nea news 2003 - no. 21 · now confident in the capacity of deep geological repositories to confine...

2003 – No. 21.2

NEA NewsNEA News

N U C L E A R • E N E R G Y • A G E N C Y

In this issue:The economics of nuclearenergyDecommissioning policies,strategies and costs: aninternational overviewImproving the interfacebetween nuclear regulatorsand operators

A new profile for regulators inradioactive waste managementStepwise decision makingfor the long-term managementof radioactive wasteNuclear emergencymanagement: what’s new?Recurring events: a nuclearsafety concern

Cov-NEA News 21.2 4/12/03 11:50

contentsNEA News2003 – No. 21.2

NEA News is published twice yearly inEnglish and French by the OECD NuclearEnergy Agency. The opinions expressedherein are those of the contributorsalone and do not necessarily reflectthe views of the Organisation or ofits member countries. The material inNEA News may be freely used providedthe source is acknowledged.

All correspondence should beaddressed to:

The EditorNEA NewsOECD Nuclear Energy Agency12, boulevard des Îles92130 Issy-les-MoulineauxFranceTel.: +33 (0) 1 45 24 10 10Fax: +33 (0)1 45 24 11 10

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency(NEA) was established in 1958 as theOEEC European Nuclear Energy Agencyand took its present designationin 1972 when its membership wasextended to non-European countries.Its purpose is to further internationalco-operation related to the safety,environmental, economic, legal andscientific aspects of nuclear energy.It currently consists of 28 membercountries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdomand the United States. The EuropeanCommission takes part in the NEA’s workand a co-operation agreement is in forcewith the International Atomic EnergyAgency.

For more information about the NEA,see:

www.nea.fr

Editorial board:Jacques de la Ferté

Cynthia Picot

Production/photo research:Solange QuarmeauAnnette Meunier

Design/layout/graphics:Annette MeunierAndrée Pham Van

Cover page: Tunnel at Yucca Mountain (NEI,USA); Orphée research reactor (Gonin, CEA,France); dismantling and disposal (NEI,USA); dismantling at Marcoule (SYGMA,France).

12 Improving the interface betweennuclear regulators and operators

15 A new profile for regulators inradioactive waste management

18 Stepwise decision making for thelong-term management of radioactivewaste

22 Nuclear emergency management:what’s new?

25 Recurring events: a nuclear safetyconcern

4 The economics of nuclear energy

8 Decommissioning policies, strategiesand costs: an international overview

Facts and opinions

NEA updates

News briefs

28 Computer-based control systemsimportant to safety (COMPSIS)

29 New publications

Although radioactive waste arises during the course of several industrial activities,that which stems from the production of nuclear energy poses a specific challenge. Inone sense it could seem inappropriate to label spent nuclear fuel as “waste” to theextent that some 96% of its contents could be reprocessed and used as fuel again.But significant amounts of waste are still generated even when a reprocessing optionhas been chosen, and most countries still rely on a “once-through” fuel cycle. All ofthese radioactive waste arisings require appropriate disposal, and their managementis an issue that has attracted considerable interest among both technical specialistsand the general public.

Low-level waste disposal generally poses no problems for either of these groups,with largely acceptable solutions having been adopted. On the other hand, disposalof long-lived waste has enjoyed less all-round consensus. Most technical specialists arenow confident in the capacity of deep geological repositories to confine long-lived wastefor the required periods without causing any harm to the environment or placingundue burdens on future generations. The general public more reluctantly shares thisconfidence, in some instances lacking trust in the experts, and in others remainingwary of the very long timescales involved. The regulatory authority can be an importantsource of objective information in these instances, as described in the article on page15. Involving stakeholders in a stepwise decision-making process can also havesignificant impact on repository development (see page 18).

Taking care of the “waste”

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editor ia l

Editorial, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

3

Waste from the decommissioning of nuclear installations also requires propermanagement and disposal. As most of the waste is of the low-level category, disposaloptions are relatively straightforward. In terms of cost, the article on page 8 recallsthat dismantling and waste management/disposal generally represent a large share(one-fourth to one-third) of total decommissioning costs. It also points out that variousmeasures and schemes are in place in each country to ensure that decommissioningfunds are accumulated in a timely fashion to be available when expenses occur.Similarly, the cost of radioactive waste disposal associated with the operation ofnuclear power plants is funded in most countries by a levee on the electricity generated,which is then put aside in a specially designated fund that is controlled andguaranteed by the State. The nuclear industry is one in which the “polluter paysprinciple” is fully accepted and in many ways legally integrated.

Editorial, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Luis E. EchávarriNEA Director-General

A. Gonin, EDF, France.

ENRESA, Spain.

NAGRA, Switzerland.

review and 27 more plant operators have expressedthe intention to file a request for such renewal. Allof these actions, which necessitate the investmentof time, effort and knowledge, and sometimesphysical investment, result in increased generationfrom the asset at costs close to operating costs – avery attractive business opportunity for all stake-holders.

When existing plants close, they generally doso for two reasons, one of which is economic non-viability, the second being political or social inter-vention. Economic non-viability usually arisesbecause a non-recurring expenditure has to bemade, the cost of which cannot be justified incommercial terms.

The choice of technology for newgenerating plant

Nuclear energy has not been the electricity gen-eration technology of choice in most countries fortwo decades or more. There are social concernsabout and political difficulties with nuclear tech-nology that centre on the perceived safety risks, thedisposal of radioactive waste and the risk ofweapons proliferation. Moreover, some countriesdo not need to invest in any new electricity gen-erating plants at present since consumer demandis being satisfactorily met by existing installations.But, notwithstanding these issues, what would bethe economics of a new nuclear power plant?

There are currently 362 nuclear powerplants operating in OECD countries andvirtually all of them compete econom-ically within the markets in which they

are situated. This is irrespective of these marketsbeing regulated or liberalised.

Nuclear power plants are characterised by highcapital costs; the incremental costs of operationare generally below the value of the electricitythat the plants generate. There is also good evi-dence that these operational costs are beingreduced. The most valuable actions being pursuedand achieved by owners are increases in plantload factors, the uprating of plant capacities andthe extension of plant lifetimes. For example,nuclear plants in the United States increasedgeneration by more than 30% between 1990 and2000 while no new plants were commissioned.Furthermore, again in the US, 10 nuclear powerplants have recently received regulatory approvalto extend their operating lives from 40 to 60 years;16 applications for license renewal are under

P. Wilmer *

The economics of nuclear energyIn common with many of the issues surrounding nuclear energy, there is sometruth in the popular claim that nuclear energy is “not economic”, but this isfar from being a universal truth. Overall, nuclear energy can be a competitive

source of electricity and a realistic economic option for the future.

* Dr. Peter Wilmer ([email protected]) is Head of the NEANuclear Development Division. This article is based on a speechhe gave in June 2003 at the European Economic and SocialCommittee Hearing on the Outlook for Nuclear Energy.

4 Facts and opinions, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

The most recent study published by the NuclearEnergy Agency (NEA), working jointly with theInternational Energy Agency (IEA), reports andanalyses data provided by OECD member and non-member country governments regarding electricitygenerating plants to be commissioned in 2005.Levellised costs, discounting the lifetime cash flowsusing a rate of 5% per annum, showed that nuclearenergy was the most attractive economic optionby a significant margin in 5 countries out of the18 from which comprehensive responses had beenreceived. At a discount rate of 10% per annum, thenuclear option was never the most attractive.

The sensitivity of total costs to changes in thecost elements are very different. For combined-cycle gas-fired power plants, the technology of“choice” today, the cost of gas accounts for morethan two-thirds of the total generation cost. Thusthe outcome of a comparative analysis dependscritically on the future price of gas over the lifetimeof the plants. The IEA currently projects the futureprice of gas over the first quarter-century of thismillennium as being below the level prevailing in2000 and less than half that of 1980, in real terms.Certainly this reference projection reflects “con-ventional wisdom”, but there is much scope foradopting an analysis based on a range of differentscenarios.

On the other hand, nuclear energy costs aredominated by the capital investment. Other costsare relatively small, including nuclear plantdecommissioning. Once built, a nuclear powerplant offers stable electricity costs over a longperiod, provided that it operates successfully. Theplant owner is exposed to financial risk from theconstruction, from regulatory uncertainty duringboth construction and operation and from marketprice uncertainty. The control of the owner’sexposure to risks depends on the details of thecommercial arrangements that support the nuclearpower plant and it is difficult to generalise aboutthem. However, the entities accepting these riskshave to have the capacity to accommodate themand this points towards large and robust orga-nisations or companies, including the generator.Small generators operating in a fully competitivemarket, probably in the private sector, may nothave the appetite for investing in nuclear energyhaving seen the fate of all generators in the UnitedKingdom and in Sweden at the hands of harshcompetition in the newly liberalised electricitymarkets.

One interesting challenge for the nuclear indus-try is the test of its historical approach of movingto larger and larger plants in order to achieveeconomies of scale. The most recent reactors com-missioned in France have a 1 450 MWe capacitywhile the first commercial reactors built in Europe(at Calder Hall in the United Kingdom) had a50 MWe capacity. However larger capacity meanslarger financial risk, and the place for this in thefuture is a topic of open debate. The alternativeapproach of reducing the size to better suit theneeds of the electricity generation systems, toallow more use of factory-based manufacturingtechniques and to benefit from series effects hasyet to be tested.

Specific national assessments conducted recentlyby some OECD member countries show thatnuclear energy is the most economic for electricitygeneration, viz. Finland, France and Japan. Othercountries, such as the United Kingdom, have foundotherwise.

The economics of future nuclear powerplants

At the heart of the future competitiveness ofnuclear power plants are the capital costs, theinvestment needed at the outset. Obtaining defin-itive data on this has always been difficult but isincreasingly so. Commercial confidentiality is an

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■ The economics of nuclear energy

Facts and opinions, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Levellised cost and discount rate

The levellised cost methodology discounts thetime series of expenditures and incomes totheir present values in a specified base yearby applying a discount rate. Applying adiscount rate takes into account the time valueof money, i.e. a sum earned or spent in thepast or in the future does not have the samevalue as the same sum (in real terms) earnedor spent today. The discount rate may berelated to rates of return that could be earnedon typical investments; it may be a raterequired by public regulators incorporatingallowance for financial risks and/or derivedfrom national macro-economic analysis; or itmay be related to other concepts of the trade-off between costs and benefits for present andfuture generations.Source: NEA (1998), Projected Costs of Generat-ing Electricity: 1998 Update, OECD, Paris [outof print].

issue and variations of project scope and condi-tions make comparisons difficult. However, it isclear that the suppliers of nuclear power plantshave acted to improve and speed up constructionmanagement and to simplify plant design andmanufacture. The benefits of a phased programmewith ongoing replication are widely recognised.The products offered today, developed through aprocess of evolution, involve a reduced specificcapital cost (US$ or Q/kWe) relative to the plantsbuilt in the past. Perhaps a 25% reduction in thecurrent guide price of US$2000/kWe installedcapacity can be achieved by the evolutionarywater reactors offered, for example, by Areva(EPR) or BNFL/Westinghouse (AP1000). The ulti-mate test is to build a plant selected by compet-itive tender and TVO in Finland is currently well-engaged in this process.

For the longer-term future, the industry looks tothe outcome of today’s investment in researchand development for new, innovative products.

Investment in R&D varies greatly between OECDmember countries, from ¥288 billion per annumin Japan (c. US$ 2 billion) to very little in someEuropean countries. The current R&D focus ofsome key countries, including OECD membersand non-members, is the Generation IV Interna-tional Forum (GIF) initiated by the United Statesand pursued jointly by Argentina, Brazil, Canada,France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, South Africa,Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The aim ofthe endeavour is to share the responsibility andcost of R&D focusing on nuclear energy systemsselected for their innovative characteristics andpromises for tomorrow. Tomorrow is beingdefined in the GIF context as plants ready fordeployment by 2030. Some choices have beenmade against specific objectives, some of whichrelate to economics. The intention is to reducethe specific capital cost to around half the currentlevel, reduce construction times and reduce finan-cial risks to a level comparable to those for othergenerating technologies and fuels.

