naming, shaming and reintegration: beyond stigmatization in ......2 naming, shaming and...
TRANSCRIPT
Berlin, August 2018
Naming, shaming and reintegration:
Beyond stigmatization in international politics
Paper prepared for the 58th ECPR General Conference,
22-25 August 2018, Hamburg
Author Contacts:
Prof. Dr. Simon Koschut
Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science Freie Universität Berlin
Ihnestr. 22 14195 Berlin
Germany
Tel.: +49 (0)30 838 75792 Fax: +49 (0)30 838 54160
Email: [email protected] Web: www.simon-koschut.com
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Naming, shaming and reintegration: Beyond stigmatization in international
politics
Simon Koschut
The standard view in International Relations theory, and much of social sciences, argues that, to resolve conflicts peacefully requires ‘keeping shaming out’ because shaming is stigmatizing and produces a category of outcasts, which often impels people to perform irrational acts of violence and harm. In this paper, I turn this assumption on its head by suggesting that, under certain conditions, shaming may contribute to social repair. Instead of ‘keeping shaming out’, we need to differentiate between different types of shaming in order to fully understand the mechanisms underpinning social exchange in communities. The main argument raised here is that reintegrative shaming – shaming, which is followed by efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community – is central to peaceful conflict resolution in international politics. This argument is empirically illustrated by the case of NATO’s military intervention in Libya.
Introduction
Shaming is a social process of expressing disapproval, with the intention or effect of invoking
suffering in the person being shamed. Shaming, unlike purely deterrent punishment, involves
a moral component of consciousness-raising, labeling, and persuasion to convince others to
change their behavior. Shaming operates at two levels to effect social control. First, it
dissuades states from non-compliance or inappropriate behavior because social approval of
significant others, such as membership in international society, is something most states do
not like to lose. Second, and perhaps more importantly, shaming reaffirms antagonistic
identities by constructing categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Risse and Ropp 2013: 15).
In some cases, such as US foreign policy toward Iran or North Korea, shaming may be
divisive and stigmatizing, emphasizing social distance, whereas in other cases, such as the
rows among NATO allies over Libya or Iraq, shaming has the opposite effect of eventually
producing social intimacy and mutual understanding. There appear, then, to be very different
ways of shaming in IR. In this paper, I argue that shaming can be both reintegrative and
disintegrative and that much turns on this distinction. The general understanding in IR theory
has thus far failed to distinguish the social distancing effects of shaming that is stigmatizing
and outcasting from the community-building effects of shaming that is reintegrative.
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Uncoupling shaming and stigmatization: Three types of social control
IR scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of theorizing the mechanisms through
which states may be shamed into compliance. Shaming has been employed to punish
deviation from international norms (Risse/Ropp/Sikkink; Keck/Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1999;
Nadelmann 1990; Andreas/Nadelmann 2008; Sandholtz/Stiles 2009; Krain 2012), enforce
international taboos (Tannenwald 2005), and to make international status claims (Zarakol
2011). In a recent volume (Friman 2015), the contributors begin to systematically unpack
naming and shaming practices by looking more closely at the conditions that shape its
effectiveness. They move well beyond naming and shaming as an exclusive weapon of the
weak, adding much-needed analytical precision to broad claims about the power of naming
and shaming practices. Still, the general understanding is that international shaming appears
to be wedded to stigmatization in IR theory. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 892) point out,
“we recognize norm-breaking behavior because it generates disapproval or stigma (emphasis
added)”. Zarakol and Subotic (2012, 924) link shame to particular structural positions in the
international system, arguing that “it is particularly stigmatized states within the international
system that are likely to feel shame”. Stigmatization erects barriers between the offender and
punisher through transforming the relationship into one that segregates the offender from the
in-group via labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination (Adler-Nissen
2014, 146). The stigmatized offender is constructed as an outcast and is placed outside the
moral boundaries of international society (Zarakol 2011, 4). Underlying the notion of
stigmatizing shaming is a strong belief in the actor’s inability to correct itself as well as a
fundamental denial of confidence in the morality of the offender. The offender is excluded
and segregated through public humiliation, condemnation, and ‘branding’ in order to insulate
the stigmatizing community from becoming ‘morally polluted’. Social bonds are broken and
social labels designate a clear separation between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’, ‘us’ and
‘them’. To sum up, stigmatization is disintegrative, “a label of difference imposed from
outside”, in which no effort is made to reconcile the offender with the community (Zarakol
2011, 4).
While IR scholars are right to focus attention on stigma labels and their disintegrative
effects in international relations, such a perspective nevertheless tends to obscure the
conceptual complexity of shaming. Below, I show how this may create problems for scholarly
research both on theoretical and practical grounds.
First, when shaming is reduced to stigmatization, this can have undesirable theoretical
consequences. Specifically, it may obscure alternative mechanisms and effects. For example,
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while moral outrage may indeed evoke stigmatization and labelling, it may also trigger
forgiveness and care, as in the relationship between mother and child. Moreover, shaming
may be practiced for different reasons and different intentions. For example, while in some
cases people may indeed wish to exclude deviant individuals from participation in their group
(for example, a sex offender or child molester who fails to acknowledge any misconduct), in
other cases people may find it preferable to reintegrate them back into society (for example, a
juvenile offender who acknowledges her/his crime and deserves a second chance). Finally, the
modalities of shaming are often historically and culturally specific. For example, whereas
outcasting and stigma labelling obtains a central place in American culture, the cultural
assumption in Japan by contrast emphasizes the basic goodness and belief in each individual’s
capacity for self-correction1. In other words, while shaming occupies a central role in both
cultures its purpose and underlying features differ significantly. In sum, the same mechanism
may trigger different effects in different situations, historical periods and cultures.
