nationalist trends in iran - katouzian

8/2/2019 Nationalist Trends in Iran - Katouzian

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Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926Author(s): Homayoun KatouzianReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 533-551Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162216 .

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. o1 (I979), 533-551 Printed in Great Britain

Homayoun KatouzianNATIONALIST TRENDS IN IRAN, 1921-1926

The first quarter of the twentieth century contains a fascinating chapter ofmodern Iranian history. It was a period of the death agony of the Qajar state;a period of revolutionary upheaval, sociopolitical disorder and disintegration,and cultural and literary transformation, a moment both of joy and of sadness,achievement and failure, which, in an unusually clear way, illuminated the longdistance between what there was, and what was desired to be. This period may beanalysed in three parts: the first decade, which covers the period of the PersianRevolution; the second decade, which can be described as a period of interreg-num, when, in the well-known phrase, power was lying in the streets waitingto be picked up; and the remaining five years which was a period of dualsovereignty, characterized by a ruthless struggle for political power.The Persian Revolution destroyed the traditional center of despotic powerwithout producing an adequate substitute, which, in a sense, was a logicaloutcome of the revolution itself. The revolutionaries had begun with a demandfor the establishment of independent judicial procedures, which was intended as astep toward the destruction of arbitrary power and its institutions; and they hadended by drafting a constitution that provided for the formation of a nationalassembly, the complete separation of powers and, to some extent, the decentral-ization of power in favour of the provinces. But the country was economicallypoor, technologically backward, politically disunited, and internationally avictim of power politics. World War I nearly proved to be the last straw.The 'central' government adopted a neutral position which, with a sizableAnglo-Russian military presence in the country, could not be taken seriously.This led to the formation of the so-called provisional government, by a group ofdissenting radical politicians, in the western province (Kirmanshah), whichdeclared war on the Allies. For a period of about three years the country wasafflicted by foreign military intervention, international gunrunning, provincialstrife, and political disintegration.When World War I ended, the fate of Persia was in balance. At the centre,the old Persian despotism had been replaced with a disunited, almost incoherent,plutocratic 'system'. In the provinces, the centrifugal, regional, and tribal,forces were threatening to tear the land asunder, a situation so typical of the

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper is the final version of a seminar paper, presented to theMiddle East Centre, when, in 1975-76, the author was a visiting fellow of St. Antony'sCollege, Oxford. I am grateful to the College and the Centre for their moral and materialsupport; and to John Gurney for useful comments on the earlier drafts of this paper.But the responsibility for my views, and my errors, is mine alone.0020-7438/79/0300-0408 $oI.50 ? I979 Cambridge University Press

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534 Homayoun Katouzianentire Iranian history upon the collapse of an established order, the fall of adynasty or, usually, even the death of a powerful despot. The presence of Britishtroops in different parts of the country had removed any trace of Persiansovereignty and independence. There was national disunity, political conflict,economic disruption and poverty, social insecurity, and administrative cor-ruption and incompetence. At the same time the geopolitical situation of theMiddle East was being radically transformed. The Balkanization of the Arablands and the Bolshevization of the Russian Empire introduced important newfactors in the accounting balance sheet of international power politics in thearea. Persia and the Persians were, once again, caught in the middle.

THE JANGAL MOVEMENTThe formation of the 'rebellious' Provisional Government in Kirmanshah had

been followed by an armed insurrection in the Caspian province of Gilan. Thiswas organized and led by a group of younger Mashruteh revolutionaries fromthe region itself. It was headed by Mirza Kfchik Khan - a former scholar of atraditional college - who had fought for the revolution in various capacities.A Shi'ite Muslim and an unyielding patriot, Kuchik was an indefatigable fighterand an incorruptible leader whose sole ambition was to rid the country offoreign imperial domination and domestic administrative corruption. The angal(Forest) Movement - as the Gilan revolution has come to be known in history -was neither a 'separatist' nor a 'bourgeois nationalist' nor a Communist revolu-tion. It predated the Bolshevik revolution in Russia; and it was a genuine re-action to the disillusionments and depressions which had followed the triumphof 1909.1The Russian Bolsheviks got involved with the Movement when, in May 1920,Soviet troops entered the Caspian port of Enzeli in order to reclaim the Russiannaval vessels abandoned by the forces of (the White-Guard) General Denikin,upon their defeat in the southern theatre of the Russian Civil War. This came asa complete surprise to the British expeditionary force occupying the port as wellas the provincial capital, Rasht, who responded by a swift evacuation and retreat(very probably) both for (logistic) military and (strategic) political reasons.Yet, apart from the repatriation of their naval vessels, the Russian occupationbecame, by accident or design, a useful instrument for Soviet diplomaticmanoeuvring: they were as anxious to secure their own backdoor from British-inspired interference in Russia as was the British government to curb the spreadof Bolshevism southward. The Russians had already sent a note of protest to thePersian government against the proposed Anglo-Persian treaty, known as the1919 Agreement, initiated and actively canvassed by the British foreign office.

1 See Fahkra'i 1965 which is intended as a political biography of KOchik Khan. Inspite of its limitations, this book is a valuable source of information on Kuchik if onlybecause the author, himself a Jangal revolutionary, is likely to be less biased than thosewho subsequently emigrated to the Soviet Union.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I92I-I926 535The Russian landing in Enzeli provided the Soviet government with anexcellent opportunity to counteract the British tactics. To this end, they helped

forge a coalition between Kuchik and a group of Azerbijani 'Marxist' revolution-aries, led by Haidar Khan, which - with moral, material and technical supportfrom Russia - occupied Rasht and declared a revolutionary republic.Haidar Khan Tariverdiev - variously known as Bombiste (The Bomb-maker),Chirdq-barqi The Electrician) and Amu-ugli (The Cousin) - had been a radicalMashrfteh revolutionary who had specialized in underground activity and dis-tinguished himself in the use of urban guerilla tactics against Muhammad 'AliShah and his gang. He was astrong personality, a heroic figure, andarevolutionarydemocrat no less committed and incorruptible than Kuchik.2 In reality there wasnot, and there could not be, much difference between him and Kuichik n terms oftheir basic goals and aspirations for the Persian political economy; in appearancehe (probably) regarded Kfchik as a 'bourgeois nationalist', and himself (cer-tainly) a revolutionary Marxist. At any rate, political prejudice, vested interest,and theoretical misunderstandings have now built up this mainly formalisticdivision into an indisputable historical metaphysic.3 The real difference was thatHaidar was an early representative of Revolutionary Westernism (or Modernism)and Kiichik, an example of Revolutionary Persianism, that is, they were menwith similar revolutionary aspirations for the country but with different, at timescontradictory, understanding of the Persian society and, hence, dissimilarapproaches for its revival and reorganization. Otherwise, the adoption of arevolutionary Marxist model, or the use of Marxist jargon by Haidar, and hissubsequent - noble and ignoble - political imitators, was much more a questionof form than substance. To put it briefly as well as bluntly, an Iranian Marxist-Leninist, both then and later, has been simply a revolutionary with some,usually superficial, knowledge of Marxist theory and tradition, wishing to ridthe country of imperialism, and promoting rapid national economic develop-ment by the use of modern technology. Inevitably, this has been combined withan emotional commitment - sometimes, even subservience - toward the SovietUnion and other Communist powers.The establishment of the Gilan republic was accompanied with the formationof the Communist party of Iran, in Enzeli in July 1920. Alarmed by thesedevelopments, the central Iranian government lost no time in negotiating fora general settlement which would normalize Russo-Iranian relations. TheRussian response was rapid as well as positive; within only a few months ofits formation, the CPI 'concluded' that the Iranian revolution must await thefull bourgeois development of the country! In January 1921, the Russiansdeclared that they would evacuate their troops and personnel from Gilan once