6

The economics of nuclear energy ■


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Levellised electricity generation costs (10% discount rate) and the effect of carbon tax

Regarding renewable energy sources for thefuture as an alternative to nuclear, all citizens of theworld, especially those in Europe, would welcomea large, inexpensive, safe, environmentally benignenergy source for the future. However, it is farfrom clear that renewable energy sources can meetthese ideal goals. In terms of economics, non-hydro renewable energy sources are currentlyexpensive and most of them are intermittent,therefore requiring additional investment in back-up plant. Interestingly, renewable energy sourcesshare a high-capital intensity with nuclear energyand therefore also carry large financial risks. Itwould be unwise to close our eyes to any optionfor the future, including nuclear energy, until theaspirations of the proponents of renewable energysources become a welcome reality.

Broadening the economic pictureIs this all the economics story? From the point

of view of governments, it is not. Energy, andelectricity in particular, are key ingredients of ourhealthy and prosperous lives that many developingcountries are missing. Its production and use haveimpacts, positive and negative, which reachbeyond economic markets. External costs are thosewhich are not included within the price for a prod-uct paid by the customer and consequently areborne by society. These are assessed using lifecycle cost analyses and impact pathway analyses,the most comprehensive study of which, forelectricity generation, is the ExternE Project, spon-sored by the European Commission. The studyfocuses on the environmental costs of electricitygeneration systems and broadly shows that theexternal costs of the nuclear electricity generationchain are of the order of 10% of the market priceof electricity; a similar figure applies to renewableenergy produced from wind. However, the externalcosts associated with the generation of electricityby the combustion of fossil fuels (gas or coal)range up to 100% of the electricity market price.Such a discrepancy implies a weakness in today’smarket arrangements that needs to be speedilyaddressed in order to direct investment towardsa more sustainable development approach.

Other aspects of the technology choices forgenerating electricity will also be of considerableinterest to governments. These include security ofenergy supply, balance of trade and employment– all of which have the potential to influencenational choices for electricity generation. Prob-ably, consideration of these would enhance thecompetitive position of nuclear energy, were they

to be quantified as external costs and internalisedwithin the price of electricity.

Concluding remarksEconomically, nuclear energy is broadly “within

the market” today. The specific individual charac-teristics of OECD member countries influencewhether it is an attractive economic choice fornew investment in generating technology in localcircumstances. Sometimes, non-economic consid-erations are at the fore in determining nationalpolicies.

In the future, the relative economics of nuclearenergy will depend on its technical development,but even more so on the evolution of renewableenergy technologies, the price of fossil fuels andthe importance attributed to external costs, includ-ing those associated with the environment andglobal warming.

Inexpensive renewable energy sources andinexpensive fossil fuels over the next 50 years donot seem to be assured. In addition, the existenceof external costs must not be overlooked by gov-ernments. From the economic perspective, nuclearenergy is a realistic economic option for the futurethat cannot be ignored.

References1. Bataille, C. and Birraux, C. (2003), “Lifetime of Nuclear

Power Plants and New Designs of Reactors”, NationalAssembly Report no. 832, Parliamentary Office for Scientificand Technological Assessment, Paris.

2. Lappeenranta University of Technology (2001), “Comparisonof Electricity Generation Costs in Finland”, LappeenrantaUniversity of Technology, Finland.

3. NEA (1998), Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: 1998Update, OECD, Paris.

4. NEA (2000), Reduction of Capital Costs of Nuclear PowerPlants, OECD, Paris.

5. NEA/IEA (2002), Externalities and Energy Policy: The LifeCycle Analysis Approach, OECD, Paris.

6. NEA (annual), Nuclear Energy Data, OECD, Paris.

7. IEA (2002), World Energy Outlook 2002, OECD/IEA, Paris.

8. IEA (2003), Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Japan –2003 Review, OECD/IEA, Paris.

9. UK Department of Trade and Industry (2003), Our energyfuture: cr eating a low carbon economy , The StationaryOffice, Norwich, United Kingdom.

7

■ The economics of nuclear energy


■■

Industry also has an interest in perfecting itsknowledge of decommissioning costs so that itmay develop a coherent decommissioning strategythat reflects national policy and assures workerand public safety, while also being cost effective.

The NEA study on decommissioningA study1 on decommissioning policies, strategies

and costs was carried out by the NEA in 2001-02,with the objectives of compiling relevant data andanalysing them in order to understand hownational policies and industrial strategies affectdecommissioning costs, and eventually identifyingdecommissioning cost drivers. The scope of thestudy was limited to commercial nuclear powerplants, excluding prototypes, demonstration plantsand plants where significant incidents or accidentswould have occurred. This approach was adoptedin order to obtain data representative of decom-missioning activities undertaken by the nuclearpower industry.


Governments are particularly interestedin ensuring that money for the decom-missioning of nuclear installations willbe available at the time it is needed,

and that no “stranded” liabilities will be left to befinanced by the taxpayers rather than by theelectricity consumers. For this reason, they havesought to understand the components of decom-missioning costs and to periodically review costestimates from nuclear installation owners. Robustcost estimates are key elements in designing andimplementing a coherent and comprehensivenational decommissioning policy, including thelegal and regulatory bases for the collection, sav-ing and use of decommissioning liability funds.

E. Bertel, T. Lazo*

Decommissioning policies,strategies and costs: aninternational overview

* Dr. Evelyne Bertel ([email protected]) is a member of the NEANuclear Development Division. Dr. Ted Lazo ([email protected]) is amember of the Radiation Protection and Radioactive WasteManagement Division.

As many nuclear power plants will reach the end of their lifetime during thenext 20 years or so, decommissioning is becoming an increasingly importanttopic for governments, regulators and industries. Decommissioning policiesand strategies vary widely at the international level, and choices in strategymay also differ. In addition, project-specific characteristics largely influence

decommissioning costs. Despite this, major cost drivers can be identified.

Included in national policy Share of positive answers

Definition of decommissioning 50%Defined decommissioning end-point 50%Mandatory timescale for decommissioning completion 25%Decommissioning license requirement 80%Defined radioactive waste exemption levels 60%

Twenty-six countries provided data and infor-mation through the study’s questionnaire. Thequestions on policy and strategy targeted issues ofrelevance for cost estimates. The proposeddetailed cost structure2 – namely cost elements(e.g. dismantling activities or site cleanup andlandscaping) and cost groups (e.g. labour orcapital) – was intended to support an in-depthanalysis of cost drivers. However, most respon-dents reported results from existing studies andestimates based on national and/or companyaccounting frameworks and practices, which werenot fully consistent with the scope and structurerecommended in the questionnaire. These limi-tations were taken into account in the analysespresented in the report.

The data collected include decommissioningcost estimates for a large number of nuclear powerplants, representing approximately one-third ofthe nuclear capacity in operation worldwide. Itoffers a robust base for statistical analysis andoverall assessment. Decommissioning cost esti-mates were provided for a broad range of reactortypes and sizes, reflecting the variety of nuclearpower plants built and operated in the partic-ipating countries. All reactor types that have beencommercially deployed (PWR, VVER, BWR,PHWR/CANDU and GCR) are covered by thestudy. The size of the reactors considered rangefrom less than 10 MWe to more than 1 000 MWe.

Decommissioning policies andstrategies

Decommissioning policy is defined as theframework implemented by governments, includ-ing laws, regulations, standards and mandatory

requirements, that imposes the background rulesto be followed by the nuclear industry for decom-missioning projects. National decommissioningpolicies were found to differ on many aspects thatmay have an impact on costs. Key points in thisregard are summarised in Table 1, which indicatesthe percentage of positive answers for each topiclisted.

Decommissioning strategy, as defined withinthe study, relates to how the owners and operatorsof nuclear power plants apply national policy totheir specific decommissioning project. Wide varia-tions can be noted in the strategies adopted byindustries in different countries and even by dif-ferent operators in the same country. Operators/owners consider a broad range of issues in choos-ing a decommissioning strategy, covering technicalfeasibility, economic efficiency, regulatory con-straints and socio-political aspects.

Regarding the decision-making process, nationalcontext and local situations are often driving fac-tors for choosing between alternative approaches.For example, the status and trends in nuclearpower development in the country, the local socialconditions (e.g. unemployment, development oftourism) and the expected re-use of the site areprimary factors considered in determining indus-trial strategies for decommissioning.

In terms of schedule, the majority consider bothimmediate and deferred dismantling when choos-ing a strategy; in some countries, however, theregulatory framework allows only one option.Each of the two options, immediate and deferreddismantling, was assumed for costing purposesby roughly half of the study respondents. It isinteresting to note that, in practice, immediate

9Facts and opinions, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

■ Decommissioning policies, strategies and costs: an international overview

Table 1. Decommissioning policy overview

and deferred dismantling are not always drasticallydifferent in terms of the overall schedule of decom-missioning activities. For example, some imme-diate dismantling strategies lead to ending decom-missioning activities 40 years after shutdown, whilesome deferred strategies with 30 years of dormancywill lead to a similar end of activities 40 years aftershutdown. This largely explains the lack of impactof immediate versus deferred dismantling ondecommissioning costs.

Decommissioning costsDecommissioning cost estimates (see Table 2)

remain below 500 US$/kWe for nearly all waterreactors considered in the survey. For gas-cooled

reactors (GCR), the reported cost estimates aresignificantly higher (around 2500 US$/kWe), but itshould be noted that only four cost data sets werereported for this reactor type and they refer to oldreactor designs not at all comparable with thehigh-temperature, gas-cooled reactors (HTGR)under development today.

Dismantling and waste management/disposalgenerally represent a large share (one-fourth toone-third) of total decommissioning costs; eachone of these two elements may reach up to 60% oftotal costs in some cases. Three other cost elementsusually represent around 10% each of the totalcost: security survey and maintenance; site cleanupand landscaping; and project management, engi-neering and site support. The other elementsseldom exceed 5% of total decommissioning costs.

Regarding waste management and disposal, theweight of radioactive waste arising from decom-missioning activities is around 10 tonnes per MWe

for any reactor type, except for the gas-cooledreactors for which it is ten times higher, around100 tonnes per MWe. This is one of the reasonswhy decommissioning costs do not seem to varysignificantly according to the type of water reactorconsidered.

Decommissioning is a labour-intensive activityand labour costs may be a significant componentof total decommissioning costs. However, on thebasis of cost data sets provided for the study, thereis no evidence of correlation between averagenational manpower costs and total decommis-sioning costs. This might be the result of industrystrategy adaptation, shifting from manual inter-vention to automated equipment when and wherehigh labour costs make it economically efficient.

Decommissioning cost driversThe study’s findings on cost drivers are only

tentative owing to the variability in coverage andcomprehensiveness of responses. However, theygenerally confirm earlier national and internationalanalyses and publications. In particular, they high-light the importance of project-specific character-istics and issues in the understanding of decom-missioning cost elements.

The main factors identified as having minorimpacts on decommissioning costs are: type andsize of the reactor (GCRs excepted); immediateor deferred dismantling option; and unit labourcosts. The major cost drivers concern: scope ofdecommissioning activities; regulatory standardsincluding waste classification and clearance levels;site conditions and re-use; and radioactive wastedisposal.

The scope of decommissioning activities takeninto account in cost estimates, including the


Decommissioning policies, strategies and costs: an international overview ■

Reactor type Average cost Standard deviation (no. of data sets) (US$/kWe) (US$/kWe)

PWR (21) 320 195VVER (8) 330 110CANDU (7) 360 70BWR (9) 420 100GCR (4) >2500 -

Table 2. Summary of decommissioning cost estimates

example, nuclear facilities or a recreation park).The scope and end-point of decommissioningactivities vary widely depending on such site-specific issues as the continued operation ofnuclear facilities during and after the unit underconsideration is decommissioned.

The quantities and specific characteristics ofradioactive waste arising from decommissioningare a major cost driver. An in-depth study in thisfield would be needed to identify and analyseseparately the impacts of regulations (clearancelevels), technical progress (plant design and oper-ation, waste treatment) and socio-political context(cost and implementation of waste disposalfacilities).

Providing for future decommissioningcosts

The information provided for the study showsthat in all countries, decommissioning costs arerobustly estimated and thoroughly analysed byoperators, regulators and governments. Costestimates based upon engineering models andfeedback from experience are carried out, regularlyupdated and often audited by independent bodies.These estimates are used in particular to assessthe amount of decommissioning funds necessary.Various measures and schemes are in place ineach country to ensure that the decommissioningfunds are accumulated in a timely fashion to beavailable when expenses will occur.

