nationalism and the radical intelligentsia in thailand

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Nationalism and the Radical Intelligentsia in ThailandThongchai Winichakul a

a Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA

To cite this Article Winichakul, Thongchai(2008) 'Nationalism and the Radical Intelligentsia in Thailand', Third WorldQuarterly, 29: 3, 575 — 591To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01436590801931520URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590801931520

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Nationalism and the RadicalIntelligentsia in Thailand

THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL

ABSTRACT The prominent Thai scholar, Chatthip Natsupha, has gone frombeing a Marxist intellectual in the 1970s to a cultural nationalist advocate of agenuine Thai essence which, he believes, is an antidote to the dominance of theWestern neoliberal capitalism. His case is not an anomaly. The intellectual pathfrom the Marxist left to the cultural nationalist right is well-trodden andreflects broader changes in nationalism in the country. The cultural nationalistThai ex-left rejected what it called ‘bad’ nationalism and embraced a ‘good’ one.However, its ideas were significantly drawn from conservative nationalism.Such nationalism, which is widespread among the Thai intelligentsia, was animportant factor in their support for the military coup which, in 2006, ousted anelected government on the dubious grounds that it was a proxy for globalcapitalism.

In his preface to the book, Prawattisat lao 1779 – 1975 (History of Laos,1779 – 1975), written by one of his students, Chatthip Natsupha (hereafter‘Chatthip’ as a Thai is called by his first name), one of the best knownscholars in Thailand, writes:

If it had not been for French imperialism, the whole Lan Sang Kingdom, boththe left and right bank of the Mekong, would have been included in the ThaiKingdom today.1

He goes on to add:

The ethnic Thai people are strong. In the long term, in making serious efforts toconsolidate the Thai in the Golden Peninsula2 into the same federation, theBangkok Thai should admit their past mistakes and establish relationshipswith the Lanna3 Thai and the Lan Sang4 Thai, both in Laos and in thenortheastern region [of Thailand] as equals and with respect . . . The consolida-tion of all the Thai peoples in these three regions would be a highly meaningfulstep.5

Thongchai Winichakul is in the Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 5211 Humanities,

455 N Park Street, Madison, WI 53706, USA. Email: [email protected].

Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2008, pp 575 – 591

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/08/030575–17 � 2008 Third World Quarterly

DOI: 10.1080/01436590801931520 575

Downloaded By: [Thammasat University] At: 08:31 7 March 2010

In order to appreciate the import of Chatthip’s remarks, a brief excursus intoethnic and linguistic labels is necessary. In contemporary Thai, the word thatconnotes the Tai/Thai ethnicity is spelled in two ways. With exactly the samepronunciation—‘thai’—one is spelled with a y at the end and the otherwithout, respectively as ‘thaiy’ and ‘thai’. When spelled ‘thaiy’ the worddenotes the modern nation-state and its citizens, although in its Romanisa-tion as ‘Thai(land)’, the letter ‘y’ is dispensed with. When spelled without they ending, it is a looser term denoting the ethnic peoples whose languagesbelong to the same Tai/Thai linguistic family. This ‘Thai’ (without a yending) includes the Shan of Burma, the Lao people on both sides of theMekong, and people speaking various Tai/Thai dialects in Thailand today,including the Muang people of former Lanna (Chiang Mai), the Tai Lue, theTai Maung, the Tai Khoen in the border areas between China, Burma andLaos, the Black and White Tai in Vietnam, and others. In this meaning, theword has recently come to be commonly written in Thai with the un-aspirated letter ‘t’. It is Romanised as ‘Tai’, in order to mark it off even moreclearly from Thaiy, both in writing and pronunciation. Thus, in recentacademic writings, ‘Tai’ refers to the larger ethnic and linguistic groups and‘Thai’ to the modern nation and its citizens. However, many Thai writers stilluse ‘Thai’ without the y ending and with the aspirated t, and never use ‘Tai’.Chatthip is one of them. In the passage quoted above, as in his other writings,he spells ‘Thai’ without a y ending for the second meaning—Tai (the Tai-speaking peoples). For reasons which should become clear later in thisarticle, I suspect that the refusal to use the unaspirated ‘Tai’ is a consciouschoice. Most of Chatthip’s followers do the same. In this article I will followthe convention when using my own voice. However, in a quote from theworks of Chatthip and others like him, I will use the italicized ‘Thai’, as Ihave in the quotations above, to note that the original spelling is ‘Thai’without the y ending.Chatthip’s remarks quoted above now become more revealing. The

mistakes to which Chatthip refers are Siamese overlordship over the Tai-speaking peoples in the region in general and the brutality of Siam (theBangkok Thai) towards King Anuwong of Vientiane and towards the Laopeople during the 1826 – 29 conflict in particular. The conflict is rememberedwell among the Lao people in the official history of Laos, as well as in folkliterature, as the heroic but tragic failure by Anuwong to liberate the Laofrom the yoke of Siam.6 Today Anuwong remains a Lao national hero,celebrated by both the pre- and post-1975 regimes. The same episode,however, is remembered in Thai historiography as a Thai national triumphover the rebels to preserve the country’s national sovereignty. Here Chatthipthinks of the Lao and Thai peoples as Tai brothers. The mistake is theexcessive violence among brothers. Chatthip, like most Thais today, blamesFrench colonialism for preventing Laos from being part of the greater ThaiKingdom.Chatthip’s perception of the past is undeniably nationalistic. The rhetoric

of a ‘federation of the Tai people in the Golden Peninsula’ is the rhetoric of aracial nationalism which in Thailand dates back to the 1940s and 1950s. Such


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a racial fantasy of the nation had faded away long time ago. Is Chatthip anideologue of its revival?Prima facie, quite the opposite. He has been a famousand influential scholar of the Thai left since the late 1970s.7 He was a founderof the ‘Political Economy’ group that promoted leftist and Marxistscholarship. His economic history was part of a progressive school of Thaihistoriography which opposed the royalist one. He is a champion of ‘peasantanarchism’, an anti-state ideology. Today his vast network of friends anddisciples includes political and NGO activists, publishers and scholars. He ishighly regarded as a prominent, senior and progressive scholar in Thailand.Is this, then, just another case of a leftist turned very right, an old story

from every corner of the world? Certainly Chatthip and his followers havenever thought of themselves as turning rightwards at all. Is, then, the racial-nationalist sentiment expressed above merely a slip of the tongue from aprogressive scholar who happened to grow up in the 1940s? As this paperwill argue, the racial nationalism today evident in the discourse of Chatthipand his disciples is deeply intertwined with their leftist, specifically leftnationalist, past. The ubiquity of nationalism across the political spectrum inThailand, however, makes it harder to discern any move from left to right inpolitics.This article describes the scholarly development of Chatthip and his

