NATO/CCMS/NACC Pilot Study:

CROSS-BORDER ENVIRONMENTALPROBLEMS EMANATING FROM

DEFENCE-RELATEDINSTALLATIONS AND

ACTIVITIES

SUMMARY FINAL REPORTPHASE 1 1993-1995

REPORT NO. 206NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

APRIL 1995

The present report provides a general overview of the NATO CCMS-NACC pilot study on defence-related cross-border environmental problems. The study comprised an investigation into two main topics, radioactive and chemical pollution, each of which is the subject of a separate detailed report. In addition to conclusions and recommendations, the present overview also includes summaries of the two specialised reports, using the same method of organisation for ease of reference.

The present report was put together by the pilot study Secretariat on the basis of contributions from the two countries responsible for heading the specialised investigations, Germany (chemical pollution) and Norway (radioactive pollution).

I would like to thank the NATO CCMS Secretariat for its support throughout the duration of the study.

Oslo, April 1995

Sverre StubPilot Study Director

Contents

Executive summary................................. i

1. Introduction to the Study.......................... 1

2. The work under the Study......................... 1

3. The sub-topic on radioactive contamination.... 4

4. The sub-topic on chemical contamination....... 13

5. Conclusions and recommendations............... 23

5.1 Sub-topic on radioactive contamination...... 23 5.2 Sub-topic on chemical contamination.........25

Appendix (Participating countries)

Executive SummaryFor the past 25 years the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) has been the NATO body dealing with environmental problems of both civilian and military relevance. When the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in 1991-92, the scope of the Committee's work was extended to cover environmental problems in Central and Eastern Europe.

One of the four priorities on the NACC workplan for 1993-94 was to investigate cross-border environmental problems and instigate cooperation to deal with them. In this context, the Norwegian Government proposed a pilot study to be carried out in cooperation with Germany entitled "Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defence-Related Instal-lations and Activities". This was approved by the CCMS Plenary on 10 November 1992.

The main objectives of the first two-year phase of the study was to "develop and present a basis for international cooperation between NACC partners on identifying, surveying and assessing pollution emanating from defence-related installations and activities and its cross-border effects". The geographical areas for the study are the Barents and Kara Seas, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.

It was agreed to split the work into two separate parts, one dealing with radioactive contamination and one with chemical contamination, to be headed by Norway and Germany respectively. The collection of information, discussions and analyses so far carried out have helped to build a common platform for reviewing challenges and deciding priorities for future initiatives. Two main reports have been written on chemical and radioactive contamination.

Twenty-three countries, including eleven in Central and Eastern Europe, participated in the study, and a network was set up linking organisations and individuals working on the relevant subjects. Five pilot study meetings were held in addition to two meetings of experts in Bucharest and Helsinki at which specific regional questions were discussed.

The most important conclusions and recommendations with respect to radioactive contamination are as follows:

- Although the present level of radioactive contamination in water and biota is relatively low, particularly in the Arctic, there are potential risks of significant future contamination.

- Dumped nuclear material should be monitored, but priority should be given to promoting safe management and storage of spent uranium

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fuel and radioactive waste as well as to developing environmentally safe methods of decommissioning nuclear submarines, including risk assessments and environmental impact assessments of different approaches.

- Releases into rivers flowing into Arctic seas of radionuclides stemming from landbased sources such as reprocessing or accidental releases of radionuclides should be studied further.

The problems identified and described with respect to chemical pollution are more widespread and most of them constitute long-term hazards to ecosystems. The main pollutants, which pose a threat to both local groundwater and the oceans, are oil derivatives and chemical components from weapons production, testing and dumping.

The most important conclusions and recommendations from this part of the study are as follows:

- Chemical munitions dumped at sea do not pose an acute threat either to human beings or to the marine environment. Investigations should be continued into their long-term effects and into the identification of further dumping sites.

- It is recommended that the remediation of land-bound sites contaminated with chemical warfare agents, energetics (explosives) and other pollutants be accelerated. For this purpose more effort should be put into research and development of new, alternative techniques like biological remediation.

- There is an urgent need for international standardisation of soil quality parameters and threshold values for civilian and military uses of land areas.

- The study has emphasised the value of cooperation between Western and Eastern countries in clean-up projects. The training of military personnel should be adapted to improve their understanding of chemical pollution, particularly with a view to prevention.

* * *

Phase 1 of the study has shown the advisability of initiating a second phase in accordance with the NACC workplan for 1995-96, focusing on some of the most urgent problems associated with radioactive pollution. The work done on chemical pollution can be followed up by the CCMS-NACC pilot study on "Reuse of Former Military Lands" and by new initiatives.

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1. IntroductionCCMS pilot studies have dealt with topics ranging from purely theoretical, mainly civilian problems to more practical problems relating to environmental aspects of military operations. The establishment of the NACC has opened up new possibilities and provided an opportunity to meet the problems posed by the environmental legacy of the cold war.

Being the first cooperative effort of its kind, the "cross-border" study has had to deal with a wide variety of challenges ranging from political reluctance to overly optimistic expectations as to the results of the first phase. As the study has progressed and East-West cooperation has become more extensive, the need for a military-civilian forum has become increasingly evident.

The topics and goals for the pilot study were identified on the basis of an overall assessment of the common environmental challenges facing the NACC countries. The choice of radioactive and chemical contamination reflected strong national priorities and the general concern about the dumping of nuclear material and old chemical weapons.

In the context of the political situation in 1992, setting up a pilot study on an agreed set of topics required extensive marketing and face-to-face discussions with the potential participants. When the terms of reference were finally agreed on and the study launched, however, the response exceeded all expectation. One reason for this was probably the decision to extend the geographical scope of the study to encompass most NACC countries along the old East-West divide from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea.

In considering the results of the study, it should be realized that the gathering and analysis of information from such a wide variety of sources has had a number of effects on the military and environmental communities of the participating countries and the relations between them. For many participants from Eastern Europe, the study was their first experience of NATO cooperation and of the kind of expectations and goals associated with such studies.

Finally, the benefits of the phased approach should be mentioned. In contrast to the long-term perspectives of many international efforts, the first phase was limited both in scope and time frame, allowing the objectives to be achieved with the aid of seven meetings and two reports, in the space of two years. This has also set a sound precedent for the second phase of the study.

2. The organisation of the study

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In addition to the summaries of the two reports, which are presented in chapters 3 and 4, some of the more intangible results of the cooperation process, as well as the organisation of the process itself, were thought to be worth including.

Norway first proposed a study of cross-border defence-related problems in April 1992. Initial consultations in Washington, London, Paris, the Hague and Bonn followed, based on draft terms of reference. Despite redrafting, the study was not accepted at the CCMS Plenary in July, and a decision was deferred until the November Plenary. During the intervening period, Norway organised an editorial meeting, which was held in Oslo in October, to rework the terms of reference. The meeting attracted eight of the countries that had expressed an interest in the study. Further bilateral consultations were also held during the autumn. As a result, Germany offered to co-sponsor the study and to take responsibility for the work on chemical contamination. After the study has been formally launched on 10 November, the programme was presented to the Russian authorities and distributed to all other NACC partner countries.

Nineteen nations responded to the invitation to the first formal pilot study meeting in Oslo in February 1993, and sent a total of 43 representatives to the two-day meeting. Most countries submitted official statements describing national status and priorities with respect to the areas covered by the study, offering further information and specifying how they could contribute to the programme.

A detailed working plan and the division of responsibilities were agreed on at the first meeting. Twenty-three countries, 11 of which are in Central and Eastern Europe, have taken part in the study. The presence of 40-50 participants at each of the five pilot study meetings and the continuity of attendance among the national representatives testify to the success of the community-building aspects of the study.