2 See Kasravi I950.3The arguments about Haidar's 'Marxism-Leninism' and Kichick's 'bourgeoisnationalism' still rage among Persian intellectuals, as evidence that there is no end of asimple lesson. This (pseudo-) ideological classification was first developed by some Jangaliemigr6s in the Russian journal Novy Vostok, and through that, in the French journalRevue du Monde Mussulman. See E. H. Carr I953.


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536 HomayounKatouzianthe British forces had been withdrawn from everywhere in Persia. On 24February a military coup d'etat 'toppled' the Persian government and assumedcontrol. Two days later, the celebrated Perso-Russian treaty (of I92I) wasconcluded and signed in Moscow. In May, the British forces left Persia but theexpected march of the Gilan revolutionaries on Tehran was inexplicably post-poned until October, during which time the Russian personnel and technicaladvisers were withdrawn from the province. The delay in action and the physicalwithdrawal of the Russians may have already sealed the fate of the revolution.But these events had some moral and 'ideological' implications which probablydid more in spelling the doom for the revolutionaries of Gilan. For, just as thecentral Iranian army was advancing on the provincial republic, the Gilan coali-tion collapsed, and the two ('nationalist' and 'Marxist') factions of the revolutionengaged in a civil war among themselves. The Jangalis were routed; Haidarwas killed in prison; Kfichik retreated and froze to death; and the remainingrevolutionary leaders either capitulated or crossed the border into the SovietUnion. Few must have realized that the gruesome public display of Kuchik'shead in Teheran was an ominous symbol of the emerging New Order in Persia.4THE 1919 AGREEMENT

The British government was anxious to stabilize the Iranian political economyso as to safegaurd their own regional as well as local interests. This desire hadbecome more intense and more urgent as a result of the October Revolution inRussia. The Iranian plutocracy (many of whom were not mere 'British agents'as it has been generally thought, both then and later) were equally anxious topull the country together and normalize the situation. Yet the coincidence ofnational poverty, political disorder, social disunity, tribal and ethnic conflict,and the economic disruption and dislocation which had followed Mashrutehand World War I would render such an achievement very difficult.Therefore, the British government (in fact Curzon, the foreign secretary)decided to provide a catalyst to enable the Iranian elite of the right administra-tive calibre and political colour, to approach this difficult task. To this end, theForeign Office entered into negotiations with the cabinet of Vusfq ad-Dawleh -an intelligent and strong, but unpopular, politician who was, mainly as a resultof this particular move, regarded as a British 'spy' - for a bilateral treaty oftechnical assistance and economic cooperation. This resulted in the notorious9 9 Agreement.The main points of the agreement were the provision of a loan by Britainto Persia; and the employment, by the Persian government, of British militaryand civil (technical) advisers to help reorganize Persia's army, and stateadministration. This looks like the first formal attempt at the provision offinancial and technical assistance from a developed to a 'developing country,'which has become widespread since the Second World War - that is, 'foreign

4 For details see Fakhra'i 1965, Carr 1953, and Serge I963.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I92I1-I926 537aid.' Yet, it was rejected by the Persian political public with an emotional (and,occasionally, physical) violence which bears no comparison with contemporaryattacks on foreign aid by dissenting political groups and parties in the countriesof the Third World. The British foreign office, and Curzon in particular,were genuinely unable to understand the significance of this reaction; con-sequently they made the habitual mistake of all arrogant powers (or 'super-powers') who would blame the results of their own ignorance of an alienculture on the activities of 'a few rabble-rousers,' 'the mob,' 'the subversiveelements,' etc. The overwhelming rejection of the 19I9 Agreement by thePersian political public was not so much because of the letter, nor even thespirit of the treaty. In fact, the Agreement had been rejected even before itscontents were known to any number of people; and it is likely that most ofthose who have regarded it as a great conspiracy against the Iranian nationalsovereignty and territorial integrity, have known very little of its contents.5By the time the 1919 Agreement was concluded, the Anglo-Russian secrettreaty of I907 had been well-known; the subsequent role and tactics of theBritish government in Persia, including political and military intervention,had left no credibility at all for any claims of British goodwill toward Persia;the British replacement of Ottoman suzerainty over the neighbouring Arablands, and especially 'Iraq, was far from reassuring; and the thinly disguisedBritish support for Shaikh Khaz'al, the ruler of Muhammara (later Kurram-shahr), who was suspected of cessationist designs for the oil province, wasalarming. A detached analysis, based not only on the Agreement but also on aknowledge of subsequent developments (including the publication of the relevantdocuments thirty years later, and other revelations through memoirs, biograph-ies, etc.) shows that the worst fears of the Persian people were unfounded; inparticular, it is now almost certain that the British did not intend to use the I919Agreement as a vehicle for increasingtheir hold over Persia, let alone colonizingit directly. But this guarded analytical conclusion, sixty years after the event,itself reveals the extent to which the British government had acted, and reacted,with real ignorance.And, true to their misunderstanding of the situation, the British had made amistake in dealing with men who were least suitable for a peaceful implementa-tion of such a policy, although perhaps in this regard they had had very fewoptions: by definition, popular politicians scarcely take unpopular politicaldecisions, especially in a 'developing country.' For, apart from his own un-popularity, Vusuq was - willy nilly - allied with two other politicians - Nusratad-Dawleh (Firuz) and Sarim ad-Dawleh (Mas'fid) - whose personal integrity

5 The political poet 'Ishqi accused VusCq of selling the country to Britain and, in ascathing political attack, he told him that 'Persia is not your daddy's property'. Dawlat-Abidi, a leading independent politician told the British charge, Sir Percy Cox, that therewas nothing wrong with the articles of the Agreement, but everything wrong with theAgreement itself; see Dawlat-Abadi 1950, vol. 4. Mustawfi, a one-time Persian diplomatin London, wrote a whole pamphlet against the Agreement entitled 'Ibtl al-bdtil (Refuta-tion of the Refuted), reprinted in Mustawfi 1962, vol. 3.


