful when combined to together, which
means that, even though humanitarian organizations are not supposed to take sides in a conflict.
However, at the same time, they are obliged to speak out once atrocity is witnessed. Both concept
can as well seem contradictory to one another, depending on how it is interpreted. The study
focused on the analysis of concept of Neutrality and Speaking out and how ICRC related to that in
the Biafran war. The case of the Biafran war was chose based on its historical humanitarian
challenges, in both the relief aid project as well as the observation project. Coupled with
subsequences disparities around sovereignty, competence and media challenges. The study made
evident that neutrality and Speaking out are vital humanitarian principles to be applied in every
intervention in other for the intervention to go right. The study also recommended the importance
of focusing the fundamental essence of humanitarian intervention with every fairness. Which
makes the relevance of Neutrality, and Speaking out paramount and as a way to promote human
dignity and alleviate suffering of the victims, irrespective of their race or position..
Keywords
Neutrality. Speaking out. Biafran war. Nigerian government. Politics of state. Sovereignty.
ICRC. Humanitarian organization. Humanitarian law. Code of conduct.
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List of Abbreviations
FBO Faith-Based Organization
FMG Federal Military Government of Nigeria
HNGO Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organization
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM International Organization for Migration
IRC International Rescue Committee
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors without Borders
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OAU Organization of African Unity
OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
R2P Responsibility to Protect
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank everyone who helped me in different ways in the writing of this thesis. First,
I want to thank my family for all their support all through the thesis especially my two daughters
Gabriella and Stephanie Ibe for their Patience and understanding all through the period. Second,
to my supervisor Daniel Strand for all his effort throughout the thesis and Angelika Drigo for
compiling the “Quick Assistance in Writing Your Master’s Thesis” guide, which was immensely
helpful for me all through the thesis. I will also thank Lars Löfquist- the Director of the program
for such an amazing program and efforts to enhance quality learning. Lastly, I would like to
dedicate this work to all those who lost their lives in the Biafran war especially the over three
million Biafrans who died of famine and malnutrition due of the war.
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Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
Keywords ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Chapter 1 ...................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 7
1.1 Aim and Research questions................................................................................................................... 9
1.2 Previous research ................................................................................................................................... 9
1.3 Literature Review .................................................................................................................................. 11
1.4 Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 14
1.4.1 Data Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 14
1.5 Relevance to humanitarian field ........................................................................................................... 16
1.6 Limitations ............................................................................................................................................ 17
1.7 Outline .................................................................................................................................................. 17
Chapter 2 CASE STUDY ................................................................................................................................ 18
2.0 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 18
2.1 Background of the study ....................................................................................................................... 18
2.2 Before the Civil war. ............................................................................................................................. 18
2.2.1. Political Challenges ........................................................................................................................... 19
2.2.2. Economic Challenges ........................................................................................................................ 19
2.3. During the war ..................................................................................................................................... 20
2.3.1 Displacements /Mass Extermination ................................................................................................. 20
2.2.2 Biafran Observation project .............................................................................................................. 20
2.2.3. Food blockade and Famine ............................................................................................................... 21
2.2.3 Religious challenges and the role of faith based organization .......................................................... 23
2 .4 conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 24
Chapter 3. Findings and Discussion ............................................................................................................ 24
3.1. Neutrality in the Biafran war ............................................................................................................... 25
3.2 Speaking out in the Bifran war ............................................................................................................. 26
3.3. ICRC Experience in Relief Aid ............................................................................................................... 28
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3.4. Challenges in Humanitarian law at the time of Biafran war ................................................................ 28
3.4.1 Political and Economic challenges ..................................................................................................... 29
3.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 30
Chapter 4: Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 31
4.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 31
4.2. Recommendations .......................................................................................................................... 32
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................ 34
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Chapter 1
1.0 Introduction “Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint -Humanitarian aid will be given
according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Notwithstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse
political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to
those opinions” ICRC & NGO’s CODE OF CONDUCT p, 269
“As much as it is Africa’s premier open sore, Biafra is also the albatross that dangles around the necks of the
Nigeria project, its apologists, perpetuators, hangers-on and their likes”- Chinua Achebe
E C. Ejiogu 2013, p.1
Humanitarian principles as established by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
are viewed as fundamental backbones for humanitarian intervention. The guidelines are to guide
organizations working in humanitarian intervention or have their activities centered in
humanitarian aid in crisis. The principle of neutrality as well as the obligation to speak are the
backbone of ICRC humanitarian principle. It is writing in ICRC code of conduct principle 2 and 3
that states that “aid should be given to people based on need alone and free from political or
religious opinion”. This suggests that humanitarian organizations should have the autonomy to act
and deliver aid in conflict situations without taking sides or patronize the politics of state, which
upon its failure to tackle internal complex matters led to intervention. The disposition to give aid
based on need, and free from political opinion deepens the understanding of principle of neutrality
upon which humanitarian aid is based (IFRC & ICRC 1994).
ICRC has already established humanitarian principles before the Biafran war. As it was first in
1965 and later incorporated into a UN General Assembly Resolution. The principles remain central
to the multi-agency Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS), as set of
principles to be applied by humanitarian organizations working in disaster (Moses 2020).
Neutrality remain one of the core humanitarian principles to adhere in humanitarian interventions
As it means that humanitarian organizations are not obliged to take sides in the conflict and
mandates them to give equal humanitarian assistance to all affected by the war. At the same time,
humanitarian aid workers are obliged by humanitarian law to speak out when atrocity is witnessed.
Especially in face of Genocide, as a way to reduce, grave violations of humanitarian right and
promote human dignity.
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According to Dunant (1939), humanitarian action was rooted in advocacy/ speaking out, which he
encouraged future adherence of humanitarian principles to always remember that. Humanitarian
action was engraved into action because of state failure to do so (Dunant 1939). To this view,
advocacy needed to be upheld, free from sentiment of politics state and non-state actors but as a
cause to promote human dignity and alleviate suffering.
Dunant also advocated that human beings should be treated as “human beings” and people should
be cared for without prejudice “assist with water and medical supplies, cleaning their wounds and
most especially caring for them. (Dunant 1939) which is in line with ICRC code of conduct, that
states, “victims should be respected and recognized a dignified human being even in media
publicity and reporting and not as if their lives and situation does not matter. ICRC started from
this “Dunaist” view and it is stipulated in the ICRC Code of conduct No.2- that they will adhere
to the principles of Neutrality in disaster at all times. ICRC is obliged to ensure that “aid will not
be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint -Humanitarian aid will be given
according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Notwithstanding the right of
NGHAs to espouse political or religious opinions, affirm that assistance will not be dependent on
the adherence of the recipients to those opinions”. ICRC obligation to speak according to code of
conduct states, “In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster
victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects” (IFRC & ICRC 1994).