References1. NEA (2003), Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants: Policies,

Strategies and Costs, OECD, Paris.2. EC, IAEA, NEA (1999), Nuclear Decommissioning, A Proposed

Standardised List of Items for Costing Purposes, OECD, Paris.

assumed starting and end-point, obviously has amajor influence on total cost. This scope is largelydelineated by national policy. Analysing in detailthe relationship between policy changes and costscould provide valuable information to policymakers. Such an analysis would, however, requiremore detailed information on national decom-missioning policy and cost estimates than wasavailable for the study.

Regulatory standards in force – includingclearance levels, allowable radiation doses toworkers and the public, environmental norms andstandards – define the framework and boundariesof decommissioning activities and have a majorimpact on the cost of decommissioning. For exam-ple, maximum acceptable dose to workers has adirect impact on manpower requirements and thecost of labour. Environmental regulations andmandatory decommissioning end-points have animpact on the scope and schedule of decom-missioning activities, which in turn are key costdrivers.

Site-specific conditions of a decommissioningproject that have an impact on cost include thenumber, type and status of units located on thesame site and the intended re-use of the site (for

11Facts and opinions, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

■ Decommissioning policies, strategies and costs: an international overview

■

Dismantling operations at a nuclear power plant in the United Kingdom.

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Ensuring that nuclear installations areoperated and maintained in such a waythat their impact on public health andsafety is as low as reasonably achievable

has been and will continue to be the cornerstoneof the nuclear safety landscape. But it is clear thatthis landscape is changing. The introduction ofcompetition into electricity markets, technologicaladvancements and government oversight are afew of the many factors creating challenges today.

The number of players involved in nuclearelectricity generation is considerable, but two keyplayers stand out when it comes to the issue ofnuclear safety: the nuclear regulator and thenuclear industry. While the industry is responsiblefor safety, it is the regulator who ensures thatlicensees operate their plants in an acceptably safemanner. Although many fora are organised in thisarea, few bring together top-level participants fromregulatory organisations and the nuclear industryfor an exchange of views with a goal of reachingcommon understandings.

Recognising this, the NEA Committee on NuclearRegulatory Activities (CNRA) and the WorldAssociation of Nuclear Operators (WANO) held ajoint international forum in June 2002. The forumsought to improve communication between theparties as well as understanding of the rationaleused by each group. Discussions focused on threeareas of interest: market competition, asset man-agement, and measuring and communicating safetyperformance. In order to better understand theresults of these discussions, it is helpful to knowhow each of these terms was approached at theforum.

12 NEA updates, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Market competition – In the present environ-ment, issues such as industry restructuring, marketliberalisation, grid stability, safety performance,maintaining competence, management of changeand impact of regulatory changes are primarydrivers to changes in industry practices, which inturn require the regulator to discern the associatedimpacts on regulation and safety. A key aspect ofmarket competition is the speed of change, whichbrings about changes in what industry or regu-lators perceive, and may result in added tensionsor pressures on both. Other issues include organ-isational changes and the increased demand bythe public to ensure safety.

Asset management – The nuclear industryneeds to maintain adequate resources to carry outits work both now and in the future, while at thesame time maximising its economic return. A keyelement in addition to financial issues (i.e. lia-bilities, relationships, internationalism, etc.) andphysical questions (life extension, periodic safetyreviews, decommissioning) is human assets. Theneed to maintain capability, skills and staff is con-sidered to be a very important issue.

Measuring and communicating safety perform-ance – It is essential for any organisation to haverelevant indicators of its performance. Bothnuclear regulators and the nuclear industry havemade numerous efforts in the past years to

B. Kaufer*

Improving the interfacebetween nuclearregulators and operators

* Dr. Barry Kaufer ([email protected]) is a member of theNEA Nuclear Safety Division.

establish systematic, meaningful and reliable waysto measure safety performance. Both parties haveestablished systems for collecting information onsafety performance, with each recognising thatthere are pros and cons in using performanceindicators. Issues needing to be addressed include:ways to share this information; what types ofindicators (e.g. lagging or leading) are used; andtransparency and openness in relation to marketcompetition and as part of a safety managementsystem.

Forum discussionsThroughout the forum, participants regularly

sought ways to define the respective roles of oper-ators and regulators; develop usable performanceindicators, especially in the management area,and improve mutual confidence between bothparties. They also addressed the control of out-side contractors, the regulator’s role and compe-tence with respect to the operator’s organisationaland staffing matters, and the need to react tointernational pressures to achieve more har-monised nuclear safety standards.

Both regulators and operators noted that theeconomic pressures of competition in electricitymarkets have led to greater focus on efficiency inplant operations, raising some concern aboutsustaining efforts to maintain a good nuclear safetyculture. It was clear from the discussions thatmarket competition has created challenges tosafety for both regulators and operators. Encourag-ingly, both sides see trends that liberalisation canactually lead to better safety performance, but theyalso acknowledge the need for continued cautionand vigilance.

Regarding asset management, regulators andoperators alike stressed that one of the biggestchallenges in the future would be to have reliableand adequately trained staff. Work is needed, bothnationally and internationally, to sustain a skilledknowledge base. Doing so will be a key test of thesuccess of joint efforts between regulators andoperators.

Measuring safety performance was a more diffi-cult area in which to achieve consensus becauseof the different approaches taken by each side.It was recognised that sharing safety performanceinformation would be greatly beneficial to bothregulators and operators, especially in improvingthe effectiveness of their responses to events. Thisis possible provided a firm understanding isreached on how the information is to be used by

both sides. Two very difficult areas were also dis-cussed: performance indicators related to man-agement issues and the continuing problem ofidentifying performance indicators that help revealworsening safety situations. The general problemof operators (and regulators) using performanceindicators as targets was also recognised.

Open and clear communication with the publichas largely been a priority and has been achievedby both parties. The remaining challenge is toensure that not only are improved messagesdelivered, but also that they are understood andbelieved.

Concerns remainThe general sentiment at the end of the meeting

was that coming together was a beginning, remain-ing in contact would be progress, and workingtogether would be the demonstration of success.The forum enlarged the scope of existing relation-ships between regulators and licensees from anational perspective to an international interfaceacross borders.

A real concern remains, however, about themeasurement and communication of safety per-formance in the modern era of market competitionand openness. Industry is worried about theregulators misusing the results of peer reviews orperformance indicators, either to take precipitateregulatory action or to make premature commentsin public. To a large extent this goes right back toa mutual appreciation of each other’s roles in theoverall safety system and how this has been alteredby the new circumstances that operators andregulators have to face.

Other concerns include:

● Safety: Is there agreement on the issue of safetyculture? How does the operator assess it andwhere does the regulator fit into the picture?How safe is “safe enough” and how can theregulator and the operator reach agreement?

● Economic pressure: It can be good for safety,but there needs to be awareness that organi-sational changes can have negative conse-quences for safety.

● Regulation: Good co-operation between theregulator and operator is necessary to ensurethat resources are targeted at real safety issues,but the regulator also needs to retain theconfidence of other stakeholders, particularlythe public.

13NEA updates, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

■ Improving the interface between nuclear regulators and operators

● Public demands: Both nuclear regulators andthe nuclear industry need to understand howto satisfy the public’s ever-increasing demandsfor openness without damaging the operator’scommercial interests or financial standing.

Both the NEA and WANO recognised that com-munication is a key area in which regulators andindustry could work together to ensure that otherstakeholders, that is government and the public,not only openly receive information but are alsoable to understand what it means and believe it.The forum succeeded in initiating a consensus-building process for regulators and operators forthe first time in a truly international setting. Thenext step is to begin working together to increaseco-operation and develop common approaches,while respecting the independence of each party.

Future co-operationSeveral practical recommendations were devel-

oped by the forum participants for future co-operation:

● The NEA and WANO should exchange infor-mation on concepts, such as the performanceindicators they develop or their criteria for eventreporting, and might define a protocol forexchanging such information.

● The NEA and WANO recognise that knowledgemanagement (concerning in this case personnelageing and maintaining technical competencies)is an area of concern to both organisations andto other interested parties. They favour thedevelopment of programmes aimed at attractingand retaining young people into the nuclearfield and maintaining technical expertise in thefuture. Both organisations agree to exchangeinformation on initiation of actions taken onknowledge management.

● The NEA, through its two safety committees (theCNRA and the CSNI), should review the resultsof the forum and prepare reports of interest anduse by their member countries as appropriate.For example, the CNRA is currently focusing onthe subjects of analysis of operating events,accident precursors and near misses, and thecontinuing development of safety performanceindicators. WANO is considering developingguidance for plant operators on change manage-ment, human performance, operational decisionmaking and other specific issues as they devel-op. Both organisations commit to providinginformation on their respective (future) pro-grammes of work and to exchange informationin the future, when possible.

● Participation of WANO members in selectedmeetings or activities of the NEA committeesor working groups, as agreed on a case-by-casebasis, would help maintain a co-operativerelation. The mutual convenience of holding afollow-up forum should be considered in twoto three years.

In line with the latter recommendation andbased on the positive feedback received, the NEAplans on holding another Regulator/IndustryForum in 2004 (RIF 2004). The topic of this forumwill be “Maintaining a Sound Basis for ContinuedSafe Nuclear Power Plant Operation”. The mainfocus will be on one of the key issues raised in the2002 forum: the use of contractors.


Improving the interface between nuclear regulators and operators ■

■■

www.nea.fr www.wano.infoW A N O

activities and facilities; and (d) inspect and reviewconstruction, operation and closure of nuclearfacilities to ensure compliance with licensingconditions.

The FSC observes that amongst all the institu-tional actors in the field of long-term radioactivewaste management, it is perhaps the regulatoryauthorities that have restyled their roles mostsignificantly. In partaicular, modern societaldemands on risk governance and the widespreadadoption of stepwise decision-making processeshave already led to changes in the image and roleof the regulators. Also, legal instruments reflectand encourage a new set of behaviours and a newunderstanding of how regulators may serve thepublic interest.

Regulators: providing a service to thepublic

The technical regulators have a mission of publicservice, are “guarantors” of safety and are the“peoples’ expert”, or peoples’ resource, on safetyconcerns. They need to act and be seen as inde-pendent overseers of the quality of the work andthe credibility in the decision-making process.Independence, competence and effectiveness ofthe regulator are crucial to public trust andconfidence in the national radioactive wastemanagement programme, especially as regardshigh-level waste (HLW) disposal.

Regulators should thus establish good contactswith the different stakeholders. Open channels ofcommunications should be maintained with the


Institutions involved in the long-term manage-ment of radioactive waste are facing a rapidlyevolving environment stemming from suchinfluences as societal changes, new informa-

tion technology and new roles for the media. Thisis taking place at the same time as some nationalprogrammes evolve from research and develop-ment to site selection and implementation of arepository, whilst others are reviewing and definingtheir policies in the waste management area. Asin many environmental areas, a demand for publicparticipation in decision making leads to a need fornew approaches to involving stakeholders. TheNEA Forum on Stakeholder Confidence (FCS)examines the societal and decision-making contextof long-term radioactive waste management,notably as regards solid waste disposal. Severalfeatures of this context have particular significancefor regulatory authorities.

Generally speaking, the regulator’s responsibil-ities are to (a) define radiation protection andnuclear safety requirements; (b) issue guidance onsafety assessment methodology and documentation;(c) review the implementer’s safety analysis as abasis for licensing waste management and disposal

C.R. Lopez, C. Pescatore *

A new profile forregulators in radioactivewaste management

* Dr. Ma del Carmen Ruiz Lopez ([email protected]) is Head of theHLW Branch at the Nuclear Safety Council, Spain, as well asa member of the NEA RWMC Regulators’ Forum and the FSCCore Group. Dr. Claudio Pescator e (pescator [email protected]) isPrincipal Administrator for Radioactive Waste Managementin the NEA Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Man-agement Division. This article is based on the NEA reportentitled The Regulator’s Evolving Role and Image in RadioactiveWaste Management.