The five general pilot study meetings were held in Oslo and Kirkenes (Norway), Munster (Germany), Istanbul (Turkey) and Cherbourg (France). In addition, two meetings of experts were held in Bucharest (Romania) and Helsinki (Finland). The latter were the first official NATO meetings in the two countries.

At the various meetings, countries submitted written or oral reports on agreed topics. The papers presented were a mix of specially prepared documents and results from other work in the same area. This served the additional purpose of linking the pilot study with other national and international work. One of the best examples of this was the preparation of the report on the Black Sea, which involved cooperation in gathering the relevant information between all the countries bordering on the Black Sea and all those in the Danube catchment area.

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Initially, there were frequent discussions relating to all aspects of the termination of the Soviet military presence and its environmental legacy. However, the work soon came to focus on topics more specifically related to the cross-border effects of radioactive and chemical pollution. It is illustrative of the rapid pace of development in the international situation that a number of the specific problems listed at the first meeting had been resolved or clarified by the time the last meeting was held.

Towards the end of the pilot study, the focus was largely on the content and conclusions of the final reports. A specific country was assigned the responsibility for reviewing each chapter of the reports, and all the participants were invited to comment on the overall content and conclusions. This allowed a consensus to be reached.

The final reports on the two parts of the study contain a unique collection of background material based on national contributions from military as well as environmental authorities, which meant that the information reached individuals and organisations that are not normally involved in specific international cooperation efforts.

In order to reap the full benefit of the community-building aspects of the study, most meetings dealt with both radioactive and chemical pollution: only at the last two meetings were there parallel sessions for detailed discussion of the two final reports. The geographical spread of the meetings helped to arouse interest among the participants and to increase the level of participation. Visits to sites such as the Kola peninsula in Russia, the Munster facilities in Germany and the nuclear reprocessing plant at La Hague in France gave the participants practical experience of the problems they were dealing with.

In addition to drawing on the already established body of knowledge, the study initiated a certain number of specific projects directly involving institutions in Russia and Canada with expertise in the fields of nuclear reactors and risk analysis. One result of the pilot study was practical cooperation between Lithuania, Canada and Norway to deal with the ground-water contamination resulting from military activities in Lithuania.

Although it was not one of the main aims of the pilot study, the public attention it has attracted internationally has reinforced the impact of the work and confirmed the appropriateness of the topics chosen. There have been frequent reports on the progress of the study in connection with the working meetings, during political discussions in various countries and in other international fora dealing with the same matters. Newspaper and television coverage have focused on the fact that NATO is taking an active approach to environmental problems, and this has not escaped decision-makers.

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In conclusion, it is fair to say that the pilot study achieved its main technical objectives and was completed within the allotted time. It has also been surprisingly successful in achieving its goals as regards network and community building, and in that it has in a short space of time gained an international position as a joint forum for East and West and given practical substance to the NACC cooperation.

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3. Summary of the report on radioactive contaminationScope of the study (chapter 1)

The objective of the study was to evaluate current and potential problems caused by radioactive contamination from defence-related sources. Information was therefore collected about cross-border radionuclide contamination of from defence-related sources so that the relative importance of these sources in terms of contamination today and in future could be compared. The report is based on the practical work carried out in several international and national fora and on the information provided by the participating nations. In the short period covered by the study, field work such as measurements of radioactivity contamination was not possible, neither was it considered necessary. The study was limited geographically to the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea including the catchment areas of the rivers flowing into theses seas.

The radioactive contamination found in the various seas stems from both civilian and defence-related sources. Defence-related sources include radioactive fallout from the testing of nuclear weapons and contamination from nuclear naval vessels. Smaller sources in quantitative terms such as spacecraft and lighthouses are also dealt with, and so are releases from reprocessing plants since, at least at one stage, these plants were used to produce weapon plutonium. The contamination from the Chernobyl accident is briefly discussed because of its extent. Potential releases from civilian nuclear reactors are kept outside the scope of this study.

The nature of radioactivity (chapters 4 and 5)

Ionizing radiation is the result of the decay of unstable nuclei (radionuclides), which emit high energy particle during this process. Ionizing from natural sources can be divided into three classes: alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Alpha radiation consists of helium nuclei (alpha particles), which originate mainly from heavy nuclei like uranium-235 or plutonium-239. Alpha particles have a range of a few centimetres in air, and a few tenths of a millimetre in body tissue. Alpha particles cannot, as a rule, penetrate human skin, but may cause damage if alpha emitters are ingested or inhaled. Beta radiation consists of electrons and positrons (beta particles). Beta radiation can be stopped by 2 cm of water or 10 m of air, while the range in body tissue is up to 10 mm. Beta particles, from strontium-90 for example, can therefore penetrate the skin and act through the skin as well as, by ingestion and inhalation. Gamma radiation consists of photons (gamma particles) and has a huge range compared with alpha and beta radiation. It is only partly stopped by a human body, and it is hardly stopped at all by air.

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Humans may be exposed external radiation to the skin, internal radiation from food and inhalation of airborne contaminants. Exposure to external radiation may take the form of radioactive particles on the skin or swimming in contaminated water. Internal radiation is due to uptake of contaminated food from the digestive tract and its effect depends on its degree of absorbtion and on how long it is stored in the body. Radionuclides from gases such as iodide-129 and radon-222 may be inhaled.

The most important nuclides dealt with in this study are strontium-90, cesium-137, plutonium-239 and americium-241. The half-life of strontium and cesium is in the order of 50-100 years, while the half-life of plutonium and americium is several thousand years. The risks posed by radioactive waste vary according to the uptake and storage of nuclides in the environment. Strontium-90 and cesium-137 have a low affinity for sediments, while the very long living nuclides such as plutonium-239 and americium-241 have a high affinity. This means that plutonium and americium do not travel in the sediment and are less available for uptake by biota.

An example of the stability of plutonium in sediments is reflected in this report in the well-known accident at Thule in 1968. Here four nuclear weapons were destroyed by the impact, resulting in disperseon of plutonium. The distribution of plutonium was followed up for several years both in the sediments and in biota and was found to be largely stationary. The binding of plutonium to sediment is an important factor on evaluating the hazard represented by the plutonium weapons on board the sunken submarine Komsomolets, (see below).

The biological effect of radioactive nuclides depends upon the extent to which they are taken up in biota and on how long they are stored in the tissue. Cobolt, cesium and iron nuclides accumulate in large amounts in biota, plutonium, uranium and americium in small amounts, and strontium is intermediate. In humans cesium and potassium are distributed evenly in soft tissue, iodide is stored in the thyroid, and strontium and plutonium are stored in the bone.

There is a connection between the damage caused by radiation and the amount of radiation energy absorbed. Several different dose terms are normally used to express the hazard of received radiation. The size of the absorbed dose is expressed in terms as received energy per unit of the mass that is exposed to radiation. Equal sized absorbed doses from different types of radiation may have different biological effects due to the different energy levels of the radiation and to differences in the uptake and storage of the radionuclides. The term "equivalent dose" takes account of this by multiplying the absorbed dose by a weight factor. For each organ, the received equivalent doses is multiplied by a weight factor in proportion

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to that organ's sensitivity to the radiation. When the whole body is exposed, the sum of these weighted equivalent doses is called an "effective dose". In this report SI - units are used consistently (Bequerel, Gray and Sievert), but the conversion factors to the older units are shown below (Table 1).

Table 1.: SI - units used for radioactivity and doses with conversion factors to other units.

Name SI - unit Conversion factor

RadioactivityAbsorbed doseEquivalent doseEffective dose

Bequerel (Bq)Gray (Gy)Sievert (Sv)Sievert (Sv)

1 Bq = 2.7x10-11 Ci1 Gy = 100 rad1 Sv = 100 rem1 Sv = 100 rem

Note: The SI unit may be preseded by: T = Tera=1012, P = Peta=1015, and E = Exa=1015.

