Newlde . , I',wh¢,l. Vol. 3, X~L I. pp. 39 13. 1984 ~1732--1 I SX/,";5 $3.01~ + (I.(111 Iq iIHcd ill ( ;Ical BI [lain PCl gam~m Ptcss [.Id

N E G A T I O N A N D LOGIC IN PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENSES: A B I O P S Y C H O L O G I C A L

PERSPECTIVE*

IFARWOOI) FISHER; (;it}: College of the City Universilv of New York. U.S.A.

This p a p e r sets in place a natural logic o f psychological defenses. Its pa t tern of negat ions is p ic tured as the skeleton organiz ing h n m a n personali ty in the Ribot, Jane t and Freud traditions. T h e under ly ing assumpt ion concern ing the essentials o f individual identity is that the physiology of the person is a scientific point o f d e p a r t u r e for the analysis o f psychological p h e n o m e n a . However , as Jane t observed,

• , . tm en|b |wm qui se forme, ressemble eta qt|elqtte chose a Ja personnalit6, mais il n'en est pas une." I1 faudrait faive une nouvelle distinction.

Comtnellt s6parer ce que not|s appelons une personnalit6 fie ce qui se pv6sente chez ces 0tres-la? Ces 6ues notts mont|ent 6videmment tan travail pour s'unifier.

(1929 1 ). 13.)

In this view, the biology o f the individual is not limited to an under s t and ing of the neurophys io logy of the brain; ra ther the total o rganism is a biological p roduc t o f hoth genetic and social evolution, and its linguistic displays are retlective of the individual 's biologically-hased and socially evolving sell. T h e need for this view is as an al ternat ive to a narrowly conceived presently pol~ular dialectic. On one hand there are compu te r -d r iven models, in which personali ty checks out against a T u r i n g test if the text of a c o m p u t e r genera ted linguistic display is indist inguishable f rom person-talk. On the o ther hand, there is an a t t empt to m a p psychological processes onto tim neurophysiological facts about the brain. A recent p a p e r of Dennet t ' s describes these two t rends (1984).

My thesis, more t'ully deve loped in Fisher, (1984a,b and in press) is that personal i ty may be seen f rom a biopsyctmlogical perspective, but perspect ive inust be compara t ive and it must include a unifying principle, namel~ one of natural logic. In short, the person can be unders tood in relation to biological processes if genetic and social d imensions of o ther organisms are studied to give a full picture o f the evolution o f the individual person. Moreover , the travail

*A version of lhis article was presented as an invited paper at the XXIII linernational Congress <>f l'sych<)logy, Acapulco, Mexico, Sel>tend)cr 3, 19,';4.

~The atltllor is a meml)ev of ttae Cognition, l.anffuage andh!/inmalion l~rr!fl,cl (CIAP) of tl'm City University of New York. Tim present paper is part of a larger effort to dcxelo 1) an understanding of cognitive processes in humans and to si.nul,tte those I)vocesses bv machine.

40 H . Fisher

t e s u h i n g in personal i ty can be t raced t h t o u g h as a natura l logic-systetn, t)\ which the kind o f ~i ld descril)ed 1)y Jane t [and later l)y Muvl)h) (1947) and I)x \,Vt'rncr (1948)] is str iven for and a c h i e \ e d or apl)voxi tnaled.

In this shovl pal)or, F reud ' s focus on i)sychologic:d defenses as cogml ixc i )heno tnena re t lec t ing psxch(>d~t)amics is e x t e n d e d in the di tecl i(m o f th~ + Ihcsis 1 haxe stated. W o r k i n g with concep t ions o f l(>wel o r d e r (Yeat ttYes an([ their g~ttne logic (Roze+ 1972) a wide a r ray o f da ta 1ha,,' I)e m a d e availal)lc to d e \ e h q ) a vic+x o f h u m a n i)sychologi¢al def~+nscs in vct,ttion to i)rimitivc I)henotncl+a <>t I)t+edatov-prey g,tmes. A highl}, sttggestivc I )he t lomenon is tnimicvx. In that phen~mmnon , lower o r d e r c rea tu res make ch, tngcs which range f t o m movl~hol<~- gical to behaviora l and to funcliotlal , l ]owevev, n stud'+ o f the logic o f d~/}'~r~e-O[[e~.~e games is h ighly suggest i \ e fo r the compat+ati~ e perspect ive lowaYd which the present I)apev aims. l ' h c specific p roposa l be ing put fo t th here is thai htllll~tll psychological det}enses, if viewed as t)iot)s+,,choh>gically ovganizt:d by a na tura l logic, would t-eveal the I)asic levels o f de fense tnechanisms ,ts well as the' stYttctt|t-e o f i t ldixidual identilx.

