Neg States CP

Solvency

Generic Ocean PolicyStates are prepared to take authority on coastline issues – federal action is unnecessary and disruptive.Juda 2006 (Lawrence, Department of Marine Affairs, University of Rhode Island, “The Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy: State Perspectives”, Coastal Management, Jan-Mar2006, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p1-16. 16p, EBSCOHost, Date Accessed: 10 July 2014)

Federal—State Relations Beyond the sensitivities noted earlier, an examination of state responses to the Commission's Preliminary Report indicates general concern for the need of clear and explicit recognition of the role of the states in future ocean management efforts. Indeed, it

appears that many of the states do not feel that their legitimate role in ocean management is sufficiently recognized and that the recommendations of the Ocean Commission in its Preliminary Report are "too federally-oriented." Several states warned against "top-down" and "federal-centric" approach that emphasized federal leadership without due recognition of the "unique responsibilities" of state governments in ocean and stressed the need for a "bottom-up" policy development that allowed for significant input from the states and regions. Quite outspoken was the state of Alaska, which emphasized the "critical role played by state governments with the sovereign authority to control access to ocean and watershed resources." And the state of Georgia observed that: “By our decentralized nature, the States are in many cases better suited and equipped to take on various management challenges. Coordinated state action is, in many cases, the most efficient and effective way of achieving our common national policy objectives. . . [The states] should have a leading role in the development and execution of ocean policies and programs. . .” One term that frequently appears in state comments on the Preliminary Report and the presence of which underscores state concerns is that of “partnership”. As used in the comments of the nation's governors, the term emphasizes the need for federal—state cooperation as opposed to the need for federal directives to the states on ocean management. It is this consideration that appears to be a basic element in the very strong and wide support among the governors for a reauthorization of the Coastal Zone Management Act an action supported by the U.S. Ocean Commission.

States prove to be more competent in managing offshore policy than the federal government.Burger 2011 (Michael, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, “Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond the States’ Territorial Seas”, Environmental Law Reporter: News & Analysis. Jul2011, Vol. 41 Issue 7, p10602-10614. 13p, Environment Complete, Date Accessed: 13 July 2014)

United States has a vested interest in reducing both greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on foreign oil. These national goals would, ostensibly, be of little concern to a state acting in a narrower self-interest. Indeed, the economic account would further argue that states will either be too restrictive in setting standards to site facilities within their jurisdiction in order to prevent unwanted impacts on highly important

local values, or else they will be too lax in order to lure industry to the state. Accordingly, on the conventional federalism account, federal regulation of offshore wind is appropriate. And yet, given the number of conflicting uses of federal waters, and the different scope of effects offshore wind would have on each, it is impossible to say that a uniform rule,

i.e., one-way federal regulatory authority, should govern. Moreover, trends in environmental regulation defy this story. As made evident by state leadership in offshore wind development, as well as in regional and state climate change initiatives, states, when properly constrained and incentivized, are proving themselves competent to act in ways that balance local, state, and federal interests. %us, although there is clearly a sound justification for a dominant federal presence in managing MSP in federal waters, the economic rationale fails to justify an exclusive one.

State action in ocean policy is key to solve political and managerial issues.Juda 2006 (Lawrence, Department of Marine Affairs, University of Rhode Island, “The Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy: State Perspectives”, Coastal Management, Jan-Mar2006, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p1-16. 16p, EBSCOHost, Date Accessed: 10 July 2014)

In regard to the National Ocean Council (NOC) several themes were in evidence. Some states strongly supported the creation of an NOC;32 not only could that body play an important coordinating role but it could also serve the important purpose of raising the public policy visibility of important ocean issues.33 Yet, other states expressed more caution and the view that the proposed NOC should not simply become an

additional layer of an already large federal bureaucracy.34 As to the role that the NOC should play, a number of states, reflecting a degree of frustration with federal government operations, emphasized that, if established, the NOC should serve to reduce duplication, improve efficiency, and further coordination among the myriad federal departments and agencies operating in the ocean/coastal area.35 Concern was expressed by some states that the NOC might duplicate the work of the existing Commission on Environmental Quality36 or that of Coastal America37 or undercut the potential role that could be played by an expanded NOAA. In its Preliminary Report the Commission provided that the membership of the NOC would composed of cabinet secretaries and the heads of independent agencies with ocean responsibilities. This recommendation is based in the view that the NOC would serve a harmonizing function among federal agencies. But with respect to NOC functioning, a variety of states

appeared to perceive the need for coordination in a somewhat different manner than did the Commission. In the view of these states the NOC should not only emphasize cooperation among federal departments and agencies but should also address the need for federal—state coordination and, accordingly, the states stressed the need for their governors to be represented on that body." This recommendation from the states was based in the valid perception that recognition must be given to the states' critical roles in ocean management" and the need for federal—state cooperation and coordination to provide for effective ocean management." Moreover, in the absence of representation of the states on the NOC, some states feared that the likelihood of a federal government "top—

down," as opposed to a desired federal— state partnership approach, would be more likely." The response from the state of Florida warned that the ecosystem-based approach favored by the Commission, and by Florida itself, could not be implemented successfully through a 'federal-centric," top-down system . Likewise, the state of Texas pointed to the need for a "bottom-up" management approach that would take into account the diverse aspects and needs of different communities." The points raised by these states lead to the more general subject of relations in ocean management that is addressed later in this article. The Preliminary Report of the Commission did make provision for representatives of different stakeholder groups, including states, to serve on a new Presidential Council of Advisors on Ocean Policy to be co-chaired by the Chair of the NOC and a non-federal member of the Presidential Council. That states would be accorded the same level of participation on this body as stakeholders representing nongovernmental interests struck a nerve and several states explicitly and sharply noted this as a fundamental problem. In a very strongly worded commentary on this

point, the state of Alaska observed that the Commission's recommendations should be amended to distinguish very clearly between governmental organizations, in particular the states, which had legal responsibility and authority for natural resource management, and nongovernmental organizations that did not have such authority. Alaska noted that "[r]elegating sovereign states that have jurisdiction over many ocean and coastal watershed-related decisions to the same advisory position as nongovernmental organizations and interest groups is inappropriate.” Similarly, Maine stressed that the role of the states is "fundamentally different" from that of nongovernmental organizations and should accorded appropriate recognition on the NOC.4' South Carolina observed that states should not be treated merely as one of a number of stakeholders but rather as an equal partner with the federal government .

AquacultureThe states are effective at aquaculture Hishamunda, Ridler, and Martone, 2014

(Nathaneal, Senior Aquaculture Officer, FAO Rome, Neil, Emeritus Professor of Economics at U of New Brunswick, Elisabetta, FAO consultant, Rome. “Policy and governance in aquaculture: Lessons learned and way forward.” FAO FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE TECHNICAL PAPER 577, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/i3156e/i3156e.pdf> Accessed: 7/14/14 RJS)

The third strategy for enhancing effectiveness and efficiency, namely subsidiarity, is the principle that management should be decentralized unless there is a reason for higher-level intervention. For example, subsidiarity would imply that local

communities are involved with site selection, even determining criteria. The advantage of decentralization is that local knowledge and interests can improve decision-making. It also increases legitimacy and public acceptance of decisions. It may even be a means of promoting aquaculture, because the evidence suggests that public support of aquaculture increases when benefits accrue to local communities, and the public are aware of these benefits (Katrandis, Nitsi and Vakrou, 2003). Equity is critical for sustainability when it refers to intergenerational equity. Natural habitats should not suffer irreversible damage because their total economic value will be negatively affected.

States can do aquaculture – Colorado provesColorado Aquaculture Association, no date

(“About Us.” <http://www.colaqua.org/about-us/> Accessed: 7/14/14 RJS)

Colorado has a rich history of aquaculture development and production . Some of the first fish production facilities in the country were established in this state. Unlike other states located in the southern tier and coastal areas of the U.S., Colorado does not have a reputation as a major producer of aquacultured products. A semi-arid, continental-temperate climate, resulting in a relative scarcity of water, and a land-locked border discourage widespread use of "traditional" forms of aquaculture that require large amounts of flowing or standing water and year-round, sub-tropical temperatures. For many decades, however, cool natural springs located in and near the mountainous areas of the state have been used for the production of several coldwater trout species; most notably, rainbow trout for the recreational and foodfish markets. More recently, producers have begun augmenting natural flow by pumping water from these underground supplies. By far, in terms of sales, rainbow trout is the state's highest-value aquacultured commodity. During recent years, Colorado ranked fifth among all states with total trout sales of about $2.3 million. Despite the seemingly high ranking, Colorado's contribution to total national trout sales of about $87.5 million was relatively small, with Idaho producing nearly 53 percent of the national output of trout as measured by sales. As a result of the relative limitations imposed on traditional aquaculture by the state's natural resources and climate, some individuals and companies have resorted to more innovative approaches and technologies for producing warmwater aquatic organisms. Additionally, they have begun to take advantage of man-made resources and some natural resources that are unique to Colorado. Endowed with abundant sunshine and significant geothermal resources, some producers are turning to indoor, high-density production in water recirculation tank systems as a means to conserve water, to economically heat water for the production of warmwater fishes, and to retain these valuable resources within the production system. When these indoor fish production techniques are coupled with the production of plants (an integrated approach called aquaponics), production and conservation of resources are enhanced even more. These new approaches and technologies have fueled a significant expansion in the number of species that have been, or are currently, produced within Colorado. In addition to trout, the list includes salmon, catfish, tilapia, hybrid striped bass, largemouth bass, muskellunge, sunfishes, yellow perch, walleye, grass carp, ornamental (aquarium) species, freshwater shrimp, alligator, and others. Complementing the interest in the private sector in new aquaculture opportunities, Colorado state government restructured its jurisdiction over aquaculture activities. Fish production has now been formally recognized as an agricultural pursuit and is entitled to the same kinds of benefits and incentives as other agricultural activities. Lobbying efforts funded by the Colorado Aquaculture Association, a state-wide organization of aquaculture interests, were instrumental in the passage of legislation to implement this crucial change in government oversight and improve the regulatory climate for aquaculture in the state.

States can do aquaculture – WisconsinLovell, 2001

(David L. Senior Analyst, Wisconsin Legislative Counsil. “WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL INFORMATION MEMORANDUM.” September 4, 2001. <http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/im/im_2001_06.pdf> Accessed: 7/14/14 RJS)

In the second half of the 20th Century, especially in the last two decades, fish farming in Wisconsin grew to the point that it could be called an industry. To address the needs of this growing industry, state study groups were formed involving state agencies, the University of Wisconsin (UW) and the industry. Important reports were published in 1988 and 1997 that identified barriers to the further development of aquaculture in Wisconsin and recommended actions to be taken to overcome those barriers. Throughout this period, the growing industry increasingly saw itself as an agricultural activity. Although the state’s concerns in regulating this industry were unchanged, there was a growing acceptance that the way that it was regulated should change. In addition, many saw a conflict in the fact that the DNR regulated commercial fish producers but

was itself a producer of fish for stocking in the waters of the state. In the 1997-98 Legislative Session, the Legislature created a new scheme for the regulation of aquaculture, based on the view of aquaculture as an agricultural activity. It transferred the primary oversight functions from the DNR to the DATCP and replaced the licensing requirement with a simple registration. It expanded the DATCP’s fish health responsibilities and retained for the DNR adequate regulatory authority to allow that agency to continue its role in the protection of the waters of the state and wild fish stocks.

States can do aquaculture - empirics proveNoble, 1993

(Martha L. University of Toledo College of law. “FRESHWATER AQUACULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES: COMPLYING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW & POLICY.” <http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/1993/acte-1323.pdf> Accessed: 7/14/14 RJS)

CONCLUSION If not properly located and managed, freshwater aquaculture operations have the potential to adversely affect

environmental quality. The regulatory framework for minimizing or preventing environmental harm is rather complex. State cooperative extension services do provide some guidance to aquaculturists in coping with the regulatory system. In addition, the legislatures of many states have directed that state agencies coordinate regulatory procedures that apply to aquaculture . The Mississippi legislature has gone further by requiring that the all governmental entities involved in the regulation and enforcement of aquaculture activities develop a coordinated procedure for one-stop permitting applicable to aquaculture activities. Under this system, an aquaculturist fills out a joint application form and deposits it with any one of the regulatory agencies. The agency with which the application is deposited is required to forward the copies of the joint application to appropriate agencies for review and expeditious action. The one-stop permitting procedure document includes time schedules for review of the joint application and for action by the agencies after the permit has been received and dated31 . Perhaps such a procedure will enable aquaculturists to consider and incorporate sound environmental practices into their plans and operations with a minimum of frustration and expense.

States need to manage aquacultureShehadeh and Pedini in 1997, Z.H. and M., http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w7499e/w7499e24.htm

The management of aquaculture has become a complex task. The challenges associated with sustainable development demand interdisciplinary and intersectoral strategies. These will require, inter alia, access to information on a variety of topics, and to efficient tools to integrate and analyze multidisciplinary and intersectoral data. Development in the absence of reliable information, planning and management would have to proceed under conditions of high uncertainty about the impact of selected policy directions and development

plans. In recognition of this, Article 9.2.4 of the CCRF urges that: "States should establish appropriate mechanisms, such as data bases and information networks to collect, share and disseminate data related to their aquaculture activities to facilitate co-operation on planning for aquaculture development at the national, regional and international level."