Second, the practical implications of linking shaming with stigmatization may be
equally serious. For most IR scholars, it may be assumed that the main reason for studying
stigmatization is to get rid of it. These same scholars would probably also agree that social
control through naming and shaming wrongful behavior is unavoidable in virtually any type
of relationship in order to maintain social order and morality. But this creates a dilemma: we
are morally condemning a practice (shaming) that is, at the same time, indispensable for
upholding moral order. Not clearly distinguishing between different types of shaming, and
thus between different types of social control, may thus result in the extinction of any type of
social control through shaming and, in the end, could undermine social order and morality.
That is, well-intentioned attempts to reduce undesirable practices of stigmatizing shaming in
international politics may have the social side-effect of reducing desirable mechanisms of
social control altogether.
Social repair, stigmatization, and toleration
A reasonable way to avoid this dilemma would be to systematically classify and explain
responses to deviance as a function of the type of deviance and underlying contextual factors.
In fact, social psychology differentiates between three types of social control: repair,
stigmatization, and toleration. Repairing social relationships is a type of social control that is
aimed at continuing cooperative and reciprocal interactions with deviant individuals. To 1 Sakiyama,Mari,"ReintegrativeshamingandjuveniledelinquencyinJapan"(2011).UNLVTheses,Dissertations,ProfessionalPapers,andCapstones.995.
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realize this aim, repair focuses on deviant behavior rather than the personality, identity, and
characteristics of deviant individuals. Major strategies to repair disturbed relationships are (1)
punishment to change the behavior of the deviant individual; (2) compensation for suffered
losses due to deviant behavior; (3) care through medical treatment or therapy if the deviant
individuals cannot autonomously change her or his behavior; (4) forgiveness to allow and
motivate deviant individuals to reintegrate; and (5) prevention by means of warning and
education or isolation of individuals if their deviant behavior seems uncontrollable.
Stigmatization, by contrast and as noted above, is a type of social control that is aimed
at excluding the deviant person from a relationship or group. Stigmatization does not
distinguish between deviant behavior and the person. Instead, stigmatization perceives the
deviant condition as a defining and essential attribute of the individual or social group, thus
rendering the person’s or group’s reputation, character, and identity as culturally inadequate
and morally “bad”. Major strategies are (1) stereotyping, which occurs when an undesirable
property is attributed to all members of a group; (2) labelling or pigeonholing by determining
or influencing the self-identity and behavior of individuals or groups as deviant from standard
cultural norms; and (3) discrimination on the basis of features that usually have nothing to do
with the deviant behavior, such as skin color, sexual orientation, or religion. Stigmatization
can be associated with past, imagined or currently present deviant conditions and is often
functional in the context of hierarchical relationships and employed by dominant groups.
Finally, toleration is a third type of social control. It is important to point out here that
tolerance is not the same as indifference with respect to deviant behavior. Rather, toleration
requires that people do care about the deviant behavior of others in a negative way but that we
also attempt to suppress and restrain our negative response. Simply put, toleration requires
people to look the other way and pretend as if the deviant condition does not exist. While this
may seem to undermine social order and morality, there may be good reasons to practice
toleration. First, there may be a caring or protective attitude toward the individual or group
that may help or even force us to tolerate the deviant condition, such as in the relationship
between mother and child. Second, toleration may result from fear of retaliation by others
whom we depend on and who may decide to break up the relationship. For example, the
appeasing character of European responses to the harsh and humiliating rhetoric US president
Trump toward NATO allies may be viewed as a case of toleration due to a lack of alternative
choices.
To conclude, I argued that much conceptual confusion as well as undesirable
theoretical and practical implications may result from conjoining shaming and stigmatization
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in IR. This may be resolved by first realizing that any social group needs to engage in social
control, and that, on the basis of different situations, historical periods, and cultures, social
control may take three major forms: repair, stigmatization, and toleration. Although each of
these types may be characteristic for distinct groups and historical periods, it is important to
emphasize that even within the same group, situation, or historical period, all three types of
social control can occur, and that one type may easily transform into another type under
changing conditions or contexts. For example, the practice of isolating deviant individuals
with the intention of reintegrating them back into society may quickly turn into stigmatization
if that individual is permanently placed outside of the intimate context of the community. In
the following sections, I will build on and further specify this conceptual distinction within
the context of IR. Since I am concerned with the practice of shaming, I will concentrate on
two types of social control: reintegrative shaming (repair) and disintegrative shaming
(stigmatization). Toleration as a third type of social control does not interest me here as it
does not involve the practice of shaming and is thus not relevant to the argument at hand.
Stigmatization and reintegrative shaming
The previous section sought to decouple the concept of shaming from the concept of
stigmatization by showing the complexity of ‘shaming-in-use’. In this section, I intend to do
two things. First, I will further conceptualize what I call reintegrative shaming (repair) by
contrasting it to its disintegrative other (stigmatization). Second, I will subsequently detail the
conditions and mechanisms under which reintegrative shaming occurs.
Recall that stigmatization involves shaming in the sense that an individual is publicly
associated with a stigma, an attribute or symbol that evokes negative feelings by members of
a social group. A stigma prevents that person from engaging with members of the group and
from adapting his or her behavior. Yet, as pointed out above, it would be erroneous to equate
stigmatization with shaming in general rather than as seeing it as a particular type of shaming.
Although stigma logically implies shame, the reverse is not true: shaming does not logically
imply stigma. In some cases, shaming may occur without engaging in stigmatizing strategies
precisely because the aim is to repair a social relationship. Empirical examples, such as the
row among NATO members over Libya in 2011, certainly do involve practices of shaming as
I will show further below. Yet, the motivation behind these shaming practices is not to
exclude members from participating in group activities but to repair a broken relationship. It
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seems useful and necessary, therefore, to introduce an alternative type of shaming to
stigmatization. I will refer to this type as reintegrative shaming.
