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MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN CAMBODIA : AN OVERVIEW (TR. ‘’LES COMMUNAUTÉS MUSULMANES DU CAMBODGE : UN APERCU’’) EMIKO STOCK 2010, ATLAS DES MINORITÉS MUSULMANES EN ASIE, M. GILQUIN ED., BANGKOK, IRASEC / PARIS CNRS, 183-216

* This text is an English translation, of the original French chapter on Cambodian Muslims entitled « Les communautés musulmanes du Cambodge : un aperçu », from the edited book « Atlas des minorités musulmanes en Asie méridionale et orientale », M. Gilquin Ed., IRASEC / CNRS Editions, Bangkok – Paris. While finally published in 2010, the text was finalized in 2006 and would therefore need to be revised and updated in many areas. This version nevertheless aims a simple translation of the original, in order to provide a readable format to a non French-speaking public. The translation was made with the help of Florianne Wild, and Alberto Perez-Pereiro whom I would like to warmly thank for the time spent on it.

“We’ll see about that at the end of the Cham month!”1. This expression, firmly rooted in current

Cambodian speech, is meant to refer to an event that is not likely to ever occur. This is how a lender might

be made to understand that he will continue to wait forever for his payment. In addition to such

expressions used by Buddhist Khmers, who make up 90% of Cambodia’s citizenry, there is other evidence

for a lack of understanding of this Cambodian minority among the majority. Khmers are indeed puzzled by

these people called the “Cham,” who are Muslims, and seem different in every way - even in their calendar,

which appears to celebrate neither the end of the month nor the beginning of the year.

This common saying reveals the complexity of the relationship between the Khmer majority and a

community that is doubly a minority because it is both Cham and Muslim - a complexity that is subsumed

by Islam as a marker of difference by Khmer observers, which then negates the complexities of group

identity when seen from the Cham/Muslim “interior”. To present this Cambodian “umma’’2 in all its

diversity of origins as well as its Islamic practices requires putting it in its context, before touching upon

the multiple reinterpretations of the faith. This will entail a discussion of its local environment, marked on

one hand by a half-century of Cambodian social crises and on the other hand by its positioning onto the

global stage, notably through the ancestral links interwoven with the umma, often Malay, and the

resumption of relations with transnational Islamic communities today.

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I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE CAMBODIAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY

I. 1. The Cambodian Umma: an integration misunderstood.

A mere 5% of 12 million Cambodians, or between 300,000 and 500,000 people, according to statistical

sources, are counted as Muslims3. One could wonder if this Muslim minority - overwhelmingly ethnic

Cham4 - is indeed as “oppressed,” and “discriminated against,” by a supposedly crushing Khmer Buddhist

majority, as the Western perception of “minority” – largely framed by a certain vision of human rights –

tends to see it? The events of September 11, which dominated international media, made Cambodian

Buddhists suddenly more aware yet again of these little-known Muslims neighbors, often in unflattering

ways: they began to question the wearing of veils, wedding celebrations where no one drinks alcohol, the

immense mosques which had formerly been as modest as small countryside pagodas.

All the same, even though those Muslims may not appear as a community completely assimilated into

Cambodian society, they are no less a part of it in their own way(s), and are continuously reformulating

their Islamicity. If there is often a lack of understanding on both sides of each other’s customs and use of

social space, this does not mean there are insurmountable barriers between the two groups. There is most

certainly communication. Apart from a minority of remote villages where Cham are dominant, Cham all

speak Khmer as well as their own language, and there are good neighborly relations. The death of a Khmer

village chief will be followed by a Buddhist cremation to which the Muslims will be cordially invited.

Together, they evoke fond memories of the deceased. Another indication of the permeability of barriers

are the economic relations. Everyone shops together in the markets; and since Buddhism forbids the

slaughter of animals, the Muslim butchers and fishermen have often dominated this business sector.

Finally, a look at matrimonial relations reveals that marriage between Khmers and Muslims, until now

considered marginal, are in fact much less rare than they seem at first.

