1 IntroductionThis IDS Bulletin analyses various aspects of the1990 New Delhi Statement. While this articledoes not engage directly with the statement(United Nations 1990), it critically examines howcurrent planning strategies fail to respond to theoverarching goal of the New Delhi Statement –‘Some for All’ – and the consequences of thesefailures for the urban poor in Global Southmegacities. These cities, it is commonlyaccepted, have sufficient potable water to meetthe needs of all residents and to successfullyuphold the principles of the New DelhiStatement. However, in most Global South cities,including Delhi, more than 50 per cent of theresidents have inadequate access to potablewater (Zerah 2000). This contradiction is oftenattributed to increasing population, waterscarcity, and urbanisation. Less attention is paidto the critical failures in water infrastructureplanning that occur due to the very politicalnature of water in Global South cities. Thus, dueto the contested nature of water, water-relatedplanning in Global South cities produces sites ofexclusions, illegitimacies and illegalities.

In Delhi (and other Global South cities), manyfactors contribute to the failures of water-relatedplanning: using only technical solutions torespond to water-related issues, and thus

depoliticising water access, supply andmanagement (Bakker 2010; Kaika 2005;Swyngedouw 2004; Swyngedouw and Merrifield1995); continually basing policy implementationon incomplete knowledge by excludingexperiential knowledge of community residents(Gandy 2008; Mehta 2005); basing decision-making on universal/global discourses of ‘waterscarcity’, ‘future water crisis’, overpopulation,and development (Mehta 2005; Swyngedouw2004; Gandy 2008); basing policy and planningstrategies on elite and middle-class interests,bypassing the poor (Truelove 2011; Baviskar2003); and rendering current problems in wateraccess as invisible and illegitimate. The failure tostrengthen inter-agency cooperation leads tofragmentation in Delhi’s water sector.

The fragmentation of the state in Delhi can beclearly seen in the ‘planned peripheraldevelopments’, where planning attempts weremade to create ‘legal’ housing options for theurban poor. These neighbourhoods lack access tobasic amenities, including potable water,exposing the irony of planning – neighbourhoodsthat are being planned have limited or no accessto potable water. In these so-called plannedspaces, the absence of state provides non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a pointof entry, a ready-made service area, and a

79

Negotiating Marginalities: Right to the City’s Water

Nishtha Mehta

Abstract Failure of water-related planning in Delhi can in part be attributed to the lack of inter-agency

coordination and cooperation. This inability of state and city agencies to work together results in

fragmentation of the state, and places potable water at the centre of politics in the city. This fragmentation

and its consequences can be seen in Delhi’s resettlement colonies, where government agencies attempt to

create formal housing options for urban poor residents, formerly living in squatter settlements. These

neighbourhoods have inadequate access to potable water and limited or no access to state agencies. This

absence of the state in resettlement colonies renders the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as

critical. Using potable water as the analytic, this article attempts to unpack the complex relationships

between state agencies, NGOs and urban poor residents of resettlement colonies.

IDS Bulletin Volume 43 Number 2 March 2012 © 2012 The Author. IDS Bulletin © 2012 Institute of Development Studies

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

captured population, resulting in the productionand reproduction of the complex relations ofpower between the NGOs, state and urban poorresidents. This article attempts to unpack theconsequences of these evolving relationships forDelhi’s urban poor residents, using potable wateras the analytic.

My analysis derives from two years of fieldworkand research for my dissertation1 that focuses onaccess to potable water in urban poorneighbourhoods of Delhi. Approximately3 million of Delhi’s residents live in slums andanother 45 per cent of the city’s 17 millionresidents live in unauthorised colonies, jhuggijhopdi (JJ) colonies, and urban villages (Singh2005). Most poor neighbourhoods of Delhi havelimited and irregular access to potable water andhave to depend on multiple sources, such as taps,tankers, public hand pumps and borewells, tomeet their daily needs. This situation becomesworse in the new planned resettlement colonieswhere potable water is available only throughpublic tankers or through few community handpumps. This uneven, inadequate andunpredictable water supply causes anxiety,contestation for the limited water, and requiresat least one person from each household (usuallywomen) to delineate specific times for collectingand storing water. This inability of urban poorresidents to access adequate quantities ofpotable water to meet their daily needs can beseen as a direct consequence of planning failuresin Delhi’s water sector.