Hutna t l psy¢:hologic,tl de fenses l)vot~)undly ,tflect |he itldividual <m thre~. d imens ions o f pevs<mality: p,s3:+hologic++l, li++g+ui.+lic and h+~i+ol. T h e I)s>tholo~ical involves lhe sell and the pe r son ' s ,txvatelless. T h e linguistic involves tncanit lgs as well as the S\rllt~tcti¢ ol"ganizati<>tl ~)[" lnngttage, ltowe\'eY, cotnmt~nicati~m s~stctns for the ht l tnan <>vgattisnl have well deve loped tier+rotks o f signals within tht- individtial as well as be tween <)tgat~isms. (]<msi<lcv that Ol/e of ten asks onesc l t the" ques t ion, "Shou ld I say this? ̀ + By leaving th;:tt <lttesti<>t+ al{me and "'ltqting the ~ mind xvoYk <m it" toY ~ while, one c;:lll delllOllStl~tle Olle's OXVll iltlt,t- COIllll/tlll[Citti()ll netxvoYk qtlitc easily. 'l+hc answer "'No; l)ettet not, vouY t t iet td will take ttml)Yage '+t]oats ut) like a I>t-int-otit f rom ~ coml}utev that has l)~:¢:n silently working . But one realizes the I)rint-out is only a fv,tgnlent ot~t net o f l e x t s yet to t)e u r n a \ elled. In additiot+, the re is the tnattev o f the iutevcotntntmiCalio~. T h e d ia logue t)etweet~ the above })tq-son and his/hey f r iend cnn also I)e s tudied in te rms o f its own mea t t ing and SVl~tactic sttt~cttiYe. I n d e e d this kind o f s tud \ o t the linguistic display o f a d ia logue of ten sul)stitutes t~>t ;t fulleY t)ictttvt: o t the total linguistic d i m e n s i o n o f person,tlitx. (St~¢:l~+ displays tnav t)e i)erson-to-pcvsot~ as in teaching, legal, a nd ])sychotheral)et t t ic d ia logues , and /o r may I>e COml)Uter- to -pe r son dia logues , which involve s imulat ions in in teract ion with i)ersons.)

" lhc logical dilnensiot~ involves the classes - - <>t the categories - - I)v xvhhh the' pe r son gt-ottl)s exl)eviences and/<n eyelets. In a very ]~toad set~se this ttleatts ~t pe r son has limits ov 1)oundavies nvnihtt)le when she/he represen ts ~.ttl} expe r i ence oY event. It~ this 1)road sense, the limits present a logic svstctn it~ which s o m e t h i n g can I)e in a ca tegory ov not. In logical te rms we s~tx there is a class :tttd :t

cOn+l)letnentary class. This I) toad view would cYoss the I)ottndaYies I)etxVCell xxhat is usttallv t h o u g h t o f as +og;;ilk,+, and what is usttallv t h o u g h t o f as p+';++'/?l;+++[. Accord ing ly , the issue xv<mld I)ecolne o~e o f a comn~¢)n t)it~at\ logic o [ cl;tss¢+s alot~g with a mttltiplicity o f rel)Yesentational s} sterns ( l anguage systctns) dit[t'ritLu , in levels oI- yel)veset~tation :ill(l/<:+1 strategies. [ h a t is, one c~ttt hay{' Y,~+l)Yescnta- tions o f te l )vesentat ions, such as the v svtnl)ol repvese,~ling the nott-t'x¢htsix t' oY, which in ttit-t~ is a rel)rescnt,tti<m o f a class o f vehttio|tshil+s. And ~mc {~til h:+t\c

Negation and logic in psychological defenses 41

other strategies such as p ic tur ing tile fo rm of someth ing as an analog, or s tandardiz ing units in a digital representa t ion .

