national security reform 2010: a midterm assessment

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NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

2010:A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

Joseph R. CeramiRobert H. Dorff

Matthew H. HarberEditors

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Strategic Studies Institute Book

NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 2010:A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

Joseph R. CeramiRobert H. Dorff

Matthew H. HarberEditors

August 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the De-partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publica-tions enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose

classied information, jeopardize operations security, or mis-represent ofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empow-ers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectivesin the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This book iscleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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IN MEMORIAMHarvey Sicherman

1945-2010

Harvey Sicherman died quite suddenly on De-cember 25, 2010. Not long before, he had completedthe manuscript that now appears as Chapter 6 in thisbook. He presented the original paper at the April 22,2010, Symposium in Washington, DC. Testimonials tohis life, his accomplishments, and his legacy appearedalmost immediately following his death, and includea special issue of Orbis published by the Foreign Pol-icy Research Institute where he served as President(http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5503.html). The authors ofthis edited volume wanted to add to this publicationan acknowledgement of what Harvey had meant toso many of us. We thought it most appropriate to ask

a colleague from the Strategic Studies Institute whohad known him for more than 40 years to share histhoughts.

I rst met Harvey Sicherman in 1967 when he was agraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania.Harvey stood out then for his sartorial splendor inan era of bell bottoms and beards. But it was and re-

mained more than sartorial elegance that drew peopleto him. It soon became clear that he had a penetratingintelligence, coruscating wit, great charm, and deeppassion, a rare combination even then among studentsof international affairs. When I later encountered himas Secretary of State Haigs assistant, I was not sur-prised by his rise. Neither could I then or now thinkof anyone better qualied for the position. As leaderof the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Harvey then

gave his utmost to restoring FPRI to its previous gloryin another sign of his commitment, passion, intelli-gence, and charm. At the same time he never lost his


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profound religious commitment that prevented thesegifts from becoming style rather than substance. Har-

vey may have slaughtered several sacred cows, but henever denied the importance of the sacred in humanaffairs. He left us all far too soon. May his memory bea blessing.

Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D.Professor, Strategic Studies InstituteU.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle, Pa


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CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................viiDouglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Preface .......................................................................ix Ryan C. Crocker

1. Introduction: Strategic Assessments

and National Security Reform ...........................1 Joseph R. Cerami, Jared E. Bennett, and

Robert H. Dorff

2. Grading the Government: A Mid-TermNational Security Assessment......................13

James Jay Carafano

3. Five Heretical Suggestions: AddressingCivil-Military Tensions .....................................25

Bernard I. Finel

4. Congressional National SecurityReform During the ObamaAdministration.....................................................37

James R. Locher III

5. Congressional National Security Reform:A Mid-Obama AdministrationReview ................................................................45

Richard Weitz

6. The National Security Council System:It's Not Much, But We Like It...........................79 Harvey Sicherman


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7. Assessing the United States in Afghanistan:The Record and the Range of Choice ............111

Joseph J. Collins

8. Stabilization and Reconstruction inConict and Post-Conict Since 9/11............141

James Stephenson

9. Our Strategic Assessment SystemNeeds an Overhaul: Summary andConcluding Thoughts .....................................167

Matthew Harber

About the Contributors ................... .187

The Bush School of Governmentand Public Service .................................................193

The Strategic Studies Institute..............................195


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FOREWORD

On April 22, 2010, the Bush School of Governmentand Public Service at Texas A&M University, and theStrategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War Col-lege, conducted a colloquium in Washington, DC, on2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Lead-ership and National Security Reform in the ObamaAdministration. This conference marked the fth

collaboration between the Bush School and SSI. Therst, The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations,was held in 2006. In 2007, a workshop was held in Col-lege Station, Texas, on The Interagency and Counter-insurgency Warfare. The third conference, Reformand the Next Presidents Agenda, was held in March2008, also in College Station, Texas. That conference

was also co-sponsored by the nonpartisan Project onNational Security Reform (PNSR), which includes re-tired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft as a memberof its Guiding Coalition. The PNSR guiding coalitionalso originally included several key members of theObama administration. The fourth conference, Lead-ership and Government Reform, took place in June2009. Two major topics were discussed: leader devel-

opment in professional schools and leadership andwhole of government reforms.

The theme of the 2010 colloquium continued thediscussion of whole of government reforms, butadded three new areas of emphasis. The rst identi-ed the critical need for congressional leadership incarrying out transformational national security re-

forms. The second addressed improving methods ofstrategic planning and assessment to meet the currentU.S. scal constraints. The third discussed the transi-


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tion from military to civilian leadership in Afghani-stan and Iraq.

The Strategic Studies Institute joins the co-editorsof this volume in thanking the Bush School staff mem-bers for their extraordinary efforts in coordinating theconference and in the preparation of this book. Weespecially thank the Bush School events coordinator,Beth Stanley. Bush School graduate assistant EthanBennett contributed to making the colloquium a suc-cess and in laying the groundwork for this volume.The Bush School and SSI also thank Robert Fiedler ofthe Reserve Ofcers Association for his outstandingsupport in hosting the colloquium in the ROA Min-uteman Memorial Building in Washington, DC.

The Bush School of Government and Public Serviceat Texas A&M University is dedicated to academicintegrity, leadership development, professional expe-

rience, and unique relationships between professorsand students academically and in research. The BushSchool program also offers students opportunitiesthrough national and international internships andemphasizes the development of written and oral com-munication skills. The Bush School, along with SSI,are proud to put forward this book, as both institutesbelieve the individual research, analysis, and opinionsexpressed within are valuable and important to theongoing debates over national security reform.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

viii


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PREFACE

Assessing U.S. leadership in ongoing national se-curity reform was the focus of a research colloquiumhosted by the Bush School of Government and Pub-lic Service, Texas A&M University; and the StrategicStudies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, onApril 22, 2010, in Washington DC. The colloquiumwas entitled 2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assess-

ment of Leadership and National Security Reform inthe Obama Administration. The colloquiums threepanels addressed: (1) Assessing National SecurityReform; (2) Legislative Imperatives; and (3) The WayForward.

This colloquium and report continue our ongoingpartnership with the Strategic Studies Institute and

other foreign and defense policy educational and re-search institutes. There is an important need to thinkmore deeply about leadership and government reformin their broadest sense. This volume includes papersthat reassess our theories, concepts, and practices forunderstanding Americas leadership role in nationalsecurity and international affairs. The following chap-ters offer a variety of ideas, approaches, and sugges-

tions. While these represent a wide and contrastingrange of views, there is a consensus that reforms areneeded across and within the many government agen-cies engaged in diplomacy, defense, and developmentpolicy.

Present as panelists and participants were morethan two dozen analysts, scholars, and former of-

cials from the executive and legislative branches ofgovernment. The majority of the concerns, questions,and ideas discussed during the symposium are articu-


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lated and expanded upon in the following chapters.The colloquium co-sponsors included the Reserve Of-

cers Association (ROA), the Foreign Policy ResearchInstitute (FPRI), the Hudson Institute, the Councilon Foreign Relations (CFR), the American SecurityProject (ASP), Creative Associates International, Inc.(CAII), and the Project on National Security Reform(PNSR). The colloquium participants, including ex-perts from both the policy community and academia,all contributed their ideas to address the pressing is-sues captured in the body of this book. We thank theseprestigious research institutions for their participationin this project.

We especially thank the Director of the StrategicStudies Institute, Professor Douglas Lovelace, for co-sponsoring the colloquium, and also SSIs Dr. RobertH. (Robin) Dorff for his efforts in conference planning

and execution, as well as for chairing a panel and co-editing this volume. We greatly appreciate the edito-rial skills of Dr. James Pierce and Ms. Rita Rummelof the Strategic Studies Institute, for their professionaland seless efforts in publishing this monograph.Robert Fiedler of the ROA provided essential supportin hosting the colloquium at the ROA Minuteman Me-morial Building in Washington, DC.