2 Politics of waterOver 100 state and city agencies overseemunicipal services in Delhi. These agencies reportto different ministries, departments, and politicalparties, resulting in a severe lack of coordinationand cooperation in the city’s public sector. Figure12 gives an overview of the various agenciesinvolved in Delhi’s water planning sector.

The two key agencies involved in Delhi’s watersector are the Municipal Corporation of Delhi(MCD) and Delhi Jal Board (DJB). Theseagencies often work at cross-purposes. Each year,MCD’s Health Department conducts a survey tocheck water quality in the city and declares thatDJB supplied water is contaminated. The DJBCEO, Ramesh Negi, in an interview with theTimes of India (26 March 2011) argues that despiterepeated requests, MCD is unwilling to conduct a

joint survey with DJB. He also contends thatevery year MCD deliberately takes samples fromareas where there are no sewer lines and peopleuse booster pumps and thus, water samplesindicate contamination.3 This annual discussion isindicative of the fragmentation, and itsconsequences for water management, supply andaccess. MCD, DJB and other organisations passthe blame for any inadequacies in waterdistribution and management to each other,placing potable water at the centre of Delhi’sinteragency politics.

The adversarial relationship between multiplepublic agencies involved in water managementand supply are deeply rooted in the fragmentedmulti-party political structure of Delhi. WhileDJB leadership is Congress-led, MCD is ruled bythe opposing political party, Bhartiya Janta Party(BJP). These parties use potable water as a toolwith which to improve their political standing inthe city. Water provision for large urban poorcommunities, which serve as important votebanks, improves drastically just before cityelections and then deteriorates again shortlyafterwards. More tankers are contracted andmore and more infrastructure is installed foronly a few months. DJB, MCD and other agencytechnicians and employees have little controlover the distribution or the decision-making.4

Thus, water-related agencies are neitherautonomous nor un-political. The opposingaffiliations and overlapping responsibilities ofmultiple water-related agencies implicate themanagement and distribution of potable water inthe splintering of Delhi’s political landscape. Thewriting and implementation of policies at alllevels of governments are affected by the lack ofcoordination between political parties, andconsequently, their affiliate public agencies.Residents remain unaware of the variousresponsibilities of each agency, leading to asevere lack of accountability in the water sector,which is both spatial and scalar in nature.

An MCD councillor who attempted to increasewater supply in her area by contracting extratankers every summer, argued that, ‘They [slumresidents] are dirty and make life difficult for therest of the neighbourhood. They are also notloyal. If they had voted for our party, I wouldhave improved water supply. The currentlegislative assembly member is completelyineffectual but let them go to him.’5 As a result,

Mehta Negotiating Marginalities: Right to the City’s Water80

water access in this neighbourhood is based onhousing type. Residents of planned, higherincome neighbourhoods have better water accessto ‘legal’ water compared to the adjoining slums.Local politicians use access to potable water as away to reward (and punish) residents trapped inthe city’s fragmented political structure.However, most inner-city slum residents locatealternate (and sometimes illegal) water sourcesto meet their daily needs. This inequality inaccess to water becomes rigid in resettlementcolonies. These colonies are not a part of theregular pipe network of the city, placing themoutside the purview of public agencies and at thecentre of the politicised water supply, such thatthey lack autonomy and their access to water iscompletely dependent on the fractured state.

