neo·realism and neo·liberalism 17 -...

International Relations: Neo-realism and Neo-Iiberalism

David Sanders

Chapter 17

THE RE has been a dramatic increase in the diversity and range of theorizing about international relations over the past two decades. Not only has the analytical rigor of "orthodox" theoretical approaches been strengthened, but the introduction of additional perspectives has brought new theories, epistemologies and even ontologies to bear on traditional questions about inter- and intra-state behavior. This chapter focuses on the two main strands of the "orthodoxy": neo-realism and neoliberalism. In particular, it seeks to assess how far the increased analytical rigor injected by game theory into the neo-realistlneo-liberal debate has contributed to our ability to "explain" or "understand" the behavior of state and non-state actors in the global system.

I approach this task, first, by reviewing the logic which led scholars to import game theoretic language and models into the analysis of international relations in the first place. I then identify a limited number of analytic weaknesses that stem from this importation. Finally, I conduct a "thought experiment" which attempts to specify what neo-realism and neo-liberalism might look like if their efforts to constitute versions of rational choice theory were substantially downgraded. I describe the combined result as "concessional realism"l-a simple but flexible set of propositions about nation-state behavior in the contemporary international system. The research program suggested by "concessional realism" is rather different from that engendered by the current neo-realist-neo-liberal debate. It implies a much more direct focus on the problems of categorizing and identifying national and transnational "interests." It also implies a much

I This description derives from Spegele (1983).

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Neo·realism and Neo·liberalism 429

stronger focus both on the problem of "Hobbesian fear" (Butterfield 1958) and on theory-guided empirical research which examines a wider range of "real" instances of foreign policy decision -making.

Origins: traditional realism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism

The current concern of neo-realist and neo-liberal scholars with game theoretic formulations originated partly with Waltz's efforts (Waltz 1979) to convert "traditional realism" into a "neo-realist" or "structural" theory. Traditional realism was both a simple decision-making theory and a protostructural theory about outcomes in the international system (Morgenthau 1967; Carr 1946). In decision-making terms, it offered an unambiguous, if simplistic, analysis of foreign policy calculation. 5ta te strategy was aimed fundamentally at maximizing the state's interests and was underpinned by three "Hobbesian" motives: achieving and maintaining the state's security; satisfying the economic demands of politically significant sections of the domestic population; and enhancing the state's international prestige. The paramount need for security was best achieved by maximizing the state's power capabilities. Traditional realism took on the character of a protostructural theory in two senses. First, the condition of international anarchy (which derived from the absence of a Leviathan-like world government) was seen as the determining structural factor that lead decision-makers to adopt "safety first" strategies of realpolitik in order to protect and maximize the interests of their respective nation-states. Second, the character and outcomes of the interactions between different states were determined by the overall pattern of national interests: friendship and co-operation between states were considered to derive fundamentally from convergences of their respective national interests; enmity and confrontation from conditions of interest-divergence.

Waltz's central claim was that any analysis of international politics which confined itself merely to the attributes of the (nation-state) units or to the interactions between units was fundamentally "reductionist" and therefore inadequate (Waltz 1979: 18-37). On the contrary, what'was required was a thoroughgoing analysis of international structure and its consequences both for nation-state behavior and for the outcome of nation-state interactions. Notwithstanding Waltz's critique of the Hobson-Lenin thesis, what he attempted to develop was precisely what Marxism always claimed to provide: a structural explanation of state behavior.

430 International Relations

Waltz developed the notion of structural explanation in two ways. First, in his exposition of balance of power theory, Waltz (1979: 126) attempted to provide a structural explanation of the dominant alliance strategy (the avoidance of power preponderance) that states pursue. As in traditional realism, a pivotal role was accorded to the notion that under anarchic conditions there is no security for the junior partner(s) in a winning coalition. Second, Waltz developed a structural explanation of. system outcomes. Defining structure as a set of constraining conditions which produce a gap between intention and outcome, Waltz (1979: 89-93, 119-22) drew a powerful analogy between balance of power theory and the theory of perfect competition. Under perfect competition, because of the structure of the market in which there are no barriers to entry and perfect information, firms which aim to maximize profit end up minimizing it (i.e. earning a normal profit) because more firms enter the market if greater than normal profits are being made. Waltz argued that structure exerts a similar set of effects in international political systems, where a balance of power (the outcome) emerges "fortuitously" as a result of each state independently pursuing its own self-interest (the intention).

