negation and the buddhist theory of meaning

J. L. SHAW

N E G A T I O N A N D T H E B U D D H I S T

T H E O R Y OF M E A N I N G *

The aim of this paper is to explain and reconstruct the Buddhist theory of

meaning which is formulated in terms of double negation. One of the main aims is to f'md out whether different types of negation are involved in explaining the meaning of an expression. This problem leads us to an investi-

gation of the different senses of negation used in Indian logic.

In the first section we shall discuss the different classifications of negation.

Since the Buddhists have mentioned the paryud~sa and the prasa/ya-pratis.edha

type of negation in connection with their theory of meaning, our discussion will aim at drawing a distinction between these two.

In the second section we shall discuss the Buddhist theory of meaning as propounded by Dignffga, Jinendrabuddhi, S~ntarak.sita, Kamala~ila, and Ratnakfrti. In this context we shall notice three different strands of thought

as to the nature of the meaning of an expression. In the third section we shall discuss the views of certain contemporary

writers on the Buddhist theory of meaning. In the fourth section we shall reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning

in terms of two senses of negation. In this context it will also be shown how to retain the distinction between direct and indirect reference of an expression

or between two different senses of meaning.

In this section we shall discuss the different attempts made by some con-

temporary writers to draw the distinction between the paryud~sa and the prasa]ya-pratis.edha types of negation.

Staal I in his paper on 'Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study' has mainly discussed the views of Mfmgm. sff philosophers and the grammarians. It is claimed that a distinction between vidhi and nis.edha 'affirmation and negation' or 'positive injunction and negative injunction' has been drawn by different schools of Indian philosophy.

The Mi'm~ .ms~ philosophers have emphasized injunctions rather than indicative sentences in this context.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 6 (1978) 59-77. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland.

60 J.L. SHAW

Let us consider the injunction na bhak.sayet 'he shall not eat'. It is claimed that this injunction should not be translated as 'he shall not eat' but as 'he shall-not eat'. This injunction does not prescribe an action different from eating. It simply prohibits eating. If the positive injunction bhaks.ayet 'he shall eat' is symbolized by N[F(x)], where 'N' stands for the obligation operator, then its negation would be N~[F(x)]. This type of negation is called prasajya- pratis.edha or nis.edha type of negation. Now the question is whether negations of the form N[~F(x)] or N[F("x)] are permissible.

According to the Mfm~a. s~ all cases of negation other than prasa/ya-prati- s.edha which is symbolized by the form N~[F(x)], are called paryuddsa 'exclusion' type of negation. It is also claimed that the paryudgsa 'exclusion' type of negation is to be understood where the negative is connected either with the verbal root or with the noun, and the prasa/ya-pratis.edha 'prohibition' type of negation is to be understood where the negative is connected with the verbal ending.

In the injunction neks.eta 'he shall not look' the 'not' is attached to the verb or the verbal root. Hence it is to be translated as 'he shall not-look' and this negation is to be considered as a paryuddsa 'exclusion' type of negation. It positively prescribes something other than looking. Hence it can be symbolized by N[~F(x)].

There are also injunctions where a noun is negated. Let us consider the injunction nanuy~/es.u yeya/~maham, karoti 'at the after-sacrifices he shall not say ye-ya]~mahe'. Here 'not' is applied to the name of a sacrifice called 'after- sacrifice'. Hence it means 'at sacrifices other than the after-sacrifices he shall say ye-ya]~mahe'. This injunction can be symbolized by the form N[F('~x,y)], and the negation involved in this injunction is to be called paryud~a 'exclusion' type of negation. The generalized version of the MLrn~m. s~ view can be expressed in the following way. If the expression of a positive injunction involves n expressions, the negation of the modal operator which is a necessity operator in this context would represent the prasa]ya-pratis.edha 'prohibition' type of negation, and the negation of any other component would represent the p a r y u ~ 'exclusion' type of negation.

Some grammarians have also made a distinction between the two types of negation called 'prasajya-pratis.edha" and 'paryud~sa-pratis.edha'. In this context it is to be noted that these grammarians are discussing indicative sentences only. If a positive or an affirmative sentence is symbolized by F(x), then the prasajya-pratis.edha type of negation is symbolized by "F(x) , and the

BUDDHIST THEORY OF MEANING 61

paryud~tsa-pratis.edha type of negation is symbolized by F( '- 'x). The general-

ized version of this view can be stated in the following way. I f a positive in-

dicative sentence involves n expressions, then the negation o f the verb or the

verbal root would represent the prasajya-pratis.edha type of negation and the

negation of any other component would represent the paryudasa-pratis.edha type of negation.