To this view, the disposition of the ICRC during the Biafran remain peculiar, as it shows lapses in
their adherence to neutrality and obligation to speak out even in the face of atrocity in the Biafran
war. Given room to politicized neutrality where aid is used as a “weapon of war” or communicating
in “misleading “way to promote their credibility instead of acting according to humanitarian ethics
and principles of Neutrality and speaking out. (Ciro Martinez, José and Eng., Brent 2016). This
disposition counters humanitarian ethics and provoked the claim of Desgrandchamps (2014)
argues, with the take that there are confirmations that “…humanitarian organizations actually
contributed to strengthening the separatist regime and thus helped to prolong the conflict” ibid.
The humanitarian intervention in Biafran war has been highly criticized from by many scholars in
both theory and practice. As the Biafran war was one of the war, were adherence to neutrality and
Speaking out was highly challenged. Leading to aid workers to question ICRC disposition to
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Neutrality and speaking out in the Biafran war. Followed by denouncing Genocide and bridging
ICRC discretion policy to save Biafrans and the birth of MSF. Ibid
1.1 Aim and Research questions
The aim of this study is to explore how the humanitarian concepts of Neutrality and Speaking out
played out in the organization International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) work during
the Biafran War 1967-1970. Furthermore, this thesis will analyze the challenges encountered by
ICRC in relation to Neutrality and Speaking out, as well as the implications of the challenges.
The following overarching research questions will be answered:
1. How did the ICRC relate to the humanitarian principle of neutrality and speaking out during
the Biafran War?
2. What were the major challenges that affected ICRC disposition to Neutrality and speaking out
in the Biafran War?
1.2 Previous research
There are some imperial studies made on the topic by previous researchers, therefore, this study
will focus majorly on the work of Desgrandchamps (2012, 2014) which discussed ICRC
participation in speaking out in the Biafran war and investigated ICRC disposition in the Biafran
in relation to their communication policy and competence in the war. Stremlau (2015) investigated
the impact and contribution of Religion in the Biafran humanitarian intervention and how it
attracted the of the international community when the war portrayed as a Christian-Muslim
conflict. Nwaka (2015) investigated the role of the Catholic Church in the Biafran humanitarian
intervention and challenges encountered by the Catholic Church in the eye of the Nigeria
government.
Pérouse de Montclos (2009) investigated the Speaking out/ advocacy made in the Biafran war and
challenged the type of advocacy made by humanitarian organizations. In the Biafran, war in line
with ICRC code of conduct and maintained Coupled with the ambiguity in the stance of ICRC in
relation to neutrality and speaking out even in face of atrocity. (Pérouse de Montclos (2009).
Omaka (2019) looked into economical and external partner’s interest in the war and how their
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affected the Biafran humanitarian intervention. Omaka argued that Biafran humanitarian
challenges in the Biafra were influenced by political and economic reason and interest by foreign
actors. As in first quarter of 1967, oil production in Nigeria had increased to 516,000 barrels per
day, making Nigeria the tenth largest exporter of oil in the world and Large European and
American oil companies had a total investment of over a billion dollars in Nigeria.
Korie (2013) reviewed the genocide perspective of the war and questioned the humanitarian
intervention done in the Biafran war. His displeasure goes to why the international community
allowed the Biafran war to be “Nigerian variant of what the Nazi called the “final solution”
according to the International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide, 1968. Korie
2013) and Omaka (2019) looked into how the political context between the Nigerian government
and the Biafrans affected the humanitarian intervention. (Omaka 2019).
Stremlau, (2015) analyzed ICRC media coverage during the Biafran war and how it varied over
time. Heerten & Moses, (2014) noted that Media and public relations played a central role in the
war, due to their influence and the dynamics of international involvement. Both the Nigerian
government and the Biafrans relied heavily on the power of media. Heerten & Moses, (2014).
Evenstein (2020) reviewed the humanitarian law in place at the time of the Biafran war to
understand the role it played in the humanitarian crises. Evenstein believed that one of the major
challenges that existed at the time of the Biafran war was majorly because the legal understanding
of humanitarian law were not well established. Ibid.
Many researchers has looked into the Biafran humanitarian intervention from different
perspectives. However, this research will focus on unifying those perspectives in a way that will
enable an understanding of how ICRC related to Neutrality and speaking out in the war. Thus, will
equip in the understanding of how humanitarian organization should act in complex settings, while
still keeping to humanitarian principles and code of conduct.
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1.3 Literature Review
Mierop 2015, p. 297 conceptualize Neutrality as simply “not taking sides in hostilities or engage
in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature” in humanitarian intervention.
Mierop in the perspective that “Neutrality” should not be used to create military advantages,
instead to be applied in a way to promote fairness to both parties. Neutrality, is one of the core
humanitarian principles of humanitarian intervention as stipulated in four major sources where
humanitarian principles can be identified: United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution
46/182 (1991)10 and Resolution 58/114 (2004). Neutrality is one of the seven fundamental
Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 1965 and in the 1994 Code
of Conduct (IFRC and ICRC, “Code of Conduct “1994)), However remain complex to apply or
operationalize.
Mierop (2015) explained that Neutrality is a complex phenomenon that has created confusion both
in understanding and in practice. Mierop explained that it has created confusions more than the
Pictet’s view on Neutrality is a “straitjacket for organizations working in the humanitarian field,
as it confines their activism in changing societies, which may not apply if the engagement is of a
political nature. Which compromise in some ways the reminiscent of the inclusion of Neutrality
as explained in the 1994 Code of Conduct. Mierop (2015) maintained the complex nature of
Neutrality made some NGOs to see their work on justice and development as not conforming to
neutrality, even at the time of drafting it. Mierop embraced the view of neutrality of principle 3 of
the 1994 “Code of Conduct” that “aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious
standpoint”, and also included a phrase “In order to enjoy the confidence of all”, which points to
the purpose of neutrality Ibid.
