nature of godhood

7/25/2019 Nature of Godhood

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Nature of Godhood

by Mohammed al-Amrani

No human vision can encompass Him, whereas He encompasses all human vision:

for He alone is unfathomable, all-aware.(6: !"#

He $nows all that lies open before men and all that is hidden from them whereas

the% cannot encompass Him with their $nowled&e. ('!: !#

Nothin& li$e unto Him.

He is the irst and the )ast, and the *utward as well as the +nward. (: "#

llah (/0# is the )i&ht of the heavens and the earth. 1he parable of His li&ht isthat of a niche containin& a lamp2 the lamp is in &lass, the &lass shinin& li$e a

radiant star lit from a blessed tree 3 an olive -tree that is neither of the east nor of

the west the oil whereof is so bri&ht that it would well-ni&h &ive li&ht of itself even

thou&h fire had not touched it: li&ht upon li&ht ('4: "#

/5: He is the *ne llah (/0#: ('# llah (/0# the ternal, the 7ncaused 8ause of

ll 9ein&. ("# He be&ets not, and neither is He be&otten2 (4# and there is nothin& that

could be compared with

The nature of Godhood in its infinite, absolute whole is bigger than the finite limited

human reach and beyond the range of human perception and the Quran does not addressAllah (S!s nature " e#cept in rare occasions " but tal$s in length about %is attributes,

creation, and effects in the whole uni&erse and especially in human life' %is reality "which is inconcei&able to any created being and, therefore, ine#pressible in any human

language Allah (S! cannot be defined in any terms whatsoe&er inasmuch as %e is

limitless in %is glory, and sublimely e#alted abo&e anything that men may de&ise by wayof definition' %owe&er the Quran alluded to the nature of Godhood in three

formulations llah (/0# is the )i&ht of the heavens and the earth. 1he parable ofHis li&ht is that of a niche containin& a lamp2 the lamp is in &lass, the &lass shinin&

li$e a radiant star lit from a blessed tree 3 an olive 3 tree that is neither of the east

nor of the west the oil whereof would well-ni&h &ive li&ht even thou&h fire had not

touched it: li&ht upon li&ht ('4: "# and when the belo&ed wife of the messenger ofAllah (S! Aisha ()! as$ed him if he had seen %is Sustainer during the ascension to thehea&ens, he replied* +ight, how could see him. nothin& li$e unto Him,(/0* 11!,

nothin& that could be compared with Him, (110*/! no human vision can

encompass Him, (2* 134! do not coin similitude for llah (/0#, (12* 5/!' TheMessenger of Allah (S! said for Allah (S! there are se&enty &eils of light, if %e

un&eils them, the light of %is 6ace would burn all it reaches of %is creation'. And Allah

(S! says they cannot encompass %im with their $nowledge,. (03* 113!' These &erses


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clearly Allah (S! is one and uni7ue in e&ery respect, without beginning and without end

hence precluding any possibility of describing or defining %im' 8onse7uently, the

7uality of %is 9eing is beyond the range of human comprehension or imagination* whichalso e#plains why any attempt at depicting. Allah (S! by means of figurati&e

representations or e&en abstract symbols must be 7ualified as a blasphemous denial of the

truth' concepts of :rimary 8ause and eternal, independent 9eing, combined with the ideathat e&erything e#isting or concei&able goes bac$ to %im as its source and is therefore,

dependent on %im for its beginning as well as for its continued e#istence' /5: He isthe *ne llah (/0#: llah (/0# the ternal, the 7ncaused 8ause of ll 9ein&.

He;be&ets not, and neither is He be&otten and there is nothin& that could be

compared with Him' (110* 1-/!

The Quran main sub;ect is the e#position of Allah (S!s


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1! n this &erse the manifestation of Allah (S! creati&e power is shown in the

obser&able creation of the hea&ens and earth and the phenomena of light and dar$ness'

+t is He who created %ou out of cla% and then decreed a term and a term $nown to

him. nd %et %ou doubt, (2* 0! n this &erse the manifestation of Allah (S! is

illustrated in the creation of the human being out of clay' nd await in patience th%

/ustainer=s ?ud&ment, for thou art well within *ur si&ht, (': 4@# This &erse pointsto the highest manifestation of an electi&e, spiritual relationship* that of the God-inspired

:rophet and the person who freely chooses to follow him' The :rophet himself is

reported to ha&e said* one of you has real faith unless am dearer unto him than hisfather, and his child, and all man$ind. (9u$hari and Muslim, on the authority of Anas,

with se&eral almost identical &ersions in other compilations'!

