I

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE?

CORE COURSE 5 ESSAY e

LT COL HAROLD W MOULTON/CLASS OF 95 MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS SEMINAR C DR. THOMAS A. KEANEY COL BRAN MCALLISTER

C

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BALLISTIC -MISSILE DEFENSE?

MOSCOW (Interfax. 3 15 pm., Jan 26. 1995)-A combat mrssrle which vlolared Russran awspacc has been uztercepted and destro.Jed by Russran Au Defense Command Forces The mtss& was launched from a northern European country (Non-v)

A hostile ballistrc mtssrle Ieunch m Europe? In 19959 From Norway? This can’t happen!

The Cold War IS over and if them IS any place that stabdity and peece look stmng end hopeful, n’s

In fact. rt did not happen-the mtssrle attack and mterceptlon, that IS. (Notway lvlnched 3

prevrously announced reseemh rocket that never got wu.hm IS5 mtles of Russ~a)(S. 1) However. the

emxteous Jnterfruc report did occur. Whtle thts mcrdent may suggest a skrmshness mstde the Russian

Defense Muustry, It also cieerly mghlights the uncertarnty of a world populared by a mulatude of

ectors with balhsttc mrsstle cqabthhes. But am baihstrc mtssrles really ti that unponent?

The pmhfemtron of ballrsnc mrsstles (and the potentml to marry them wnh weepons of mess

destructton) compels the Untted States to at least evaluate their unpact on US secunty mterests

throughout the world. First, one must bnefly look t the systems that pose a potentnil threat to the

Umted States. However. we aren’t so much worned about the systems. but rather. how they WIIJ be

used agrunst the Uruted States or US mterests So. there IS ;L need to peer into a crystal bell to predrct

“the next war.” Wnh this as beckgmund. then. one GUI appnuse the threat of beihsttc mtssiles end

hkely tmplnxtrons of the threat. Most tmportant. though. IS the need to crexe ztn qpmpncte response

to the threat. Thus. thrs paper wd.I eddress the cntuztl chxnctensucs of a balhstrc mrssde defense

system desrgned to meet the needs of the Umted States for pursurt of us mtetests. To begin. one must

examme the brrlhstrc mrssrle cepabdntes that the Umted States may fxe

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Balhsnc missiles ZUE aheady wdespnzad and gowmg. Whde Iraq may be out of busmess for

the nme bemg, plenty of other mrd World countnes cunently own or are actively pursumg a balllstlc

missile capabihty. (See Appen&x 1) Today. over twenty non-NATO countnes have bailisuc missile

capabxhtxes. Furthennole, these ye the countnes that axe pursuing weapons of mass destmcnon

(WMD). lndm, Libya North Korea. Syna and Pakistan all ae known to have or are acqmnng the

cap&&y to match nuclear weapons with their ballistic mlssdes. In fact, pro~ecuons for the end of the

decade now expect that w~thm the balhstxc missile commumty, five to ten countnes urlll have nuclear

crtpabxlxty, ten will possess blologcal weapon capability, and up to twenty could have chemical

warheads to match with these delivery systems. (16: 7)

At the moment, the bulk of the miss&s &spersed throughout the globe are the short range

variety Scud-type mlsslfes with ranges under 250 mdes (500 km). However, the futun: may already

be hele and it 1s not so hmlted. Former Director of Central Intelhgence, James Wwisey. recently

highlighted the potential nsk to Southeast Asrs the Pacific, and even Eulrope (if employed from the

Middle East) from North KO~X’S Yo Dong-1 missile that has a 1000 km range. (39. AlS) If that

wele not enough. -Vonh Konza also IS developing the TD-1 and TD-2 which have ranges from 2OCO to

3500 km. China IS aheady there cvlth the CSS-2 and as &lay to nach over 3000 km. India. tw.

can reach very long ranges with as Agru (maximum range 2500 km). (See range compansons,

Appencfix 2)

Cen;unIy, the depth of these new misslIes can change the equation of a conflict. More

drsconcertmg, though. IS the fact that there appears to be htrle hope for arms control measures to keep

them in the hands of the few who &zady own them. The Hissde Technology Control Regime

(MTCR) seeks to limit pmhferation through export controls. However. slgmfant parties (I.e.. Chma.