In addition, our Bush School staff performed nu-merous tasks in planning and executing the confer-ence. Special thanks to our events coordinator, BethStanley, for her professionalism in arranging all oursupport efforts. Our Bush School Graduate Assistantsfor Research, Ethan Bennett and Matthew Harber,provided administrative and research assistance as

well as their ideas and writing talents in planning forthe conference as well as in preparing the papers pre-sented in this volume.


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Our mid-term assessment is designed to contrib-ute in a positive manner to the ongoing initiatives for

institutional and organizational national security re-forms. At the same time, we fully realize that muchwork remains to be done to improve U.S. and coali-tion efforts to sustain the essential leadership role ofthe United States in national security and internation-al affairs. The Bush School is proud to join with SSIto publish this book as a tribute to the ideals of twoinstitutions that strongly believe that the individualresearch and ideas expressed in the pursuit of publicservice and the national interest are always valuableand important.

RYAN C. CROCKERDean and Executive ProfessorHolder of the Edward & Howard

Kruse Endowed ChairGeorge Bush School of Government& Public ServiceTexas A&M University


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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS

AND NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

Joseph R. CeramiJared E. BennettRobert H. Dorff

One of the fundamental skills of critical thinking isthe ability to assess ones own reasoning. To be goodat assessment requires that we consistently take apartour thinking and examine the parts (or elements) forquality.1

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2010, the Reserve Ofcers Association(ROA), the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI),the Hudson Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations(CFR), the American Security Project (ASP), CreativeAssociates International, Inc. (CAII), and the Projecton National Security Reform (PNSR) participated withthe Bush School of Government and Public Service,

and the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, in co-sponsoring a colloquium in Washing-ton, DC, on a mid-term assessment of leadership andnational security reform in the Obama administration.Three panels discussed Assessing National SecurityReform, Legislative Imperatives, and AssessingNational Security ReformThe Way Forward. Thecolloquium theme focused on the need for advanc-

ing the research and study of key national securityissues, engaging the invited participants in sharingtheir expertise, and informing interested community


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members of ways to develop a deeper awareness andunderstanding of security reform issues facing the

U.S. Government by examining the topics of leader-ship and national security reform.

PANEL 1: ASSESSING NATIONAL SECURITYREFORM

The rst panel claried conceptual questions byoutlining the current themes inherent in the nationalsecurity reform debate. In introducing the panel, Jo-seph Cerami of the Bush School commented that thepanels rst objective was to outline and assess chang-ing national security efforts as they have evolved andadapted during the rst 2 years of the Obama adminis-tration. The second panels objective was to detail spe-cic political and organizational challenges in which

progress was made during the rst 2 years, as wellas those obstacles that continue to impede signicantand efcient reforms.

The panelists introduced the current terminologyand trends, and set the conditions for the colloquiumdiscussions. Integral to this panel was an analysisof how security paradigms and the continuing needfor reform might affect the organization, operations,policies, and strategies of the U.S. military in the shortterm.

Joseph Collins of the National Defense Universityspoke on Afghanistan. In his examination, Collinsmade ve major points: Two presidents have declaredthat the War in Afghanistan is of vital importanceto the nation; the costs of the war have been high in

blood and treasure; the Taliban is weakening, thanksto President Barack Obamas surge; the Karzai gov-ernment is weak, corrupt, and ineffective; and the


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Afghan people are tired of war, coalition forces, andtheir own government. Collins further questioned the

future of the wars success, given the current stress onthe Department of Defense (DoD) budget (currentlyprojected to be more than $700 billion/year).

Scott Feil of the Institute for Defense Analyses ad-dressed how assessments are generated within theDoD. Feil examined two categories of assessments,Strategic Assessments and Operational Resource As-sessments, subsequently detailing how such assess-ments contribute to national security solutions. Usingas examples the DoD response to the improvised ex-plosive device (IED) and the resurgence of the Armypost-Vietnam, Feil concluded that the obstacle en-countered in problem solving in government is thatit does not focus on the problem as a whole.Rather,each segment of government proposes solution sets

that optimize its own capabilities and interests. Heconcluded that the government should confront na-tional security as a whole with a focus on optimizingthe overall function, which necessarily suboptimizesthe individual subordinate processes and organiza-tions.

Thomas Mahnken of Johns Hopkins Universityand the Naval War College examined U.S. Defensepolicy and its implications for national security re-form. Focusing on the proper division of labor in thegovernment, Mahnken suggested that entities withingovernment abide by their clearly dened roles, rec-ommending that the DoD be used to ght and winwars, and the State Department (DoS) and the U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID) be

empowered to support a whole of government ap-proach to national security issues.


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Harvey Sicherman of FPRI reviewed the best andworst cases of past Presidents actions in making na-

tional security policy, distinguishing between theHarry Truman (White House-State Department part-nership) and Richard Nixon (White House dominant)models. He praised the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft (Pres-idential-led, integrated, interagency process) variant.Sicherman concluded that the current administrationhas tried a version of the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft mod-el, but too much is being done in the White House.Instead, Sicherman recommended giving greater re-sponsibility to the State Department, allowing the Na-tional Security Council (NSC) to focus on its primarymission of coordinating policy for the President whileconsidering policy alternatives.

PANEL 2: THE LEGISLATIVE IMPERATIVE

The second panel, discussing the Legislative Im-perative, examined the congressional role in the na-tional security process from 2008 to 2010. Panel Chair James Locher III of the Project on National SecurityReform opened the panel by stating that 95 percentof the American people say that national security re-form will never be done. Locher went on to refute thispoint, claiming that the objects impeding reform were:a lack of routine oversight, a lack of condence, a slowconrmation process for presidential appointees, afailure to pass legislation that has become endemic,and frequent confrontation between the branches ofthe government. Locher exclaimed that many believeCongress lacks the political will to take on national

security reform, but was quick to point out that, quiteto the contrary, Goldwater-Nichols achieved just thisfeat. To elucidate the issues complexity, Locher identi-


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ed clear differences between the past and today, withtodays challenges being: a security environment that

is much more complex, the unprecedented size of thedefense budget, and concerns over domestic security.According to Locher, the major challenges confrontingnational security reform are those of politics, scope,ownership, and bandwidth. Politically, individualsfavor the status quo. With regard to scope, Locher em-phasized that the size of national security reform isdaunting and inhibits congressional commitment. Inreference to ownership, Locher stated that the simplefact is that there is no mandate for national securityreform. Finally, he stated that bandwidth, or time, is amajor challenge, as it took Goldwater-Nichols over 4years to complete. The focus needed for national secu-rity reform would certainly require politicians to sur-render other legislative initiatives.

The post-September 11, 2001, system and cam-paigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed addi-tional pressure on the U.S. Governments civilian andmilitary departments and their levels of interagencycooperation. At the heart of this discussion was anassessment of the contributions of the Project on Na-tional Security Reform, an initiative on Capitol Hill tobuild political support for congressional reform of in-teragency dynamics much in the same way the Gold-water/Nichols Act transformed the armed services.

Nina Serano of the Congressional Research Ser-vice focused on the possibility of legislative action onreform, including reorganizing Congress for properoversight. Recognizing prospects for comprehensivereform is a daunting task; however, Serano stated

that some members are discussing selected reforms.One example is a national security professional de-velopment program to foster interagency cooperation


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through a civilian interagency education and trainingprogram, including rotations between agencies. She

noted expert opinion that recommends that Congressreorganize itself cyclically, with small changes madein response to events, and large, substantive changesfollowing periods of rising frustration or party turn-over. She reected that the Obama administrationmight trigger changes in Congress by submitting aunied security budget combining all security assis-tance accounts.

Larry Sampler of CAII spoke on the topic of legisla-tive imperatives for national security reform. Samplersaid that one of the major impediments to national se-curity reform is the prerogative of an ofcial to seekreelection, thus making things inefcient. The U.S.Governments system of checks and balances createsan environment of stasis, leading to operational pa-

ralysis in the government. Sampler also addressed theissue of the terminology being used between militaryand civilian entities, and the need to understand thisterminology to produce effectiveness. Sampler citedthe need for good leadership behind national securityreform. Finally, Sampler expressed his belief that the3-Ds (defense, diplomacy, and development) model isnot a model based in reality, and should be done awaywith.

Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute and PNSRdiscussed the importance of resource allocation andnational security reform. He recommended that theNSC play a greater role in designing an integratednational security process, including new approachesfor matching resources to strategies. Weitz also sug-

gested the need for a national operational framework,whereby national security reform would be viewed asmore of a national responsibility.


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James Lindsay of CFR examined the practicalityof national security reform. Specically, Lindsay tried

to answer the questions of why Americans wish toproduce reform, and why the government has failedto achieve it. Lindsay suggested that reform is under-taken to elicit greater policy effectiveness. The U.S.Government has failed to achieve reform because ofbad policy choices and a streamlined executive. Lind-say also focused on the role of development and itsorganization within the government, emphasizing thepolitical battles that impede reform. He concludedthat reform would be achieved only if the governmentfocused on pivotal reform measures, admitting thatthe overall political climate would be the eventualcatalyst for change.

PANEL 3: ASSESSING NATIONAL SECURITY

REFORMTHE WAY FORWARD

This panel focused on examining steps to imple-ment signicant national security reform over the next2 years (2010-12). Panel Chair Robert Robin Dorff ofthe Strategic Studies Institute asked the panelists toassess the Obama administrations rst years with aneye toward offering ideas for continuing or accelerat-ing the pace of national security reform. The research-ers were also asked to assess the successes and weak-nesses of the rst years and address the institutionaland organizational challenges that continue to face theadministration. Finally, the panelists were asked tosuggest promising areas for national security reforminitiatives in the near term.

Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New AmericanSecurity stated that one issue confronting the Obamaadministration is that it has recognized its limits of


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engagement, especially given the complexity of is-sues like Iran and North Korea. Cronin criticized the

nearsightedness of America by calling for a nationalsecurity strategy that focused on the future, thinkingabout the America of 2030, and not just 2010. Croninrecommended that the United States should focus oncivilian capacities and a stronger State Department bydeveloping a better system of educating diplomats,and by recruiting the best and brightest. Cronin alsorecommended that the United States should becomeserious about investing in development, focusing onthose countries in the bottom realm of the develop-ment process, the poorest performers.

Bernard Finel of ASP suggested strengthening therole of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andremoving any politics associated with the position. Hesuggested that this could be achieved by assigning a

timeline to the position, such as 5 years without thepossibility of removal. In that same vein, he recom-mended taking the media out of the military, allowingthe DoD voice to be expressed through a single ofce,the Secretary of Defense. Fiscal responsibility was an-other topic of interest, as Finel stated that declaringwars (those planned for 10, 15, or more years) shouldbe something that is placed on a normal budgetingprocess. Finel also discussed the legality of behaviorin combat by suggesting that there should be an in-crease in personal liability for criminal conduct.

James Stephenson of CAII examined the areas ofcounterinsurgency, reconstruction, and stabilization.A focus of the talk was the shrinking role of USAID.Stephenson said it was a great concern that USAID

was being taken over by the DoS, further hinderingUSAIDs ability to control its own policy, planning,and budget. The majority of Stephensons time was


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spent discussing the role of stabilization and recon-struction. Stephenson said that the individuals who

work effectively in stabilization know their territoryand can enable the local populace. Stephenson ques-tioned the scal sustainability of the current DoS-ledcivilian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, whichuse large numbers of U.S. temporary hires who areexpensive and lack the training, the experience, or themobility to be effective.

Beth Tritter of The Glover Park Group explored thedebate over development, questioning where it ts inthe approach to national security. Tritter agreed thatthe 3-Ds approach is an incorrect model and furtheraddressed the question of whether or not develop-ment was truly essential to U.S. foreign policy. Trittersuggested that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wasmaking development an issue because it takes work

off of the hands of the DoD. Tritter also commented ondecits and current spending levels, saying that thiswill be the catalyst for reform.

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: JAMES CARAFANO,HERITAGE FOUNDATION

The Keynote Speaker, James Carafano, tackled na-tional security reform with regard to defense spend-ing and congressional oversight effectiveness. First,Carafano addressed the overarching sentiment of pes-simism in America today, the belief in the idea that wecannot afford defense measures. Carafano defendedthe position that defense is the fundamental respon-sibility of the government. He further stated that the

proposition for cutting defense spending often be-comes an excuse for inaction. Carafano also spoke onthe topic of Congress, suggesting that it is incapable


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of doing functional assessments of national security.He said this is because of the fact that the majority of

power is being held by the Senate and House leader-ship, not in the committees. This produces committeehearings that are almost irrelevant, allowing little timeto be given to pertinent, substantial issues. He also di-rectly addressed whole-of-government reform, cou-pling it with the recommendation that there is a needto dene this concept more clearly. Carafano conclud-ed by stating that the government should build an ef-fective construct for the whole of government, and thenations leadership needs to build a conceptual doc-trine in strategic, operational, and tactical terms. Ac-cording to Carafano, this will allow the government tofocus more directly on national security issues that arenonlinear and highly complex.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

While there was no consensus among the panelists,three major themes did emerge from the presentationsand discussions. First, the initiatives for the extensivenational security reform that are required to meet cur-rent threats will have to come from outside of the ex-ecutive branch bureaucracy. This is true, even thoughformer senior members of the Project on National Se-curity Reform hold key executive branch positions.

A second major point was that the 3-Ds model hasbeen a harmful way to portray the capacities, require-ments, and relationships for policy and operationaleffectiveness, especially in ongoing counterinsurgen-cy operations in Afghanistan. In the view of several

stability and reconstruction expert eld hands withextensive on-the-ground experience, the current 3-Ds


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model is incorrect, since these functions are not prop-erly represented by circles, are not the same size in

terms of capacity and resources and, in many signi-cant ways, do not overlap in several respects in thekey areas necessary for effective integration, align-ment, and coordination.

Third, the Obama administration still has muchwork to do in organizing development efforts to focuson the need for stronger political, economic, and socialdevelopment structures, resources, and leadership.Given the ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan,there is an urgent need for better denition of the rolesand responsibilities of the DoS, the DoD, and USAID.

The following papers and authors insights in as-sessing early strategy and reform efforts reect on theneed for improving strategies, as well as the need formore effective assessments. Regarding the need for

improving congressional oversight, James Carafanoargues for improving our assessment of the whole-of-government construct and the interagency process, aswell as for designing scally responsible methods forlinking policy, operations, and practice. Bernard Finelcritically assesses the current state of U.S. civil-militaryrelations and the deciencies in strategic, cost-benetanalyses. James Locher, the guiding force in the na-tional security reform movement, assesses congres-sional roles and responsibilities. In assessing nationalsecurity reform efforts, Richard Weitz sees a need formore comprehensive national security reviews thataddress capabilities, needs, and resources, as well asfor improving our strategic knowledge management.FPRIs Harvey Sicherman provides historical and cur-

rent insights on the presidency and Cabinet versusNSC tensions and the need for attention in terms ofboth policymaking structures and functions.


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Reforming U.S. national security policymaking,especially policy implementation, remains a work in

progress among and within government, nongovern-ment, and private organizations. The purpose of thisbook is to reect on the idea that the national securitycommunity should place renewed attention on, andmore-critical thinking about, improving strategic as-sessment processes as well.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Richard Paul and Linda Elder, Critical Thinking: Learn theTools the Best Thinkers Use, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Pren-tice Hall, 2006, p. 43.


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CHAPTER 2

GRADING THE GOVERNMENT:A MID-TERM NATIONAL SECURITY

ASSESSMENT

James Jay Carafano

INTRODUCTION

The way America manages and maintains the keyinstruments of national security has slipped into neu-tral. Frankly, there are few signs that the trend is likelyto change any time soon. Two of the biggest obstaclesto making progress are: (1) an increasingly Washing-ton-wide belief that that the United States cannot af-ford to defend itself; and (2) an equally dour belief

that mastering interagency and whole-of-governmentoperations are just too difcult, or that mastering themrequires the impossible task of completely recong-uring how Washington works. Both these beliefs arewrong-headed, and if they dont change, America willslip from neutral into reverse.

