NapoleonPart Twosession iv

Russia

NapoleonPart Twosession iv

Russia

major topics for this session

I. Two Emperors

II. Crossing the Niemen

III. Borodino

IV. Moscow

V. Retreat

VI. Crossing the Berezina

“A man has his day in war as in other things;I myself shall be good for it another six years,

after which even I shall have to stop.”

--Napoleon at Austerlitz 1805

I. Two Emperors

I. Two Emperors

First meeting at Tilsit, July 1807

“But when the Tsar of all the Russias, the commander-in-chief of three million horse-guards, foot-guards, life-guards and Cossacks, begins to talk sweetly of brotherly love, it is time for decent people to look to their guns.”

--HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON

“Betrayal at Erfurt” --Asprey

✦ September 1808-Napoleon, furious at the declining situation in Spain, determined that he needed to shore up his relations with Russia before setting matters right there

✦ he invited Tsar Alexander to the French Imperial city of Erfurt, approximately half way between St Petersburg and Paris

✦ The Principality of Erfurt became subordinate to Napoleon I as imperial state domain (domaine réservé à l'empereur) after the defeat of Prussia in the Battle of Jena and Auerstedt, while the surrounding Thuringian states joined the Confederation of the Rhine.

✦ he arranged a lavish series of entertainments to compliment the negotiations:

✦ Parisian chefs, furnishings, musical & theatrical performers, hunts and balls

✦ but he made the serious error of involving Talleyrand in the negotiations. Instead of advancing Napoleon’s aims, he revealed to Alexander what Bonaparte’s reactions had been to the previous day’s discussions, “treachery of the highest degree [undoubtedly paid for by] Russian, Austrian and English gold”--Asprey

✦ therefore the young tsar “dug in his heels” and refused to come under the older emperor’s political and personal dominance

The Erfurt Convention, October 1808

✦ both agreed that Britain was “their common enemy and the enemy of the [European] continent”

✦ they promised that neither would make a separate peace

✦ Russia promised military support if Austria should attack France but refused to undertake restraining Austrian rearmament as Napoleon had wished

✦ Russia remained suspicious of French intentions in Poland and resentful of French relations with their enemy, Ottoman Turkey

✦ in addition to his frustration over Alexander’s refusal to restrain Austria, Napoleon was humiliated that Alexander demurred to offer one of his sisters as Joséphine’s replacement. The tsar had said that decision was not his, but his mother’s

The French Emperor hoped to keep the peace with Russia. Needing Alexander’s support for his Continental System, he had put off with soft words all Polish pleas that he reform their semi-independent Duchy of Warsaw into a free Kingdom of Poland. This, Alexander insistently demanded that he promise never to do. Napoleon had already blocked the constant, lemming-like [warm-water-port-seeking] westward expansion of the Russian empire. But Poland had been the traditional keeper of Europe’s eastern borders against Asian barbarism; worse, Poles could remember that Smolensk had once been a Polish frontier fortress. As a countermove against Napoleon’s influence in Poland, in 1810 Alexander pushed a propaganda campaign throughout the Duchy of Warsaw, urging the reunification of Poland under his own personal rule. Russian troops concentrated along the Duchy’s eastern frontier, ready to advance if any sort of popular could be aroused for Alexander’s proposed client kingdom. No demand whatever developed, but the concentrations remained.

Esposito & Elting, “INTRODUCTION TO THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN’, after MAP 106

“I shall have war with Russia on grounds that lie

beyond human possibilities, because they

are rooted in the cause itself”

Napoleon to Austrian Count Metternich,

autumn, 1810

Did he mean that a clash of wills stemming from two expansionist policies was inevitable? Was he thinking in terms of the present or the near or far future? It is difficult to suggest an answer but it is obvious from the written record that from the autumn of 1810 onwards he was on a collision course with his eastern ally.

Asprey, p. 209

Napoleon’s relations with Czar Alexander were rapidly deteriorating….He ha increasingly regarded [Ambassador] Caulaincourt’s long-winded reports of the czar’s friendship, loyalty and desire for peace as camouflage for intended evil--and he was right. Caulaincourt was being duped. Alexander was not only trading openly with enemy England, he was also working with Prince Czartoryski in setting the scene for rebellion in his favor in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; he was secretly sounding out Austrian and Prussian courts as to a military alliance; he was secretly encouraging the Spanish central junta in Cádiz to carry on its struggle against France.

Asprey, pp. 226-227

Finally, the Continental System bore increasingly heavily upon England and continental Europe alike. To tighten its enforcement, Napoleon annexed Holland (1810) and various minor north German states. The latter included Oldenburg, a minuscule principality, the heir-apparent of which had married Alexander’s favorite sister. Alexander protested; Napoleon retorted that he would recompense the displaced ruling family, but would keep its territory. Alexander (prodded by his merchants) raised his tariff on French wines and opened his ports to “neutral” (actually English) shipping. England, desperate for allies, labored to capitalize on every Russian resentment against France. In 1811, Napoleon’s empire nevertheless seemed assured. In March, his young wife gave birth to the long-desired heir the “King of Rome.” But Napoleon was studying all available books on Russia, French garrisons remained in the Prussian fortresses, French troops quietly massed between Hamburg and Danzig, and spies came and went.