Now let us discuss Kajiyama's 2 account of two types of negation in Buddhist

philosophy. He has explained the distinction between the paryudasa and the

prasa/ya-pratis.edha types of negation by reference to some Buddhist texts. By

citing a passage from Avalokitavrata he has explained the distinction between

them in the following way.

"Negation having the following characteristics must be regarded as paryudf~sa: (1) it states implication (arth~patti); (2) by a single sentence (3) affirms a positive entity [tool; (4) having [the characteristics of] implication and the affirmation of a positive entity, does not use the very word [of the entity], as when one, meaning a ks.atriya, uses not the word k.satriya but the word abhr~hmana." 3

The prasajya-pratis.edha negation has been claimed to be any negation differ-

ent from the paryud?tsa negation. The former has been explained in the

following way.

"This Iprasajyapratis.edha] has the following characteristics: (1) it does not show the sign ofarth~patti; (2) is devoted to negation, aims only at negation, i.e. simply negates what is asserted by the other party; (3) does not afftrm the existence of an entity or a non- entity; (4) having [the characteristic of] negation and without having [those of] implication and the afftrmation of an entity, expresses [the object of negationl by its own word, as when one, meaning 'not a Brahman' says 'not a Brahman' by which he simply makes negation." *

By citing another passage from Arcat.a's Hetubindut.~ Kajiyama substantiates

Avalokitavrata 's distinction between the paryud~a and the prasa]ya-pratisedha types of negation. He says,

". . . . i t is clear that paryud~sa has the following characteristics: (1) affirmation primarily intended; (2) negation is understood by implication; (3) the object to be affirmed is not mentioned by its own name, as in the case ofabr~hma.na (non-Brahman) which means a member of another caste - ks.atriya, vaidya, ifidra; (4) a positive idea is yielded by the negative expression, and both ideas are conveyed in a single sentence (ekav~kyat~) because both refer to the same object." s

In characterising the prasa/ya-pratfs.edha type of negation the following charac-

teristics have been mentioned:

62 J.L. SHAW

"... (1) the primary aim is negation; (2) affirmation may be understood, but it is only secondary to negation; (3) the negation, e.g., sf~ryam, na paiyanti forms a separate sentence from that which it tentatively supposed, i.e. s~ryam palyanti; the two sentences must be understood in two steps; (4) the object of negation is explicitly mentioned by its own word, as in the case ofsfirya in sf~ryam na palyanti... ,,.6

The above characterisation of the distinction between the two types of

negation in modem terminology might be expressed more clearly in terms of

semantics and pragmatics rather than in terms o f syntax. Pragmatics is involved

when it is claimed that in paryud~sa negation affirmation is primarily intended,

but in prasa/ya-pratis.edha negation affirmation is not primarily intended if

there is any affirmation. Semantics is involved when it is said that bo th the

negative sentence and its implicate describe the same fact in paryud~sa negation. The negative sentence 'he is not a Brahmin' and its intended impli-

cate 'he is a k.satriya' describe the same fact, and the expressions 'no t a Brahmin'

and 'k.satriya' refer to the same thing. But in the case ofprasajya-pratis.edha negation 'he is not a Brahmin' and 'he is a ks.atriya' do not have the same

meaning, and the former does not imply the latter.

Kajiyama's account of the distinction between the two types of negation

is closely connected with Matilal's 7 account o f the distinction between

paryudasa negation and prasa/ya-pratis.edha negation. Kajiyama's account

emphasizes the qualitative rather than the quantitative distinction between

the two types o f negation, while Matilal 's account emphasizes the quantitative

rather than the qualitative distinction.

According to Matilal an ordinary negation has a denial aspect and a commit-

ment aspect. Both the commitment aspect and the denial aspect may vary in

different degrees. He says,

"When we say 'That flower is not red' we are committed to admit that the flower has some other color (which may even be closer to red in shade). When we say 'Man is not the creator of the universe' the degree of commitment is very low. One could even argue in this case that we are hardly committed to accept the view that the universe has a creator" , 8

As the commitment aspect varies in varying degrees, so does the denial aspect.

The intensity of the denial aspect of the sentence "That flower is not red" is

lower than that of the sentence "Man is not the Creator o f the universe". Now

it is claimed that in paryudasa type of negation the commitment aspect pre-

dominates over the denial aspect, but in prasa/ya-pratis.edha type of negation

the lat ter aspect predominates over the former aspect. Matilal has not ruled

B U D D H I S T T H E O R Y O F M E A N I N G 63

out the possibility of an extreme form ofprasajya-pratis.edha type of negation

where the commitment aspect is reduced to zero.