Neutrality and speaking out remain vital principles in humanitarian action as it part of the most
principles of humanitarian actions and they were directly connected to humanitarian action in both
academics and practice. Neutrality and speaking out principles determines how and in what
manner humanitarian operation is going to look like and becomes a strong guidelines to aid
workers during humanitarian operation.
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Desgrandchamps 2012 refers to advocacy or “Speaking out” as the communication policy of
humanitarian actors, necessary for informing and mobilizing public opinion. However, there has
been controversies about the definition. Especially at the time of Biafran, war due to ICRC policy
of discretion at that time. Desgrandchamps (2012) believes that the breaking of ICRC digression
policy by founding fathers of MSF has made evident the importance of speaking out in
humanitarian intervention. (Desgrandchamps 2012). However, many humanitarian actors see
advocacy- though an integral part of humanitarian action but as the act of “speaking out on
someone’s behalf”.
To this view, Advocacy or speaking works hand in hand with other principles in humanitarian
especially in the face of Genocide and massive human right violation (Mierop 2015). Mierop 2015.
talked about the importance of autonomy in jurisdiction and the implication of humanitarian
organization to reply on state for the transport of goods and staff as that will risk possibility and
obligation to speak out when need be. Moses (2020) believed that Neutrality and speaking out
works hand in hand and believed that humanitarian action should strive to remain independent and
be as neutral image as possible in other to reach those in need on all sides of a conflict. Moses
maintained that humanitarianism should be about speaking out for those who need help, to ensure
that they get help in “an impartial, non-discriminatory manner” ibid.
Mierop (2015) argued that for Neutrality or Advocacy to take place, independence must be in
existence to avoid subsequent contractions. Which entails that advocacy and other activities of
Neutrality need to be part of the assessment of the degree humanitarian actors are operating on.
Thus, acknowledging that Independence works hand in hand Neutrality and it is exceedingly
difficult for humanitarian actors to maintain Neutrality without independence (Mierop 2015, p.
299). Mierop believed that “Speaking out“ is very important and maintained that humanitarian
organizations should be always be cautious of their perception, he is of the view that “a
combatant’s perception of humanitarian action become the practical measure of its neutrality”.
Humanitarian organizations may not have all the control, but surely, they can influence the
perception of their neutrality, followed by acceptance and accountability (Mierop 2015, P.303).
Mierop explained that it is essential for aid workers to have in mind in assessing the principle of
neutrality is to know how it relates to the other principles as neutrality is a balancing act and works
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together with other principles (Mierop 2015.p.306). Ensuring that Institutional and political
independence exists while in operation, to avoid any contradiction in relation to their advocacy or
speaking out. Mierop believed that Independence could also be controversial especially when there
is need for collaboration between the State and the humanitarian organization. Which entailed
proper negotiation and autonomy in jurisdiction between the State and humanitarian organizations
in other to find how best to be autonomous in their operation as well as their communication ibid.
Moses (2020) argued that the there is need for a redefinition of the essence of humanitarianism.
Moses believed “remaining Neutral in conflict is not a moral position but simply the most effective
obligation to negotiate access to people in need of humanitarian assistance to the affected
population. Moses explained that the “traditional” perspective of neutrality remains necessary “to
enjoy the confidence of all” parties to a conflict, not otherwise. Which conforms to Pictet view
that “confidence” is vital, as without confidence humanitarianism cannot stand. This explains that
Neutrality cannot work in isolation but can work with Independence which means autonomy from
the political, economic, military, or other actors” Autonomy implies also is the ability to be free to
determine one’s actions and liberty to freely assess needs, deliver services and evaluate impact
without interference. Mierop refuses the influence of politics of state in humanitarian action.
Where government and other actors use humanitarian action as a crisis management tool to
exercise sovereignty and prompted the need for due autonomy in aid distribution (Mierop 2015).
However, complexities around the principle of Neutrality and Speaking prompted Moses (2020)
to presents the view that there is, a recognized division between “traditional” or “Dunatist”
perspective view in humanitarian action. Moses stressed the importance of having a uniform
understanding the theoretical and practical reasons underpinning the humanitarian commitment
and its relation to the principle of humanity that stands at the heart of humanitarian aid provision.
Moses (2020) maintained that the principle of Neutrality and Speaking out is basic in humanitarian
intervention, as it forms the basis of humanitarianism. He explained, “The commitment to save
human lives and the refusal to prioritize the lives of some human beings above others on any
grounds stands as the very basis of humanitarianism itself”. Which conforms to the ICRC
perspective on Neutrality according to their Code of Conduct, Dunant’s call to “care for the enemy
wounded as friends” To this view, Neutrality an speaking out can be achieved if humanitarian
organizations have their fundamental essence of humanity (Moses 2020, p.70)
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1.4 Methodology
Rajasekar et al. (2013), research methodology refers to the procedures that researchers use in
describing, predicting and explaining phenomena. Methodologies employs the research works
with the guiding philosophies, standards, as well as important values and assumptions to be used
in making references and conclusions from collected data. It defines the case study selected and
how different data collected in this study were utilized or operationalized in the research. As well
as the sources of information, which in this research was based on secondary data of academic
research.
The study will employ the case study research design to analyze how ICRC related to Neutrality
and Speaking out in the Biafran war. Case study research design is suitable for this research due
to its possibility to producing in-depth result. According to Yin (1984), a case study "is an
empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context, to uniform the
understanding, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident;
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used." According to Bryman (2012) case study
involves a detailed and exploratory analysis of a single case in a way to maximize understanding.
Therefore, it is suitable method for this research due to its unique features and possibility to give
detailed understanding of the topic.
1.4.1 Data Sources
My selection of sources for this thesis was guided by intention to study the concept of neutrality
and speaking out and how ICRC related to that in the Biafran humanitarian intervention. I believe
that the concept of Neutrality and Speaking out are vital in humanitarian action, though often
viewed as opposites of each other or complementary to each other. However, there can be
complexities if not carefully applied. Second, I chose to do study scholarly articles on the
challenges of Biafran humanitarian intervention. I made use of the work of writers which I believe
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that their perspective will be relevant to be able to examine how ICRC related to the concept of
neutrality and speaking out in the action during the Biafran war. Lastly, I will also employ other
relevant data that brought to perspective the situation that surrounds the war, which may have
affected ICRC disposition in relation to Neutrality and Speaking out in the war.