Esposito & Elting, “INTRODUCTION TO THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN’, after MAP 106

“If the Russian czar does not wish war, and if he does not

stop these hostile moves, he will have one next year, despite me

despite himself, despite the interests of France and Russia”

Napoleon to the king of Würtemburg in Paris,

2 April, 1811

Both “cheat” on the Continental System

✦ much to Napoleon’s anger, some of his corrupt officials in French ports, in his brother Louis’ Holland, and the North Sea German ports were selling licenses or “looking the other way” when “neutral” ships brought in British goods

✦ Russia, aware of this, and badly hurt by losing their trade to Britain in naval stores (timber, hemp and tar) began to open her Baltic ports to such British trade as well

✦ then Russian merchants sent a stream of British goods into “the Germanies”

✦ British agents were bribing many of Alexander’s ministers to turn him against France

✦ Napoleon’s plan “to win the war at sea on land” with his war on British trade first led him into the disastrous Peninsular War and now would provoke him into this catastrophic war on a second front

As for Alexander, he had decided on war sometime early in 1810. Taught by defeat, he had decided to remain on the defensive militarily, but to employ diplomacy, subversion, and economic pressure aggressively everywhere. This threw the onus for any open hostilities completely onto Napoleon--hence the popular “historical” picture of a lovable liberal Czar, subjected to unprovoked assault by a squat little Corsican bounder.” Alexander was also considering peace with Turkey, and negotiating gingerly with England and Sweden. Bernadotte, now Crown Prince (and actually ruler) of Sweden, would join any alliance against France, if promised Norway. Napoleon remained oddly passive to these shifts, neither making a real effort to conciliate Bernadotte nor supplying the money and weapons needed to support Turkey’s war effort. He did not want war with Russia, but, as before, the thrill of an impending campaign was beginning to grip him.

Esposito & Elting, “INTRODUCTION TO THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN’, after MAP 106

“I shall not fire the first cannon, but I shall be the last to sheathe my

sword.”Tsar Alexander

to the French ambassador,General Caulaincourt, on the

threat of war with France.Vilna, May 1812

Perhaps the French historian Bainville demonstrated the crux of the matter when he wrote, “Napoleon went to Moscow in pursuit of the ghost of Tilsit.” Basically it was insatiable ambition, lust for power and a desire to regain the international position he had enjoyed in July 1807 that led Napoleon to make his fatal decision. At Tilsit, Napoleon had drunk the heady wine of apparently consummated success; one monarch of ancient lineage--the unfortunate king of Prussia--had attended the conference in the role of helpless suppliant; another--the powerful Tsar of all the Russias--had been eager to reach a friendly accommodation with the adventurer of Corsican extraction…. This had represented Napoleon’s greatest hour, at least superficially. To all appearances he was then the … master of continental Europe.

Chandler, pp. 739-740

With war with Russia increasingly inevitable, in 1811 Napoleon began stocking large amounts of foodstuffs and munitions in depots between Danzig and Warsaw. His preps were thorough, far beyond those of any previous campaign, but calculated to fit his intent to bring the Russian armies to battle in Western Russia and destroy them there. (That, oddly was what Alexander planned to do to the French. Eventually, Russian generals realized that they were outsmarted and outnumbered, and so headed rapidly eastward--afterwards explaining that it was Alexander’s far seeing plan!)

Col. John Elting, Swords Around A Throne, p. 566

II. Crossing the Niemen

II. Crossing the Niemen

“Soldats!” opened the Imperial proclamation of 22 June 1812. “The second Polish war has opened; the first ended at Friedland and Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia swore eternal friendship with France and also war against England. Today she has broken her undertakings! She will give no further explanation of her strange behavior until the French eagles have again withdrawn behind the Rhine, leaving our distant allies at her mercy. She will learn at her cost that her destiny must be fulfilled. Does she think us degenerate? Are we no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz? She places us between dishonor and war; there can be no doubt which course we shall choose. Forward then, let us cross the Niemen, so we can carry the war into her own territory. The second Polish war will bring as much glory to French arms as did the first.”

Chandler, p. 739

created by the French civil engineer Charles Joseph Minard, which ingeniously combined both a map of the campaign and a visual representation of the number of men remaining in Napoleon’s doomed army.  The thickness of the line is proportional to the number of men in the army (one millimeter equalling 10,000 men), with the beige section representing the offensive toward Moscow, and the black line the retreat.  Below, Minard also included a second chart showing the temperature on various days during the retreat (Minard used the Réaumur scale for his temperatures, as was commonplace at the time.  Converted to Celsius, this makes the coldest part of the retreat a whopping −37.5 °C). 

Napoleon heavily discounted Russia’s fighting capability, as well he might considering his victories at Austerlitz and Friedland. Nor would he be without allies. A secret treaty with Prussia signed in February guaranteed him 20,000 troops, free passage of the country and logistic support for men and horses. A secret treaty with Austria signed a month later provided for 30,000 troops to protect his right flank in Poland. Davout’s army in Germany would soon muster 200,000 men, Murat was coming from Naples in command of a second army based on Stettin, General Junot would arrive from Italy with the vanguard of Viceroy Eugene’s army of 80,000. A Bavarian force also 80,000 strong would be commanded by Gouvion St. Cyr. General Prince Poniatowski would command 60,000 Polish soldiers [perhaps Bonaparte’s most motivated and loyal foreign troops, jbp], the other confederation states would provide 70,000 more bodies--in all nearly 600,000 troops including the Imperial Guard, now a hefty 50,000. More French soldiers would soon arrive from Spain, and another 120,000 conscripts were to be raised in France.