North Korea. Russia) are not participants. Nor can MTCR halt mhgenous pmgnms (Iike those of

India and Israel). Ultimately. MTCR and rums control only address the supph problem of the

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‘iquatlon-and a mulhtude of states rue demonstmtmg a demand for such weapons Smce the supply 1s

not completely cut off. states with a desm! ae findmg a means to achieve rhelr goal of giunmg 3

cheap subsntute for a manned bomber force balhsuc mlsdes

SUE. the mlssdes PIE out there, but does that really unpact the Umted States3 To answer that

question. one must look mto the future.

THE NEXT USE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES?

To properly plepye to defend agamst future threats to US nanon& security mterests,

leaderstip must evaluate the “next war” by answenng four basic quesaons:

1. When will the war begm?

2. Whatkindofawarvvlllabe?

3 How wdl the war beg&

4. Where wdl the war begm3 (18: 1)

The first quesnon IS the toughest to answer. mle It clearly would be unpmdent to sacnfice

readmess to the pomt that the Umted States could not act tomormw. It does not appear that a maJor

conflict IS m our near future. Desert Storm 1s stall quite fresh on the corporate memory of the

mtematlonal commumty; and. there IS no one who can honestly match conventional capabd~ty with the

Umted States today or for the rest of this decade. Thus, while &ssutied today, ;L mtlonal ;1ctor who

may want to match up agamst the Umted States to pursue his agenda could now be seekmg that

capability to deter, defeat. or bypass US stren,oth. Balhstlc mlssdes could be Just the capablhty to

meet such a need. The best pre&ction for the next major confhct not untd after 2000 and m3ybe not

for a full decade or more

Given the end of the Cold War superpower standoff. and the nzcent US suc~e%s In the

PersIan Gulf War. It appears that the Umted States wti not end up m a global-type war soon. Fang

an immensely capable convennonal force backed by a still vmble nuclear triad. nnonal actots will

3

‘hkeiy not try to t&e on the United States on us home tutf. Rtier, the most plausrble scenvlo for the

next ma.or US conflict wtll come from some regional actor/state that believes the Umted Sates wdl

not mvolve itself m the legron or that rt can deter the Umted States from achtevmg its goals. So the

rtnswer to quesnons two and four: a regxonal conflict.

To further clz&y m thrs context, the conflict wtJl likely occur m a region where ballrsuc

miss&s am a factor fmm the start of the war. Ballistic missiles have become the weqon of choice m

regtonal conflicts, especitiy m the Middle East.. (See Appendtx 3) In fact, b&sac mtssiies ;ue

present m or ccn reach each of the WOW’S most volatde tegrons with stgmfic;mt US Ililtlomrl mtemsts’

East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, end South Asia Given then “trump czrtd” nature, balIishc

mtssiles may provtde the rmpetus for a regtonal actor, behevmg in hts own strength, to oppose ;L US

national secunty interest

Finfly. we need to answer the thnd quesuon-how wdl the wiir begm? Thts one IS pmbahly

the easiest. While It IS posstble that the Umted States would be totally ptepved ;md allowed the

luxury of another Desert Smeld-type bmld up, it IS much more probable that we wtll be caught off

guard. Indeed. the only prudent coutse for prepwon for the next con&t IS to ztssume that It wdl

come wnhout wammg IJtke August 1990, June 1950, or even December 1941). The implicatron of

such a start IS, of course. that the Umted Smtes mrlitaty wtll have to “come in It IS” rather than butld

up md prepare once the confrontation spills over mto a use of force If ballisac mrsslles = in the

scenano. the Ututed States wdl face them wtth fielded systems-there will not be tune to develop ;I

defense on the spot

IMPLICATIONS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

Pretty simple: the “next waf’ wtll be a no-notice regtonal conflict. away from the Uruted