A recent suspicion of “the other” after September 11, has been added to the numerous peculiar beliefs that

the Khmers hold with regard to the Cham... Prejudices - no doubt a part of all “inter-ethnic” relations -

persist on both sides, whether Cham or Khmer: their respective cuisines are shunned because of food

taboos or differences in meals preparation that are difficult to overcome for the uninitiated. The fear that

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the Cham, in their boats, will not come to rescue a drowning person is doubtless a response to the

uneasiness that Khmers experience with regard to water, whereas the Cham have been excellent navigators

since time immemorial. The apprehension - and fascination - that the Khmers have for Muslims, whose

ancestral reputation is one of skillful sorcerers, nonetheless does not prevent Buddhists from soliciting

their ‘magical’ services whenever needed. Finally, if the Khmers are amused by the story of a marriage

between a sow and a dog as the original birth of the Cham, they see nothing insulting in it, but consider it

an ancestral creation myth (Ner 1941: 193). The day-to-day relations between Muslims, be they Cham or

Chvea (a non-Cham, Muslim minority in the country), and the Khmer, extend therefore well beyond an

ignorance of ‘’the other’’. While different confessional communities may often be found within the

delimited area of the same village, Khmer and Cham will keep and protect separate social spaces. Opting

for a multi-culturalist model rather than an assimilationist one: this is probably the final result desired by

the Cham minority, when they adopted the religion of the Prophet and thus established Islam as an identity

trait. But first, let’s return to the foundations of this umma in Cambodia. We will find a history linked to

the last breath of the Cham kingdom.

I. 2. Formation of a Muslim Community in the Lower Mekong

During the first centuries of our era, along with the process of Indianization, Champa and Cambodia both

took the path of Brahmanism, later followed by Mahayana Buddhism—especially pronounced in Champa

during the 15th and 16th centuries. While Theravada Buddhism became solidly established among the

Khmer, Cham were discovering Islam on their shores. Encounters with travelers, Arabs, Indians, and

Persians - all Muslims5 - helped to establish Islam in Champa. It was through continuous exchanges with

the Malays that Cham seem to have found their new faith (Cabaton 1906: 27-47; Manguin 1979; Reid 2000:

43-49). This transition toward another religion must be read as a social act. In continuity with a common

Austronesian identity (sailing, trade, the use of Malay languages…), the Islamization of the Cham facilitated

their insertion into mercantile networks. The new religion, associated with the prosperity of its followers,

was also attractive because of the supernatural powers it seemed to confer on its greatest leaders through

Sufism, similar to the wonder-working talents attributed to monarchs of the past (Reid 2000: 19). On the

other hand, in the geopolitical sphere, the few accounts we have from the 17th century of the attempts of

Cham sovereigns to play the Malay Muslim network card in order to counter the military incursions of the

Vietnamese, emphasize the failure of this policy (Manguin 1979 ; Abdoul-Carime 2005). Successive defeats,

whose chronology and importance are debatable, will sweep away the last shreds of Cham sovereignty in

1471, 1692, and 1832. After each attack, refugees were taken in by Cambodia, and little by little they came

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to constitute the Cambodian Cham community that we know today. These first arrivals, very likely not yet

Muslims, will be converted - yet again - through contact with the Malays who had preceded them as settlers

in the country (the “Chvea,” who will be discussed later in more detail). In addition, the last migrants,

already Islamized in Champa, found these Chvea to be guides toward a greater orthodoxy (Cabaton 1906;

Ner 1941: 166). Slowly, the Cham villages are recomposed, keeping their own language alive, maintaining

contact with the Chvea in order to sometimes oppose together the newly adoptive Khmer kingdom, other

times to support it.

I. 3. Shared Memories: A Short History of Cham-Khmer relations

Looking closer, over the long term, the Cham and the Khmer have always had close relations, however

ambiguous. Champa, the kingdom composed of various principalities, extending from the Annam Gate to

the region of Donnai (in present-day Vietnam) was the neighbor of the kingdom of Angkor6. The two

neighboring states sometimes fought side by side against the eternal Vietnamese ‘invader’. Sometimes, they

joined with that same invader to conquer the other on the border - be this other Khmer or Cham - who

had become troublesome. To balance this seeming dichotomy of relations into historical perspective, we

should consider the bas-reliefs of the Bayon, where the “great Khmer king,” Jayavarman VII, who had

lived many years in Champa, is represented as laying low the Cham enemy… alongside his Cham allies

(Vickery 2004: 42-46).