Asprey, pp. 239-241

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Situation 23 June 1812, andNapoleon’s Advance Since 31 May

...huge efforts were made by Napoleon and his staff to provide an adequate supply system. From the very beginning it was appreciated that there would be no chance of living off the countryside as in previous campaigns…. he feared that the Russians might have recourse to a “scorched earth” policy…. “without adequate transportation, everything will be useless.” Consequently, provision had to be made for the movement of vast quantities of fodder, biscuit, rice, vegetables and brandy, and the myriad other articles and stores that the vast army would need…. For meat rations, vast herds of cattle and oxen were collected…. In round numbers, the Grande Armée was accompanied by no less than 200,000 animals (to include the 30,000 horses of the artillery and the 80,000 of the cavalry), besides a total of some 25,000 vehicles, including the supply wagons, ammunition caissons, ambulances and other forms of conveyance. The problem of feeding so many animals would be acute, and there is small wonder that the Emperor delayed the invasion date until that time of year when the Russian plains would be holding their lushest crops of grass.

Chandler, pp. 757-758

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Situation 1 July 1812

KOVNO

VILNA

By late 24 June, Kovno was occupied, Ney had reached the bridges, and Murat was beating the country toward Vilna.Entering Vilna early on the 28th after a brief skirmish, Napoleon ordered its organization as his advanced base.

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Situation 1 July 1812

KOVNO

VILNA

By late 24 June, Kovno was occupied, Ney had reached the bridges, and Murat was beating the country toward Vilna.Entering Vilna early on the 28th after a brief skirmish, Napoleon ordered its organization as his advanced base.

After considering an assortment of plans...Alexander [had] finally adopted one drafted by Phull, a refugee Prussian officer. Under it, Barclay would cover the main roads to the two Russian capitals. After meeting the first shock of the French offensive, he would retire slowly to the fortified camp at Drissa. Theoretically, the French army would arrive before that camp considerably weakened by casualties and detachments left behind to protect its communications. It would then be forced either to attack Barclay’s entrenched army or to retreat. Meanwhile, Bagration, reinforced by all available Cossacks, would strike into the French right rear. Tormassov would protect Kiev against a possible Austrian advance; if not attacked, he would move north. --Esposito & Elting

DRISSA

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Situation 14 July 1812

Napoleon’s principal worry was [his brother] Jerome’s lagging advance. He required intelligence concerning the Russian forces opposing Jerome as a basis for future orders….While Murat continued to edge eastward, repeatedly defeating Barclay’s cavalry, and Jerome finally advanced on 5 July, Napoleon had developed his plan. Davout should continue boldly on to Minsk, crowding Bagration southward and thus enabling the French to reach Vitebsk ahead of him….Accordingly, he authorized Davout to take command of Jerome’s army, ...should the good of the service require it. (Davout was to keep this authority secret; unknown to Davout, Napoleon did not inform Jerome of it.)

MINSK

VITEBSK

On 12 July, the French main army began concentrating toward Barclay’s south flank, all indications being that the latter was concentrated at Drissa and would fight there. Davout’s cavalry occupied Borisov and established contact with Jerome….On 13 July, seeing an opportunity to destroy Bagration before turning north, Davout informed Jerome that he was assuming command of the right wing. Incensed, Jerome halted all troop movements on 14 July, and turned over his command to his chief of staff, Marchand….

BORISOV

Napoleon was momentarily stymied, but not for long. If Bagration and Barclay had escaped defeat they could still be destroyed further east, probably at the next river line, that of the Dvina. They were plainly on the run, it was only a matter of catching them up to force a battle. While the army waited for its supply trains Davout’s columns remained on Bagration’s trail, not an easy task since the wily prince knew the country very well and commanded some of the best horseflesh in the world. After heading south he cunningly doubled back to the northeast planning to join Barclay on the Dvina. His maneuver precipitated a serious quarrel between Davout and Jérôme, the latter again being negligent, but the damage was done. Jérôme in royal pique returned to Westphalia--a furious emperor transferred most of his corps to Marshal Victor’s command.

Asprey, p. 254

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Situation 24 July 1812

Davout received Jerome’s resignation on 15 July. Shaken by such flat non-cooperation, he urged Jerome to reconsider…. In reply, Jerome announced his departure for Westphalia…. Too weak to attack Bagration singlehanded, Davout decided to seize Mogilev, thereby barring the shortest route northward to Vitebsk.

MOGILEV

ORSHA

During the retreat on Vitebsk, Alexander was persuaded to return to St. Petersburg, thus giving Barclay a relatively free hand. Barclay ordered Bagration to join him at Orsha, claiming (on 21 July) that, once his troops were concentrated at Vitebsk, he intended to attack Napoleon. (On 23 July, he suggested to Alexander that it would be necessary to withdraw to Smolensk before offering battle.)