Renewables

States can implement ecosystem-based management and regulate renewables most effectivelyBurger 2011 (Michael, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, “Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond the States’ Territorial Seas”, Environmental Law Reporter: News & Analysis. Jul2011, Vol. 41 Issue 7, p10602-10614. 13p, Environment Complete, Date Accessed: 13 July 2014)

This Article assumes that ecosystem-based ocean management is an achievable and desirable goal, and MSP is an

appropriate means to reach it. The regional approach advanced by the National Ocean Council is undoubtedly a sound one. However, as currently constituted, the National Ocean Council is an intergovernmental entity with an uncertain funding base, designed to serve a coordinating function. Its regional plans will have little, if any, legal import. This leaves

ecosystem-based management and MSP toothless in the very real conflicts over how to use ocean space. State-based MSP in federal waters, as exemplified by the RI O-SAMP, could more deeply imbed these key principles in present-tense decision making. Whether one approaches the issue from the top-down perspective of regional planning or the bottom-up approach of state-based

planning, the three-mile line dividing state and federal jurisdiction interferes both with the implementation of MSP and the achievement of ecosystem-based management. The CZMA bridges the regulatory divide by granting states a limited authority over projects in federal waters; the limits on this authority are sufficient to allow states to go further than they have in the past , and, within the constraints of the CM P approval

process and consistency review, to study, map, plan, and possibly even zone future uses in proximate federal waters. On a theoretical level, there are significant advantages to greater regulatory diversity and experimentation in the evolving fields of offshore wind and offshore renewable energy production, while the advantages of a more centralized approach are, to an

extent, already captured by the CIMA and NOA.% 2009 regulations. Thus, recognizing the federalism choice before them, federal agencies, states, and courts should opt in to state planning in federal waters.

EnergyOnly the states solve energy efficiencyCarlson 2008<Ann E. Carlson, Commentary, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 63 (2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/ vol107/carlson.pdf>

California first began regulating appliance standards in the 1970s, and New York and Minnesota quickly followed. These states regulated appliance standards in order to overcome a market failure: appliances are often purchased not by those who will pay utility bills (renters/lessees of commercial and residential property and owners of new homes) but by developers and landlords, whose incentives are to

purchase appliances with the cheapest initial cost rather than those that provide long term energy savings. In response to state regulatory activity in setting appliance standards, the federal government stepped in. In 1978 Congress enacted legislation that in large measure preempts states from adopting their own standards if the federal government has adopted a standard for the product at issue. States can apply for a waiver of preemption requirements for products with federal standards, but to date the Department of Energy

(“DOE”) has rejected the only waiver request that has been submitted—California’s 2006 petition for a waiver for

residential clothes washers. The standards for a waiver of preemption requirements are tough to meet: under the Energy Policy Act a state needs to show that more stringent state regulation is necessary to meet “unusual and compelling State or local energy or water interests” that “are substantially different in nature or magnitude than those prevailing in the United States generally.” States must also seek a waiver to regulate products that lack federal standards, but generally speaking the DOE has granted such waivers liberally. Essentially, then, we have federal standards for major appliances (central air conditioning, heat pumps, furnaces, boilers, refrigerators, freezers, washers, dryers ovens dishwashers, etc.) and state standards for

less significant appliances (hot tubs, pool pumps, compact audio products, and DVD players, to name a few). Federal preemption of appliance standards is not problematic if federal authority is used effectively. If the aim of federal regulation is to promote improved energy efficiency, however, the federal government’s track record to date is not promising. Over the past forty years, federal performance on appliance standards has often included delay in implementing enabling legislation followed by litigation, grudging compliance, and the adoption of relatively weak standards. Weak standards obviously produce fewer energy savings and hence fewer greenhouse gas emissions reductions than stronger ones. Delay in the context of climate change has clear significance given the long shelf life of various greenhouse gases—100 years for carbon dioxide, for example—and the resulting accumulation of gases in the atmosphere. Federal foot-dragging in setting appliance standards began in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, passed in 1978, mandated energy efficiency standards for thirteen appliances if the regulations could be economically justified. In 1982 the DOE announced

that it would not issue any standards. NRDC v. Herrington, a 1985 D.C. Circuit decision, overturned the DOE’s regulatory declination.

Federal planning of energy fails- only decentralization can solveHiremath et al, 2007<Decentralized energy planning; modeling and application—a review R.B. Hirematha, S. Shikhab, N.H. Ravindranathb, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews Volume 11, Issue 5, June 2007, Pages 729–752, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032105000894>

The energy-planning endeavor involves finding a set of sources and conversion devices so as to meet the energy requirements/demands of all the tasks in an optimal manner. This could occur at centralized or decentralized level. The current pattern of commercial energy oriented development, particularly focused on fossil fuels and centralized

electricity, has resulted in inequities, external debt and environmental degradation. For example, large proportions

of rural population and urban poor continue to depend on low-quality energy sources and inefficient devices, leading to low quality of life. The current status is largely a result of adoption of centralized energy planning (CEP), which ignores energy

needs of rural areas and poor and has also led to environmental degradation due to fossil fuel consumption and forest degradation. CEP exercises cannot pay attention to the variations in socio-economic and ecological

factors of a region, which influence success of any intervention. Decentralized energy planning (DEP) is in the interest of efficient utilization of resources. The regional planning mechanism takes into account various available resources and demands in a region. This implies that the assessment of the demand supply and its intervention in the energy system, which may appear desirable due to such exercises, must be at a similar geographic scale. In this regard, the district is accepted as the

appropriate planning level. Planned interventions to reduce energy scarcity can take various forms such as (a) energy conservation through promotion and use of energy-efficient stoves for cooking and water heating, compact fluorescent bulbs in place of ordinary incandescent bulbs, (b) supply expansions through energy plantations and (c) alternatives—renewable sources of energy such as micro/mini/small hydro power plants, wind, solar and biomass-based systems. Energy planning models have been reviewed earlier by Jebaraj and Iniyan [1] focusing on macro or national level models. Another review article on computer-aided modeling and planning has been presented by Sagie[2]. A review of more than 90 published papers by Pohekar and Ramachandran [3] focused on neural networks and analysed the applicability of various methods and models. The focus of this paper is to review the different DEP models and approaches.

EnvironmentState enforcement of environmental issue is more responsive—states are better equipped to monitor and fix environmental problems Kuehn 95 (Robert R., “The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws”, Tulane Law Review 70, Page 2373-2397, HeinOnline)

A more practical justification for state enforcement is the claim that decentralized enforcement is more flexible and responsive than enforcement by a centralized agency such as EPA. The provisions in federal statutes

allowing a state to attain authorization to enforce the federal program reflect the belief that the level of government closest to the environmental problem should be the primary enforcer, provided By being closer to the problem, state enforcement agencies, in theory, can obtain better information on the nature of the compliance problem. States have more interaction with the regulated community and are better able to monitor their compliance.32 It is not surprising, therefore, that ninety percent of environmental inspections are performed by state environmental agencies?’ EPA simply does not have the resources or physical proximity to monitor and inspect sources in fifty states, and it may be at a particular disadvantage in trying to respond to a situation that requires rapid governmental action. State enforcement officials also may be more responsive to local needs and conditions than federal officials who do not reside in the area?’ This could result in more enforcement, if enforcement policies and procedures provide for citizen input and if officials are sensitive to citizen concerns. Conversely, it could give the regulated community greater access to the agency’s personnel and more influence over enforcement decisions. At least with the enforcement of hazardous waste site cleanups by state agencies, citizens want expanded federal involvement because they view states as “more readily subject to political pressure from industry.”35

State action is key to effective environmental policyKoehn 8 (Peter H., Professor of Political Science at the University of Montana, Global Environmental Politics Volume 8, Number 1, “Underneath Kyoto: Emerging Subnational Government Initiative and Incipient Issue-Bundling Opportunities in China and the United States”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v008/8.1koehn.html)

For the most part, China's cities and provinces have not yet adopted policy strategies that address GHG emissions directly.147 Nevertheless,

the subnational government initiatives that are starting to affect GHG emissions in China and in every region of the United States carry widespread public appeal because the co-benefits of mitigation are highly valued at the grass-roots level. In an impressive group of US states and cities, and increasingly at the local level in China,

public concerns about air pollution, consumption and waste management, traffic congestion, health threats, the ability

to attract tourists, and/or diminishing resources are legitimizing policy developments that carry the co-benefit of

controlling GHG emissions. Collectively, expanding and emerging subnational government efforts to promote renewable

energy, reduce urban air pollution, [End Page 71] and embrace emission-reduction targets "constitute a diverse set of policy innovations rich with lessons" for climatic stabilization. In an environment of multilayered politics, the strengths of decentralized governmental systems include enhanced competition, innovation, experimentation, and adaptation to local conditions.149 Thus, it is not surprising that local policy framing enables subnational levels of government to become "more capable and innovative than their central-level counterparts"150 in the climatic-change arena. Eventually, local emission-mitigation initiatives will need to be enhanced by increasingly proactive national governments. Although climate protection cannot be addressed entirely at the subnational level, in China and the United States today the principal issue-bundling

impetus for emissions-mitigation-policy and consumptive-behavior change is bubbling and spreading from the bottom up. Maximizing the capacity of subnational governments to deal with the daunting climatic-change challenges raised by population and consumption trajectories in both countries requires that additional US states and cities, and

Mainland provinces, municipalities and townships adopt politically palatable framing strategies. In order to take full advantage of

arising opportunities to influence individual and collective behavior, local authorities must be trusted and transparent and their framings must be "credible and persuasive."151 A co-benefits framing strategy that links individual and specific community concerns for morbidity, mortality, stress reduction, and healthy human development for all with GHG-emission limitation/reduction and renewable-energy development is especially likely to resonate powerfully and non- competitively at the subnational level throughout China and the United States.

Voters would rather have environmental policy be regulated by the states—federal regulation can’t make judgment that will be in the best interest of all statesAdler 98 (Jonathon H., “A New Environmental Federalism”, Forum for Applied Research & Public Policy Vol. 13, 1998, http://home.earthlink.net/~jhadler/federalism.html)

America is a broad and diverse country, and environmental concerns, preferences, and problems vary from place to place. The local and regional nature of many environmental problems means that local knowledge and expertise is necessary to develop proper solutions. Such localized knowledge is inevitably

beyond the reach of even the most intrepid federal regulators. For example, the most effective and equitable strategy for controlling ozone precursors will vary from city to city depending upon the local mix of stationary and mobile sources, the relative age of the automobile fleet, and dominant weather conditions. As University of Kansas law professor Henry Butler and Cornell law professor Jonathan Macey noted in

a recent study, "Federal regulators never have been and never will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources."10 One-size-fits-all can very easily become one-size-fits-nobody. Moreover, when policies are nationalized, it can become difficult to address the concerns of those communities that suffer disproportionately from policy errors or omissions. Local environmental concerns must compete against national political priorities. A small town that needs to devote resources to improving the quality of its drinking water must compete for federal funds and attention with whatever environmental concern is

on the evening news. Federal agencies and national politicians are less responsive to local needs than more local institutions and officials. As Mary Gade explains, "States are closest to their constituents and problems, bringing a necessary sensitivity and perspective to local environmental issues that even EPA’s 10 regional offices, often many hundreds of miles away, can’t have."11 The public’s broad support for environmental protection is often confused

with public support of existing policies, in particular, and an extensive federal role in environmental policy more generally. Yet when voters are given the choices as to which level of government they would prefer to direct environmental policy, they almost invariably choose state and local governments over the federal government . In 1996, a national poll of registered voters found that Americans, by a margin of nearly two-to-one, would choose to have most environmental priorities set at the state or local level rather than in Washington. Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg also found that "for ordinary citizens, devolution is a way of making the environmental regime more responsive, more flexible and sensible."13

FishingEmpirics prove that the Federal Government has implemented catch shares wrong, the states can do it betterCCA ’13 (Coastal Conservation Association, States Vs. Feds – Not A Moment Too Soon, http://www.joincca.org/articles/604, accessed: 7/13/14 GA)

You could say that the wheels have fallen off federal fisheries MANAGEMENT of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. It’s been a downward spiral for many years, and it culminated this year with the announcement of a 27-day recreational season, followed by a revolt by the Gulf states over territorial waters and the implementation of inconsistent regulations. The feds say 27 days is the best they can do. The states, which know a thing or two about how to manage wildlife resources, disagree. Federal legislation has already been filed by REP. JO BONNER OF ALABAMA, and more is undoubtedly on the way, to cut through the chaos and have the states take back control of fisheries MANAGEMENT. CCA fully supports these efforts for greater state management and nothing makes it clearer that it’s the right way to go than

the latest news from NOAA Fisheries. On March 28, THE FEDERAL REGISTER POSTED the opening of a comment period for an exempted fishing permit (EFP) for the Gulf Headboat Cooperative to run a two-year pilot program to allow a select group of headboats to use catch shares to run their BUSINESS . We WARNED ON MARCH 7 that

something like this was likely to be attempted as the fisheries situation in the Gulf deteriorates. While the states, other headboat businesses, and the recreational sector as a whole deal with a 27-day season, this pilot PROGRAM proposes to take a portion of the meager recreational quota and give it to a select group of people to use as their own, whenever they want, however they want. In its APPLICATION for the EFP, the Gulf Headboat Cooperative graciously nominated 11 boats owned by seven of its own members to participate in the pilot program, which is supposed to give NOAA Fisheries an idea of how catch shares will work in the recreational sector. The pilot program was recommended last year by the Gulf Council’s Ad Hoc Headboat Advisory Panel, which happened to include four of the Cooperative’s members who selflessly volunteered to receive their own private catch

share. It is a mystery what remains to be learned about catch shares. The COMMERCIAL sector, which has 51 percent of the total allowable catch of snapper in the Gulf, already operates under a catch share system. Those businesses were literally given a percentage of fish based on their past catch history to use as they see fit, too. The commercial program was initially presented as a way to address a number of problems in that sector for the greater good of the resource and the public, but it was manipulated beyond recognition. In a classic bait-and-switch scenario, it devolved into an almost untouchable resource giveaway that has created a snapper-

baron class of about 350 commercial businesses that now control 51 percent of all the red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. If the program had been allowed to operate as initially conceived, it may have produced a far different and better result, but that is not what happened. There is no reason to think a catch share system for headboats will produce anything different. NOAA Fisheries has plenty of experience with catch shares – how they’re used and manipulated in the commercial sector, all those strangely low transaction costs to avoid paying administrative fees, all those sweet inside deals to family members, etc. They know from more than six years of experience that the program has never generated enough revenue to even pay for its own MANAGEMENT. They know they are making a few people rich by giving away a valuable public resource for absolutely free to private businesses that succeed by figuring out how to get the most out of the ocean while giving the least back. They know they are ignoring even their own economic evidence of how to best use the resources in their charge, and they know it will be virtually impossible to undo those programs once they get started. NOAA Fisheries knows all that, but is willing to look past those details because catch share systems make the lives of federal fisheries bureaucrats easier. It reduces the number of boats and people fishing, and that means it is easier to count every fish those few people catch. MORE fish concentrated on fewer boats is all good to NOAA Fisheries because the agency simply does not have the tools or the will to actively manage resources like the states.