ideas—a school of thought which went from its early affiliation to a form ofMarxism to Chatthip’s current endeavours to study the Tai peoples in hissearch for the genuine Thai essence. This essence, he has come to believe, isthe crucial element militating against the dominance of the Westernneoliberal capitalism. The article will then show that this intellectualidiosyncrasy and its political success reflect changes in Thai nationalismamong the Thai intelligentsia. Although Chatthip originated in a liberal-leftnationalism, his current ideas are derived in good part from conservativenationalism as well.Moreover, the Chatthip case is not an anomaly among the leftist

intelligentsia in Thailand. It is part of, and reflects, broader Thai leftistintellectual life. The Thai left never fights nationalism; it is against ‘bad’nationalism and has fashioned its own acceptable version. The Chatthip caseprovides a lens on the broader Thai leftist intelligentsia. At the criticalmoment for Thai democracy in 2006 their nationalism led most of them tosupport the military dictators who ousted an elected government on thepretext that it was the proxy of global capitalism.

The Chatthip School in left debates

Chatthip’s ‘leftist’ period, roughly 1972 – 81, has been described well both inThai and English.8 Only a brief summary is necessary here.Historical studies in Thailand changed dramatically after the popular

uprising in 1973 that ousted the military regime. During the early 1970s ThaiMarxist historiography began to proliferate. It had inspired Chatthip and hiscolleagues to launch a new style of economic history that challenged thedominant royal-nationalist history. Under the umbrella of the ‘Political

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Economy’ group he helped create, and contributed significantly to shaping, anew landscape emerged in historical studies in Thailand.9

The key question for Chatthip, and for many others on the Thai left at thetime, was why Thailand remained underdeveloped. The answer, theybelieved, lay in the obstacles put up by the sakdina or Thai feudalism. In aneo-Marxist and Maoist analysis of the Thai social formation they askedquestions such as whether Thailand was a semi-colonial/semi-feudal society,a dependent capitalist or semi-feudal/semi-capitalist society, or an Orientalsociety.10 This was not a trivial terminological matter, since the terminologyinvolved depended on correctly analysing the Thai social formation andhence its class relations, the nature of the Thai state, the correct strategiesand tactics for class struggle and the prospects for revolution. Theconsequences of failure in this analytical task would be more than merelyacademic.The ‘Chatthip School’, which started making an impact early on, proposed

that the feudal socioeconomic formation in Siam changed very little before1855, when Siam was forced to open up its market to European powers. Thiswas the result of two main factors. First, the sakdina state hindereddevelopment by its monopoly over major commodities such as rice, by itscontrol over production through the production tax, and through thebondage system which imposed bonded labour on all. The second factor wasthe cohesiveness of villages characteristic of Asiatic society. They resistedchanges and outside influences and ensured their survival and that of thehuge unfree agrarian economy. The combined result of these two factors wasthat no independent bourgeoisie could emerge to be the agent of capitalistdevelopment. When, in 1855, foreign influences were finally forced on thisstatic social formation, the bourgeoisie which emerged in Siam was Chinese.Chatthip saw members of this bourgeoisie, however, as either compradors forthe Europeans or functionaries of the feudal state. Without an independentbourgeoisie in Siam, there was no self-sustaining dynamic of capitalaccumulation within Thai society. This was the key to underdevelopmentof Thai capitalism.11 As we shall see below, the tinge of racialism alreadypresent in his discounting of the Chinese bourgeoisie was a clue to his laterpolitical trajectory. It became an important reason why, for Chatthip, thealternative for underdeveloped Thai society lay not in a more successfulcapitalist development but in Thai villages.In contrast to the royal-nationalist history that dominated historical

scholarship in Thailand, the Thai past as reconstructed by the ChatthipSchool emerged, for the first time, as the story of production, economicclasses, tax-farmers, bourgeoisie, capitalists, land tenure systems, and so on,rather than one of royal battles against foreign enemies or benevolent princesof prosperity. Royal chronicles gave way to archival materials about rent,taxes, production and commodities, and dynastic and regnal periodisation toa social and economic one, as episodes of royal glory were unceremoniouslylumped together as the pre-1855 stagnation. Indeed, the Chatthip School casta distinctly unflattering light on the monarchical state: it was mono-polistic, rent-seeking, parasitic, exploitative and repressive, an obstacle to


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development and the origin of the social ills of the present. In sum, themonarchical past was no longer glorious, nothing to celebrate.Critics of Chatthip’s ‘political economy’ included other Marxists and

historians. The former rejected Chatthip’s idea of a semi-feudal/semi-colonialThai economy.12 A leading Thai historian, on the other hand, demonstratedthat a domestic bourgeoisie and a vibrant bourgeois economy had emergedlong before 1855. The coming of the colonial powers affected the course ofthe development of the bourgeoisie in Siam, but was not the origin of thebourgeois economy.13

In a tragic irony (though hardly unique to Thailand) debates among leftand radical intellectuals over the state and social formations grew in inverseproportion to the political fortunes of their movements, and affected thosefortunes in turn. Given their implications for revolutionary strategies, themore heated and inconclusive the debates became, the greater grew theideological crisis on the left, the more complex issues became, the lessconfident the radicals could feel about their ideas and strategy. The Thaicommunist movement collapsed in the early 1980s, well before theglobal collapse of communism, thanks to its internal conflicts and to thechanged situation in the region after the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict.Debates over the nature of the Thai social formation faded away without aconclusion. Nobody cared to answer questions which only yesterday seemedso pressing. Thailand’s economic ‘miracle’ in the 1980s and 1990s probablyalso made the debate about underdevelopment look absurd. Whether it wasthe feudal state or the dependent bourgeoisie which had hitherto hindereddevelopment now seemed largely academic and jokes about the earnest andheated ‘terminological’ disputes of the past proliferated in the halls oflearning. While many former radicals were taking time to heal their wounds,by the early 1980s Chatthip was already holding up the village as the antidoteto the ills of capitalism.