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538 HomayounKatouzianand administrative ability fell far short of his own. Perhaps the charge of beingBritish agents has been more just against these two men than any other Persianpolitician of this century, if only because future events proved that, in pursuitof their narrow self-interest, they would be ready to offer their services to anyperson or power. At any rate, such a triumvirate was wholly anathema to thepolitical public, even without their involvement in the Agreement!THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1921

The period I92I-1926 was a period of dual sovereignty: a period of intensestruggle for political power both among rival men, and between competingpolitical visions. It was inaugurated by the coup d'etat of February 1921(3rd Isfand 1299, Persian calendar) when a professional 'Cossak' Brigade led byReza Khan - who was later to found the Pahlavi dynasty - marched from theprovincial town of Qazvin, occupied the capital almost without bloodshed,declared martial law, and put Sayyed Zia ad-Din (Tabi Taba'i), a hithertoobscure journalist, in the office of prime minister. At least a few days before itscommencement the coup's imminence had been known in Tehran; indeed,the Shah had ordered the capital's garrison that no resistance should be offeredagainst the intruders. Furthermore, the Qajarmonarch immediately recognizedthe coup and thus, as the National Assembly was still in recess, gave it someretrospective legitimacy.6In fact there had been no government to topple: Vusfiq's cabinet had beenalready replaced by a 'caretaker'government led by Sephadar-i Rashti (Akbar),a man hardly capable of taking care of anything even at the best of times.In fact his so-called government was already withering away when, in anticipa-tion of the coup, he resigned from office. In retrospect it is clear that the couphad been intended as the alternative route to the achievement of the spirit ofthe 1919 Agreement - that is, a political stabilization in Persia which wouldnot pose a threat to the main local and regional interests of the British Empire.It is equally clear that Britain was somehow involved in the conception of thecoup, although it is highly likely that the British foreign office itself had notconceived the idea. The full facts of the matter are not yet known; but it iscertain that the commander of the local British forces, General Ironside, had beendirectly involved in its conception and execution. According to both writtenand spoken memoirs, there had, at first, been other civilian and military nomineesfor the leadership of the coupthan those who finally led it: many are said to haveturned down the suggestion. At any rate it is certain that Reza Khan had beenhand-picked by Ironside who had been impressed by the man's personal andmartial qualities.7

6 See Arf'a, I963.7See Dawlat-Abadi 1950: IV; Mustawfi 1962: III; Khajeh-Niri, 1942 and 1943;Makki I944 and 1945. The role of General Ironside in this episode is now commonknowledge.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I921-1926 539The coupmakers immediately declared martial law and interned nearly all theconventional politicians of all political persuasions, not even excluding Nusrat

ad-Dawleh, the opportunistic member of Vusuq's triumvirate who, returningfrom London, had fancied himself as the natural candidate for premiership in thenew set-up. This was the beginning of an entirely new era in Persian history inthe profoundest sense of this term. Yet, it is a sign of the anti-authoritariannatureof the Persian public, and of the political atmosphere to which they had becomeaccustomed, that next to the opening words 'I command' of Reza Khan's martiallaw declaration, printed on the city walls everywhere, there appeared overnightthe taunting response 'Go to hell' (Guh Mikhur - lit: have shit). They found itnot only unacceptable but also unbelievable that Reza Khan, or anyone else,would seriously presume to take commandof their life. They were soon to knowbetter.But it would be a mistake to think that the coupwasgreetedmerelywith amixtureof apathy and hostility: on the contrary, for reasons which will become clear in amoment, it was given an enthusiastic, even euphoric, reception by many youngerpolitical activists, including scores of poets and essayists, belonging to a revolu-tionary trend in Persian nationalism. For example, the poets 'Ishqi and 'Arif -both of whom had been previously imprisoned for their outspoken oppositionto the 1919 Agreement - wrote songs, poems and articles in support of the coupand its twin leaders: the political elite had been locked up; the communiquesissued by Sayyed Zia and Reza Khan were couched in unprecedented (radicaland vitalistic) nationalist terms, ending with slogans such as 'long live theIranian nation;' and within a month the new prime minister had declared the19I9 Agreement - which he himself had previously supported in his journal -dead and buried. In fact, when three months after the coup Sayyed Zia 'inex-plicably' resigned from premiership and left the country, this was seen by theradical nationalists not as an internal coup by Reza Khan (which is the morelikely explanation) but as a subtle counter-coup by the hated political elite: themore so, as it was followed by the release of the political (elite) prisoners whowere still in gaol, and general elections. The deceptive normalization appeared -both to the opponents and to the supporters of the coup- as a return to the statusquo ante. The song of lament written by Abulqasim 'Arif for the departure ofSayyed Zia ('I would forfeit my life for your Black Cabinet, return!') is stillremembered.DUAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONTEST OF MEN AND VISIONS

There were to be five more cabinets, led by the elite politicians of varyingpolitical tendencies and (especially) methods, before Reza Khan, the (de facto)permanent minister of war, became prime minister towards the end of 1923.In this period, he rapidly consolidated his position in various fields: he tightenedhis command over (the expanding) professional army, and gained total popularityamong both officers and men; he personally commanded the troops which finally