Reintegrative shaming is shaming, which is followed by efforts to reintegrate the
offender back into the community through words or gestures of forgiveness and ceremonies
of restoration and repentance. The concept of reintegrative shaming originates from research
in criminological theory, particularly the work of John Braithwaite. He showed that different
groups develop different strategies of shaming wrongdoers. Whereas some groups employ
stigmatization to deter transgression, others pursue shaming within a cultural context of
respect for the offender. In this paper, I argue that this distinction is equally important for the
study of international politics. Reintegrative shaming means that expressions of community
disapproval are followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community (Braithwaite 1989,
55). This presupposes persistent belief in the deviant person’s moral capacity for self-
correction. Reintegrative shaming separates the deviant act from the deviator, according to the
Christian tradition of ‘hate the sin, love the sinner’.2 As Braithwaite (1989, 101) explains, “it
is shaming which labels the act as evil while striving to preserve the identity of the offender
as essentially good”.
It should be noted that reintegrative shaming is not simply a weaker or softer form of
stigmatization. On the contrary, it can be just as cruel at times, making the offender ‘feel the
pain’ of violating community norms through discrediting words, gestures, and status
degrading acts. The key distinction between shaming that is disintegrative and reintegrative
shaming is that the former emphasizes social distance whereas the latter emphasizes social
closeness. Even though the status of the deviant actor may be temporarily lowered, he or she
will eventually be invited to come to terms with it and community ties are reinforced by
combining shame with praise.
As with stigmatization, reintegrative shaming is communicated through words,
gestures, and symbols. However, in contrast to stigmatization, the discourse of reintegrative
shaming is a discourse of social intimacy. It communicates disapproval of wrongdoing with
respect, and emphasizes rehabilitation, reintegration, and restoration. For example, a strong
condemnation of misbehavior (‘you betrayed us’) will be immediately followed by public
expressions of mutual respect and social belonging to the group (‘our mutual bond remains
strong’). Thus, in stark contrast to stigmatization, reintegrative shaming sets out to produce
more interaction and greater interconnectedness, albeit a painful one for the offender,
2 It is important to note that this famous dictum by St Augustine is not confined to Christian theology but was also used in a very different sociocultural context by Mahatma Ghandi in his autobiography.
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between community members. Channels of communication remain open and social
connection is there to facilitate apology and remorse.
There has been a number of studies in IR that focus on peace building and transitional
justice through reconciliation (Daase/Engert/Rennert 2016; Porter 2015; Aiken 2013; Minow
2002; Kritz 1995).3 While there are conceptual overlaps between these studies and the notion
of reintegrative shaming developed here, they differ in at least one crucial aspect.
Reconciliation happens only after social bonds have been broken, “in the aftermath of
traumatic conflicts”, after wars being fought, and between “former enemy countries” (Yinan
He 2015, 1; Bleiker 20054). Hence, processes of forgiveness through reconciliation, on the
one hand, and processes of forgiveness through reintegrative shaming, on the other hand,
move in fundamentally different directions. Whereas reconciliation moves “from enmity to
amity” (Gardner-Feldman 2012), reintegrative shaming never departs from amity.
Reconciliation assumes prior categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, memory divergence, and
separation. Reintegrative shaming assumes the opposite: it requires memory convergence and
a strong sense of community.
To sum up, reintegrative shaming can be said to differ from shaming that is
stigmatizing in at least three aspects. First, actors who seek to reintegrate offenders into the
community tend to employ shaming strategies that primarily target wrongful behavior, not the
offender. Second, reintegrative shaming involves relatively high levels of interconnectedness
and collective identification and a discourse that emphasizes social intimacy instead of
distancing. Third, reintegrative shaming is prosocial: it aims at relational repair and
community-building as opposed to stigmatization which tears relationships apart. Table 1
provides an overview of both types of shaming. Put differently, whereas disintegrative
shaming (stigmatization) divides the community by creating a class of outcasts, reintegrative
shaming unites the community by seeking ways to maintain bonds of mutual respect and
amity in the face of a moral transgression.
3 Elizabeth Porter (2015) Connecting Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation, Lynne Rienner; Nevin T. Aiken (2013) Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice, New York: Routledge; Kritz, Neil J. (ed.) 1995. Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. 3 volumes. Washington DC: USIP; Minow, Martha (ed.) 2002. Breaking the Cycles of Hatred. Memory, Law and Repair. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Teitel, Ruti G. 2000. Transitional Justice. New York: Oxford University Press; For an overview of the state of research see van der Merwe et al. 2009; Thoms et al. 2008; Backer 2009. 4 Roland Bleiker (2005) Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Table 1: Types of shaming
Stigmatization
(Disintegrative shaming)
Reintegrative shaming
Shaming strategies Stereotyping, labelling,
discrimination (actor- rather
than behavior-centered)
Punishment, compensation,
care, forgiveness, prevention
(behavior- rather than actor-
centered)
Level of interconnectedness
and identification
Low (‘us’ and ‘them’) High (‘we-feeling’)
Form of discourse Social Distance Social intimacy
Social effects Antisocial: exclusionary and
outcasting
Prosocial: Relational repair
and community-building
The conceptual triad of reintegrative shaming
Having carved out a conceptual way to differentiate the practice of reintegrative shaming
from disintegrative shaming or stigmatization, I will now concentrate on the mechanisms and
conditions under which reintegrative shaming can occur. Reintegrative shaming can be said to
be only effective under certain conditions. These conditions include multiple relationships of
interdependency, the intimate context of relatively small communities, and a normative
consensus on basic values and principles. These conditions translate into a conceptual triad of
reintegrative shaming: moral transgression, justifiable anger, and acknowledgment of shame.
Moral transgression
In order for reintegrative shaming to produce its community-building effects, members need
to follow a scripted series of sequential steps. This begins with the presence of a moral
transgression. To initiate this script, a taboo is violated, or a value disregarded that threatens
the moral order. Each community has its own definitions of what is appropriate and what is
not and violations of these standards of appropriate behavior constitute a potential threat to
the social bonds of the community. Social bonding typically involves two important aspects:
commitment and attachment. Commitment is a legal obligation to follow the rules and accept
a certain degree of restriction of freedom of action. This refers to the cognitive aspect of
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social bond. Commitment is a necessary but insufficient condition for norm compliance. What
is needed is attachment to community norms because these represent the people and values
that matter. Attachment is the emotional connection one feels toward other people, sensitivity
to their opinions, feelings and expectations, which make it also desirable to follow community
norms (Hirschi 1969). Both are at play in processes of reintegrative shaming.