States. facing some sort of balltsac mlssrle c3pablhty. but not stanmg for the next five to ten years

3’ Well, not really so sunple. Ballistrc missiles have the capacny to tmnsfotm the cucumstnnces

of a conflict so tha the “next war” may not be a war at all. Thud World missiles alrezly threafen US

mthtary msmllctrons and allies around the globe. These balhstrc missiles could cletiy pose ;z dmzct

threat to US forces or ties, but more damgmg IS the mdilect threat that they pose. Since balhsuc

mtsstles ccn retch so far, they put cnacal assets d nsk. If ball&c missiles take out key nodes (ports,

;ilrfields, command and contml factlines. . ) the Umted Strtres may become Impotent to use its

convenuonal might m response to a mgromtl thmu. Under the worst cucumsmnces, an advetzuy who

wxxts to bmndish ballisnc muss&s along wrth ;I nuclear. blologlcal. or chemtcai (NBC) cepabtlity

could nuse the stakes so lugh that US leaden&p would not put up wtth the nsk/costs and thus be

deterred from actmg ti all.

Furchermom, belhsuc mtssrles have the capacny to hold the utternational commumty hostage

when armed at popultiron centers or nuclear power faclliues. Even a piece of a broken conventtonaily

tipped mlssde C;UI demohsh an apattment complex msultmg m stgmficnnt casualtxes. IMtmed with

WMDs. ;t bailrstrc mlssrle could wreak havoc and bnng on CM.~KI casualty mtes the likes of wmch

have not been seen since World War II. It really doesn’t matter who gets krlled or where the prectse

mrget 1s 3s long cs the threat IS real rmd the mrssde atmck creates panic and tension.

Couldn’t the Umted States Just use its nuclear fist to deter such rtctrons? Probably not. The

Persian Gulf War proved thu a convenaomrlly tipped balhsuc mrssile causes tenor, but It may not be

suffictently hostrle to Justify nuclear retaliation (a cortlitron buster below the threshold for nuclear

response). Furthermore. the Umted Stares found that convennonal notrons of deterrence may not

wodc How does one deter someone who uses hrs own popularron z hosmges? Indeed. given that

one mqor lesson from the Persum Gulf Wru w;1s that the Umted Staes could not truly defend Itself

ctgamst btitsuc mtsstles. the next logical step for an opponent of the Umted Stves would be to pursue

a cm&ble balllsuc mlsstle capabtltty and mtich it with WMDs. In fact. rtf least one Indurn Geneml

noted that f;tct speaficrrlly (10 6)

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.’ Thus, ballistx misslies pose a th~at to US national mtexests today and show evev m&cation

that they will be even moie tiueatemng tn the fumle. Smce diplomacy (arms contmi) and deterrence

appear to be madequate, a mllrtay nsponse 1s the most logical addihonal appnxch Lt General

Charles Homer (the Jomt FoEes &r Component Commander for the Persxm Gulf War) cited the

mrlitaxy requuemenw

When very accumte miss&s vnth mass destmcnon warheads are avatlable to T~IK! World nations. the US wdl need a legion& Hnde-area tr defense foxe to duplxate on a grand scale the Patnot’s pivotal mle of defangmg the Scud. (11: 6)

Since mole than a handful of Thud World nations have or Hrlti have such a capabtity, now 1s the tune

for the Umted States to actively pursue a counter to that threat.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFEUSE

The PersIan Gulf War was mstmcave and Impoamt. Wlule others may have spied a potential

US Achlles’ Heel to btishc mlsales. the Umted States cenamly xxogruzed its need to pursue

Theater lMlsslle Defense (TMD) The current admuustmtion has elevated ‘MD above the former

Stmteglc Defense Irutlatlve (SDI). The current pmgmm IS conceptually built on four pdlars. pasave

defense, active defense: attack openuons; and the battle management/command. control.

commumcat~ons. computers. and mtelligence required to support openr~ons. Competing for a share of

the f2-3 bllhon annual budget are ;t mynad of systems that can overwhelm even the knowledgeable.