The recreational sector is too big and unwieldy for NOAA to manage – it would rather just count fish. Do the states waste time and resources trying to count every duck or dove that recreational hunters shoot every year? No. Does anyone know exactly how many trout or reds recreational anglers caught in Texas or Louisiana, for example, last

year? No. If managers do their jobs right, it doesn’t really matter. The states know that successful MANAGEMENT – the kind that produces healthy, vibrant populations that can be enjoyed widely by their citizens and become economic engines – takes a commitment that goes far beyond counting carcasses. By allowing this pilot program

to see the light of day, NOAA Fisheries seems stuck promoting the one thing it can manage to do – implement

catch share programs, give away marine resources to select businesses, and count fish. If the public gets shut out in the process, that’s an acceptable byproduct. This is the path that has led the states to square off against the federal GOVERNMENT over fisheries, and it’s a fight that hasn’t come a moment too soon.

IFQ’s work better under the state’s managementBrady ‘08 (Fixing problems in fisheries—integrating ITQs, CBM and MPAs in management by Mark Brady 07/02/08 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X08001073)

Together the management, exclusion and alienation rights are referred to as the control rights because these allow the holder to both

transform the resource and regulate access. The basic characteristic that makes an ITQ-system work (in certain circumstances) is the creation of well-defined withdrawal rights, i.e., the right to land a certain quantity of fish or even generate effort. Withdrawal rights can though be designed in a number of different ways and even the withdrawal right itself might be subdivided—to advantage as Townsend et al. [11] show—into component rights such as the entitlement share, annual catch allocation and license to fish. In an ITQ-system individuals hold the right to withdraw fish, but rights for a group could be helpful when

implementing a co-management regime. The right to manage, such as setting catch limits, is in most cases separated from the right to fish, but there are cases where fishers also have management rights. Whichever the case withdrawal and management rights are hardly independent of each other. A fishery is more likely to function well if the participants

believe in the system of management [12]. Consequently, a system where participants feel separated from management is not likely to have their support and hence more likely to fail. The allocation of rights might also affect the opportunity for management reform. A fishery in which individual fishers have secure interests is more likely to accept management actions that are costly in the short run, such as increasing mesh size, but promise positive effects on future

catches because they will reap the gains and not risk sharing these with newcomers. In the economics literature the discussion of fishing rights tends to focus on the quality of rights rather than the type of rights per se. Rights should be well-defined in terms of exclusivity, security, permanence and transferability [13], [14] and [15]. The better the quality of rights the better markets for rival and/or exclusive goods such as fish function. Political scientists and sociologists on the other hand tend to focus on the type of rights and associated evolution of use rules [16]. The type of rights has bearing on factors such as the distribution of wealth and acceptance of a system: issues more related to equity than efficiency from the economist's perspective. Both aspects are of course essential for the success of a management system. Natural scientists on the other hand tend to rely on the States right to protect biodiversity through MPAs and other restrictions on fishing.

Centralized fisheries management can’t solve, states are best to provide incentives to fishers Sutinen in 2003(Angling management organizations: integrating the recreational sector into fishery management Jon G Sutinena, Marine Policy Volume 27, Issue 6, November 2003, Pages 471–487 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X03000794)

First, while centralized approaches may involve the public in fishery management, it is impractical to keep all parties informed on detailed issues and solicit their views on all issues. Accordingly, decision-making is usually

delegated to small groups that may not adequately represent the diverse interests that are affected by the decisions. Fishers justifiably feel excluded from the process, and view the resulting rules as imposed by others who do not share their interests. Hence, overly centralized fishery management often loses the trust and confidence of fishers. The rules have little legitimacy in the eyes of fishers, who are not willing to comply with the rules unless coerced to do so by

enforcement authorities. Second, centralized management approaches tend to establish common rules for nearly all aspects of fishing activity over large spatial scales. This approach is partially justified on the basis of biological

considerations, since stock status must be evaluated at broad spatial scales. The conventional approach to management adopts this biological

scale as the unit for management and for establishing rules of use. However, the use of the same broad spatial scale for establishing management rules threatens the ability of management to achieve socioeconomic objectives. In general, the broader the spatial scale, the more the diverse the interests of fishers, and the greater the difficulty in designing rules that are optimal for all. Acceptable compromise is often difficult to achieve. The inappropriateness of common rules tends to alienate

fishers, who often feel excluded from meaningful participation in management decisions. Third, a decentralized system can draw on the knowledge and social networks available in local communities. It is well known that regulations are more effective when developed and implemented with extensive involvement by fishers. Resulting regulations are more appropriate for local circumstances and fishers are more willing to monitor one another and to comply with the regulations since they feel that they have a stake in the management program. In addition, we expect that fishers will be more willing and able to invest some the increased economic benefits from properly managed fisheries towards research, enforcement and habitat improvements.

Federally governed fishery management is less effective than state governanceJentoft in 2007 (Limits of governability: Institutional implications for fisheries and coastal governance by Svein Jentoft Marine Policy Volume 31, Issue 4, July 2007, Pages 360–370 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X06001266)

What organizational models out there have these capacities, or has that wheel yet to be invented? Interactive governance theory has a strong belief in the merits of “public–private partnerships”, a model that combines the governing capabilities that the state, market and civil society can provide. The governing system does not have be a unitary system—one large organization that includes everything. Rather, it would need to be a system of governing subsystems and mechanisms. It would employ legal, economic and organizational incentives, tailor-made for the task and the situation. It would

exercise a combination of what interactive governance theory calls “first, second and meta-level” governance [10]: it would need to be concerned with day-to-day and practical aspects and their institutional frameworks, as well as the ethical and social principles underpinning the whole governing exercise. Finally, macro- as well as micro-governance would be required. Macro-governance does not necessarily have to be hierarchical, but the subsidiarity principle often demands that the state

become involved. The state, after all, has a vantage point and a repertoire of tools that other stakeholders do not have. Who governs the governing system is a question with no easy response. The answer, for most practical purposes, would be the state and the legislature, from which it draws its authority. But sometimes

the governing sub-systems require the active involvement of authorities both lower and higher than at state level. The need for more decentralization may be obvious in fisheries and coastal governance if we follow the subsidiarity principle but so, too, is the need for global governance, since ecosystem boundaries do not follow national boundaries and globalization makes fisheries, fisheries and coastal affairs more and more complex at a level beyond the state. What the proper institutions are at these levels, and how they could become a reality, is a question yet to be determined. This is our final issue.

Off Shore WindThe three-mile state territory policy is arbitrary – lack of state jurisdiction expansion perpetuates state/gov’t conflict.Wilder 1992 (Robert Jay, Ph.D., M.A., B.A. from U.C. Santa Barbara and a Law Degree from University of San Diego Law School, “The Three-Mile Territorial Sea: Its Oryigins and Implications for Contemporary Offshore Federalism”, Virginia Journal of International Law Volume 32 (1991): 681., Date Accessed: 14 July 2014)

Besides its leading role in international affairs, the three-mile limit has had far-reaching implications for American federalism as well.5 After its creation in the late eighteenth century, both the states and the federal government assumed that the states had exclusive ownership of this narrow offshore belt; this belief would go uncontested for roughly a century and a half. Not until the "Tidelands Controversy" of the mid-twentieth century would federal officials assert an interest in owning the resources of the territorial sea. The ensuing debate between the states and federal government ended in 1953 with the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) and its companion Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act (OCSLA).6 By these Acts the states regained control of the three-mile sea while the federal government won exclusive control of the outer continental shelf (OCS). For legal purposes, the federal OCS was defined as extending from three to two-hundred miles offshore. 7 This Article will reconsider the historic events that led to this resolution dividing state and federal authority three miles seaward. Of course, in light of the many years that have passed since the adoption of

the state-federal division and given the weight our legal system attaches to stare decisis, one might ask whether historic antecedents ought not now be considered moot. Put another way, given the many years since the adoption of a U.S. three-

mile limit and its domestic application dividing state and federal authority, can the original rationale that gave rise to the present structure of offshore federalism still be significant today? In a word, The current significance of the rationale stems from the fact that the division of authority has led to marked inconsistency in the management of offshore Unsurprisingly, this is particularly so where state and governments pursue conflicting goals within their respective zones at sea. For example, management of offshore oil and gas has proven especially unwieldy since state and federal governments have adopted clearly opposing policies toward new development-8 Even though many coastal states are strongly opposed to new offshore development,9 agencies within

the federal government seek to expand production beyond the three-mile This Article argues that because the three-mile measure was originally adopted as an arbitrary figure, and because this division was itself adopted nearly forty years ago, the present management regime should be reconsidered in light of the much greater uses now being made of the shelf. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that were the question of offshore governance reopened for debate, the coastal states would today accept a scheme wherein they could control a narrow three-mile belt while the federal government enjoys exclusive control of the much broader OCS. It is suggested here that rather than perpetuate the fragmentation inherent in this division, a approach based On Shared

State/federal governance should be substituted for the management of offshore oil and gas.13 Joint management will require the extension of state jurisdiction but not sovereignty beyond three miles, thereby creating a zone of co-extensive authority and

state/federal partnership. 14 The goals are to achieve more integrated offshore management and to structure the governance regime so it is cognizant that environmental impacts of offshore development are transboundary in nature and may be felt throughout an entire ecosystem. Significantly, extension of state authority is now more than just an issue of hypothetical debate. To wit, the Western Legislative Conference of the Council of State Governments recently approved a resolution that calls on Congress to extend states' boundaries to twelve miles offshore. 15 Legislation to carry out this resolution was introduced in Congress in 1991.16 These current events provide substantial evidence that

traditional assumptions regarding offshore federalism are beginning to be reassessed. In the words of the Congressman who introduced the legislation: [A]n offshore limit of three miles, or ten and a half miles for the Florida Gulf Coast and Texas, historically was accepted as the most appropriate distance for state jurisdiction. And under the common law system we inherited from the

British, a decision that is adhered to remains the law. But the three-mile limit was not a decision based on unchallengeable data. Because the limit was derived from archaic facts, it should now be reevaluated in view of the things we are trying to protect. The circumstances existing when the three-mile distance was created have since changed; extension of state jurisdiction is the logical thing in the 1990's.17 Assuming that the extension of state jurisdiction is indeed the logical thing for the 1990's, this discussion will begin by the modern status of the three-mile

territorial sea and the significance of that limit today. Both international and domestic settings are briefly addressed. It will be shown that the three-mile measure of territorial sea has passed from the scene for international purposes, while on the domestic front it

needlessly perpetuates the division of state and federal authority offshore. The discussion then reconsiders the historical rationale underlying this measure of territorial seas. This involves a review of events that shaped claims to offshore jurisdiction. Beginning with the open seas of ancient Rome, an expansion of claims seaward will be traced to their broadest limits as reflected in Iberian pretensions of the sixteenth century. The modern preference for freedom of the seas is then evidenced by a general contraction culminating in

the eighteenth century invention of the three-mile limit. Next, the Tidelands Controversy is discussed. This struggle between state and the federal governments over ownership of the submerged lands is shown to have established the foundations for the regime that exists today. The Article concludes with a look forward to alternatives for domestic offshore governance in the 1990's, focusing on the modern push to extend state jurisdiction to twelve miles offshore.