The issue of defense spending is both highly con-troversial and political. There is an overreaching pes-simism that the United States cannot afford defensemeasures. One of the best examples of this is the debateon the ballistic missile defense program. Spending onthis important project does not even account for 1 per-cent of the defense budget in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011,and is $1 billion less than the Bush administrationsbudget request for missile defense in FY 2009.1 Such

cuts are trumpeted as cost-saving measures and proofthat Washington is capable of making hard choices; infact, the exact opposite is true. The mantra of cutting


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defense as a strategic priority in order to address thenations scal ills has become a convenient excuse to

justify politically expedient decisions.Whole-of-government reform has become an

equally convoluted Gordian knot.2 Everyone ac-knowledges that the most pressing national securitychallenges require the effective integration of multiplefederal agencies. Likewise, there is a consensus thatthe U.S. Government often fails to muster effectivejoint action in times of crisis or great need. Most, how-ever, also believe that xing this shortfall is just toohard or requires restructuring the federal bureaucracyfrom top to bottom. Painting the problem as a dif-culty akin to the labors of Hercules encourages mostin Washington to adopt the politically convenient an-swer: do nothing.

WASHINGTONS PHONY WARTHE GUNSAND BUTTER BATTLE

The U.S. defense budget has suffered from a dan-gerous, post-Cold War trend: It has been slowly erod-ing, interspersed with event-driven massive increasesto pay for current operations. This yin and yang ofspending has undermined the development of astable, coherent defense program.3 Today, nationaldefense ranks a distant fourth in the overall budget,trailing nancial support for the elderly (through So-cial Security and Medicare), education funding, andmeans-tested welfare payments. In terms of nationalspending, defense is actually at near historic lows. Alldefense spending (military operations in Afghanistan

and Iraq included) is equal to about half of what theUnited States spent on average each year (as a per-centage of gross domestic product [GDP]) throughoutthe Cold War.4


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Defense spending is less than one-fth of the fed-eral budget. Nevertheless, it was the target of roughly

half of the administrations $17 billion in spend-ing cuts in 2010.5 As many as 50 programs were cutor eliminated in the past year alone,6 nor is there anend to the cutting of the defense budget in sight. TheObama administration has proposed cutting the C-17Transport Plane ($2.5 billion); EP-X Manned AirborneIntelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target-ing Aircraft ($12 million), or the Navys CGX CruiserProgram, known also as Next Generation Cruiser Pro-gram ($46 million).7

Entitlement spending and the sum of all other dis-cretionary spending account for most of the federalbudget. Federal, state, and local governments con-sume over 40 percent of U.S. GDP.8 Given that propor-tion, even large cuts in the defense budget would not

reign in federal spending or reduce the federal de-cit. In the not-so-distant past, Congress has eagerlyshowered checks for hundreds of billions of dollars ondicey nancial gambits like the Troubled Asset ReliefProgram (TARP) or the demonstrably nonstimulatingstimulus package.9 Legislation such as health careand cap and trade (the latter has to be passed in theSenate yet) will add multi-trillion-dollar expenses,even further straining the budget.

Taking all of the above into account, militaryspending (including the costs of all the battles in theglobal war on terrorism) looks pretty modest. Certain-ly, defense, despite the heated rhetoric from Washing-ton, is not the source of the nations scal ills. The wayAmerica is going, the federal debt will be $4.8 trillion

in just 5 years. By then, the interest payment on thedebt alone will exceed the entire defense budget.


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Lack of funding will inevitably lead to a lack incapabilities. The military has missions that cannot be

compromised without putting the United States atrisk. It has to protect the homeland and respond todomestic disasters, ensure freedom of the commons(air, space, sea, and cyberspace) for commerce; helpbuild the capacity of other allies to defend themselvesand partner with the United States to defend com-mon interests; and have the capability to breach thesanctuary of the nation's enemiesconventional andnonconventional, state or nonstateso that they haveno home base from which they can attack the UnitedStates with impunity. All these missions are performedtoday, but the military strains to do so with the forcesavailable. The notion that long-term national defensecan be provided for with signicantly fewer forcesand capabilities dees common sense.

The government has put off modernizing manymajor systems (such as ground vehicles) for decades.Procurement holidays are unprecedented since theGreat Depression, and unparalleled for a nation atwar. To make matters worse, the United States neverrecapitalized its forces after the Cold War. Thus, callsfor another peace-dividend now are the equivalent oftaking a peace-dividend on the back of what in manyways is still a peacetime force.

It is necessary to maintain current levels of defensespending and implement comprehensive reforms toprevent a debilitating investment crisis in defense. Forexample, the average age of the Air Force inventory is23 years, and there are no plans to replace it.10 Accord-ing to Air Force estimates, 800 aircraft will be lacking

by 2024, and Navy ofcials projected a shortfall of upto 200 aircraft by 2018.11


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The broad range of missions performed today re-quires steady, robust funding for several years. In ad-

dition, the services will need billions of dollars for atleast 3 years after operations in Iraq conclude to repairand replace equipment damaged during combat op-erations.12 For years the Department of Defense (DoD)has not addressed the issue of shortfalls (differencesbetween service requirements and money allocated tofulll these requirements in the budget) because of thedynamic of wars and budget supplementals.13

Predictable levels of defense spending would al-low the military to reset, rebuild, and modernize arse-nals and train forces for all types of warfare. However,forcing the military to make unnecessary trade-offs,accepting too much risk, assuming that the potentialthreats will never materialize, or not reducing globalmilitary commitments in line with changes in defense

strategy could ultimately produce a hollow force thatis unready, unable, or too small to help keep the na-tion safe, free, and prosperous.

Soft power, the use of diplomacy, and other toolsof national security are not necessarily fungible. Softpower is not a substitute for hard power. Indeed, softpower is at its most effective when it is used in con-cert with hard power. Gutting defense will not onlydo little to revitalize the U.S. economy; it will unbal-ance and undermine all the nations instruments ofnational power.

WASHINGTONS FAINT OF HEART ONWHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT

In addition to losing its will to fund national de-fense, Washington has become positively inert onaddressing the challenges of harnessing all the instru-


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ments of national power on tough issues. Here, muchof the fault lies with Congress, as well as with the ad-

ministration that has not pressed Congress to do theright thing.

The poster child for the lack of integrated effort isthe challenge of homeland security. There is no ques-tion that Congress has a major role to play in establish-ing an effective homeland security regime. While theHomeland Security Act of 2002 created a lead federalagency for many domestic security activities, this wasonly the rst step. Building an effective Departmentof Homeland Security (DHS) requires sound strate-gies, solid programs, personnel reforms, and integrat-ing information technologies; effective congressionaloversight is a key part of making these initiatives hap-pen.14 Congress, however, has failed to provide com-petent leadership.

The nal report of the September 11, 2001 (9/11)Commission reafrmed the importance of xing con-gressional oversight. The commission held that:

Congress should create a single, principal point ofoversight and review for homeland security. Congres-sional leaders are best able to judge what committeeshould have jurisdiction over this department [the

DHS] and its duties. But we believe Congress has theobligation to choose one in the House and one in theSenate, and that this committee should be a perma-nent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.15

One expert witness appearing before the commis-sion testied that the lack of effective congressionaloversight is perhaps the single greatest obstacle im-

peding the successful development of the DHS.16

Today, there are at least 100 committees, subcom-mittees, and other entities claiming jurisdiction over


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the DHS. Congressional oversight is both proper andnecessary, but the high number of hearings decreases

their relevance and provides little time for pertinentsubstantial issuesin addition to creating burden-some duplications, consuming resources, and devour-ing the time of the DHS staff.

Fixing this conundrum of oversight would requirecollapsing jurisdiction into single committees withresponsibility for homeland security oversight in theHouse and Senatesuch a reform ought to be a prior-ity. Yet neither the leadership in the Congress nor theWhite House has shown any serious interest in takingsuch a step.