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540 HomayounKatouzianrouted the Janglis in Gilan; he began to put down tribal and regional rebellions,highway robbery and brigandage; he established non-committal contacts withthe political elite, posing as an honest broker who was above conventionalpolitical intrigue and petty rivalry; he gathered around himself younger menof the civil service and the professions - many of them with modern, western-style if not Western, educational backgrounds -who made up the emergingtechno-bureaucratic elite of the country; he cast the image of an able and honestpatriot in the country at large; and, finally, he managed to win over the majorityof the deputies of the national assembly. In a short and decisive period he dugin deep roots while the political elite - contemptuous of 'the illiterate formerprivate soldier' - were engaged in their conventional cut-throat competition.They woke up to reality when it was too late.The clash of ideas, and the unfolding of events, in this crucial quinquennium,have been little understood in relationto the time andplace in whichthey occurred.Because, either inappropriate models or analogies have been applied to them; orthey have been evaluated merely in the light of subsequent events - that is, byreading history backwards. For example, according to some models Reza Khanappears as a 'strong' nationalist leader determined to effect social progress in acountry not yet ready for 'western-style parliamentary democracy'; indeed,this was the view of the British legation in Tehran, and, through them, theForeign Office, in London. According to some other models, Reza Khan was a'bourgeois nationalist' leader confronting 'reactionary feudals' and their 'reli-gious supporters'; this was the view of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran and,through them, the people's commissariat for foreign affairs in Moscow. In fact,there is very little difference of substancebetween these two views: they are bothgeneralizations from the European social and intellectual experience, merelycouched in different ideological terms.8According to a third (and much moreIranian)model, the Persian public had -from thebeginning regarded Reza Khanas a British 'spy' who would fulfil his mission in the service of British imperialism.Yet, anyone who would care to examine the vast political, journalistic andartistic (mainly poetical) literature of this period, would soon realize thatthis is mainly a projection of later emotions backward to the contemporaryfacts. Even Sayyed Hasan Mudarris, the most tenacious opponent of Reza Khan,did not accuse him of being a British 'spy', and, in any case, did not oppose himmerely for this reason: indeed, with a rare clarity of vision he saw the real threatin Reza Khan's bid for total power.This subject is important in its own right; but it is indispensable for ananalytical understanding of the development of the Iranian political economysince the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty, which is best discussed by a classi-fication and assessment of the main political tendencies of the period.

8 The coincidence of the British and the Russian 'analytical' assessments of RezaKhan, even though they used different jargons, is remarkable. For a summary of theRussian view, see Carr I953. For a more detailed and documented British view, seeWaterfield 1973.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I92I-I926 541'Nationalist' Trends

Three basic political tendencies may be identified since the triumph of theMashruteh revolution, regardless of the many more guises in which theyappeared.Furthermore, all the three tendencies could be described as'nationalist'from the viewpoint of European history and social science: the first tendencymay be called 'modern,' 'progressive,' 'radical' or 'forward-looking' nationalism;the second, 'liberal,' 'democratic,' or 'bourgeois' nationalism; and the third,either 'conservative,' 'insular,' 'backward-looking' nationalism, or indeed,'obscurantist,' 'pro-feudal' 'black reaction'! It is sufficient to employ the aboveterminologyin order to show up the conceptualmisunderstandings which theyformalize.

In fact, only the first tendency can be clearly identified as having a kind ofnationalist vision rather similar to its European counterpart. The reason is that itdrew considerably - though not entirely - on European cultural and historicalsources which had lately impressed the Persian intellectual consciousness. It washardheaded, modern-minded, impatient and acutely conscious of the ancient,that is, pre-Islamic, glories of the Iranian Empire. It wanted to remove thebarriers which it believed religion had put in the way of Persia's cultural andtechnological progress. It was weary of the slow processes of parliamentary andjudicial deliberations, and it scorned the corruption and selfishness which theysometimes involved. It matched the learning, urbanity or parliamentary sophis-tication of the other tendencies, in its liveliness and energy, both in journalismand in military and administrative activities. It was vocal, forthright and positivein action; meritocratic in attitude, and contemptuous of the old 'aristocratic' andreligious values. It consisted of an amalgam of journalists, political poetsand essayists, westernized bureaucrats and military leaders. They were hetero-geneous in their educational, technical and socio-economic backgrounds,and otherwise unhomogenous in their motives and aspirations; and in anycase, not all of them continued within this broad tendency until the end. Butthere is a sufficient amount of similarity in their methods, ideas and temperto justify grouping them together within a distinct tendency.Hardheaded nationalist sentiments began to be expressed in a scattered fashionin the first instance by poets and journalists as early as the beginnings of theFirst War, though they can even be traced back to the revolutionary period itself.The poets Muhammad Reza 'Ishqi, Abulqasim 'Arif (Qazvini), FarrukhiYazdi, and Abulqasim Lahuti are but a few well-known examples of the literarygroup within this tendency. Later, a number of distinguished intellectuals,lawyers and soldiers, including Sulaiman Mirza Iskandari, 'Ali Akbar Davar,'Abdul-Husain Taimur-Tash, Farrajullah Bahrami, 'Ali Dashti, ColonelHabibullah Shaibani, Generals Amir-Ahmadi, Yazdan-Panah and Amir-Tahmasibi, etc., were added to the list and increasingly gathered around thepersonality of Reza Khhn.The literati filled in books and journals about the bygone glories which


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542 Homayoun Katouzianhad ended in total poverty and helplessness. They popularized the stories ofthe Achiminid and Sassanian military and cultural achievements and, in thisprocess, they stumbled upon Persia's historic defeat by the Arab nation, whichin turn they held responsible for all the religious superstitionand obscurantismthat plagued the country at the time. Many of them were not anti-religious,but nearly all were contemptuous of religious leaders and preachers. 'ArifQazvini wrote:

Eversince the Arabsgot a foothold in Iran,No word of happinesswas heard from the land of Sassan.9'Ishqi wrote the 'opera' of the Resurrection of the Iranian Emperors0Oandreacted sharply, in a poem, to a suggestion apparently made by some Turkishjournalists that Zoroaster had been a Turk and not an Iranian.11 He was soearnestly full of nationalistic fervor that he once wrote, referring to the depth ofhis patriotic feelings:

I am in love, let my dismemberedheartbearwitness,I hold no other evidence but this shreddeddocument.12Lhuiti - the Gendarmerie major who organized the attempted Tabriz coup of1922 and sought refuge in the Soviet Union upon its failure,13had written,as early as 191o:

Where is Balkhand Bukhara,Whatbecameof Khivaand Kabul?Where is India and Samarkand,What becameof Babylonand Zabul?14Farrukhi-Yazdi, the nationalist poet, whose career was to experience all seasonsincluding membership of the National Assembly and death in prison,15wrotealmost nothing else than patriotic political pieces of which this is a specimen:

We are the dearones of KaikavusThe Sons of Jamshidand of Cirus [Cyrus]The offspringof Karan,Give and Tius,(But) as we are deeply disappointed n England,Lord Curzon has been visited with anger,He has (now) resorted to passion plays.16Once the poets and essayists had set the stage in this fashion, the politiciansand military leaders entered the scene. The latter were naturally more aware of9 'Arif I946, 270. 10 'Ishqi, n.d., 222-232." Ibid., p. 350. 12 Ibid., p. 334.13 See Hedayat I963: 331-334. This had followed the uprising and tragic death ofShaikh Muhammad Khiabani earlier. See ibid. See also Bahar 1954: I, whose moving

poetical requiem for Khiabani has the refrain: Gar khun-i Khiabani-i mazlum bijfushad;sar ta sar-i Iran kafan-i surkh bipashad: If the innocent blood of Khiabani comes to boil;the entire Iranian people could have a red shroud.14 See 'Abbasi 1958: I, 204-207.15 See Farrukhi 1953, Introduction. There is a strong probability that he was murderedin prison (in 1939).16 See 'Abbasi 1958: I, 438-440.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I921-1926 543the practical constraints on the restoration of some of the past glories, but theseaspirations provided them with the ideal goals toward which they should strive,and the methods of reform which they should employ. For it is commonplace -although this was curiously unknown to most of the intellectual stage-managers -that the pursuit of such goals usually requires means incompatible with the kindof civil liberties, and sometimes even license, which the nationalist writers hadtaken for granted. Thus, gradually a dividing line began to appear between thepragmatic realism of the politicians, and the abstract idealism of the intellectualswithin this political tendency; and, as so often happens, these two groups, whichwere so close to each other in terms of ideas and aspirations, eventually becameeach other's deadly enemies.

Looking at the situation in retrospect, it was probably inevitable that thepractical leadership of this tendency would be assumed by a military leader, andReza Khan emerged as the obvious choice. A native of Savad Kuh in the Provinceof Mazandaran, Reza Khan was a brigadier who had risen from the ranks duringthe post-revolutionary period. He had been present in a number of counter-insurgency campaigns against the restorationist attempts of the relics of the olddespotism; and, in particular, he had distinguished himself in action in thesuccessful campaign led by the great revolutionary generals, Ephrim Khan ('theArmenian'), and Sardar Bahadur (later, Sardar As'ad) against Salar ad-Dawleh,the brother of the fallen monarch.17His rapid promotion owed a lot to hisprofessional merits, the meritocratic character of revolutionary armies, and thePersianization of the iranian officers' corps in the 'Cossak' Brigade, especiallyafter the rise of Bolshevism in Russia, had led to the disappearance of theImperial Russian officers previously 'seconded' to the Brigade. Brigadier RezaKhan, later known as the Sardar Sepah - a title that is almost translatable into'The Lord General' - was intelligent, hardworking, forthright, and ruthless,with an astonishingly powerful memory, and a high degree of self-confidence thatthrough success degenerated into arrogance.18He had had very little formaleducation, but he had accumulated a good deal of experience in military organi-zation and leadership. He was nationalist in sentiment, pragmatic in choice ofmeans, and ruthless in the application of methods that he thought necessary forthe achievement of both personal and national objectives. He had an iron willthat on a number of occasions helped him to save his own life, or a cause thatwithout this quality might have been totally lost. He successfully combined twoconflicting qualities which are very rarely found in the same person: a shorttemper and directness to the point of rudeness - and sometimes even obscenity -and an ability to hold views, plans, and even personal grudges so close to his chestthat he would catch almost everybody by surprise each time he decided to revealhis hand.19 He had no time for freedom but pretended to operate within aframework of law and order, he was not democratic in attitude but there was an

17 See Bahar 1944.18See Dawlat-Abadi 1950; Mustawfi 1962, and Hedayat I963.19See Hedayat 1963, 385-386 and 403. See also Khajeh-Nuri 1942: I, esp. pp. 90-92.


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544 HomayounKatouzianelement of populism in his behavior. Like his main rival and adversary, SayyedHiasan Mudarris (some of whose personal qualities he must have secretlyadmired) he was contemptuous of the old nobility and he regarded themas utterly incapable of saving the situation. Mudarris may not have been guiltyof too much exaggeration when he said, at about this time, that there had beenonly two men of political courage and masculinity left in the country, Reza Khan,and himself.

The second - so-called 'liberal' or 'bourgeois nationalist' - political tendencywas more directly a product of the MashrzutehRevolution. This was representedby a fairly genuine synthesis between Shi'ite anti-despotism and westernpluralism in support of personal freedom, legal justice and political power-sharing. It was not predominantly or significantly religious in character. But itrealized that in the circumstances an attack on religion, its historical origins andsocial traditions, would be incompatible with the spirit of the institutionalframework which it wanted to preserve for the body politic. It was symbolized byrespectable and popular political figures such as Mirza Hasan Mushir ad-Dawleh,Mirza Husain Mu'tamin al-Mulk, Mirza Hasan Mustawfi al-Mamalik andDr. Muhammad Musaddiq as-Saltaneh (who was destined to lead the campaignfor the nationalization of Persian oil twenty-five years later). These men weredeeply committed to the preservation of the constitutionalist achievements of thePersian Revolution; yet, at the same time, they were not averse to a certainamount of housecleaning especially for the establishment of law and orderthroughout the country. Their European education and experience added totheir upbringing in enlightened and sophisticated Muslim households had, in thefirst instance, impressed a deep sense of legalism on their minds which did notmake it impossible for them to reach compromises within a broadly legalisticframework. Personally, they were not the stuff of which martyrs are made aslong as they could help it; but their conduct was at times so correct, so apparentlyopen and indiscriminate that it earned some of them the ambiguous - if notmildly pejorative - title of Vajih al-Milleh (national goody-goody). Their'nationalism' was to a large extent empirical and, therefore, it had less to do withthe greater glory of the Persian nation than with a reassertion of the civil andnational dignity of the Persian people. This outlook was even more true of thethird political tendency which we shall discuss in a moment. In a purely relativesense, they had been the Presbyterians of the Persian Revolution, and theybecame the Directoirists of its aftermath: they were equally opposed to Jacobin-ism, Restorationism and Bonapartism.The third and last major political tendency was much more radical, lessflexible, more obstinate and more entrenched in the old Persian civil andreligious culture; less Europeanized, and therefore, less acutely conscious ofnationhood but more of the community of Iranians. These men were notreligious obscurantists who might have been harking back to the early or middleQajar sociocultural arrangements. On the contrary, they were quite uncompro-mising on the issues of the defense of parliamentarygovernment and decentraliza-