A new profile for regulators in radioactive waste management ■

public, implementers, government departments,parliament, concerned action groups and others.Appropriate mechanisms of dialogue must befound with the different stakeholders. In particular,the regulators should be involved early in theprocess of facility siting and collaborate with thepotential host community/ies to the extent thatthis is compatible with the national regulatoryregime.

Successful experiences in facility siting haveshown that active regulatory involvement is neededand is also possible without endangering theindependence and integrity of the regulatoryauthority. For example, thanks to their earlyinvolvement and commitment at the local level,the regulatory authority of the Nordic countrieshave come to be seen by the municipalities as “theindependent expert of the public” and “compe-tent and responsible supervisors of safety”.

Regulatory process: gradual progressand public involvement

A stepwise decision making and implementationprocess implies a stepwise regulatory process. Thiskind of regulatory process facilitates the develop-ment of regulations in a gradual way, starting fromvery general principles and ending with theguidance applicable to a licensing review. In thisway, the job of regulating the development andimplementation of a radioactive waste disposalfacility, for instance, is intrinsically one of graduallearning and refinement. Accordingly, rules set atone step may be modified or updated at a laterstage, although regulators must clarify the reasonsand basis for changing regulations at later stagesof repository development. (For further detailsregarding stepwise decision making in radioactivewaste management, see the article on page 18.)

In order to preserve flexibility in a decision-making process that can last decades, regulatorsshould strive to avoid over-prescriptive rules tooearly. This attitude implies in turn a well-structuredand formalised interaction process betweenimplementers, regulatory authorities and otherstakeholders that secures the societal trust men-tioned above. A potential issue that could emergeis whether the level of knowledge is adequate toprovide the necessary input for the technical andsocietal decision at each stage in the stepwisedevelopment process. A pragmatic response to thisquestion can be given: in the early stages, only apreliminary safety appraisal is needed stating thatnothing has been found that would raise doubts

about the possibility to achieve the required safetylevel.

The process of rule making and its applicationto facility site selection and licensing should betransparent and comprehensible. This implies anopen process in which the public and otherstakeholders can comment on the approaches usedby the regulators:

● The “rules of the game” for the regulatoryprocess should be known as soon as possible,and in any case in advance of a licensingapplication.

● Ideally, the general public should perceive theoverall system of regulation, including theformulation of relevant policy by government,as being impartial and equitable.

However, since there are decisions that are theexclusive responsibility of the regulatory author-ities, the regulators should determine and informin advance when, where and how public and otherstakeholder input can be accommodated. Theregulators should also communicate the basis oftheir decisions. In any event, public involvementin the regulatory process will be an area of con-tinuing learning.

Confidence and public trustPublic trust is based both on track record and on

perceived morality and values. A good track recordwould suggest, from experience or evidence, thatcertain future events would occur as expected. Aperception of such attributes as reliability, honesty,veracity, fairness and strength of a person orinstitution would further allow a certain degree ofdelegation to be given. Public trust is thusnecessary to further legitimate the mission and roleof the regulators, in the eyes of the public.

A number of organisational and behaviouralfeatures appear essential to building confidenceand meriting public trust. Among these are:

● Openness: being active in providing informa-tion about decisions, policies and questionsrelated to safety. Openness is also a matter ofbeing prepared to answer questions, as well asto discuss and to exchange views with the publicor various organisations. Communications needto be open and honest. Open channels of com-munication must be maintained.

● Clarity: demonstrating a commitment to open-ness through efforts to communicate in waysthat are clear and understandable to the broaderpublic. The use of plain language to explain


safety, institutional and procedural concepts isessential for fostering the understanding andtransparency necessary for building trust.

● Accountability: in the sense that regulators mustbe prepared to have their actions and decisionsprobed and questioned in public fora.

● Independence: being independent of the nuclearenergy industry in regard to licensing decisions,and of any other organisations likely to beaffected by such decisions. Independence hasto be demonstrated by visible actions.

● Competence: both statutory and effective.Statutory competence is granted by the mandatedefined for regulators in the national pro-gramme. Effective competence relies on thetraining of regulatory staff and the resources oftheir institution. The regulatory staff must havethe required expertise and sufficient resourcesfor careful scrutiny of the implementer’s propos-als and arguments. Achieving and maintainingadequate, effective competence within regulatoryauthorities means that they must be able toattract and retain capable staff.

Dialogue and interactionIn order to gain public confidence and trust, all

the relevant regulatory authorities, includinggovernment, need a long-term strategy for publiccommunication as well as for interaction with otherstakeholders. A prerequisite in defining the com-munication strategies with stakeholders and toaddress issues of real interest is to listen to theirconcerns and expectations.

Public concerns have turned out, in many cases,to be different from what the technical expertsregard as the most relevant concerns. In order toincrease public confidence in their mandate, theregulators must understand the social concernsand how to address them. Studies and research onsocial concerns should thus be the starting point inaddressing regulatory public information anddefining stakeholder communications strategies.Indeed, risk perception, values and interests of thepublic and different stakeholders have been thesubject of research by a number of regulatoryorganisations.

Since local authorities are key decision makersin any facility siting process (and even more so ifthe municipalities participate on a voluntary basis,or have veto rights, such as in Sweden and Finlandregarding repositories), they are natural intermedi-aries for dialogue with the technical regulatoryauthorities. In the first instance, the technical

regulator’s role should be one of collaboration,acting proactively alongside the municipalities.The objective is not to gain public acceptance ofa project but to build up the regulator’s credibilityand gain public confidence as well as to providenational and local decision makers with the neces-sary information on safety matters.

Communication with the public and the newsmedia is a matter of particular importance, as theyare both an audience in themselves and a channelfor communicating with other audiences. How tocommunicate with the public is not a simplesubject because of the limitations in translatingtechnical language for public understanding. Inany event, communication requires the organisa-tion’s commitment to continuous learning: trainingin risk communication and in conducting publicmeetings is necessary. Thus, in addition to theregulatory control functions, public informationshould be a key function of regulators. In fact thisis stated in several legal instruments having servedto create regulatory bodies and is included as agoal in regulatory strategic plans.

The regulatory authority, as a body with inde-pendent functions, should provide independent,neutral, balanced and factual information aboutissues related to safety. Indeed, most of the tech-nical regulators have the obligation both to makeregular or periodic reports and to inform stake-holders when asked. Consequently regulators haveto be prepared to respond. This means that theyshould position themselves on questions of debateand issues of public interest (e.g. waste disposalalternatives and options, general feasibility ofdisposal, retrievability, etc.).

ConclusionsThe traditional position worldwide has been that

regulators should not be too intensely involvedwith the waste disposal programme until the actuallicensing process begins, since their independencemight be legally compromised. This position isgradually changing towards a more active andvisible role in the pre-licensing steps.

The regulatory process is part of a broaderdecision-making system. Culture, politics andhistory vary from country to country, providing dif-ferent contexts for establishing and maintainingpublic confidence. However, an open, stepwiseregulatory process led by a respected regulatorcan give confidence that the implementer’s pro-posals are subject to detailed technical scrutinyon behalf of the public. ■■

■ A new profile for regulators in radioactive waste management


The context of long-term radioactivewaste management is being shaped bychanges in modern society. Values suchas health, environmental protection and

safety are increasingly important, as are trendstowards improved forms of participatory democ-racy that demand new forms of risk governance indealing with hazardous activities. These changesin turn necessitate new forms of dialogue anddecision-making processes that include a largenumber of stakeholders. The new dynamic ofdialogue and decision-making process has beencharacterised as a shift from a more traditional“decide, announce and defend” model, focusedon technical assurance, to one of “engage, interactand co-operate”, for which both technical assur-ance and quality of the process are of comparableimportance to a constructive outcome. Conse-quently, the scientific and engineering aspects ofwaste management safety are no longer of

C. Pescatore, A. Vari*

Stepwise decisionmaking for the long-term management of radioactive waste

exclusive importance. Organisational ability tocommunicate and to adapt to the new contexthas emerged as a critical contributor to publicconfidence.

In the new decision-making context it is clearthat (a) any significant decisions regarding thelong-term management of radioactive waste willbe accompanied by a comprehensive publicreview with involvement of a diverse range ofstakeholders; (b) the public, and especially thelocal public, are not willing to commit irreversiblyto technical choices on which they have insuf-ficient familiarity and understanding; and (c) anymanagement options will take decades to bedeveloped and implemented, which will involvestakeholders who have not yet been born. Thus,a “decision” no longer means opting for, in one goand for all time, a complete package solution.Instead, a decision is one step in an overall, cau-tious process of examining and making choicesthat preserve the safety and well-being of thepresent generation and the coming ones whilenot needlessly depriving the latter of their rightof choice. Consideration is thus increasingly beinggiven to the better understanding of conceptssuch as “stepwise decision making” and “adaptivestaging” in which the public, and especially themost affected local public, are meaningfullyinvolved in the planning process.

* Dr. Claudio Pescator e (pescator [email protected]) is PrincipalAdministrator for Radioactive Waste Management in the NEARadiation Protection and Radioactive Waste ManagementDivision. Dr. Anna Vari ([email protected]) is ar esearcher at the Inst i tute of Sociology of the HungarianAcademy of Sciences. This article is based on the forthcomingNEA report entitled Stepwise Decision Making in RadioactiveWaste Management.

Features of a stepwise decision-makingapproach

The key feature of a stepwise decision-makingconcept is a plan in which development is bysteps or stages that are reversible, within the limitsof practicability. In addition to the institutionalactors, the public is involved at each step andalso in reviewing the consequences of previousdecisions. This is designed to provide reassurancethat decisions may be reversed if experienceshows them to have adverse or unwanted effects.Discrete, easily overviewed steps facilitate thetraceability of waste management decisions, allowfeedback from regulators and the public, andpromote the strengthening of public and politicalconfidence. They also allow time to build trust inthe competence of the regulators as well as theimplementers of a waste management project. Astepwise approach to decision making has longbeen implemented in national waste managementprogrammes, e.g. since the early eighties in theUSA and in the Scandinavian countries. However,despite the early implementation of the stepwiseapproach to decision making, the subject has notbeen widely developed and debated. In particular,accepted guiding principles have not yet been for-mulated, the roots of any such process in empir-ical social science research have not been fullyreviewed, nor the difficulties of its implementationanalysed. A satisfactory analysis might not havebeen possible until recently, however, before moreexperience was accumulated. The NEA Forum onStakeholder Confidence has examined the abovepoints in a report1 soon to be released, whose keymessages are summarised hereafter.

➩ Decisions are already being made in astepwise and participatory fashion andthere is thrust to increase public participation in decision making.

Decisions are already being taken – and progresstowards radioactive waste management solutionsis already being made – in a stepwise fashion.Governments and the relevant institutions areincorporating provisions that favour flexibility indecision making, such as reversibility of deci-sions and retrievability of waste. In addition, gov-ernments and the relevant institutions are increas-ingly implementing instruments of participatorydemocracy that will require new or enhancedforms of dialogue amongst all concerned parties.For example, partnerships are created with local

communities or communities are given means tointeract significantly with the decision-makingprocess. These arrangements promote the buildingof trust in decision makers and implementers.

➩ Stepwise decision making requires thereversibility of decisions.

Reversibility denotes the possibility of revers-ing one or a series of steps at any stage of a pro-gramme. Such a reversal, of course, must be theresult of careful evaluation with the appropriatestakeholders. This implies a need for review ofearlier decisions, as well as for the necessarymeans (technical, financial, etc.) to reverse a step.Reversibility also denotes the fact that fallbackpositions are incorporated both in the long-termwaste management policy and in the actual techni-cal programme. In the early stages of a programmefor waste disposal, for instance, reversal of adecision regarding site selection or the adoption ofa particular design option may be considered. Atlater stages during construction and operation, orfollowing emplacement of the waste, reversal mayinvolve the modification of one or more compo-nents of the facility or even the retrieval of wastepackages from parts of the facility. Thus, reversibil-ity in the implementation phase requires theapplication of a retrievable waste managementtechnology.