BIGGER-THAN-A-BREADBOX PROBLEMS

Beyond homeland security, many federal missions

require better integration, the foundation of which iswhole-of-government reform. The manner of U.S. in-teragency operations has changed little since the endof the Cold War. Innovations are needed to create aregional framework for interagency planning and ac-tion. To understand the performance of the interagen-cy process, it is useful to divide it into three levels:policy, operations, and practice. At the policy level,agencies in Washington reach broad agreement onwhat each will do to coordinate and support an over-all U.S. policy. At the lowest level is the practice ofcooperation among individuals on the ground.17

It is at the operational level where the U.S. Gov-ernment undertakes major operations and campaignsand where agencies in Washington have to develop

operational plans such as coordinating recovery op-erations after a major hurricane. This is where inter-agency cooperation is the weakest, a legacy of the


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Cold War. There was never a requirement for federalagencies to do that kind of integrated planning to

contain the Soviet Union. Agencies generally agreedon the broad role each would play. There were fewrequirements under which they had to plan to worktogether in the eld to accomplish a goal under uni-ed direction. Washington has never had an enduringformal system to do that.

The United States needs to improve its ability tocoordinate major interagency challenges outside ofWashington, away from the ofces of Cabinet secretar-ies and staffs, whether it is coordinating disaster reliefover a three-state area after a hurricane, or conduct-ing the occupation of a foreign country. In short, thechallenge here lies not in the formulation of nationalpolicy, but in planning and executing operations in away that lets the people on the ground work well to-

gether and get the job done. Especially at the federallevel, centralization and dissolution of responsibilitiesof federal agencies complicates the process of govern-ing, obfuscates effective congressional oversight, blurslines of authority and responsibility, and increasinglybogs the White House down in the day-to-day affairsof managing homeland security.18

There are many reasons interagency cooperation isweakest at the operational level. Flaws come from: thetraditional divide between civil and military spheres;distinct institutional cultures and operational orga-nization; lack of common knowledge, practices, andexperiences that would facilitate trust and condenceamong participants at the interagency process; andlack of capabilities to conduct operational activities.

In addition, federal inspector general corps responsi-ble for oversight, efciency, and credibility align withindividual agencies instead of providing commonground for interagency operations. Ultimately, the


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question is: What can be done to make the interagencyprocess more responsive in the operational environ-

ment?One major shortfall in the interagency process is

the lack of adequate capacity to conduct operationsoutside of Washington. Where the lead agency has thepreponderance of responsibility and resources, otherdepartments usually act like bystanders, primarilyinterested in doing as little as possible. There is littlecooperation or planning with outside organizations ordepartments.

Congress is ill-suited to promote cooperation be-tween federal agencies. It appropriates funds for oper-ations of individual departments and the jurisdictionof committees that oversee the government dovetailwith the departments they oversee. Also, many poli-ticians are rightly uncomfortable with the notion of

big government. They are concerned that creating amore effective interagency process would empowergovernment to the point that it might lead to abuse,encouraging Washington to take on missions that arenot appropriate.

While Congress has done much to promote inter-agency inertia, the administration has done little tobreak the log jam. Nothing will change unless Wash-ington starts doing something different.

How can we break out of this morass and startmaking real progress toward preparing effectively forthe worst? The Constitution suggests an answer. Theframers were most interested in articulating the roles,responsibilities, and checks and balances between thebranches of government. They left it to responsible

men and women within each branch to largely deter-mine how to run their part of the government. Thus,the answer is: We need each part of government to doits job, and we need responsible people.


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Real reform has to start with Congress. It must seta legislative framework that ensures the Executive

branch can stock federal agencies with responsiblepeople who are skilled in interagency operations.Each chamber should establish a new committee withvery narrow jurisdiction to address only those mat-ters that are essential to building a federal work forceskilled at whole-of-government operations. The com-mittees should have oversight for the policies estab-lishing the education, assignment, and accreditationof interagency leaders in the federal enterprise. Suchcommittees could provide the needed, but currentlystill lacking, leadership.

GETTING BACK ON TRACK

Unless Washington takes two critical stepsad-

equately funding national defense and xing congres-sional oversight of interagency operationsthe in-struments of national security are likely to get rustierin the years ahead.


1. Baker Spring, The Obama Administrations Ballistic Mis-

sile Defense Program: Treading Water in Shark-Infested Seas,Heritage Foundation BackgrounderNo. 2396, April 8, 2010, avail-able from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/The-Obama-Administrations-Ballistic-Missile-Defense-Program-Treading-Water-in-Shark-Infested-Seas.

2. Whole-of-government reform is an approach encompass-ing interagency operations; coordinating the joint effort of mul-tiple government agencies, often with support from the ministries

from different nations and nongovernmental and internationalorganizations; as well as private sector service providers (entitiesthat often have different operational styles and practices, con-


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trasting organizational cultures, disparate resources, and conict-ing goals and missions).

3. Kevin N. Lewis, The Discipline Gap and Other Reasonsfor Humility and Realism in Defense Planning, in Paul K. Davis,ed., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much IsEnough, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994, p. 104.

4. Jim Talent, A Constitutional Basis for Defense, HeritageFoundation America at Risk Memo No. AR 10-006, June 1, 2010,available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/A-Consti-tutional-Basis-for-Defense.

5. Baker Spring, The 2011 Defense Budget: Inadequate andFull of Inconsistencies, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.2375, February 22, 2010, available from thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2375.pdf.

6. John T. Bennett, DoD Examining F/A-18 Multiyear Plans;Gates Endorses KC-X Requirements, Defense News, March 24,2010, available from www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4553123 .

7. Ed OKeefe, 2011 Budget: Spending Cuts and Reductions,The Washington Post, February 1, 2010, available from voices.wash-ingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2010/02/2011_budget_spending_cuts_and.html.

8. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-ment, Economic Outlook 86 Database, available from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/2483816.xls .

9. James Carafano, War Spending Is Not Frivolous Spend-ing, Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 1, 2009, avail-able from www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/12/War-Spending-is-Not-Frivolous-Spending .

10. Talent.

11. Ronald ORourke, Navy-Marine Corps Strike-FighterShortfall: Background and Options for Congress, Report for Con-gress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 12,2008, p. 4, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22875.pdf.


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12. Mackenzie Eaglen, U.S. Defense Spending: The Mis-match Between Plans and Resources, Heritage Foundation Back-grounderNo. 2418, p. 3, available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/us-defense-spending-the-mismatch-between-plans-and-resources#_ftnl .

13. David Berteau, Fixing the Shortfalls: Defense BudgetTrends and Long Term Impact, Defense Industrial InitiativesGroup Current Issues, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, No. 19, December 14, 2009, p. 1, avail-able from csis.org/les/publication/DIIG%20Current%20Issue%20Number%2019%20Fixing%20the%20Shortfalls%20Defense%20Bud-get%20Trends%20and%20Long%20Term%20Impact%20_0.pdf.

14. James Carafano, Homeland Security Needs ResponsibleCongressional Oversight, Heritage Foundation WebMemo No.528, July 7, 2004, available from www.heritage.org/Research/Re-ports/2004/07/Homeland-Security-Needs-Responsible-Congressional-Oversight.

15. The 9/11 Commission Report: National Commission on Ter-rorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 421, available from www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.

16. James Jay Carafano and David Heyman, DHS 2.0: Re-thinking the Department of Homeland Security, Heritage Foun-dation Special Report No. SR-02, December 13, 2004, available fromwww.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/12/DHS-20-Rethinking-the-Department-of-Homeland-Securit y.

17. James Jay Carafano, Herding Cats: Understanding WhyGovernment Agencies Dont Cooperate and How to Fix the Prob-lem, Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 955, July 26, 2006, availablefrom www.heritage.org/research/lecture/herding-cats-understanding-why-government-agencies-dont-cooperate-and-how-to-x-the-problem .

18. Jena Baker McNeill and James Carafano, PresidentShould Merge Homeland Security Council with NSC, Heri-tage Foundation WebMemo #2390, April 9, 2009, available fromwww.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/04/President-Should-Merge-Homeland-Security-Council-with-NSC.