Decentralization GoodDecentralization improves economic, political, and environmental efficiency in offshore projects.Burger 2011 (Michael, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, “Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond the States’ Territorial Seas”, Environmental Law Reporter: News & Analysis. Jul2011, Vol. 41 Issue 7, p10602-10614. 13p, Environment Complete, Date Accessed: 13 July 2014)

Thus, CZMA consistency review extends the states' reach beyond the three-mile line authorizing review of federal projects and federal approvals in federal waters; the RI OSAM P, through its incorporation into the RI C MP, could

result in an even greater degree of state control over federal waters, allowing it to prospectively plan for future rather than merely responding to individual projects and their inevitable conflicts, as they arise . In any of the projected scenarios, the CIMA sufficiently constrains state authority by, first, requiring consideration of national interests in the CMP, and, retaining ultimate federal power through federal agency overrides and the appeals process. Ill. Federalism Choice The CZMA's statutory

and regulatory scheme may allow for it, but does it make sense, on a theoretical level, to empower states to study and delineate priority and/or exclusive uses for areas in federal waters? Typically, cooperative federalism scholarship examines targets for environmental regulation within state borders and seeks to determine whether federalization or decentralization would achieve an "optimal" result .107 In this instance, the direction of

power is reversed, as states may seek to influence or control decisions made in federal territory. This reversal alters the balancing, but many of the factors in the analysis remain the same, so it is worth recalling the conventional accounts. Several dominant rationales weigh in favor of federalization of environmental law: the need to address the interrelated problems of interstate externalities, the "race to the bottom," and "not in my back yard" opposition (NIMBY- ism); the efficiencies gained through federal uniformity; the benefits derived from pooling resources for gathering technical information, generating scientific knowledge, creating durable rules, and providing for enforcement; the potential for greater diversity of interest group participation; and the mobilization around national-moral imperatives. On the

flip side, it is often argued that decentralization may provide a means to a number of valuable ends: decision making that is both more democratic and more responsive to local preferences; decision making that is tailored to local environmental conditions; regulatory and policy innovation; adaptive management or other experimentalist or "New Governance" regimes; and interjurisdictional competition that can lead to economically efficient regulation.

Answers To

PermPerm can’t solve - If the issue is important, the federal government will use the supremacy clause, gun control and health care proveQuattlebaum ’13 (Jeremy, professor of constitutional law at Leonore Annenberg University, What happens when states enact

legislation that contradicts federal laws?, Leonore Annenberg University, http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/speakouts.aspx?name=what-happens-when-states-enact-legislation-that-contradicts-federal-laws-&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1, accessed: 7/14/14 GA)

From Colorado to Missouri, Wyoming to Washington, states recently have passed laws that contradict or ignore federal laws. In these so-called nullification efforts, the states have acted because they say the federal laws are unconstitutional or they disagree with the laws. For example, Colorado and Washington have legalized marijuana for anyone over the age of 21 while the federal government still criminalizes the possession and distribution of the drug. This led to a standoff between the states and the Department of

Justice, until the department announced that it would not prosecute marijuana growers and distributors in Colorado and Washington. The Justice Department emphasized that the states must tightly regulate marijuana and that it has the right to arrest anyone breaking a federal law. Wyoming’s House of Representatives passed legislation that would make it illegal for federal agents to enforce federal regulations regarding personal firearms in the state. Missouri’s legislature approved a similar measure, but the governor vetoed it. And it doesn’t end there. An Associated Press analysis found that four of five states have a law that directly opposes a federal law. The laws include medical marijuana use, the federal health care law, identification standards for driver’s licenses, and gun measures. So what does it mean when a state passes legislation that goes against federal laws? The answer is tricky. In the cases of Colorado and Washington, the federal government, operating through the Department of Justice, decided that it was not worth the legal fight and has stepped back to see what happens in regard to marijuana laws. The Justice Department said it would allow the states to enact legalization efforts as long as strict regulations ensure that the drug does not get into the hands of minors, that the profit is not going to criminal enterprises, and that marijuana grown in the states does not cross into states where the drug is illegal. Simply put, the federal government is

allowing the marijuana shops to open, but it also retains the right to shut them down at any time. When it comes to gun laws AND HEALTH CARE, it’s a battle among the 10th Amendment, the commerce clause, and the supremacy clause. The 10th Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Supporters of states’ rights argue that the 10th Amendment GRANTS the states more power than the federal government, because if it isn’t a power granted by the Constitution to the federal government, it is a power of the state. But the U.S. Supreme Court routinely has rejected states’ claims that the federal government has overstepped its bounds and violated the 10th Amendment. In Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court said that state agencies did not have to perform federally mandated BACKGROUND CHECKS of individuals trying to purchase a handgun, but since the background checks were federal law, federal agencies were allowed to conduct background checks.

Essentially the ruling says that states don’t have to participate in federal laws, but they can’t prevent federal agencies from enforcing those laws. Article I, Section 8, states that Congress has the POWER “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.” This is commonly called the commerce clause, and the Supreme Court routinely has determined that any economic activity

that could potentially spill over state boundaries can be subject to federal regulation. Furthermore, Article VI of the Constitution contains what is often referred to as the supremacy clause. It states that when a state law is in conflict with a federal law, the federal law takes priority. Adam Winkler, a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles who

specializes in constitutional law, said that “the law is clear — the supremacy clause says specifically that the federal laws are supreme over contrary state laws, even if the state doesn't like those laws."

Perm can’t solve - The Federal government trumps state law Linder ’14 (Doug, professor of constitutional law at UMKC, The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption The issue: How should courts determine whether a federal law preempts state law?, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/preemption.htm, accessed: 7/14/14 GA)

Article VI of the Constitution makes federal law "the supreme law of the land," notwithstanding the contrary law any state might have. In the important 1958 case of Cooper v Aaron, in which the Court considered the efforts of state authorities to block integration of Little Rock's Central High School, the Court unanimously declared, "No state legislator or executive or judicial official can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it....If the legislatures of the several states may at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a mockery." Federal law, not state law, is "the supreme law of the

land." Despite the efforts of some states, even today, to "nullify" federal laws they disapprove of, few things in constitutional law are any clearer than the fact that any such efforts are grossly unconstitutional. What remains a much more difficult question under Article VI is when a state law or action, which is at least arguably consistent with federal law, in fact creates sufficient conflict so as to justify finding it "preempted." The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution which states that the "Constitution and the laws of the United States...shall be the supreme law of the land...anything in the constitutions or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." This means of course, that any federal law--even a regulation of a federal agency--trumps any conflicting state law. Preemption can be either express or implied. When Congress chooses to expressly preempt state law, the only question for courts becomes determining whether the challenged state law is one that the federal law is intended to preempt. Implied preemption presents more difficult issues, at least when the state law in question does not directly conflict with federal law. The Court then looks beyond the express language of federal statutes to determine whether Congress has "occupied the field" in which the state is attempting to regulate, or whether a state law directly conflicts with federal law, or whether enforcement of the state law might frustrate federal purposes. Federal "occupation of the field" occurs, according to the Court in Pennsylvania v Nelson (1956), when there is "no room" left for state regulation. Courts are to look to the pervasiveness of the federal scheme of regulation, the federal interest at stake, and the danger of frustration of federal goals in making the determination as to whether a challenged state law can stand.

Perm can’t solve--Harmonization of federal and state law fails without a framework leads to vague laws that courts have to interpret- doesn’t ensure an adequate balance of powerRachael E. Salcido in 2008 Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Offshore Federalism and Ocean Industrialization, Tulane Law Review 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1355

As the foregoing cases illustrate, physical boundaries alone are not enough to prevent the extension of federal management imperatives to state lands under the Property and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution. As we increase different uses of offshore areas, the potential for a similar set of conflicts grows . Furthermore,

conservation and restoration activities now play a greater role in the mix of ocean uses because of the decline in commercial fisheries and other valuable marine resources (such as coral reefs and [*1410] kelp beds). n353

Thus, states will increasingly have to contend with the potential for federal prerogatives that cross the three-mile border. And while humans do have the capacity to recognize and abide by borders, the ones we have constructed offshore are merely a legal fiction: they are not consistent with ecosystem management, nor do they have any binding power over wildlife. n354 Secondly, as shown in Ventura County and Granite Rock, regulated industries frequently push for consolidated permitting. n355 Private

developers often balk at multiple layers of regulation due to added cost, delay and unpredictability. n356 Nonetheless, while preemption is always theoretically available, Congress may choose instead to encourage harmonization of federal and state efforts. This requires a legal framework that clearly defines the relative roles and responsibilities of each level of government. Such a framework, however, is frequently lacking. As the cases on

cooperation and coordination mandates illustrate, vague mandates often leave courts with little room to reinforce the political compromise reached in legislation promoting "cooperative" approaches between the states and the federal government. n357 These mandates may be politically difficult to achieve within legislation, as with section 302(b) of the FLPMA. The more unified Congress can be in encouraging a cooperative approach and including express statements thereof in statutory language, the more appropriate it will be to turn to the judicial branch for enforcement of these mandates.

It’s federal jurisdictionThe three-mile line is irrelevant and smudges state and federal jurisdiction in offshore energy policy.Burger 2011 (Michael, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, “Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond the States’ Territorial Seas”, Environmental Law Reporter: News & Analysis. Jul2011, Vol. 41 Issue 7, p10602-10614. 13p, Environment Complete, Date Accessed: 13 July 2014)

The three-mile line was drawn based upon ancient and somewhat arbitrary principles.24 Today, it is irrelevant in at least two important

ways. First, it is ecologically irrelevant. Marine ecosystems do not follow the contours of the three- mile jurisdictional limit; nor do marine species. Second, it is energy-irrelevant. Viable areas for alternative energy, including wind, can be inside or outside of the three-mile line, or both. Where renewable energy projects are sited on the OCS, they will have to connect to the electric grid onshore; thus, the energy has to cross the three-mile line if it is to make land, and transmission lines will inevitably run through coastal waters within one or another state's territorial sea.2S In the absence of new federal legislation vesting connection siting

authority in a federal agency, states will have authority over offshore wind's connectivity through the property rights and jurisdictional control vested under the SLA. It is not surprising that the three-mile line has, historically, resulted in tension between coastal states and the federal government. Nor is it surprising that industry has sought uniform application of federal authority beyond the states' territorial seas. Most recently, the three-mile line figured into a dispute between private shipping companies and the California Air Resources Board, whose South Coast Air Quality Management District promulgated "Vessel Fuel Rules" requiring ships coming to call at Long Beach or Los Angeles to use certain fuel types within 24 miles of the shore.2S Despite the Vessel Fuel Rules' extra- territorial reach, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that they were not preempted by either the or general maritime law principles.29 There is not yet a similar case regarding contemporary attempts to develop

offshore resources, but the three-mile line is plainly problematic, and there is little question that it impedes both the development of comprehensive ecosystem-based management regimes and the expeditious review of individual projects or programs.

Federal Gov. Bad

GenericThe federal government fails when planning and implementing things like energy and environment policiesSachs ’09 (Jeffery, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, The Failing U.S. Government--The Crisis of Public Management, Scientific American, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-failing-of-us-government/, accessed: 7/10/14 GA)

The crisis of American governance goes much deeper than political divisions and ideology. The U.S. is in a crisis of policy implementation. Not only are Americans deeply divided on what to do about health care, budget deficits, financial markets, climate

change and more, but government is also failing to execute settled policies effectively. Management systems linking

government, business and civil society need urgent repair. The recent systems failures are legion and notorious. The 9/11 attacks might well have been prevented if the FBI and the intelligence agencies had cooperated more effectively in early 2001 when they were receiving various signals of a possible terrorist attack. Hurricane Katrina caused mass devastation and loss of life because recommendations to bolster the levees shielding New Orleans and other protective measures were neglected for decades despite urgent expert warnings, and because the federal emergency relief effort failed completely after the storm. To this day, reconstruction efforts in New Orleans are paralyzed and many poor communities there have been abandoned. The U.S. occupation of Iraq was marked by massive and shocking corruption, incompetence, and implementation failures by U.S. agencies. On the economic front, the current financial crisis is a remarkable systems failure. Government regulatory agencies completely dropped the ball while overseeing the surge of several dangerous financial instruments, especially sub-prime mortgages, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and credit default swaps (CDSs). The supply of CDSs in particular soared from nearly zero in 2000 to an estimated $60 trillion in 2008 with almost no regulatory attention. These unregulated CDSs underpinned the reckless lending that eventually

burst in the Great Crash of 2008. The list, alas, goes on and on. Military procurement systems are, according to retired military leaders, so broken that they now jeopardize national security: the U.S. is buying armaments that are overpriced, unneeded and technically defective

armaments. Our system for financing the costly federal health care system subsidizes the overuse of advanced technologies while underfinancing highly effective and lower-cost public health measures.