The findings of research will be analyzed using a critical constructive method, which will help to
explain what prompted their actions and why. To be able to dig into the Biafran humanitarian
discuss, I focus majorly on five scholarly article from scholars, who has researched directed on the
Biafran humanitarian intervention from different perspectives. I believe that there work captured
the major events in the war, from perspectives that are relevant for the thesis. Majorly on the
perspective of the humanitarian challenges in the Biafran, war.
The articles include; Desgrandchamps, Marie-Luce (2014) “Dealing with ‘genocide’: the ICRC
and the UN during the Nigeria–Biafra war, 1967–70, Aaronson, Michael. The Nigeria Civil war
and Humanitarian intervention. The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in
Africa, 2013, Nwaka, Jacinta C. "When neutrality loses its value: caritas airlift to Biafra 1968 –
1970”, Desgrandchamps, Marie-Luce (2012) “Organizing the unpredictable”: the Nigeria–Biafra
war and its impact on the ICRC and Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (2009) Humanitarian Aid
and the Biafra War: Lessons not Learned: Africa Development.
The legal framework will employ a text analysis of regulatory documents on humanitarian
principles and guidelines. This method was chosed, as it is the most suitable method for carrying
out the purpose of the study, in the viewing of explaining the contents of the documents
(Mannelqvist, Ingmanson & Ulander-Wänman, 2019, p. 166-167). To this view, I based my data
from information from the “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, Pictet, Jean (1979) “The Fundamental Principles of the
Red Cross: Commentary. IFRC, and Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop (2016) Coming clean on
neutrality and independence: The need to assess the application of humanitarian principles,
International review on the Red cross as well as Bugnion, F. (2012). Birth of an idea: The founding
of the international committee of the red cross and of the international red cross and red crescent
movement: From solferino to the original Geneva convention (1859-1864). International Review
of the Red Cross, 94(888), 1299-1338.
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To deepen my knowledge on the neutrality and speaking out context I studied Udombana,
Nsongurua (2005) “When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian
Intervention in Sudan”, Jeremy Moses (2020) “Why Humanitarianism Needs a Pacifist Ethos” in
the journal of Global Society and, E. C. Ejiogu 2013, Chinua Achebe on Biafra: An Elaborate
Deconstruction. To be able to give a more descriptive research and analysis in relation to
qualitative design, I other credible reports related to humanitarian intervention Biafran war.
1.5 Relevance to humanitarian field
Neutrality and Speaking out remain vital humanitarian principles and complex to implement in
practice. Therefore, this study will help academia and practitioners to have more clarity in how to
work with humanitarian principles of neutrality and advocacy to speak out against inhumanity
especially in very complex settings. The case study of the Biafran war is because the Biafran war
marks a very important history in humanitarian intervention where aid workers faced with many
challenges that finally led to the start of MSF. Biafran war was also a war were humanitarian
organization were accused to be part of promoting a counter discourse instead of advocating for
the genocide witnessed. To this view, it became interesting to understanding the challenges ICRC
encountered in the Biafran war and how that affects the implementation of neutrality and speaking
out in general.
Therefore, the results of this study will help to create a deeper understanding on neutrality and
speaking out both in theory and practice. As it will aid future, researchers and practitioners to know
how to better relate to principle of neutrality and speaking out in complex humanitarian action.
Where there are high possibilities of politicization of aid, indiscriminate action and influence of
external actors.
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1.6 Limitations
This research will discuss how ICRC related to Neutrality and Speaking out in the Biafran War.
Furthermore, this research will discuss potential challenges and implications of the principle of
Neutrality and speaking out in the Biafran war. However, the major limitation of this research is
that it not include interviews of the affected persons and authorities that participated directly in the
Biafran war. The thesis did not also review any political documents that might have affected how
ICRC disposition regarding the food blockage or direct communications with the Nigeria
government. The thesis was written based on secondary source of data, from scholarly articles
researched within the field, which could not allow for possible triangulation of information
collected improving credibility. However, more research is recommended to widening the
discussion of the implications of the humanitarian challenges as well more analysis on the
implementation of neutrality and speaking out in humanitarian interventions. Which will be useful
in future research in Neutrality and Speaking out in theory and practice.
1.7 Outline
The chapter began with identifying the problem in relation to neutrality and speaking out in the
Biafran war humanitarian intervention. The chapter made evident strong humanitarian challenges
in the war leading to loss of millions of combatant and noncombatant followed by famine that
wipe out over three million Biafrans. Due to humanitarian challenges around food blockage and
aid distribution leading to mass extermination of Biafrans in the Biafra. The chapter discussed the
aim and purpose, followed by previous research and literature review on Neutrality and speaking
and its challenges. The chapter concluded with a discussion on the relevance of the research
followed by limitations of the research and recommendation for further study. Chapter 2 will dig
into the case study followed by the analysis of the thesis
For a better understanding of this study, this research was divided into different chapters. Chapter
2 will discuss the case study of the Biafran war and Chapter 3 discuss the findings of this thesis as
relates to Neutrality and speaking out in the Biafran war, which will be done with different
subheadings. Chapter 4 will be on the discussion of the content of the thesis, followed by the
chapter five, which will be the conclusion of the research.
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Chapter 2 CASE STUDY
2.0 Introduction
This chapter will analyze how ICRC and UN related to the principle of Neutrality and speaking
out in the Biafran and try to unveil their challenges in the war that led to their disposition. The
chapter will begin with the discussions on the background of the war, followed by incidents of the
war as well as Biafran humanitarian challenges.
2.1 Background of the study
The Biafran war happened between 1967-1970 in Nigeria located in the western part of Africa,
home for over 180 million people. The most populated African nation- Nigeria has three big ethnic
groups, known as the Igbos, Hausas and Yoruba’s. Biafrans population are Christians from the
Igbo ethnic and eastern part Nigeria. While the Nigerian government represents the Hausas from
Northern Nigeria. The crises originated from long aged division made by the British colonial
masters in the 1914 amalgamation of northern, southern and eastern protectorates of Nigeria for
easier administration. Which later escalated due to political and economic tussle influenced by
different actors.
2.2 Before the Civil war.
Economic, Religious and Political tussle were the major challenges the Nigerian government and
the Biafrans representatives before the war. The ethnic /one sided war between the Nigeria the
Igbos (an ethnic group / region in Nigeria) There were killings of the Bifrans/ Christians living in
Hausa land /Northern Nigeria. Many Christians living in the Northern Nigeria were killed and
ripped off their belongings even before the war. Followed by coup, counter coup by the military
representatives of different regions and reached the climax when the Biafran declared their
sovereignty from Nigeria to start a new nation.