Sources of radioactive contamination (chapters 2 and 3)

The Barents Sea and the Kara Sea.

The major defence-related sources contributing to the existing levels of radioactive contamination in the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea are:

I. nuclear explosives II. liquid radioactive wasteIII. contaminants transported along riversIV. reprocessing plants

The main potential sources of radioactive contamination are:

I. high level solid radioactive waste e.g. dumped reactorsII. low-/ and medium-level solid radioactive wasteIII. radioactive waste stored on boats on or close to the shoreIV. nuclear naval vessels, particularly submarines.

More than 2000 nuclear explosions have been carried out by the US, the Soviet Union, France, the UK, China and India. There have been 135 nuclear explosions at Novaya Zemlya alone, and the amount of radioactivity from atmospheric explosions here totalled 410 PBq of cesium-137 and 270 PBq of strontium-90 and 150.000 PBq of tritium-3. The atmospheric explosions at Novaya Zemlya were so high up that the fallout was global in character and not in the form of local precipitation.

Of the 42 underground explosions at Novaya Zemlya, 25 were accompanied by release of radioactive inert gases. There were three

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underwater explosions, each less than 20 kiloton, but most of the radionuclides remained in the water and sediments. High radioactivity levels would therefore be expected locally in the sediments in the Barents Sea south of Novaya Zemlya. Seven peaceful explosions in connection with mining, for seismic purposes etc have not been dealt with here.

Until recently, liquid waste was dumped in the Arctic seas. The waste comes from reactor cooling systems including those on board submarines and from the cleaning operations at shipyards or service ships. It consists mainly of tritium-3, but may also contain cobolt-60, nickel-63 and iron-55 from activated corrosion products. The activity level of this waste was generally not very high, however, so that this dumping has not significantly changed the total radionuclide content of these seas. No dumping of radioactive waste in the Artic seas has taken place since 1992, and the intention is to halt it permanently if adequate waste-handling facilities can be built within a reasonable time.

As far as is known, releases to the Arctic seas from rivers (most importantly the Rivers Ob and Yenisey) have been fairly small. About 10 TBq of strontium-90 and 1 Tbq of cesium-137 are transported to the Kara Sea annually along the River Ob. The Mayak facility near Chelyabinsk (Russia) is located more than 2000 km upstream of the Ob outlet into the Kara Sea, but is close to the Techa which, ends up as a tributary at the River Ob. In the late 1940s and early 1950s there were substantial releases directly into the River Techa, but these have since decreased significantly. The regular operations of the Mayak facility are not likely to pose a threat to the Kara Sea. A small part of the strontium-90 contamination measured at the Ob outlet into the Kara Sea is due to the earlier releases from this facility, while the major part is probably due to radioactive fall-out in the catchment area. However, because of the large quantities of radioactive materials stored near the Mayak facility, an accident may have significant consequences within a far reaching radius, so that, despite the distance, this facility must be considered a potential source of radioactive contamination of the Arctic seas.

Similar considerations apply to the plutonium production facility in Seversk near Tomsk, which has also discharged significant quantities of radionuclides into the Ob river system since 1955. The River Yenisey is affected by another plutonium production facility at Zelenogorsk near Krasnoyarsk. Most of the nuclear reactors (three out of five at Seversk and two out of three at Zelenogorsk) at these sites have been shut down in recent years (including all of the three reactors with an open primary circuit). Large quantities of liquid radioactive waste (an estimated 40 EBq at Seversk and 25 EBq at Zelenogorsk) have been deposited in the ground at both facilities.

Some of the radioactive contamination has been brought by ocean currents from faraway sources such as the reprocessing plants at Sellafield (UK),

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Dounreay (UK) and La Hague (France). The releases from Sellafield, in particular, were quite large for a number of years (annual discharges of more than 4 Pbq of beta emitters from 1974 to 1978 and more than 100 Tbq of alpha emitters in 1973 and 1974). However, the annual amounts of many of the most important radionuclides released from Sellafield were reduced by a factor of about a hundred during the 1980s (notable exceptions to these reductions are tritium-3 and iodine-129). It has been estimated that some 20% of water-soluble materials of the releases from Sellafield are transported through the Barents Sea. A new facility (Thorp) was recently put into operation at Sellafield. It is anticipated that releases from this new facility will be substantially lower than those experienced from the Sellafield facility in the 1970s. Whether reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is more or less environmentally desirable than storing the fuel as solid waste is still a controversial question.

There are several potential sources of radioactivity in the Arctic sea area itself. The dumping of radioactive waste around Novaya Zemlya has attracted considerable attention from the media. The largest known potential sources on the seabed are 16 dumped reactors, mostly of military origin, six of which contain spent nuclear fuel. In addition, a screening assembly with damaged fuel from one ship reactor (about 60% of the core) has been dumped separately. The dump sites were investigated by Russian-Norwegian cruises in 1992-94, and only low activity was registered in small areas close to some of the dumped nuclear waste. Further, the most recent information available about the contents of the dumped reactors and their corrosion rates indicates that these reactors will not constitute a serious environmental problem in the future. The dumped low- and intermediate-level solid waste contains mainly activation products which normally consist of relatively short-lived radionuclides

A risk assessment has been carried out on the sunken submarine Komsomolets, which sunk to a depth of almost 1700 m, in 1989, 180-190 km WSW of Bear Island in the Norwegian Sea after a fire. The possible risks to the environment represented by the wreck has been the focus of considerable international media attention. Monitoring of the surrounding area has shown only minor releases of radionuclides into the environment. Given the low rate of corrosion at such a depth and the distribution of the current at such a depth, the submarine with its nuclear reactors and its two nuclear torpedoes is not considered to constitute a serious threat to man or the environment either today or in the future. This is not surprising in view of the reports of the investigation of the sunken American submarines, Scorpion and Thresher, which have not led to any heavy contamination by radionuclides in the surrounding environment either. Any attempt to raise the Komsomolets is believed to be much more hazardous than leaving it alone.

The Russian Northern Fleet has been operating ships with nuclear propulsion since 1960, and the fleet contains in all about 200 nuclear

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submarines containing about 400 reactors. The reactors each contain about 160 fuel elements, which under normal conditions of operations have to be removed every seven years or twice during their service life. There are currently about 21.000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies in the Northern Fleet, which are stored partly on land and partly on board ship. Spent fuel elements are stored locally at shipyards for about three years after removal, before they are sent away for reprocessing. In recent years this transport has not been feasable and this has led to an accumulation of nuclear fuel elements that constitute an environmental hazard.

In general nuclear submarines have an expected lifetime of 20-30 years. This means that several Russian submarines have been taken out of service and their weapons removed, and these are now scheduled for decommissioning (removal of reactors). These reactors constitute an important potential source of future contamination. At present around 70 Russian submarines with a total load of 140 nuclear reactors are moored near the shore awaiting decommissioning. About 50 vessels still have spent fuel assemblies on board inside the reactors. Estimates show that by the year 2000 the figure will have increased to more than 100 submarines containing 200 reactors. The present rate of decommissioning of the Northern Fleet is low and will lead to an accumulation of stored submarines. The large accumulation of submarines awaiting decommissioning means that they are regarded as a potential hazard and this is of great concern to the people of the Northern region.

The study also focused on possible accidents involving submarines. A total of 37 reported accidents were reviewed: five US and 32 USSR/Russian.

The most serious reactor accidents are the "loss of regulation" accidents. Most of the submarine reactors are, however, pressurised-water reactor (PWR), which have a number of features that counteract the increase in power and therefore reduce the consequences of loss of regulation. The other major type of accident is loss of coolant. In the worst case this could lead to the melting of the core and even melting through the reactor tank and the hull of the vessel.