Justifiable anger
Given the emotional investment in social bonds through attachment, the reaction to a violation
of community norms by one of its members can be expected to be anger at the offender. It is
important to distinguish, however, between ‘personal anger’ in response to a frustrating event
that is personally disliked or causes injury to the individual, on the one hand, and ‘justified
anger’ which is morally approved by others and thus constitutes a social condemnation by the
community as a whole, not just by some individual member. To become justifiably angry is to
make a moral claim on behalf of the community, for it serves to identify instances of behavior
that threaten the moral order of the group, not just the moral ideals of an individual. The
concept of justified anger thus defines the boundary between socially acceptable and
unacceptable behavior.
Justified anger can be expressed in various ways, such as refusal to speak with the
offender (the proverbial ‘cold shoulder’), dropping the markers of polite or calm speech, or
through non-verbal gestures of disapproval. With the help of such expressions, members “talk
out” their justified anger so that it becomes “visible or known to the community” (White). In
other words, by “talking out” their justifiable anger members make a moral claim to identify a
transgression and draw attention to certain behavior as a moral breach while, at the same time,
demanding the need for corrective action. Contrary to shaming that is disintegrative, however,
members also make an effort to maintain bonds of respect and amity. The shaming members
acknowledge the value of community bonds, signaling their intention to ritually closing the
conflict episode as a source of division and disruption. This move is important as members
emphasize the moral education rather than the deterrent and stigmatizing qualities of shaming
(Wilson/Herrnstein 1985, 495). The moral claim should be visible, explicit, and unambiguous
so that the offender cannot misinterpret the message. At the same time, bonds of mutual
respect are maintained throughout the shaming process. Preserving the continuum of amity
even in the face of conflict by distinguishing between offense and offender ensures that
reintegrative shaming achieves its desired effect to maintain community ties. More
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importantly, it ensures that justified anger will not lead to aggressive behavior or violence
among its members.
Acknowledgment of shame
After a moral claim has been explicitly stated, the offender is in a position where that person
must admit guilt and express remorse, argue for its innocence, or contest the legitimacy of the
moral claim and rally others around its cause. Political and moral leadership are thus closely
linked to emotional leadership. Justified anger can be understood as a symbolic manifestation
of legitimate power, an indication of how the rest of the community ought to feel and morally
react. Resistance to justified anger reveals an open challenge to the social hierarchy and the
authority of its most significant members. In the latter case, more extended negotiation occurs
over the aptness or justification of the claim and the meaning assigned to the situation. Take,
for example, the case of former US President George W. Bush arguing that the Geneva
Conventions should not be applicable to detainees in Guantanamo Bay because they were
“enemy combatants”. By resisting this line of argumentation, member states such as Germany
and France openly questioned political leadership of the US within NATO.
The longer the shaming process continues, however, the more increases the likelihood
of creating permanent division among members of the community. For shaming to be
reintegrative, the offender then must acknowledge shame, admit guilt and express repentance.
The repentant role can be manifested in remorseful public expressions that amount to formal
or informal ceremonies to address the moral claim and to signal its moral capacity by seeking
rehabilitation. For example, when US President Barack Obama announced his intention to
close Guantanamo Bay, NATO allies interpreted this as an acknowledgement of shame on
behalf of the US. Repentance thus marks the turning point between shame and reintegration:
Only if the offender presents a moral self that is consistent with the values and moral
expectations of the group and by acknowledging wrongful behavior, the offender will receive
positive emotional responses from others, such as praise or sympathy, which opens the door
for reintegration. In this way, a positive image of self and the group can be sustained through
a cultural context of mutual respect while still providing a forceful response to wrongful
behavior.
To sum up, reintegrative shaming closely follows a script that gives rise to a sequence
of particular emotions and their ritual expressions in particular situations as manifestations of
the moral order of a community. The purpose of this script is to resolve conflicts among its
members peacefully, that is without threatening or resort to physical violence. Starting from a
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violation of community values, members make a moral claim of condemnation through
expression of justified anger which is followed by repentant acknowledgment of shame and,
subsequently reintegration through collective expressions of sympathy. In the final section, I
will illustrate the empirical relevance of reintegrative shaming by contrasting it against the
practice of stigmatization during NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011.
Empirical illustration
It has been argued here that shaming can be both reintegrative and disintegrative and that
much turns on this distinction. While it is important to distinguish between disintegrative and
reintegrative shaming for both theoretical and conceptual reasons, it should be acknowledged,
however, that it is not always easy to distinguish them on empirical grounds. This is
especially the case when the motivations and purposes of shaming are unclear: do the actors
really care about each other’s well-being and do they sincerely wish to repair their
relationship? One way to demonstrate this conceptual distinction empirically is to contrast the
practice of reintegrative shaming to the practice of stigmatization in a situation when both
occur almost simultaneously and among members of the same group. As I will argue below,
this is exactly what happened in the case of NATO’s military intervention against Libya.
NATO’s military intervention against Libya in 2011 produced a number of serious
conflicts within the transatlantic security community. Most notable among these conflicts was
the push for greater military engagement in Libya by France and Britain as well as the refusal
by Turkey to hand over command to NATO. The most serious conflict within the transatlantic
security community, however, arouse over the abstaining vote on Resolution 1973 by
Germany in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). UN Resolution 1973 authorized
the use of military force to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. Since the German Foreign
Minister Guido Westerwelle had previously even insisted to oppose the resolution (but was
eventually persuaded by German diplomats to abstain), the vote was perceived as a “no” by,
France, Great Britain, and the US. It was the first time that Germany had not sided with its
fellow transatlantic community members in the UNSC on a major security issue. This
provoked fears on both sides of the Atlantic of German “nationalist calculations” and a “non-
alligned foreign policy“.5 The German vote thus can be said to have had a destabilizing effect
on the transatlantic security community with the potential to provoke a serious crisis.