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I92I-I926 545tion of power. Indeed, in terms of technical skill, a few of them must be rankedamong the greatest parliamentarians that Persia has ever seen. They were theinheritors of the earlyShi'i opposition to centralized political authority; they wereShi'ite Muslims who realized that their opposition to arbitrary power, and theircommitment to the defense of personal liberties and independent judicial pro-cedures was - in the context of Persian politics - nearest to anything which mightbe described as the Shi'ite political doctrine.20In practice they normally foundthemselves in alliance with the second political tendency, with whom they shareda good deal of political objectives; and like them, they drew their public supportfrom the Bazar community and the urban crowd. They included men like thepoet Muhammad Hashim Mirza Afsar, Mirza Hashim Ashtiani, Sayyed'Ibrdhim Zia al-Va'izin, Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali Tehrani, Firuz-Abadi, Ha'iri-Zadeh, Kazirini, the (manoeuvrable) poet-laureat Bahar and, above all, SayyedHasan Mudarris, who in almost every respect was the very personification ofthis movement. Many of them, including some of those mentioned above, laterchanged course and withdrew from the public scene, but Mudarris remainedadamant until the bitter end.21

Mudarris was a native of Qumsheh (now Shahreza) a small town in thecentral province of Isfahan. He was educated first at a madrisa in the cityof Isfahan, then in Najaf. He later found his way into the Iranian nationalpolitics when he was selected as the representative of the Isfahani religiousleaders in the National Assembly. In no time this unknown provincial 'dlim whohad brought along with him little more than a sharp wit, and an even sharpertongue, made a considerable reputation in the political circles of the capital.World War I and the long parliamentaryrecession it brought found Mudarris inthe Provisional Government of Kirmanshah as their Minister of Justice. Whenthat government finally dissolved itself, he was among those of its leadershipwho thought it safer to spend a period of grace in Istanbul before returning toTehran. On his return he opposed the 1919 Agreement, although his personalrelations with Vusuq ad-Dawleh, the prime minister on whom the fate of thetreaty directly depended, remained on the whole cordial. On the morrow of the1921 Coup, when on the order of Sayyed Zia (Taba-Taba'i) almost everyconventional politician was arrested, Mudarris found himself in prison. And afew months later, after the quick disappearance of Sayyed Zia from Persianpolitics (at least for some considerable time to come), he secured a seat forhimself in the newly elected national assembly. It was from this time onwardthat the battlelines were more and more clearly drawn for the final confrontationless than five years later.Mudarris was an accomplished parliamentarian, with electrifying oratoricalpowers, who on a number of important occasions turned the parliamentary tide

20 For example, in a debate in the National Assembly (1921), Mudarrissaid that'Muslim Persia must be Muslim and Iranian' Khajeh-Nuri 1943: II, I62.21 He wasmurderedn prison n 1938afternineyearsof banishment n the old citadelof Khaf in the province of Khurisan. ibid, pp. 334-336.


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546 Homayoun Katouzianin his own favor by the sheer weight of a speech or two, full of common sense,wit and, sometimes, moral intimidation. He was in contact with people of allclasses and, if anything, he was noticeably less warm in his attitude toward thenobility than he was toward the common people. He was democratic in hispolitical attitude, and he had no use either for high posts or for worldly posses-sions. Indeed, Flaubert's remark about Renan, 'If a man is someonewhy shouldhe want to be something,'fits his case perfectly. But, at the same time, he lovedto enjoy personal power, especially in a 'king-making' capacity. He was very self-assured to the point of being incautious and even tactless at times, and this wasan important factor in his downfall. He was a man of principle but, unlike someof the leaders of the second tendency, he was not too particular about the meanshe employed for the attainment of his objectives. Even when he used tacticswhich could be easily taken as evidence of hypocrisy and inconsistency, however,he applied them in such a way that would largely pre-empt such accusations.For example, he surprised many by his defense of Nusrat ad-Dawleh's creden-tials for commission to the National Assembly barely six months after the latter'sactivities in favor of the 1919 Agreement. But, at the same time, he spoke withsuch contempt both of him and his role in that episode that it was difficult toaccuse him of inconsistency.22 Or, when in a moment of despair he made thetactical mistake of contacting Khaz'al, the Shaikh of Muhammarra who stoodaccused of being a separatist, a tyrant, and an agent of imperialism all at once,he still made no bones about his sentiments towards him. He wrote:I have, on two or three occasions,mentionedin my lettersthat the people of Tehrangenerallydonot thinkwell of you; thatyou donot have agoodreputationn the country,and that all the peoplehave a sense of hatredand disliketowardyou. Therefore,if youwould like your past to be forgotten,you would have to compensatefor it with gooddeeds. ... This is the dayon which you arebeingput to the test... if you passit well,yourwrongdoingswill be inevitablymitigated . . otherwise t is not possibleto deceivethe people of Tehranwith words alone.... .23This small passage is in fact highly representative of some of his prominentpersonal characteristics; in particular, his directness, his inflexibility on points ofprinciple, and a self-assurance which sometimes bordered on arrogance. He once,reputedly, sent a message to Sayyed Zia saying: 'You should have killed us all,if you wanted to be allowed to succeed.'24And he later proved, even though inanother context, to be as good as his word. He did not understand the modernprocesses of politics and government, and yet he was a great politician; he wasdictatorial in personal manners, but democratic in social spirit. He was prag-matic in his choice of means but rigid in the defence of his principles. Mudarris

22 He said, in a long and fascinating speech, that Nusrat's reputation had been 'tainted,'but that now he was 'repentant' and had 'confessed to his errors.' He might not be honestin his repentance, but they had to take his word for it; and if he changed his course againhe (Mudarris) would be as good as he had been in opposing him as a member of Vusufq'striumvirate. Khajeh-Niuri I943: II, I59-I63.23 See Mustawfi I962: III, 638.24 Ibid., p. 267.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I92I-I926 547was a star of the postrevolutionary 'liberal-anarchism'; he fell when the 'liberal-anarchist' age was over.THE UNEQUAL CONFRONTATION