As far as the post 15th century Cambodia goes, the Cambodian Royal Chronicles document the inclusion of

the Cham community then in formation on Khmer soil and its role played in local power circles. An

example is the conversion of the Khmer King Ramathipadei I (the Sultan Ibrahim from Dutch sources),

who, in order to conquer the throne in the 17th century, allied himself with these newcomers who had the

reputation of great military skills (Weber 2005: 108-110). On the other hand, we hear of rebellions of the

Muslim community as “one” against the Khmer kingdom - more probably these were struggles of

particular factions against such-and-such a prince taking over the throne, or else, on the other hand, to

support some other prince, than an actual unified ‘Cham’ or ‘Muslim’ front. In addition, there is the

ambivalent memory of the sovereign Ang Duong (1858-1860): on one hand, a trusted monarch who

offered his hospitality and his lands (in the region of the former royal capital of Udong), on the other hand

the leader of a bloody repression in Thbaung Khmum, Kompong Cham— a memory persisting in the way

Cham built their social networks until today (Weber 2005: 117-134).

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Diverse from within and often divided, this heterogeneous Muslim population thus offers its services to

various parties, but remains under the protection of a monarch who is respected and to whom, after the

short-lived experience of the Champa royalty, it owes allegiance7. Finally we should mention references

such as the popular tales in which a Cham prince marries a Khmer princess; treasures stolen sometimes by

the Khmer, sometimes by the Cham (Vickery 2004: 26). And last but not least, half-expressed, somewhere

between the desire for union and regret of it, the mythical naga princess, the alleged common founding

ancestor and unifier can be evoked8.

I. 4. The Cham in the Wake of Contemporary Cambodian History

In the aftermath of 1954 independence, a new appellation was created by Norodom Sihanouk, then chief

of state: Khmer-Islam. The term rings with the echo of a paradox: how can one be Khmer-Islam when

Cambodian Buddhism and “Khmerness” go hand in glove, and when the great majority of Muslims are not

Khmer9? But time – post-colonial time – is of the essence, and true to a nationalist and populist ideology,

the sovereign wanted no one excluded from the new nation building process. Therefore, he uses an

ensemble of neologisms taken from the root word “Khmer,” which designates of the “ethnic” majority.

Khmer-Islam is one of those terms. It does not intend (as the then “people’s father” defended himself), a

dissolution of Muslims into Khmer culture, but rather a unification of all countrymen into a national

impetus (Stock 2012). Many remained faithful to the King Father until his political fall in 1970, although

some may have reproached the importance given to Buddhism in the Constitution of the new nation (Po

Dharma 1981: 174). As the regional issues gradually grew clear with the beginning of the American war in

Vietnam, and in response to the appeal of their “cousins” in Champa— now oppressed minorities under

the South Vietnamese regime—the Cham of Cambodia and those of Champa ended up, in 1964, in

creating the FULRO (Unified Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races). The movement’s intent was

the liberation of the former lands of Champa, occupied by the Vietnamese. It was founded by, among

others, Colonel Les Kossem, but received support from the government of Norodom Sihanouk, and

especially from General Lon Nol, then head of the armed forces. The latter seized power during a coup in

1970, and FULRO became no more than another military organ used by the new government (Po Dharma

1981: 176-180). Today, certain former members of FULRO look back at their adherence as a patriotic

“Cambodian” act, emphasizing their support to the King, or at least, to the acting Khmer government. The

“great moments” of FULRO, for many, recalled the idealized combat of former Cham generals who

fought beside Khmer princes, rather than the re-conquest of a Champa whose terminology was then

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making its appearance10. The quest for their own identity within the new national construct, hesitating

between references to “Champa” and “Islam,” may also have been one of the triggers for this involvement.