Not all steps or decisions can be fully reversible,e.g. once implemented, the decision to excavatea shaft cannot be reversed and the shaft “un-dug”.On the other hand, these decisions can beidentified in the process and used as a natural holdpoint for programme review and confirmation.Reversibility is thus also a way to close downoptions in a considered manner. If, for instance,in repository development the need to reversecourse is carefully evaluated with appropriatestakeholders at each stage of development, a highlevel of confidence should be achieved, by thetime a closure decision is to be taken, that there areno technical or social reasons for waste retrieval.

➩ Competing requirements of technicalsafety and societal control are to bereconciled in long-term wastemanagement.

Due to the extremely long-lasting potential dan-ger of radioactive waste, the primary feature thatwaste management facilities should demonstrate


■ Stepwise decision making for the long-term management of radioactive waste

is long-term safety. At the same time, severalstakeholders demand future controllability andretrievability of waste when these are placed inunderground repositories. Only a step-by-stepapproach to technical implementation can assurethat the competing requirements of safety andcontrollability may be met simultaneously, andthat robust systems for waste management maybe established. Such robust systems include moni-toring during characterisation, operation and, inthe case of final disposal, the post-operationalphase. In response to the competing requirementsof technical safety and societal control, manyimplementing organisations are focusing theirefforts on developing a final repository from whichthe waste is retrievable. In some cases retrievabilityis also a legal requirement.

➩ Public involvement and social learningprocesses are facilitated by a stepwise approach.

There is significant convergence between theapproach that is being taken by the practitionersof radioactive waste management and theindications received from field studies in socialresearch. Empirical research studies in socialscience identify confidence in the radioactivewaste management methods and trust in thedecision-making and implementing institutions askey factors of public acceptance. These studiesalso indicate that gaining familiarity with, andcontrol over, radioactive waste managementtechnologies and institutions are crucial for

building up trust and confidence. Familiarity andcontrol are to be gained through public involve-ment and social learning processes. Therefore,bottom-up approaches are proposed, wheredecision makers and other stakeholders areadvised by scientific experts, but at the same time,decision makers and experts consider theobjectives, needs and concerns defined by stake-holders. Bottom-up approaches are largely facil-itated by stepwise procedures that providesufficient time for developing, through deliber-ation, discourses that are both competent and fair.

➩ Competing social values exist and lendcomplexity to decision making.

Research on organisational management suggeststhat competing values inevitably need to be embod-ied in societal decision processes for these to besuccessful, and that the dominant values maychange over time. For example, in the past, deci-sions related to radioactive waste managementwere dominated by a technical command-and-control approach, focusing primarily on findingtechnically optimal solutions. Later, this approachhas given way to an individual-rights orientation,with a focus on participation and on reachingdecisions that have community support, even ifthey may not result in optimal solutions initiallychosen by the experts. When participation andcommunity support are accommodated, a furthershift is then seen in seeking distributive equity.The tension that exists between competing valueslike technical efficiency, community support and


Stepwise decision making for the long-term management of radioactive waste ■

Involving stakeholders in a stepwise decision-making process can have significant impact on repository development.

NAG

RA,

Swit

zerl

and

distributive equity, lends complexity to decision-making processes. Research indicates that it isimpossible to satisfy all the competing values byan idealised decision-making process. In a highlydeveloped democratic society, however, all desiredcriteria should be accommodated at least to adegree.

➩ Overarching principles of publicinvolvement, social learning andadaptive decision making are emergingfrom practical experience and socialresearch.

A consensus appears to emerge from the expe-rience in both social research and practical radio-active waste management. Three overarchingprinciples are the essential elements of anydecision making that seeks broad societal support,namely:

● public involvement in decision-making processesshould be facilitated, e.g. by promoting interac-tions between various stakeholders and experts;

● social learning should be facilitated, for exampleby promoting constructive and high-qualitycommunication between individuals with differ-ent knowledge, beliefs, interests, values andworld views;

● decision making should be iterative and providefor adaptation to contextual changes.

➩ In the radioactive waste managementcontext, a set of specific action goalsshould be targeted.

A set of goals specific to the radioactive wastemanagement context may be stated as a way oftranslating into action the principles outlinedabove. In particular, in order to identify and imple-ment solutions that are widely regarded as legit-imate, it will be important:

● to have an open debate and decisions on thenational policy regarding energy production andthe future of nuclear energy;

● to develop a broad understanding that the statusquo is unacceptable and that an importantproblem needs to be solved;

● to define clearly the goals of the waste man-agement programme, including the source, typeand volume of waste to be handled;

● to define a technically and politically accept-able waste management approach;

● to identify one or more technically and polit-ically acceptable site(s) for a waste manage-ment facility;

● to negotiate tailor-made compensation/incentive packages and community over-sight schemes with host and neighbouringcommunities;

● to implement decisions by fully respectingagreements.

➩ Implementing a stepwise process raises anumber of methodological issues to beresolved.

Long-term solutions to manage radioactive wastewill typically take decades to be implemented.Incorporating the views of national, regional andlocal stakeholders and allowing for the integrationof their views will likely be difficult to implementin the decision-making process. In particular,progress can no longer be expected to be linearwhen an iterative approach is used.

The concrete arrangements for sketching outand agreeing on decision phases, for selectingand involving stakeholders in a participatoryprocess, and for adapting institutions to meet long-term expectations, will require careful planningand tuning in each national context. Criteria willbe needed for balancing the social sustainabilityand the efficiency of a process made more lengthyand uncertain by added decision checkpoints. Itwill be important that focus and attention arekept with time and that a guarantor of the processbe properly chosen. Continued reflection andexchange on an international level can make apositive contribution to these efforts.

Reference1. NEA (forthcoming), Stepwise Decision Making in Radioactive

Waste Management, OECD, Paris.

21

■ Stepwise decision making for the long-term management of radioactive waste

NEA updates, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

■

Activities in the area of nuclear emer-gency management have flourishedover the past several years. Throughthe use of internationally organised,

multinational drills, a wealth of experience andknowledge have been gained at both the nationaland international levels. The lessons learnt pri-marily concerned the early, urgent-communicationphases of nuclear emergencies, and are currentlyin the process of being consolidated and incor-porated into national structures and approaches.While communication and data managementtechnologies continue to advance, multinationalexercises are becoming more routine and tutorial.The focus of current work is thus shifting towardslater accident phases, particularly to the mid-termphase, when control has been regained of theemergency situation but the accident’s conse-quences have yet to be addressed.

In addition to these “classic” nuclear emergencyresponse interests, since the 11th of September2001 national authorities have been concernedwith accident response capabilities in case ofterrorist acts that might involve radiation. Theyhave notably sought to verify that existing emer-gency response structures, plans and capabilitiesare adequately flexible to address the results of

T. Lazo, S. Mundigl*

Nuclear emergencymanagement: what’snew?

* Dr.Ted Lazo ([email protected]) and Dr. Stefan Mundigl ([email protected]) are members of the NEA Radiation Protection andRadioactive Waste Management Division.

22

terrorist activities. This, in turn, has drawn atten-tion to the physical security of large radiationsources and of nuclear installations.

Emergency exercises and lessons learntFrom the modest national and international

nuclear emergency response structures and capa-bilities of the pre-Chernobyl era, significant andsustainable improvements have been achieved.This has not been, however, without significantefforts. Recognising the need to improve interna-tional communication and co-ordination followingthe Chernobyl accident, the Conventions on EarlyNotification and on Assistance were developedthrough the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) and quickly ratified by a majority of coun-tries. The European Commission also issued aDirective to its Member States requiring accidentnotification and public communications. However,to assist countries in improving their internationalcapabilities, the NEA held the first InternationalNuclear Emergency Exercise (INEX 1) in 1993.This table-top exercise brought together nationalnuclear emergency response organisations toaddress a simulated accident at a fictitious reactornear the border of two fictitious countries. Theresults of this exercise highlighted the need formore detailed study of international issues, andled the NEA to develop INEX 2. This more ambi-tious drill used real national and internationalemergency response centres, their hardware, theirprocedures and their personnel to address, in real-time, a simulated accident at a real reactor. Four


such exercises were performed in the INEX 2series between 1996 and 1999, with the activeparticipation of the IAEA and the EC. Finally, theINEX 2000 exercise was carried out in 2001,similarly to the INEX 2 exercises, but with theprincipal objective of testing the implementationof lessons learnt from INEX 2.

The experience from these exercises can bebroadly divided into the areas of communicationsand emergency response structural improvements.At the national level, it was recognised that thecommunication of accident-related information toother countries was of strategic importance. Thiscame from the realisation that, even for accidentswith effects only within one country’s nationalborders, other countries would be very interestedin the health and safety of their citizens in theaffected country, in the transport of goods fromthe affected country, in the movement of people(by train, plane or car) into and out of the affectedcountry, and numerous other health and safetyissues related to the general “interconnectedness”of the modern world and its infrastructures. Inaddition, in an age of global news communication,it was concluded that without accurate, verifiedinformation, governments and their structurescould be seen as “out of touch”, thus eroding socialconfidence in a government’s ability to appropri-ately protect its citizens. For these strategic reasons,national governments made international agree-ments (the conventions and directives mentionedabove) to formalise the requirement to communi-cate. To implement this, and based on the expe-rience from exercises, the emergency manage-ment community focused on more appropriatelyaddressing the information needs of decisionmakers. This involved clearly identifying the typesand formats of information that should be sup-plied at the various stages of an accident to facil-itate decision making by government officials.Further, the technological mechanisms for collect-ing, transmitting and formatting accident-relatedinformation were improved, moving from telexand fax communications to increasing use of theworldwide web and electronic mail.

In parallel to the need for better and moretailored communication and information, the co-ordination of actions was identified as a policyobjective. In border regions, the co-ordination ofurgent countermeasures for population protectionwas seen as needed to prevent affected popula-tions from negatively perceiving “different levelsof protection” in adjoining areas separated by asimple national border (two sides of a river for

example) when such differences have been estab-lished for valid reasons. Local cross-border tieswere reinforced as a result of this experience, andjoint, local exercises are increasingly common.On a more international scale, some level of co-ordination of such things as travel and traderestrictions or alerts was seen as being in theinterest of all affected and non-affected countries.Networks of national and international responseorganisations, connected through modern elec-tronic means, have been improved to facilitatesuch co-ordination.

At the national level, these lessons have incitedmany governments to improve and streamlinetheir national decision-making processes andstructures in order to appropriately collect anddiffuse all needed information. This recognitionof the strategic importance of such nuclear emer-gency management structures, with the concomi-tant implications for resources, has led to changesand improvements at the national and internationallevels.

A shift in focusWhile the experience and lessons from large-

scale nuclear emergency exercises continues tobe internalised, national and international strategicfocus is shifting to other areas. Notably, since theterrorist attacks on the 11th of September, signif-icant efforts have been made to analyse potentialradiological threats, and to assure that existingnuclear emergency response structures andprocesses are sufficiently flexible to appropriatelyaddress these threats. Specific training and proce-dures have been developed nationally, as needed.Even before the terrorist attacks, however, theradiological protection community was increas-ingly focusing its attention on accidents with largeradiation sources, such as those used in industrial


■ Nuclear emergency management: what’s new?

The INEX Series

1993: INEX 1

1996-1999: INEX 2

2001: INEX 2000

2004+: INEX 3

radiography, medical cancer therapy machines orresearch institutes.

Apart from the Chernobyl accident, where 31fire fighters died of radiation poisoning, no nuclearworkers or members of the public have ever diedas a result of overexposure to radiation due to acommercial nuclear reactor accident. On thecontrary, most of the serious radiological injuriesand deaths that occur each year (two to fourdeaths annually and many more exposures aboveregulatory limits) are the result of exposures tolarge, uncontrolled radiation sources. Thesesources often come from abandoned medicalclinic or industrial radiography equipment, andare often found by unsuspecting individuals whowould like to sell them as valuable scrap metal.Better control of large sources and a more efficientnetwork for the exchange of information regardinglost sources has been developed through theIAEA, and several major international conferenceshave been devoted to these issues. The new threatof terrorist attacks only heightens the need forgreat vigilance in the protection and control ofsuch large and potentially dangerous sources ofradiological hazard. It also bears noting that, inconjunction with concern over terrorist threats,much national attention has been devoted to thephysical security of nuclear installations.