VITEBSK

Napoleon still hesitated to move boldly against Barclay, for his own forces were not sufficiently concentrated, and he feared that any premature move would only startle Barclay into further retreat.At 0400 29 July, Napoleon decided to “devote seven to eight days to let the army close up….” Troops were to be put under shelter and fed regularly; reserve rations for twenty days were to be accumulated. All units would submit accurate strength returns….Napoleon had plentiful reasons for this pause. His army, and especially his cavalry was exhausted. Much of his artillery and his ammunition trains were still far to the rear; some of Murat’s cavalry were out of ammunition. Because of excessive straggling (Ney’s corps was down to 20,700 from 37,800), he was uncertain as to the number of soldiers still with him. Finally, it seems certain that Napoleon had cold-bloodedly decided to allow Barclay and Bagration to unite, hoping that they might then risk a battle.

Barclay’s uncertainty as to Napoleon’s dispositions was only one of his troubles. His troops, worn out and poorly supplied, were deserting. His own staff intrigued against him as a “German” and “traitor” who had tamely abandoned Russia’s Polish and Lithuanian conquests. Any attempt to retire farther, giving up Smolensk--one of Russia’s earliest and most cherished trophies--plainly would endanger his career.

Meanwhile on 4 August, Bagration had closed up around Smolensk and gone energetically to work undermining Barclay’s authority. Barclay, under pressure from Alexander and his own subordinates, reluctantly decided, on 6 August, to attack Napoleon--of whose actual dispositions he remained ignorant. The combined Russian armies would advance on Rudnya, turn Eugene’s left flank, destroy his corps, then catch the rest of the French piecemeal as they attempted to aid Eugene.

RUDNYA

Meanwhile on 4 August, Bagration had closed up around Smolensk and gone energetically to work undermining Barclay’s authority. Barclay, under pressure from Alexander and his own subordinates, reluctantly decided, on 6 August, to attack Napoleon--of whose actual dispositions he remained ignorant. The combined Russian armies would advance on Rudnya, turn Eugene’s left flank, destroy his corps, then catch the rest of the French piecemeal as they attempted to aid Eugene.[7-12 August, the Russian attack fizzles out] Davout had established bridgeheads at Orsha, Dubrovna and Rosasna. Sensing Barclay’s irresolution, Napoleon continued preparations for his own offensive…..On 12 August...Napoleon ordered Davout across the Dnieper to Rosasna while Junot moved on Romanovo.

RUDNYA

Dni

eper

Riv

er

ROMANOVO

ROSASNA

Shortly after noon on 14 August, Ney and Murat drove the Russians back towards Smolensk.

At about 1230 Napoleon launched a limited attack against Smolensk, apparently to test Barclay’s determination to defend it. His assault was shrewdly organized, its main effort being directed against the south face of the town, out of reach of Barclay’s artillery on the north bank. Four hours’ hard fighting cleared the suburbs. Docturov, already mauled, was badly hammered while withdrawing into the city. Poiniatowski almost carried one of the gates…. The French seem to have made no real effort to storm the old walls…. When massed French 12-pounders proved unable to breach the walls, Davout used his howitzers to set the buildings behind it on fire. Napoleon halted the assault at about 2000 (8 pm).

At about 1230 Napoleon launched a limited attack against Smolensk, apparently to test Barclay’s determination to defend it. His assault was shrewdly organized, its main effort being directed against the south face of the town, out of reach of Barclay’s artillery on the north bank. Four hours’ hard fighting cleared the suburbs. Docturov, already mauled, was badly hammered while withdrawing into the city. Poiniatowski almost carried one of the gates…. The French seem to have made no real effort to storm the old walls…. When massed French 12-pounders proved unable to breach the walls, Davout used his howitzers to set the buildings behind it on fire. Napoleon halted the assault at about 2000 (8 pm).

At 2300 (11 pm) Barclay ordered Smolensk evacuated. This precipitated another generals’ mutiny, led by Bennigsen and Constantine, who accused him of throwing away a “glorious victory.” Their clamoring merely stiffened Barclay’s spine: Docturov had lost heavily…. French losses around Smolensk were approximately 9,000; Russian losses somewhat higher.

The Emperor by now was fully aware of the enormity of his undertaking. The farther he advanced, the greater it grew. So long as he had encountered only kings, their defeat had been child’s play. But all the kings were beaten, and now he had to deal with the people. This was another Spain, but a Spain remote, barren, endless that he had found at the opposite end of Europe. He hesitated, uncertain as to how to proceed….

General Count Philippe-Paul de Ségur, Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, p. 43

By 0400 20 August, he had ordered Murat and Davout to resume the pursuit.The French advanced in three columns Thoroughly sensible of his lengthening line of communication, Napoleon shifted reserves and garrison troops eastward, and ordered Victor to take command of the army’s rear area.At first, the weather was hot and dusty, with wells and streams going dry. Later nightly rains helped. Astride the main highway, the Russians stripped the countryside as they retreated, leaving little for the center French column. The two flank columns, though slowed by poor roads, usually found undisturbed villages and sufficient supplies. [In the center column] hunger caused considerable straggling, and numbers of stragglers and foragers were killed by angry serfs and Cossacks.

Dni

eper

Riv

er

The Russian armies suffered at least as much as the French. Morale dwindled; sickness and desertion increased….on the 29th Barclay found that he had been superseded by Kutusov.