The idea behind Matilal's account of the distinction between the two types

of negation might be expressed by representing a sentence as a two-foM proposition. The first member of this ordered pair might be called the presupposition of a sentence and the second member might be called the manifest

content or the asserted content of a sentence. Much the same idea is conveyed by the terms 'determinable' and 'determinate' as used by W. E. Johnson. 9 The

sentence 'This flower is red' is represented by the ordered pair (this flower has a colour, this flower is red). The negation of this sentence would be represented

by the ordered pair (this flower has a colour, this flower is not red). This negation denies the second member of the ordered pair only. But the negation of the sentence 'Man is the creator of the universe' denies both the manifest content and its presupposition. It can be represented in the following way:

Man is the creator of the universe = (There is a creator of the

universe, Man is the creator of the universe). Man is not the creator of the universe = (There is no creator of

the universe, Man is not the creator of the universe).

Now the question is whether in denying the presupposition of a sentence we are committed to the presupposition of the presupposition. It seems to me that the answer would be positive unless there is no presupposition of the

presupposition. When all presuppositions are denied, the commitment aspect

becomes zero. The symbolic counterpart of this thesis can be represented in the following form:

(1) p = (rl, s)

(2) "-p = (r l , $)

(3) "--'p = (•, g),

where 'p' stands for a sentence, 71' stands for the presuppositional element

of the sentence, and 's' stands for the manifest or asserted content of the sentence.

(2) would represent the form ofparyud~sa negation and (3) would rep-

resent the form ofprasa/ya-pratis.edha negation. I f there is a commitment aspect in (3) also, then (3) would be equal to the ordered triple (r2, f~, g), where r2 is a presupposition of rl. The paryud~sa negation might be defined

as one where only the manifest content is negated, and all other negations

64 J.L. SHAW

might be called 'prasa/ya-pratis.edha' negations. The extreme form of the

prasa/ya-pratis.edha negation would be one where the ultimate presupposition of the presupposition-series is also negated. In the concluding section of this

paper we shall see how this distinction between the two types of negation is

linked up with the Buddhist theory of meaning.

It seems to me that the above discussion does not provide an adequate tool for reconstructing the Buddhist theory of meaning. In addition to the

above distinction between the two types of negation we need one element from the Nyffya concept of double negation for reconstructing the Buddhist

theory of meaning. According to the Ny~ya l° there are two main types of negation. These

might be represented by the following forms:

(1) x is not iny orx does not occur iny , or not-x is iny

(2) x is no ty , where 'x' and 'y' are non-empty terms in both

cases.

(1) represents relational absence and (2) represents mutual absence or difference. The difference between the two types of negation has been explained in terms of their limiting relations. According to the Ny[ya if 'x' denotes a positive entity, then 'not-x' denotes a negative entity, and x is the counterpositive of not-x, i.e. the negation ofx. The manner of presentation o fx in the

cognition of not-x is called 'the limitor of the property of being the counterpositive'. 11 In the case of relational absence the limitor of the property of being the counterpositive is an occurrence-exacting relation, but in the case

of mutual absence the limitor of the property of being the counterpositive is the relation of identity. The difference between them can be explained in terms of their positive counterparts. The sentence 'x is in y ' or 'x occurs in y '

expresses an occurrence-exacting relation which relates the denotatum of 'x ' with the denotatum of 'y', but the sentence 'x isy ' expresses an identity relation between the denotata of 'x ' and 'y'. The negation of the former type of sentences would represent relational absence and the negation of the latter type of sentences would represent mutual absence. Let us use the symbol ' ~ ' for relational absence and the symbol ' - ' for mutual absence. Now the question

is whether the law of double negation holds good. According to most Ny~ya philosophers the law of double negation holds good if the same type of negation is used. But according to most of the Naiy~yikas " - -x would not be identical with x, rather it would be identical with x-ness. The expression ' - x '


means 'different from x', and the property signified by the expression 'differ-

ent from x ' or ' - x ' resides in objects other than x. The relational absence of

this property signified by the expression " ~ - x ' resides inx only. Hence it is equated with x-ness. This shows how a property can be signified when a double

negation involving two different types of negation is applied to a term. In the concluding section of our article we shall utilise this element from the Ny~ya conception of negation for reconstructing the Buddhist theory of meaning.

1I

In this section we shall state the theory of meaning propounded by different

Buddhist philosophers.