THAW, PAC-3, AEGIS/SM-2. Corps SAM. ABL, BPI, and on. and on.

Given a quite restncted set of fiscal resounzes for the foreseeable future. the services wdl

continue to battle over the share of Department of Defense funds allocated to ballwlc mlssde defense

Thus. it IS important to take a step back and look at the emblem as a whole. Rather than recommend

systems to solve the pmblem. thele IS a need to descnbe the cntlcal chanctenstlcs of a full rheater

mrssrle defense system that can meet the needs of the Umted States. To meet Genenl Homer’s goti

*ior wide area “defangmg,” the US TMD system should be layered, onented on boost phase or pre-

launch phase. rapidly deployable, and networked together.

LAYERING

A theater baihsnc mlssrle can be launched from a hidden mobile launcher. Once arbome. the

missile may leach mcre&ble speeds (up to 3 km/set). Ranges. warheads. mlsslle soptisticaion. and

penetmtion ads vary gxezttly xxws the spectmm of threat systems. Thus threat spectmm decreases the

pmbabdity that a smgle defmlve system FLU be able to stop the mcommg mwstie. A angle bullet

Just cannot do it all. Given the catastmph~ nature of even a few ‘leakers,” a low pmbabdity of

stoppmg the missile is an unacceptable 3nswer.

However, mulaple attacks at the sane missrle offer a substan~al incmse m the likelilmxi that

it wti be stopped pnor to reaching any lucmnve target. Since the pnmary am of the system IS to

prevent a btisnc misstie from dehvenng its warhead to any fnendty terntory. the optimum defense IS

one that makes every attempt to intercept the misstie unul it 1s destmyed. Thus means attackmg the

missile before launch, m the ascent, dunng midcourse, and iin&ly in the termmal phase usmg 3

“shoot-look-shoot” doctnne (contmumg to attack untd confinnanon of destmcnon of the ballrsnc

missile)

Muiuple attacks from a single system offer maeases m k.dl pmbabdity-muluple attacks across

the life cycle of the bail&z muscle (fmm mulnple systems) offer maeased pmbablhty of a kill and

the opportumty to quit once It IS destmyed. Being able to quit attackmg an inbound missile IS

extremely important-a allows the TMD system to d~snzgard the destroyed mlssde and concenuate on

other Inbound missiles. Thus attnbute could be cntlcal to protect agamst attacks of multlple mlssdes

launched simultaneously

An mterestmg ad&tlonal argument for lyenng IS financial If you establish a stanrfrrni for the

amount of ‘leakers” that is acceptable. aeating 3 system with multiple layers will dnmatlctily reduce

the size of the mterceptor Inventory required to meet that standard (once qan based on the concept

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, ’ of “shoot-look-shoot”: This directly affects the cost of the entue system-the more layers. the gxeaer

Educuon m cost to aclueve the desued level of defense. (22: 24)

AlTACK OPERATIOYS AND BOOST-ORENTED APPROACH

closely ued to the idea of layenng is the need to pnontlze whe= it would be best to mtexcept

the btisac mlsslle Clearly, the opumum cucumstance would be to prevent the launch m the first

place. lIus IS the goal of a#ack operattons that seek to destroy the balhstic missile befoE launch.