The Thai village and its primordial essence

Given Chatthip’s conclusion that the bourgeoisie in Siam/Thailand was notstrong enough to counter the power of global capitalism (and byimplication presumably not strong enough to be a worthy target ofopposition itself), he now saw the Thai village—or rather an essentialised,even orientalised, version of it—as the site of resistance to capitalism—orrather to the global, Western, consumerist and materialist civilisation whichdid not have much of a domestic presence in the villages. Subscribing to thedubious notions of the ‘Asiatic mode of production’, Chatthip and hisdisciples argued that, just as Thai villages were not penetrated by theparasitic Oriental despotic state to any significant degree in the past,14 theynow stood outside the ambit of neoliberal global capitalism and thus, morethan any other part of Thai society, had the potential to resist it. It wasimportant, they claimed, to find out what values and elements constitutedvillage resistance, whether they remained vital, and how one should goabout strengthening them, if they did not. Chatthip’s ideas were no longer


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about underdevelopment and retarded capitalism. They were about‘anarchistic’ Thai villages which he saw as Thailand’s last redoubt againstcapitalism and the state.In his highly acclaimed study,15 Chatthip relied heavily on oral interviews

with old people about their lives and villages in the recent past, how theygrew rice, wove cloth, cared for their gardens and fowl, how they sold andbought things in the markets, and how their largely ‘non-economic’ life waslived day in and day out. The village subsistence economy here appeareddevoid of domination and exploitation. It was based on forms of communitysolidarity which had remained strong throughout history. In addition to histhesis that the sakdina state did not penetrate deeply into village life,16 he alsoattributed such cohesion, solidarity and immunity to the incubus of modernlife to special cultural characteristics (to be explained below). These were alsothe reasons why there had been few changes before the country’s economywas opened to colonial powers. The state and capitalism were, and remained,outsiders and aliens—contaminants—to village life. Their incursion hadoccurred only recently and slowly. There remained many villages that wererelatively untouched by capitalism and they were the true force againstcapitalism and the state. They had to be strengthened. The originally anti-capitalist project had now become an anti-state project too.The Thai intelligentsia, Chatthip included, was critical of capitalist

development and industrialisation in Thailand since the 1960s and, inparticular, of the economic boom of the 1980s. They saw nothing butgrowing social ill and human suffering under global capitalism. Suchconcerns only enhanced Chatthip’s romanticisation of the authentic village asthe site of anti-capitalism: this is clear in the depiction of Khiriwong villageby one of his more prominent disciples:

Khiriwong is a real village which is identical to the one imagined byvillagers . . . not penetrated by state and capitalism. We might think that thiskind of community existed only in the peasant millennialism of the past. Or itmight be just a wish of a utopian thinker. But this is real . . . [The research onKhiriwong] suggests an ‘anarchist’ theory of development, a kind of socialism,focusing on folk ideology and small organizations . . . to counter the power ofthe state and capital cities.17

Those who have romanticised villages in Asia range from Gandhi to thosewho subscribe to ideas of ‘Oriental despotism’. Critics of such romanticisa-tions are also numerous,18 and romantic ideas about Thai villages inparticular have also been criticised.19 Among Chatthip’s many critics on thispoint, Kitahara notes that Chatthip substitutes the empirical village for the‘normative village’ he wants to see.20 Although Chatthip counters this withhis ‘empirical’ research embodied in hundreds of tapes and stacks of fieldnotes, Anan questions Chatthip’s fieldwork, his handling of interview dataand their interpretation, and his application of theories to the data.21 An evenmore devastating criticism is contained in a young graduate student’s workexposing how Chatthip’s writing, not his empirical data, constructs his ideal


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Thai village.22 These important criticisms have not, however, preventedChatthip’s ideas from becoming very influential among scholars and‘progressive’ activists.What made the Thai village, the core of Chatthip’s idea of a progressive—

anti-capitalist and anti-state—politics, strong, autonomous, cohesive, self-sufficient, and rather anarchistic? Abandoning his prior socioeconomicapproach, he found the answer in the ‘culture’ of the Thai peasantry. Thetwin intellectual moves that have propelled his academic enterprise since theearly 1980s are the idea of community culture, and the belief in the pri-mordial essence or root of the Thai village.‘Community culture’ refers to the peasant intellect and peasant ways of

living. ‘Community’ here is a social entity identical to a ‘village’23 and‘culture’, the common cultural and intellectual elements shared by (Thai)peasants across the country and beyond. Community culture allows Thaipeasants to live self-sufficiently in harmony and peace, and to cope withchallenges from the outside effectively to avoid the perils of the state andcapitalist ‘development’.24 The villagers’ intellect is superior to the modern orWestern and is able to reject Western culture—consumerism, capitalism,neoliberalism, and the like—as it has done for hundreds of years in dealingwith exploitative states.In his influential study on the village, Chatthip used the term ‘Thai village’

in two senses: in one it referred not just to any village, but to an essentialisedidea of one, and in the other, to villages of the ethnic Thai.25 The ‘villagers’intellect’ in subsequent works became interchangeable with the ‘Thaiintellect’ (‘Thai’ with the y ending). The state and capitalism also becameinterchangeable with the West and the ‘outsider’. The village’s ‘communityculture’ is rooted in the primordial or authentic cultural essence of all Taipeople (or Thai in Chatthip’s spelling), predating the feudal state and Indicinfluences.26 According to the ‘Declaration of the Project for the Culturaland Social History of the Thai People’, the primordial ‘institution of [Thai]community’ is trans-historical, predating and surviving all particulareconomic and social formations.27

What is such an essence? Chatthip and his school identified a few elements,although they never elaborated on them. Chatthip emphasised the mostimportant one: ‘nam jai’, a vague but inclusive notion of care for others,generosity, kindness, hospitality, and the like.28 The second one is respect forindividuality within the communal harmony. There is also flexibility inlearning and adopting knowledge and technology from the outside withoutjeopardising other elements of the Thai essence.29 He also mentions inpassing a number of other characteristics, such as the ‘primitive’characteristics of villages, respect for elders and the elders’ councils,traditional means of merriment and gatherings, and the role of women incommunity and family.30 Although these characteristics are not elaboratedand it is not clear how they belong to the Thai alone and not to other peoples,or how they belong to villages and peasants and not others, the importantpoint Chatthip keeps emphasising is that this authentic essence of Thaipeople constitutes the culture of the Thai village.31 This Thai essence needs to


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be refreshed and revitalised to make the country strong because, we are told,‘Thai village culture is the natural culture of Thai people’.32 To put it theother way round, as he also asserts several times, Thai culture is the peasantculture, it is not the one promoted by the state, which is a combination of theIndian-ised, feudalistic, high culture and modernist culture favoured by theurban bourgeoisie, who are mostly Chinese.33

Chatthip is well aware of the multi-ethnic nature of Thailand and itsadjacent regions beyond the borders. Villages, whether in Thailand or theTai-speaking region, whether in the past or the present, were rarely inhabitedby the Thai alone but usually contained a mix, including Khmer, Mon, Lao,Lua, Lue, Karen and other people. Chatthip argues, however, that ‘upperSoutheast Asia is naturally the land of Thai peoples’, that peoples in this areaincluding Yunnan and Assam share the Thai culture and language. Non-Thaiinhabitants of these lands live under two cultures, one of their own and anaccepted Thai language and culture.34 From the view that authentic Thaiculture is found among the Tai peoples untouched by development,capitalism, modernity and Western influences, Chatthip then moves on tothe true Thai communities outside the country.