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2.2.1. Political Challenges
Ejiogu (2013) explained that political influence was one of the greatest challenges that the Biafran
humanitarian intervention faced. According to him, The political differences existed prior to the
war between politicians from the Northern and eastern Nigeria-Nnamdi Azikiwe after the Nigerian
independence and Biafra war represents ‘a cataclysmic experience that changed the history of
Africa’ on several levels. Especially, as regards to Biafran humanitarian intervention.
The African union could not intervene in the Biafran war, due to their loyalty to sovereignty and
politics of state that existed at that time. ibid. However, Other actors, including USA, Canada, the
Soviet union as well as the OAU and UN were in support of Nigeria France and Israel assisted
biafrans and given them food and weapon during the war. In 1966, prior to the war, Many Nigeria
were unhappy about the corruption and apathy going on under the government of Prime Minister
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, which led to strong social conflicts and strikes by governmental
authorities (Toyin Falola, 2002).
These disappointment leds to several social movement that also escalated and led to the killing of
the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and other prominent men in the nation. As many believed that,
his government favored the Northerners and their alliances, which made his death very
disheartened by many northerners. After the death of Tafawa Balewa, the army took over the
government and Major General Aguji Ironsi (who is from the eastern part of Nigeria) took over
power to rule the nation. However, coming from eastern Nigeria (Biafran) the northerner took it
as a scheme for the Igbos to rule them/rule the country and decided to persecute and kill the eastern
(Biafra) who lives in their part of the country.in their churches and their homes.
2.2.2. Economic Challenges
The nature of the Bifran conflict was complex caused by many different things. The conflict
started as a social conflict rooted in exclusion in economically and political entitlements and later
developed to a complex and indiscriminate war amongst the two region. The war started a few
years after Nigeria regained their independence from Britain. However, the Britain maintained its
economic hold in Nigeria through their alliances with northern Nigeria and continued reap off the
profits from mining and commerce.
20
Nigeria at the time of the war known as one of the great oils nations in the world and was the tenth
biggest oil exporter in the world. However, a British owned company known as United african
company controlled over 41,3% of all Nigeria foreign trade at 516 barrels of oil per day. Through
their alliances from northern Nigerian, even though the oil was majorly from Eastern Nigeria
whose interest was not protected by the alliances.
2.3. During the war
During the war, the Biafrans were faced with many persecutions including rape/ sexual violence,
which was declared even before the war in a radio broadcast in Hausa language.“ Let’s go kill the
damned Igbos, kill of their men and boys, and rape their wives and daughters....” (Korie.....).
Followed by various forms of denial, statelessness and access to humanitarian assistance
Desgrandchamps (2014) As many injured Biafran men and women including children and orphans
refugees returned to eastern Nigeria were ripped off their belongs and had little or no resources for
their lives and shelter. Many people were displaced multiple times before finding refuge.
2.3.1 Displacements /Mass Extermination
Desgrandchamps (2014) explained that the plan for the genocide was established even before the
war and ICRC was aware it before it actually took place. Death list of the top Igbo military leaders
was made and Military and weapon were made ready to attack the Biafrans on the day of
celebrating of their sovereignty. Target point were defined and to take place in some prominent
area in the Biafran region. Before the actual the order of outright exterminate took place. The
Nigerian government was accused of genocide against the Biafrans. Dehumanization can be traced
in war, which was more of the consequences of the famine that resulted to a special kind of drained
body and disease called kwashiorkor- pictures of which was seen across the world.
2.2.2 Biafran Observation project
According to Desgrandchamps (2012), the Nigeria government has upper hand in the Biafran
humanitarian intervention. Especially, in reference to the “observation project” which the
coordinated instead of ICRC that was leading the humanitarian intervention. Desgrandchamps
believed that ICRC would have coordinate the observation project to ensure Neutrality in the
21
Observation. Especially, since it happened in the middle of media confusion of the true situation
of Biafra. Viewing that it was a vital moment of the Biafra humanitarian intervention, when the
whole world want to know the truth of what is happening in Biafra. Makes it a vital moment for
Neutrality to be place to ensure that the true situation of the Biafra’s are told.
Desgrandchamps disagreed with ICRC in allowing the Nigerian government to coordinate the
whole observation project without interference, which compromised Neutrality in the part of the
Biafrans. In such situation, Speaking out becomes very important as ICRC was aware that the
observers were based in Lagos the Nigerian federal capital located several hundred kilometers
from the front line and the observers made relatively short trips to the conflict areas and was not
allowed to visit the war striking areas until the war stabilizes. To remain Neutral in this stance
entails speaking out about it or helping to ensure that the project is done according to humanitarian
guidelines. The observers did not rely in the Nigeria government in their transportation, security,
and communication. The observers did not have translators that can help interpret their
conversations with the local community in the language they understand. Ibid.
Allowing the Nigerian government to champion the project by choosing the country and
representative they wanted, without ensuring strongly emphasizing that such important journey
needs to be neutral for both parties. Desgrandchamps believed that ICRC supposed to help to
ensure the participation of more Neutral observers and ensure that the coordination was done in a
Neutral manner. Hence, the inability to establish Neutrality measures at vitals time as the
“observation project caused more trouble to the Biafrans and more complications in the
humanitarian intervention.
2.2.3. Food blockade and Famine
Pérouse de Montclos (2019) believed that the Biafran humanitarian crises is historical in African
contemporary history. Not only because it is remembered as one of the worst humanitarian crises
on the continent, “but also as a tragedy that gave rise to the concept of ingérence, or the
international responsibility to protect”. The history made by Biafran relief aid, created an
unforgettable memory in the minds of many and the impact of aid during the conflict have been
22
forgotten. To this view, the indelible memory remains in the minds of many Biafrans, especially
in the quest for justice and disappointments of the outcome.
Korie (2013) believed that the greatest challenge that the Biafran war faced was the food blockade
and intense famine that the Biafrans faced which wiped the lives of over three million Biafrans.