The idea that outcomes occur which are neither intended nor desired by any of the actors involved had, of course, been a familiar theme in game theory since the 1950s. Indeed, Prisoner's Dilemma had long been recognized as a possible restatement of the Hobbesian security problem which was central to traditional realism (Axelrod 1970; Snyder 1971). It was therefore quite natural that the "unintended and undesired outcome" principle should have been taken up by a new generation of neo-realists who sought to develop it further both in terms of other sorts of game and in terms of iterated games. It was perfectly possible for international actors to prefer mutual co-operation, but the structure of the situation in which they found themselves produced an outcome of mutual defection. Equally naturally, neo-realism's neo-liberal opponents engaged in a similar exercise-though with the objective of showing that the structural constraints on co-operation implied by these games were far weaker than neo-realists supposed. In essence, Waltz's efforts to transform realism into a scientific, structural theory led directly to international relations theorists placing much more emphasis on game-theoretic approaches. The logic was simple. International relations theory should aspire to the status of structural theory; game-theoretic models described the structure of the situation in which nation-state decision-making takes place: it was obvious that the two should be combined to produce a new and more sophisticated theoretical apparatus-a task which both neo-realists and neo-liberals undertook with considerable vigor and enormous skill.

Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism 431

II limitations of the game theoretic approach to international relations theory

The neo-realist/neo-liberal debate has been criticized from a wide range of different positions, ranging from post-Marxian critical theory to feminism. Much of this criticism has been epistemological. Neo-realists and neo-liberals are variously accused of failing to recognize that their theories merely serve to justify an existing power structure (Peterson 1992); of reifying the concept of causality (Ashley 1986); of underestimating the importance of political discourses (Enloe 1994; Campbell 1992); and offailing to understand the centrality of subjective meanings, rules and rule-following behavior (Hollis and Smith 1990). I am not concerned to dwell on such critiques here. Rather, I seek to provide a critique that accepts the basic "neo- positivist" epistemology of the neo- realists and neo-liberals (Keohane 1993: 297).

Given that it is not possible here to review all of the limitations of game theoretic approaches to understanding state behavior, I focus on two key problems: their failure to provide a convincing analysis of the notion of "interests" and their ineffective specification of the notion of "structural constraints."

A Problems relating to the role of national interests

In traditional realist theory, national interests played a pivotal role. In the discourse of foreign policy debate, "the national interest"-even in an age of proliferating international institutions and regimes-still appears to pre-occupy the private calculations and public utterances of a wide range of national leaders. The continuing centrality of interests (though they admittedly do not refer explicitly to national interests) is also acknowledged by Axelrod and Keohane (1993: 88): "Perceptions define interests ... [To I understand the degree of mutuality of interests (or to enhance this mutuality), we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined." Axelrod and Ke?hane ( 1993: 88) go on to specify the way in which rational choice theorists approach this problem: "One way to understand this process is to see it as involving a change in payoffs, so that a game such as Prisoners' Dilemma becomes more or less conflictual ... "

I have no quarrel whatsoever with Axelrod and Keohane's assertion that "we must understand the process by which interests are perceived." As I


understand it, the game theoretic perspective assumes that a state's "interests" are maximized if its payoff gains are maximized (Axelrod and Keohane 1993: 88-91), while its payoff gains can themselves be regarded as "gains in capabilities" (Baldwin 1993b: 16-17). In this sense "understanding the process by which interests are perceived" seems to consist in showing how different preference orderings can arise and how they correspond to different varieties of payoff structure: a given actor's interests are considered to vary according to the character of the particular game that it is playing at anyone time. Unfortunately, this is more a definition of interests~efined in terms of payoff structures-than an account of the "process" whereby interests are perceived and determined.