(1) The view of Digndga:

According to Dign~ga, as quoted by Mallav~d~, 12 a word expresses its meaning

by excluding the meanings of all other words from its own meaning. This

remark suggests that in order to express the meaning of a word the meanings of all other words are to be excluded. For example, the word 'cow' expresses its meaning by excluding the meaning of 'non-cow', i.e. the meanings of words like 'horse', 'dog' etc. This view might suggest that the exclusion of the mean-

ings of other words is not the meaning of a word. This exclusion is simply

necessary to express the meaning of a word. It has also been said 13 that according to Dign~ga a word is caused by or

has its origin in an imaginative construction or concept (vikalpa), and an

imaginative construction (vikalpa) is caused by or has its origin in a word. This remark suggests that both a word and an imaginative construction have

the same nature, i.e. both of them are in the realm of unreality. Since the imaginative constructions or the concepts are unreal, the words which are caused

by them are also unreal. If the words are taken as unique particulars, then there can be no relation between a word-particular and an object-particular, because

both of them are equally unique particulars (svalaks.anas). 14 Hence the meaning-

relation (v~cya-v~caka-sarnbandha) holds between a word-universal (i.e. a word-

imaginative-construction) and an object-universal (i.e. an object-imaginative-con-

struction). But some commentators like Matilal Is have suggested that according to

Dign~ga a word can refer to a real particular in an indirect way.

"The only way a name can identify, or refer to, a particular is through negation and

66 J.L. SHAW

elimination of other concepts."16 "A word expresses a concept and a concept being a fiction cannot POSITIVELY qualify or characterise the particular (as a Nyaya realist believes), but it can NEGATIVELY disqualify the particular from being claimed by other fictions or concepts. ''~7

(2) The view o f Jinendrabuddhi:

According to Jinendrabuddhi, who claims to expound the view of Dign~ga,

the exclusion of the meanings of other words is the sole meaning of a word.

He says, " . . . the repudiation of the contrary is the exclusive meaning (of every word)". 18 Again he says, "the own meaning of the word is just repudiation of the contrary (and nothing else)", t9

If we accept this interpretation, then the meaning of 'A' is the same as the

meaning of 'exclusion of non-A' or ' not :non-A'. Since both ~1 'and 'not non-A' refer to the same imaginative construction (vikalpa), we can assert an identity between them. If the Buddhist theory of meaning is stated in this form, then several objections can be raised against it. As a matter of fact innumerable objections have been raised by the followers of the Nyaya and the MimSm. s~. The obvious objection is that this explanation of meaning involves either infinite regress or circularity. If the meaning of 'A' is given in terms of 'not non-A', then the meaning of 'not non-A' should be given in terms of 'not non

not non-A', and the meaning of the latter should be given in terms of eight negations and so on. On the contrary, if the meaning of 'not non-A' is given in terms of 'A', then it involves circularity. In addition to these objections

many logical, epistemological and metaphysical objections have been raised against this doctrine.

In order to avoid the objections raised by the Ny~ya and the Mfm~m. sa philosophers the later Buddhist philosophers like S~ntaraks.ita, Kamalag~a, Jfi~nagr~rnitra, Ratnakirti, have modified the Buddhist theory of meaning

without giving up the main theme of their predecessors.

Now let us discuss the views of some later Buddhist philosophers.

(3) The view o f S~n taraks.i ta and Kamalag ~a : 2°

According to S~ntaraks.ita and KamalMfla the verbal cognition does not give rise to the apprehension of absolute negation or nullity (nis.edha), nor does it give rise to the apprehension of the specific individuality of the momentary particulars. It is claimed that apoha 'exclusion' or the meaning of an expression consists in the reflection of the objects. ". . . Apoha, in the form of 'Reflection', being brought about directly by words, forms the primary denotation of words. ''21 It is also claimed that the other two kinds of Apoha form the


secondary (indirect) denotation of the words. 22 In this context the expression

'the other two kinds of Apoha' means a momentary particular which is

excluded from other momentary particulars, and an object of ordinary

cognition or an ordinary thing in the external world, which is excluded from

other ordinary things in the external world. So in this passage we fred an

indirect reference to unique particulars, and a distinction between primary

and secondary meanings of an expression.

According to the above authors a word or an expression produces a

reflection, and after having cognised this reflection we cognise that this

reflection excludes other reflections. The relation between the two cognitions

is called the relation of implication. This relation o f implication has been explained in terms of an example.

"In the case of the sentence 'Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day', the direct meaning consists of the denial of 'eating during the day', and the implied meaning consists of the affirmation of 'eating during the night'; in the same manner, in the case of the word 'Cow', which is affirmative (positive) in character, the idea of affirmation is the direct resultant, and the idea of negation is the indirect resultant due to implication. ''~3

