Naked and Vulnerable

A Cybersecurity Starter Kit

@MrShannonFritz

Who is this Guy?

• I’m Shannon Fritz

• I’m a Microsoft Enterprise Security MVP

• I’m on twitter @MrShannonFritz

• I’m a Solutions Architect at Concurrency

• We transform businesses

Modern Applications

Modern IT Management

Identity, Management

Identity, Application, InformationCommunications

Customer Engagement

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Cloud Data CenterNetwork, Identity

Analytics & Data

Identity, Application, InformationCommunication

Digital

Transformation

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@MrShannonFritz

A Cybersecurity Starter Kit

• Why you’re hereoYou know you are at risk, but it’s ambiguous

oYou want improve security

oYou uncertain where best to start

• What you’ll getoSome examples to make a case for improving security

oFour specific areas to start making improvements now

@MrShannonFritz

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@MrShannonFritz

@MrShannonFritz

Starting Out

• First, ADMIT that theorganization CAN do better

•Second, KNOW thatyou can ALWAYS do better

•Then, make a PLAN

@MrShannonFritz

Get Specific

• Identify specific things to addressoWhat risk are you concerned with?

oWhy is it bad?

•Select the low hanging fruit

•Make it measurable

@MrShannonFritz

Get Specific - Threats

•Possible Risk ConsiderationsoDDoS / BotNet

oSocial Engineering

oRansomware

oCredential Theft

TIP: Do NOT start with ‘insider’ threats

@MrShannonFritz

Get Specific - Assessments

•Possible Starting PointsoNetwork Segmentation

oBad Configurations

oAPIs and Protocols

oSoftware Versions / Patching

oExcessive Privileges

oCredential Management

@MrShannonFritz

Get Specific - Assessment

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00001Workstations and

ServersDenise Smith X Privilege Escalation Local Administrators LAPS High Low High 1

00002 Active Directory Qiong Wu X Unauthorized Use Privileged Accounts MIM PAM Med Med Low 4

00003Workstations and

ServersNaoki Sato X Code Execution Patching SCCM X Med Med 3

00004 Business Culture Daniel Roth X Social Engineering Phishing KnowBe4 High Low High 2

00005 WiFi Andrea Dunker X Unauthorized Use Pre-shared Key 802.1X Low High Med 5

00006Workstations and

ServersEric Gruber X Business Data Loss Malicious Software Device Guard High High Med 6

Discover Assess

@MrShannonFritz

Prove It

• If you need to, Prove the risk!

•Exploit the vulnerability

•Record your process

TIP: DO NO HARM

Do not use your own access or Personal Relationships

CYA – Get permission, or Hire a Penetration Tester

@MrShannonFritz

Why Prove It?

•Risks of ProofoSomeone can get angry (or Die?)

oYou can get in trouble (Fired / Legal)

•Benefits of ProofoGets peoples attention

oGets business buy-in

oMakes Security Real / Real Cool

@MrShannonFritz

Analyze it

•What did you get?

•How did you get it?

•What went wrong so you could get it?

•Who is responsible for what went wrong?

@MrShannonFritz

Remediate it

• Team up with the responsiblepeople and collaborate

•Define ‘Remediation Objectives’

• Create official projects with funding,assigned resources and deadlines.

• Test Again!

@MrShannonFritz

Repeat it

•Define the concern

•Prove it is a Risk

•Analyze the Proof

•Remediate and Test it

Four Attacks to Mitigate FirstSource: Praetorian

@MrShannonFritz

The Study

•100 red team penetration tests

•75 different companies

•12 month study (to June 2016)

•450 real-world exploits

•Most attack vectors are OLD exploits, not 0-days

•Top attacks are largely based on Credential Theft

@MrShannonFritz

Attack Stages

•Get creds ofan individual

•Get on thenetwork

•Elevate Access

•Seize the Target

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 1: Weak Domain User Passwords

• Key ProblemsoAD cannot prevent “bad” passwords, only set length and char set

oMany users have Admin rights to their machine

• RecommendationsoUse a passphrase not password; ie: Increase length to 15

oAllow users to keep passwords for a longer time; ie: 180 days)

o Implement an password enforcement solution; ie: blacklist “Password1”

o Implement MFA for Admin and Remote access

Used in 66% of tests to successfully compromise the target

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 1: Weak Domain User Passwords