A theory of interests-for that is what Axelrod and Keohane are in effect calling for2-cannot be based on the notion that, if we have understood the principles of gain maximization, then we have also understood the way in which nation-states seek first to specify, and then to protect and promote, their interests . We may be happy to assume that it is "in a state's interests" to maximize its gains. But this is not equivalent to saying that the principle of gain-maximizing reveals all that needs to be known about interest protection and promotion.

Interests need to be considered in their historical context. Before we can speculate intelligently either about the formation of interests or about the consequences of states having conflicting or overlapping interests, we need to know what states' leaders perceive their respective states' interests to be. This can only be achieved through extensive, laborious and difficult empirical study. To be sure, some sort of "interest typology" might prove useful in this context. It might make sense, for example, to differentiate between a nation-state's economic-ecological interests (which could consist in maximizing the long-term economic and ecological welfare of its population) and its political-security interests (which could consist in maximizing the state's ability to respond rapidly and effectively to any external threats or challenges that might impinge upon it in the future3

). I am obviously not in a position here to offer a theory of nation-state (or sub- or supra-state) interests. Such a theory is nonetheless an essential prerequisite of a satisfactory explanation both of nation-state behavior and of the outcomes of inter-state interactions. It is also likely that a satisfactory theory of nationstate interests can only be developed, as it were, from the "bottom-up"; from a considered analysis of a large amount of (currently uncollected)

2 Indeed. Keohane ( 1993: 294) explicitly suggests that "without a theory of interests . .. no theory of international relations is possible."

) I take it that this was what Morgenthau (1967: S-{;) had in mind when he wrote that statesmen "think and act in terms of interests defined as power."

Neo·realism and Neo-liberalism 433

empirical evidence relating to policy-makers' interest-perceptions. What international relations theory really needs is a new Quincy Wright: someone who has command of an enormous range of substantive case studies of interests and who possesses the theoretical insight to offer a simplifying synthesis of what s/he observes. I would certainly not want to advocate a purely inductivist approach to the analysis of international relations-that way lies mindless empiricism. Equally, as Hanson (1958) observed, there is a place for both inductive and deductive theorizing in the process of systematic enquiry. In the analysis of nation-state interests, at least for the time being, we desperately need a little less theoretically based deduction and a little more empirically based induction.

B The ineffective specification of "structural constraints"

As noted earlier, Waltz defines structure as a set of constraining conditions that produces a gap between intention and outcome. He goes on to suggest that the two main structural characteristics of an international system are the particular distribution of capabilities that it exhibits and the (anarchic) ordering principle upon which it is based.4 Accepting this definition, it is legitimate to ask how far the methods adopted by game theorists are capable of capturing the way in which international structure might be considered to constrain the outcomes of state interactions.

In terms of the importance of the distribution of capabilities, such methods have achieved a considerable amount. For example, Snidal's recent (1993) work on the importance o frelative gains under varying conditions of system polarity-which shows that the impact of relative gains declines as the number of actors increases-continues a long line of studies that have very effectively analyzed the connections between polarity, the decision calculus of major actors and system outcomes.

The record is less convincing, however, in relation to game theorists' efforts to analyze the structural consequences of the anarchic character of the international system. The key difficulty in this context is whether the options defined even by multidimensional, multi-choice payoff matrices bear sufficient resemblance to the "real" choices of "real" policy-makers for the structure of the matrix to be regarded as an analogue for the (anarchic) structure of the international system. This question is particularly problematic with regard to the question of uncertainty. Uncertainty is one of the

• Waltz's (J 979: 93-7) third component of structure as applied in the domestic context. the fune· tional differentiation of units. is of no relevance in intern 31ional political systems: nation·states vary in capabilities. not in function; they are "like units."