New Delhi, being the capital of India, is also atthe heart of regional politics and conflicts, inwhich water becomes a critical tool. The waterfor Delhi’s treatment plants comes from UttarPradesh, Punjab and Haryana. The major shareof this water (38 per cent) is obtained from theriver Yamuna. The flow of the river in Delhi isrestricted because of diversions upstream,mainly for irrigation in Uttar Pradesh andHaryana. Though located on the banks of theYamuna, Delhi accesses the river’s water fromthe Yamuna Canal fed by Tajewala Barrage inHaryana. In the dry season, very little water isallowed to flow beyond Tajewala Barrage.6 Shiva(2001) argues that water scarcity in Delhi isconstructed by promoting over-irrigation. Thus,interstate politics influence Delhi’s waterallocation, and water supply in the city becomesa game of probability and not certainty.

Delhi’s downstream location also places the cityat the centre of other political agendas. In thepast, during local protests in Haryana and UttarPradesh, water regulators controlling supply toDelhi were taken over, preventing surface waterfrom flowing into the city’s water treatmentplants. This created ‘water scarcity’ in Delhi, andforced the central government to meet thedemands of the protestors. With each such‘successful’ protest, water becomes more andmore contested and politicised, and the technicaland policy responses are rendered inefficient inresponding to the produced water scarcity.

These multi-agency and multi-scalar politicscreate room for corruption. Middlemen demand

money in exchange for helping residents navigatethe splintered interdepartmental relationships.This fragmentation also increases the lack ofparticipation and community engagement. Asone agency develops ways to engage residents,other agencies undermine participation, or createfactions, such that groups working with onepolitical party are not permitted to benefit fromthe programmes initiated by any other party.

The breakdown in interdepartmentalcooperation and coordination results ininadequate water infrastructure in the city. Partsof the city have no pipes, no public standpoints,no storage tanks or any other waterinfrastructure, and other parts of the city areadequately (and sometimes excessively) servedby the city’s water infrastructure. Thus,incomplete water infrastructure further resultsin uneven water delivery across the city. Theconsequences of the lack of interdepartmentalorganisation and coordination become even moreacute for planned resettlement colonies.

3 Resettlement colonies: potable water in SavdaGhevraResettlement of informal communities is not anew trend in Delhi; it began 40 years ago duringthe emergency rule of 1975–7. However, to makeDelhi the showcase of India’s economic growth,resettlement of slums has gained impetus in thelast decade. During the preparations for the 2010Commonwealth Games, this trend also gainedjudicial and policy support (Bhan 2009; Dupont2008). Bhan (2009) found that, during 1990–2003approximately 51,000 houses were demolished inDelhi, at least 45,000 homes were cleared in2004–07, and in late 2007, eviction notices wereserved to approximately three of Delhi’s largestslum settlements. Currently, there are 52resettlement colonies in Delhi housingapproximately 2 million residents. These coloniesare all located at the periphery of the city. In andaround these colonies, ‘ineligible’ squatters havecamped in temporary, informal housing. Tarlo(2000) argues that these informal camps aroundthe formal planned colonies indicate failures ofDelhi government’s resettlement policy. Theeligibility system for resettlement further holdsthat to live in the resettlement colonies, onlyslum residents who moved to Delhi before 1990are eligible to receive 18sqm land on a lease offive or ten years, and for those who moved to thecity during 1990–8, 12.5sqm of land is allocated

IDS Bulletin Volume 43 Number 2 March 2012 81

for five or ten years. Each eligible household hasto pay Indian Rs7,000 (US$150) for the land(Dupont 2008). I argue that this also indicatesthe strategic way in which planning, rather thansolving the ‘slum problem’, has relocated it in lessvisible parts of the city, even as it claims to haveincreased access to ‘formal housing’ for the urbanpoor. Resettlement colonies are indicative of acritical institutional failure, as theseneighbourhoods become planned slums andresidents deal with increased problems ofaccessing water, livelihood, transportation andfood. Savda Ghevra is one such colony (Tarlo2000).