! 1757-age 12 he went to the military engineer’s academy. Became fluent in English, French, German, Swedish, Polish and Turkish

! 1762-as a captain, served under Suvorov

! in wars against the Turks he whetted his skill at employing cossacks

! 1773-leading a faltering attack, he received the wound in his temple which cost him his right eye

! 1787-92--again under Suvorov, he served as a Lieutenant- General in the Russo-Turkish War. Thereafter, he held many high civil posts

! 1805-at Austerlitz his advice was ignored by Alexander

! 1806-1812-he commanded the Russian armies in yet another Russo-Turkish war Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov,

usually shortened to Mikhail Kutuzov 1745 – 1813

Kutusov’s appointment had been forced on Alexander (between whom and Kutusov there was open dislike) by the frightened Russian nobility. Sixty-seven years old, too fat to mount a horse, popular with the common soldiers, crafty, lazy and greedy, Kutusov was still a realist. He had little hope of defeating Napoleon, yet he knew that he must fight to defend Moscow. To get a better grip on his command and to postpone the day of battle as long as possible, he risked his popularity by continuing the retreat….[On 1 September], scenting imminent battle, Napoleon halted two days to rest men and horses, and allow stragglers and detachments to close up. On 2 September he called for immediate and careful musters of men, m o u n t s , a m m u n i t i o n a n d m e d i c a l supplies--”for my decision will depend upon them.”The returns showed approximately 128,000 men present and 6,000 able to close up within five days….At about 1400 (2 pm) on 5 September, Murat developed the main Russian Army, occupying a hastily fortified position around the little town of Borodino.

BORODINO

A major problem for the whole Grande Armée was the disastrous rate of losses among the horses, more from disease, fatigue and -- particularly -- bad fodder and care than from enemy action.

Pauly, Polish Lancers, p. 38

III. Borodino

III. Borodino

Franz Alekseyevich Roubaud was a Ukrainian painter who created some of the largest and best known panoramic paintings.Roubaud was born in 1856 in Odessa and attended an art school there. In 1877 he went to Munich, where he studied at the Munich Academy. He then settled in Saint Petersburg, working in the Imperial Academy of Arts and painting huge panoramas of historical battles - ... Siege of Sevastopol (1854) [which we saw in the 19th century Europe class] (unveiled in 1905, damaged during the Siege of Sevastopol (1942), restored in the 1950s), Battle of Borodino (1911, moved to Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow in 1962) [which I saw there in 1972] and…. His works were so large that they had to be exhibited in pavilions specially built for that purpose. In 1913, Roubaud left Russia for Munich, where he died in 1928

Semenovsky village

Battle for Semenovsky ravine

Hand-to-hand fighting

French positions

Westphalian Cuirassiers

Attack of the Saxon Cuirassiers

Cavalry fight on the rye field

Russian cavalry counter-attacks

Russian reserves

Semenovsky villagewhere we began

Now, let’s examine each panel in detail

detail from panel 3

Napoleon

Murat

details

detail from panel 7

details

Napoleon at Borodino Heights, Vasili Vereschagin

Borodino has been magnified---largely through Tolstoy’s fiction---into an apocalyptic struggle. Losses were heavy---between 28,000 and 31,000 French, and more than 45,000 Russians---but actually Wagram was a greater and more sternly contested battle.

Esposito & Elting, opposite MAP 118

French soldiers are not easily deceived; and these wondered why, with so many Russians killed and wounded, there should be only 800 prisoners. It was by the number of prisoners that they judged success, since the dead attested to the courage of the defeated, rather than to a victory. If the survivors were able to retreat in such good order, proud and undaunted, what did the winning of one field matter? In such a vast country, would the Russians ever lack for space on which to fight?

de Ségur, p. 83

IV. Moscow

IV. Moscow

Vowing to defend Moscow to the last, Kutusov retreated rapidly toward that city. Leaving Junot on the [Borodino] battlefield to collect wounded and trophies. Napoleon pursued….On 9 September Murat rushed Kutusov’s rear guard out of Mozhaisk, forcing it to abandon some 10,000 sick and wounded. On 13 September, Kutusov halted just west of Moscow and called a council of war...he probably had fewer than 75,000 men. No good defensive position was available….Kutusov finally chose to retire southward. Meanwhile, Count Rostopchin, the violent and erratic governor of Moscow, had driven most of that city’s population off…, released all prisoners from the city’s jails, and carried off or crippled all fire-fighting equipment. Murat reached the western gates of Moscow on the 14th, on the heels of the Russian rear guard.

Since both sides were anxious to spare the city, a verbal agreement was reached: the Russians were to withdraw unmolested, leaving Moscow intact to the French….Napoleon was angered when no local authorities could be found to surrender the city to him…. Fires had been noticed in Moscow during the 14th….

Marshal Duroc was still sorting out imperial headquarters in the luxurious rooms of the Kremlin when arsonists put match to fuse. The fire began on the night of 15 September, burned furiously and dangerously for three days and sporadically for another day or two until squelched by rain. Such was its intensity that imperial headquarters had to be temporarily moved outside the city proper. In addition to fighting the flames and shooting Rostopchin’s convicts, the soldiers devoted themselves to an orgy of drunken looting of what they called “the Moscow fair.” The great fire destroyed about three-quarters of the dwellings and shops. “The superbly beautiful city of Moscow no longer exists,” Napoleon informed Czar Alexander two days after the fires were out. “...Four hundred arsonists were arrested in the act...they have been shot.”