The early American submarines were prone to leaks although, the US naval reactors appeared to be of a high quality. The Soviet/Russian submarines on the other hand had 12 failures in their nuclear power plants, including five loss-of-coolant accidents. A further 10 submarines had fires or explosions, including two that were lost. Three Soviet/Russian submarines had defects in their weapons systems compared with one American, which was lost. Four Soviet/Russian submarines had loss of propulsion.

The Baltic Sea

Most of the radioactive contamination in the Baltic Sea area is derived from civilian sources, particularly the Chernobyl accident, and few defence-

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related sources of radionuclide contamination have been identified in this area. After the removal of RTG-powered lighthouses from the coasts and spent fuel from the training reactors at Paldiski in Estonia, the remaining potential sources are depositories of radioactive waste. The best known of these depositories is the Sillamäe uranium-mining waste depository in Estonia. It covers 33 ha and is 25 m high at its highest point.

The Black Sea

The dynamics of radionuclide concentration in the Black Sea are influenced by the input of radioactive contaminants in fallout, river runoff and discharges from land-based nuclear facilities located in the Danube catchment area.

The contamination of the Black Sea resulting from nuclear explosions reached its peak in 1963-64. It is significantly lower today. In this context, tritium, however, is a special case. Chiefly because of the atmospheric nuclear-weapons tests, its concentration level in the Black Sea is still today more than ten times higher than the natural background level.

Apart from the global fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, there is no information about any defence-related sources of radioactive contamination in the Black Sea area. Except for Ukraine, the defence forces of this region are not equipped with nuclear weapons, and no dumped solid radioactive waste (either reactor fuel or other kinds of waste) has been found in the region.

Water in the vicinity of nuclear facilities such as power plants may be contaminated by radionuclides, for example radioactive iodine. However, it should be stressed that the global contaminating effects resulting from the ordinary operation of nuclear power plants are small. The Chernobyl accident in 1986, on the other hand, produced a level of global contamination that also affected the Black Sea and its river systems. For the Black Sea, the mean pre-Chernobyl background level of cesium-137 was estimated to be about 11 Bq/m3. This value was increased 10-40 times by the Chernobyl accident, and the products of this accident constitute the main source of radioactive contamination in the Black Sea. The contaminants entered the sea as a result of atmospheric transport from the accident site. The fairly rapid decrease in the concentration of radionuclides in the surface layer of the Black Sea in the years following the Chernobyl accident can be explained by the natural decay of the radionuclides, the sedimentation of particles and fresh-water input from rivers. In 1993, the cesium-137 concentrations were still 2-3 times higher than the pre-Chernobyl values.

Risk assessment (chapters 6 and 7)

In evaluating the effect of a release of radioactivity one must predict the

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radiation dose delivered to a critical group of humans who are at risk, because of their place of rescidence or lifestyle. An alternative is to estimate the radiological consequences of an activity to the human collective or population dose. This is the total dose or increase in dose to a specified affected human population.

In general, it is more difficult to describe contamination distributed by sea currents over short distances and a short time scale than is the case with atmospheric distribution by wind. The present study contains a risk assessment for the release from the sources described, and in a few cases a more detailed analysis of the risk involved is presented.

As mentioned above, risk assessment in connection with releases from the sunken submarine Komsomolets is described in detail in the report. Studies like this require a knowledge of the type and the nuclide composition of the spent fuel. Further the corrosion of different parts of the ship including the reactor compartment must be known in order to estimate the release at any time. Such technical information is sensitive and not readily available. The risk assesment further requires information about the mobility of the different nuclides, their binding to sediment and most importantly a model of the sea current at the site of release. The results show that the risk for humans and environment from Komsomolet is neglible.

As another example we have studied a hypothetical, accidental atmospheric release from a fire on board a decommissioned submarine at the Kola Peninsula. The radioactivity released was 1 PBq of cesium-137 and 1 PBq strontium-90. In one scenario the effect of the release on excessive deaths (cancer) was studied in general terms. In another case the distribution of the radioactive cloud was followed using metereological information. It should also be mentioned that we have studied the dispersion of radioactive nuclides (cesium-137, plutonium-239, cobolt-60) in the Barents sea after a relase into the Kola Fjord.

Risk assessment is an important tool for clarifying the magnitude of the problems and hazards associated with submarine accidents. Because of the many factors involved in such analyses, they are very suitable for international collaboration.

Methods for handling of radioactive waste (chapter 8)

Decommissioning of submarines

The radioactive waste produced by the operation of submarines and the refuelling and decommissioning of nuclear reactors must be handled in an environmentally acceptable manner.

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The general procedure for decommissioning of nuclear vessels involve the shutting down of the reactor. The heat production and the activity of radionuclides with short half-lives will then rapidly decrease. One year after shut-down the heat production of the reactor is reduced by more than 99%. After a few years the radioactivity is usually dominated by strontium-90 and cesium-137.

The decommissioning of nuclear vessels can be carried out in a shipyard. The first step in the decommissioning procedure, after the reactor has been shut down for at least 6 months, is the removal of the fuel assemblies. The spent fuel is usually stored temporarily for at least 3 years before they can be shipped off for final disposal. The second step is to close the primary circuit of the reactor. Finally the reactor compartment with the primary circuit is cut off from the rest of the vessel and sent for final disposal. For pressurised-water reactors this procedure is in principle not complicated. In the case of liquid metal-cooled reactors, which have mainly been used in Russia, the procedure is the same, but the practice is more complicated because in these reactors there is a greater risk that the fuel elements will be stuck and impossible to remove. The removal of the fuel is usually carried out at a naval shipyard. At present in Russia, only two submarines can have their fuel removed at the same time and the process takes about three months. Whereas in the United States a shipyard is able to dismantle eight vessels a year, the current rate for the Northern Fleet is one vessel a year. Given the large number of vessels which need decommissioning in the Northern Fleet, the problem of accumulation of vessels awaiting decommissioning is serious.

Due to its geographical limitations, the study has focussed only on the problems of the Russian Northern Fleet. In the USA around 50 nuclear vessels are ready for decommissioning or are in the process of being decommissioned. A further 70 US vessels are expected to reach this stage the before the year 2000. Several British and French vessels are also ready for decommissioning. The problem of decommissioning is therefore an international one, and active collaboration between nations could contribute to a better procedures. An obvious problem inhibiting active collaboration is sensitive technical details in reactor construction and the submarine itself. These are details of importance for the operation of the vessel.

Interim storage of radioactive waste

Waste should be classified according to the intensity of its radioactivity and according to its half-life. High-level waste comprises spent nuclear fuel and highly active waste from fuel reprocessing. Such waste must be cooled for several years in storage. Medium- and low-level waste are easier to handle, but this also requires storage. Liquid waste is usually solidified or treated separately.

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High-level waste such as spent fuel assemblies can be stored in water pools for a period of 30-40 years, thereafter encapsulated in cannisters and placed in a repository for fuel disposal. Alternatively the waste is cooled in water for a few years and then transported to a reprocessing plant. The liquid waste from reprocessing has to be stored for several years, then solidified, encapsulated and disposed of as above. Since there is an excess of plutonium in the world and since uranium fuel is relatively cheap, the necessity for reprocessing has been questioned.

At present over 20 000 spent fuel assemblies are stored at Northern Fleet bases, and this is claimed to exhaust the existing storage facilities. The 55 vessels awaiting decommisioning contain a total of 15.000 fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies in a naval reactor contains about 1.5kg uranium-235 and storage facilities of fuel corresponding to about 50 tons of uranium-235 is urgently needed. In addition the spent fuel contains fission products and actinide isotopes which are harmful from an ecological point of view.

The report provides several examples of interim storage facilities. The price is on the order of USD 30.000 - 60.000 pr ton of uranium stored. A realistic time table for the building of such a storage facility would be three years for planning and design followed by three years for construction and installation of equipment. This time could be reduced by using an existing facility as a model.

A much larger and more complex problem is the construction and planning of a final repository which would preserve the waste for several thousand years. This is not only a technical question, but also involves the handling of public opinion.