So according to them the meaning of an expression or the direct denotation

of an expression is a reflection or an imaginative construction which is an

internal and subjective entity. These entities are neither unique particulars

nor universals like redness. Moreover, it is said that a reflection or an imagin-

ative construction is qualified by the exclusion of other reflections. This

remark shows that the primary denotation o f an expression ~1' and the exclusion ofnon-A are related by the relation qualificand~tualifier. Now the

question is whether the qualifier i.e. exclusion ofnon-A is different from the

qualificand i.e.A. As an answer to this question it is said that the exclusion ofnon-A is in the reflection A itself. Now it may be asked whether anything

by itself can be both a qualificand and a qualifier. In reply it is said that in

reality nothing can be qualified by anything. The qualificand~lualifier distinction is a creation o f our mind. This remark can be explained by introducing

a distinction between an ontological level and an epistemic level. Ontologically

the thing called ~1' and the thing called 'the exclusion of non-A' are the same

thing, but epistemically or from the point o f view of their meanings the latter

is a qualifier o f the former. So the qualificand-qualifier relation holds at the

level o f meaning. Now the question is what status is to be assigned to the ordinary external

objects of the world. It is said, "People, not knowing the distinction between

68 J.L. SHAW

what is 'perceived' and what is ' fancied' regard it to be something 'external ' . ' ' ~

From this remark it follows that the externalised reflections are to be called

the objects in the world. This externalisation is due to the illusion inherent in

human beings.

As regards the nature of an expression it is said that it is also a reflection or

an imaginative construction which is neither a unique particular nor a universal.

The denoter-denoted relation (i.e. the relation between an expression and its

meaning) holds between reflections. The terms of this denoter-denoted relation

are considered as external things by deluded persons. "In reality there can be

nothing that can be either denoter or denoted, - as all things being in perpetual

flux, no concomitance is possible. ' '2s From this remark it follows that the

meaning-relation holds at the level of reflections only.

Now the question is whether this explanation of the meaning of an ex-

pression is applicable only to nouns or noun-like expressions, or to all expressions

of a language. According to ~n t a r aks i t a and K a m a l a ~ a this explanation

(i.e. the explanation in terms of a positive reflection and the exclusion of

others) is applicable to all expressions of a language. The meaning of a verb-

expression is a reflection which is qualified by the exclusion of other reflections

corresponding to the words for action.

It is said,

"That 'in the case of verbs the exclusion o f other things is not apprehended' cannot be admitted. For when a person uses a word, it is not because he is addicted to such use, but for the purpose of bringing about the cognition, - in the person hearing the word - in regard to a certain thing that is intended, desired, to be known. Consequently, when the desired thing is apprehended, the exclusion o f the undesired thing also becomes apprehended by implication;...". 2 6

Again it is said,

"When the verb 'pacati" ('cooks') is uttered, what is understood is that 'he is not doing nothing', - nor is he eating or gambling' - where the 'exclusion of other acts' is clearly apprehended. Thus, whatever is intended (to be spoken), there is always something 'excluded' by the 'Relative Negation', - this something being 'doing nothing' and also other acts (than the one meant to be spoken of by the verb used). ''27

From the above remarks it follows that the qualificand-qualifier relation

holds good in the case of the meaning of a verb, and the qualifier is appre-

hended by implication. According to Sgntaraks.ita and Kamala~ila even a

logical particle such as 'and' means a reflection which is qualified by the

exclusion o f other reflections such as option. The meanings o f the words


like 'all', 'knowable' or 'cognisable' are also explained in terms of the exclusion of others in the context of a sentence. The meaning of the sentence 'All things

are soulless' excludes the meanings of sentences like 'Only external things like the jar are soulless'. 2s Similarly, the meaning of the sentence 'Colour is cog-

nisable through visual sense-organ' excludes the cognisability of colour through

other sense-organs.

From the exposition of ~ntaraks.ita and Kamalagila it follows that the meaning of an expression, e.g. 'A" is not identical with the exclusion ofnon-A. The exclusion ofnon-A is a qualifier in the meaning-complex of the expression

'A '. So we cannot say that A = the exclusion of non-A, or p = the exclusion of non-p, where 'A' is a word and 'p ' is a sentence. From this fact we should not conclude that according to this doctrine the law of double negation does not hold good. The 'exclusion' operator and the 'non' operator in 'exclusion of non-A' or 'exclusion of non-p' might be two different types of negation. As a matter of fact the law of double negation in sentences like 'It is not the

case that he does not cook' is retained. This sentence means the same as 'He cooks ' . 29

"If a third negative is added, what is understood is either that 'He is doing nothing' or that 'He is doing something other than cooking'; and when a fourth negative is added, what is understood is something differentiated from this last, that is, 'He is cooking'. ''3°

From this remark it follows that the meaning of an expression and the meaning of its double negation would be the same. Since 'the exclusion of

non-A' does not mean the same as 'A ', the former cannot be the same as

'not-not-A'. But 'not -not-A' means the same as 'A" This is due to the fact

that 'exclusion' and 'non' are different types of operator. The difference between them is very important for the reconstruction of the Buddhist theory

of meaning.