My way of looking at defense mechanisms is to focus on the use of negation. Picture a natural logic system as a series of classificmions and their complements . On a primit ive level, a decision might be "This stimulus represents someth ing dange rous - - or it doesn ' t ." I f we cross the boundar ies o f ])ercepfiou and cognition with ttlis f u n d a m e l m d appro, tch, then we can imagine a tv,tffic pauevn of negat ions mark i ng the limits o f an individual 's categories, l 'h i s i)aueHl is a guide to how a person ' s toed categorizing lays out, but in addit ion an elemeut ,d s t rucutre of ttle person ' s picture of his ov hey self. T h e re,tsota personali ty is so f tmdamenla l ly involved has re) do with the function ¢)f negat ion in defense mechanisms.

In my work on defeuse mechanisms. 1 have described negat ion as :~ logical maneuxev (Fisher, 1971, 1973). From this vantage point one can exami lw the interaction of deletlses with a psychology o f the sell and with the languages ( representat iotud systems) available to tile person (see Fisher, 1982, 1983. 1984a,b,c). Let me present an example bv which to illustrate the connect ion between defense aud sell.

In the well-knowtl defense of prqjecfion, tile logical negat ion involved affects the category of sell direcdy. So much is this so, lhat if the detensive reasoning predica ted on pvojectiotl as a major premise proceeds t¢> its "'logic,d" conclusion. then the person ' s sense o f identity is at stake. I f a person is commit ted to :t m:~jtw premise, "It is m)l I who thinks o1 does any wrong," the business of cavvyitlg it fi)rwavd t() its logical conclusion involves ;t series of applications to sl)ecific minor premises. Thus , "Who took the cookie? Who thought of taking the cookie.-- Who might have wanted the cookie? Who w;ts hungry? Who has a,) ' selfish sense o[ need?" become ~t series of questions represen t ing oppor tuni t ies ti)v min tn premises to become congruen t with the m;tjor premise of the defense. All the questions C:lll be answered in a fovm It'ml logic,dly reflects "Not I." Typically, the not I c a t e g o r y in projecti<)n allows mlo ther person or persons to I)e stll)slitttte(l in. 'l+he reasoning is simple. I f she/he did it+ it was not I. l h e eXztmple ot + project ion is o f a defense that goes directly' to the heart o f the telatitm of self and defense I)v negat ing Ihe I or the sul)ject. () they deft:rises can be showu to psychologically, linguistically and logically delimit the sell.

Now if the ma t t e r were simple enough to make a syntact ic [l;jllsf])lnl involvi,~g say subject and objett , d len one could have a cOral)leer p r o g r a m such as Kenneth (]oll)~'s. Insuucf ions such as, replace sul)ject with object would xield "I did not hit him; he hit me." Such tratlst~>rtnmg is ,ttttomatic+ ~tll(t revolves :tv()ttnd a logic system st> I):lsic it pe rvades v,tvious levels and strategies <)f representa t ion. T h e neg,ttions of this logic system work t<) delimit the self ill a WaY I can tlescvibe here onl~ briefly, illl(t perhzq)s it~ a word. T h e work of defensive logic is in o[,~posilirm to /tie sell. [See Fisher (1,q,S4a) [~)r an ex tended ¢listussiot~ of this concept ion in relation to Laing's views on the self'.] Moreover , :my tvansfi)vm app roach would have to I)e c ,mdogued as a simtdatit)n of no m o r e lha~ a~ antagonist o f the sell. T h e sell would remain elusive. Hence the ghosts o f the te rms 1 used above, exper ience aud awaren~ess, conle back to hatuH tls. A scientist

4 2 H . Fisher

is no t c o m f o r t a b l e with too m u c h mys te r} , s<) I will o f f e r s o m e a p p r o a c h l~> specif ic i ty . In r e g a r d to these p r o b l e m a t i c ps>chologica t t e rms , the l ingu i s tk d i m e n s i o l i i nvo lved is a m a u e r o [ agency , r l h e logic invo lved is ;t two- s ided d e l l o u e l l l e n [ o f nega t ion" o n e s ide involves t i le fate o f one ' s c a t e g o r i z i n g sts a n a t u r a l a n d evo lv i l lg b ioh)gica l phenomen<~n, a n d the o lhe2 side, l he rclet2tlcss ser ies <>[+ m a n e u v e r s e n s u i n g f r o m a p e r s o n ' s f iercely hem d e f e n s i v e c o m m i t - 211C11[S.