For conclusions and recommendations on radioactive contamination, see chapter 5.1.

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4. Summary of the report on chemical contaminationSince the beginning of this century, defence-related activities have left their mark not only on people's lives and living space and on the urban and rural landscape generally, but also on the environment as a whole. Armament production sites and field testing ranges are affected by chemical pollution originating both from the production and from the unsound disposal of chemical weapons, smoke and munitions. Many military installations have become contaminated as a result of the use and storage of fuel and lubricants and the application of a wide variety of chemicals in army, air force and naval activities.

The pilot study of chemical pollution had the following objectives:

i) Identification, location and description of existing marine and terrestrial sources of chemical pollution,

ii) Evaluation of the present condition of such sources and the hazard they represent to humans and, in the long term, to the environment,

iii) Identification and description of the tools available for assessing the risk of pollutant dispersion and the likelihood of cross-border pollution,

iv) Development of models for evaluation and risk assessment of suspected contaminated sites as a basis for decisions on remedial action, and

v) Identification of project management procedures for selecting technologies, to deal with the polluted sites.

The study dealt with the following chemical products and compounds which have been found as contaminants on military and/or armament-related sites:

i) Explosives and decomposition products (e g TNT and aminotoluenes)ii) CW agents and decomposition products (e g viscous mustard and arsenicals)iii) Chlorinated hydrocarbons (e g decontaminants, chlorobenzene, smoke)iv) Hydrocarbons (e g mineral oil products, kerosene, lubricants)v) Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)vi) DDT; 2.4-D; 2,4,5-T, dioxinsvii) Heavy metals (e g Cd, Cr, Cu, Zn, Hg)viii)Others (white/red phosphorus)

A summary of the chemical pollution repeat follows, with chapter references in parentheses.

Current situation as regards chemical pollution, dumped CW munitions and contaminated sites (chapter 2).

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Dumped CW munitions (chapter 2.1)

Three major dumping sites have been identified in the Baltic region: East of Bornholm, south-east of Gotland (= south-west of Liepaja) and south of the Little Belt. Munitions were dumped in these areas in 1945-1947 under the supervision of the Soviet and British occupation forces in Germany. Information on the amount of CW munitions actually dumped varies from one source to another. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) estimates that approximately 40 000 tonnes were dumped, equivalent to 13 000 tonnes of originally active chemical warfare agents.

CW munitions from the Baltic Sea have been found to contain various types of mustard gas, irritants based on arsenicals, tear gas, the lung irritant phosgene and the nerve agent Tabun (southern Little Belt) and/or decomposition products. The munitions are covered by up to several metres of sediment at depths of 20-40 m (Bornholm), 70-120 m (Gotland) and 30 m (Little Belt). According to other information, a further 90 tonnes of munitions were dumped in the Baltic Sea between 1943 and 1965.

In the Skagerak approximately 173 000 tonnes (HELCOM report) of CW munitions were sunk on Goman cargo ships at a depth of 800 m between 1945 and 1948. The munitions are reported to have contained mustard gas, chloroacetophenone, phosgene and Tabun. Some of the chemical munitions were probably dumped overboard during transport from the harbour of Wolgast in Germany.

The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) drew the following conclusions as regards chemical munitions dumped in the Baltic Sea:

i) Chemical munitions and residues of warfare agents are not a threat to control areas of the Baltic Sea. There are very few, unconfirmed observations of chemical munitions washed ashore.

ii) Chemical warfare agents soluble in water do not constitute a widespread threat to the marine environment. The chemical and physical properties of chemical agents indicate that only poorly soluble and slowly degradable viscous mustard gas and compounds containing arsenic (Clark and Adamsite) can pose long-term threats to the marine environment. Elevated concentrations of such compounds can persist locally for many years in sediments.

iii) As long as chemical munitions remain on the seabed they pose no threat to humans.

The only real danger facing fishermen in the Bornholm basin is from the dumped chemical munitions in the Baltic Sea. There is a risk that chemical munitions or lumps of viscous mustard gas may be caught in bottom trawls and hauled on board, where it can contaminate the crew. Similarly, if

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thin-walled or leaking containers of liquid or gaseous chemical munitions are unintentionally lifted, chemicals may be suddenly released and endanger personnel and equipment.

There is no risk of such accidents in the area South of the Little Belt because no mustard gas was dumped there. Shells that were dumped in this area contain partly or completely degraded Tabun and phosgene and are now covered with sediment. It is unlikely that intact munitions would be caught in bottom trawls here.

Likewise, the CW munition loadings sunk on cargo ships in the Skagerrak are not a threat to shipping or fisheries. Thin-walled CW bombs should already be empty as a result of corrosion, and the contents of chemical shells are being slowly released into sea water through leaks at the filling screws. The problems posed by the dumped CW munitions will be further reduced over time. The munitions continue to corrode and released CW agents are diluted and degraded in the sea water.

Marine pollution, including defence-related pollution (chapter 2.2)

It is not possible to identify that part of the marine pollution for which military activities or effluents from military installations are responsible. However, a knowledge of the current level of marine pollution, for instance with reference to regional areas of accumulation, particularly at the river mouths, and of uptake by aquatic organisms, provides important baseline information which will allow us in the future to recognize changes, some of which may be traceable to military sources.

The pollution load of the Baltic Sea consists mainly of nutrients that originate in agricultural runoff in the countries surrounding it. In all, 132 "hot spots" where industrial pollutants like heavy metals, PCBs and other chlorinated compounds are released have been identified around the Baltic Sea, most of them located in the St Petersburg area, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad, Poland and Eastern Germany. Nevertheless, it has been calculated that some nitrogen pollution is transported as airborne material from as far away as France and the Netherlands. The concentrations of chlorinated hydrocarbons are decreasing. The reduction in discharges from the pulp and paper industry in Finland and from the metal industry in Sweden should bring about stabilization of the water quality. Inflows of water from the North Sea occur irregularly and result in the exchange of deep and shallow water layers, thus reducing the hydrogen sulphide concentration in deep waters.

The Black Sea region is ecologically unstable and is relatively heavily polluted by industry and agriculture. Pollutants that have been found in sea water samples include heavy metals, particularly in littoral areas and estuaries, chlorinated hydrocarbons like DDT (and derivatives), PCBs in the surface microlayer and polycyclic aromatics, which accumulate strongly in

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the sediment.

Given the serious pollution levels in the Black Sea and the Baltic as well, every effort should be made to prevent the entry of defence related pollutants into ground water and runoff into rivers, since this would lead to further deterioration of water quality.

Terrestrial contaminated sites and runoff (chapter 2.3)

Most contaminated terrestrial sites have been polluted by mineral oil products like fuel and lubricants which have penetrated into the ground as a result of spills, leakages from tank installations or carelessness. Such pollution can have cross-border effects because of dispersion in the ground followed by runoff through rivers and waterways.

Many sites contaminated with mineral oil products or other chemical waste such as polychlorinated biphenyl's (PCBs), DDT and heavy metals have been reported by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Ukraine and Canada in the Arctic zone).

The areas contaminated vary from a few square metres up to 50 km2, and in some cases the groundwater is heavily polluted. At some sites, large quantities of fuel, e g kerosene, have escaped to form underground oil pools. In most cases, the exact extent of the pollution (contaminated area, depth and local distribution) has not yet been determined. The cases reported generally include dumps and landfills containing heavy metal products, paint residues, various kinds of scrap, kitchen-refuse and other rubbish associated with farmer military installations.

Other sites have been contaminated by armament-related activities such as conventional or chemical munitions production, field testing, and improvised methods of disposal for explosives and chemical agents, e g open pit burning. Remnants of explosives, e g TNT, chemical agents, and their degradation products are still present in soil. Although we assume that there is armament-related chemical pollution in several countries, only Germany has reported three typical cases involving residues of chemical agents explosives, including a variety of types of degradation products.