(4) The view of Ratnakrrti:

Ratnakirti in his Apohasiddhi.h says,

"By the term 'Differentiation' what is intended is not merely a positive entity (A); nor merely exclusion of (the other) non-A, but the meaning of the term is the positive thing (A) qualified by the exclusion of the other (non-A). ''3t

This passage emphasizes the qualificand-qualifier aspect of the meaning-complex. In this respect his view coincides with the view of S~ntaraks.ita and Kamalagila. As regards the apprehension of the positive, i.e. the qualificand

70 J.L. SHAW

and the negative, i.e. the qualifier component of the meaning the view of Ratnak~rti differs from that o f ~antaraks.ita and Kamala~na. Ratnak~rti says,

"...we do not find any successive stages of grasping (of affirmative and negative) meaning. No one apprehends a negative meaning, after having understood an affirmative meaning by logical implication.

Nor, conversely, does anyone apprehend a distinct positive meaning, after having understood a (primary) negative meaning. ''32

From the above remarks of Ratnak~rti it follows that the meaning of an

expression is a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of other entities, and

the qualificand and its qualifier are apprehended or grasped simultaneously.

He also admits that the meaning of an expression is an imaginative construction.

The unique particulars are not expressible by any expression. In this respect

also his view coincides with the view of Santaraks.ita and Kamalagfla.

Ill

In this section we shall discuss Herzberger's 33 reconstruction or explication

of the Buddhist theory o f meaning.

According to Herzberger the problem in the context of the Buddhist

theory of meaning is how to explain the meaning of the term 'not-not-A'

if the meaning of 'A' is given in terms of 'not-not-A'. He asked,

"If the meaning of the word 'cow' were to be given by the doubly negative complex 'not-non-cow', what would its meaning be within that complex? ''34

If the meaning of 'not-non-cow' is given in terms of 'not-not-not-not-cow', then it will lead to infinite regress. Since this is not what is intended by the

Buddhists, this view requires some non-classical account of negation. He

claimed,

"The doctrine requires a semantic distinction between terms and their double negations, and it also requires some partial semantic equivalence between them. Minimally then it requires a logic rich enough to represent a term and its double negation as equivalent on one semantic level and non-equivalent on another. ''as

As a logical reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning Herzberger suggested a two-foM proposition which is an adaptation from a suggestion of

Emil Post. A two-fold proposition is an ordered pair (g,m) of classical propositions such that 9 ' represents the ground and 5n' represents the manifest

content of some sentence. He said,


"Ground and manifest content axe classical propositions, perhaps to be thought of as regions of logical space, or as sets of possible worlds. ''3~

Now several kinds o f negation can be formulated by applying the two- fo ld

proposition. He thinks that the Buddhist negation might be formulated in

the following way:

N~g, m) = (1, t~)

The negation operator 'N' suspends the presuppositional ground and denies

the manifest content o f a sentence. The double negation would take the

following form:

NN(g, rn) = (1, m)

According to Herzberger the semantic interpretation o f unity (1) is a tautology

or a necessarily true proposition representing a vacuous presuppositional ground

Since the Buddhists are nominalistic philosophers, the presuppositional ground

includes all platonic elements and the manifest content includes the nominal-

istic elements.

"Thus the first component in the content of the sentence Socrates is ill might be some proposition to the effect that there exists such a property as illness; and its second component might be some proposition to the effect that the term 'ill' appfies to the man Socrates." 37

When the above-mentioned double negation is applied to the sentence 'Socrates

is ill', it will yield 'Socrates is not non-ill'. The latter sentence will have the same manifest content as the former, but it will have a vacuous ground, and

hence it will have a purely nominalistic import.

Now let us consider Herzberger's reconstruction o f the Buddhist nominalistic theory o f meaning.

The In'st question which naturally comes to a reader of the Buddhist texts

is whether the Buddhists would admit the reality o f particular individual

objects like the man Socrates or the word 'ill'. A Buddhist would treat such

objects as constructed entities. They are externalised imaginative constructs.

There is no difference between these objects and the platonic universals so

far as they are considered as imaginative constructions. Only the unique momentary particulars are considered as real objects.

In order to overcome this objection the supporters o f Herzberger's theory

of sentence and negation might suggest that as all platonic elements are

72 J.L. SHAW

included in the presuppositional part so all constructed entities might be included in the presuppositional part. If all constructed elements are included in the presuppositional part, then it cannot be said that in the sentence 'Socrates is not non-iU' the word 'ill' is applied to the man Socrates. At the most what can be said is that the momentary unique word-particular 'ill' applies to the momentary unique object-particular Socrates. Now the question is whether it is possible to assert this sort of relation in a Buddhist metaphysical system. The Buddhists claim that no word is applicable to the unique momentary particulars. Hence they cannot be named by any expression. If it were so, then the relation called 'applies to' cannot hold between them.