Authentic Thai culture outside Thailand

Chatthip’s search for the authentic culture of the Tai/Thai people began inthe late 1980s with his studies of the ‘Tai-Ahom’ peoples of India’s Assamstate, interest in which was stimulated by his encounter with the work ofAhom scholars there.35 Around the same time another group of Thaischolars who were strongly interested in the Tai people in southern Chinaestablished connections with the Yunnan Academy. The study of the Taipeoples soon became a larger national and even international scholarly andcultural enterprise—indeed, a veritable academic industry studying the Taispeaking peoples beyond the borders of Thailand. It became multi-faceted—including studies not only of languages and customs but also handicrafts—and also began to interest various branches of the Thai state. There were agreat many projects which involved hundreds of academics and drew onmany research centres in most major public universities, includingChulalongkorn, Thammasat, Mahidol, Chiang Mai and Khonkaen. Theseefforts enjoyed substantial financial backing from key Thai funding agenciessuch as the Thailand Research Fund, the National Culture Commission, theMinistry of Education, several foundations including one associated with theQueen (who was particularly interested in varieties of Tai textiles), as well aspublic and private foreign funders such as the Japan Foundation and theToyota Foundation. Naturally these endeavours resulted in a large numberof publications. Among their authors, Chatthip was not the only one caughtup in a search for the authenticity of Tai/Thai ethnicity.Strictly ethno-linguistic studies of the Tai-speaking peoples outside

Thailand, which have been ongoing for a long time, imply no primordialcultural characteristics, race, essence or authenticity of the Tai people andmay even question such notions. By contrast, the works by Chatthip and his


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followers construct trans-historical characteristics or elements of an un-changing, primordial and authentic Thai culture (ways of living, values,traditions, belief systems). They also assume that peoples in southwesternand southern China, eastern Burma, northern Laos, northwestern Vietnam,and the Ahom in Assam are all on the peripheries of nation-states and thusless penetrated by either state or capital. The Thai culture of these peopleshas been, in his own words, ‘frozen’ in its original condition,36 and is thusmore authentic than that in the villages of Thailand. These people allow us to‘look back’ to true Thai characteristics.37

The strongest criticism by Thai scholars of this endeavour rejects outrightthe assumption that there is an authentic Thai essence to be found. Such anessence is a fantasy that cannot be substantiated by any methodology.38 Anyparticular culture is the outcome of cultural exchange and mixture over along time.39 Chatthip counters that these critics are trapped by stateboundaries, unable to see the common culture among Thai villages acrosstheir boundaries, modern and historical. They also pay too much attention tothe Mon, Khmer, and Indic influences in the elite culture of the past or to themodern Chinese elite.40 His is clearly a certain type of avowedly anti-elitistnationalism, opposed to other nationalist conceptions.Equally seriously other critics point to the similarity of Chatthip’s

advocacy of the dominant Thai of mainland Southeast Asia to the 1940sracial nationalism and its Pan-Thai project (to be discussed below). Chatthipand his disciples vehemently deny any similarity. They claim, first, that theThai culture they advocate is a peasant and anarchist one, while the 1940snationalism was that of a fascist regime. Theirs, they claim, is a people’snationalism. Second, their authentic Thai culture is pitted against the state,whereas that of the 1940s was statist as well as fascist. They are interested inreenergising resistance to the state and capitalism, not in any form of politicalarrangement. Nor are they interested in Pan-Thai-ism.41

In practically any other country this sort of essentialisation of ‘national’characteristics would be dubbed nationalist. However, and this is a remarkablefact of intellectual life in Thailand, I have not found in writing a criticism thatChatthip’s ideas are nationalist. Anan’s comprehensive evaluation and critiqueof Chatthip’s scholarship does not criticise his nationalism at all.42 ToChatthip and his followers, including the most important sources of hisresearch funding,43 the search for the essence of the Thai people is about a racebut it is not racist. Nor is it generally considered nationalist.A brief outline of the broader history of nationalism in Thailand will help

put this curiosity, as well as Chatthip’s school and ideas, in historical andintellectual context, including that of nationalism on the Left.

Nationalisms in Thailand

If Chatthip’s works are very well received among ‘progressive’ intellectualsand activists, this is not least because of his nationalist ideas and tendencies.The success of the Chatthip School is inseparable from the wider nationalistintellectual milieu in Thailand.


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As it emerged in the 19th century, nationalism in Siam was, as in mostother countries, the ideology of the formation of a modern imaginedcommunity and, as in most colonial societies, it was a response to Europeancolonialism. The ruling elites as well as their critics and opponents shared thenationalist aspiration for modernisation and development, and anxiety in theface of colonialism. The chief differences among them were about how they‘imagined’ the country, about modernity and about the correct strategyagainst colonialism and for modernisation. From the beginning then,nationalism was seen in a positive light, not as either discriminatory ordangerous.44

Although Siam was not formally colonised, it was nevertheless in a ‘semi-colonial’ condition, with the inevitable collaboration with the Siamese rulingelite. However, whereas in many colonies the arrival of nationalism and theanti-colonial struggle weakened the power of such elites, in Siam the power ofthe ruling elite was strengthened to an unprecedented level. As a semi-colonial absolute monarchy, Siam expanded and became more centralisedthan ever. State apparatuses were modernised without a serious break withmonarchical rule, royal hegemony or its culture.45 Thai nationalism, when itemerged, reflected this history: Siam was an imagined community neither of apeople—whether politically or ethnically defined—nor of a ‘race’, but of amonarchy. The first form of nationalism in early 20th century Siam was whatI call royal nationalism,46 a nationalism defined by loyalty to the monarchy.It remains a strong force today and forms the foundation of the dominantnationalist discourse. To this day, if someone expresses any dislike orcriticism of the King, he or she will be asked ‘Are you Thai?’, since being Thaiis equated with being royalist.Building upon but also contesting royalist nationalism, the second wave of

nationalism in Siam/Thailand was the work of the political forces thattoppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. In this form Thai nationalismbecame even stronger in the 1940s, when it was influenced by fascism andJapanese nationalism. Although this did not eliminate royalist nationalism,its emphasis shifted to the ‘Thai race’. Among other things, it aimed at thesolidarity of all the Tai-speaking peoples inside and outside Thailand, ie at‘Pan-Thai-ism’. Despite the short life of the regime, this racially nationalistideology and its political implications have never been confrontedadequately, let alone criticised in any significant measure in the Thai publicsphere. Its legacies remain vibrant and visible even today. LuangWichitwathakan, the ideologue of the regime during World War II, remainsa famous figure among Thais in general, and his works (songs, plays, books)are still widely and positively received.47