Public construction systems are failing to keep up with urgent national needs. Roads, bridges, rail, water and sewerage systems and many dams are in dangerous disrepair around the country; large sections of New Orleans remain wrecked and highly vulnerable; and even ground zero of 9/11 remains a hole in the ground because of endless bickering. Similarly, despite nearly a decade of planning, the government has failed to build and test even a single coal-fired power plant that captures and sequesters its carbon dioxide.* This so-called Future-Gen project, vital for the transition to a low-carbon economy, has still not been launched. We need a better scientific understanding of these pervasive systems failures. It is wrong to think that they illustrate the inevitable failure of government. Other governments around the world more successfully manage infrastructure investments, health systems and environmental resources, apparently with greater flexibility, less corruption, lower costs and better outcomes. America should be learning from their experiences. Several factors are at play. A key one has been the flawed privatization of public-sector regulatory functions. Wall Street firms hold excessive sway over government regulators, so that dangerous behavior has been unconstrained. Private insurance companies and health care providers block measures to curtail the overuse of costly technologies. Private military suppliers drive the

procurement of unneeded weapons systems. A second has been the collapse of planning functions within the federal government. A remarkable feature of the recent debates over climate change, energy systems , infrastructure rehabilitation and health care reform is the lack of detailed forward-looking government proposals and plans. The Obama administration has stated general principles (very admirable ones) but too often without clear targets and the operational strategies to achieve them. Planning has been replaced by lobbying and backroom deals in Congress that are nearly opaque to the public. A third, and paradoxical, factor is the chronic underfunding of government itself. It sounds like the old joke about the bad restaurant: that the food was lousy and there wasn’t enough of it. The public is wary of putting more funds into government having witnessed one public sector failure after another. Yet without investing more resources in skilled public managers in health care, energy systems, and national security, we are probably doomed to remain stuck in the hands of vested interests and lobbies. Fourth, today’s challenges cut across technical specialties, government departments and public and private sectors. In health care and energy, for example, the private sector holds the key technologies but the public sector is needed to finance research and development, to regulate sustainable practices (for example, for emissions reduction and primary health standards), and to ensure access for the poor. Public health must be addressed not only through

curative medical care but also through nutrition, food systems and a safer built environment. Energy systems must respect ecological as well as economic constraints. Yet our government agencies are not designed to take a holistic approach. In short, we have arrived at a point where the challenges of sustainable development —including public health, infrastructure, energy and national security—require changes not only to policy but also to basic public management systems. In many crucial areas, tinkering will no longer suffice: we need an overhaul to regain government control over regulatory processes, reduce lobbying, restore public planning and ensure the adequate financing of skilled public managers, and align public management systems with holistic strategies.

FisheriesCentralized fisheries management leads to resource depletionSatriaa in 2004(Decentralization of fisheries management in Indonesia by Arif Satriaa, Marine Policy Volume 28, Issue 5, September 2004, Pages 437–450 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X03001362)

Currently, decentralization of fisheries management is highly considered as an alternative to overcome the problem of resources depletion. As commonly accepted, the resources depletion is because of the practices of the centralization of marine fisheries management. The centralization of fisheries management was characterized by the existence of national policy that all marine waters are state property, to be managed centrally, through the provincial, regency, and village offices of the central government, for the benefit of the entire nation [1], such as in Indonesia. This centralization regime was actually derived from Western industrialized nations that neglected common property regimes in fisheries [2]. Moreover, in post-colonial societies throughout the world new legislation has been enacted which redefines the right of the state whereas water resources have been nationalized in the interest of the state. Decolonization was often accompanied by the nationalization of resources, and then post-colonial

governments continued the centralization policies of the colonist by making state-property out of common property [2] and [3]. The critical matter of the centralized policy is that all waters become de facto open access, even though they were de jure regulated, such as Indonesia in which are regulated through fishing zone based on size of fishing vessel. Certainly, these centralized policies lead to the resources depletion. This happened due to high cost of centralized management enforcement, which means unlikely to conduct fisheries management without role and responsibility of local people

in which marine and coastal ecosystem large and widely diverse. Meanwhile, actually many fisheries community management systems (CBFMs), which have amounts of traditional rules or local wisdom, which contains valuable norms how to wisely treat natural marine resources, are found. They are implemented based on defined geographical areas and controlled access. In addition, they are self-monitored by local fishers, and enforced by local moral and political authority [4] and [5]. These are the great strengths of such systems and what they have to contribute to co-

management designs [6]. Nevertheless due to centralization policy they are being undermined. Those conditions, which led to create open access regime, pushed the rise of “free competition” in marine waters among fishermen crossing different economic

scale (class), ethnical and cultural background, and others. As a result, resources depletion (such as over fishing, destruction of mangrove and coral reef) and social conflict were inevitable, and it certainly threatens marine fisheries sustainability in the future. However, currently in some Asian developing countries there are political systems changes toward a decentralist pattern that certainly imply marine-fisheries management model. By definition, decentralization is any act in which a central government formally transfers powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy [7]. In Indonesia, decentralization has been proceeded by the establishment of Undang-Undang 22/1999 on Local Government, which then called the Local Autonomy Law. By this law, local government has got the bundles of new authorities concerning marine-fisheries management. As mentioned in this law as far as 12 miles water sea area from shoreline is under provincial government authority, and within those 12 miles there are 4 miles under the authority of the local or district government (articles 4 and 10). These authorities include: (a) exploration, exploitation, conservation, and marine resources management within the authority water area, (b) administrative management, (c) zone management, (d) law enforcement of local regulation or central government regulations that are deconcentrated to local government. Indonesia, therefore, is still dealing with amounts of agendas how to institutionalize and establish their marine fisheries management in

decentralized ways. However, decentralization becomes the most appropriate form of fisheries governance in which enables local governments to fundamentally control local fishing by community based management system [8] . Decentralization is also justified as a means for increasing the efficiency and equity of development activities and services delivery, and also for promoting local participation and democracy [7] . The efficiency and equity benefits of decentralization come from the presence of democratic processes that encourage local authorities to serve the needs and desire of their constituents [7]. However, a democratic decentralization is a promising means of institutionalizing and scaling up the popular participation that makes community based natural resources management effective [7]. Concerning democratic values of decentralization, Seddon (1999) argued, “sub national governments’ proximity to their constituents will enable them to respond better to local needs and efficiently match public spending private needs only if information flows between citizens and local government. On the other hand, the process of decentralization can itself enhance the opportunities for participation by placing more power and resources at a closer, more familiar, more easily influenced level of government” [9]. Accordingly, decentralization theoretically gives more opportunities for local people to participate in

a decision making process due to the nearness of social distance between policy maker and the people, who must feel the policy influence. Certainly, because the community participation in the decision-making process theoretically leads to increasing efficiency and equity in natural resources management and use, in terms of marine-fisheries management, CBFMs are potentially recognized, revitalized, and developed well. Nevertheless, beside the potential positive impact of decentralization as explained before, decentralization may lead to conflict, particularly when they involve the transfer of natural resources management and use powers [7].

EnvironmentThe federal government empirically has a more lax stance on environmental regulation than states—leads to bad enforcementKuehn 95 (Robert R., “The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws”, Tulane Law Review 70, Page 2373-2397, HeinOnline)

The forces behind the current drive toward devolving federal environmental enforcement are many. The anti-

federal government sentiment that, in part, propelled the Republicans into control of the 104th Congress has taken aim at the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its perceived regulatory excesses, and has led to riders on appropriation bills that would restrict the ability of EPA to enforce existing environmental laws.3 Recent efforts to balance the federal budget resulted in legislation approved by the House of Representatives that would reduce EPA’s enforcement budget by fifty percent in one year ,4 effectively devolving enforcement by severely curtailing the federal enforcement role and ensuring that states would implement a greater proportion of any enforcement that is still performed. Further, President Clinton’s experience as a governor, as well as the state-government background of Clinton’s Administrator of EPA, have made the Clinton Administration receptive to proposals to speed the process of devolving enforcement. As

with past efforts to decentralize environmental protection, there has been little serious discussion , much less agreement, regarding the criteria by which to judge the suitability of devolving enforcement.5 This Article briefly reviews the original arguments for and against federal enforcement of environmental laws to determine if the justifications are still supportable, and then uses the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity to weigh the appropriateness of devolving enforcement to the States.

Aff States CP

Federal Gov Best

GenericA national plan is necessary to success—the federal government must be the actorJOCI ’06 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, U.S. OCEAN POLICY REPORT CARD, http://www.jointoceancommission.org/resource-center/2-Report-Cards/2007-01-01_2006_Ocean_Policy_Report_Card.pdf, accessed: 7/14/14 GA)

Many regions and states are organizing from the “bottom up,” but to fully address critical issues facing marine ecosystems, adequate support from and coordination with the federal government are also necessary. The federal government should develop a national framework to support regional approaches and collaboration , and more regions and

states should develop and implement ocean governance mechanisms. A national ocean policy is needed to acknowledge the importance of oceans to the nation’s economic and ecological health and to protect, maintain, and restore marine ecosystems so that they remain healthy and resilient and able to deliver the services people want and need. • Management Decisions Grounded in an Ecosystem-based Approach. In carrying out a national ocean policy, the U.S. government needs to implement an ecosystem-based management approach that examines the links among living and nonliving resources. Instead of managing one issue or resource in isolation, the United States needs to move toward a management approach that considers human activities, their benefits, and their potential impacts within the broader context of interconnected social, economic, and ecological factors. • A Stronger NOAA Capable of Implementing an Ecosystem-based Management Approach. NOAA should be codified

through passage of an organic act for the agency, and that act should establish NOAA as the lead ocean agency and articulate a core mission of: assessment, prediction, and operations; ecosystem-based management; and science, research, and education. An organic act should also call for reorganization of the agency to better equip it to carry out its core mission and to remain science-based, but with its management programs better connected to make use of that science in decision

making. • Federal Agency Coordination and Leadership. Eleven cabinet-level departments and four independent agencies have responsibilities for ocean and coastal policy and management. High-level attention to carry out a national ocean policy and improved coordination and communication among ocean agencies would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the management of ocean and coastal resources. • Improved Federal Agency Structures. A stronger NOAA and more effective federal agency coordination are essential to improving national ocean governance. However, to truly recognize the connections among the sea, land, air, and all living creatures, the current federal structure should be reconsidered to further strengthen, through reorganizing and consolidating programs where appropriate, the federal government’s ability to carry out a national ocean policy . • Coordinated Management of Offshore Waters. A coordinated offshore management regime is needed to improve governance of federal waters, avoid and minimize conflicts among users, safeguard human and marine health, and manage offshore waters for the maximum long-term benefit of the nation and all its citizens. • A Fair Return for Use of Offshore Resources. Offshore waters are held in the public trust for the benefit of the entire nation. As such, when these publicly owned resources are used by the private sector for private gain, it is appropriate and fair for the public to receive some return for that benefit. Revenue collected from private use of ocean space and resources should be put toward the management and

understanding of the oceans. • Regional Approaches and Strong State and Local Role Supported by a National Framework. A national framework is needed to support and guide the development and implementation of regional plans and processes that involve federal, state, tribal, and local governments.

AquacultureThe federal government is needed for aquacultureHishamunda, Ridler, and Martone, 2014

(Nathaneal, Senior Aquaculture Officer, FAO Rome, Neil, Emeritus Professor of Economics at U of New Brunswick, Elisabetta, FAO consultant, Rome. “Policy and governance in aquaculture: Lessons learned and way forward.” FAO FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE TECHNICAL PAPER 577, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/i31 56e/i3156e.pdf> Accessed: 7/14/14 RJS)

Poor governance of aquaculture is due to a number of reasons. In some jurisdictions, the sector is insignificant and of low priority. Even

where intensive aquaculture is important, institutional and legislative frameworks have struggled to keep abreast of new challenges caused by the novelty of the industry and industry growth. An illustration comes from the United States of America, where offshore aquaculture has been handicapped by the absence of legislation and a federal lead agency (Pew Trust, 2007). There has also been a need to alleviate concerns of consumers and the general public. Although all food production entails damage to the environment, aquaculture has developed at a time of growing environmental awareness among the public, together with improved communications, and vociferous

opposition groups. There has been particular scrutiny of marine aquaculture, particularly cage culture because it takes place in public space (unlike most agriculture). Well-funded NGOs generate media attention with scientific conclusions that may differ from those of industry or government. Most regions of the world perceive opposition to farmed seafood as a major challenge for aquaculture (Hishamunda, Poulain and Ridler, 2009). Governance measures to mitigate this consumer and public mistrust would be increased transparency and better communication.

No solvency – water pollution state agencies will restrict state controlled aquaculture.Noble, 1993

(Martha L. University of Toledo College of law. “FRESHWATER AQUACULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES: COMPLYING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW & POLICY.” <http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/1993/acte-1323.pdf> Accessed: 7/14/14 RJS)

In contrast to Texas, the state of Alaska is hostile to aquaculture operations. In 1990, the state legislature enacted a nearly complete ban on finfish farming - described as growing or cultivating finfish in captivity or under positive control for commercial purpose." The Alaska Department of Fish and Game is authorized to regulate other aquaculture facilities. Alaska state law requires that aquatic farming be regulated in a manner that ensures protection of the state's fish and game resources. The Alaska Fish and Game Commissioner may issue permits for aquatic farming on the basis of criteria which include the following among others: (1) the proposed farm or hatchery may not require significant alterations in traditional fisheries or other existing uses of fish and wildlife resources; and (2) the proposed farm or hatchery may not significantly affect fisheries, wildlife, or their habitats in an adverse manner12. The ban on finfish farming and the high priority given to wild fish and game reflects the concerns of the state's commercial salmon fishing industry and the state's general economic dependence on commercial and sport fishing. Legislative findings supporting the ban on finfish farming included the finding that serious risks are posed by commercial finfish farming, including the spread of disease among wild fish by farmed fish, genetic intermingling of wild fish stocks with genetically manipulated farmed fish, degradation of water quality near finfish farms, and land use conflicts over the siting of commercial finfish farms 13 . Note also that Alaska lacks a vigorous agricultural sector. In addition to state agencies that directly regulate or promote aquaculture operations, other state agencies, such as those which regulate water pollution, may impose legal constraints or requirements on freshwater aquaculture operations.