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CHAPTER 3

FIVE HERETICAL SUGGESTIONS:ADDRESSING CIVIL-MILITARY TENSIONS

Bernard I. Finel

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, Washington, DC, hasbeen consumed with another in a periodic round ofhand-wringing over the structure of the national secu-rity process. The main thrust of these efforts has beenan attempt to deal with supposed gaps in Americascapacity to coordinate whole-of-government respons-es, particularly in counterinsurgency situations as inIraq and Afghanistan. The recommendations have

usually focused on better integration of the variousinstruments of statecraft, as well as better training andeducation for civilians to produce a unied cohort ofnational security professionals. This entire line of ar-gumentation is both awed and misguided.

At a fundamental level, much of the debate overnational security reform has been distorted by the un-examined assumption that it is in Americas interestto maintain a quasi-colonial presence abroad. Effortsto implement reforms in support of that objective runinto the problem that this approach simply does notsupport American national security, and the tensionsbetween any objective assessment of the challengesfacing the United States and the supposed demandsof this imperial mission create an endless series of un-

solvable problems. On the other hand, over the pastdecade, there have been three sets of crises in the na-tional security process. Identifying the problems with


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greater clarity allows for a more consistent and sus-tainable path forward.

First, there is indeed a problem surrounding the oc-cupation/counterinsurgency/counterterrorism (CT)/hybrid war nexus, but the problem is not the lack ofa capacity to wage such conicts using a whole-of-government approach. The problem is in the failure toimpose a disciplined cost-benet analysis frameworkto the issue, and the associated failure to develop anexplicit risk-management framework for these sorts ofconicts. These conicts involve actual costs and op-portunity costs, few of which have been explicitly as-sessed against likely benets from the endeavors.

Second, there is an ongoing crisis in civil-militaryrelations. The consequence of unhealthy civil-militaryrelations has resulted in a paradoxical rise of militaryentrepreneurs freelancing on policy issues, combined

with a failure to systematically integrate professionalmilitary advice into policy decisions. Though thesetwo problems seem contradictory at rst glance, theyactually represent two sides of the same coin. Theyboth result from a breakdown in a disciplined andprincipled scheme for civil-military relations. We needa system in which responsible military advise can bedelivered to senior decisionmakers, while at the sametime discouraging what has become a back-channel-policy development process whereby military leaderscurry opinion leaders in think tanks and the press di-rectly.1

Third, the United States national security com-munity has, over the past decade, been implicated inan egregious series of unlawful activities. These have

included battleeld war crimes and their cover-up,unlawful domestic surveillance, torture and otherinhumane treatment of prisoners, and a wide vari-


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ety of criminal acts committed by individuals on U.S.Government contracts.2 These acts are a tremendous

embarrassment and pose a threat both to Americanforeign policy and domestic liberty. The national secu-rity community needs to operate within the connesof domestic and international law. It is doing neitherin too many cases.

In order to address the three sets of challenges,I propose ve heretical recommendations. None ofthese have been discussed in the national securityreform debates in any depth, but they have the ad-vantage of: (a) dealing with some pressing crises inthe national security community, and (b) that they canbe accomplished without spending billions or re-engi-neering vast segments of the U.S. government.

THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT

CHIEFS

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)ought to be better insulated from political pressures.The CJCS needs to be able to provide candid adviceto the President and Congress about military issues.If that is to be the case, he needs to be above politicalpressures. He is not in the chain of command in anycase, so there is no issue of civilian control involvedin insulating him. However, there are real negativeconsequences to the Chief being muzzled by direc-tives that the Department of Defense [DoD] speakswith one voice, or the pressure associated with theimplicit threat of being removed for being at oddswith administration policy, or not being reappointed

to a customary second term as happened with GeneralPeter Pace.


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Like the director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-tigation or the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the

CJCS should be appointed for a 5-7 year term, Senateconrmable, but removable only for causes like theabuse of ofce for personal gain. The CJCS should becharged by statute with providing the President notjust with his best advice, but with serving as a conduitfor formal dissents from within the militarycreat-ing something akin to the State Departments dissentchannel.3

There would be many benets to this approach.First, the President would have more reliable accessto independent, professional military advice. Second,various CJCS products, including the Chairmans RiskAssessment, would be more candid and honest. Third,this approach would create a channel for military dis-sent and hopefully reduce the amount of back-channel

lobbying and diminish the opportunities for militarypolicy entrepreneurs.

Consider recent cases. A strong, independent chair-man would have been able to give additional weightto the concerns of Generals Tommy Franks and EricShinseki about inadequate forces being budgeted forthe initial invasion of Iraq. He could have given voiceand standing to the concerns of the Judge AdvocateGeneral Corps (JAGC) regarding violations of inter-national law in our treatment of detainees. He could,in 2006 and 2010, been more candid about identifyingthe aws and limits in the Quadrennial Defense Reviewsof those years. In 2009, he could have been more effec-tive in advising President Barack Obamas Afghani-stan review that recommended a counterinsurgency

approach in Afghanistan without any sense of the re-source implications of that decision.4


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PUBLIC VISIBILITY OF OTHER GENERALOFFICERS

In contrast to the greater role for the CJCS, it isimperative that other general ofcers see their prolediminished. In 2009, the United States was treated tothe public spectacle of a theater commander publiclydebating the Vice-President of the United States on acritical policy issue. This is a shocking level of insub-ordination, similar to General Douglas MacArthursbreach of protocol during the Korean War. In 2010,General Stanley McChrystal was ultimately red forthe lack of judgment demonstrated in various quotesgiven by him and his aides to a Rolling Stone reporter.5

But General McChrystal was not the rst to trans-gress norms of civil-military relations. Indeed, a largenumber of political generals over the past several

years have routinely been crossing the line into policyadvocacy. For instance, General Michael Hayden, asthe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, wasa key architect of an unlawful domestic surveillanceprogram and proceeded to provide many of the publicrationales. General David Petraeus, of course, was theface of the Iraq surge in 2007, but he also issued pro-nouncements on the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in Au-gust 2010 launched a media blitz to weaken PresidentObamas announced timeline in Afghanistan.6 He lat-er issued a press release directly calling out Americancitizens for exercising, albeit in a misguided fashion,their First Amendment rights to free speech.7 Engag-ing publicly in these policy debates goes beyond thetraditional role of military ofcers in lobbying for

service-specic programs. Decisions about war andpeace, about the balance between civil liberties and se-curity, and politically complex issues like Middle East


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peace must remain in the civilian sphere if the conceptof civilian primacy is to mean anything.

A fundamental challenge is that in the United Stateswe have come to so venerate military service that themoment a military leader weighs in on an issue sup-porting him or her, it becomes a test of patriotism. Thequestion ceases to be the strategic issue under con-sideration and instead becomes about supporting themilitary. This also serves to politicize the military inways that are not conducive to sound civil-military re-lations. When the liberal activist group Move On tookout ads challenging General Betray Us, they crossa line of respectful dialogue, and yet it was a naturalconsequence of Petraeus willingly taking on the roleof administration spokesman for an unpopular war.8As a consequence and for the benet of both civiliansupremacy and military professionalism, this sort of

involvement in policy debates needs to be restrained.Serving General ofcers, other than the CJCS,

should be banned from any public statements. Theyshould not give speeches to think tanks or universities,nor give interviews to TV or newspapers. They shouldcommunicate only through the chain of command andwhen responding to direct questions in congressionalhearings.

LIMIT GENERALS AS POLITICAL APPOINTEES

Another major cause of the politicization of themilitary is the now-routine tapping of recently retiredofcers to serve as political appointees. The ability toreward military ofcers for following unlawful or oth-

er politically sensitive orders with high-prestige ap-pointments risks politicizing the military and erodesprofessionalism in the ofcer corps.