,

I ,I , i


critical features of an anarchic structure that the payoff matrix approach seeks to encapsulate. The core of the problem in this regard is that payoff matrices radically understate the degree of uncertainty that actually faces policy-makers in the international system. A kxk matrix specifies uncertainty in terms of the k alternative strategies available to an opponent. 5 Yet, even in a k-actor situation in the "real world," the uncertainties are much greater than this k-choice position would imply. In deciding between competing policy options, decision-makers in "real" situations are typically confronted with the following uncertainties:

• How will different factions inside the opposing country react?

• Will this course of action strengthen the position of more or less friendly factions in the opposing country?

• Will this course of action be seen as a precedent for the future or will it be seen as sui generis?

• How will public opinion in the opposing country react?

• Will this course of action increase the intransigence of the opposing decision-makers or will it make them more amenable to compromise in the future?

• How will domestic public opinion react?

• How will different domestic groups or parties react?

• How will the decision-maker's own party react? Will it strengthen the leadership's hand or that of opposing factions within the party?

• Will this option have collateral effects on third parties?

• How will these effects, if they occur, affect this country's relationship with the third parties in the future?

• And,.most important of all, how likely is it that this course of action will actually lead to the outcome that is desired?

The answers to most of these questions are very rarely known in the "real world" of international politics. Yet the uncertainty about all of them constitutes a crucial element of the decision calculus of the foreign policymaker that needs to be explicitly taken into account if "real" choices, and hence "real" outcomes, are to be explained. Neither payoff matrices nor the sort of "win-set" models envisaged by Putnam (1988) in his two-level theory of games begin to capture the Ureal" uncertainties that confront the "real" policy-maker. Yet it is precisely these "real" uncertainties that

, The greatest degree of uncertainty occurs, of course, when an actor does not know what payoffs it will receive given either its own and/or its opponent's actions. This sort of situation has been handled extensively by game theorists. See, for example, Rasmussen 1989.

Neo-realism and Neo-Iiberalism 435

structure-that is, act as structural constraints upon-both the choices that are made and the outcomes that obtain in the "real world:' The question must remain open therefore as to whether game-theoretic perspectives adequately reflect a central aspect of the anarchic international structure which they were expressly intended to encapsulate.

III Towards a game theory-free concessional realism

Although the foregoing discussion is in no sense offered as a thoroughgoing critique of game-theoretic approaches to international relations, it does have some implications for the way in which the neo-realist/neo-liberal debate might be developed. The failure of the game theory approach to take adequate account of either interests or uncertainty suggests that it might be worthwhile considering what neo-realism and neo-liberalism would look like if they were shorn of their game-theoretic superstructure. The Uthought experimen t" that follows offers precisely such a portrayal. In deference to the increasing recognition that neo-realist and neo-liberal propositions need to be subjected to more explicit empirical scrutiny (Keohane 1993), the "experiment" emphasizes the importance of direct empirical testing. The experiment also seeks to maintain the view adopted by diplomatic historians that realism constitutes both a theory of decisionmaking and a simple structural theory about the origins and outcomes Of nation-state behavior.

In offering revised statements of neo-realist and neo-liberal theorieswhich are presented in Appendices 17 A and 17B-I follow Lakatos (1970) in assuming that all theories have both (1) a largely non-negotiable and non-falsifiable "core" and (2) a set of testable propositions that are to a

. greater or lesser degree derived from that core. In terms of the testable propositions, I distinguish between (i) statements that can be empirically evaluated by a detailed examination of the decision calculus of individual policy-makers (the "decision-making level"); and (ii) statements that require empirical testing in the context of the trans~_ational pattern of interests or co-operation (the "structural level").

Readers will doubtless decide for themselves as to the individual and collective adequacy of the theoretical statements outlined in Appendix Tables A 17.A and AI7.B. Four features of the tables merit particular attention.