5 ‘The Unadventurous Eagle’, The Economist (12 May 2011).
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The community-building effects of reintegrative shaming in NATO will be empirically
traced here on the inside, and subsequently contrasted with the stigmatizing effects of
disintegrative shaming on the outside. Accordingly, the case study is structured into two parts.
First, the presence and effects of reintegrative shaming on the inside will be shown by looking
at how relevant community members reacted to Germany’s abstention in the UNSC. Second,
the case study will switch perspective by looking at the stigmatizing effects of disintegrative
shaming expressed by the same community members toward the Gaddafi regime on the
outside. In doing so, the case study design applies the conceptual framework of
reintegrative/disintegrative shaming developed above. The empirical analysis will only look
at the main parties involved in the conflict, namely Britain, France, Germany, and the US who
are NATO member states and were also members of the UNSC in 2011. In addition, the
analysis will focus on elite discourse among political leaders. Political leaders are defined
here as “responsible decision-makers“ having a political mandate in one form or another
which includes heads of state, heads of governments, cabinet members and other elected
representatives. 6 Since political leaders are publicly mandated representatives of their
respective state one would expect them to internalize (at least to a significant extent) NATO’s
values and norms.7
Reintegrative shaming
The decision for military intervention in Libya was controversial among NATO members
from the very start. With France and Britain actively pushing for military enforcement of a
no-fly zone to protect the Libyan opposition, the United States and Germany (along with
others) remained at first skeptical of fighting another war in the region. In March 2011,
however, the US changed its position when it became clear that a humanitarian crisis in the
city of Benghazi was imminent. In addition, the Arab League came out in support of a no-fly
zone, and Security Council veto powers China and Russia signaled that they would not block
a UN resolution to authorize the use of military force. Germany, in contrast to its NATO allies
in the UNSC, held on to its position not to become a war party in Northern Africa opting
instead for more far-reaching economic and financial sanctions against the Gaddafi regime.
The German abstention in the UNSC on March 17 must have been a shock to political
leaders in France, Britain, and the US because Germany could have supported the resolution
without automatically having to contribute troops. The symbolic meaning of the abstaining
vote thus proved to be much more destabilizing than the material lack of German military 6 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 7 Eznack, ‘Crises’, p. 242.
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capabilities. As an important member of the transatlantic security community, Germany had,
for the first time, openly sided with non-members like China, Russia, Brazil, and India in the
UNSC on a significant security issue leaving France, Britain, and the US isolated. What
shook the community’s foundation was thus less Germany’s refusal to participate in the
military intervention – many NATO member countries chose not to participate militarily – but
Germany’s refusal to offer political and moral support for the mission. As a result, Germany’s
symbolic move was interpreted as a serious moral transgression, an undermining of allied
solidarity or, bluntly speaking, as ‘a stab in the back’.
In defending its position, Germany was quick to point out that its decision to abstain
on UN Resolution 1973 was not to be mistaken with indifference or even sympathy for the
Gaddafi regime.8 Instead, Germany portrayed its decision as a rational choice, a process of
logical reasoning, a “difficult evaluation process (…) of weighing up the pros and cons”.9 The
underlying psychological motives of the German decision making process – the “concerns
and fears about the consequences of a military operation” based on Germany’s “painful
experience” in the past – were, at least initially, sidelined in public declarations and
speeches.10
Disappointed by the emotional indifference expressed by Germany, NATO members
could hardly conceal their anger at the German government. French foreign minister Alain
Juppé was rather polite when he said that, “I would have liked to see us accompanied by
Germany“. Anonymous voices in the French diplomatic service spoke more bluntly of a
German “mistake with unpredictable political consequences“ and a “crisis“ within NATO.
Echoing French diplomats, the French newspaper Le Monde wrote that “the German
government is lacking solidarity or any maturity”. The French magazine Le Parisien even
quoted a French diplomat who directly attacked the German Chancellor: “Our relationship is
getting markedly colder (…) Angela Merkel will have to pay for this!” These statements
clearly reveal that French policymakers no longer viewed Germany as an equal and instead
attempted to coerce and change is behavior.11 This notion is further substantiated by Le
Figaro which cites another French diplomat who calls the German UNSC abstention “a
severe blow to the Franco-German friendship”. Another statement by the French foreign
8 Angela Merkel, Press Statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel on Current Developments in Libya (18 March 2011). 9 Guido Westerwelle, Statement by the German Foreign Minister in the German Bundestag on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (18 March 2011). 10 Westerwelle, Statement. 11 ‘Setback for Franco-German Relations’, SpiegelOnline (24 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/setback-for-franco-german-relations-paris-and-berlin-at-odds-over-libya-operation-a-752992.html} accessed 14 March 2013.
15
minister Alain Juppé even conveys the threat not to cooperate with Germany in the future:
“The common security and defense policy of Europe? It is dead!”12
In a meeting of the EU foreign ministers in Brussels, Alain Juppé, supported by his
Danish colleague, Lene Espersen, confronted Guido Westerwelle directly with this justifiable
anger stating that “if we had not intervened there would have probably been a bloodbath in
Benghazi”. In NATO headquarters, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen openly
accused the German NATO representative of violating group solidarity. In response, the
German representative interrupted the NATO meeting by leaving the room.13 But Rasmussen
went on to link his anger at Germany directly to the transatlantic norm of amity: “Obviously
some of those allies and partners carrying the heavy burden start to ask whether it would be
possible to broaden the participation a bit (...). That is also the essence of our alliance: that
allies that actually have the necessary assets at their disposal, also contribute those assets,
based the principle of solidarity.”14
In the transatlantic security community, such meetings represent ritualized
performances symbolizing solidarity and their abrupt disruption undermines social cohesion
and trust among its members. Accordingly, members of the House of Commons spoke of
“obstruction” and “cowardice” while British Prime Minister David Cameron did not even
attempt to defend Germany against such accusations.15 In Washington, President Barack
Obama wrapped his anger into a not so subtle verbal side blow against Germany: “Some
nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of
America is different”.16 Setting Germany apart from the rest of the group, Obama left out
Germany when he spoke of “our close allies”.17 Moreover, in April 2011, US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton chose Berlin of all places as the venue for making clear just how angry
American leaders were at Germany. In front of her predominantly German audience, Clinton
evoked emotions of shame and embarrassment: “The world did not wait for another
12 ‘France Plays Hawks, Germany Demurs’, The Guardian (24 March 2011), available at: {http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/france-hawk-germany-demurs-libya-europe} accessed 14 March 2013. 13 ‘Libya Crisis Leaves Berlin Isolated’, SpiegelOnline (28 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-serious-mistake-of-historic-dimensions-libya-crisis-leaves-berlin-isolated-a753498.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 14 ‘NATO Pushes Allies on Libya’, Army Times (8 June 2011), available at: {http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-nato-pushes-allies-for-more-libya-involvement-060811} accessed 14 March 2013. 15 David Cameron, Prime Minister Statement to the House of Commons Following the UN Security Council Adoption of Resolution 1973 on Lybia (18 March 2011); Sebastian Borger, ‘London kritisiert Berlin wegen Enthaltung’, Der Standard (19 March 2011). 16 Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya (28 March 2011). 17 Obama, Remarks.