Aspects and methods of risk assessment including transfer mechanisms (chapter 3)

Risk assessment in connection with chemical pollution in marine and terrestrial environments is a complex procedure involving chemistry, biology, toxicology, ecotoxicology, hydrology, geomorphology and geophysics. The risks studied are, first, these posing a threat to human beings and secondly, possible threats to the environment. Risk assessments should also differentiate between acute dangers and long-term hazards.

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Moreover, the assessment of environmental hazards, like those emanating from military or armament-related pollutants, depends on current environmental perceptions. Degrees of contamination that were considered acceptable 20 to 30 years ago are considered unreasonable today. Another aspect of risk assessments that should be borne in mind is that their conclusions are not always independent of the financial situation of the country concerned.

Reconnaissance and sampling (chapter 3.1)

Reconnaissance of marine and terrestrial defence-related pollution is done by historical research, including taking evidence from contemporary witnesses, and by evaluating the data from long-distance sensors and/or direct sampling and chemical analysis.

A considerable number of non-destructive techniques have been tested and qualified for locating dangerous items on the sea bottom or underground. Ultrasonic equipment is mainly used at sea, and magnetic probes and differential global positioning for ground searches. Standardized sampling and analytical procedures are needed to achieve comparable results from the reconnaissance projects. Such procedures have been developed and standardized for soil, water and air analysis in West European countries.

In addition to finding out about the pollutants, it is necessary to know all about the geophysical conditions in the ground and aquifers so that dispersion and run-off studies can be made.

Transfer mechanisms and dispersion studies (chapter 3.2)

Models have been developed for studying the various processes which govern the migration of hazardous chemical pollutants in and under the ground, in groundwater, in rivers and in sea-water, such as the "Operational Model of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea" and the "Rhine Alarm Model". Other models, e g for River Elbe, are in the process of development.

The North Sea and the Baltic Sea model has been successfully applied in a number of specific situations, like the spreading of oil in the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War in 1991 and the drift of pesticide bags after the loss of hazardous cargo off the French coast in 1993.

River alarm models are useful tools for an effective alert system in case of accidental spills into the river, e g the Rhine Alarm Model. Because of the unsuitable simplifications, however, a model is not capable of accurately

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reproducing all the processes involved in contaminant propagation, but the errors in prediction resulting from inaccurate input data. For example, the quantity of contaminant spilled in an accident can often be estimated only very roughly. Increasing the accuracy of the input variables would presumably improve model performance.

Bioaccumulation of contaminants (chapter 3.3)

There is much evidence of the uptake of chemical pollutants in both the Baltic Sea and Black Sea by aquatic organisms. For examples, in the Baltic Sea PCBs and DDT reach the seal population and other predators through the food chain. Some idea of the size of the potential threat posed by PCBs to the marine environment can be gained from the fact that so far 1% of the total world production of 1.5 million tonnes of PCB has been found in the sea, and 20-29% has been discharged into the environment as a whole. Bioaccumulation of chlorinated and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons has also been registered in hydrobionts also in the Black Sea, but this requires more detailed investigation.

Terrestrial microorganisms, plants and animals may also take up pollutants from contaminated ground. The most important ways of contamination for animals are ingestion and diffusion through the skin. DDT, which was used as an insecticide by various armed forces until the sixties, can still be found in the eggs of birds of prey.

Arsenicals from specific chemical agents (e g Clark, Lewisite) are taken up by some marine algae and by plants. Although they may be transformed (degraded) to less toxic but in some cases also to more toxic metabolites, they do not pose a problem to humans and animals as far as we know. More research needs to be done on the role of arsenic in both marine and terrestrial ecosystems.

Risk assessment models applied to sites suspected of military and armament-related contamination (chapter 3.4)

Due to the take-over of large military properties from the West Group of the Russian Armed Forces and the Western Allies, models have been developed for the first registration, first evaluation and risk assessment of military and armament-related areas in Germany.

The ALADIN model is a personal computer programme for the first registration of property-related data, which can only be acquired in a non-sampling investigation programme by research in archives and the use of other available information. Using the MEMURA model for a first evaluation allows areas suspected of military and armament-related contamination to be classified in order of priority. The MAGMA model was used to assess the risk to humans emanating from military and armament-related contaminated sites, and to classify the various forms of

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remedial action. When the existing hazards have been determined, the information is reported to the competent environmental agencies, enabling them to devide on countermeasures against acute or potential dangers.

Aspects of risk assessment of underground CW munitions (chapter 3.5)

For the risk assessment of CW munitions hidden in the ground, each case has to be evaluated separately. A number of variables like the present and future use of the property, the quantity and preservation status of the items found and the amount of chemical agent that has soaked into the surrounding soil have to be taken into consideration. In the case of hydrolysis of the respective compounds by contact with the humidity in the soil, degradation products also have to be considered. Unexploded CW munitions and chemical agents and their toxic degradation products in the ground represent an acute and growing threat in the connection with the training of military units and to civil support personnel. When such items or toxic compounds on the soil surface are discovered, appropriate counter-measures must be enforced. These measures are followed by scouring campaigns for buried munitions. However, before a decision in favour of soil remediation, particularly with respect to arsenic contamination, can be made, an extensive investigation of possible impacts on the environment, like migration into groundwater, has to be carried out.

Risks involved in the recovery of hazardous defence material and the cleanup of contaminated sites (chapter 3.6)

The report gives the following examples of occupational health measures and of a system for alerting the local population in case of cleanup activities:

- Cleanup of a former German munition plant, and- Cleanup of waste burials of the former German army chemical defence

laboratory (used in World War II)

It was found that the unearthing of unexploded CW munitions and contaminated items required substantial precautionary, protective (detectors, respirators and protective clothing) and emergency measures. These included medical support, first aid stations and provision for the evacuation of individuals in case of accident. Excavating contaminated soil also requires stringent protection measures, and in future machinery operating under remote control will be given preference in order to reduce the risk of injury to the health of personnel.

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Chemical pollution disposal, remediation and deposition (chapter 4)

Background, ecological aspects of site decommissioning and remediation (chapter 4.1)

Before any decision can be made to clean up a contaminated site, and before the appropriate technical solutions can be selected, the risks have to be evaluated, giving first priority to human health and second to the environment.

Problems originating from chemical pollution at contaminated sites which have to be attributed to previous defence-related activities cover a wide range. For decommissioning and/or conversion of such sites, and as a precondition for a specified further use of the property, detailed plans have to be developed for the degree of remedial action. Because of the many differences between pollutants and between local conditions at the site, there are no universally applicable methods for carrying out the process of site remediation.

In many cases, particularly where serious difficulties or areas of great public concern are involved, a comprehensive study is needed of existing conditions and of the objectives of the remediation.

The following types of areas are often the site of military and armament-related chemical pollution:

i) Munition production/filling stations, mainly for explosives, smokes, chemical agents and incendiaries

ii) Proving grounds and test centres for military equipmentiii) Storage areas/depots for materiel as specified under (i) and fuel depotsiv) Operative troop installationsv) Demilitarization (demolition) places for munitions and smokesvi) Areas of land burial and sea dumping

Standardized criteria and threshold levels for remediation (chapter 4.2)

A toxicological data base containing permissible intake doses is required to evaluate the risks to human beings emanating from contaminated sites. It is also possible to define the goal of remediation by considering a number of human exposure scenarios involving the proposed future use of the land concerned.

The available toxicological data bases do not include the effects of combinations of toxic substances, which is a drawback if there is more than one pollutant at the same site.