Anti-fascist, ‘liberal’ intellectuals have considered the racial nationalism ofthe 1940s dangerous from the beginning. They do not consider nationalismitself unacceptable, and even favour a ‘good’ nationalism: ‘bad’ nationalismor ‘chauvinism’ (khlang chat, literally mad/crazy about the nation) isunderstood as an extreme manifestation of acceptable nationalism (chatniyom, literally nation-ism). It is only the racial/racist content of khlang chatwhich makes it extreme and bad. However, the Thai general public has never


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rejected even so-called chauvinism. The distinctions between chauvinism andacceptable nationalism are never clear, whether in Thailand or elsewhere.Even today most intellectuals and the general public embrace the notion ofThai-ness as a quality that Thais must guard and promote because it is agood nationalism.The Thai left, both communist and radical, rejected racial nationalism but,

like the liberal intellectuals, not nationalism itself. Although left nationalismis distinct in emphasising the Thai people as the source and legitimacy of theirnationalism, the political and social activists of the 1980s also felt royal-nationalist influences: indeed, these resurged in the 1960s and 1970s. Theintelligentsia of the popular movement today, including Chatthip and manyadvocates of community culture, also insist on the centrality of the people.48

But they cannot escape the lure of royal-nationalism entirely, so pervasive isit. The current leadership of the popular movement against capitalismincludes quite a few royalists.A self-proclaimed radical conservatism has also been influential among

Thai intellectuals and activists since the 1980s. Based on liberal and radicalinterpretations of religious ideas, mostly Buddhist ones, in opposition to theperils of capitalism, consumerism, and the destructive impact of Westernculture,49 it fills the ideological void created by the collapse of the leftistradicals. It promotes popular movements and democracy, as it sees the stateas a destructive agent of modern capitalism. Indeed, the radical conservativesare chief among the main forces behind the notion of community culture andits potential to counter capitalism.50 They are not considered nationalistdespite the fact that their anti-capitalism has often become quite anti-Western and anti-modern.While the monarchy, the Thai race and the people are the main bases for

the various currents of Thai nationalism, the varying ‘Others’ of Thainationalism have changed over time. During the Cold War the threateningOther was the communist, often identified as China and Vietnam. Thaicommunists were those who were deceived, because a Thai was not supposedto be a communist. The communist Other was an exception, however: formost of the history of Thai nationalism, the Other was the ‘West’: Europeancolonial powers in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century, andneo-imperialism, undesirable Western culture, consumerism, neo-liberalismand global capitalism in recent times. For the Thai left, colonialism andimperialism have always defined their nationalism. After the end of the ColdWar, therefore, all Thai nationalisms—from the conservative to the left—now shared a common Other—the West, although it meant different thingsto each.But the West has always been considered desirable and threatening at the

same time.51 Siam was known for its openness to foreigners and alieninfluences and its cosmopolitanism. Since the early 19th century ideas andtechnologies from the West were welcomed, although there were alsoanxieties about losing identity and independence. The strong reactions byThai intellectuals across ideological camps against threats from the Westwere evident once again in the face of globalisation and particularly the 1997


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economic crisis. As Reynolds has reported,52 Thai intellectuals were wary ofglobalisation. They saw a great opportunity to take a place among the risingeconomic stars in Asia, but they worried about losing the distinctiveness thatmakes Thai identity.Unlike the colonial threats of 100 years ago, the danger this time is not to

political sovereignty but to ‘Thai-ness’ although an ‘us versus them’mentality, argues Reynolds, is common to both. Since the 1980s ethnicnostalgia has risen amid perceptions of diminishing Thai-ness. Efforts torescue fading local identities are also on the rise. This is the context in whichacademic enterprises in search of the authentic Thai, including ideas aboutcommunity culture, acquire their significance. Indeed, Reynolds hascommented on how Chatthip’s idea of the Thai essence is similar to that ofroyal-nationalism.53 These are the main strands of Thailand’s version ofcultural nationalism.Given the centrality of anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and kindred themes

in the discourse of contemporary Thai cultural nationalism, one should notethat it is especially popular among precisely the westernised, consumerist,materialistic and even capitalist sectors of society. Indeed, it practically seemsto be their spontaneous ideology. This is less paradoxical than it may seem.Whatever the original intellectual impulses behind Chatthip’s and hiscolleagues’ work, the various themes which they wove together in theirdiscourse about Thai-ness have resonated because they fulfil criticalideological needs of neoliberal times. Their anti-capitalism is at the sametime a longing to assert their Thai-ness, or at least their appreciation of it, atthe very moment when they seem to have lost it completely. The anti-imperialism can be convenient when one does not wish to identify causes ofproblems closer to home such as the domestic capitalist class. The anti-statism is, of course, particularly useful in neoliberal times: the poor Thaipeasant can conveniently be portrayed as too upstanding to need statehandouts (and those who do need them can conveniently be portrayed as notauthentically Thai). Finally, of course, like all discourses of the nationalcharacter, they can always be deployed against alien influences and ideas—whether about democracy and human rights, socialism or feminism.The economic crisis that hit Thailand in 1997 was widely believed to be a

conspiracy by George Soros, who represented Western powers’ attempts toderail rising Asian competitors. The term ‘Washington Consensus’ connoted,in Thailand, an actual conspiracy among Western powers.54 Nationalismresurged and in this resurgence the various strands of left nationalists mergedand mingled. In this context the new conservative cultural nationalism of theformer Leftists acquired a new prominence and significance. The series ofpublications under the rubric of the Withithat (Vision) Project by some ofthese formerly left cultural nationalists is a good illustration. Funded by theThailand Research Fund (TRF), a quasi-government agency and one of themost powerful research funding agencies in the country, it has publishedmore than 20 books in the ‘Lokaphiwat’ (Globalisation) series on anti-imperialist, anti-neoliberal, anti-American and anti-Western themes. Globa-lisation is merely an updated name for neo-colonialism. A dozen more have


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been published in the ‘Phumpanya’ (Intellect) series of schools of thoughtwhich are supposed to constitute alternatives to knowledge from the West.These includes strong advocacy of the village community culture and ofChatthip’s ideas. Thai cultural nationalists of all kinds have now found newinstitutional forms of unity!