The Biafrans got help from the international community due to the media publication of pictures
the extend of showing unhealthiness and malnourishment that Biafrans were encountering. Which
was what brought help to them after three years of massacre and famine as well as infringed to
access to health care. Korie (2013)
Desgrandchamps (2012), explained that the food blockade was able to take place the political
position that Nigerian government at the war. As the war was treated as “an internal matter" by the
UN and OAU at the time of the war, as a way to respect the sovereignty of the Nigeria. Evenstein
(2020). Which has massive implications in the aid delivery and humanitarian resources available
for the Biafran intervention. However, the Nigerian government did not give access to human right
actors to intervene or to infringe in their sovereignty. Which was possible because of the
humanitarian law and politics of state that existed at the time of the war. Leading to mass
extermination and great famine. On the Biafrans and leaving the Biafrans at the mercy of the
information told by other organizations about the genocide happening in Biafra. Instead of ICRC,
that was championing the Biafran humanitarian action. Ibid.
“During the summer of 1968, the throes of emotion caused by the famine as well as the concerns
voiced by UNICEF led the UN to slightly reconsider its position by publicly calling upon the
belligerents to cooperate in letting relief through to the victims”
23
2.2.3 Religious challenges and the role of faith based organization
Nwaka (2015) explained that The Catholic Church were one of the organizations that played a
major role in the Biafran humanitarian intervention. The Catholic Church was already present in
Nigeria and has been in volved in some humanitarian program even before the war. During the
war, the Catholic Church played major role to bring relief to the Biafrans. Especially, by the
beginning of 1968, when there high food scarcity in Biafra and the FMG’s blockade, had reached
crisis proportions. The Catholic Church sought ways of bringing relief supplies to Biafrans. They
attempted to break the FMG’s blockade by smuggling in food items from Cameroon through Oron
to save the starving Biafrans. The involvement of the Catholic Church in the Nigeria–Biafra war
has ever remained one of the highly controversial themes of this war. As their role was highly
significant and welcomed by the Biafran Government, but the Federal Military Government of
Nigeria was totally against the church and its activities. Ibid
To this view, the Nigeria–Biafra war was one of those wars in which religion, as an instrument of
conflict management, played a double-edged sword, irrespective of the Church competence in
managing conflict. Even though, the Catholic Church was already present in Nigeria before the
Biafran war and has made involved itself in a number of activities in the Federal Nigeria side.
Their contributions during the war was viewed as faith based and negatively by the Nigeria
government majorly because Biafrans are Christians.
Stremlau (2015) believed that, In the middle of the crises on food blockade and famine, when
International communities no longer has interest in the war, attention to the Biafran crises was
drawn to the international community when the war portrayed as a Christian-Muslim conflict.
Which made a difference and brought participation of more actors contrary to when it was treated
as an “internal matter” irrespective of its ambiguities. Falola et al (2016) explained that culture
and religion also played a role in the Biafran humanitarian intervention. Falola questioned ICRC
view on Neutrality and their the competence on aid relief as well as their inability to Speak out
especially on their challenges around the food aid until the it degenerated to the disease called “
kwashiorkor” that happened to the Biafrans during the war due to hunger and malnutrition (Falola
et al 2016)
24
2 .4 conclusion
From the background provided on the Biafra war, which helped to unveil the root causes of the
war and how it escalated into the. The chapter began with a background of the Biafran war,
followed by major incidents before the war. The chapter continued with incidents that happened
during the war, including the mass extermination, the Biafra observation project as well as the
famine and different humanitarian challenges of the war. The chapter ended with discussion on the
role that the Catholic Church paid in the Biafran war and the complexities around their action.
When viewed negative by the Nigeria government.
Chapter 3. Findings and Discussion
The first sub-chapter will focus on the connection between the theoretical concepts of neutrality
and the case findings. By doing so, the purpose is to address the potential challenges of Neutrality
and Speaking out, especially in a complex war setting. The other sub-chapters are devoted to
providing a discussion of the research, by presenting the main results of the case study in
combination with the results and theoretical discussion.
25
3.1. Neutrality in the Biafran war
The case of Biafra war shows that Neutrality and speaking out as seen in the Biafra appeared to be
challenging even from the very beginning of the intervention. Even though that prior to the war,
ICRC has already established “code of conduct” which is in line with humanitarian ethics and
principles of humanitarian action. Information contained in the ICRC “code of conduct” included
that their neutrality and communication policy in interventions. According to the literatures, it is
evident that it is difficult to combine Neutrality and Speaking out in a humanitarian setting unless
with proper caution– and the Biafra war is not an exception.
Neutrality and Speaking are vital humanitarian principles to adhere to in humanitarian intervention
and their obligation to speak out against in humanity when witnessed. However, many factors
makes it difficult to combine both principles especially in an indiscriminate war, which includes,
the impact and influence from politics of state, humanitarian law, as well as humanitarian
competence and dilemma. There were arguments weather ICRC disposition in the Biafra war was
due to inexperience in humanitarian aid response. As though ICRC has experience in armed
conflict, but the Nigeria Biafra war was in many ways a new response scenario for them and thus
became a turning point.
Desgrandchamps (2012) explained that prior to the war, which ICRC had no real strict information
policy to alert world opinion at that time, as their communication policy tends to vary on different
intervention. There were argument weather ICRC became incredibly careful with speaking out for
the Biafran due to their fear of the Nigerian government or competence in public relations and
relief programs. As in one instance, their communication in media tends to show amateurism in its
public relations and publicity which succeeded in angering the Nigerian government.
Desgrandchamps explained that the lack of a clear policy and staff responsible for information
matters and led to the conclusion that the ICRC had not taken public relations seriously and the
conditions in which the Nigeria–Biafra operation unfolded made it particularly necessary to have
a solid policy for communicating with the media and with the ICRC’s partners. Desgrandchamps
2012 p.1427)
26
3.2 Speaking out in the Bifran war
Heerten & Moses, (2014) noted that Media and public relations played a central role in the war,
due to their influence and the dynamics of international involvement. Both the Nigerian
government and the Biafrans relied heavily on the power of media. However, it was not until
Biafra hired the Geneva public relations Mark press in January 1968 that significant international
sympathy was won irrespective of the subsequent media coverage. However, there were accusation
of the position of all state actors in the war, in the view of weather their interest in the war was
based on sympathy, economic or political reason in the view of the Nigeria oil resource or pressure
from colonial masters. Ibid.
According to Desgrandchamps (2012), ICRC media coverage in the summer of 1968 contrasted
sharply with the trickle of information provided earlier. There were also accusations, that the
communication was a cover up for them for their difficulties in setting up the Biafra operation,
which was earning it a great deal of criticism, at that time. Which prompted ICRC Committee
member to believe that it is necessary as it could boost its image and prove its effectiveness to
remain a key player in the humanitarian sector. Ibid. Stremlau, John (2015). Believed that funding
became another issue that affected ICRC communications in the Biafran war. As the US
government, which were major donors in the intervention, were concerned about their activities
and decided to divide the Biafran funding into two between the ICRC and the churches due to
failure in the crises.