Whether the mrsslle IS all m the factory or on the launcher raxl, an attack that prevents launch

certamly protects friendly assets. However, more unportant, attxk operations usually take out

cpability. Destmymg the factory, tmnspoItation system, or the launcher stops not Just a single

misstie, but also the capacity to bnng mole ml&es mto the confhct. (See Appenhx 4 for examples

of attack opentlons effectrveness m a canpqn) Thus, attack openmons. ptesentmg the most

effiaent layer of a layead defense. deserve pnmq focus m the TMD system

Simdarly, should a misstie launch occur, the best place to destmy it would be as early as

possible-m the boost or ascent phase. The desrrability of such an early attack opuon stems from two

mYn ObJectives First, attackmg an mbound mlsslle early allows moxe opportumues to evaluate the

defense and conduct follow-on attacks (fmm dus or other layen). Secondly, the potential fallout from

an NBC warhead cannot be allowed to enter fnendly temtoq. Destmymg a chemical warhead m

fight may result m debns which contanmates the Eglon below the intercept. Obvlousiy, It would be

best to have tfus debns ramng down on the enemy mther than tiendiy assets.

In the past (dunng SD1 days). these two avenues to ballistic missile defense did not recexve

the bulk of the attention. The feaslbdity of such operations over the USSR was fughly questIonable.

But now, cucumstances and our underlymg assumptions about the next WY have changed. Missile

arsenals of future adversanes will be dxamatically smaller than that of the former Soviet Union.

Furthermore. in ;L regional context. the Umted States should be able to npldly gan ar supenonty over

the enemy rurspace and thus enable both attack opexat~ons and boost/ascent phase mtercept. Hence.

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. wluie It may have always been desuabie to be onented on early attack. It has certanly become more

possible to align our TMD towad such operanons.

DEPLOYABILITY

me answer to quesuon three above (How wdl the next war begm?) pmvldes the pnmay

motivation for thus chaactensuc of a fuII Th4D capabtity Since the next conflict could likely be a

no-nouce affar m a region with httle US forwrruri presence, the enun: TMD system ti probably need

to be bmught mto the theater. Whether space-based, aborne. or surface (land or sea) onented. every

asset of the TMD system will need the capabfity to rapidly Rspond to a bal&ic missile threat.

The key word IS rapid. As mentioned before, btimc miss&z can haten ports and

population centers at a moment’s nonce. Therefore, the ~sponse to those missdes must be able to

amve m a tunely fashon-qmck enough to deter or defend against the first set of launches. Cenamly

the system wdl have to be phased m with the Est of the theater combat capablhty, but it wdl be quite

important to have an @%~nr defense in early It does no good to bnng m a slgmficant “heavy”

defense on Day 30 when the advexsay’s arsenal 1s exhausted on Day 14.

Furthermore, US Patnot pmtecaon of Isnel dunng the PersIan Gulf War &splayed the flexible

natunz required for a full TMD system. Responsiveness to changmg pnontles for cnticai asset

pmtecnon will demand deployabdlty as a key charactenstlc m support of both mllitvy and political

ObJeCtIVeS.

=-l-WORK

The final key attnbute of ;L complete TMD system 1s the abthty to have the entue system

networked together. In the past. when defendmg against a ‘Mach 1 axrcmft. the zur defense system has

been allowed up to 20 minutes for the detection-to-destruction cycle response. In Inq. a Mach 5 Scud

Rduced tis time down to 3-4 minutes. Futuli: tugh speed. advanced missile threats could further

reduce the nsponse time to less than ;i minute (a Mach 25 mlsslle narrows the wmdow to 35

seconds: Tlus shnnkmg envelope to defend demands thar all assets work syneststically to halt the

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. ‘mcommg missde. Full mtegzmon and networking of mformanon are essennal to ensure opnmal

resouxe tiocatlon and coopemtive engagement.