In 2009–10, I conducted fieldwork in SavdaGhevra, a 250-acre resettlement colony on thenorthwest periphery of Delhi. Savda Ghevra is aplanned neighbourhood, where the first wave ofsettlement began in 2006. The colony is built onagricultural land and is surrounded by fields andsmall villages. Currently, Savda Ghevra housesnearly 8,000 families from slums of North, Westand Central Delhi. When developed fully, thisarea is expected to house 20,000 families,making it the largest planned resettlementcolony in Delhi. I began fieldwork byfamiliarising myself with the site using directobservations in order to understand the dailypatterns of behaviour, the physical environmentsof the site and the interactions betweenresidents. I also conducted participantobservations for several months in order tounderstand the themes and patterns ofbehaviour associated with collecting, storing,using, and draining water. My goal was tounderstand how the interactions with wateraffect the everyday social and behaviouralpatterns. I then conducted semi-structuredinterviews and focus groups with women fromthe community over a period of six months. Iasked questions regarding the social (relationshipwith other residents, position in community,position in household, education for children),economic (ability to work, cost of water), spatial(choice of housing, place of employment), andhealth (water-related diseases, money and timespent at hospitals) related consequences oflimited access to potable water, and also askedthe women to comment on how water access hadchanged since resettlement. Additionally, Iinterviewed people associated with differentNGOs and government agencies working inSavda Ghevra.

I found that, at the time when it was first settled,there was no planned or built-in water pipenetwork for Savda Ghevra. Potable water was(and continues to be) supplied only throughtankers. The MCD Slum Wing has provided 23community hand pumps and people haveinstalled private pumps to meet their waterneeds. However, DJB found that the groundwaterin this area is non-potable, thus the dependenceon water tankers for potable water hascontinued. Five years after the initial wave ofresettlement, there are still no plans to providepiped water or any water infrastructure for thiscommunity and, for approximately 90 per cent ofthe 8,000 households of Savda Ghevra, DJBtankers remain the only source of drinking water(CURE 2010).

The community residents have no ownership orcontrol over when the water tanker reachesSavda Ghevra – if it comes at its regular time,whether it stops at its designated location, andover how much water it carries every day. Theclosest DJB office is approximately two milesoutside the community, and thus, even as peopleare forced to depend on only the ‘formal’ and‘legal’ water sources, they have limited access topublic agencies. The inflexibility,unpredictability and unaccountability of thissingle potable water source render watercollection as a severely contentious activity. Assoon as tankers arrive, women, children and(some) men run towards it to ensure that theycollect enough water to meet their needs. Thedesperation to access adequate amounts ofpotable water causes abusive verbal arguments,physical violence, and injuries to water collectors.

The formal system of water collection forcespeople in Savda Ghevra to attempt to meet theirpotable water needs using ‘legal’ and ‘legitimate’sources. These classifications govern the life ofurban poor in inner city squatter settlements andin the planned resettlement colonies. Howresidents fit in legal/illegal and legitimate/illegitimate categories becomes a way to withholdthe right to the city’s water and to its publicinstitutions from the urban poor residents. Thus,in its attempt to create a world-class city, Delhi’sfractured state manages to produce plannedslums, where the state exists through its absence,and residents exist in an ahistorical space,without local or contextual knowledges. In thesespaces of neglect and absence, NGOs emerge as

Mehta Negotiating Marginalities: Right to the City’s Water82

effective intermediaries between residents andpublic agencies.

4 Role of non-governmental agenciesIt is argued that NGOs fill the void left by thepublic sector when it is unable meet the needs ofresidents. NGOs are seen as an importantalternative to the bureaucratic, rigid andineffective state (Fisher 1997; Edwards andHulme 1996; Fowler 1991). The complicated andhistorically mistrustful relationship betweenurban poor residents and the state produces thespace in which NGOs operate (Fisher 1997;Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ndegwa 1996). Thus,in a place such as Savda Ghevra where the statehas abdicated responsibility for providing food,livelihood, and adequate and reliable potablewater, the role of NGOs becomes critical, andtheir relationships with state agencies and withresidents of the community become complex.