16
Srebrenica in a place called Benghazi”.18 Subsequently, at a NATO meeting on June 8, US
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates linked justifiable anger to the transatlantic norm of amity
by demanding German solidarity as “a matter of fairness in an alliance built on the principle
of shared burdens“.19 In a similar way, French foreign minister Alain Juppé criticized
Germany for undermining allied solidarity when he argued that “NATO must play its full
role, and it is not doing so sufficiently“20 Finally, in a joint declaration by state leaders
Obama, Sarkozy, and Cameron published simultaneously in the International Herald Tribune
(New York), Le Figaro (Paris), and the Times (London), they hardly hid their justifiable anger
at the German norm violation of amity by calling the German lack of solidarity in Libya “an
unconscionable betrayal“ and that opposition to the Gaddafi regime needed to “begin with a
genuine end to violence, marked by deeds not words“.21 Consequently, French Defense
Minister Gerard Longuet, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, and British Foreign Minister
William Hague argued in similar ways.22 While such allied finger pointing may be easily
mistaken for stigmatization and emotional rigidity against the German norm breakers, NATO
allies simultaneously were careful to maintain bonds of mutual respect and amity in the face
of the moral transgression. For example, the joint declaration by Obama, Sarkozy, and
Camerov cited above begins with the following statement: “Together with our NATO allies and coalition partners, the United States, France and Britain have been united from the start in responding to the crisis in Libya, and we are united on what needs to happen in order to end it.”
This emphasis on mutual bonds and solidarity, prominently placed before any accusations or
expressions of justifiable anger, underlines the willingness for social repair and to maintain a
discourse of social intimacy among NATO allies, which obviously includes Germany.
Indeed, German political leaders began to publicly express solidarity toward Britain,
France, and the US, thus acknowledging shame over wrongful behavior. When Angela
18 ‘United in Mutual Annoyance’, SpiegelOnline (6 June 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/united-in-mutual-annoyance-what-s-gone-wrong-with-german-us-relations-a-766826.html} accessed 14 March 2013. 19 ‘Gates Presses Allies To Do More Against Libya’, Army Times (8 June 2011), available at: {http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-gates-presses-allies-to-do-more-against-libya-060811} accessed 14 March 2013. 20 ‘France and Britain Say NATO Is Not Fulfilling Its Role In Libya’, Deutsche Welle (12 April 2011), availale at: {http://www.dw.de/france-and-britain-say-nato-not-fulfilling-its-role-in-libya/a-14980521-1} accessed 14 March 2013. 21 Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy, ‘Libya’s Pathway to Peace’, International Herald Tribune (14 April 2011), available at: {http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/10324-document-obama-cameron-a-sarkozy-say-nato-attacks-will-continue-until-gaddafi-goes.html} accessed 14 March 2013. 22 ‘France, UK Say NATO Falling Short On Libya’, CBS News (12 April 2011), available at: {http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20053078.html} accessed 14 March 2013.
17
Merkel addressed fellow party members in the German Bundestag, she wished the allies
success and conceded that the decision to abstain on Resolution 1973 had been made “with a
heavy heart”.23 In various speeches and remarks by members of the German cabinet in the
following days and weeks, an emotional pattern emerged, expressing “gratitude”, “honor”,
and “respect” vis-à-vis other security community members.24 German foreign minister Guido
Westerwelle underlined that: “We respect and understand those partners (…) who (…) came
to a different conclusion than we did. We understand those who, for honourable motives,
chose to support international military intervention in Libya”.25
Up to this point, the overall performance by Britain, France, and the US can be viewed
as sanctioning the emotional non-conformity of Germany. This performance was arguably
intended to provoke feelings of shame – an acknowledgement that Germany had violated the
norm of allied solidarity. Former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, for example,
wrote in a contribution to a German national newspaper that he felt “nothing but shame for
the failure of our government”.26 Other members of the German political elite reacted in
similar emotional ways. Former German Chief of Staff and former head of NATO’s military
planning committee, Klaus Naumann, echoed Joschka Fischer by stating: “I am ashamed of
the position of my country.” In the German media, Richard Herzinger, an influential journalist
writing in the conservative newspaper Die Welt, criticized “the shameful way that Germany
emerged as the party seeking to delay action” and the liberal German weekly newspaper Die
Zeit published a headline calling the Libya intervention “A German shame”.