Asprey, pp. 265-266

“This is no time for faintheartedness! Let us swear to be

doubly courageous and persevering!”

Alexander’s proclamationto the Russian people

September, 1812

...the Czar…[showed] himself in his speeches as great as the misfortune.

“The enemy is in a capital as empty as a tomb, with no way of dominating, even of existing. He entered Russia with three hundred thousand [note how he halves the number] men of all races, without union, without national or religious ties. Half his forces have been destroyed by the sword, hunger, and desertion. In Moscow now there are only ruins. He is in the center of Russia, but not a Russian is at his feet … Meanwhile our forces are increasing anf hemming him in. He is in the heart of a thickly populated country, surrounded by troops that have halted him and are ready to pounce on him. To escape starvation he will soon have to flee through the dense ranks of our fearless soldiers. Shall we draw back now, when all Europe is following us with encouraging eyes? Let us now be an example to them, and welcome the Hand which has chosen us to be the first nation in the cause of truth and liberty!” He ended with an invocation to the Almighty.

de Ségur, pp. 121-122

V. Retreat

V. Retreat

Marshal Ney in the retreat

...Ney’s method of retreat, the one he had observed since leaving Viazma on the third of November, that is, for thirty-seven days and nights.

Every day at five o’clock [1700] he halted and held the Russians at bay while his soldiers ate and rested, then set off again at ten [2200]. All night long he urged on the horde of laggards by dint of threats, supplications, or blows. At daybreak, about seven o’clock, he halted again, took up a position, and rested under arms and on guard until ten. Then generally the Russians would come in sight again, and we had to keep up a constant flight [fighting withdrawal, the hardest military maneuver] until nightfall, gaining as much ground as possible in a backward direction. At first this was in pursuance of definite marching orders, but later according to circumstances. The rear guard had been progressively reduced from two thousand men to one thousand, then to five hundred, and finally to sixty!

de Ségur, pp. 288-289

Napoleon’s step son Eugene Beauharnais gave Kutusov a bloody nose at Maloyaroslavets on 23-24 October.

At Maloyaroslavets, there was soul-searching in both headquarters. Kutusov, with...little confidence in his new troops after their defeat by Eugene, retired two miles, uncovering a side road leading through unforaged country to Medyn. Napoleon, with the main Russian army holding an almost impregnable position across his road to Kaluga, spent the day in indecision.

The French retreated at a crawl. Napoleon would abandon nothing, insisting on picking up the wounded at the Mozhaisk and Borodino hospitals, and every available gun and wagon. Thus overloaded, his exhausted teams gave out, littering the road with derelict vehicles. Davout, commanding the rear guard, was swamped by thousands of stragglers and lagging artillery and wagons from the main body.

MEDYN

KALUGA

“…. But most horrible was the field of Borodino, where we saw the forty thousand men who had perished there, yet lying unburied.” Marbot too remarked on the field of Borodino “covered with the debris of helmets, swords, wheels, weapons, scraps of uniforms and thirty thousand corpses half eaten by wolves. The troops and the Emperor passed by rapidly, casting a sorrowful glance at this immense tomb.” Napoleon and the Guard reached Viasma only at the end of October. Although the army was now strung out for about 50 miles and was frequently under attack by guerrillas, Cossacks and regular army units, Napoleon did not seem to be upset although he continued to worry about the safe evacuation of the wounded.

Asprey, p. 272

“…. But most horrible was the field of Borodino, where we saw the forty thousand men who had perished there, yet lying unburied.” Marbot too remarked on the field of Borodino “covered with the debris of helmets, swords, wheels, weapons, scraps of uniforms and thirty thousand corpses half eaten by wolves. The troops and the Emperor passed by rapidly, casting a sorrowful glance at this immense tomb.” Napoleon and the Guard reached Viasma only at the end of October. Although the army was now strung out for about 50 miles and was frequently under attack by guerrillas, Cossacks and regular army units, Napoleon did not seem to be upset although he continued to worry about the safe evacuation of the wounded.

Asprey, p. 272

Only a few days later [4 Nov] the favorable weather turned to a storm that covered the troops with snow and the roads with ice. [Heavy snow made it impossible to graze the starving horses.] The cavalry, unshod for winter except for [the] Guard, was helpless. Fallen horses littered the roads, the poor creatures still in their death throes being butchered for food. Abandoned gun carriages, caissons, wagons and elegant carriages holding incredibly valuable treasures littered the primitive roads, the troops quickly stripped them of their plunder only to abandon it in turn.

Asprey, pp. 273, 265

Only a few days later [4 Nov] the favorable weather turned to a storm that covered the troops with snow and the roads with ice. [Heavy snow made it impossible to graze the starving horses.] The cavalry, unshod for winter except for [the] Guard, was helpless. Fallen horses littered the roads, the poor creatures still in their death throes being butchered for food. Abandoned gun carriages, caissons, wagons and elegant carriages holding incredibly valuable treasures littered the primitive roads, the troops quickly stripped them of their plunder only to abandon it in turn.