B1CThe use of the pronouns %e., ., e., and the possessi&e pronouns %is. My.and


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incomprehensible unity such that we cannot understand the reality behind our statements'

hen we ascribe goodness to Allah (S!, goodness does not mean e#actly what it does

when we ascribe it to a creature nor does it mean something entirely different' tsmeaning is analogical* in some sense the same and in some sense different' Again

A7uinas has thrusted himself in a sphere beyond mans comprehension hence such

nonsenseD ?ewish Maimonides insisted on e7ui&ocal meaning only, with the result thatnegati&e attributes alone can be ascribed to Allah (S! and some Muslim scholars

strangely followed his suitD et he recogniEed that e&en negati&e attribution gi&es some

understanding of the di&ine being' So-called slamic philosophers such as al-6arabiaccepted this notion of di&ine simplicity but most theologians such as bn Taymmiah and

al-GaEali re;ected it' Some used it to re;ect the Trinity' Augustine had recogniEed a

potential conflict between simplicity and the Trinity, but belie&ed the resolution lay in

proper understanding of the TrinityD


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strong sense to mean that if a predicatepapplies to Allah (S! at any time then it must

apply at e&ery time' 9ut this is so broad that it brings into the discussion of immutability

things that, while changing, are in no way changing within Allah (S!' 6or e#ample,Smith belie&es in Allah (S!. could be false yesterday and true today, yet nothing

within Allah (S! has changed' Allah (S! is immutable in a wea$er and less

problematic sense if it is re7uired only that he does not change in his character andpurpose' The wea$er sense fits well with the &iew that Allah (S! e#ists in time, since he

could be considered immutable yet begin an action, forgi&e a person, and so on' %ence,

predicates li$e, Allah (S! is protecting from harm. could be the case at one time butnot another and Allah (S! would still be immutable' The stronger sense of immutability

fits well with a god outside of time' escartes is one of the few to hold the contrary &iew, that the laws ofmathematics and logic are sub;ect to the will of Allah (S! (Descartes Conversation

with Burman, 00, K3!' :erhaps the most significant challenge to omnipotence in&ol&es the

e#istence of e&il' t seems e&il would not e#ist if Allah (S! is both good andomnipotent' :rocess theology denies omnipotence, 8hristian Science denies the ultimate

reality of e&il, and some post-%olocaust thin$ing seems to 7uestion the goodness of Allah

(S!' Augustine defends the orthodo# 8hristian concept of Allah (S! on grounds that

he did what was good in creating free beings yet they used their freedom to do e&il' Somesuffering is the ;ust conse7uence of sin' 6urthermore, where e&il is a lac$ of good we

cannot as$ why Allah (S! created it since it is merely the absence of something'

A7uinas, +eibniE and others recogniEe that some good things e#ist only in the presence ofcertain types of e&il' 6or e#ample, forgi&eness e#ists only where there is sin' n the light

of these secondary goods, +eibniE argues that out of all the possible worlds Allah (S!

created the one with the best possible balance of good and e&il' Some thin$ers appeal to afuture life to settle apparent discrepancies in the balance of good o&er e&il' Allahs future

blessing, it is said, can more than ma$e up for suffering in this world' illiam Alston

de&elops the idea that as limited beings we are incapable of discerning-and therefore

7uestioning-whether Allah (S! has sufficient reasons for allowing the e&il that e#ists'


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today, it seems ha&e no alternati&e but to dotoday"a conclusion that seems to &iolate

free will' To sol&e this, 9oethius and A7uinas appealed to the concept of Allahs

timelessness, which entails that none of Allahs $nowledge is past or future' A7uinas alsosaid that Allah (S! determines all e&ents and determines that they will be done freely'

>e Molina ob;ected that this amounts to remo&ing free will' %e constructed his own

&iew, which said that Allahs $nowledge is logically prior to his decree of what will be'Allah (S! $nows what an indi&idual will do in all possible circumstances (a capacity

called middle $nowledge!, and he decrees those circumstances in which a person freely

cooperates with the di&ine plan' %ence fore$nowledge is compatible with free will'amascus agreed that Allah (S! is imperturbable, but stressed it is because he is

so&ereign, not because he is uncaring' A7uinas accepted Aristotles &iew that Allah (S!cannot change and is impassible' %e can act, but nothing can act upon him' So emotions

that proceed from Allah (S!, such as lo&e and ;oy, are in Allah (S!H but other

emotions such as anger and sadness can be ascribed to him only metaphorically' Iarly,medie&al, and )eformation 8hristianity generally affirmed that because Allah (S! could

not suffer, 8hrist suffered in his humanity but not in his di&ine nature' %owe&er, the idea

that Allah (S! is unaffected by the world is being rethought in modern times'