A c c o r d i n g l y , a C o m p a r a t i v e xiew al lows us to sec that < le lcnse-~Alcnsc gamcs

i21 l o w e 2 ()t'g;121iStllS seeIll not t() involve a w a r e n e s s as we wou ld or<linmi]~ <le[inc it. R a t h e r o r g a n i s m s s eem t<) evolve o~el- l ong peri<>ds o f l ime and ~ \ c r a success ion o1 g e n e r a t i o n s , h i bo th i)httn a n d a t d m a l species , dc[Cl2ses tav~witL~ the surv iva l o f ~t I ) a r t i cuhu spec ies man e m e r g e such 1hal the <lcfinitiott <~t the iden t i ty <>flhe i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r <Athat s p e d e s is in ques t ion - - s t t le;tsl ~ts ta r ;t~,

i n t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n is c o m e r n c d . I c i ted m i m i c r y as sm e x a m p l e <~1 this. It~ m i m i c r y t h e r e cmt I)e a d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s m h as a d , m g c in s [ r t t< lme o r in col<>rati<>n. A pre<lat<>r-l)rey gmnc ensucs <>\'er the c<>utse <>l t ime ~,0 llml lht- 2nechani~m has o r has not surv iva l \~tltte. R<)ze a rg t tes <<mvincingly that the om2+c has a logic like that o f t i le Von Neumsttll2 g a m e m a l t i x , m2<l that ove r the cou r se o f ,+'v<)hHio2t s tat is t ical c h a n g e s in t i le C<)l2ecl Hess C,[ the "'<levi<let's" or i)t'lcei'+ er'~, j u d g m e n t c<mcern ing the i<tcntit~ <>t the o r g a n i s m in <t2a~stion can I>c Ira¢ke<l ;~ OlltCO211es ()[' Ihe gS2tlle ~t2t(I p e r h a p s as delet21li2te2s <)t +~VllS2l (le[e2lseS I+tsl <~2 h a \ c to be c l m n g e d in s o m e wa'+. But i l a d r a m a t i c ¢ha22ge like one in t<>lo2ati<m <w it~ s t r u c t u r e can t ake ph2<e, s o m e real lx basic t+leu+ents in l he <lcter2nim21i~m ~)l ;222 Ol'g~221iStlt'S in<livi<hmlitv a r c inv<>l\e<l.

Sttl)l)OSe to accoun t |k>r c h a n g e we a<h)ple<[ a stat~da2<l t : voh t l i omny exl )h tna- t ion. Ever+ il+ we a s s u m e d til t + locus o1 c h a n g e were s o m e h o w drcums<r i lx :<l t<> dev i a t i ons a n d al terat io2ts in the instr t tct i~mal packe t s o l + the g-en<>222t+s <d the c r e a t u r e s , l dott l) t if a2t'+one w o u l d sttgtl0 all s t t th va r i a t ions a rc a n d have always been p r e s e n t as an t t t f l o lded a n d ol/serval>le r ea l i t \ . ' l h e < l e l e n s e - o t l e n s e gslttlt'b o f lower o r g a n i s m s a r e sul>ject t<> e x t e r n a l ( ommt tn i ca l i o l2 e \ ' en t s m1(l e f tee ls , but these in te rac t with s o m e chal2ge wi thin <ng, mistns+ even if that i n t e r ac t ion is picture<l as o n e that l<>llows s<>mc set <fl in<h:l)en<le2ll a n d acci<lcntallx vahtstl>le tnut;2tions. I n d i v i d u a l i t y a n d iden t i ty a r c at issue.

' l ' h e ques t i on o f the a n a l o g i e s I)etwee21 such ;2 p r imi t i ve dele2tsc sls mimicrx a n d the e le2nenta l levels o f a htt2natt I)eing's <lc[enses is <>t2e i a d d r e s s in l : i sher (19Nla ,b) . th~we~er , to t)ut it I>rict+l~ he re , Ihe2c al)t)ea2 It> I)e ;t sc2ics ~>1 a t u o m a t i c <lelensive m a n e u v e r s l )e~@e have when they ass tu l lc l)OSturcs - - rhc to r i ca l l ' , , bchavi<nal lv , func t i<>na l lv - - in o r d e r to rest)on<l t<> <lelcnsc-<d te , tsc s i tua t ions . S i m e these involve l)otil intra-c<mmmnicati<>n isst2cs as ~ell ;~s