In the recent past. the US An Force has proposed to take on the enure mlsslon to faahtate

such mtegration. WMe the “cmdle-to-gave” ownership by a smgie selvlce has men& the key 1s an

mtegmted and networked system. Given the duecbon of Jomt warfare, and the successes of the

JFACC (Joint Forces hr Component Commander) system, rt appears that the Umted States can reach

thxs goal through ogamzaonal SUUC~UKL As long as services seach for mtempemb&y (which may

be assisted by the new Jomt Requuements Oversight Cou.na.I pmcess), and BMK.41 experts putsue

mtegntlon and connecnvlty from sensor to shooter, the TMD system need not Eade under a single

hat..

OTHER ISSUES

One of the biggest advantages of a fully deployed TMD system would be its dampemng effect

on the threat. A credible defense will negate the tmmp cad nature of ballisuc mlsslles and Educe

them to Just another weapon SUbJeCt to destructron by US military might. In fact. once a fully capable

TMD system 1s fielded. the value of baihsnc mlssdes wdl fall so much that states may &scontmue

their pursuit of the weapons. Thus. TMD itself becomes a ae&bie counter-pmhfentlon tool. The

rnonz widespread the TMD cqxhlitxs are, the mole likely states ae to bypass the baIbstlc mlssrle

option.

Thus value of widespread TMD capabdlty leads to a second pomt. NATO should be brought

Into the deveiopment and deployment of the US ‘MD system. Not only would tis ensure a broader

‘MD capability worldwide (and hence. undermrmng further pmhferation). but It also would offer the

Uruted States the oppomuuty to mingate some of the srgmficant costs to field such a system.

Burdenshanng may well mdeed become the only way to actually fund tis capablllty in the face of

dramanc downwaxd pressure on defense budgets

10

. The shanng of ??viD wtth NATO and broademng of the an&n&de cap&&y wdi also ad m

dealmg with the issues assoaated with the ABM (Arm-Balhsuc -%&de) Treaty. There IS mote than a

Bttle debate as to the legality of cunent US efforts m TMD with nzspect to the ABM TEXY. The

solution 1s to sidestep the debate and acuvely pursue ;t resoluuon with Russia (signatory as the former

USSR). In the end, It IS m the interest of both countries. and their allies. to develop systems that

protect against theater-ievel missiles. Safeguards should be employed to pnzvent major impact to

strategic foxes, and thus preserve the deterrent relauonsh~p that has avoided nuclear war for decades.

One unpomnt caveat IS wotth menuomng when discussmg balhsuc missile defense. Balhstlc

misstles anz not the only theater misslle threat. Cruise missties an2 also an unportant emexgmg thnzit.

Whde then: axe some pomons of a full Th4D system that couid assist m pmtectmg agamst the cnnse

mlsslle thnxu (i.e., attack opentlons), limdanentally, the defense agamst cmise missiles IS an entirely

different problem to be solved. Furthermore, If a full TMD system does mdeed deter pmhfentlon of

ballistic mwsdes. it may dnve opponents into the cnnse missile arena to seek power aggrunst the Umted

Stcites or its interests.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall. there IS probably already a consensus on balhstlc miss&s. They indeed ae a threat.

Widespread today and pmhferatmg, ballishc missiles an? a factor in most regions where the Umted

States has mayor mterests. Futiennoce. the threat is Impmvmg-espeaally m its mnge capablhtles

Since the Umted States IS likely to fight its next war legionally, and since bJllsnc mlsslles

will pmbabiy be a mqor part of the acuon, the Uruted States cannot sit tdly by and not prepare for

such a contingency To do so would mvlte some very senous consequences-preempnon of US

deployment/employment of foxas. blackmalmg the mtematlonal commumty. or worst of all. massive

casualties. The ptoblem IS exceptionally complex, and requires actlon along sevenl fmnts: focussmg

on supply and demand; usmg &plomutc, techmcal, as well as rnlliw means; and pursued through

muitmanonal as well as umlateral approaches

The mtitary response to ballisuc miss&s needs to be a well munded Theater Ballisnc Missile

Defense system. Such a system nquues four major atmbutes. It must be layered to achieve a Hugh

pmbabdlty of successfully stoppmg an mcommg maale and to opnmtze the system for defense

agmst salvos of brtllistx mlssdes. It should focus on stopping the misslie befoxe launch or wMe It

sulk remains over enemy temtov (att;ick operations and boost phase onented). It must be able to

amve in ume to defend, and thus be rapxily deployable. And finally, the system must be mtegmted

and networked together to ensme optunal use of the assets avadable and cooperative engagement of

mbound threats.