EnvironmentFederalism is failing- States can’t implement environmental policiesStewart 77<Richard B. Stewart “Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 86, No. 6, Federalism (May, 1977), pp. 1196-1272 Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. http://www.jstor.org/stable/795705>

Environmental policy in the United States has reached a difficult impasse. Over the past decade, responsibility for setting environmental policy has increasingly shifted from state and local authorities to the federal government. Reacting to the perceived inability of the states to check or reverse environmental degradation, Congress has

enacted comprehensive statutes establishing environmental standards and control strategies.1 The federal government, however, is dependent upon state and local authorities to implement these policies because of the nation's size and geographic diversity, the close interrelation between environ- mental controls and local land use decisions, and federal officials' limited implementation and enforcement resources. The success of federal programs has been gravely compromised by this dependence upon state and local governments, whose generally poor record in controlling environmental deterioration triggered the initial resort to federal legislation,2 and whose subsequent performance in the con- text of federal programs has in many instances remained inadequate." Some of the difficulties besetting federal environmental programs could be alleviated if federal officials were empowered to require or induce local officials to carry them out. Yet recent court decisions- particularly that of the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v. Useiy (NLC) 4-have cast considerable doubt on the constitutional authority of the federal government to require state implementation of federal programs. This article will consider two strategies for federal conscription of state enforcement resources: enactment of direct man- dates and imposition of conditions on federal grants. It svill examine the constitutional issues presented, together with underlying questions as to the proper allocation of responsibility for environmental policy between state and federal authorities. The initial section discusses the difficulties faced by federal officials in effectuating national environmental policies. The article then advances structural explanations for the increasing resort to federal determination of environmental policies, and the corresponding rea- sons why state and local officials are often unwilling to carry out federal mandates. Succeeding sections discuss the extent of Congress's constitutional authority to require state implementation of federal policies and to impose conditions on federal grants to state and local governments to achieve the same end. The conclusion seeks to answer the crucial question whether the courts should deny or limit congressional power to force unwilling state and local governments to impose heavy sacrifices upon their reluctant citizens for the sake of national goals.

States are not efficient in environmental policy—the federal government has to step inGlicksman ’06 (Robert, professor at George Washington University law school, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, GW law, http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1653&context=faculty_publications, accessed: 7/12/14 GA)

If the states and localities were not capable of adopting and implementing an effective set of programs to protect the public health and the environment, it would be necessary and advisable for the federal government to step into the breach, 78 particularly because “many Americans regard environmental quality as an important national good that transcends individual or local interest .”79 One possible explanation for

the states’ failure to provide effective environmental regulation was their lack of scientific expertise and their inability to provide the resources needed to implement such regulation .80 Similarly, federal environmental legislation arguably permits environmental policymakers to take advantage of the economies of scale that result from the adoption of national standards.81 As John Dwyer has explained, “[i]n terms

of efficiency, it makes little sense for each state to duplicate the underlying research and collection of data necessary to regulate air pollution. There are also economies of scale in standard setting when the

standards are nationally uniform.”82 Daniel Esty has elaborated on this rationale: It makes no sense to ask every state, city, or town to measure the level, size, and type of particulates in its air, determine their connection to respiratory failure and other health problems, identify the safe level of emissions, and design cost-effective policy responses. Data collection and quality control, fate and transport studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and risk assessments all represent highly technical activities in which expertise is important and scale economies are significant. In addition, the core variables within these functions do not vary spatially, and thus diversity claims hold little sway. Absent centralized functions, independent state regulators will either duplicate each other's analytic work or engage in time-consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient division of technical labor. The poorer the jurisdiction, moreover, the more likely its regulators will lack

basic technical competence. Likewise, the smaller the regulating entity, the more likely it is to suffer from the absence of scientific scale economies. Both of these dimensions of technical failure are recognized as significant obstacles to good regulation in many states.83 The federal government was thus better equipped to develop the necessary expertise to formulate effective environmental regulatory standards as well as to implement and enforce those standards in an efficient manner. Another possible explanation for the federal government’s ability to generate more effective environmental legislation is the relatively greater difficulty of capturing the federal as compared to the state and local governments

Federal enforcement of environmental regulations is best—solves market balance and incentivizes states to cooperate with environmental policyKuehn 95 (Robert R., “The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws”, Tulane Law Review 70, Page 2373-2397,

HeinOnline)

Federal enforcement also helps avoid certain market imbalances. Companies that invest in environmental compliance are at a competitive disadvantage if their competitors can avoid those costs because the lax enforcement practices of another jurisdiction overlook some violations of environmental laws. Industries that had invested heavily in environmental compliance were placed at a competitive disadvantage when the regulated community perceived in

the early 1980s that the EPA would not enforce environmental laws.’5 Only federal enforcement, when aggressively implemented, has the ability to “level the playing field” by initiating enforcement actions, or forcing reluctant state agencies to initiate enforcement actions, in states with weak enforcement practices.

Environmental policy belongs solely under the jurisdiction of the federal government—best at promoting and enforcing Medoway 12 (Merideth, “Why the Federal Government, Not States, Should Regulate the Environment”, http://mic.com/articles/4090/why-the-federal-government-not-states-should-regulate-the-environment)

The fight between state-versus-federal rights is never-ending. The 10th amendment bestows great power upon the states to hopefully prevent the federal government from gaining excessive power. All powers not specifically dedicated to the federal government belong to the states. Not surprisingly, when the government proposes nationwide laws, the states-versus-federal problem arises

and a fight begins. Of course, I promote states’ rights; I do not want an all-powerful central government. But, in certain cases, a national law is necessary. Environmental policy is one of these cases . While specially targeted laws would greatly benefit some states, other states would suffer from insufficient rules; no authority would supervise the states to make sure the laws were strict enough in each . Furthermore, many environmental issues travel across state borders. For example, mercury emissions pass over many states. Pollution from a

factory in Philadelphia travels easily, infecting nearby states. Additionally, waterways do not end at state lines. Rivers, lakes, and streams flow from state to state, allowing industry-polluted water from the Rio Grande to infect not only Colorado, but also New Mexico and Texas. If one state falters on strong laws, all other states will

suffer. In a recent case of nation-versus-state, building roads through national forests has caused an argument in Colorado. At the urging of President George W. Bush, Colorado and Idaho created their own rules for road creation in forests. This decision, allowing the states to tailor laws specific to their situations, was in direct contradiction to Clinton’s “roadless rule,” which limited opportunities to build roads in national forests in the West. State environment managers claim that the state-level rules will be just as strict, but Colorado needs to consider jobs and industries since the dip in the economy, and the specific rules would address such issues. Thus, conservationists argue that Colorado will

actually receive the least amount of protection, allowing America’s treasured national forests to be destroyed. Unfortunately, leaving rule-making to the states will harm the planet when states refuse to make environmental protection a priority. If people could relinquish states’ rights, our habitat would reap the benefits — as would the inhabitants themselves. This hesitation and outright fight against national laws comes from not only a lack of knowledge about environmental issues, but also a lack of interest in learning about them. People are stubborn and do not want to be told that they are damaging the planet every day; and conditions are only getting worse. Environmental issues not only have to stand up to the state versus federal argument, they also have to combat a large portion of America that wants to ignore them completely. In fact, the Tea Party has joined a campaign to spread the message that the United Nations’ (UN) attempts to conserve energy and preserve open space are actually part of a conspiracy to “deny property rights and herd citizens towards cities.” Members of the movement reject any evidence of global climate change and recoil at the idea of adjusting their lifestyles to make the planet healthier. Groups like this are an additional reason for why environmental laws must be national. On a state level, groups like the Tea Party may be strong enough to deter strict laws — or any laws for that matter — concerning the environment. On a national level, they would have less of an impact, making it easier to generate appropriate legislation. Of

course, environmental legislation will never be a simple task. State or national level, there will be a battle. However, the most effective legislation will come in the form of a national law, subjecting every state to the same regulations, ensuring that they all comply with a healthy standard that will help protect our planet.

Federal government better at enforcing environmental regulation—won’t be coopted by fear of losing industriesEngel (Kirsten H., “State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?”, HeinOnline

While federal regulation is obviously superior to state regulation when the goal is the prevention of interstate spillovers or the realization of economies of scale, selection of federal controls to guarantee minimum levels of

environmental quality seem a less obvious choice: why were states not considered competent to protect the environmental quality rights of their own citizens? According to the legislative histories of the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Congress thought the answer obvious: states simply could not be trusted to impose upon industry the costs that would be necessary to adequately

protect human health and the environment. To Congress, a history of state reticence to impose controls under prior federal laws demonstrated that states were too afraid that they would lose existing or new industries to other states to impose stringent controls or take an aggressive stance on environmental enforcement.53 Consequently, if human health and the environment were to receive adequate protection, the job must fall to the federal government which is comparatively immune to such pressures. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act, for instance, is marked by comments such as the following, appearing in the House Committee Report:

Federalism is failing- States can’t implement environmental policiesStewart 77<Richard B. Stewart “Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 86, No. 6, Federalism (May, 1977), pp. 1196-1272 Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. http://www.jstor.org/stable/795705>

Environmental policy in the United States has reached a difficult impasse. Over the past decade, responsibility for setting environmental policy has increasingly shifted from state and local authorities to the federal government. Reacting to the perceived inability of the states to check or reverse

environmental degradation, Congress has enacted comprehensive statutes establishing environmental standards and control strategies.1 The federal government, however, is dependent upon state and local authorities to implement these policies because of the nation's size and geographic diversity, the close interrelation between environ- mental controls and local land use decisions, and federal officials' limited implementation and enforcement resources. The success of federal programs has been gravely compromised by this dependence upon state and local governments, whose generally poor record in controlling environmental deterioration triggered the initial resort to federal legislation,2 and whose subsequent performance in the con- text of federal programs has in many instances remained inadequate." Some of the difficulties besetting federal environmental programs could be alleviated if federal officials were empowered to require or induce local officials to carry them out. Yet recent court decisions- particularly that of the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v. Useiy (NLC) 4-have cast considerable doubt on the constitutional authority of the federal government to require state implementation of federal programs. This article will consider two strategies for federal conscription of state enforcement resources: enactment of direct man- dates and imposition of conditions on federal grants. It svill examine the constitutional issues presented, together with underlying questions as to the proper allocation of responsibility for environmental policy between state and federal authorities. The initial section discusses the difficulties faced by federal officials in effectuating national environmental policies. The article then advances structural explanations for the increasing resort to federal determination of environmental policies, and the corresponding rea- sons why state and local officials are often unwilling to carry out federal mandates. Succeeding sections discuss the extent of Congress's constitutional authority to require state implementation of federal policies and to impose conditions on federal grants to state and local governments to achieve the same end. The conclusion seeks to answer the crucial question whether the courts should deny or limit congressional power to force unwilling state and local governments to impose heavy sacrifices upon their reluctant citizens for the sake of national goals.

State competition results in bad environmental policies—federal government solves bestOates 01< Wallace E. Oates, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, and University Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-01-54.pdf>

The basic contention in this literature is that in a setting of interjurisdictional economic competition, local officials, in their eagerness to attract new business investment and create new jobs, will introduce measures to reduce costs to local business in the form of low taxes and excessively lax environmental standards, which will result in suboptimal outputs of local public goods (including environmental quality). In one sense, the argument is puzzling. If local governments seek to promote the well-being of their residents, then they should care about local environmental quality. If the benefits from a marginal improvement in the local environment exceed the costs, we should expect the improvement to receive support and be carried out. What is going on here? There is now a large—in fact an enormous—theoretical literature on all this.4 Let me first point out that it is straightforward to construct a standard kind of model of local public decisionmaking in which competition among governments induces efficient local choices (e.g., Oates and Schwab 1988; Wellisch 2000). In these models, jurisdictions compete for mobile firms to increase local wage income and expand the local tax base. The models generate what are effectively analogues to the purely competitive model for the private sector; they provide invisible-

hand theorems in which interjurisdictional competition guides local public choice into Pareto-efficient outcomes.