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Recently a considerable amount of scientific work has been done in the field of residual risk consideration with reference to soil pollutants. The concentration values of specific pollutants have been correlated with a series of intended future land uses and established as criteria for need for further observation or immediate action. Unfortunately the data lists (like the Holland list and the Eikmann-Kloke list) differ from country to country and even in different parts of the same country. Standardization is badly needed to create a uniform basis for soil evaluation, which is particularly important for studying cross-border conditions.

Recovery or lifting of dumped or sunken items (chapter 4.3)

There are well-developed techniques for the recovery of containers with hazardous contents and of unexploded or buried chemical munitions. The first priority with respect to unearthing and subsequent transport must always be adequate safety precautions. The cleanup of contaminated sites may be complicated by the presence of hazardous items, e g detonators or duds. That is why visual control is needed during unearthing activities. Sometimes all the soil has to be passed through a sieve in order to remove such items before it is subjected to remedial treatment.

Special containments and the addition of adsorbents are required for the safe transport (and intermediate storage) of leaking containers with hazardous contents. The equipment also needs to be gas-tight and to be able to withstand specific pressures.

Large objects on the sea floor can be dismantled from midget submarines or with ROVs (Remotely Operated Vehicles). However, all nations are highly reluctant to undertake lifting of dumped chemical munitions, except for investigative purposes, owing to the considerable hazards and extremely high costs involved.

Remediation of contaminated sites (chapter 4.4)

Remediation procedures and project managementDecisions to implement a remediation project on a contaminated property are preceded by a detailed investigation of site characteristics, treatibility and technical feasibility studies and the selection of the most suitable remedial technology.

Treatability and feasibility studies must be performed as early as possible to establish whether action is necessary and to assign priorities in the case of competing contaminated sites. Remedial action should always be accompanied by monitoring programmes to measure the overall performance of the technology and to make a quantitative assessment of the possible impacts on humans and the environment.

Public participation and consultation of the general public and local

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communities seem to be advisable in order to ensure that the public is accurately informed.

The following two case studies are described in the report:

- Cleanup of Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in northern Canada- PCB destruction at Goose Bay, Labrador

Immobilization and sealing techniques, and deposition

Immobilization and sealing techniques are a type of remedial action that can be applied as a protective measure against the dispersion and/or volatilization of pollutants from a contaminated site. They are effective in the case of inorganic waste compounds, but cannot be used for soil containing organic chemicals.

Because in principle the toxic compounds are not converted to harmless substances, it is not known how effective these techniques are in the long term.

Deposition of toxic waste from contaminated land on a waste dump is considered to be a provisional measure in cases of emergency, particularly for averting an immediate danger to human health and/or to the environment. This has to be followed by remediation by thermal or chemical techniques.

Toxic waste remediation and thermal disposal technologies

Remedial action generally comprises two steps: physico-chemical separation of the contaminants from the soil matrix and thermal, chemical or biological conversion (disposal) of the separated toxic compounds to non-hazardous ones. Both steps may be executed as a single process or in combination, depending on local conditions and the availability of technical resources.

The technical solution chosen for remediation of an area depends on the physical and chemical properties of the pollutants, their adhesion to soil particles and geological structure of the ground. Soil vapour extraction by air venting is a suitable technique for the removal of volatile and semivolatile components, especially organics, from an unsaturated zone. The off-gases have to be given subsequent cleanup by adsorptive measures in order to eliminate (or chemically convert) the pollutants.

High-pressure solid washing and flotation are widely used ex situ processes for the elimination of solid and/or water-soluble substances (e g heavy metals and many organic compounds) from the contaminated soil matrix. Whatever the chemical nature of the contaminants, these processes are all fairly similar as far as the mechanical engineering is concerned, but need

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very specific types and mixtures of surfactants as auxiliary material for particle disintegration and flotation. Examples of cases where soil washing and flotation can be used in connection with defence-related contamination are explosives (e g TNT) and solid chemical agents (e g arsenicals like Adamsite) found as soil pollutants). Material separated by this technique usually needs further treatment like thermal disposal or deposition on a special water dump. In the case of PCBs and other polycyclic hydrocarbons found as soil contaminants solvent extraction with organic solvents may be an effective alternative.

Relatively well-tried methods for toxic waste disposal are thermal incinerators. Their most outstanding feature is their complete destruction of all toxic organic compounds (100% mineralization), thereby producing end products that are ready for final deposition. A range of different thermal incinerators (electric infrared heating, directly and indirectly heated rotary kilns, fluidized bed furnaces, batch-type chamber furnaces and high-temperature plasma reactors) are available, and can deal with a wide variety of defence-related pollutants like mineral oil, halogenated products (chemical agents) and nitrogenated products (explosives) as well as inorganic constituents like complex cyanides, sulfides, arsenides and mercury.

Chemical pollution disposal plants involving aqueous and/or thermal techniques are subject to approval by state or district authorities. They have to meet environmental emission and waste water standards, the most important of which is the prevention or removal of dioxins in flue gases.

Six cases studies have been presented as examples of sound ways of disposing of chemical pollutants:

Case 1:Goose Bay mobile infrared incinerator, CanadaCase 2.Cleanup of explosives production site Stadtallendorf, GermanyCase 3:Swiftsure destruction of chemical agent waste at Defence Research

Establishment Suffield, CanadaCase 4:The German chemical warfare incineration plantCase 5:Installation for burning of waste materials, PolandCase 6:Remediation of contaminated sites with arsenic chemical agents as

the key pollutant, Germany

Cleaning of groundwater

Most groundwater cleaning techniques are long-term processes in which the water is pumped above the ground surface for further treatment by air stripping methods and subsequent adsorptive elimination of the pollutants. Direct adsorption from the aqueous phase on active carbon columns is a less comprehensive but less rapid technique.

Contaminants from military activities and installations like

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chlorinated/fluorinated hydrocarbons (e g solvents, freons), aromatic and aliphatic hydrocarbons (e g gasoline, kerosene, paint thinner) represent a group of chemicals which can be eliminated by the use of physico-chemical water purification techniques, like those used for drinking water production.

Microbiological remediation of soil and/or groundwater by bioaccumulation and biodegradation

Biotechnology-based methods for the remediation of defence-related contaminated sites are attracting increasing interest because of their cost benefits. Various combinations of biotechnological and biological methods and chemical and physical methods have been shown to provide powerful technologies for the remediation of soil and water contaminated by explosives, propellants, hydrocarbons, chlorinated hydrocarbons and others. New case studies have also been presented describing the remediation of arsenic-contaminated soil and water by algae, higher plants and soil-associated microorganisms. New findings indicate that these bioprocesses provide a good opportunity to develop powerful methods for full-scale soil and groundwater remediation.

There is a need for further research and development to scale up biotechnological methods for use in bioremediation technologies. Particular attention should be devoted to permeability conditions in soil since these are a key factor in the application of in situ bioremediation.

For conclusions and recommendations on chemical contamination, see chapter 5.2.

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5. Conclusions and recommendations from phase 1As the pilot study for practical purposes has been split into two separate parts, there has been no effort to come up with any general conclusions and recommendations covering both sub-topics. The points below therefore reflect the views and priorities of the countries which have participated in and contributed to the respective parts of the Study.

5.1 Sub-topic on radioactive contamination1. Based on the present study, the lack of proper storage facilities for

radioactive materials has been identified as an urgent problem for the Arctic area. It is recommended that future studies be directed towards the planning and organisation of such storage facilities, including an evaluation of the environmental impact of different alternative solutions. Since the selection of a storage site close to a national border may affect public opinion in neighbouring nations, such plans should be published internationally for comment. International co-operation is important, but the construction and the cost of a storage facility is, of course, a national responsibility.

2. The amounts of radioactive waste resulting from the future decommissioning of submarines will be much larger than the amounts of waste previously dumped around Novaya Zemlya. It is strongly recommended that procedures and plans for the disposal of the reactor compartments are developed, including an evaluation of the environmental impact. Such a risk evaluation is dependent on presently unavailable information about the nuclide inventory, the state of the fuel and safety features such as shielding and corrosion protection of the reactors. Not only the risks associated with the storage facilities themselves need to be addressed, but also those associated with the disposal operations. Some countries have experience of decommissioning nuclear vessels, and international technical collaboration is therefore encouraged.