Desgrandchamps (2012) believed that “the question of whether or not to speak out, as fundamental
as it may be, was therefore just one of the issues facing the ICRC in terms of its communications
policy during the conflict”. However, one can argue that since ICRC, champion the Biafran
humanitarian, they will have access to firsthand information of all the happenings in the Biafran
and was expected to be the first to speak out in case of atrocity. However, ICRC attitude to
communicate was noted by the Nigeria government, both in the functioning of the organization
and staff competence. Which possible prompted negligence and reduced collaboration. Ibid.
27
However, Pérouse de Montclos (2009) believed that ICRC only took media communication
seriously after the bombing of their flight by the Nigeria government. Prior to that, here were
ambiguity in their stance in respect to neutrality and speaking out even in face of atrocity. Pérouse
de Montclos noted that the act of true advocacy in which ICRC was established. In reference to
Dunant Perspective, which was employed by some French doctors including Bernard Kouchner
that led to the birth of the MSF, was rewarding as it is in line with the principles. Ibid.
In 1968 ICRC were struggling with both the challenges around the relief supplies to Biafrans as
well as the observer report of counter discourse. However, these challenges led increased number
of staff working in the Biafran case, due to the complications and nature of the war. This
complexities would have enabled ICRC to Speak out about the genocide happened in the Biafra.
However, ICRC discretion policy at the time of the war could not allow them to do so. According
to Desgrandchamps (2014), the former president of the ICRC and Committee member, Leopold
Boissier, in an article published in the International Review of the Red Cross and in the Journal de
Genève of January 1968. Which states that; “ICRC favored discretion to loud denunciations and
justified its position by explaining that the interest of the victims was better protected by silence
and an active presence in the field than by public protests that would result in its expulsion from
the field.
The discretion policy complicated the possibility of ICRC to speak out about the genocide and
possibly tension to the dilemma facing the aid workers. However, the discretion policy was
challenged when ICRC hospital and flight was bombed by the Nigeria government, that ripped the
lives of lives of many international volunteers. The bombing prompted ICRC to instant react and
demand a new negotiation with the Nigeria government. The sudden instant reaction of ICRC
when the flight was bombed provoked the curiosity of some aid workers. Some aid workers began
to challenge the discretion policy, in a way to mean that it is not neutral. Especially some French
doctors who worked directly in the war most affected zones, who were forced to spread the news.
At this point without ICRC directives as they were afraid of their lives. (Desgrandchamps 2014)
“In August 1968, the neutral landing strip provided by the Biafrans to the ICRC was bombed by
the Nigerian air force.57 In October, four Yugoslavian, Swedish and British volunteers working
for the humanitarian operations of the ICRC,…several hospitals marked by the Red Cross emblem
and designated as neutral were attacked by the federal air force”
28
3.3. ICRC Experience in Relief Aid
ICRC experience on relief aid was also one of the challenges that the Biafran humanitarian action
suffered. As there existed tensions between the Nigerian government and humanitarian
organizations in the food aid distribution, communications, the Biafra observation project, etc.
Which areas were sensitive and requires more professional negotiation agreement to ensure proper
participation.
Desgrandchamps (2012) explained that ICRC relief aid experience was seen as amateur, by the
Nigerian government. Their competence in negotiation did not only hindered negotiations about
the relief effort in Biafra, but also affected the management of the entire operation in Nigerian.
Thus, provoked considerable criticism from the Nigerian authorities, British and American
diplomats, and Switzerland (Desgrandchamps 2012, p1416). Desgrandchamps 2012 p.1420)
explained that ICRC also had critics in unprofessionalism in operation as viewed as too
authoritarian and arrogant by some individuals. This became more evident when the images of
malnourished children was shared mounted on the ICRC to find solutions and be more effective,
This reflected the ICRC’s awareness of the need to better coordinate and lead the growing number
of external operations in which it was involved. ibid.
3.4. Challenges in Humanitarian law at the time of Biafran war
According to Evenstein (2020), the International law “understood as a universal body of law that
applies to all states regardless of their specific cultures, belief systems, and political organizations
was relatively a recent development. In the nineteenth century, European thinkers conceptualized
humanitarian law in a whiter oriented manner, which was difficult to apply in other parts of the
world. However, their view dominated International law theory and discuss that existed at the time
of the Biafran war.
Evenstein (2020) explained that Biafran war happened at a time where humanitarian law preceding
over humanitarian intervention were not well established. Evenstein explained that the major
29
challenges with humanitarian intervention before nineteen centuries was majorly because the legal
understanding of humanitarian law were not well established. As humanitarian law, preceding
over humanitarian intervention was conceptualized in the nineteenth century. Aaronson (2013)
argued that the problem was that there were many interpretations on the legal aspect of
humanitarian interventions, coupled with the then political interpretation sovereignty. Many
humanitarian interventions was left at the mercy of the state. The constant justification that existed
in the nineteenth century around crises was majorly that humanitarian crises was treated as internal
matter, where the state has sovereignty to settle. Which is usually not the case when the war is one
– sided, between the state and a particular region of the country.Ibid.
3.4.1 Political and Economic challenges
Sovereignty and politics of state constituted the major challenges that the Biafran humanitarian
intervention suffered. According to Aaronson (2013) Biafran war happened at a time when the
state has sovereign power to solely decide over its territory, at a time where international
humanitarian assistance can be seen as interference or working against state sovereignty. Coupled
with the lapses in the understanding of international humanitarian law and the scope of
humanitarian intervention during the time of Biafran war. To some, ‘humanitarian intervention’
means the enforcement of human rights, which can be seen as representing the core of theories
about justice through law. Aaronson maintained that, it is precisely for these reasons that claims
of or calls for the legality of ‘humanitarian intervention’ are so closely connected to claims of or
calls for (more) justice in international law. ibid.
Omaka (2019) believed that Biafran intervention at one point began to lack support from
international actors majorly due to the Kwale incident. Even though, the war became indeed “a
Nigerian variant of what the Nazi called the “final solution” of the Jewish problem” as according
to the International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide, 1968, humanitarian
funding for Biafra dropped and many external actor’s interest reduced after the incident, ibid.