FishDecentralization in fisheries management leads to policy failure – only centralization can create coherent policies.Potter 2002 (Brian, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, LA, “Divergent paths: institutional structure and optimal fisheries policy”, Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association. 2002 Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, p1-49. 49p., 28 August 2002, Political Science Complete, Date Accessed: 14 July 2014)

Using the institutional structure of fisheries management and the nature of industry representation, this paper seeks to predict the behavior of

industry and elected representatives in managing fishery resources. As seen in the case of Canadian cod, when the functions of management are centralized in one state actor, the government can pursue objectives other than fishers’ desire for stable, profitable harvests. On the other end of the spectrum, the numerous actors involved in management, allocation and subsidization decisions in New England created high costs in drafting a cohesive policy. In between these two extremes, state misrepresentation of fishers is tempered by the dissenting voice of other state actors while the cost of coordination among agencies is surmountable . The three types of state structure combine with divisions in fisher lobbies to influence the behavior of harvesting groups in influencing regulation. State managers enjoy more freedom where divisions within the industry result in competing policy proposals and supporting information. Perhaps most clearly seen in the rupture of the once united New England and Pacific groundfish lobbies, a cohesive industry can control the policy 46 agenda and challenge the validity of state information while competing sectors offer rival proposals that allow managers the opportunity to choose regulations for optimal fisheries management. The change displayed by these two cases, if it can be classified as a trend, offers some optimism for future fisheries management. Initially, both cases allowed ample industry influence over its own regulation, resulting in fisheries collapse. Pacific coast trawlers were able to interpret legislative requirements in a way that prevented reductions in harvesting capacity, thereby perpetuating overcapitalization. The New England groundfish industry was in charge of most details of its own regulation. Unwilling to force painful concessions from its members, the lobbies’ actions contributed significantly towards the closure of the fisheries. However painful, both collapses resulted in institutional and interest group changes that improved the environment for successful resource management. Fisheries failure led to a reduction in the number of government actors participating in New England’s regulatory debate. In particular, many members of Congress began to address public goods issues (viz. health care) instead of common property regulation. Others

abandoned altogether service to fishing constituencies and instead found more promising blocks of voters. The decrease in the number of actors involved in management, allocation and subsidization lessened the cost of coordinating among state actors and resulted in a more coherent set of policies. The result of reduced transaction costs among agencies was to internalize positive and negative effects of common property exploitation. Involvement by an excess of government actors led to policy 47 failure, which in turn reduced the field of elected

participants and improved opportunities for sustainable policy. Cohesive coalitions broke under the weight of protecting their unity, in turn allowing more policy proposals and information for management choices. To maintain unity, the leadership must either equitably distribute costs of overfishing or obscure different returns to different sectors. While the presence of cohesive industries is typically due to outside threats in the past, the realization of threats within the group eventually leads to its dismemberment. The result of interest group rivalry is a better flow of information and competition to present the most promising policy that follows principles of national legislation. Fisheries failures may form the catalyst for institutional and representational change that improves the environment for sustainable resource use. The pressure of maintaining fractured institutions and united lobbies to avoid common property regulation eventually becomes untenable, leading to changes that best promote the interests of the resource and its users alike. The policy environment seems stable once it reaches a point where the management debate follows established national principles, as seen in the North Pacific case. Rival groups can use the plural institutional structure to defend themselves against assaults by competitors. This environment similarly offers defense against state encroachment. Resource institutions may “evolve” to a point of plural, principled debate, although such a trend lacks proof. On a pessimistic note, the centralized state rarely surrenders

control. While only one case of centralization is considered in this study, a cursory review of state-led resource policy finds failure and little change. As state objectives often differ from those of 48 resource users, resource policy failure does not serve as a catalyst for institutional change. Instead, resource institutions in these cases await a larger national debate on the state’s role and functions.

The federal government has exclusive control over fisheries in and beyond federal watersNOAA no date, Office of General Counsel, Seaward Limits of US Laws, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_seaward.html

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) is the primary law governing marine fisheries management in United States federal waters. Courts have held that the extraterritorial application of the MSA is based on the explicit language of the statute . 16 U.S.C. § 1811(b) provides that "The United States claims, and will exercise in the manner provided for in this Act, exclusive fishery management authority over the following: (1) All anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such species beyond the exclusive economic zone; except that the management authority does not extend to any such species during the

time they are found within any waters of a foreign nation. (2) All Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the exclusive economic zone." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(11) defines "exclusive economic zone as "the zone established by Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(7) defines "Continental Shelf fishery resources" to encompass specific enumerated species of coral, crab, lobster, abalone, conch, claim and sponge. See also 50 C.F.R. § 600.10.

Fisheries management is federally controlled-the industry is nationalized. SARAH M. KUTIL in 2011, Associate Editor, Environmental Law, 2009–2010; Member, Environmental Law, 2008–2009; J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School, expected 2011; B.S., University of Wisconsin–Madison, SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY THRESHOLDS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: A RESPONSE TO A CHANGING CLIMATE http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/8255-411kutil1

While amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act have recently prioritized conservation goals, fisheries management has traditionally focused on nationalizing United States waters and developing the industry rather than ensuring

sustainable use.32 The Act is implemented by the Secretary of Commerce through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which in turn defers to the regional Councils so long as they comply with the Act.33 In the absence of agency regulation , fisheries beyond state waters34 are generally unregulated.35 The open access default is somewhat of a relic of the traditional freedom of the high seas.36 Open access makes sense in the historical context because the Magnuson-Stevens Act was originally passed in 1976 with the intent of requiring foreign fisheries to obtain permits to fish within two hundred miles of the United States coast, while also further developing the national fishing industry.37 Because of the default open access and emphasis on economic development, regulations under the Act are often only promulgated when fisheries are already at a reduced capacity.38 In 1996, Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act,39 which introduced additional conservation aspects to the Magnuson-Stevens Act,40 but without removing the commercial slant. The Act requires an FMP for fisheries found to be overfished;41 FMPs can contain

measures for protecting habitat, requiring observers, reducing bycatch, or imposing gear restrictions.42 An FMP is only required upon the Secretary of Commerce’s determination that a fishery is at or is approaching overfished status.43 An overfished fishery is one that had or has a level of anthropogenic fish mortality that “jeopardizes the capacity of [the] fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis.”44 Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is a concept widely used in fisheries management as a measure of the maximum number of fish that can be taken consistently over time.45 An FMP for an overfished fishery must contain a number of specifications: a description of the fishery, an assessment of MSY and optimum yield, reporting requirements to the Secretary, identification of essential fish habitat, scientific data needed, criteria for determining whether the fishery is overfished, standardized reporting methods for bycatch, requirements of recreational fishing, rebuilding plans, and a mechanism for determining catch limits.46

Fisheries are federally controlled and regionally managed- federal government still exercises authoritySARAH M. KUTIL in 2011, Associate Editor, Environmental Law, 2009–2010; Member, Environmental Law, 2008–2009; J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School, expected 2011; B.S., University of Wisconsin–Madison, SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY THRESHOLDS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: A RESPONSE TO A CHANGING CLIMATE http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/8255-411kutil1

FMPs must also be consistent with the Act’s National Standards,47 which codify the tension between economic and

conservation needs inherent in the Magnuson-Stevens Act. There are ten National Standards in the Act. Most indicative of the tension between industry and environmental needs are the following: 1) measures must prevent overfishing while maintaining the optimum yield, defined as the maximum sustainable yield as reduced by social, economic, or ecological factors;48 and 2) consistent with conservation, measures must account for a fishery’s importance to local communities.49 The Act prioritizes conservation goals by requiring economic concerns be consistent with conservation measures. However, it also uses phrases such as “to the

extent practicable” to reserve discretion for the Councils and NMFS in determining the practicability of conservation.50 The Councils preliminarily determine what measures are practicable and so long as their determinations comply with the Act, the agency must approve them.

Regional management of fisheries is dominated by fishing industry influence- they will fail at conservation when they set and distribute catch shares SARAH M. KUTIL in 2011, Associate Editor, Environmental Law, 2009–2010; Member, Environmental Law, 2008–2009; J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School, expected 2011; B.S., University of Wisconsin–Madison, SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY THRESHOLDS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: A RESPONSE TO A CHANGING CLIMATE http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/8255-411kutil1

The commercially centered provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, together with NMFS implementing regulations and the scientific uncertainties inherent in fisheries management, increase the already wide latitude afforded to Councils composed largely of industry stakeholders . ** This often results in actions that tend toward the bare minimum of conservation and precaution required under the Act.' The Magnuson-Stevens Act grants NMFS and the Councils an enormous amount of discretion . NMFS has used its discretion to promulgate

guidelines for setting reference points for stock assessments and measuring success in achieving statutory directives." Council discretion extends both to conservation (how many fish can be caught) and allocation decisions (who gets to catch them).M By requiring the Councils to make both conservation and allocation decisions, the Act and NMFS (perhaps inadvertently) provide an incentive to focus less on conservation to avoid difficulty in allocation** given that less conservation of resources means that more resources are available to allocate. NPFMC has traditionally been more conservation-minded than the other seven Councils, in part because of its historical responsibility to ensure enough fish remained after

foreign exploitation for the developing United States fleets.*' Even so. its management practices have shared with the other Councils a tendency toward exploitation in the face of staggering scientific uncertainty, consistent with the spirit of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.

State and regional oversight alone fail- they will defer to the highest possible limits, undermining conservationSARAH M. KUTIL in 2011, Associate Editor, Environmental Law, 2009–2010; Member, Environmental Law, 2008–2009; J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School, expected 2011; B.S., University of Wisconsin–Madison, SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY THRESHOLDS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: A RESPONSE TO A CHANGING CLIMATE http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/8255-411kutil1

The Councils’ discretion under the Act allows them to effectively reduce the margin of error, threatening the sustainability that NMFS adaptive management is designed to ensure. Councils must adhere to the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act by ensuring their proposed FMPs are consistent with the Act’s National Standards and other

provisions.76 The National Standards require the Councils to prevent overfishing, ensure optimum yield, base

their decisions on the best scientific information available, and take other issues into consideration such as bycatch, efficiency of

use, and the needs of fishing communities to the extent practicable.77 The National Standards set forth two hard and fast requirements: prevent overfishing and ensure optimum yield.78 These requirements appear to be straightforward, scientifically based conservation measures to maintain a balance between environmental needs, preventing overfishing, and the commercial interest in obtaining optimum yield. The population level that will determine whether a fishery is overfished

and the level that will produce optimum yield sound like purely scientific quantities. Nevertheless, these presumably scientific quantities are subject to the discretion of the Councils.79 For example, Councils determine MSY based on a range

recommended to them by the Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC),80 required under the Act.81 Because of scientific uncertainty in estimating fish stock populations, scientists can only provide the Councils with a likely range for MSY. A higher level of uncertainty in the data requires a larger range to achieve the same level of confidence. The higher the

uncertainty level, the larger the recommended range for MSY given to the Council. A wider range for an uncertain stock provides the Council with the opportunity to set the MSY at the higher end of the range while still arguably relying on the best available science. Therefore, greater uncertainty in data translates to greater Council discretion. Councils tend to set management measures such as MSY at the higher end of the range rather than the more precautionary option of the middle or lower end of the range, and at

times, ignore scientifically estimated ranges entirely.82 While the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires Councils to make determinations—such as MSY levels—based on the best available science,83 the Act does not require Councils to give any particular weight to the recommendations of their SSCs.84 NMFS guidelines urging precaution where population levels are uncertain do not apply to the Council’s determination of MSY.85 MSY provides the upper limit for optimum yield, the goal for setting acceptable biological catch levels, and other reference points that are supposed to be increasingly more conservative as uncertainty increases.86

Offshore windOnly the federal government has the power to implement offshore wind.Burger 2011 (Michael, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, “Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond the States’ Territorial Seas”, Environmental Law Reporter: News & Analysis. Jul2011, Vol. 41 Issue 7, p10602-10614. 13p, Environment Complete, Date Accessed: 13 July 2014)

Jurisdiction and Boundary Blurring Along the Three-Mile Line Jurisdictional Divisions and Offshore Renewables Jurisdiction over tidal waters in

the United States is clearly divided between the federal government and the states. The Submerged Lands Act (SLA) gives states jurisdiction from the mean high-tide line out to three nautical miles, and grants coastal states "title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective states, and the natural resources within such lands and waters." The federal government does retain some power within the states' territorial seas—including the power to regulate "commerce," "navigation," "power generation," and "national defense” – but it does not have the rights to "management, administration, leasing, use and development of the lands and natural resources. "17 Beyond the states' territorial seas, the federal government claims jurisdiction out to 200 nautical miles, the boundary of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).IS Under the still-unratified United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Ill, signatories have extensive rights over natural resources within their EEZs, including the

right to develop renewable energy resources. The power to site offshore wind and other renewable facilities beyond the three-mile line is vested solely with the federal government. As amended by the 2005 Energy Policy Act (2005 EP Act), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act grants the Secretary of the Interior power to authorize alternative energy projects on the outer continental shelf (OCS).20 In March 2006, the Secretary delegated this authority to the agency formerly known as the Marine Minerals Service (MMS).21 Traditionally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had jurisdiction over most domestic energy projects; in April 2009, after a few years of jurisdictional bickering, the MMS and FERC signed a Memorandum of Understanding dividing authority over alternative energy development on the OCS, with the MMS taking responsibility for wind energy and FERC taking responsibility for tidal, wave, geothermal, ocean thermal, current, and other hydrokinetics.22 MMS then promulgated a final rule for approving leases for off- shore wind and marine renewables on the OCS.23

Perm

General States cannot solve alone – federal action is needed to constrain their power for effective policy implementation and enforcement.Burger 2011 (Michael, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, “Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond the States’ Territorial Seas”, Environmental Law Reporter: News & Analysis. Jul2011, Vol. 41 Issue 7, p10602-10614. 13p, Environment Complete, Date Accessed: 13 July 2014)

United States has a vested interest in reducing both greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on foreign oil. These national goals would, ostensibly, be of little concern to a state acting in a narrower self-interest. Indeed, the economic account would further argue that states will either be too restrictive in setting standards to site facilities within their jurisdiction in order to prevent

unwanted impacts on highly important local values, or else they will be too lax in order to lure industry to the state. Accordingly, on the conventional federalism account, federal regulation of offshore wind is appropriate. And yet, given the number of

conflicting uses of federal waters, and the different scope of effects offshore wind would have on each, it is impossible to say that a uniform rule, i.e., one-way federal regulatory authority, should govern. Moreover, trends in environmental regulation defy this story. As made evident by state leadership in offshore wind development, as well as in regional and state climate change initiatives, states, when properly constrained and incentivized, are proving themselves competent to act in ways that balance local, state, and federal interests . %us,

although there is clearly a sound justification for a dominant federal presence in managing MSP in federal waters, the economic rationale fails to justify an exclusive one.