First, it is clear that the con tent of the tables could not by any stretch of the imagination be described as sophisticated. ("Simplistic stuff" is one


self-criticism that occurs to me.) In comparison with the recent works of Keohane, Snidal, Grieco, Powell, Baldwin and many others, there is a huge loss of abstraction and theoretical rigor. My response to this potential criticism is to ask both myself and the reader whether this loss actually matters significantly. If we work to the agenda defined by Tables A 17.A and A 17 .B, we will certainly know less about the theoretical world. However, I am not convinced that working to the agenda of these would necessarily tell us any less about the world of observation-which is the world we want to understand and explain anyway-than more sophisticated, rigorous and abstract analyses. The strength of the propositions embodied in Tables AI7.A and AI7.B lies partly in their parsimony and partly in the unambiguous empirical research agenda that they imply: a series of hypotheses that can be tested individually and directly by examining a wide range of historical case

studies. The second key feature of the tables concerns the concept of interests.

The statement of concessional realism accords some prominence to perceptions of national interests. However, it is evident that a considerable amount of empirical work needs to be undertaken in order to determine what decision-maker~ actually perceive their states' interests to be.6 This investigation also implies the need for an analysis of how perceptions of interests are shaped by country-specific historical forces and by institutional practices and commitments at both the national and international level. This in turn implies an emphasis on domestic political structures and processes that is not normally allowed for in neo-realist theory. It is an emphasis, however, whose importance has certainly been recognized by neo-liberals and institutionalists.7 Given the obvious importance of domestic considerations in the study of foreign policy, it seems appropriate that a putative theory of international relations should make due allowance for the possible operation of domestic factors in the genesis of nation-state

behavior. A third feature of Tables A17.A and AI7.B that merits attention concerns

the concept of structure. It could be argued that the propositions as they stand significantly underplay the role of international structure and that the onlyhint of an analysis of structural effects, in Waltz's sense, occurs in the non-falsifiable core of realism (in Table AI7.A, proposition 2b). There is certainly nothing comparable to the sort of structural effects that Waltz describes in his discussion of the analogy between perfect competition and

• Given the increasing role of contemporary international institutions, the notion of"decision-makers' perceptions" should probably be extended to include the leaders of major transnational insti

tutions. 7 See, for example: Axelrod and Keohane 1993: 101-2; Elman 1995.


balance of power theory. In response to this criticism, I would argue that the overall pattern of perceived interests-which can only be specified by first considering states' perceptions of their interests-is just as much a structural characteristic as Waltz's "distribution of capabilities." In this sense, in looking at overlapping and contradicting patterns of interest, the model outlined in Table AI7.A does take some account of possible structural effects. If this still represents a weak analysis of structural effects in Waltz's sense, then so be it. I can only observe in mitigation that, as far as I am aware, no one else (Waltz included) has managed to produce an account of the effects of international structure that would bear comparison with the way in which structural effects operate under conditions of perfect competition.

My final comment about the theoretical restatements presented in Tables A17.A and A17.B concerns the alleged tensions between neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Although neo-realism and neo-liberalism accept some of the same preliminary assumptions (notably that the international system is an anarchic one composed of self-regarding, interest-maximizing states), it is generally accepted that the two theories do generate different expectations about the prospects for co-operation between nation-stateswith the neo-liberal position, obviously, being the more optimistic. It is also widely acknowledged that neo-realism seems to provide a better model for analyzing the military-security problems that states confront, while neo-liberalism offers a more useful account of their relations in the political-economic sphere (Grieco 1993a: 131).

The question that obviously arises in this context is why this pattern of differential success should be observed. Grieco gets the closest to providing an answer when he discusses his k coefficient-which measures a state's "sensitivity to gaps in payoffs" in its dealings with another state. Grieco (1993b: 323) suggests that, "In general, k is likely to increase as a state transits from relationships in what Karl Deutsch terms a 'pluralistic security community' to those approximating a state of war ... [Thellevel of k, for example, will be lower if a state's partner is a long-term ally rather than a long-term adversary."