Less urgent, but no less important, is the desireby the nuclear emergency management commu-nity to better master response during the mid-term of a nuclear accident. This period followsthe urgent phase before a release and continuesuntil the accident facility is brought under controland releases end. The characterisation of contam-ination deposition may not be fully complete atthe beginning of this mid-term phase, but urgentcountermeasures (e.g. evacuation, sheltering andthe use of stable iodine) have been implementedas demanded by the urgent accident phasecircumstances. During this period, agriculturalaspects will be increasingly important, and theinvolvement of stakeholders in decision-makingprocesses will be significant. Evacuees will wantto return to their homes and businesses; individ-uals from the affected areas will wish to knowwith certainty their exposures and risks; cleanupactivities will begin and corresponding waste willneed disposal. A multitude of practical questionswill arise during this period, and policy, structuraland procedural aspects of mid-term emergencyplanning must be in place for governments torespond appropriately. As mentioned earlier, socialtrust in government as well as its institutions and

officers could well be threatened should mid-termresponses inadequately address the needs ofstakeholders. For this reason, nuclear emergencymanagement specialists are now focusing onidentifying the details of the types of issues thatwill arise, and on developing effective imple-mentation processes and structures for theirresolution.

Forthcoming NEA activities on nuclearemergency management

The NEA Committee on Radiation Protectionand Public Health (CRPPH), through which theINEX exercises have been organised and analysed,is addressing some of the above-mentioned issuesthrough its Expert Group on Nuclear EmergencyMatters. The CRPPH is focusing its efforts ondeveloping nuclear emergency exercises to assistresponse organisations to better meet the needs oftheir national decision makers and has entrustedits Expert Group with designing the INEX 3exercise. Although not yet finalised, this exercisewill be a table-top exercise, similar to INEX 1. Thescenario to be used will involve a significant con-tamination “footprint” from an unspecified source,and the actions taken and results of the urgentresponse phase will be documented as a startingpoint for the exercise. The focus of INEX 3 willthen be on response to agricultural issues arisingas a result of the contamination. Depending uponthe interests of the country participating in theexercise, some urban contamination issues, againin the mid-term phase, may also be addressed. Asthis is a table-top format, countries can performthe exercise individually, or with neighbouringcountries, depending upon their strategic nationalobjectives. Current plans call for the exercise to beorganised in late 2004 or early 2005, and to takeplace over a period of a few months. A workshopwill then be organised to present, compare andanalyse national exercise summary reports, andto draw out common lessons and conclusions.

It is hoped that through these efforts, nationalplanning and preparation for the management ofnuclear emergencies will continue to improve tobetter serve the needs of decision makers, and toallow stakeholder needs and concerns to beaddressed in a fashion that builds trust andconfidence in government.


Nuclear emergency management: what’s new? ■

■


Nuclear power plant operating expe-rience consists of many types of eventswith different impacts on safety. Gen-erally, common-cause failures (CCFs)

represent the highest risk, since CCFs could makeseveral redundant trains of a safety system inop-erable at the same time. Apart from CCFs, thecomplete or partial repetition of nuclear incidentshas also gained attention recently. This phenom-enon is called recurrence.

One early example of a recurring event is theThree Mile Island (TMI) accident of March 1979. Asimilar event had occurred about 18 monthsbefore, although with no consequences as thereactor was at low (9%) power. The lessons of theearlier event had not been appreciated. Over thepast years, many recurring events have beenobserved, though fortunately of lesser severitythan that of TMI.

What is a recurring event and how is itanalysed?

The Working Group on Operating Experience(WGOE) of the NEA Committee on the Safety ofNuclear Installations (CSNI) has produced tworeports on recurring events. It also sponsored aworkshop on this topic in collaboration with theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) andthe World Association of Nuclear Operators(WANO) in March 2002.

As one result of that work, the followingdefinition has been developed for recurring events:

“An event with actual or potential safetysignificance that is the same or is very similarto important aspects of a previous nuclearindustry event(s), and has the same or similar

P. Pyy, D.F. Ross*

Recurring events:a nuclear safety concern

cause(s) as the previous event(s). Additionally,for an event to be considered as recurring,there should exist prior operating experiencewith corrective actions either:

i) identified but not specified, or

ii) not adequately specified, or

iii) not implemented, or not implementedin a timely manner by the responsibleorganisation.”

Analysis and evaluation of nuclear operationalevents have been among the most vital nuclearsafety activities for decades. The need to performthis analysis was recently emphasized in theNuclear Safety Convention (Article 19). Conse-quently, there are many databases of operatingexperience for various levels, from plant leveldisturbances to component data. For instance, theNEA and the IAEA jointly operate the IncidentReporting System (IRS). Industry has, through theWorld Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO),established another system. Each regulatory bodyhas its own national operating experience systemfor plant event collection and analysis. In addition,individual utilities, owners groups by reactor type,and reactor vendors have systems tailored toindividual needs.

In reflection of the multitude of systems tocollect and analyse operating experience, thereseems to be no single method for searching forrecurring events in a systematic fashion. Hence,the identification of recurring events has been

* Dr. Pekka Pyy ([email protected]) is a member of the NEANuclear Safety Division. Dr. Denwood F. Ross ([email protected])is a consultant to the NEA.

done primarily on a case-by-case basis. This obser-vation has warranted WGOE work on improvingtechniques and methods for the review of oper-ating events.

Examples of recurring eventsIn the 1990s, in response to a repetition of

similar types of events or/and causal factors, NEAmember countries decided that a more systematicstudy of recurrence was required. The first WGOEreport1 identified four examples of recurringevents: loss of residual heat removal in PWR mid-loop conditions during outages, BWR instability,service water system clogging and valve pressurelocking.

A recurring event of particular interest forpressurised water reactors is the loss of residualheat removal (RHR) cooling while at mid-loopconditions. Some aspects of this scenario are: theprimary system is generally open to the contain-ment atmosphere; the main containment may beopen; decay heat is being removed by the RHRsystem; and the steam generators may not beavailable for RHR. More than 20 occurrences ofloss of RHR at mid-loop conditions were observedduring the time period 1980-1996, i.e. more thanone per year. The events were widely publicisedand regulatory bodies made numerous communi-cations. Even so, such events continued to occur.

Another recurring event concerns instability inboiling water reactors. A usual design criterion forBWRs is that either the reactor remains stable bydesign, or else instabilities are detected and cor-rected. However, over the period 1982-1995 aboutten instances of BWR instability were detected. Insome cases, the oscillations were between 40 and90% neutron power, and the utilities weresomewhat surprised when inadvertent instabilitywas experienced.

A third example of recurring events is thereduction or interruption of service water due tobuildup of marine life, including clams, barnacles,shrimps and molluscs. Seven such cases werenoted over the period 1980-1997. Service waterplays an important role in transporting energy fromkey systems to the ultimate heat sink.

Assessment of recurring eventsThe results of the first phase of WGOE work

showed that there were many reasons to continuethis and to involve utilities too. One follow-upaction to the first recurring event report was the

organisation of an international workshop on thissubject, held in March 2002 in co-operation withWANO. This workshop2 significantly contributedto international knowledge about the causes ofrecurrence and corrective actions. It also producedinvaluable material for the second report3 onrecurring events issued in 2003.

The recurring events identified in the secondreport are listed in the box. Three recurring eventsidentified in this second report were also identifiedin the first report. This lends substance to someof the causes of recurring events, notably poorfeedback on operating experience.

One example of a recurring event newly iden-tified in the second report is PWR corrosion. Twosafety-significant recurring events involvingdegradation of a PWR upper vessel head werereported. Boric acid leaked through cracks in thecontrol rod drive module and attacked the headmaterial. In places, the only remaining control ofthe primary pressure boundary was the stainlesssteel cladding. Prior occurrences of corrosion ofthe upper head or other carbon steel pressure-retaining parts due to boric acid had been reportedin a number of member countries, some as farback as 20 years.

As a second example, hydrogen detonationswithin BWR piping have been reported by severalstations. In some cases the immediate consequencewas loss of emergency core cooling system (ECCS)train (i.e. the high pressure injection system). Thedirect cause is the ignition of hydrogen followingits separation from oxygen due to the radiolysisof reactor water. In another instance there wasunisolable blowdown of steam to the suppressionpool. Similar events had been reported as far backas 1985.

26

Recurring events: a nuclear safety concern ■


1. Loss of residual heat removal (RHR) at mid-loop

2. BWR instability

3. PWR vessel head corrosion

4. Hydrogen detonation in BWR piping

5. Steam generator tube rupture

6. Multiple valve failures in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

7. Service water system biofouling

8. System level failures due to human factors

9. Strainer clogging

Examples of recurring events

Important lessons learntThe history for some recurring events is up to 20

years. This raises questions as to why correctiveactions had not been implemented in a timelymanner. Several possibilities exist:

● The operating organisation was not aware of theevents or thought that they were not applicable.

● The regulatory authority was not aware of theevents or had not imposed timely correctiveactions on the licensee.

● Work on the appropriate corrective action wasin progress, but not fully implemented.

● The event was considered to be of lesser impor-tance and risk than other plant modifications,and thus was not being pursued as rapidly asneeded.

● Overall, the operating experience feedback pro-gramme was not fully effective.

● The root cause of the event had not been cor-rectly identified, and thus the corrective actionswere not responsive.

● The contributing factors or causes were notappropriately taken into account in identifyingthe corrective actions.

● What was thought to be a solution was not, orthe problem was generic, and what fixed oneaspect did not fix all aspects.

It is likely that many if not all of these possibil-ities play a role in delaying action.

The risk of the recurring events spans a largescale. There is reasonable agreement that the lossof RHR while at mid-loop can be risk-significant,especially if the primary system pressure boundaryand/or the containment pressure boundary is open.This was the situation in some cases. In general,making a quantitative risk analysis of recurrenceis difficult and may require many assumptions.

There is no rigorous procedure to study report-ing systems of operating events that would high-light recurrence. Thus, detection of a recurrent

event is largely dependent on the knowledge,memory and expertise of the analyst. One difficultyis that an event may be taking place at several sitesinternationally, but has not yet recurred within agiven country. It is therefore increasingly importantfor each member country to report all events ofsafety significance to the IRS system.

Possible avenues for the futureRecurring events are important to safety in that

they can indicate deficiencies in the plant safetyculture, gaps in the national operating experiencefeedback systems, loss of continuity in skilled andknowledgeable operations and engineering staff, orlack of attention to design and operational factorssuch as plant ageing. Due to the fact that nationalsystems may be incapable of detecting recurrence,international activities are required to tackle theproblem. The NEA is currently seeking to mapeffective ways to fight recurrence as part of theCSNI/WGOE programme of work.

One possible remedy for recurrence is widerinternational dissemination of brief event descrip-tions extracted from the IRS. Such a descriptionmight consist of an abstract; the history of earlierevents; direct causes; root causes and contributors;corrective actions; schedule for completion ofcorrective actions; and safety significance (includ-ing risk insights). Circulating this information ona regular basis could prove useful both to theregulatory authorities and to the nuclear utilities.

For minor events, trend analyses may be used tomonitor the frequency of component failures orhuman performance problems, which may indi-cate weaknesses in plant processes and pro-grammes. Resources to treat this information needto be made available in the plants and the regula-tory organisations if the nuclear industry hopesto maintain and further improve its safety andeconomics.

Notes 1. NEA/CSNI/R(1999)19, “Recurring Events”, OECD/NEA, Paris.

2. NEA/CSNI/R(2002)25, “Proceedings of the Workshop on Howto Prevent Recurring Events More Effectively, 6-8 March 2002,Boettstein, Switzerland”, OECD/NEA, Paris.

3. NEA/CSNI/R(2003)13, “Recurring Events”, Vol. 2, OECD/NEA,Paris.

Further reading1. Convention on Nuclear Safety, IAEA, Vienna, June 1994.

2. NEA (2000), Nuclear Power Plant Operating Experiences from theIAEA/NEA Incident Reporting System, 1996-1999, OECD/NEA,Paris.

3. IAEA (2003), Nuclear Power Plant Operating Experiences fromthe IAEA/NEA Incident Reporting System, 1999-2002, IAEA,Vienna.

27

■ Recurring events: a nuclear safety concern


■

Hydrogen explosions in BWR piping have been identified as a recurring event.