The left populist nationalism in perspective

Chatthip’s romanticisation of the village and the Thai essence shares a greatdeal with the wider nationalist milieu of which it is a part: anti-capitalism andanti-US views with leftist radicals; anti-globalisation views with the radicalconservatives and the conservative nationalists; occasional derogatory anti-Western nationalism with all of them. There are also notable differencesamong these currents. Chatthip and his sort of cultural nationalists sharetheir distrust of the state—seeing it as an agency of capitalism and the Westthat threatens the essence of being Thai—with other radical currents, and thissets them apart from the conservatives. However, while the people are, forChatthip and most other nationalists, where the hope for the future is,Chatthip’s romanticism about ‘the people’ is different from that of the leftistradicals. Unlike the latter’s ‘people’, whose potential has yet to be realised,the utopian essence of the people in Chatthip’s view is primordial and trans-historical. Originating and posited in the past, this people can still be found inthe present, although it needs be revived and revitalised now. Such aromantic view of ‘the people’ is akin to that of the radicals and otherconservatives. Royal-nationalism also sees ‘the people’ as loyal subjects who,in their transcendental Thai-ness, are loyal to the unique nation and themonarchy. Racial nationalism believes that a trans-historical Thai-ness canbe found among the Tai/Thai race everywhere. The opening quote on thepossible political ties among the Tai/Thai Brotherhood is less surprising aswe understand the genealogy of Chatthip’s nationalism. Only Chatthip’sclaims of anti-statism or anarchism really set him apart from Thailand’sconservative nationalisms.Chatthip’s nationalism is generally seen to be a blend of various elements

of nationalisms and it is very well received in all quarters, including among‘progressive’ intelligentsia. It is not considered a nationalism of a bad kind,indeed hardly a nationalism at all. Critics have pointed to his simplisticconcepts, his flawed methodology and especially his handling of oralinformation, but the racial, nationalist and conservative character of his ideashas not been challenged. For to challenge this as a nationalism would break ataboo: nationalism is not bad and it cannot be criticised. So criticism may beaimed at everything about Chatthip’s thinking but his nationalism. In effect,the inability of Thai public and intellectual discourse to recognise the rise ofpernicious forms of cultural nationalism merely ensures that they will be evenstronger.As I explain elsewhere,55 in the history of Thai democracy the Thai

intelligentsia and popular movements against the military dictatorship haveoverlooked the dominance of the monarchists and their royal-nationalism,


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except between late 1970s and early 1980s, when the Marxist radicalmovement was strong. After the collapse of that movement and its ideologyin the early 1980s, the intelligentsia took refuge in their romanticised view of‘the people’ but retained their mixture of fear, awe and disdain for capitalismand the West. But the leftist view of the people was replaced by aromanticised one in which the people were considered an anti-capitalist forcenot because they had the potential to go beyond capitalism but because oftheir pre-capitalist character. The anti-capitalist force can be found in thepast, before the penetration by capitalism. This historical spirit is shared bythe conservatives both radical and royalist.On the other hand, although the left collapsed, it left a lasting legacy of

opposition to capitalism and imperialism which remained strong in discourseat least, even as it turned more conservative. In historical perspective distrustof Western powers has defined Thai nationalism for most of the time sincethe late 19th century. As the economy strengthened in the 1980s, particularlyas a local bourgeoisie emerged, the contest with and animosity towards theWest has acquired a new significance and articulation. In Thailandglobalisation is a suspicious new round of threats from the West that thecountry cannot wish away and must guard against.In 2005 – 06 I conducted research on how former rightwing leaders who

had taken part in the massacre of radical students in 1976 viewed the tragedythen. I had hours of conversations with about 20 of them, many of whomwere no longer politically active but all of whom insisted that they did theright thing in 1976. Their rightwing ideology, including racial and royalnationalism, remained strong. Since all memories are tainted by the present,parts of the conversations were about the present. I asked them what theyconsidered the most important danger or threat to Thailand in the present.Without exception they said capitalism and the USA. One of them said,ironically of course, that he should have listened to the left 30 years ago.The original paper from which this article is drawn was written as a

cautionary tale about the political twists and turns in the discourse of leftistswho have embraced conservative nationalism. The Chatthip case wassupposed to be an illustration of the broader shift on the left. The politicalcrisis in Thailand in 2006 proved that it was too late for warnings. Animosityto global capitalism and the distrust of the state found its enemy in theelected government, which had at its helm the richest man in the land at thetime, Thaksin Shinawatra. Apparently corruption scandals and abuses ofpower doomed the government. But the popular movement that oustedThaksin was overtly royalist, with overwhelming support from the formerleftwing and conservative intelligentsia who considered the fight againstThaksin a battle against a dictatorship that was a proxy of global capitalismand its designs on Thailand.56 Leftist rhetoric worked side by side with theroyalists in the mass media and at the demonstrations. Radical songs againstcapitalism and imperialism were sung next to the royal anthem. Theroyalist-military coup in 2006 ended the democratisation that had been goingon for 15 years and pushed the country’s democracy back at least to theperiod of an obedient government under royal-military dominance last seen


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in the 1980s. Many former leftist intellectuals endorsed the ‘Thai-styledemocracy’ that would keep an elected regime in check, and justify theconstitutional right of the monarchy and the military to guide and steer thecountry’s democracy. Those who opposed the coup and called for democracywere lambasted as the dogmatists of ‘Western democracy’.While the Chatthip case may not illustrate or explain the leftist – royalist

anti-democratic alliance in all its details, it does address the broadertendencies which explain its making in historical perspective. The elements ofconservative and racial nationalism in Chatthip’s ideas have not caused anyharm yet. Or perhaps they already have. Perhaps we can study the seismicactivities but we cannot predict an earthquake. We can only feel regret afterthe harm is done.

Notes

This article was originally written for a workshop on developmental and cultural nationalisms held at theUniversity of Victoria in 2004. At the time I was only too conscious that, in dealing with the Thaiintelligentsia, it should have had greater historical depth than it did. It took me many years to be able tocorrect the deficiency. In the meantime the Thai intelligentsia went into crisis with the anti-democracymovement in 2005 and the coup in 2006. These events also derailed my academic interests. The intellectualcrisis, however, gave me the historical perspective on the Thai intelligentsia that I needed to finish thisarticle. Throughout the long delay Radhika Desai and Michael Bodden have never lost trust in me, alwaysencouraging me to think about the article and to get through this difficult time.1 S Theerasasawat, Prawattisat lao 1779 – 1975 (History of Laos, 1779 – 1975), Bangkok: SangsanPublishing, 2000, p 12.

2 ‘Suwannabhumi’ (literally, golden land) is the ancient Indic name for mainland Southeast Asia. In Thaithe Sanskrit word is translated as ‘laem thong’ (literally, golden peninsula).

3 Lanna was an ancient kingdom covering the upper Chao Phraya valleys in northern Thailand, with itscentre today at Chiang Mai. It used to be a separate and independent kingdom between the 13th and16th centuries, was a vassal of Burmese kingdoms between the 16th and 18th centuries and a vassal ofBangkok after that until the late 19th century, when Bangkok integrated it into the modern Thai state.