• Use a passphrase, Keep passwords longeroSet with AD Group Policy

• Password enforcementoAzure AD Premium with Password Reset

• Implement MFA for AdminoMicrosoft Identity Manager Privileged Access Management (MIM PAM)

oAzure AD Privileged Identity Management (AAD PIM)

• Implement MFA for RemoteoRDS Gateway and Azure MFA

oAD FS and/or Azure Application Proxy

@MrShannonFritz

Password Guidance• Use a Passphrase

o A statement with punctuation is easy to remember, longer & harder to crack

• Randomly Generate a Passwordo http://aka.ms/password

• Use Windows Hello (login with PIN, Fingers, Face)o http://tinyurl.com/winhello

• Do you save passwords in your browser?o http://lastpass.com and https://1password.com are far better solutions!

• Do you re-use passwords?o http://haveibeenpwned.comtells if your account was leaked

• Do you want more guidance?o http://aka.ms/passwordguidance

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 2: Name Resolution Poisoning

• Key Problemso Exploits behavior of Windows when connecting to a network

oClient machine is coaxed into transmitting credentials to attackers

oAttacker can replay captured credentials or attempt to crack them

• RecommendationsoDisable LLMNR and NetBIOS (after testing!)

oDisable Proxy autodetection (WPAD)

oMonitor the network for illegitimate Broadcast traffic

oBlock outbound tcp/53 (dns) and tcp/445 (smb) to the Internet

Used in 64% of tests to successfully compromise the target

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 2: Name Resolution Poisoning

• Disable LLMNR and NetBIOSo LLMNR – Use AD Group Policy to disable

oNetBIOS – On DHCP server enable option “001” set to “0x2”

oNetBIOS – On client set a reg key for network adapters (scripting)

• Disable Proxy autodetection (WPAD)oAD GPO for Internet Explorer

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 3: Local Admin / Pass the Hash

• Key ProblemsoMany organizations use the same Local Admin password on all systems

oThe NTLM hash can be can be used without knowing the password

oThe NTLM hash can be used on other systems with the same password

• RecommendationsoRevise business process around the use of local admin accounts

oDeploy Microsoft LAPS

oRead the Microsoft PtH v2 Whitepaper

oDeploy Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA)

Used in 64% of tests to successfully compromise the target

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 3: Local Admin / Pass the Hash

• Revise business process around the use of local admin accountsoUpdate the “gold image” build process

oRestrict/eliminate used of local accounts, monitor and alert

• Deploy Microsoft LAPSohttps://aka.ms/laps - Use GPO to install/configure on Clients & Servers

• Read the Microsoft PtH v2 Whitepaperohttps://microsoft.com/pth

• Deploy Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA)ohttps://microsoft.com/ata

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 4: Cleartext Passwords in Memory

• Key ProblemsoDomain Credentials are stored in cleartext in the LSASS process

o Local Admin or SYSTEM users can read this memory space

o Exposes not only the Hash, but the actual password itself

• RecommendationsoMove Windows Server 2012 R2+ and Windows 10

o Install and enable Microsoft Security Advisory 2871997 on older OS’s

oRemove local admin rights

oUpdate the “gold image”

Used in 59% of tests to successfully compromise the target

@MrShannonFritz

Attack 4: Cleartext Passwords in Memory

• Move Windows Server 2012 R2+ and Windows 10oThese OS’s do not store the cleartext passwords in memory

oWindows 10 can further be protected with Credential Guard

• Install and enable Microsoft Security Advisory 2871997oUpdates available for Windows 7 and 2008 R2

ohttps://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2871997

oHKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control SecurityProviders\WdigestUseLogonCredential: 0 (REG_DWORD)

oUsers with SYSTEM can alter this, monitor for changes (use OMS)

@MrShannonFritz

The Fifth Attack!

• Insufficient Network Access Controls

•Used in 52% of tests to successfully compromise

•Read the whitepaper! https://www.praetorian.com/

Takeaways

• Document and Share your security concerns (internally)• Work from the list, and have others contribute

• Prioritize Remediation based on Likelihood and Impact• Start with a narrow scope and short time frame

• Your Current Passwords are Weak and Puny• Use Stronger Password Policies, SSPR & MFA

• Reusing a Password is Dangerous• Use a Generator and a Manager

• Pace yourself! – It’s easy to get overwhelmed. Get some help.

Thank You!

Want to know more?

Want our help?

sfritz@concurrency.com