Asprey, pp. 273, 265

Great numbers of soldiers could be seen wandering over the countryside, either alone or in small groups. These were not cowardly deserters: cold and starvation had detached them from their columns… Now they met only armed civilians or Cossacks who fell upon them with ferocious laughter, wounded them, stripped them of everything they had and left them to perish naked in the snow. These guerrillas...kept abreast of the army on both sides of the road, under cover of the trees. They threw back on the deadly highway the soldiers whom they did not finish off with their spears and axes.

Count Philippe Paul de Segur

“Understand that the foundation of an army is the belly. It is necessary to procure nourishment for the soldier wherever you assemble him and wherever you wish to lead him. This is the primary duty of a general.” --FREDERICK THE GREAT

As a soldier, Napoleon had touched his lowest ebb. Traveling near the head of the army, in the middle of his Guard, he at times seemed to have abdicated his command. He warned neither Victor, Macdonald, Schwarzenberg nor Maret of his plight, and made no effort to coordinate their operations. (It was 7 November when he finally advised Victor that the main army was exhausted and its situation was critical.) And, by isolating himself from his army, he completely neglected its still-deep resources of morale and devotion. --Esposito & Elting

ORSHA

*

Napoleon reached Smolensk on 9 November, and found bad news...ordered the Guard issued 15 days rations and the other units 6. The Smolensk administrative staff fumbled the situation, either demanding formal requisitions or panicking. Stragglers began looting, other troops joined them, and many supplies were wasted. Instead of leaving Smolensk with his 50,000 effective troops well closed up, Napoleon proceeded as if the Russians did not exist. --Esposito & Elting

SMOLENSK

An immensity of woe stretched out before us. We were going to march forty days more [from Smolensk] under the weight of this iron yoke! Some of the men, already overburdened with their present miseries, were completely overwhelmed by the dreaded prospect. Others … no longer counting on anyone but themselves...resolved to live at all costs. From that time on, the strong plundered the weak, stealing from their dying companions...their food, their clothing, or the gold with which they had filled their knapsacks instead of provisions. Then these miserable wretches whom despair had driven to banditry, threw away their own weapons in order to save this infamous loot, taking advantage of...the complete anonymity, the unrecognizable state of their uniforms, the darkness of night, and anything that might encourage cowardice and crime. I should not have mentioned these obnoxious details if reports exaggerating their horror had not already been published: for such atrocities were rare, and the guiltiest were executed.

de Ségur, pp. 191-192

VI. Crossing theBerezina

VI. Crossing theBerezina

from 50,000

to28,000

Orsha had been the salvation of the French army. Its commanding officer and administrative staff were capable and determined, and had taken all possible measures to receive and resupply the troops from their well-stocked magazines. Insofar as possible, stragglers had been sent back to their units and rearmed. In a belated effort to lighten his army, Napoleon ordered all surplus vehicles burned, and their horses transferred to the artillery. He himself set the example, destroying most of his papers and personal baggage. Counting...on being able to use the Borisov bridge [over the Berezina] he even burned his ponton bridge train, over the objections of its commander General Eblé. (However Eblé managed to retain two field forges and eight wagons loaded with coal and tools. Each of his pontoniers carried a tool, spikes, and clamps.)

Jean-Baptiste Eblé

Oudinot meanwhile had marched on Borisov with the II Corps and part of Dombrowski’s division….The Russians just managed to burn the bridge before Oudinot could rush it, but left him some 350 wagons loaded with supplies and more than 1,000 prisoners. Oudinot had learned of two other fords: one at Studenka (from Corbineau, who had joined him after crossing there during the night of 21-22 November), and one nearer Borisov, used by a Polish regiment that had been cut off on the 21st….Oudinot quickly decided to use the Studenka ford.

Before dawn on 26 November, Napoleon massed Oudinot’s guns on the low ridge behind Studenka. At 0800 Polish lancers rode into the stream, each carrying a voltigeur behind him. After them three small rafts shuttled 300 infantrymen across. These troops, efficiently covered by Oudinot’s guns, quickly cleared the opposite bank. Simultaneously Eblé began construction of two 105-yard long bridges, one for infantry and cavalry, one for vehicles. Working shoulder deep in freezing water, buffeted by floating ice, engineers and sailors finished the infantry-cavalry bridge by 1300. Eblé, austere and deeply revered, set the example.

The vehicular bridge was finished at 1600; all available artillery was pushed across as fast as it came up. At 2000 (8 pm) the collapse of three trestles halted this movement. Eblé roused half of his exhausted men from their fires, and led them into the river. After a three-hour struggle in the freezing darkness, the artillery bridge was again serviceable.

At 0200 27 November, the vehicular bridge broke again; Eblé took the other half of his men into the wreckage, got traffic moving again by 0600. It broke again at 1600 (4 pm) but was repaired in two hours…. Napoleon sent the Guard across the river, Junot followed, then Eugene, finally Davout. Those stragglers who reached the bridges were cleared through between the formed units. Napoleon was extremely active, reconnoitering Oudinot’s position and checking each unit that crossed.

28 November

28 November

Victor had skillfully organized the Studenka ridge, his weak south flank being supported by guns massed on the west bank. Wittgenstein attacked repeatedly, attempting to break in between Victor and the bridges. Several times he managed to place artillery fire on them; each time, Victor knocked him sprawling back.