There is a diverse group of NGOs working inSavda Ghevra on issues related to education,food provision, livelihood, transportation, andwater and sanitation access. Asha, Young Men’sChristian Association of New Delhi (YMCA),Multiple Action Research Group (MARG), ChildSurvival India (CSI), and Center for Urban andRegional Excellence (CURE) are some of the keyorganisations working in this neighbourhood. Atleast three organisations are working on water-related issues, such as improving access topotable water, providing information on how tofilter water, and providing a bridge betweenmunicipalities and residents. Due to absence ofthe state, NGOs are often forced to partner withpublic agencies and take on the role of ‘producer’for certain services, such as building toiletblocks, compost pits, managing public parks, andproviding medical treatment. Thus, in their newrole as ‘agents of state’ (Zerah 2010: 162), NGOsshift from their historic role, which was tobecome a source of information and support tocommunities (Zehra 2010).

NGOs are sometimes viewed as a part of thestate. Residents of Savda Ghevra are unable toaccess municipal agencies, and view NGOs as theonly accessible part of the public sector. Thisinterchangeability between NGOs and publicagencies in the eyes of the residents emphasiseshow people may be deriving their rights to accessthe city’s resources from these organisations.Thus, even as the resettlement colonies remain

outwardly formal, the complex relationshipsbetween NGOs, state and residents contribute tothe process of informalisation of the community.For Savda Ghevra, this complexity and itsconsequences are visible through the work of oneNGO – CURE – in the community.

CURE serves as an example of an NGO whichpartners with the public agencies to work inSavda Ghevra as a part of the Sanjha Prayasinitiative. This initiative aims at ‘improvinggovernment–citizen partnership to advancebetter urban governance’ (CURE 2010).7 SanjhaPrayas focuses on refining service delivery inurban poor neighbourhoods, with a special focuson water supply, access and management. CURE,as a part of the Sanjha Prayas initiative, hasattempted to improve access to potable water inSavda Ghevra. The organisation works with poorcommunities and with local governments onpolicy reforms, improved access to basic services,and inclusive and participatory governance. TheNGO also works specifically with women andyouth from the community, and with all levels ofgovernment – national, state and local on issuesrelated to water, sanitation, power, education,livelihood, health care, and housing (ibid.).Facilitators from CURE conducted focus groupsto determine the preferred location for ‘tankerstops’, and convenient water collection time. Byestablishing an onsite office in Savda Ghevra andhaving regular staff within the community,CURE has become one of the key sources ofinformation and grievance redress for the peopleof Savda Ghevra. Residents walk into its localoffice when they are looking for work, food,housing or potable water. CURE employees haveaccess to contact information for localtechnicians, political leaders and municipalcouncillors. Residents explain their problems toCURE workers, who then get in touch with theappropriate authority to address the issues.

CURE’s entry into Savda Ghevra is at the momentof disconnect between the urban poor and thefractured state, and the work of the organisation iscritical to the provision of basic services in thecommunity. CURE and other NGOs in SavdaGhevra are attempting to ensure adequate accessto potable water for residents. However, anunintended consequence of the work of NGOs isthat they serve as the only link between theresidents of places such as Savda Ghevra and thestate. Thus, as residents become dependent on

IDS Bulletin Volume 43 Number 2 March 2012 83

NGOs, they do not mobilise or resist stateprogrammes, and the process of informalisation inslums, and especially in resettlement colonies,continues. Even as CURE and other NGOs play avital role in forming a bridge between residentsand the state agencies, they also serve as the onlylink between the residents of Savda Ghevra andthe state. This promotes continued passivity on thepart of residents and continued absence of thestate, further damaging the already fracturedrelationship between marginalised populationsand state agents. In this way, NGOs unwittinglyare contributing to the disjunctive governance atthe planned periphery of the city and the urbanpoor residents, who already lack access to publicagencies, are further marginalised and placedoutside the purview of state agencies.