In addition to this objection a few more objections can be raised against Herzberger's reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning.

Herzberger's reconstruction does not take into account the two senses of meaning or reference found in the Buddhist texts. In the primary sense of meaning a word refers to an imaginative construction and the meaning of an expression is given in terms of its positive content which is qualified by the exclusion of all other contents. In the secondary sense of meaning a word indirectly refers to reality without specifying any positive content. In our reconstruction of the Buddhist theory we shall see how these two senses of meaning can be represented. Moreover, Herzberger's account does not draw the distinction between the two types of negation present in the meaning- complex expressed by the form 'exclusion of non-A'. For our purpose it is very important to draw a distinction between the first negation which is expressed by the expression 'exclusion' and the second negation which is expressed by the expression 'other than' or 'non'.

IV

Now let us reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning in the light of the above discussion. Our positive thesis can be developed along the line of Herzberger's two-fold proposition, but it differs substantially from his reconstruction. The suggestion of the two-fold proposition has been mentioned in our discussion of the distinction between paryud~sa negation and prasajya- pratis.edha negation. In that context it has been suggested that a negative expression has a commitment aspect and a denial aspect. In an extreme form ofprasa/ya-pratis.edha negation the commitment aspect is reduced to zero. This concept along with the idea of the two-fold proposition or content


would be necessary for our reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of mean-

ing. We would like to draw a distinction between the 'exclusion' operator and

the 'non' operator which occur in expressions like 'exclusion of non-cow'. In this context we can utilise the Nyffya distinction between the relational absence and the mutual absence. The operator 'non' is similar to the operator for the mutual absence of the Nyffya. The operator 'non' divides the universe of discourse into two parts. When it is applied to the expression 'cow', it yields two classes which are mutually exclusive, but their union exhausts the universe of discourse. One class includes only cows, and the other class includes every-

thing other than cows. The law of double negation also holds good with respect to this operator. In this respect this operator is similar to the Nyaya operator for mutual absence. But the 'exclusion' operator when applied to an entity

forms a property. The exclusion o f cow is a property which resides in all objects other than cows. As in the Nyaya the relational absence of the mutual absence of cow is not identical with cow, but with cowness, so the exclusion

of non-cow is not identical with cow, but with the essential qualifier of cow. S~ntaraks.ita, Kamalagna and Ratnakfrti claimed that the meaning of a

term is a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of the other. So the mean- hag of the term ~1' cannot be equated with the exclusion of non-A. The ex-

clusion of non-A is only a part of the meaning of the term ~1 '. Moreover, two different semantic levels are involved in this discussion. The semantic level where the terms 'exclusion' and 'non' occur might be called the level of meaning. But the semantic level where words like 'not-cow' or sentences like

'not-p' occur might be called the level of language. If the Language-Metalanguage distinction is introduced, then the former level would form the object language and the latter level would form the metalanguage.

The meaning of an expression is an ordered pair such that the second member of the ordered pair is a qualifier of the first member, and the first member is a positive entity. The meaning of a term might be represented in the following way:

',4' means (A, exclusion of non-A)

In this meaning-complex the expression 'A' stands for an imaginative construction, and the expression 'non-A' stands for all other imaginative construc-

tions from a given universe of discourse. Moreover, exclusion of non-A, not the expression 'exclusion of non-A', is a qualifier of A.

'74 J .L . SHAW

Now the question is how the word 'A' is related to A which is an element

in the meaning of the word 'A" As an answer to this question it might be suggested that A is the referent of the word 'A '. But A is apprehended as

something qualified by the exclusion of non-A. Now what follows from this interpretation is that we cannot assign a meaning to an expression unless it

has a reference. Since in Buddhist philosophy the primary reference of an expression is an imaginative construction, the Buddhist would claim that every word has a reference unless it is an expression like 'all' or 'knowable' whose meaning cannot be given in isolation.

Now the question is, how do we give the meaning of the word 'not-A'? If we accept Ratnakrrti's definition as a general definition of meaning, then

the meaning of 'not-A' might be stated in the following way:

'not-A' means (non-A, exclusion of other than non-A i.e. exclusion of A)

Here the expression 'non-A' stands for a set of imaginative constructs which does not include the imaginative construct called 'A '. In this context it is to be noted that the expression 'other than non-A' is the same as 'A" So the law of double negation with respect to the operator 'other than' or 'non' holds good.

Now the question is whether the law of double negation holds good with

respect to the operator 'not ' when it is applied to an expression. The Buddhists would claim that 'not-not-A' means the same as 'A '. ~ntaraks.ita and Kamala~a claimed that the sentence ' I t is not that he is not cooking' means

the same as 'He is cooking'. So the law of double negation with respect to the operator 'not ' holds good when it is applied to a word or to a sentence. The

difference between the operator 'non' and 'not ' is this. The operator 'non' is at the semantic level of meaning, while the operator 'not ' is at the level of language. In other words, the former is in the object language and the latter is in the metalanguage.