GRS,

Ger

man

y

reparations for the launch of a new joint projecton Computer-based Control Systems Important

to Safety (COMPSIS) have made considerableprogress. The proposed project will build on thework of an earlier task force, which collectedoperating experience in this area and formed adiscussion forum to aid regulatory bodies in thelicensing of digital instrumentation and control(I&C) systems. It is planned to begin the projectduring the first half of 2004.

The COMPSIS project aims to facilitate theexchange of operating experience in the area ofcomputer-based control systems important tosafety. The overall objective is to improve safety

28 News briefs, NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

News briefs

Computer-based control systems importantto safety (COMPSIS)

Instrumentation and control (I&C) systemsbased on computers are vital for the safe

operation of nuclear power plants.

Ring

hals

AB,

Sw

eden

management and the quality of risk analysis of thesoftware used in I&C systems and other equip-ment. Software and hardware faults in safety-criticalsystems are typically rare and consequently mostcountries do not experience enough of them tobe able to draw any meaningful conclusions aftertheir occurrence. Combining information fromseveral countries has proved a successful methodfor overcoming this problem in several other NEAjoint projects and this approach will be employedin the course of the COMPSIS project.

A COMPSIS task group was originally formedin 1996. The functions of the task group were to:

1. collect, analyse and report on the operatingexperience of computer-based systems in nuclearpower plants in the participating countries; and

2. evaluate the evolving technology as it is appliedto nuclear power plants and identify new issuesthat might affect the licensing and operation ofcomputer systems in NPPs.

The task group produced a trial database anda set of guidelines issued as NEA/CSNI/R(99)14.The members of the task group concluded at thebeginning of 2003 that wider data collection andan in-depth analysis of the issue was worth pur-suing internationally. The NEA Committee on theSafety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) endorsedpreparations for a joint project in this area in June2003.

For further information concerning the COMPSISproject, contact Dr. Pekka PYY ([email protected]) of the NEA Nuclear Safety Division.

P

29NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

New publications

Actinide and Fission Product Partitioning and TransmutationSeventh Information Exchange Meeting, Jeju, Republic of Korea, 14-16 October 2002

ISBN 92-64-02125-6 – Free on request.

During the last decade interest in partitioning and transmutation (P&T) has grown in manycountries around the world. In the years to come, P&T is expected to be one of the keytechnologies for nuclear waste management, together with geological disposal. In order toprovide experts a forum to present and discuss state-of-the-art developments in the P&T field,the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has been holding biennial information exchange meetingson actinide and fission product partitioning and transmutation since 1990. This book and itsenclosed CD-ROM contain the proceedings of the 7th Information Exchange Meeting held inJeju, Republic of Korea, on 14-16 October 2002. The meeting covered the broad spectrum ofdevelopments in the field, such as the role of P&T in advanced nuclear fuel cycles; developmentsin partitioning; developments in accelerators, materials and fuels; the performance oftransmutation systems and their safety; R&D needs, including benchmarks, data improvementand experiments; and the role of international collaboration. More than 100 papers werepresented during the meeting. These proceedings also contain a summary of the panel discussionon perspectives for the future development of P&T.

Decommissioning Nuclear Power PlantsPolicies, Strategies and Costs

ISBN 92-64-10431-3 – Price: U 40, US$ 46, £ 27, ¥ 5 100.

The decommissioning of nuclear power plants is a topic of increasing interest to governmentsand the industry as many nuclear units approach retirement. It is important in this context toassess decommissioning costs and to ensure that adequate funds are set aside to meet futurefinancial liabilities arising after nuclear power plants are shut down. Furthermore, understandinghow national policies and industrial strategies affect those costs is essential for ensuring theoverall economic effectiveness of the nuclear energy sector. This report, based upon data providedby 26 countries and analysed by government and industry experts, covers a variety of reactor typesand sizes. The findings on decommissioning cost elements and driving factors in their variance willbe of interest to analysts and policy makers in the nuclear energy field.

Nuclear Electricity Generation: What Are the ExternalCosts?ISBN 92-64-02153-1 – Free on request.

Broad economic analysis becomes increasingly important in the context of market deregulationand integration of environmental and social aspects in policy making. External costs will remaina challenge for policy makers as long as they are not assessed and recognised in a reliable and

Economic and technical aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle

30 NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

fair way across all sectors of the economy. This report provides insights into the internalisedand external costs of nuclear generated electricity and alternative sources. This book will beof interest to policy makers and analysts in the field of energy and electricity systems. Itcontains authoritative information and data that could assist in their decision-making processesas well as support more in-depth analyses and academic research.

Nuclear Regulatory Review of Licensee Self-assessment(LSA)ISBN 92-64-02132-9 – Free on request.

Licensee self-assessment (LSA) by nuclear power plant operators is described as all the activitiesthat a licensee performs in order to identify opportunities for improvements. An LSA is part ofan organisation’s holistic management system, which must include other process elements.Particularly important elements are: a process for choosing which identified potentialimprovements should be implemented and a process of project management for implementingthe improvements chosen. Nuclear regulators expect the licensee to run an effective LSAprogramme, which reflects the licensee’s “priority to safety”. Based on contributions frommembers of the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), this publicationprovides an overview of the current regulatory philosophy on and approaches to LSA as performedby licensees. The publication’s intended audience is primarily nuclear safety regulators, butgovernment authorities, nuclear power plant operators and the general public may also beinterested.

Effluent Release Options from Nuclear InstallationsTechnical Background and Regulatory Aspects


Radioactive effluent releases from nuclear installations have generally been substantiallyreduced in recent years, well below regulatory requirements. At the same time, international andintergovernmental agreements and declarations, as well as national policies, continue to seekto optimise and further reduce such releases. Nevertheless, due to societal concerns aboutlevels of radioactivity in the environment, the management of effluent releases from nuclearinstallations remains high on the agenda of public discussion. This report provides basictechnical information on different options for managing and regulating radioactive effluentreleases from nuclear installations during normal operation. It should contribute to national andinternational discussions in this area and be of particular interest to both nuclear regulatoryauthorities and nuclear power plant operators.

The Future Policy for Radiological ProtectionWorkshop Proceedings, Lanzarote, Spain, 2-4 April 2003

ISBN 92-64-10570-0 – Price: U 27, US$ 31, £ 19, ¥ 3 700.

The international system of radiological protection is currently being revised with the aim ofmaking it more coherent and concise. The International Commission on Radiological Protection

Radiation protection

Nuclear regulation and safety

31NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

(ICRP) has published its draft reflections on the system’s evolution, and has opened discussionswith the radiological protection community in order to seek a broad range of stakeholder input.This open dialogue among stakeholders will help bring about a common level of understandingof the issues at stake and contribute to the evolution of new ICRP recommendations. Theseproceedings present a significant block of stakeholder input, comprising the views of policymakers, regulators, radiological protection professionals, industry and representatives of bothnon-governmental and intergovernmental organisations.

Occupational Exposure Management at Nuclear PowerPlantsThird ISOE European Workshop, Portoroz, Slovenia, 17-19 April 2002


The Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE), a joint initiative of the OECD NuclearEnergy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has become a uniqueworldwide programme on the protection of workers in nuclear power plants, including a networkfor the exchange of experience in the area of occupational exposure management, and theworld’s largest database on occupational exposure from nuclear power plants. Each year, aninternational workshop or symposium offers a forum for radiation protection professionals fromthe nuclear industry, operating organisations and regulatory authorities to exchange informationon practical experience with occupational radiation exposure issues in nuclear power plants. Theseproceedings include the presentations made at the Third ISOE European Workshop on OccupationalExposure Management at Nuclear Power Plants, held in April 2002 in Portoroz, Slovenia.

Possible Implications of Draft ICRP RecommendationsISBN 92-64-02131-0 – Free on request.

The Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) of the OECD Nuclear EnergyAgency (NEA) has, since its inception, worked to develop and improve international norms inthe area of radiological protection of the public, workers and the environment. Internationalradiological protection norms continue to evolve, with significant new steps having been takenby the International Radiological Protection Commission (ICRP). Since the issuance of its 1990recommendations, which form the basis of the international system of radiological protection,the ICRP has continued to add to them. The sum of these recommendations has become overlycomplicated and at times incoherent. In 1999 the ICRP therefore began to re-evaluate itsrecommendations with the aim of consolidation, simplification and clarification. New ICRPrecommendations are due to be published in 2005. This document, which is supported by theNEA Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health, and by the NEA Radioactive WasteManagement Committee, provides detailed suggestions with regard to the proposed ICRPframework. The stakeholder views expressed in this report have been presented to the ICRP atthe second NEA/ICRP Forum in April 2003, and have persuaded the ICRP to reintroduce severalkey concepts into its proposed new system.

Short-term Countermeasures in Case of a Nuclearor Radiological EmergencyISBN 92-64-02140-X – Free on request.

Nuclear emergency planning, preparedness and management are essential elements of anycountry’s nuclear power programme. The timely and appropriate implementation of short-termcountermeasures can, in case of a nuclear emergency with a release of radioactive material,considerably reduce the doses the public could receive in the vicinity of the nuclear installation.

32 NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

This report summarises information on national emergency preparedness and planning in NEAmember countries for the implementation of short-term countermeasures such as evacuation,sheltering and iodine prophylaxis. The information presented may be used to better understandand to compare existing national approaches, procedures, practices and decisions, which mayvary among countries due to different national habits, cultural specificity and societal needs.This report may also assist member countries interested in achieving international harmonisationof short-term countermeasures.

Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) in the Context of theEntire Safety CaseWorkshop Proceedings, Oxford, UK, 25-27 September 2002

ISBN 92-64-10354-6 – Price: U 45, US$ 52, £ 30, ¥ 5 700.

A joint NEA-EC workshop entitled “Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) in the Context of the EntireSafety Case”was organised in Oxford on 25-27 September 2002 and hosted by United Kingdom NirexLimited. The main objectives of the workshop were to provide a status report on engineeredbarrier systems in various national radioactive waste management programmes considering deepgeological disposal; to establish the value to member countries of a project on EBS; and to definesuch a project’s scope, timetable and modus operandi. This report presents the outcomes of thisworkshop.

Features, Events and Processes Evaluation Cataloguefor Argillaceous MediaISBN 92-64-02148-5 – Free on request.

The OECD/NEA Working Group on the Characterisation, the Understanding and the Performance ofArgillaceous Rocks as Repository Host Formations for the disposal of radioactive waste (knownas the “Clay Club”) launched a project called FEPCAT (Features, Events and Processes CATaloguefor argillaceous media) in late 1998. This report provides the results of work performed by anexpert group to develop a FEPs database related to argillaceous formations, whether soft orindurated. It describes the methodology used for the work performed, provides a list of relevantFEPs and summarises the knowledge on each of them. It also provides general conclusions andidentifies priorities for future work.

The French R&D Programme on Deep GeologicalDisposal of Radioactive WasteAn International Peer Review of the “Dossier 2001 Argile”


This report presents the conclusions of the international review team established by the NEASecretariat at the request of the French government to perform a peer review of the Dossier 2001Argile. The latter was produced by the French National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management(Andra) to describe the research, development and demonstration activities in the French pro-gramme on the disposal of high-level and long-lived radioactive waste in a deep geological repos-itory excavated within an argillaceous formation.

Radioactive waste management

33NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Public Confidence in the Management of RadioactiveWaste: The Canadian ContextWorkshop Proceedings, Ottawa, Canada, 14-18 October 2002

ISBN 92-64-10396-1 – Price: U 45, US$ 52, £ 30, ¥ 5 700.

Public confidence is significantly affected by social considerations, such as public participationin decision-making processes, transparency of activities, access to information, effective andappropriate mitigation measures, development opportunities and social justice issues. In orderto increase public confidence, there is a need to fully understand social concerns and to designan effective strategy on how to address them. This is particularly so in relation to radioactive wastemanagement decision making. A workshop held in Ottawa in October 2002 brought together awide range of Canadian stakeholders to present their views and to debate related issues withdelegates from radioactive waste management programmes in 14 countries. This third interactiveworkshop of the NEA Forum on Stakeholder Confidence focused on key areas such as the socialconcerns at play in radioactive waste management, how these concerns can be addressed, anddevelopment opportunities for local communities. These proceedings provide a summary of theworkshop, the full texts of the stakeholder presentations and detailed reports of the workshopdiscussions.