What Grieco is implying here is that the character of the relationship between any pair of states will depend upon specific historical circumstances. If nations have established a reasonable degree of mutual understanding and trust through a long period of co-operation, they are less likely to worry about relative gains (they are insensitive to "gaps in payoffs") and are therefore more likely to co-operate with each other in the future than are nations which, for whatever historical reasons, are deeply suspicious of each other. To historians, of course, this is self-evident. Yet to


international relations theorists, somehow, its significance seems to be underestimated. As a formal theorist, Grieco quite rightly incorporates his k coefficient into his formal model of the decision calculus of the state under anarchic conditions. In so doing, however, he misjudges the explanatory importance of historical circumstance. It might well be the case that states worry less about relative gains when they are dealing with long-term friends and allies. The crucial point, however .. is that when "real" states deal with long-term friends and allies the whole character of their interaction is fundamentally different from the sort of interaction that occurs when they deal with states for whom they retain a sense of Hobbesian fear. Grieco's k coefficient-though it is an extremely clever device-simply doesn't go far enough. It cannot be stressed enough that states discriminate in the ways that they relate to other states. Just as an individual relates differently to each of her/his various friends and acquaintances, so a state will behave and calculate differently towards the various states with which it has contact. And precisely because states discriminate, they make different sorts of calculation about the costs and benefits of cooperation depending upon whom they are dealing with. Nation-states may or may not be sufficiently alike in the problems that they confront to merit Waltz's description of them as "like units." "Real"-discriminating-<iecision-makers most assuredly do not see all other states as " like units": they invariably regard some actors as "friends" and others as either real or potential "enemies."

What all of this suggests is that the attempt to develop a single decision calculus (based on either absolute or relative gains) in order to analyze nation-state decision-making is unlikely to capture the sheer inconsistency of decision-making in the "real" world. At a minimum, we need to develop two different models of nation-state decision-making-one for situations where historical circumstances mean that a condition of Hobbesian fear still exists between the parties involved; and one for situations where Hobbesian fear has, for whatever historical reasons, been transcended. If we think about it, this is precisely what neo-realism and neo-liberalism have, in their separate ways, already provided us with. Where Hobbesian fear exists, military-security issues predominate and the neo-realist model proves broadly satisfactory. Where Hobbesian fear has been transcended, political-economic issues predominate and the neo-liberal model works smoothly. If this .characterization fails to explain why Hobbesian fear is sometimes transcended and sometimes not, I am unconcerned: these are matters of historical contingency rather than questions of theory.s

, Consider, for example, the case of postwar Anglo-American relations. It would be ridiculous to suppose that an abstract theory could explain why U.S.-U_K_ relations were so close in the 1960s that


If the plausibility of this argument is accepted, the implications for the propositions specified in Tables A17.A and A17.B are clear. Proposition 8 of Table AI7.A suggests that:

The boundaries of anarchy/Hobbesian fear can be redrawn (through changing alliances and bloc memberships) but never eliminated without Leviathan. Where the boundaries of Hobbesian fear have been elimina ted between countries, political and economic co-operation between them will be more readily achieved.

One way of thinking about neo-liberal theory is to regard it as a set of sub-hypotheses that fall within the confines of proposition 8. Where Hobbesian fear has been eliminated, the neo-liberal propositions summarized in Table AI7.B would come into operation; where it has not, realism would still hold sway.9 The resultant combination could be described as a "concessional realist" model. Just as realism, in transmuting itself into neorealism, made an epistemological "concession" to positivism ($pegele 1983), so neo-realism now needs to make a substantive concession to neoliberalism by recognizing that, in specified circumstances, the neo-liberals simply tell a more plausible story. It should also be stressed that the idea of neo-liberalism as a special case of concessional realism is not intended to constitute a "demotion" of neo-liberalism, merely a convenient location of it. Neo-liberals should be reassured that such a location would not imply a diminution of the theoretical power of their analysis. The removal of Hobbesian fear does not mean the end of anarchy. It merely means that the anarchic structure in which states must operate is "mature" as opposed to "immature" (Buzan 1991). There is still no Leviathan to see fair play and there is still considerable uncertainty both about the aims and future behavior of other actors and about the outcomes of co-operation or confrontation. As with all compromises, this proposed fusion of neo-realist and neo-liberal thinking will probably appeal to neither. We shall see.