Omaka (2019) believed that Kwale incident where the Biafra the killed eleven oil workers and put
a death penalty handed to the remaining eighteen foreign technicians threatened to execute
30
eighteen AGIP workers, caused they major reason for international community to abandon Biafra.
Even though, the Biafra has explained that they did that just to raise political awareness about their
situation in Nigeria. It was hugely misunderstood and caused actors who were supporting their
view to withdraw abruptly. Coupled with “the withdrawal of the International Committee of the
Red Cross from Biafra which happened after the downing of one of the ICRC relief planes by the
Nigerian military on 5 June 1969.ibid.
To this view, Biafran humanitarian intervention were faced with challenges around sovereignty,
which did not allow access to international institutions and organizations, including African union.
Many institutions could not intervene in the Biafran war because of the politics of sovereignty and
the need to respect the sovereignty of the Nigeria government. Which has strong implication on
Neutrality or fairness on the part of the Biafrans. Coupled with the interest lost by few supporters
of the Biafra due to the Kwale execution. Omaka believed maintained that the sudden quietness
and indifference position of the international community must have economical undertone or
linked to the oil natural resource of Nigeria located in the Biafran region.
However, there are traces, economic interest influenced participation of external actors. Especially
those who were interested in the Oil business in Nigeria. As in first quarter of 1967, that oil
production in Nigeria had increased to 516,000 barrels per day, making Nigeria the tenth largest
exporter of oil in the world and Large European and American oil companies had a total investment
of over a billion dollars in Nigeria. Many country were interested in the oil in Nigeria, including-
The United States represented by Gulf, Mobil, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, and Philips;
Italy by ENI; France by ERAP; and Britain by Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum etc.
3.5 Summary
The analysis of this research has proved that the ICRC undermined neutrality and Speaking out
during the Biafran war. Different things caused this disposition, which includes, the complexities
in the humanitarian law that existed at the time of the Biafran war as well as the politics of state in
place. Which makes the makes the state to have the sovereignty to decide and handle all “internal
matters. As conflict within the state were treated as an “internal matter” at the time of the Biafran
war. This legal background in so many ways affected how external actors attended to the Biafran
and in so many ways may have affected ICRC disposition. The chapter have also unveiled that
31
ICRC was new in relief aid at the time of the Biafran war and struggled with coordination of relief
programs as well as in communication. Followed by challenges from political, religious and
economic pressure.
Chapter 4: Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to analyze how ICRC related to Neutrality and Speaking out in the
Biafran and possible challenges and implications of their action.
In order to do so, the study was centered on two guiding research questions, which were. 1) How
ICRC relate to humanitarian principle of Neutrality and speaking out in the Biafran war? 2) What
implication did the Neutrality and Speaking out in the Biafra war projects to future development
of humanitarian intervention?
4.1 Conclusions
In conclusion, Neutrality and Speaking out was challenging to apply in the Biafran war, due to
many complexities around the war. The war became historical in many ways in both the kind of
massive human extermination, politics of state, food blockade and famine experienced by the
Biafrans. The research unveiled that there were disparities between ICRC policy lines and public
32
positions in the war. As their reactions generated more complexities and affected the ideal stand
expected of humanitarian organization. ICRC struggled with many vital things in the intervention,
including pressure from its field staff, safety, the urgency of the situation and the need to make its
actions known to the greater public. These challenges on the other hand would have prompted
ICRC to speak out. Instead, ICRC was reluctant to appeal to public opinion at the beginning of the
war but that changed when it has more consequences of their project. However, ICRC experience
in relief aid at that time, coupled with low competence in negotiations, political and public relation
as well as competence media communication, were factors that could not allow ICRC to speak out
on time during the Biafran war. Desgrandchamps (2014)
However, this research has made evident that Neutrality and speaking out are vital humanitarian
principles, but complex to operationalize, especially in complex settings. Thus, Neutrality and
speaking are complementing to each other when carefully applied. The research also unveiled the
importance of autonomy and independence of action, which are vital for humanitarian organization
to be able to do their function.
The case study of the Biafra humanitarian intervention made evident some flaws on the part of
ICRC on how the related to neutrality and speaking out in line with the humanitarian guidelines.
Since ICRC has already established their code of conduct before the war before the Biafra war, it
was expected that ICRC would have strained more to work line with the guidelines. Better
coordination, communication and negotiation competence was expected. Especially in vital
situations like the “The Biafra observation project" which was initiated and organized by the
Nigerian government without ICRC supervision or heading the project
Such indifference became contradictory especially when ICRC behaved differently when their
flight was bombed and demanded to have a new agreement with the Nigerian government. Coupled
with media and counter media publication made by ICRC, which confuses the world about the true
situation of the Biafra’s. Which caused more suffering on the aid workers and prompted some
French doctors to denounce genocide and speak out to for the Biafrans.
4.2. Recommendations
33
In line with Carin (2014), the research recommends the importance of Responsibility to protect,
especially in interventions where the power bargain is not equal. Responsibility to protect (R2P)
which was one of the concept that grew out of the world’s failure to tackle the mass atrocities in
wars like that of the 1990s in Rwanda, Bosnia and others as well as other new approaches. To this
view, it is very important that humanitarian action should involve respect to human rights and
dignity, which makes Neutrality and Speaking out to the very essential.
The study recommends the importance true diligence in operationalization of humanitarian
principles, to ensure that all victims are treated equally, irrespective of their race and position. As
well competence in humanitarian negotiations and communication, especially in Speaking out. To
ensure that the content of the communication is neutral, though capturing the context in a manner
of advocacy. In a manner, that will both assist the alleviation of the suffering of the victims but at
the same time will not be jeopardized the overall humanitarian intervention. This research has
unveiled how ICRC related to Neutrality and speaking out in the Biafran war. The research has
also made evident that combining Neutrality and Speaking out in humanitarian intervention are
quite challenging especially in an indiscriminate war setting. The study has made evident the
importance for humanitarian workers to have their focus on fundamental essence of humanitarian
intervention with every diligence and fairness to humankind.
In conclusion, the discussion on Neutrality and speaking out evidently part of a larger discussion,
as it involves many in operation. This research recommends further research on Neutrality and
Speaking out, which will deepen the understanding of how humanitarian organization can
effectively work, relate to Neutrality and Speaking out even while collaborating with the state even
in complex wars.
34
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