Public Information, Consultation and Involvement in Radioactive Waste ManagementAn International Overview of Approaches and Experiences

ISBN 92-64-02128-0 – Bilingual – Free on request.

Institutions involved in radioactive waste management face a rapidly evolving environment stem-ming from societal changes, including new information technology and new roles for the media.As in many environmental areas, a demand for public participation in decision making creates aneed for new approaches to involving stakeholders. This report addresses stakeholder dialogue,consultation and information practices by radioactive waste management institutions at the startof the 21st century. It will provide both the practitioner and the non-specialist with a valuablebaseline of detailed, comparative information. It can be used to assess the state of the art in thefield as well as to provide a historical perspective when assessing future progress.

The Regulator’s Evolving Role and Image in Radioactive Waste ManagementLessons Learnt within the NEA Forum on Stakeholder Confidence


Of all the institutional actors in the field of long-term radioactive waste management (RWM),it is perhaps the regulatory authorities that have restyled their roles most significantly. Modernsocietal demands on risk governance and the widespread adoption of stepwise decision-makingprocesses have influenced the image and role of regulators. Legal instruments both reflect andencourage a new set of behaviours and a new understanding of how regulators may best servethe public interest. This report, based on the work of the NEA Forum on Stakeholder Confidence,presents findings of relevance to regulators and examines their role within a robust andtransparent RWM decision-making process. Detailed international observations are providedon the role of regulatory authorities; characteristics of the regulatory process; attributes thathelp achieve public confidence; and regulatory communication approaches.

34 NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 71Volume 2003/1

2003 Subscription (2 issues + supplements) – ISSN 0304-341X – Price: U 80, US$ 80, £ 50, ¥ 9 400.

Considered to be the standard reference work for both professionals and academics in the fieldof nuclear law, the Nuclear Law Bulletin is a unique international publication providing itssubscribers with up-to-date information on all major developments falling within the domainof nuclear law. Published twice a year in both English and French, it covers legislative devel-opments in almost 60 countries around the world as well as reporting on relevant jurisprudenceand administrative decisions, bilateral and international agreements and regulatory activitiesof international organisations.

Supplement to No. 71: Bulgaria

ISBN 92-64-10378-3 – Price: U 21, US$ 24, £ 14, ¥ 2 700.

Benchmark on Beam Interruptions in an Accelerator-driven SystemFinal Report on Phase I Calculations


In accelerator-driven system (ADS) development, it is important to evaluate temperaturevariations caused by beam trips as they can result in a temperature transient that would leadto thermal fatigue in the structural components of the subcritical system. A series of benchmarksis therefore being organised by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) for a lead-bismuth-cooled and MOX-fuelled accelerator-driven system. This report provides a comparative analysisof the Phase I calculation results of the beam trip transient benchmark. In subsequent phasesof the benchmark, temperature transients in different power densities and under irradiatedfuel conditions will also be investigated. This report and those to follow will be of particularinterest to ADS designers, including subcritical system physicists as well as accelerator scientists.

Benchmark on Deterministic Transport CalculationsWithout Spatial HomogenisationA 2-D/3-D MOX Fuel Assembly Benchmark

ISBN 92-64-02139-6 – Free on request (includes a CD-ROM).

One of the important issues regarding deterministic transport methods for whole core calculationsis that homogenised techniques can introduce errors into results. On the other hand, withmodern computation abilities, direct whole core heterogeneous calculations are becomingincreasingly feasible. This report provides an analysis of the results obtained from a challengingbenchmark on deterministic MOX fuel assembly transport calculations without spatialhomogenisation. A majority of the participants obtained solutions that were more than acceptablefor typical reactor calculations. The report will be of particular interest to reactor physicists andtransport code developers.

Nuclear science and the Data Bank

Nuclear law

35NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

CINDA 2003The Index to Literature and Computer Files on Microscopic Neutron Data

ISBN 92-64-02144-2 – ISSN 1011-2545 – Free on request.

CINDA, the Computer Index of Neutron Data, contains bibliographical references to measurements,calculations, reviews and evaluations of neutron cross-sections and other microscopic neutrondata; it also includes index references to computer librairies of numerical neutron data availablefrom four regional neutron data centres.The CINDA bibliography allows its users to find thereferences to specific types of cross-section information or other microscopic data from neutron-induced reactions, for any given target nucleus. In this publication CINDA entries are sorted firstby element and mass number and then by cross-section or other quantity. Within these isotopesand quantity groups, the entries are sorted by date of publication.

International Evaluation Co-operationVolume 9: Fission Neutron Spectra of Uranium-235ISBN 92-64-02134-5 – Free on request.

This report has been prepared by Subgroup 9 which was set up in 1998 with the aim ofinvestigating discrepancies found between microscopic and macroscopic data for the uranium-235 fission neutron spectrum. In addition, it was noted that the most recent evaluation ofthis spectrum had been performed in 1988 and had been based on only one experiment. It wasthus felt necessary to review the existing evaluations, taking into account new experimentaldata and improved calculations methods.

International Nuclear Data Evaluation Co-operationComplete Collection of Published Reports as of October 2003 (CD-ROM)

Free on request.

The NEA International Nuclear Data Evaluation Co-operation programme brings togetherevaluation projects being carried out in Japan (JENDL), the United States (ENDF), westernEurope (JEFF) and non-OECD countries (BROND, CENDL and FENDL). The Nuclear Data Sectionof the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sponsors the participation of evaluationprojects from non-OECD countries. The Co-operation programme was established to promotethe exchange of information on nuclear data evaluations, measurements, nuclear modelcalculations, validation, and related topics, and to provide a framework for co-operativeactivities between the participating projects. The Co-operation programme assesses needs fornuclear data improvements and addresses those needs by initiating joint evaluation and/ormeasurement efforts. Expert groups are established to solve specific common nuclear dataproblems. Each expert group produces a final report of its findings. The present CD-ROM containsa full collection of the expert group reports as of October 2003.

PENELOPE 2003 – A Code System for Monte CarloSimulation of Electron and Photon Transport Workshop Proceedings, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, 7-10 June 2003


Radiation is used in many applications of modern technology. Its proper handling requirescompetent knowledge of the basic physical laws governing its interaction with matter. To ensureits safe use, appropriate tools for predicting radiation fields and doses, as well as pertinentregulations, are required. One area of radiation physics that has received much attention concerns

electron-photon transport in matter. PENELOPE is a modern, general-purpose Monte Carlo toolfor simulating the transport of electrons and photons, which is applicable for arbitrary materialsand in a wide energy range. PENELOPE provides quantitative guidance for many practical situationsand techniques, including electron and X-ray spectroscopies, electron microscopy and microanalysis,biophysics, dosimetry, medical diagnostics and radiotherapy, as well as radiation damage andshielding. The proceedings contain the extensively revised teaching notes of the secondworkshop/training course on PENELOPE held in 2003, along with a detailed description of theimproved physics models, numerical algorithms and structure of the code system.

Plutonium Management in the Medium TermA Review by the OECD/NEA Working Party on the Physics of Plutonium Fuelsand Innovative Fuel Cycles (WPPR)


The decision to re-use plutonium generated in thermal reactors is a strategic one for a utility, andis closely tied to its spent fuel management strategy. One option is to reprocess the spent fuelin existing reprocessing plants and immediately re-use the plutonium. Another option is topostpone re-use of the plutonium by placing the irradiated fuel in interim storage. The availabilityof different types of reactors determines the timescales for the present, medium-term or long-termfuture re-use of plutonium. Current commercial reprocessing plants are all designed to separatethe remaining plutonium at discharge for re-use. Historically, the rationale was to recover sufficientplutonium to enable a build-up of fast reactors, which were expected to be deployed as uraniumreserves became scarce and prices rose. For a variety of reasons, but principally that of the lowprice of uranium ore, fast reactors have not yet been deployed commercially and projectedtimescales for doing so have been postponed everywhere. This report reviews the technical optionsavailable for plutonium management during this interim period. Presenting the consensus viewsof experts in this field, it is intended to serve as a reference source for researchers as well asutilities.

Pressurised Water Reactor Main Steam Line Break(MSLB) BenchmarkVolume IV: Results of Phase III on Coupled Core-plant Transient Modelling


This benchmark is based on a well-defined problem concerning a pressurised water reactor (PWR)main steam line break, which may occur as a consequence of the rupture of one steam lineupstream of the main steam isolation valves. This event is characterised by significant space-timeeffects in the core caused by asymmetric cooling and an assumed stuck-out control rod duringreactor trip. It is based on reference design and data from Unit 1 of the Three Mile Island nuclearpower plant (TMI-1). It includes a description of the event sequence with set points of allactivated system functions and typical plant conditions during the transient. This report summarisesthe results contributed by international participants to Phase III of the exercise addressing best-estimate, coupled core-plant transient modelling.

36 NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Ask for our free 2003-2004 Catalogue of Publications.Contact us at [email protected] or www.nea.fr.

37NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Where to buy NEA publications

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For customers in the rest of the world

38 NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

From the American Nuclear Society (ANS)

All maps are sent “rolled” (unfolded) mailed in shipping tubes.

Editions of both Nuclear News

wall maps still AVAILABLE–Maps won’t be updated

again until May 2005.

These maps show the location of each plantsite with tabular information about eachreactor’s net MWe, design type, date ofcommercial operation and reactor supplier.

ORDER INFORMATION

U.S. and World maps are just $13 each,plus shipping (prepaid).

Combo order (one of each) is $25,plus shipping (prepaid).

BUY NOW!Contact: Sue Cook, ANS Accounting Department

Phone: 708-579-8210 • Email: [email protected]

Web: www.ans.org/pubs/maps

Single Map OrdersQuantity Cost (US$)1-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27.007-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36.0021-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42.0041-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48.00Over 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65.00

Combo OrdersQuantity Cost (US$)1-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27.00 4-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36.0011-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42.0021-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51.00Over 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65.00

Actual map dimensions: U.S. Map – 39” x 26”;World Map – 26” x 39”.U.S. nuclear power plants are shown only on the U.S. map, not on theworldwide map. Map information current as of December 31, 2002.

Radwaste Solutions was created for you—professionals working in the nuclearwaste business. This bimonthly magazine delivers timely articles, insights, andsolutions on current issues and topics of interest to radwaste professionals. Thesubscription price is just $70 for non-ANS members and $445 for libraries(overseas subscriptions add $25 for postage and handling).

The magazine covers all facets of radioactive waste management and facility remediation, including high-level waste, low-level waste, decom-missioning, reutilization, transportation, and disposal. It profiles work at utilities, U.S. Department of Energy facilities, and the private sector,as well as work overseas.

Here are the 2004 editorial cover stories:

Start your 2004 subscription now!

TransportationDecommissioning and

Decontamination

Low-Level WasteEnvironmental RemediationUtility Waste Operations

High-Level Waste/Spent Fuel

ANS MembersPhone 708/579-8217

e-mail: [email protected]

Non-ANS members and libraries Phone 708/579-8207

e-mail: [email protected] yourself a favor! Subscribe today.

A publication of the American Nuclear Society

EmploymentOpportunities

OECDNuclearEnergyAgency

39NEA News 2003 – No. 21.2

Vacancies occur in the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Secretariatin the following areas:

Energy Economics

Nuclear Safety

Radioactive Waste Management

Radiation Protection

Nuclear Energy Economics

Nuclear Science

Nuclear Law

Nuclear Engineering

Computing

Qualifications:

Relevant university degree; at least two or three years’ professionalexperience; very good knowledge of one of the two officiallanguages of the Organisation (English or French) and ability todraft well in that language; good knowledge of the other.

Vacancies are open to candidates from OECD member countries.The OECD is an equal opportunity employer.

Initial appointment:

Two or three years.

Basic annual salary:

From € 53 571 (Administrator) and from € 76 816 (PrincipalAdministrator), supplemented by allowances depending on residenceand family situation.

For information regarding current vacancies see:

www.nea.fr/html/general/jobs/index.html

OECD PUBLICATIONS, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16PRINTED IN FRANCE

(68 2003 02 1 P) – ISSN 1605-9581

nea news 2003 - no. 21 · now confident in the capacity of deep geological repositories to confine...

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