the Americans could trust the British sufficiently to sell them nuclear weapons. (Indeed Waltz (1979: 121) counsels against expecting a theory to "tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday."} The u.s. might have been uncertain about what foreign policies Britain would pursue in a wide range of contexts. What it was certain about , however, was that (I) the British would never use the weapons against the U.S. and (2) that the British were_sufficiently responsible not to use them without close consultation with Washington. The U_S. decision could, of course, be analyzed in terms of either relative or absolute gains calculations, but this would not explain how the extraordinary degree of trust that existed had been built up over the previous 25 years_ The nature of the calculation that the U.S. government made was dependent on the character of the relationship that existed between Washington and London; and that character was in turn determined by contingent historical circumstances.

9 The extent to which nco-liberal propositions were also relevant under conditions of Hobbesian fear could still be investigated empirically.


Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Hugh Ward, Eleni Moraiti, Bob Goodin and participants at the XVlth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Berlin for their helpful comments.

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Appendix 1 7 A

Concessional Realism

Table A 17.A Propositions summarizing concessional realism

A The non-falsifiable core of concessional realism

The international system is an anarchic, self-help one. In the absence of a single effective central authority, the nation-state has to rely primarily-though not necessarilyexclusively-on its own efforts to protect the economic and security interests of its citizens.

2 The Hobbesian state of nature model, with certain modifications, provides a useful analogue for the international system. Specifically: a) It is not the internal characteristics of the state that determine its external

behavior though its internal characteristics may affect the way in which its leaders define national interests. The crucial determining factor in external behavior is the external environment in which the state finds itself. This environment engenders a high level of uncertainty for state decision-makers and fosters a sense of "Hobbesian fear" among. them.

b) If one state behaves in a consistently belligerent fashion in an anarchic system, then all potentially affected states must either follow a realpolitik strategy in return or else contrive the protection of another state that does. A realpolitik strategy can be defined as follows: A will increase its (usually military) power capabilities in order (i) to increase its ability to use force (or the threat of force) against Band (ii) to minimize the chances that B will use force (or the threat of it) against A.


c) As a result of (a) and (b) states are in a continuous state of preparedness to use force for either offensive or defensive purposes.

d) For a variety of historical reasons, states can redraw the boundaries of Hobbesian fear and as a result combine themselves into more or less cohesive blocs. In security matters, the calculations and behavior of these blocs will be analogous to the calculations and behavior of states.

e) The external policies of states or blocs are driven by three main motives: security ("safety"), gain ("satisfying appetites"), and glory/prestige ("reputation").

3 Under anarchy, the state's dominant behavior strategy (disagreed) is to maximize its own power capabilities (Bull 1977) or to avoid the development of power preponderance elsewhere (Waltz) or to avoid relationships in which it is obliged to playa subordinate role (Galtung 1964) or to prevent others from making advances in their relative capabilities (Grieco).

4 Under anarchy, the pursuit of this dominant strategy produces a tendency towards pre-emptive expansionism or political imperialism among the states which possess the physical capability to undertake it. The forms which this imperialism take will vary according to historical context. Nation-states will use whatever political and/or economic mechanisms are convenient to sustain and strengthen their existing position in the international system. Sometimes imperialism will consist in the development of international institutions that operate disproportionately to reinforce the interests of the sponsoring state(s).

B Concessional realist propositions capable of being tested at the individual, decision-making level

5 Given the continuing threat to the state or bloc from its external environment, the most important motive underlying external policy is always the attainment of national (or bloc) security; economic gain calculations will always be subordinated to security calculations if there is any tension between the two.

6 Under anarchy, the intentions of potential antagonists are inferred from their capabilities, not from their express statements or promises. Monitoring of opponents' capabilities is a permanent feature of international politics.

7 Grieco's binding thesis: "If states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners will seek to insure that the rules so constructed will provide for effective voice opportunities for them and will thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners" (Grieco 1993b: 331).

8 The boundaries of anarchy/Hobbesian fear can be redrawn (through changing alliances and bloc memberships) but never eliminated without Leviathan. Where the boundaries of Hobbesian fear have been eliminated between countries, political and economic co-operation between them will be more readily achieved.