Through the fourth session of the national assembly (1923-I925) it becamegradually clear that Reza Khan was bidding for a complete take-over. In fact,Mudarris and his followers became alive to the threat and its full implicationsearlier than others. The popular politicians of the second tendency were, atfirst, not entirely convinced that this was so; and, in any case, they had beenrather impressed with Reza Khan's positive achievements (both then, and evenlater). This was in part a reflection of differences in vision. For, what Mudarrisand his tendency were (rightly) most afraid of was a restoration of functionaldespotism. They cared much less about the maintenance of law and order in theprovinces, the revival of 'the past Iranian glories,' etc., than the defense of thehard-won achievements of Mashriteh against the increasing threats of revivalistnationalism. On one occasion, Mudarris told one of his own sympathizers (whohad pointed out Reza Khan's merits to him) that after all the people had to besafe 'from those whom they supply with a few rifles!'25The illegal activities of the police and the gendarmerie, both of which thewar office had quietly brought under its own command, were increasingdaily; and it was becoming less and less possible to indulge in free (and sometimeslicentious) political activity and journalism which had been usually, but notalways, possible since World War I. Besides the annual budgetary increasesin the allocation for the army, there were illicit financial appropriations by theministry of war. This issue came to a head particularly when, in a parliamentaryspeech, a member of the national assembly (Mu'in at-Tujjar, a leading Bazarmerchant) complained against it. Mudarris took up the theme and pointed theattack at Reza Khan himself with reference to the manipulations of the Khaliseh(state) properties, and indirect taxes by the war office. The confrontation thatfollowed was finally settled with a tactical retreat by the minister of war.26In time, the leadership of both anti-despotic tendencies found themselvesin opposition to Reza Khan's tactics and aspirations. But it was Mudarris andhis group who took a consistent and wholly intransigent stand against him.Mudarris in particular resorted to almost every possible tactic to prevent theSardar's assumption of complete power. He tried unsuccessfully to move thePrince Regent into action. He rallied the leaders of the Bazar, the commercialcommunity, and entered negotiations with individuals whom he would haveotherwise not regarded as natural allies. In this way, he managed to alienate, atleast for a critical period, leaders of the second political tendency whose sym-pathies were generally much closer to his own than the other party's. Forexample, late in 1922, he managed to bring down the government of the popularand highly respected Mirza Hasan Mustawfi al-Mamalik by his masterly25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., 537-546. Khajeh-Nuri 1943: II.


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548 HomayounKatouzianparliamentary tactics, and tried to put the highly unpopular Mirza AhmadQavam as-Saltaneh in his place. His own justification was simple and pragmatic:he likened Mustawfi to a 'jeweled sword' which, however, was only useful duringpeace time; and Qavam to a 'sharp sabre' which was absolutely indispensable forwar. But this did not prevent the national-revivalist poets 'Ishqi, 'Arif and Far-rukhi from showering him with a barrageof abuse and obscenity. Yet, by will andby circumstance, Reza Khan's fortunes continued to rise in spite of occasionalsetbacks: he was elected to premiership, by the National Assembly, in 1924,mainly because of the spinelessness of Mushir ad-Dawleh (a popular goody-goody), though this would have happened sooner or later;27he overthrew, andarrested, Khaz'al, the tyrannical Shaikh of Muhammara (who had been enjoyingBritish protection), hence enhancing his stature among his supporters and by-standers, and throwing his opposition into confusion or silent admiration; hebought off a number of politicians and journalists from the opposite camps,frightened some others into inaction, and won over many others who, in suchcircumstances, alwaysjudge 'the truth' by the relativepowerof the contenders.REZA KHAN BECOMES REZA SHAH

The final battle was fought in two stages. Early in 1925 telegrams beganto arrive from all over the country for the establishment of a republic. Demon-strations and meetings were held, leaflets distributed, concerts given, andspeeches delivered propagating the virtues of a republican system. Reza Khanpretended to be neutral, but the active involvement of the army in the republicancamp was symbolic. The opposition to republicanism - including the leadersand supporters of the two anti-despotic political tendencies also closed ranks.In fact, it was clear to many of the latter that Reza Khan's republic is the firststep toward the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty.28 Some national-revivalistintellectuals, notably the poet 'Ishqi - who had been increasingly showing signsof a change of heart - defected to the opposition. But the government alreadyenjoyed quite a sizable majority in the National Assembly, and it would not be anexaggeration to claim that but for the exceptional energy and astuteness of Mud-arris the campaign would have been an undiluted success. It failed ingloriously.After preparing the mood, both inside and outside the National Assembly,Mudarris and his parliamentary allies tabled a motion of censure against thevery person of the prime minister, consisting of three points, the second of

27 Over a dispute about the banning of a newspaper, Reza Khan sent a message toMushir ad-Dawleh, the prime minister, that he should either ban the newspaper or facethe prospect of being barred from entering the cabinet room. The weak and urbaneprime minister found the message so insulting as he resigned his office, and refused towithdraw his resignation, even when Reza Khan had tried to retract or modify his words.28 For example, in a poem on the subject, the poet-laureate wrote: Dar pardeh-yijumhuri, kibad dar-i shahi; Ma bikhabar u dushman-i tamma' zirang ast: In the guiseof republic, he wants to become king; we are naive, and the greedy enemy is canny.Bahar 1954: I.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, I92i-I926 549which accused him of no less than 'activities against the constitution and con-stitutional monarchy; and insulting the National Consultative Assembly.' This,indeed, was a daring move which, in the circumstances, no one but the agingandfearless Sayyed could possibly have led. It immediately created an atmosphereof nervous tension for the government, even in spite of the fact that they en-joyed complete control over the internal security forces; and they had a clearmajority in the National Assembly. It looked as if the opposition had no hopeat all.

On the day on which the motion of censure was to be debated, a big demon-stration had been organized by both sides outside the National Assembly.Each party was hoping to provide moral support for its own deputies and taunt,and intimidate, those of the other side. By all accounts the government lobbywas relatively thin, and their voices were quickly drowned by the supporters ofthe opposition. The ranks of the latter swelled, especially when the news wentout that 'even before the formal declaration of a republican system' an old andrespectable religious dignitary, that is, Mudarris, had been struck inside theassembly. This was true, and the timing was so perfect that one is tempted tothink that the Sayyed had planned it all down to the last detail. It happenedbefore the arrival of the prime minister when the Assembly was not yet insession, but argument and controversy was raging among the deputies in thelobbies and corridors. According to eyewitness accounts Mudarris was deliber-ately emotional in tone and provocative in content: a tactic which led to the'explosion' of a lesser light in the government camp, a certain Dr. Ehya'as-Saltaneh (Shaikh), who assaulted him. When the prime minister arrived at thescene outside the Assembly, without knowledge of the blow to Mudarris and itsimpact on the demonstrators, he was furious, and ordered the Assembly guardsto attack and disperse the crowd. A protracted and bloody battle was fought inwhich the Sardar himself was personally involved, being showered - accordingto Bahar, Dawlat-Abadi, Khajeh-Niri, etc. - with bricks and even shoes ('Notflowers but bricks did they throw at him,' wrote 'Ishqi in a long semicolloquialpoem, entitled 'The Republic Saga,' whose publication certainly made a signi-ficant contribution to his own death by assassination not long afterward). Thenext public figure to lose his temper, in the charged atmosphere of that day, wasthe highly respected speakerof the Assembly - Mirza Husain Mu'ataminal-Mulk,an 'independent,' who was particularly angry with the Sardar's order to theAssembly guards to disperse the people by force without consulting him first.Given his personal political sentiments, he must have felt as if he was being out-maneuvered in his own house, and by the use of his own servants (i.e., theAssembly guards who were formally under his command). He lost his temperand abused the prime minister, in front of many deputies, when Reza Khan hadmanaged to disengage himself - with the help of the poet-laureat - and enter theassembly building. Mudarris had won. The republican movement was scrappedand the government camp, whose star had reached its nadir, had to pause for awhile in order to heal its wounds. The Sardarhimself adopted a very conciliatory