Moltmann, who was for a time a German prisoner of war, and @itamori, a ?apanesethin$er, both witnessed orld ar and its aftermath' They concluded that Allah (S!

must be mo&ed by suffering' )ichard 8reel defends impassibility as being uncontrolled

by outside influences' %e says, among other things, that* Allah (S! has emotions butthey are not controlled by anything outside himself, he ta$es into account the ultimate

good that will come from suffering, suffering does not ma$e lo&e more admirable, a

Allah (S! who suffers would be more appropriately an ob;ect of pity than of worship,;ustice does not re7uire passibility because it need not be based on emotionH and

omniscience does not re7uire passibility because Allah (S! need $now only that a

person has an emotion, he does not need to e#perience it' A mediating position would

allow emotion in Allah (S! but not control of him in any way by creatures' Allah (S!


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would be affected by the world but only in the way and to the e#tent he allows'

Goodness.hereas classical Gree$ religion ascribed to the Allah (S!s &ery human

foibles, theism from :lato onward has affirmed that Allah (S! is purely good and couldnot be the author of anything e&il ("epublic!' n ?udaism di&ine goodness is thought to be

manifested especially in the gi&ing of the law (Torah!' n slam it is thought to be

manifested in di&ine re&elation of truth through the prophets, especially as re&ealed in theQuran' And in 8hristianity it is manifested in the gracious granting of 8hrist as the way

of sal&ation' hile goodness encompasses all moral perfection (e'g', truth telling,

;ustice!, bene&olence is that particular aspect of goodness that wills the benefit of another'The )eformers, and :rotestantism generally, stressed that Allahs desire for the benefit of

creatures is dependent not on their merits but purely on di&ine lo&e' >i&ine lo&e is not

only irrespecti&e of merit but it is shown most clearly where it is entirely unmerited, as in

grace shown to fallen humanity' Therefore di&ine forgi&eness and redemption are ta$enas the highest e#pressions of bene&olence' 9ene&olence intersects with omnipotence in

pro&idence, wherein Allah (S! orders e&ents for good ends' t also raises the possibility

of a clash between the di&ine and human wills, as when a person spurns Allahs action in

the world' >i&ine goodness raises the 7uestion of whether Allah (S! willsbecause itis good oris good because Allah (S! wills it' The former seems to wea$en di&ine

so&ereignty, but the latter seems to ma$e goodness arbitrary' The arbitrariness may besomewhat relie&ed if Allahs will is understood as bounded by his unchanging character'

Allah (S! would not, for e#ample, decide to ma$e torturing for en;oyment right since

his nature fore&er condemns it' The issue has implications for di&ine command ethics,according to which acts are right or wrong because Allah (S! commands or forbids

them (as opposed to, for e#ample, a competing &iew that acts are right or wrong

according to whether they promote the greatest happiness!' As to our $nowledge of

di&ine goodness, A7uinas separates the order of being from the order of $nowing* allgoodness deri&es from Allah (S! but we understand di&ine goodness by e#trapolating

from the goodness of creatures' 6or A7uinas, this re7uires an analogical (as opposed to an

e7ui&ocal! relationship between di&ine and human goodness' 6or @ant, di&ine goodnessis $nown as a postulate of pure practical reason* Allah (S! must be there to reward

&irtue and punish e&il' The greatest challenge to belief in di&ine goodness has been the

fact that e&il e#ists, or more recently, the amount and type of e&il rather than the merefact of it' The problem is lessened if it is ac$nowledged that di&ine goodness does not

re7uire that each creature always be made to e#perience as much happiness as it is

capable of e#periencing' )easons may include, for e#ample, that* it is impossible that all

creatures collecti&ely e#perience ma#imal happiness (e'g', because the ma#imalhappiness of one precludes the ma#imal happiness of another!, or that there is some

higher good than the happiness of all creatures (e'g', ?ohn %ic$s &iew that maturity is

that higher good, and ac7uiring it may entail some displeasure!, or that some forms ofgood are manifested only when certain types of e&il e#ist (for e#ample, forgi&eness

re7uires wrongdoingH mentioned in 2,. abo&e!H or because Allahs fa&or is undeser&ed

and not gi&en in response to merit, it cannot be owed and Allah (S! cannot be faultedfor not gi&ing it'

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