9 Moral principles have no real force in international politics when nations' vital interests are at stake except as ex post justifications for actions based on other, interest-maximizing calculations.


10 International law has no real constraining force in international politics when nations perceive that their "vital interests" are at stake. Legal principles, like morals principles, are espoused merely to justify decisions already taken on the basis of interest-maximizing criteria.

C Concessional realist propositions capable of being tested at the structural level

11 Co-operation between or among nation-states derives from decision-makers perceiving that there is a convergence of economic and/or security interests between or among the states involved. Confrontation or discord between nation-states-especially including overt violent conflict-is the consequence of decision-makers perceiving that there is a serious divergence of interests between the states involved.

12 If the decision-makers in competing states perceive that the security interests of their respective states are intensely divergent, no amount of co-operation between the states involved can improve the relations between them. Cooperation in "areas that don't matter" cannot contribute to the transformation of the relations between states: co-operation has no autonomy independently of the logic of the pattern of perceived interests.

13 In the security sphere, if power capabilities are relatively evenly distributed between or among potential antagonists, then a balance of power can be said to exist between or among them. Such a balance, in turn, produces a position of mutual deterrence in which each party calculates that it would incur more overall cost than overall benefit if it were to engage in aggression. If no such balance exists, the'n either coercive diplomacy or war (or both) will occur.

14 Outcomes in international politics are determined entirely by the pattern of political and economic power relations. The parties with the strongest array of relevant capabilities will always prevail in any conflict or negotiation.

Appendix 1 7B

Neo-liberalism

Table A 17. B Propositions summarizing nea-liberalism

A The non-falsifiable core of neo-liberalism

1 The international system is an anarchic, self-help one. The states that comprise it are self-regarding interest-maximizers.


2 The effects of anarchy in the contemporary international system are strongly mitigated by the relatively high levels of interdependence shared by many, if not all, nation-states. Interdependence consists in (a) economic interpenetration in terms of international trade and financial flows; (b) nation-states' collective interest in avoiding a major nuclear war; and (c) nation-states' collective interest in avoiding ecological catastrophe.

3 States co-operate with one another when they recognize that they share a mutual interest in so doing and recognize that reciprocity will produce a positive gain for each of them.

4 States sometimes recognize that the long-term costs of confrontation with another state or group of states is so great that it is better to contrive ways of co-operating with that state or group of states; this may help to break down the sense of mistrust that is felt between the states' leaderships.

B Neo-liberal propositions capable of being tested at the individual, decision-making level

5 In interactions with other states, the fundamental goal of the state is to maximize the absolute gains that it makes.

6 Productive co-operation between states is easier to contrive among states if fewer states are involved in the co-operation effort.

7 Actors try to change the context in which they interact-they seek to reduce the sense of Hobbesian fear and mistrust that they feel towards other actorsin order to increase the chances of co-operation. This leads to the creation of international institutions and regimes and prompts states to attempt to gain acceptance for new norms of international behavior.

8 Over time, international institutions can influence the ways in which national decision-makers perceive the interests of their respective states. In particular, institutions can facilitate further self-interested co-operation by reducing uncertainty; by increasing the quality, evenness and volume of information; and by establishing and reinforcing a state's reputation for reliability.

9 The leaderships of states which enjoy an extensive network of transnational ties are more likely to develop common perceptions and expectations which in turn will facilitate further co-operation. This process is also likely to be fostered by the growth of "epistemic communities,"

1 0 International regimes ("sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations") facilitate co-operation and reinforce reciprocity by "delegitimizing defection" (Krasner 1983: 3).

C Neo-liberal propositions capable of being tested at the structurallevel

11 International institutions are capable of developing sufficient political resources to enable them to engage in supranational enforcement, thereby overcoming


~he constraining effects of anarchy. Equally, states will not always abide by their International commitments.

, 2 In~titutional inertia can lead international institutions to persist after the perceived convergence of interests that created them has disappeared.

neo·realism and neo·liberalism 17 -...

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