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550 Homayoun Katouzianpolicy toward the opposition, and in particular he tried to keep Mudarris happyfor a while by conceding to some of his demands in a private conference. Thisattitude had been calculated to lull the opposition into inaction especially at atime, after the collapse of the republican movement, when a concerted andsystematic effort might just have managed to deny him the final ascendancy, forever. In spite of this, however, the long-term balance of power had decisivelychanged, and while Mudarris was still dizzy with his impossible triumph, thesecond stage of the war was already being set. Mudarris had won the battle notsuspecting that he was about to lose the war.In mid-October I925 a simple motion, signed by a number of deputiesincluding some who until recently had been in opposition, was tabled in theNational Assembly demanding the abolition of the Qajar dynasty and thetemporary transfer of the royal title to the prime minister, until a constituentassembly had ratified the decision. The opposition, now sunk to a handful ofdeputies some of whom had decided not to attend with or without apologies,29desperately tried to use delaying tactics, but to no avail. Of the fourteen deputiesled by Mudarris he alone raised his powerful voice, shouting that even if theytook 'a hundred thousand votes it would still be illegal,' and stormed out of theHouse without delivering a formal speech. Four of the 'independents' - Taqi-zadeh, 'Ala, Musaddiq and Dawlat-Abadi, in that order - delivered speechesagainst the resolution. All speeches, except that of 'Ala which was no more than afew words counseling caution, were reasoned, and moderate. They invariablyincluded praise for the achievements of the prime minister and support for hiscontinuation in office, but they argued that the proposed resolution would be ofno practical benefit, or that it had to be applied according to proper constitu-tional procedures. In particular, Musaddiq, who delivered an extremely well-prepared, reasoned, and yet emotional speech, said that he was opposed to themove because if it turned the Sardar into a powerless constitutional monarch,the country would lose the leadership of a very able politician, and if it turnedhim into a dictator (which he very well knew would be the case) it would beagainst the achievements of the Persian Revolution: he would not support sucha cause no matter whether he was 'abused,' 'cursed,' 'killed' or even 'mutilated.'The speeches were answered, one by one, by four members of the MajorityFaction in a moderate tone.30The assembly divided, and the motion was carriedoverwhelmingly. The Qajars fell and an exciting chapter of Iranian historyended.Both the elections for the constituent assembly, and its deliberations, whichratified the decision of the National Assembly, and conferred the royal title toReza Khan and his male issue, were no more than a farce: they must have

29The night before, an unsuccessful attempt had been made on the life of the poet-laureat with the express purpose of terrorizing the opposition, and bringing the waveringmembers of the Assembly into line. Later that night the majority of deputies had beenindividually summoned to a secret meeting in order to get their firm commitment for thenext day's historic vote. Dawlat-Abadi: IV.30 For the full text of all the speeches, see Makki I945.


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Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926 551surprised few men other than Sulaiman Mirza Iskandari, the parliamentarysocialist leader who had only then discovered that he had been deceived by'the bourgeois nationalist leader' whom he had so consistently supported.Yet it is also true that only a few men - this time Musaddiq among them -could conceive of the long-term implications of this event. In fact, just afterReza Khan's coronation early in 1926, the light-hearted urban crowd had madeup another one of their habitual anti-authority (but, in this case, not so offensive)slogans: 'that which they've put on your head; they've just been pulling yourleg!'31 They would soon learn who was pulling whose what. For this was acrucial strategic success for the despotic counter-revolution, which ruled overPersia for the next fifteen years.UNIVERSITY OF KENT AT CANTERBURY

REFERENCES'Abbasi, M. (1958). Tarikh-i matbu 'at va adabiyat-i Irdn dar dawreh-yi mashrztiyat.

2 vols. Tehran.Arf'a, G. (I963). Under Five Shahs. London.'Arif, A. (I325/1946). Divdn-i Mirza Abulqdsim 'Arif-i Qazvivi. Tehran.Bahar, M. T. (I944). Tarikh-i mukhtasar-i ahzdb-i siasi dar Irdn. Tehran.Bastani-Parizi, M. H. (1962). Mushir-ad Dawleh.... Tehran.Browne, E. G. (I9o0). The Persian Revolution. London.Carr, E. H. (1953). The Bolshevik Revolution. vol. 3, London.Cottom, R. W. (I964). Nationalism in Iran. University of Pittsburgh Press.Dawlat-Abadi, Y. (1950). Haydt-i Yahyd. 4 vols. Tehran.Fakha'i, 'I. (I965). Sarddr-i Jangal.Fakhra'i, 'I. (1968). Gilan dar junbish-i mashruitiyat. Tehran.Farrukh, S. M. (1967). Khdtirdt-i sidsy-i Farrukh. 2 vols. Tehran.Farrukhi, M. (1953). Divdn-i Farrukhi, ed. H. Makki. Tehran.Fateh, M. (1954). Panjdh sdl naft-i Irdn. Tehran.Hedayat, M. (I963). Kdtirdt va khatardt. 2nd. ed. Tehran.'Ishqi, M. R. (n.d.). Kulliydt-i musavvar-i 'Ishqi, ed. A. A. M. Salimi. Tehran.Khajeh-Nfri, 'I. (1942). Bdzigardn-i 'asr-i tald 'i: I. Tehran.Khajeh-NCri, 'I. (943). Bdzigardn-i 'asr-i tald 'i: II. Tehran.Kasravi, S. A. (I950). Tdrikh-i mashruteh-yi Irdn.Makki, H. (I944). Tdrikh-i bist saleh-yi Irdn. 3 vols. Tehran.Makki, H. (1945). Nutqhdy-i tdrikhy-i Ductur Musaddiq. Tehran.Mustawfi, 'A. (1962). Tdrikh-i 'ijtima 'i va 'iddry-i dawreh-yi Qdijrriyeh. 3 vols. Tehran.Safa'i, 'I. (1962). Rahbardn-i Mashru-teh. 2 vols. Tehran.Serge, V. (1963). Memoirs of a Revolutionary. London.Waterfield, G. (I973). Professional Diplomat (a biography of Sir Percy Loraine). London.

31 In keh sarit guzashtan; sar bi sarit guzashtan.

nationalist trends in iran - katouzian

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