In the end. with this kind of theater masde defense the Umted States will have taken long

strides toward countenng a threat that lmpenls US interests. It IS wolthwMe to remember the words

of Winston Chuxti who also faced an ar defense pmblem.

Cenrunly. nothmg IS mo= necessary, not only to thus country, but to all peace-loving powers in the world than that the good old earth shouId acquue some means

of*destmymg the sky marauder. (35. Al5)

Today, the manuder is a ball&x misstie. The United States must certainly pursue a capability to

“destroy the marauder.”

12

. , APPENDIX 1

Balhstlc Mlssdes Of Oevelopxng Countries

North Korea franchxse

Souse: Jomt Theater WssJe Defense Conops (Draft), J-26. Jomt Staff, Depanment of Defense. November. 1994

. , APPENDIX 2

BALLISTIC hflSSilE DEFENSE TBMTHREAT-REALANDGROWING ORGANIZATION

Launch Range (km)

Type ~““~“““l”“““““““‘l”“““““*~““““““””””””q 500 1,000 1,500 2000 woo 3,000 3,5oc I

css-2

Agni

css-x-5

Arniston

No Dong I (Dev)

Al-Hussein

Scud c

SS-23 FO (Cev)

Scud B

9 Extent

- Countries With TBMs - Different TBM Designs >

10s

- Existing Launchers 100s - Existing Missifes 1,000s

Scud Mod 2 I ‘;“;” 40120

B-21 M3 Icf 10 70

‘ROG P

l Characteristics - Ranges - Apogees - Velocities

80 - 3,100 km 20-600 km 1 - 4+ kmlsec

Source: Bailisuc Missde Defense Oqmmuon Bnefing, “Balbnc MsslIe Pmliferauon. .March 19%

l XPPElVDIX 3

Missile Use In Reglonal Confhct

Conflict Date Missiles Used/By Against

Third Arab-lsraek War Israel I

Thwd IndwPakstan~ Wal . Pakman

QlYPt Israel Israel Israel

Bntlsh fleet Argentm

Yom K~ppor War 1973 Gabnet. Mk l’ilsael

s=eaPt FRoc3syna. Egypt As-5 KewEgypt

ExocetVArgentlna Sea Skua’iCireat Bntaln

Iran-Iraq Scud. FROG/Iraq Iran Scud Oghab kar+l30/lran lr=l SlyXVklQ Iran

Drownraq U S S Sfa* Ian Armat’llraq Iran

Sll~‘/l~ Iran S&vonn - Harpoon (?‘nran m

19@2-88

U S -Libya dash 1966

I

WYa Haqxxn’Nnrted Stales

Lampeousa (Italy)

bbya

1966-91 I

Scud/Afghan army Afghan mujaheaQn I AfghanMan

Israel. Saudr Aabla. Oatar. Bahram

m I

Yemen I

Souse. Joint Theater Mlsslie Defense Conops (D&t), J-36. Jomt Staff. Department of Defense. November, 1994.

APPENDIX 4

OCA Effects on TBM Launches

LAUNCES PER DAY

80.00

70.00

60.00

50.00

40.00

30.00

20.00

10.00

0.00

-m-2.6% Post launctl klu t-670 Post launch kill -6% Prelaunch h 10% Post

&Unch

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 DAY

- 40 launcher baseiine - Eachsurviving Iauncher attempts two launches per day

Sowce. HQ USAF/T& Theater AN Defense Office. March 1995.

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17

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