Now what we have said about the meaning of a word can be said about the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence is an ordered pair such that the second member of this ordered pair is a qualifier of the first member. It can be expressed in the following way:

The sentence 'p" means (p, exclusion of non-p).

Here 'p' stands for a complex imaginative construction, and 'non-p' stands for


all other complex imaginative constructions. The former is qualified by the exclusion of the latter. In this explication the p (or non-p), not the sentence 'p' (or the sentence 'non-p') is a set of complex imaginative constructions. They might be taken as propositions or thoughts in the sense of Frege. It does not matter for our purpose if they are taken as sets of possible worlds.

The negation of a sentence 'p' might be defined in the following way:

The sentence 'not-p' means (non-p, exclusion of other than non-p i.e. exclusion of p)

Here also the expression 'non-p' stands for a set of imaginative constructions which does not include the imaginative construction called 'p', and the law of double negation holds good with respect to the operator 'other than' or 'non'. And 'not-not-p' would mean the same as 'p'.

Now the question is how to explain the indirect reference of an expression to reality. The indirect reference to reality might be called a negative character. isation of reality or it might be called the secondary meaning of an expression. When an expression is taken as indirectly referring to reality or signifying the secondary meaning, the commitment aspect or the first member of the ordered pair of the meaning-comples becomes zero. It can be represented in the following form:

'A' means (0, exclusion of non-A)

Here '0' does not stand for an entity. So no positive entity has been referred to. We are left with a qualifier which excludes all imaginative constructs except A. Now it may be said that the imaginative construct A qualifies reality. But tlus cannot be said because A as an imaginative construct does not appear in the meaning of 'A" What appears in place of A is zero. So we are left with a negative characterisation of reality. The secondary meaning of the expression 'not-A' can be represented in a similar way.

'not-A' means (0, exclusion of other than non-A i.e. exclusion of A)

Here also we are not committed to a positive entity. We are left with a qualifier which excludes A.

Once we accept this type of reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning, the different strands of thought in Buddhism can be reconciled. When it is said that the meaning of an expression is exclusion, what is meant is that the commitment a.~pect of meaning is null. This def'mition is to be

76 J.L. SHAW

taken as our secondary sense of the word 'meaning' or the indirect reference

of an expression or the negative characterisation of reality. But when it is

said that the meaning of an expression is a positive enti ty qualified by the

exclusion of the other, what is intended is our primary sense of the word

'meaning'. Once we introduce two senses of the word 'meaning' , the two-

fold demen t in the meaning-complex, and the two senses of negation, a lot

o f objections raised against the Buddhist theory o f meaning would be wide

of the mark and the Buddhist theory can be brought into the main stream of

contemporary semantics.

V i c t o r i a U n i v e r s i t y o f W e l l i n g t o n

NOTES

*This research was supported by a ~ant from the U.G.C., New Zealand and by a grant from the Internal Research Committee, Victoria University of Wellington. t J .F. Staal (1962). 2 Y. Kajiyama (1973). 3 Ibid, p. 170. 4 Ibid, p. 170. s Ibid, p. 171. 6 Ibid, p. 171. 7 B .K. Matilal (1971). s Ibid, p. 163. 9 W.E. Johnson (1964), p. 174. to D. FL H. Ingalls (1951), B. K. Matilal (1968), and Sibajiban Bhattacharya (1974). tt Sibajiban Bhattacharya (1974), p. 340. 12 Mallav~df. 13 MaUav~dL 14 Mallav~dL ts B.K. Matilal (1971), p. 40. 16 Ibid, p. 41. 17 Ibid. , pp. 44-45. ts Th. Stcherbatsky (1962), vol 1, p. 463. lg Ibid. , p. 463. ao .S~ntarak.sita and Kamala~ila (1937), vol 1, pp. 466-613. 21 Ibid. , p. 536. 22 Ibid. , p. 537. 23 Ibid. , pp. 539-540. 24 Ibid. , p. 562. as Ibid. , p. 567. 26 Ibid. , p. 589. 2~ Ibid. , p. 590. 2s Ibid. , p. 604.


29 1bid., p. 594. 3o Ibid., p. 594. 3~ Ratnakfrti (1969), p. 53. 32 Ibid., p. 53. 33 Hans G. Herzberger (1975). 34 Ibid., pp. 4 -5 . 35 Ibid., p. 5. 36 Ibid., p. 11. 37 1bid., p. 13.

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negation and the buddhist theory of meaning

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