3. In addition to the solid waste discussed above, both decommissioning and the normal operation of submarine reactors generate large amounts of liquid radioactive waste. To avoid continued dumping of liquid radioactive waste, it is recommended that procedures for proper treatment of such waste be developed and that suitable facilities are constructed as soon as possible. It is noted with satisfaction that a Russian- American-Norwegian collaboration to solve this problem is emerging.

4. The total amount of waste carried by oceanic currents from reprocessing plants such as Dounreay, Sellafield and La Hague is

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considerably smaller today than they were a decade ago, and its present effect on the radionuclide contamination of the seas considered in this study is now small. However, the discharges from Sellafield and Dounreay are expected to increase somewhat in the near future. Although reprocessing today is mainly of importance for the operation of civilian reactors, it may also be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium (depending on the details of the spent nuclear fuel). There are contradictory views as to whether reprocessing in general is environmentally beneficial or not. It is recommended that further evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of reprocessing be evaluated in suitable international fora.

5. The release of radionuclides into the Arctic seas through the rivers depends on the contamination of the catchment area, the sediments along each river and on the seepage from contaminated areas such as the area surrounding of the Mayak facility. Furthermore, accidental release from such areas could take place. It is recommended that factors important to the release of radioactivity to the Kara Sea through the rivers be further investigated.

6. The evaluations in this report indicate that the radioactive materials

which have been dumped near Novaya Zemlya constitute a relatively minor problem (today, as well as in the future) compared to the potential problem of radioactive waste from nuclear submarines. This can be deduced from the results of the joint Russian-Norwegian expeditions carried out in 1992, 1993 and 1994. The detailed effects of the dumping are addressed in several other international fora, and based on the present information, it is recommended that this issue not be carried on to future NACC studies.

7. There is one sunken submarine containing radioactive materials in the geographical area covered by this study, namely the Komsomolets. This submarine lies at a depth of more than 1600 m, and the risks associated with any radioactive material which may be released from it are considered to be small, especially compared to the risks associated with the large number of submarines, both in operation and out of service, that can be found in the surface waters in the region. Furthermore, the risks associated with handling and raising this submarine are much larger than those associated with leaving it undisturbed. It is therefore recommended that the submarine be left in its present position.

8. Waste management is the most pressing issue in the Baltic Sea area. It is recommended that this be handled according to internationally accepted requirements, and that the guarding of these facilities be reliably arranged to prevent theft of radioactive materials. Further investigations should be made to ensure the stability of the Sillam_e uranium-mining waste depository.

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9. The radioactive contamination of the Black Sea and the Danube catchment area is mainly of non-military origin. The study of the radioactive contamination of these areas will have to be part of a complex ecological program. Therefore, after evaluation of the results of various research projects in the riparian countries as well as several international expeditions, it is recommended that the international water quality monitoring programs be extended to monitoring of radioactivity in both surface water, sediment and biota using unified sampling and analytical methods.

10. As a general comment, it is recommended that special emphasis be given to the training and education of the personnel responsible for planning and operating the various defence-related nuclear facilities. Among the particularly vulnerable processes are fuelling and defuelling operations and decommissioning of submarines. It is crucial that all those involved in such work understand their responsibilities and are not only competent, but also willing, to contribute to increased safety and improved quality control in the day-to-day operations

5.2 Sub-topic on chemical contamination 1. The general conclusion which has been drawn from risk-assessment of

sea-dumped chemical munitions is that they represent no acute danger either to human beings or to the marine environment. However, further monitoring of sea areas used for dumping of CW munitions is required to keep up-to-date knowledge about the physical condition of cases containing munitions, to locate additional, previously undiscovered, dumping sites and register local changes like deposits of sediment on the cases. It is also recommended that investigations be continued on the long-term effects on marine ecology (water quality, uptake in biota) of released chemical agents and degradation products .

2. The already stringent regulations concerning the release of waste have to be strictly enforced upon the navies of the respective nations in order to minimise the environmental impact caused by (intentional) discharges, loss of cargo or illegal waste disposal. International water quality testing programmes should be extended to monitor the concentration of chemicals in surface waters, in sediment and in the biota, using a unified sampling and analyzing methodology. Such analytical activities, controlled by regular interlaboratory comparison studies, are proposed to produce the input of an international environmental data base.

3. The OPERATIONAL MODEL FOR THE NORTH SEA AND THE BALTIC SEA has proven to be a valuable tool for drift path prediction and for charting the dispersion of the pollutants. The application of this model

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by the nations should be encouraged and supported, e.g. for the Black Sea and the Azov Sea.

4. Highly specific technologies are required for the reconnaissance, identification, recovery, transportation, intermediate storage, dismantling and final destruction of the contents of old or obsolete chemical weapons. Countries which have to solve these problems should establish a common scientific and technical advisory board for data exchange and transfer of know-how, as has been established with HELCOM. In a similar context the suggestion was made to establish a multinational BLACK SEA COMMISSION for mutual information and warning in case of spills from military and civilian sources.

5. Although land-bound sites with CW munition burials etc. only give rise to long-term impact on the environment, there are unpredictable health hazards in conjunction with sub-acute dose exposure to hazardous materials. Consequently, it is recommended that the pace of remediation of land-bound chemical warfare agent contaminated sites be accelerated to a maximum. A similar step is recommended for the treatment of contaminated land containing residues of chemical agents and of energetics (explosives).

6. We recommend the development of operational prediction models for the rivers Elbe, Odra, Wisla, Dnepr, Dnestr etc. as has been developed for the river Rhine or started for the Danube. We furthermore recommend that bi- or multinational commissions be established to enable countries to inform and warn one another in the event of chemical spills into the rivers or waterways from military and civilian sources.

7. Material drain-off in ground compartments, particularly in groundwater, is dependent on a variety of parameters and follows rather complicated mechanisms, which are mainly influenced by soil permeability. Computer-aided models need to be further improved, particularly with respect to site-specific factors.

8. Germany has developed models for investigation and risk assessment of suspected or definitely contaminated sites (ALADIN, MEMURA and MAGMA). The increased use of these models is strongly encouraged, as is taking advantage of the training courses offered.

9. We see an urgent need for international standardization of soil quality parameters or limit values. In addition to the criteria for envisaged land use which have been established for civilian activities (e.g. children's play grounds, parks, agricultural use etc.), equivalent values must be agreed upon for military purposes, like infantrymen training, tank driving etc.

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10. Countries are encouraged to direct more efforts towards research and development of biological remediation techniques. These are more economical and less intrusive than physico-chemical or thermal techniques. They are especially suitable for moderately contaminated sites with bio-degradable compounds.

11. Canadian officials have experienced that public consultation and participation of citizens in environmental planning committees during the early phases and the execution of toxic waste disposal or remediation projects is very helpful. We think that openness and an understanding of public concerns may help to overcome existing negative attitudes.

12. Project management courses for those involved in large-scale chemical pollution cleanups or military land remediation projects in NACC nations should be arranged and financially supported.

13. In the course of this pilot study it became obvious to all participants that cooperation between western and eastern countries through all phases of cleanup projects on military- or armament-related sites is beneficial. Nations should feel challenged to follow the example of this cooperative effort.

14. In the future, the raising of environmental awareness through training courses for military personnel will create the basis for better understanding of the problems caused by chemical pollution.

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Appendix: Participating CountriesBelarusCanadaCzech RepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryItalyIcelandLatviaLithuaniaNetherlandsNorwayPolandRomaniaRussiaSlovak RepublicTurkeyUkraineUSA