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As a consequence, no retired general ofcer shouldbe eligible for any political appointment for a period

of no less than 5 years after retirement from the ser-vice. Nor should any serving general be eligible torun any government agency (including Departmentof Defense agencies). This would make a dramaticchange in the culture of several DoD agencies, but as apractical matter, an agency head ought to be a civilianbecause of the positions inherent policymaking role.

The example of Michael Hayden is too serious toignore. Hayden developed and implemented an un-lawful domestic surveillance program; indeed, as ini-tially implemented, it was denied recertication evenby the Bush administration. He was then rewardedwith a promotion to head the CIA immediately uponhis retirement from active duty.

NATIONAL SECURITY EXPENDITURESSHOULD FOLLOW PAYGO UNLESS WAR ISDECLARED

PAYGO is a congressional rule whereby all newexpenditures must be offset with either revenue in-creases or spending cuts making them budget neutral.PAYGO was used to great effect in the 1990s, leadingto dramatically reduced budget decits and actual sur-pluses from 1998 to 2001. Placing war supplementalsoff-budget and refusing to even consider spending orrevenue off-sets makes waging drawn-out conictswith few national security benets too easy politically.The United States should be able to use force in de-fense of the national interest, but using force should

only be done in circumstances where the threat issignicant enough to justify additional revenues orspending cuts as part of the price of doing business.


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Regardless of whether the United States nationalsecurity actually benets from the extended occupa-

tions of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is doubtful that theseconicts could be termed cost-effective. Consider theimportance of the CT mission in justifying the escala-tion of the conict in Afghanistan. Certainly, there aresome CT benets to a greater presence in Afghanistanand a continued suppression of the insurgency, but isthe United States really getting $100 billion worth ofCT annually from the effort? By placing these conictslargely outside normal budgeting channels, Americanleaders have largely ignored the tradeoffs associatedwith waging long, drawn-out, nation-building cam-paigns.

CLARIFY PERSONAL LIABILITY FORCRIMINAL ACTS

In the name of the War on Terror, the United Stateshas essentially accepted what was once a punchlineas a national policy, If the president does it, it isntillegal. And just as bad, the United States has decidedthat the Nuremberg Defense, I was just following or-ders, is legitimate.9 It would have been hard enoughto overturn the Bush administrations precedents; itwill be essentially impossible to overturn bipartisanprecedent from both Presidents George Bush andObama.

As painful as the American experience with inde-pendent counsels, particularly Ken Starrs lurid inves-tigation into President Bill Clinton, has been, the expe-rience of the Obama administration has demonstrated

the fundamental problem with leaving these sorts ofinvestigations in the hands of future administrations.It is difcult to imagine a president investigating the


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national security choices of his predecessor. By thesame token, however, the current precedent provides

no deterrence against unlawful acts committed in thename of national security. This is a fundamental threatto our constitutional order.

While it would be ideal if we could rely on profes-sionalism to restrain unlawful conduct, the reality isthat, absent some possibility of criminal liability, thepressure to simply go along is likely to be difcult torefuse. There needs, in short, to be some independentauthority capable of investigating and initiating crim-inal proceedings for actions such as war crimes andunlawful intelligence activities.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States currently faces a number of sig-

nicant foreign policy challenges, but we will not beable to meet those challenges until and unless we ad-dress some of the major problems that have emergedover the past decade. Most notably, the United Stateshas expended billions of dollars in unnecessary andoften incompetently waged conicts in Iraq and Af-ghanistan, demonstrating that effective military ad-vice is not being well integrated into policymakingdecisions.

Worse, the consequence of this decade of war hasbeen a dramatic erosion in civil-military norms to thepoint that egregious violations of these norms is socommonplace as to pass largely without notice. Thegreat risk is not of a military coup, of course, but rath-er of a continued politicization of the U.S. military in

a way that makes the effective integration of militarypower into American national security strategy evenmore difcult.


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There is a strong temptation to address problemsthat will help us win the wars we are in. This drives

the admirable desire to develop better whole-of-gov-ernment approaches to issues like counterinsurgency,but prioritizing this approach assumes that such warsare either inevitable or benecial. As a practical mat-ter, neither one of those claims is at all self-evident.Addressing some of the major challenges in the provi-sion of military advice, the politicization of the mili-tary, and the erosion of civil-military norms of pro-fessionalism would serve a dual purpose: It wouldboth ensure that civilian supremacy, a key value in ademocracy, is protected, and it would likely providebenets in the form of more effective security strategydecisionmaking.

Many U.S. problems in Iraq and Afghanistanstemmed from a failure to integrate military advice

into key decisions. By doing so better, the UnitedStates may not only have a better chance to win thewars we are in, but also to avoid those kind of linger-ing conicts whose costs easily outweigh any conceiv-able strategic benet.


1. This paragraph was written prior to General StanleyMcChrystals problems following the publication of a prole inRolling Stone magazine. That development merely strengthens theassessment of this essay.

2. Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, New York: Anchor, 2009 ; JackGoldsmith, The Terror Presidency, New York: W.W. Norton, 2009.

3. Foreign Affairs Manual Vol. 2, General, Policy 2 FAM 070,Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/84374.pdf.


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4. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Civilian, Military Ofcials at OddsOver Resources Needed for Afghan Counterinsurgency, Wash-ington Post, October 8, 2009, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100704088.html .

5. Michael Hastings, The Runaway General, Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010, available from www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236.

6. Associated Press, Hayden insists warrantless surveil-lance is legal, MSNBC, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12847084/; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Gen. David Petraeus saysAfghanistan war strategy fundamentally sound, WashingtonPost, August 16, 2010, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081501514.html .

7. Julian E. Barnes and Matthew Rosenberg, Petraeus Con-demns U.S. Churchs Plan to Burn Qurans, Wall Street Journal,September 6, 2010.

8. Wikipedia provides a comprehensive review of the contro-versy that is available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MoveOn.org_ad_controversy.

9. Daphne Eviatar, In Torture Cases, Obama Toes BushLine, Washington Independent, March 16, 2009, available fromwashingtonindependent.com/33985/in-torture-cases-obama-toes-bush-line.


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CHAPTER 4

CONGRESSIONAL NATIONAL SECURITYREFORM

DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

James R. Locher III

INTRODUCTION

As an equal branch of government, Congress playsa crucial role in national security affairs, and CapitolHills participation in the reform of the national secu-rity system is essential to the ultimate success of thisendeavor. With the legislative power to authorizeand appropriate resources, Congress can spearheadand direct reform through its oversight of the appli-

cation, administration, and execution of the laws itpasses. While national security reform is a sizeableundertaking, Congress successfully completed thedifcult transformation of the Department of Defense(DoD) with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Ad-mittedly, todays national security environment haschanged considerably from that of the 1980s. Severalchallenges must be overcome in Congress to ensuresuccess, including issues of institutional knowledge,politics, and capacity. Overcoming these challengeswill require reform in the legislative branch itself.

Comprehensive restructuring is critically neededto revamp our out-of-date national security system,which was devised to address the Cold War threatsof a bipolar, state-centric world. In the post-World

War II environment, stove-piped agencies and depart-ments were responsible for applying the elements ofnational power with only a marginal need for inter-


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agency coordination. The President beneted from theNational Security Council, established by the National

Security Act of 1947. Its members were drawn fromthe agencies and departments with purviews relevantto national security. This arrangement, however, hasproved ill suited for the current threat environment,which is characterized by tensions among a complexarray of state, substate, and transnational entities,and is further complicated by the dynamics of tech-nological advancements and globalization. The newnational security threats require a careful calibrationof the instruments of national power enabled by ro-bust coordination across the interagency community.

Capitol Hills organization mirrors that of the ex-ecutive branch. Individual committees are chargedwith overseeing specic agencies and departments.However, since Congress does not have a National Se-

curity Act of its own to encourage a holistic approachto national security affairs, it remains focused on itsparts. Its inability to look at the national security sys-tem comprehensively has rendered Congress unableto address whole-of-government integration, whichis now the central challenge of the national securitysystem.