4 The name of the Lao kingdom before becoming part of French Indochina in 1893.5 Theerasasawat, Prawattisat lao, p 13.6 M Ngaosyvathn & P Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast AsiaProgram Publications, 1998.

7 Chatthip’s high status in the Thai academy, and the superlatives which tend to be heaped on him, canbe seen in the two Festschrifts marking his retirement: Political Economy Center, 60 pi chatthipnatsupha (Chatthip Natsupha—60 years), Bangkok, 2001; and S Sampatchalit & S Yodkamolsat Khuekhwam phum jai (With Pride), a Festschrift for Chatthip Natsupha, Bangkok: Sangsan Publishing,2002. See also the tribute to his academic career in C Maneepruksa, ‘Chatthip natsupha chiwit laengan’ (Chatthip Natsupha: life and works) and his intellectual biography in A Ganjanaphan,‘Sangkhom thai tam khwamkit lae khwamfaifan nai ngan khong chatthip natsupha’ (Thai societyaccording to the ideas and ideals in the works by Chatthip Natsupha), both in Political EconomyCenter, 60 pi chatthip natsupha.

8 For Thai descriptions, see N Ativanichayaphong, Phatthanakan khwamkhit setthasat kanmuang thaitangtae 2475-patchuban (The development of the Thai political economy ideas from 1932 to thepresent), Bangkok: Political Economy Group, 1988. For English descriptions, see C Reynolds &L Hong, ‘Marxism in Thai historical studies’, Journal of Asian Studies, 43 (1), pp 77 – 104; and L Hong,‘Warasan Setthasat Kanmuang: critical scholarship in post-1976 Thailand’, in A Turton &M Chitakasem (eds), Thai Constructions of Knowledge, London: School of Oriental and AfricanStudies, University of London, pp 99 – 118.

9 Hong, ‘Warasan Setthasat Kanmuang’; and T Winichakul, ‘The changing landscape of the past: Thaihistories after 1973’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 25 (1), 1995, pp 99 – 120.

10 Among the leading scholars engaging in this question in the 1970s were Marxists/Maoists such as JitPhoumisak. See C Reynolds, Thai Radical Discourse: the Real Face of Thai Feudalism Today, Ithaca,NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1987, ch 2; Ativanichayaphong, Phatthanakankhwamkhit setthasat kanmuang thai tangtae 2475-patchuban, pp 20 – 35; C Natsupha,


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Watthanatham thai kap khabuankan plianplaeng sangkhom (Thai culture and the movement for socialchange), Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1991; and C Samudavanija, Sakdina kap phatthana-kan sangkhom thai (Thai feudalism and the development of Thai society), Bangkok: Nam-akson kanphim,1976, esp Introduction. Chatthip’s Political Economy Group spent their early years on this question. SeeAtivanichayaphong, Phatthanakan khwamkhit setthasat kanmuang thai tangtae 2475-patchuban.

11 C Natsupha, ‘Panha phatthanakan setthakit thai’ (Problem of Thai economic development), inNatsupha, Setthasat kap prawattisat thai (Economics and Thai history), Bangkok: Sangsan Publishing,1981, pp 312 – 323; and C Natsupha & S Prasartset, The Political Economy of Siam, 1910 – 1932,Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981. Compare this view with Seksan Prasertkul,‘The transformation of the Thai state and economic change (1845 – 1945)’, unpublished PhDdissertation, Cornell University, 1989, which clearly identifies a (predominantly Chinese) bourgeoisiewhich fosters and shapes capitalism in Siam rather than hindering it.

12 S Yala, ‘Panha kan suksa withi kanphalit khong thai an-nuang machak thritsadi kung muangkhunkung sakdina’ (Problems in the studies of modes of production in Thailand as a result of semi-colonial,semi-feudal theory), Warasan Setthsatkanmuang (Journal of Political Economy), 1 (2), 1981, pp 8 – 98.

13 N Eoseewong, Pakkai lae bairua (Pen and Sail), Bangkok: Amarain Printing, 1984; and Eoseewong,Pen and Sail: Literature and History in Early Bangkok, trans C Reynolds, L Hong, P Phongpaichit,P Jory & R McVey, ed C Baker & B Anderson, Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 2005.

14 P Thippayapraphai, Naewkit withikanphakit baep e-sia kap kan-athibai muban thai (The Asiatic modeof production concept and explanations of Thai villages), Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 1997.

15 C Natsupha, Setthakit muban thai nai adit (Thai village economy in the past), Bangkok: SangsanPublishing, 1984. This was translated into English as The Thai Village Economy in the Past by C Baker,Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 2001.

16 C Natsupha, Ban kap muang (Village and city), Bangkok: Sangsan Publishing, 1986.17 P Lertwicha, Khiriwong (the Khiriwong village), Bangkok: Muban Publications, 1989.18 See J Breman, The Shattered Image: Construction and Deconstruction of the Village in Colonial Asia,

Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies, 1987; and J Kemp, Seductive Mirage: The Search for the VillageCommunity in Southeast Asia, Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies, 1987.

19 See K Bowie, ‘Unravelling the myth of the subsistence economy: textile production in nineteenth-century northern Thailand’, Journal of Asian Studies, 51 (4), 1992, pp 797 – 823; J Rigg, ‘Redefining thevillage and rural life: lessons from South East Asia’, Geographical Journal, 160, 1994, pp 123 – 135; andKemp, Seductive Mirage.

20 A Kitahara, The Thai Rural Community Reconsidered, Bangkok: Political Economy Center,Chulalongkorn University, 1996.

21 Ganjanaphan, ‘Sangkhom thai tam khwamkit lae khwamfaifan nai ngan khong chatthip natsupha’, pp154 – 159, 183 – 188.

22 Y Mukdawichitra, Aan ‘watthanatham chumchon’ (Reading the ‘community culture’ ethnography),Bangkok: Fa Dieo Kan, 2005. This study follows the ideas and methodology of J Clifford & GMarcus,Writing Culture, Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1986.

23 Ganjanaphan, ‘Sangkhom thai tam khwamkit lae khwamfaifan nai ngan khong chatthip natsupha’,p 171.

24 Chatthip elaborates the concept by explaining the ideas of four thinkers on ‘community culture’ in‘Naewkit watthanatham chumchon’ (The ‘community culture’ concept), in C Chumwatthana &U Pattamanand (eds), Saithan haeng khwamkit (Streams of thoughts), Bangkok: the AcademicCommittee for the 60th Anniversary of Khun Warunyapha Sanidwongse Na Ayutthaya, 1989, pp 47 –72; and ‘The community culture school of thought’, in Turton & Chitakasem, Thai Constructions ofKnowledge, pp 118 – 141. Although some of these thinkers work among the urban poor, Chatthipadopts this concept, modifies and applies it to his idea of the Thai village in subsequent works.