inter-comm2ttficati<>n issues, the m a t t e r r e g a r d i n g htt2mtn i<lemit'+ a n d the se l l is very g rave . It ix not m e r c i \ st n m t l e r o f I>htffing the o l h e r guy; it is ;t u m t l c r o | <leceivittg <mescl[ +. l~henomena in<ht<lc a u t o m a t i c imits2tion o f geSlUl,~s <)t <)lllt'l's, o [ s l )ecch p a t t e r n s , v<>icc l )a t te rns , a n d s, ,ntactic l )auerus , bu t it2 ;2d<liti<m, phcn<mtc tm like ide21ti l ication with tlt+= + aggrcss<>2 as ;t r esuh o l a<hth t r a u m a <~2 <)[ e x t r e m e c h a n g e s in the l )a lance o f pox~cr in relati<mshil)s m c inv<d~c<l. : \ t a m o r e I t m < h t m e t m t l level, <~thcr l)hcn~>mcna wou ld i r e h i d e a Imk in the

Negation and logic in psychological defenses 43

difl 'erentiat ion of self f'ronl other . In describing the variety of ways a person may mirro/" someone else, a variety of representa t ions of the self as o ther need to be art iculated on d i f fe ren t levels, such as the ability to represen t empath ic signals within and/or to the self.

In this p a p e r a logic system was chosen to describe the backbone of the person 's travail toward the organizat ion of personality, and the pa t te rn of negat ions in deie'nses was chosen as the point o f compar i son for a biopsycholo- gical view. " lhe major outcomes of these choices are tile following:

(1) It should he possible to track th rough the logical negations of defense to examine how they affect the many layers of sell and sell definition. For exalnple, at a most pr imit ive level, a child can st) complete ly absorb the pa r em ' s behavior and m a n n e r that tile child is seen I)y others as a mimic. This may or may not be seen by tile child him/herselL Moreover , in ex t r eme cases the absorpt ion is so coniplete that the chiM takes not only the assimilated behavior hut also the "sense" of the paren t ' s self to be its own. Where a child feels ov knows there is a d iscrepancy hetween the mimicked behaviors and/or sell and the chikt's sense of individuality, the child feels empty . T h e negat ion here is o f sell. Whe/ 'e the child s tereotypes tile pa ren t the identification can he with some idealized part. Psychoanalysts call this splitting the object. An example is the idolized "good" parent . In this case there is a negal ion of the child's sell, a mimicking of one "side" of the picture o f the parent , and a negat ion by tile child o f the of lmr side of its view of the paren t and t)f its own self.

T o mimic the ideal paren t is to negate the sell by way of two defenses. By mimickil /g the idealized parent tile child exchanges one par/ o f the self. T h e child's logic is fllat f is not I; it is the ( ;ood other. From the point o f view o f g a m e theory, a choice has to be made. One decides who one is. But f)-om the point o f view o f logic, the child violates the logical laws of identity and of contradict ion l)x a t t empt ing to "have it both ways." T h e r e is a mat te r o f natural logic making for a sense of opl)osing categories o f I and lit)/ I. But there is a trick of awareness hv which some aspect o f the I can view this contra(lictovv state of all, ms. In consequence, if the contradic t ion is permi t ted to stand, there follows a profus ion of logical t ransformat ions . T h e pers tm winds u t) with e laborated internal games of opposi t ion. I call these inverted dtJtmse-O/[?,.~e A~cnne,s.

'f<) go <m and elaborate , the second <lele'nsc is one of prt)jection - - or a defm~se like pro.jection. T h e part <if the parent that is not ideal is negated as is any aspect o f that non-ideal al)s<>rhed into the chil<t's assimilation t)f the parent . In this case the child's "had" self can become other persons. T h e logic is "Badness is not me: it is she/he who is I)a(t.'" Now there are many variations of these def}ensive maneuve r s and negat ion patterns. For example , in these inverted games, the person jux taposes various percepts , flipl)ing them over so that now the s tereotype is o f the sell, now it is o f the parent : now the negated s tereotype is not one the self knows; now it is.

One variat ion o f impor t ance is that the child can kee I) the s tereotype of the idealized pa ren t by accept ing the self as had. T h e logic is that the parent and the chiM are e i ther good or bad, but that an individual cannot he hoth. T h e parent is good, and the re fo re cannot be bad. I f bad were done o r t r a n s a c t e d il l the

44 H. Fisher

interaction between parent and child, the child would therefore I)e tilt. bad one. She/he the re fo re cannot t)e good. 1 am citing this logic to show how ,m inversion of the d e [ e n s e - o f f e n s e game becomes not a win between pa rem and child, bm an tuner opposi t ion thin may. be I)inarv (sell VelSUs ide,tl self) ov ternary (sell versus ideal sell versus non-ideal sell). Moreover , in keeping with the view o t logic I am developing here, these categories of sell are descvit),d)le as a series of classes and C O l l l p l e l l l e l / t a l y c l a s s e s itll(t h e l l c e sul~ject u) ,t ( a lc ' t l l t l s ~)1" +.lilsse~, notat ion (see Fisher, 1973, f984b).