Two key deciencies result from the legislaturesstove-piped approach to national security. First,through its excessive focus on the parts, Congresshas a tendency to reinforce divisions in the executivebranch, magnifying interagency gaps and cleavages.Second, Congress is becoming increasingly irrelevantto the larger issues of national security, as it lacks aninstitutional mechanism to address issues that cut

across agency lines.One reason for this is the current committee sys-

tem, which causes two notable dynamics. By depriv-


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ing any congressional body of the explicit jurisdictionto authorize, fund, or oversee interagency solutions,

congressional committees examine issues from thenarrow connes of particular agency perspectives.Furthermore, stove-piped programming is reinforcedby an appropriations process driven by committee jurisdictions rather than a mission-based budgetarypractice that would be more akin to a whole-of-gov-ernment approach.

The Project on National Security Reforms (PNSR)report, Forging a New Shield, identied six major prob-lems in congressional performance in national secu-rity affairs. They are as follows:

1. Congress undertakes no routine oversight of in-teragency issues, operations, or requirements;

2. Congress lacks interest and condence in the ex-ecutive branchs management of foreign affairs;

3. The allocation of resources by Congress tendstowards inexibility;

4. Slow conrmation processes for presidential ap-pointees by the Senate lead to inaction and bureau-cratic drift on many issues;

5. The failure to pass legislation on time has be-come endemic;

6. The legislative and executive branches are tooconfrontational.1

Given these problems, there is considerable needfor Congress to reform itself in order to further com-prehensive national security transformation. Unfor-tunately, there has been no meaningful action on thisfront to date.

Even so, Capitol Hill has been acutely interestedin reforming the executive branch apparatus in an ef-fort to keep it responsive to changing national secu-


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rity imperatives. Through its oversight role, Congressseeks to promote efciency, economy, effectiveness,

responsiveness, and accountability among the execu-tive agencies and departments. Nevertheless, recentoperations have highlighted serious shortcomings inthese 5 areas. Although existing executive branch au-thority will enable many solutions, other challengeswill require changes to the law necessitating that Con-gress act as it did with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of1986, which mandated a sweeping reorganization ofthe DoD. Currently, however, Congress lacks the rel-evant institutional mechanisms and perhaps the po-litical will for doing so. Skeptics may be concernedthat Capitol Hill will never undertake comprehensivenational security reform, but in asserting this, they ig-nore the case of Goldwater-Nichols, which was passedover bitter opposition by the DoD.

The example of Goldwater-Nichols provides hopefor congressional action on national security reform,but admittedly, there are important differences be-tween it and todays reorganization needs. First, thecontemporary security threat environment is muchmore complex and rapidly changing than that of the1980s. Modern challenges require approaches that arenot purely diplomatic, developmental, or defensive innature, often demanding tools that cross agency lines.This reality presents challenges of jurisdiction, autho-rization, and appropriations that will require a moreintricate organizational practice than that instituted inthe Goldwater-Nichols era.

Second, the scope of national security reform nec-essary is unprecedented in its size and complexity and

may be 15-20 times bigger than Goldwater-Nichols.Those who have studied PNSRs work have noted thatthere has never been a transformation effort as large


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as that currently being attempted. While Goldwater-Nichols addressed only the DoD, the current reform

must include the entire national security system, bothin the executive and legislative branches. Furthermore,todays reform will have to consider international anddomestic security apparatuses, encompassing organi-zations not considered under Goldwater-Nichols toinclude state, local, tribal, and territorial governmentsas well as nongovernmental and private organiza-tions.

Third, in addition to broad changes to existinginstitutions, national security reform necessitates thecreation of entirely new entities and capacities, a chal-lenge not tackled in Goldwater-Nichols, which onlyprovided the proper authorities to already-existingorganizations.2 The creation of these new entities willdemand a concentrated effort by both the executive

and legislative branches.Finally, the scope of national security reform de-

mands careful stewardship through and by Congress.However, whereas Goldwater-Nichols beneted fromownership by the Senate and House Armed ServicesCommittees, no one committee sees itself as havingthe mandate to push for current reform initiatives.The absence of a congressional champion has stymiedthe progress of national security reform on CapitolHill. Furthermore, todays Congress is constrained bypartisan political considerations, which has prevent-ed a truly bipartisan approach. Bipartisanship wascrucial to the ultimate success of Goldwater-Nichols.Republican Senator Barry Goldwater and DemocraticSenator Sam Nunn demonstrated tremendous skill in

forging this legislation and ushering it through a Re-publican Senate and a Democratic House.


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Indeed, the challenges of national security reformon Capitol Hill are formidable and multifaceted, en-

compassing intellectual, political, scope, ownership,and bandwidth challenges. Intellectually, becausethe legislature lacks jurisdiction and the institutionalmechanisms to systematically look at interagencyissues, it does not have the requisite storehouse ofknowledge. As it did with Goldwater-Nichols, whenCapitol Hill knew little about defense institutions,Congress will have to devote time and resources tounderstanding interagency organizational practice.In addition to this intellectual challenge, politicallyentrenched congressional interests favor the statusquo and discourage comprehensive reform. Further-more, with multiple stakeholders involved and thecomplexity of reform required, the scope of reorga-nization is simply daunting, inhibiting congressional

engagement and commitment. The compounding ofthese challenges, and the amount of time reform willdemand, create a bandwidth challenge; Goldwater-Nichols took 4 years and 241 days to enact, and inorder to achieve success, the Act was the top priorityof the Senate Armed Services Committee for 2 years.Nearly 2-and-a-half decades on, as the inefcienciesof the congressional process have grown, nding thecapacity on Capitol Hill to undertake institutional re-form on the scale of todays requirements has becomemore challenging.

Certainly, the task of national security reform issignicant, demanding a focused, bipartisan effort inboth the executive and legislative branches. While to-days transformation will prove a more demanding ef-

fort than the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the experience ofthe 1980s proved that seemingly insurmountable chal-lenges can be overcome with skillfulness and commit-


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ment. Modern national security reform is not a novelpreoccupation; it is essential to the national interest of

the United States, and Congress must act to make it areality.


1. Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Turning Ideasinto Action, Arlington, VA: PNSR, 2008, pp. 404-434, availablefrom www.pnsr.org/data/les/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf.

2. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza-tion Act of 1986,Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of-ce, 1986, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm.


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CHAPTER 5

CONGRESSIONAL NATIONAL SECURITYREFORM:

A MID-OBAMA ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

Richard Weitz

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR)is comprised of former senior national security execu-tives and military leaders, as well as foreign affairs, in-ternational development, and human capital experts.Since 2007, this bipartisan group has engaged in anintensive analysis of the U.S. national security system,with particular attention to the interagency aspects ofnational security. It is the perhaps the premier organi-zation on issues relating to national security reform,

the topic that is PNSRs exclusive focus.The PNSR offered a vision for the national security

system of the 21st century in its November 2008 report,Forging a New Shield.1 This report offers the most com-prehensive study of the U.S. national security systemin American history. Its vision stresses the need forholistic reform, as contrasted to the piecemeal reformthat has been pursued since 1947. This new improvednational security system would:

employ whole-of-government approaches; operate effectively across the interagency; reect the insights and innovations that come

from collaboration by many varied perspec-tives, both inside and outside government;

empower leaders to make timely, informed de-

cisions and take decisive action; be sufciently cohesive and agile both to seize

opportunities and overcome threats;


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ensure that the national security system inte-grates all elements of national power and puts

mission outcomes rst; coordinate effectively between the federal gov-

ernment and state, local, tribal, and territorialgovernments and other mission partners.

To realize this vision of a collaborative, agile, andinnovative national security system that horizon-tally and vertically integrates all elements of nationalpower, the PNSR develops several key concepts forprocesses that would improve U.S. national securitydecisionmaking: strategic management, effective re-source allocation, empowered interagency teams,a dedicated national security workforce, and a col-laborative culture of information sharing. In TowardIntegrating Complex International Missions, the PNSR

sought to document the lessons it learned from sup-porting the National Counterterrorism Centers Direc-torate of Strategic Operational Planning.2

In the fall of 2009, the PNSR published anotherre

national security reform 2010: a midterm assessment

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