Aquaculture States and federal government must work together to promote aquaculture.Noble, 1993

(Martha L. University of Toledo College of law. “FRESHWATER AQUACULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES: COMPLYING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW & POLICY.” <http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/1993/acte-1323.pdf> Accessed: 7/14/14 RJS)

Aquaculture enterprises in the United States have developed from three major origins: 2 mariculture operations which enhanced or replaced commercial harvesting of wild stocks; 3 freshwater aquaculture systems which developed from farm ponds or as an alternative or supplement to other crop production systems, such as rice cultivation; and fish hatcheries which provided young animals to replenish depleted native game stocks or to facilitate introduction of game fish species. Because of this diversity of origins, the current administrative framework for regulating aquaculture is relatively complex. This complexity is compounded by the fact that the United States is a federal system and that the national government and the governments of the fifty states regulate and promote aquaculture. At both the federal and state levels, however, the trend is to view aquaculture, particularly freshwater aquaculture, as a form of agriculture.

Spending DA Net Benefit

States run out of moneyThe USFG can’t run out of money, but states can- the state action of the counterplan links more to the DA than the affL. Randall Wray May 16, 2014, Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City and Senior Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, What are taxes for? The MMT approach; http://multiplier-effect.org/what-are-taxes-for-the-mmt-approach/

Previously we have argued that “taxes drive money” in the sense that imposition of a tax that is payable in the national government’s own

currency will create demand for that currency. Sovereign government does not really need revenue in its own currency in order to spend. This sounds shocking because we are so accustomed to thinking that “taxes pay for government spending.” This is true for local governments, provinces, and states that do not issue the currency. It is also not too far from the truth for nations that adopt a foreign currency or peg their own to gold or foreign currencies. When a nation pegs, it really does need the gold or foreign currency to which it promises to convert its currency on demand. Taxing removes its currency from circulation making it harder for anyone to present it for redemption in gold or foreign currency. Hence, a prudent

practice would be to constrain spending to tax revenue. But in the case of a government that issues its own sovereign currency without a promise to convert at a fixed value to gold or foreign currency (that is, the government “floats” its

currency), we need to think about the role of taxes in an entirely different way. Taxes are not needed to “pay for” government spending. Further, the logic is reversed: government must spend (or lend) the currency into the economy before taxpayers can pay taxes in the form of the currency. Spend first, tax later is the logical sequence.

The federal government can’t run out of money- it has a sovereign currencyPascal Emmanuel Gobry in 12, contributor, No, The United States Will Not Go Into A Debt Crisis, Not Now, Not Ever; Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/pascalemmanuelgobry/2012/10/19/no-the-united-states-will-not-go-into-a-debt-crisis-not-now-not-ever/

If there’s one article of faith in Washington (and elsewhere), it’s the idea that the United States might get into a debt crisis if it doesn’t get its fiscal house in order. This is not true. The reason why it’s not true is because we live in a fiat currency system, where the United States government can create an infinite number of dollars at no cost to meet its obligations. A Treasury bill is a promise that the government will give you US dollars–something that the United States government can produce infinitely and at no cost. That’s the reason why interest rates on United States debt have only gone down even as the debt has ballooned .

That’s the reason why Great Britain has very low rates on its debt despite having very high debt-to-GDP. That’s the reason why Japan has an astounding debt-to-GDP ratio and still enjoys some of the lowest rates ever. Investors have bet for so long that there would be a run on Japanese debt and have ended up so ruined that in financial circles that trade is called “the Widowmaker”. (Here’s a more detailed analysis by my former colleague Joe Weisenthal at

Business Insider.) Well, what about Argentina? Argentina had to default on its debt because it had pegged its currency to the US dollar. It wasn’t sovereign with regard to its currency since it had to maintain its currency’s peg. It wasn’t

Argentina’s debt that caused it to default, it was its currency peg. What about Greece? Same thing. Greece hasn’t used its own currency for ten years. Of course it’s going bankrupt. Does it seem that strange that governments can’t run out of

money? You don’t have to take my word for it. How about Alan Greenspan? He said (PDF): ”[A] government cannot become insolvent with respect to obligations in its own currency. A fiat money system, like the ones we have today, can produce such claims without limit.”

State budget cuts nowStates are cutting mental health programs now—not enough moneyBECKER 14 (ARIELLE LEVIN, “CT mental health clinics brace for state cuts tied to Obamacare”, The CT Mirror, http://ctmirror.org/ct-mental-health-clinics-brace-for-state-cuts-tied-to-obamacare/)

While Gov. Dannel P. Malloy has touted a proposal to increase spending on mental health services, agencies that run mental health and substance abuse clinics are bracing for more than $10 million in cuts to state grants starting July 1. And they say the cuts could mean treating fewer people at a time when demand for care is growing. The Malloy administration proposed cutting the money last year as part of its two-year budget, arguing that the state funding would no longer be necessary because most uninsured Connecticut residents would gain new coverage options Jan. 1 as part of the federal health law. That means the agencies that provide services would be able to bill their newly insured clients’ coverage, the thinking goes. But leaders of mental health agencies say that logic is flawed. Many clients still don’t have insurance, and all of them aren’t likely to get it by the start of the next fiscal year, they say. And even if all their clients had insurance, providers say, it wouldn’t make up for the grant cuts. That’s because clinics rely on the grants not just to cover the cost of treating uninsured patients, but to help make up for what they say are inadequate payments by Medicaid, which doesn’t always cover the full cost of services and doesn’t pay for things like care coordination. And Medicaid is the program that’s expected to cover most of their newly insured clients. “The mental health system is under tremendous stress,” said Raymond J. Gorman, president and CEO of Community Mental Health Affiliates in New Britain. “The governor has put forward a couple of initiatives for some program expansions, but program expansions never take care of the underlying fundamentals of the system being dramatically under-resourced.” If the grant cuts occur, Gorman said his agency's options would include cutting staff, reducing outpatient programs by half and eliminating individual therapy. “We’re going to have to dramatically reduce the size and scope of what we do, the number of people that we serve and provide less intensive care to them,” he said.

States making budget cuts due to federal budget sequestration—Virginia provesMartz 14 (Michael, “Larger state shortfall means more budget cuts “, Times Dispatch, http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/larger-state-shortfall-means-more-budget-cuts/article_9425218a-0870-11e4-8094-001a4bcf6878.html)

Virginia faces a new kind of financial challenge with falling tax revenues that likely mean deeper spending cuts in this year’s budget and a shifting job market because of federal cutbacks in defense spending. The state ended the last fiscal year on June 30 with $438.5 million less in revenues than projected, or a shortfall of almost $89 million more than anticipated when Gov. Terry McAuliffe and the General Assembly adopted a two-

year budget last month that already reflected $1.55 billion in reduced spending. The state collected about 1.6 percent less in revenues than the previous year, marking the first time in memory that annual tax collections declined when the country was not in economic recession, according to the governor’s top financial official. “You’ve got something different happening here than normal,” said Secretary of Finance Richard D. “Ric” Brown, who has been a state budget official for nearly 40 years. “You are dealing with a new frontier, and you’re going to have to be cautious about that.” Immediately, the state has to deal with a deepening revenue shortfall that Comptroller David Von Moll certified to the governor Thursday. The certification triggered a statutorily mandated revenue reforecast that began a day earlier with a meeting of the Joint Advisory Board of Economists, chaired by Brown. The shortfall represents 2.6 percent less in revenues than the budget forecast, which had assumed growth of about 1 percent in the 2013-2014 fiscal year compared with the previous 12 months. It also poses a significant challenge to McAuliffe and the assembly money committees, which will meet Aug. 15 and receive a new revenue forecast that will determine how much money is available for the fiscal year that began last week,

as well as the following year. The governor and legislature adopted a two-year budget last month that reserved more than $800 million in spending cuts, while drawing more than $700 million from the Revenue Stabilization Fund, often called the rainy day fund, to close the anticipated gap. But the new budget assumed a drop in revenues of $350 million in the just-ended fiscal year — not almost $439 million. The revenue loss carries forward into the biennium, potentially doubling the additional shortfall to $178 million in this fiscal year. Any additional shortfall would have to be offset by further cuts in budgeted spending. Brown said it is premature to speculate on how deep the additional cuts will be until after the new revenue forecast is complete. He believes that tax payments made June 30 but not received before the books closed on the last fiscal year have inflated early collections for July, which are about 50 percent ahead of last year. “Some of that has rolled into the new year and it will stay in the new year,” he said. As a result, Brown said, the total shortfall for the last fiscal year “is probably a little bit higher than it would have been.” More than 90 percent of the shortfall, or $401 million, reflects steep declines in collection of non-withholding income taxes, typically collected on capital gains from investments and payments by professionals and contract employees who don’t have taxes collected from their paychecks. The plummet of non-withholding collections came in May, one of the worst revenue months in modern state history, because many wealthy Virginians responded to impending federal tax policy changes more than a year ago by taking their investment gains in the previous year. Brown said the state will take a close look at its model for predicting non-withholding collections, which are inherently volatile, but it also cannot overlook faltering collections of withholding income, sales, and corporate income taxes. “We’ve got to acknowledge there is some general weakness here,” he said. For example, withholding income taxes increased by 2.3 percent in the fiscal year that ended June 30. They had been forecast in February to increase by 2.9 percent, and that was after McAuliffe lowered the projection from the 3.2 percent increase then-Gov. Bob McDonnell projected. As a result, the state collected $66 million

less than projected in withholding income taxes, which account for almost two-thirds of all state general fund revenues. The weakness in withholding collections prompted administration and legislative budget officials to cut an additional $200 million from the new two-year budget last month by reducing a forecast growth of 4.2 percent in each year of the biennium that they viewed as unrealistic. Sales tax collections, representing about 19 percent of general fund

revenues, also fell more than anticipated — $12.9 million less than projected. Corporate income taxes declined by 4.9 percent,

compared with an expected decrease of 3.4 percent. Beyond the immediate shortfall, the state’s big concern lies in Northern Virginia, traditionally the economic engine but now suffering from the effects of federal budget sequestration and cuts in defense spending that directly affect high-paying jobs for defense contractors . Those jobs are being replaced by lower-paying service jobs in what Brown called “the leisure industry.” “You don’t make those jobs up by going where we’re going,” he said.

States cutting programs right now—childcare cuts proveBlake 14 (Casey, “State budget could cut child care subsidies for thousands”, Citizen Times, http://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2014/07/11/state-budget-cut-child-care-subsidies-thousands/12557541/)

Landon Young, 9, visited Grandfather Mountain yesterday. Last week, he learned about vegetables and healthy eating as he helped tend the garden he grows with his friends, and earlier this year he learned to swim, had daily tutoring sessions and played counting games he didn’t even realize were teaching him math. But the hours he spends outside school could look dramatically different this fall, as he sits with relatives in a small apartment waiting for his mom to get off work or spends his afternoons being shuffled between friends and family who will watch him

after school. Landon is one of an estimated 12,000 children who could lose their spots in after school and summer childcare once the state budget is finalized. House and Senate budgets include proposals to significantly alter eligibility requirements for families receiving childcare vouchers for after school and early education childcare. The majority of the children affected will be between 6 and 12 years old, as the new proposals will shift funding focus to the

youngest children from poorer families to receive help. But area childcare advocates say the change could put children at risk by forcing parents to choose between work and leaving their children in potentially unsafe situations. “We’re afraid lowering this threshold will just push families who are close to economic sufficiency over the cliff,” said Greg Borom, director of advocacy for Children First/Communities In Schools of Buncombe County. “The people it will affect most are all working,

they’re all doing what they can to need fewer services, but this will only set them back.” Eligibility shifts Borom said advocates have lobbied state legislators for years to increase the value of the vouchers to meet market rates for the rising cost of childcare, but not at the expense of families making just enough to get by . State legislators have said the intent behind the changes is to match funding levels with the neediest among those facing long wait lists, which topped 30,000 statewide last year. By raising eligibility requirements for older children, pre-k children from the most impoverished families will jump to the front of those long lines. Buncombe County had about 1,300 waiting for childcare subsidies last year at its peak, according to Sheila Hoyle, who oversees Southwest Child Development Commission, which oversees Buncombe’s and seven other counties’ subsidy programs. Rep. Nathan Ramsey, R-Buncombe, who has voted against proposals to lower eligibility thresholds in the past, said the cuts are tied to higher-profile funding

increases elsewhere. “The Senate has proposed an 11 percent pay raise for teachers, and while I would love to

see that as much as anyone, I don’t want it at the expense of other vital services,” Ramsey said. “That funding

means getting money from somewhere.” “As a specific proposal, I would vote against it again,” Ramsey said. “These families just can’t afford to pay those market rates. No way.”