In a word, tile child's view of an opposi t ion wifldn the parent ' s character is tivst negated by way of total mimicry. I am not 1; f m n ()fUel. ' f h en , the b,Mness i~ negated in the other . Mimicry is a game of achiexing invuhmvabilitv. "lhe I)()im here is that if the defini t ion ¢)f sell is now as in\ ,uhmrable other , the o ther <umol be bad because to be bad is assailable. We ttletl have a mimicrx of the ideal onlx. t towever , we postulate an inner t o m m u n i ( a t i o n system, f ' h e child (() l l l i l l t leS H) process signals discerning contradict ions in tile other , whether the contradic- tions of ideal and non-ideal ,tre perceived as actually part of tile i )mem's travail or as in the child's self. ( )nee these (lelensive logic games ave set in motion, the \ p roceed in a variety of paue rns of defenses, using negat ion in ways making logical m m s t b r m a t i o n s , displaying linguistic markers a t l e t t ing s~ntax and mean ing dif ferent ly in d i f f e r em defenses, and making constam fliptlops in the person 's defini t ion of sell and of the charac ter of others (see Fisher, 1973, 198tc: in press).

Lastly, since these various opposi t ions m e being mimicked, die child exper iences the inverted games as the sell. While one can make l+aing's a rgunmnt a [?dse sel/i this exper ience of self is ultimately negated if the person 's natural logk has been set in mot ion t)v detenses and keeps rolling on in a dialectic between defense and sell.

(2) It is possible to see the vicissitudes of the individual 's language trallSlOllnil- tions when negat ion is t racked th rough abstract and concrete word meanings. Thus , if a signal system of communica t ion (see for example , ( ; regory, 1980) is assumed, varying levels o f at)straction f rom the presentat ion t~) re- representa t ions o f signals can be described. A primitive presenta t ion may involve a sensory input on some level o f sensation. Subsequently there ~an I)e various t ransmissions and t rans format ions of this presentat ion in ,m organized image which is in te rpre ted . Say that one simple imerpveta t ion is that a given signal represen ts a ti)reign danger . ( ) r ,tt ano the r higher level o f al)stritction, the defensive stance is more clearly articulated. Say that a person veimevprets the dange r by mimicking its power. By a simple tlu+n <)[ natural logit that prover is now not the other : it is tile sell. Such presenta t ions :rod tel)resentat ions can I)e described at d i f fe ren t levels t)f ,tl)stv',tction and in terms of the different linguislic or representa t iona l svstelns of the person. In the case o t the ht tman being, awareness of tile extermtl ( le lense-ofTense games "peol)le pla}" elm lead to a complex inverted game reflected in \r~ltl'iOtlS negations of the usual COll(l-elc- abstract rules of organizat ion. For examples , see Fisher (1.q84c).

(3) By a compara t ive I)iopsychological app roach it is possible t<, identity fundamental d e f e n s e - o f f e n s e games in a \avietv of organisms and to skeuh the

Negation and logic in psychological defenses 45

analogs ill h u m a n though t and behavior. These would include inversions of games and a complex ne twork of defensive negations limiting se l f -o the r deve lopment s and affect ing the organism's overall epistemic systems (Fisher, 1975; in press). Mimicry p h e n o m e n a are widely obserwlble in many di f ferent kinds of organisms. These p h e n o m e n a represen t a p ro found change by way o f natural h)gic and a communica t ion matrix. Analogs in h u m a n (teli:nse mechan isms push ou r unde r s t and ing of the organizat ion of defenses fur ther in the search for ways to free the self.

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Fisher H. (1973) Language and logic: in (tefenses../ommd/br the 77~emy o/Social Behaviom. 3, (2), 137-914.

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Press (in press). Gregory R. 1_ (1980) Perceptions as hypotheses. Phil. Tra~>. R. Soc. 1.mid. 11 290, 181-197. .]anet P. (1929) L'&,olutimt/z~)'cholog'iqm" (le In pe~ommli/~. Nouvelle edition. Paris: La socidlt}

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