28 November

Alarmed by this firing, the stragglers rushed the bridges, blocking them repeatedly, but at dusk those who had not crossed camped on the east bank, deaf to all warnings. Eblé cleared the bridges, and Victor withdrew between 2100 and 0630 in perfect order. The sight of his rear guard finally aroused the stragglers; though ordered to burn the bridges at 0700, Eblé gave them until 0830. Possibly 10,000 of them did not escape. It was 0900 before Wittgenstein’s Cossacks ventured forward to rob those unfortunates.

28 November

In more senses than one, Napoleon had snatched an outstanding victory out of his worst defeat. The Grande Armée might be dying on its feet, but neither winter, hunger, rivers, nor overwhelming odds in men and guns could halt it. It trampled them underfoot and went on. And with it, borne above disaster, marched Napoleon’s prestige and the traditions of the French Revolution. “You should never despair while brave men remain with the colors.” --Esposito & Elting

His army too weak for another battle, Napoleon ordered Vilna prepared to resupply it.Winter was the deadly enemy. The temperature plummeted below zero; storms scourged the shambling columns. Few men could do more than keep alive. Both armies gradually disintegrated from hunger, exhaustion, cold, and typhus.

VILNA

The BerezinaCrossing

VILNA

The BerezinaCrossing

Now the irregulars and Cossacks came into their own: hardy frontiersmen, they endured where Russian regulars perished. Highly disinterested in hard fighting, but hunting constantly for easy loot, they slowly demoralized the exhausted French.

Napoleon had decided to leave his army, a course he had refused to consider east of the Berezina. Now there was little more he could do; his continued presence with the army exposed him to unnecessary risks. Only from Paris could he rebuild his army for the 1813 campaign; only from Paris would he be able to control his empire, once the full outcome of the Russian campaign became known. (As early as 24 October, the half-insane General Malet had almost seized through a fantastic plot; others might be expected.)….E & E

Bad News from France, painting depicting Napoleon encamped in a Russian Orthodox church (Vasily Vereshchagin, part of his series, "Napoleon, 1812", 1887–95)

Smorgony

[At Smorgony the Emperor had told his assembled marshals]”I no longer feel strong enough to leave all Prussia between myself and France. And why should I remain at the head of a retreat? Murat and Eugène are well able to lead it, and Ney to protect it. It is absolutely necessary that I return to France, to reassure and arm the people, and to assure the allegiance of all the Germans. Then I shall come back with fresh adequate troops to save what is left of the Grand Army….But to reach Paris I shall have to cross a thousand miles of allied territory alone. In order that this may be accomplished without danger, my intention must be kept secret: no one must know the road I am to take, and the disastrous news of our retreat must not be made public. I must ride ahead of that news, because of the effect it would have and the general defection which would result, were it known.

de Ségur, pp. 266

Traveling in his usual whirlwind fashion, Napoleon reentered Paris on 18 December--E & E

By the time he reached Rovnopol, two-thirds of his 78-man Polish lancer escorthad died from cold, hunger and exhaustion

Napoleon had attempted a campaign beyond his means. The forces involved were too great, the spaces across which they operated too vast for the existing methods of communication and supply. Napoleon’s abilities as a general and a ruler, outstanding as they proved, could not compensate for the impossible demands imposed by time and space. A sense of impending failure seems to have seized him early, frequently muffling his clear mind and power of decision.

Esposito & Elting, opposite MAP 126

Time was to show that the decision to invade Russia constituted the irrevocable step which effectively compromised any remaining chance of survival for Napoleon and his Empire. From the moment the first troops crossed the Niemen, the Emperor was committed to the path leading inexorably to St. Helena, and although the next few years would hold several transient military successes for his arms, there could be no retracing his steps. The die was cast from 22 June 1812, though few men guessed it at the time.

Chandler, p. 739

In the last analysis, Napoleon’s defeat can be explained in terms of two circumstances. First a general decline in the quality of his generalship, shown first of all in a lack of energy which led to poor supervision of subordinates and repeated failure to intervene personally at the decisive point (as had ever been his practice in the years of his prime); this is also reflected in growing indulgence in wishful thinking concerning the military capabilities of his troops (which he persistently overestimated) and the character of the Tsar (whom he consistently underestimated). The second circumstance was the sheer size of the enterprise he attempted to undertake; it is doubtful whether any other soldier in history would have achieved a larger measure of success, both in the preparatory and the executive phases under the military conditions of 1812…but “Great and distant enterprises perish from the very magnitude of the preparations made to ensure their success.” The problems of space, time and distance proved too great for even one of the greatest military minds that has ever existed, but it was the failure of a giant surrounded by pygmies.

Chandler, p. 861

Alameda, Spain,29th December 1812,

...The successes of the Russians are great and glorious, and will be a means of rousing the Continental Powers from their lethargic state. It will show the world that a true spirit of patriotism will always overpower tyranny and oppression. Bravo, Russians! they are worthy of the country they inhabit, and their labors will be crowned with success. The man that would not be profuse of his life in defence of the place that gave him birth, deserves not the name...

in a letter to his father,G. Simmons,

Lt., 1st Batt., 95th Regt.

George Simmons, A British Rifle Man, 1899, p. 270