5 DiscussionSavda Ghevra is planned. Government agenciesacquired land and began developing theneighbourhood three years ago before the firstwave of resettlement in 2006. The official story isthat Savda Ghevra is not a slum; it is moredeveloped, more ‘modern’, and more organisedthan the informal settlements of Delhi. SavdaGhevra is said to have wider roads, more landarea and better facilities than slums. However,the reality on the ground is different. Currently,Savda Ghevra has no water infrastructure andthere are no plans in place to provide water pipesfor this community. This ‘formal’ colony remainsa part of MCD and the Delhi DevelopmentAuthority’s (DDA) slum and jhuggi jhopdi (JJ)department. An inversion of formality can beseen in Savda Ghevra, and in other resettlementcolonies. While state agencies imagineresettlement colonies as a ‘formal’ part of thecity; the residents are unable to access water,food, and employment in these neighbourhoods,and have greater access to the ‘formal’ statenetworks in their ‘informal’ slum settlements.

Resettlement colonies also mark a temporaldisconnect in planning. As planning attempts toaddress a future water crisis, create a futureworld-class Delhi, and rid the city of slums in thefuture, it becomes impotent in the present,creating places such as Savda Ghevra. Thistemporal disconnect is especially visible in thewater sector. In Savda Ghevra, as with any otherinformal settlement of Delhi, politics of waterremain a critical part of life in the community.Access to potable water remains unpredictable,

irregular, and contested. Political leaders, publicagencies, NGOs, and community organisationsuse water as a tool in interdepartmental, localand regional politics. In addition to these issues,residents retain no ownership over water or watersources, adding to the difficulty in accessingadequate amounts of potable water. As planningattempts to address ‘informality’ throughresettlement, the current problems in the watersector are exacerbated. This informality withinthe ‘formal’ resettlement colonies is reinforced bythe absence of public agencies in the community.

Thus, as planning failures deepen, slum and‘ex-slum’ dwellers remain illegitimate andinformal. NGOs function at this temporal, spatialand experiential disconnect in planning and playa critical role at the urban fringe. The role ofNGOs in resettlement colonies has importantimplications for planning. As NGOs become the‘legitimate’ intermediaries between the state andthe peripheral urban poor communities theyreinforce the illegitimacy of the residents, andthe role of planning becomes a tool of the staterather than one for communities and residents.

This article demonstrates the need to rethink slumclearance and resettlement policies in cities suchas New Delhi, and to imagine a new role forNGOs, where they begin to challenge state ‘truths’of water scarcity, development, and ideas of ‘world-class’ and ‘modern’ cities. NGOs can encouragethe politicisation of currently (and historically)depoliticised issues such as gender, and wateraccess. NGOs can also focus on challenging thecurrent political structure of places such as Delhiby increasing the autonomy of communityresidents. This will address the current skewedgovernance system in Global South cities.

My analysis also highlights how access to potablewater varies due to social, spatial, and economicdifferences in Delhi. I argue that the New Delhiand other global statements do not engage withissues concerning water politics and inequalitiesthat permeate all aspects of water supply, accessand management in urban centres of the GlobalSouth. Thus, because of the problematicassumption that the state will attempt to meet theneeds of all residents and not privilege the needsof some groups over others, the New DelhiStatement leaves out urban poor populations, suchas those residing in Savda Ghevra, leading to acritical multi-scalar failure in water-related policy.

Mehta Negotiating Marginalities: Right to the City’s Water84

Notes1 My dissertation titled ‘Water Thieves: Women,

Water, and Development in Delhi, India’,examines the impact of planning strategies onwater access in two ‘slums’ – one planned andthe other unplanned – in Delhi, India.

2 Adapted from ‘Multiple Agencies but noAccountability’ – Accountability InitiativeBlog, www.accountabilityindia.in/accountabilityblog/1637-cpwd-pwd-ndmc-djb-multiple-agencies-no-accountability/ (accessed3 May 2011).