25 Natsupha, The Thai Village Economy.26 C Natsupha, ‘Naewkhit khrongkan suksa watthanatham chonchat thai’ (Concepts for the cultural

studies of the Tai ethnic peoples project), paper prepared for the seminar, ‘The State and Directions ofthe Tai Cultural Studies’ by the Office of the National Culture Commission, Bangkok, 10 – 13September 1993; and Natsupha, Prawattisat watthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai (History of theculture of community and of Thai ethnicity), Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1997.

27 The declaration appears at the front of practically all the books by members of Chatthip’s group. Seethe preface to several books in Chatthip’s project, such as C Satyawatthana, Suepsan prawattisatsangkhom lae watthanatham pai ywe (The social and cultural history of the Pai Ywe people), Bangkok:Sangsan Publishing, 2001. The declaration is unsigned, but undoubtedly approved, and probablywritten by, Chatthip himself.

28 See Natsupha, Watthanatham thai kap khabuankan plianplaeng sangkhom, pp 195 – 198; Natsupha,Prawattisat watthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai; and K Leelalai, Prawattisat chonchat thai(History of the Thai peoples), Bangkok: Withithat Project, 2001, p 14.


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29 Natsupha, Prawattisat watthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai, pp 102 – 103.30 Satyawatthana, Suepsan prawattisat sangkhom lae watthanatham pai ywe, pp 15 – 16.31 In an interview with a Japanese scholar he suggests that they are the Oriental characteristics as well.

Natsupha, Prawattisat watthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai, p 54. In another place he writes thatthe indigenous Mon–Khmer culture that pervaded the area of Thailand long before the Thai, alsoshares values with it because it shares the same root from the same source in southern China. SeeSatyawatthana, Suepsan prawattisat sangkhom lae watthanatham pai ywe, p. [15]. I am not aware of asingle discussion or research work on these Thai primordial characteristics.

32 See the Chatthip group’s declaration referred to in footnote 27.33 Natsupha, Prawattisat watthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai, p 52; and Natsupha, Watthanatham

thai kap khabuankan plianplaeng sangkhom, p 8.34 See the declaration referred to in footnote 27.35 See Y Saikia, Fragmented Memories: Struggling to be Tai-Ahom in India, Durham, NC: Duke

University Press, 2004, pp 215 – 223.36 Natsupha, Watthanatham thai kap khabuankan plianplaeng sangkhom, pp 66, 83.37 Natsupha, Prawattisat watthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai, pp 90 – 91.38 Ganjanaphan, ‘Sangkhom thai tam khwamkit lae khwamfaifan nai ngan khong chatthip natsupha’,

pp 229 – 246; and Nidhi Eoseewong’s introduction, in Leelalai, Prawattisat chonchat thai.39 W Pongsripian, ‘Sathanaphap kansuksa prawattisat thai’ (History of the Tai peoples: a critical review),

in S Ongsakul & Y Masuhara (eds), Kansuksa prawattisat lae wannakam khong klum chatphan thai(Studies of history and literature of Tai ethnic groups), Bangkok: Amarin Printing, 2002, pp 30 – 55.

40 Natsupha,Watthanatham thai kap khabuankan plianplaeng sangkhom, p 83; and Natsupha, Prawattisatwatthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai, pp 81, 91.

41 See one of the most engaging reactions to the criticism that Chatthip is nationalist in the introductionto Natsupha, Prawattisat watthanatham chumchon lae chonchat thai. The quote at the beginning of thisarticle is undeniable evidence of his ‘pan-Thai’ nationalism. I have not seen a single discussion of it yet.

42 Ganjanaphan , ‘Sangkhom thai tam khwamkit lae khwamfaifan nai ngan khong chatthip natsupha’.43 Chatthip was among the first three scholars to be named a Distinguished Senior Researcher by the

Thailand Research Fund (TRF) in 1991, with an award of three million baht for research. Later he andhis group of 15 researchers got some tens of millions of baht of support from the TRF in the mid-1990s.

44 M Copeland, ‘Contested nationalism and the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy in Siam’,unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1994.

45 It is impossible to discuss this important subject adequately here. See K Kesbunchoo-Mead, The Riseand Decline of Thai Absolutism, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004; C Rajchagool, The Rise and Fall ofthe Thai Absolute Monarchy, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994; L Hong, ‘Extraterritoriality in Bangkok inthe reign of King Chulalongkorn, 1868 – 1910: the cacophonies of semi-colonial cosmopolitanism’,Itinerario, 27 (2), pp 125 – 146; Hong, ‘Stranger within the gates: knowing semi-colonial Siam asextraterritorials’, Modern Asian Studies, 38 (2), pp 327 – 354; T Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A Historyof the Geo-body of a Nation, Honolulul, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994; and Winichakul, ‘Thequest for ‘‘Siwilai’’: a geographical discourse of civilizational thinking in the late 19th and early 20thcentury Siam’, Journal of Asian Studies, 59 (3), 2000, pp 528 – 549.

46 WF Vella, Chaiyo!King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism, Honolulu, HI: Universityof Hawai’i Press, 1978.

47 S Barme, Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity, Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 1993.

48 This article cannot do justice to the ideas of these people. Suffice to note that, apart from Chatthip,influential thinkers among them are Nidhi Eoseewong and Kasian Tejapira.

49 See Radical Conservatism: Buddhism in the Contemporary World, Bangkok: Sathirakoset-Nakhapra-teep Foundation, 1990; and D Swearer, ‘Sulak Sivaraksa’s Buddhist vision for renewing society’,Crossroads, 6 (2), 1991, pp 17 – 57.

50 Natsupha, ‘Naewkit watthanathoam chumchon’.51 Winichakul, ‘The quest for ‘Siwilai’.52 C Reynolds, ‘Globalization and cultural nationalism in modern Thailand’, in J Khan (ed), Southeast

Asian Identities, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998, pp 115 – 145.53 Ibid, p 139.54 This belief was widespread and can easily be found in mainstream journalism. The propagator of this

view is Phuchatkan (The Manager), a daily newspaper. More sophisticated and academic literature inthis vein has also become abundant since the 1997 crisis.

55 T Winichakul, ‘Toppling democracy’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(1), 2008, pp 11 – 37.56 K Tejapira, ‘Toppling Thaksin’, New Left Review, 39 (New Series), 2006, pp 5 – 37.


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nationalism and the radical intelligentsia in thailand

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