Feelings of collective shame among German political elites were not, however,
confined to inactive policymakers like Joschka Fischer. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, a
prominent member of the German Bundestag, shouted in a parliamentary debate on Libya: “I
think it’s a shame that the federal government, as a member of the UN Security Council,
abstained in this situation.” The head of the oppositional Social Democratic Party, Sigmar
Gabriel, followed suit depicting the vote in the UNSC as “simply undignified”. Omid
Nouripour, defense spokesperson of the Green Party in the German Bundestag, also found
allied anger over the German vote in the UNSC understandable: “This was a disgrace!” But
even in her own party, Merkel faced the repercussions of allied anger expressed, for example, 23 Severin Weiland and Roland Nelles, ‘Berlin lässt seine Verbündeten alleine kämpfen’, Spiegel Online (18 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/libyen-einsatz-berlin-laesst-seine-verbuendeten-alleine-kaempfen-a-751673.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 24 ‘Merkel Praises NATO for Libya Campaign’, in: The Local (18 March 2011), available at: {http://www.thelocal.de/national/20110827-37221.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 25 Guido Westerwelle, ‘Interview with German Foreign Minister’, SpiegelOnline (21 March 2011), available at: {http//www.spiegel.de/international/germany/Spiegel-interview-with-german-foreign-minister-gadhafi-must-go-ther-s-no-question-a-752164.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 26 Joschka Fischer, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik – eine Farce’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (24 March 2011).
18
by her German parliamentary spokesperson for foreign policy, Philipp Mißfelder, the
chairperson of the foreign relations committee in the European Parliament, Elmar Brok, as
well as Ruprecht Polenz, head of the foreign relations committee in the German Bundestag,
who all feared that Germany had lost its previous status and trustworthiness among members
of the transatlantic security community as a result of the UN vote.27 Moreover, a usually calm
and collected Günther Oettinger, EU Commissioner for Energy and also a fellow party
member of Angela Merkel, responded to a question on Libya at a press conference in a very
emotional way: “In Berlin, they can say what they want, to the point of embarrassment!”28
Feelings of shame are usually equated with inferior status. In the transatlantic security
community, it means the loss of “love and respect of those whose approval matters” and it is
this type of appraisal that can lead to social conformity. 29 As pointed out above,
acknowledging feelings of shame can lead to reconciliation and community-building while
denial of shame leads to further isolation.30 In the Libyan case, it can be tentatively argued
that German political leaders indeed felt shame resulting from the emotional expression of
anger and disappointment expressed by important community members. As a result, Germany
became emotionally disconnected from the rest of the group. In order to regain its previous
status within the community, Germany, at least implicitly, acknowledged feelings of shame,
thus expressing feelings of gratitude, honor, and respect toward its fellow members. In
addition to the feelings of collective shame cited above, Angela Merkel’s statement that she
was “saddened” by the political discussions among NATO members following the UN
Security Council vote points into this direction.31 When it did, arguably, the door for
reintegration was open.
This case of reintegrative shaming – following Germany’s reaffirmation of solidarity
and symbolically underscored by the decision to step up its military surveillance in
Afghanistan to disburden NATO members involved in the air campaign over Libya – was
embedded into a series of community-building symbolic rituals. On April 14, the NATO
ministers of foreign affairs held their meeting in Berlin (of all places) to issue a joint
statement on Libya that included a reaffirmation of NATO unity and solidarity. On June 7, 27 ‘Koalition der Kämpfer’, SpiegelOnline (22 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/militaereinsatz-in-libyen-koalition-der-kaempfer-a-752488.html} accessed 14 March 2013. 28 ‘Westerwelle vollzieht Kehrtwende bei Nato-Militäreinsatz’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (28 August 2011), available at: {http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/die-deutschen-und-der-krieg-in-libyen-westerwelle-vollzieht-kehrtwende-bei-nato-militaereinsatz-1.1135764} accessed 14 March 2013. 29 Elias, Process, pp. 414-415. 30 Hutchison and Bleiker, Reconciliation; Scheff, Revenge. 31 Ulrike Guérot, Germany in Europe: Angela’s Walk of Shame, The European Council on Foreign Relations (24 March 2011), available at: {http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/germany_in_europe_angelas_walk_of_shame} accessed 4 November 2012.
19
Barack Obama awarded the German Chancellor with the Presidential Medal of Freedom – the
highest civilian award in the US32 – and granted her the first state dinner for a European head
of state during his presidential term. This public expression of mutual gratitude, honor and
respect – a “unity reviving ceremony”33 – was accompanied by highly emotional remarks by
the US President and the German Chancellor that ushered an aura of social intimacy between
both political leaders. In his remarks, Barack Obama underlined the degree of emotional
attachment between both leaders by stating that, “it is our joint will that this NATO mission is
successful (…) we have one heart of allies that beats with the other allies”.34 Angela Merkel,
on her part, stressed collective “pride” of the German-American heritage, and “gratitude” for
the US role in World War II. On several other occasions during her remarks, she emphasized
the metaphor of transatlantic “friendship” and linked it to her own personal emotional
experience: “Without the United States of America, I would in all probably not be able to
stand here before you today. Overcoming the Cold War required courage from the people of
Central and Eastern Europe and what was then the German Democratic Republic, but it also
required the steadfastness of Western partner over many decades when many had long lost
hope of integration of the two Germanys and Europe”.35
The day before the award ceremony, Barack Obama gave an interview to a German
newspaper (his first interview with a German print media since his inauguration) in which he
talked about his personal “feelings” for his “friend” Angela Merkel. In tune with the German
Chancellor, the US President appeared eager to expressing “respect”, “gratitude”,
“admiration”, and feelings of “trust”.36
In sum, Germany’s decision to abstain on UN Resolution 1973 was interpreted by
Britain, France, and the US as a violation of the norm of allied solidarity and thus, a serious
moral transgression. Britain, France, and the US sanctioned the non-conformity of Germany
through the expression of justifiable anger. This appears to have produced feelings of shame
and embarrassment on the German side accompanied by a loss of power and status within
NATO. In order to regain its previous status within the community German political leaders
publicly acknowledged shame, which led to a process of reintegration. It can thus be
reasonably claimed that in the Libyan case reintegrative shaming stabilized the transatlantic
32 The Presidential Medal of Freedom is awarded to individuals that have made “an especially meritorious contribution to the security or national interests of the United States, world peace, cultural or other significant public or private endeavors” (EO 9586). Recipients include Mother Teresa, Lech Walesa, and Stephen Hawking. 33 Flam, ‘Emotional’, p. 49. 34 Angela Merkel and Barack H. Obama, Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel in a Joint Press Conference, Washington, D.C. (7 June 2011). 35 Merkel and Obama, Remarks. 36 Barack H. Obama, ‘Interview with President Obama’, Der Tagesspiegel (5 June 2011).