3 MCD says 12 per cent of drinking water iscontaminated (26 March 2011), Times of India,

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-26/delhi/29192024_1_waterborne-diseases-drinking-water-water-pipelines/(accessed 27 March 2011).

4 Personal conversation with DJB juniorengineer, 8 December 2009.

5 Personal conversation with MCD councillor,26 April 2010.

6 Constitution and Functions of Upper YamunaRiver Board, http://uyrb.nic.in/ (accessed28 April 2011).

7 Center for Urban and Regional Excellence,http://cureindia.org/ (accessed 3 May 2011).

IDS Bulletin Volume 43 Number 2 March 2012 85

ReferencesBakker, K. (2010) ‘A Political Ecology of Water

Privatization’, Studies in Political Economy 70:33–59

Baviskar, A. (2003) ‘Between Violence andDesire: Space, Power and Identity in theMaking of Metropolitan Delhi’, InternationalSocial Science Journal 55.175: 89–98

Bhan, G. (2009) ‘This is no Longer the City weOnce Knew: Evictions, the Urban Poor andthe Right to the City in Millennial Delhi’,Environment and Urbanization 21: 127–42

Centre for Urban and Regional Excellence(CURE) (2010) Savda Ghevra Concept Note

Dupont, V. (2008) ‘Slum Demolition in DelhiSince the 1990s: An Appraisal’, Economic andPolitical Weekly 43.28: 79–87

Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996) Beyond theMagic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountabilityin the Post-Cold War World, West Hartford CT:Kumarian

Fisher, W. (1997) ‘Doing Good? The Politics andAntipolitics of NGO Practices’, Annual Reviewof Anthropology 26: 439–64

Fowler, A. (1991) ‘The Role of NGOs inChanging State–Society Relations:Perspectives from Eastern and SouthernAfrica’, Development Policy Review 9: 53–84

Gandy, M. (2008) ‘Landscapes of Disaster: Water,Modernity and Urban Fragmentation inMumbai’, Environment and Planning A 40.1: 108–30

Kaika, M. (2005) The City Flows, New York:Routledge

Mehta, L. (2005) The Poetics and Politics of Water:The Naturalization of Scarcity in Western India,New Delhi: Orient Longman

Ndegwa, S.N. (1996) The Two Faces of Civil Society:NGOs and Politics in Africa, West Hartford CT:Kumarian

Shiva, V. (2001) ‘World Bank, WTO andCorporate Control Over Water’, InternationalSocialist Review 19

Singh, A.K. (2005) ‘Inequities in Delhi’s WaterSupply’, Infochange, October,http://infochangeindia.org/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=5601(accessed 3 May 2011)

Swyngedouw, E. (2004) Social Power and theUrbanization of Water: Flows of Power, New York:Oxford University Press

Swyngedouw, E. and Merrifield, A. (eds) (1995)The Urbanization of Injustice, London: Lawrenceand Wishart

Tarlo, E. (2000) ‘Welcome to History: AResettlement Colony in the Making’, inV. Dupont, E. Tarlo and D. Vidal (eds), Delhi:Urban Spaces and Human Destinies, New Delhi:Manohar

Truelove, Y. (2011) ‘(Re-)Conceptualizing WaterInequality in Delhi, India through a FeministPolitical Ecology Framework’, Geoforum 42.2:143–52

United Nations (1990) New Delhi Statement, GlobalConsultation on Safe Water and Sanitation, 1990,www.ielrc.org/content/e9005.pdf (accessed1 December 2011)

Zerah, M. (2010) ‘Reconfiguring PowerRelationships: Policies towards UrbanServices in Mumbai’, in S. Banerjee-Guha(ed.), Accumulation by Dispossession:Transformative Cities in the New Global Order, NewDelhi: Sage Publications

Zerah, M. (2000) Water: Unreliable Supply in Delhi,New Delhi: Manohar Publishers