20
security community and contributed to a ritualized process of community-building on the
inside.
Stigmatization
In addition to the rift over the German abstention in the UNSC, the Libyan intervention was
accompanied by recurring public emotional expressions of anger, dislike, and even outright
hate toward the Gaddafi regime by NATO’s political leaders. US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, for example, depicted the Libyan leader as
“a ruthless dictator that has no conscience and will destroy anyone or anything in his way. If
Qaddafi does not go, he will just make trouble. That is just his nature. There are some
creatures that are like that”.37
Barack Obama described Muammar Gaddafi as a “murderer” and a “terrorist” whom he found
to be involved in “brutal repression” and exercising a “grip of fear”. In a joint statement,
David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy spoke of the “violent dictatorship” of “Qadhafi’s war
machine”.38 Likewise, Angela Merkel and Guido Westerwelle made it clear in various public
statements that Germany regarded Gaddafi as an illegitimate leader who “has to go”.39 More
forcefully, Guido Westerwelle underlined “the brutality of the Libyan regime” and stated that
“I denounce and condemn the horrendous violations of human rights committed by the
Libyan regime (…) We stand against this dictator.”40 His fellow party member and German
minister for economics, Phillip Rösler, publicly referred to “Gaddafi’s homicide units”.41
Echoing French, British and American leaders, Angela Merkel called Gaddafi a “despot”
whose “disgraceful deeds (…) shall not remain unpunished” and whose death made her feel
“relieved and very happy”.42 The German president, Christian Wulff, used even more drastic
words to describe the Libyan leader: “This is state terrorism. This is obviously the kind of act
37 Quoted in: Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, ‘As U.N. Backs Military Action in Libya, U.S. Role Is Unclear’, New York Times (17 March 2011). 38 David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy, Joint Statement by the French President and the British Prime Minister (28 March 2011). 39 Merkel and Obama, Remarks; Guido Westerwelle, ‘Westerwelle lobt Nato-Einsatz jetzt doch’, Die Zeit Online (27 August 2011), available at: {htpp://www.zeit.de/politik/Deutschland/2011-08/westerwelle-nato-einsatz/komplettansicht} accessed 4 November 2012. 40 Guido Westerwelle, Speech at the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva (28 February 2011). 41 ‘Später Respekt für Nato-Einsatz’, FocusOnline (27 August 2011), available at: {http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen/militaerisches-eingreifen-in-libyen-spaeter-respekt-fuer-nato-einsatz_aid_659482.html} accessed on 14 March 2013. 42 ‘Merkel fordert Gaddafi zum Rücktritt auf’, FocusOnline (27 February 2011), available at: {http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen-merkel-fordert-gaddafi-zum-ruecktritt-auf_aid_603850.html} accessed on 14 March 2013; Angela Merkel, Press Statement, Berlin (20 October 2011).
21
that can be described as psychopathic”.43 All of these emotional expressions of anger, dislike,
and even hate also reappeared in the joint statement on Libya by the NATO ministers of
foreign affairs in Berlin cited above. At this meeting, the NATO Secretary General spoke of a
“desire for freedom” and contrasted his emotional statement against “Gaddafi’s brutal and
systematic attacks”.44
In addition to these emotional expressions of anger, dislike, and hate NATO political
leaders also frequently stressed emotions like courage and bravery when speaking about
NATO’s military effort in Libya in general and NATO soldiers in particular. For example, on
14 April NATO ministers of foreign affairs paid “tribute to the skill, bravery and
professionalism of our men and women in uniform carrying out this difficult task“.45 Barack
Obama equally praised the “brave pilots that have executed their mission with skill and
extraordinary bravery”.46 David Cameron stated that the military intervention was undertaken
“with some fantastic allies and some very brave other countries“.47 Bravery and courage are
essentially emotional expressions of fear: if one is not afraid of someone or something one
does not have to feel brave or courageous. Thus, in the Libyan case, NATO members
stabilized the transatlantic security community in two ways: first, by finding a stigmatizing
Other that all members could focus their emotions on; second, by framing the military effort
in terms of morally acceptable expressions of fear such as bravery or courage. In sum, by
sharing these stigmatizing expressions towards an outsider, the members of the transatlantic
security community were able to maintain mutual trust and collective identity by setting
themselves emotionally apart from the Gaddafi regime and thereby generating internal
cohesion.
In sum, the expression of anger and fear toward an emotionally shared Other can be
said to have generated internal relief and social cohesion through processes of stigmatization
on the outside: a sense of belonging and togetherness against a common outside foe. It
energized the community and provided its members with a collective sense of power:
“Together we can make a difference. Together we can change the world”. 48 As a
consequence, it can be tentatively claimed that the stigmatizing practices contributed to the
43 ‘Wulff nennt Gaddafi einen Psychopathen’, FocusOnline (24 February 2011), available at: {http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/krise-in-libyen-wulff-nennt-gaddafi-einen-psychopathen_aid_603237.html} accessed on 14 March 2013. 44 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General at the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Libya Partners at Berlin (14 April 2011). 45 NATO, Statement on Libya Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO contributors in Berlin to Operation Unified Protector (14 April 2011). 46 Barack H. Obama, Presidential Statement on Libya (22 August 2011). 47 David Cameron, Libya Statement in Full (18 March 2011). 48 Flam, ‘Emotional’, p. 49.
22
stabilization of the transatlantic security community that included a symbolic process of
emotionally disconnecting insiders from outsiders. This stands in contrast to the prosocial
effects of reintegrative shaming that took place during the transatlantic conflict over the
German abstention in the UNSC.
Conclusion
(still needs to be written...)