In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took the capital after having controlled certain provincial areas,

sometimes for several years. Their rise to power marks, for all Cambodians, a period when a “cleansed”

and areligious model based on “Khmerness” - a basic ideal of the Khmer peasant - as conceptualized by a

few urban ideologues, was implemented through terror and mass extermination. Ten years ago, William

Collins remarked on a debate that is still current today11: were the Muslims of Cambodia victimized to a

greater extent by the Khmer Rouge than the Khmers themselves (Collins 1996: 41)12? Admittedly, losses

among the Muslim population speak for themselves: in 1979, there were between 138,000 and 260,000

“Cham” survivors13. This is out of the 250,000 to 700,000 counted before 197514. Therefore the losses

represent - according to the figures - a mortality rate between 36% and 71%, which is two to three times

greater than for other Cambodians. Muslims indeed attracted more attention because of some outstanding

points:

- Their linguistic differences: their language was not understood by the majority,

- Their religious differences: at a time when the Pol Pot model considered religion a debasement of

society,

- Their social organization: going much beyond the Khmer family network and units, and exceeding

the “new family”: the Angkar15.

They therefore stood out in total contradiction to the model imposed by the regime of Democratic

Kampuchea. Indeed, any outward sign of disagreement with the line of Angkar - “the organization” - any

traditional or religious practice connected with the time before “Year Zero,” any reference other than that

of the cleansed and idealized peasant was a pretext for elimination (including among the so-called “pure”

Khmer). Thus, while it is verified that a much larger proportion of the Muslim general population perished

during this period, it must also be noted on the other hand that if only 11% to 17% of Muslim religious

leaders were alive after 1979, only 3% to 7% of the Buddhist monastic order survived in 1981 (CAS 1996;

BI 2000). A re-contextualization of the massacres of Muslims shall therefore be conducted on regional

basis: an area with a Cham majority obviously brought about a greater number of Cham deaths; if some

heads of districts with Muslim majorities were said to be particularly bloodthirsty in their repressive

measures towards Muslims, Buddhists were no less victimized; but also historically: the reputation of the

Cham as eternal insurgents, going back to the revolts in Kompong Cham during the previous century, to

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their pro-FULRO bias in favor of Lon Nol, but also their rebellions against Democratic Kampuchea no

doubt contributed to a sadly “preventive” repression16.

With the restoration of peace in 1991, the first free elections held by UNTAC17, and the financial manna

that came with it, the networks were re-built. Cambodian politicians rejoined parties which, even though

they did not offer yet any political or ideological program, were the guarantee of a linkage of networks and

a social positioning. Some Muslims found choice places in the state apparatus, taking jobs as ministers,

under-secretaries of state, party members, commune chiefs. Equally divided by the three principal parties in

place and their convictions, Muslims - just as non-Muslims - began to hold multiple positions on both the

political and the socio-religious scenes.

I. 5. One Muslim Community or Plural Communities?

In order to define from the outside this community which is seemingly united by Islam, the Khmers use

the term “Cham” in present-day language. Yet, the latter can designate both an “ethnic group” or “a native

of Champa”. Even before the migrations, the Champa kingdom, while mainly composed of persons of

Cham “ethnicity,” also included other Austronesian and Austro-Asiatic groups (Gay 1987: 49-59). In

addition to this initial confusion is the term “malais”, which the French protectorate used to designate

Cham and Malays from Indochina. By jumbling them together, they were taking up the terminology of the

Khmers, who, in their royal chronicles, often named the Muslim group Cham-Chvea, since they fail to

recognize the difference (Mak Phoeun 1987: 83-94). If until now, this article has drawn a portrait of the

Muslim community by emphasizing the first (Cham) and marginalizing the second (Chvea), it’s precisely

because we have little information about the Chvea. What we know is that they probably settled in

Cambodia from the 14th century on. To complicate matters, the Chvea, who rarely refer to themselves as

such, did not make up one sole and unique ‘stock’, but two: the “Malayous”, on the one hand, who

originated in Malaysia and the south of Thailand, and the “Chvea,” on the other hand, a people originating

in Java, Sumatra and Borneo. However, these distinction and their provenances seem more and more

confused, since the protagonists themselves, who now speak only Khmer, insist on introducing themselves

as “Khmer-Islam”. In fact, this is how in general, today, Cambodian Muslims prefer to introduce

themselves, whether their interlocutor is Khmer or a government official, in order to emphasize their

integration into Cambodian society. But very rapidly, and in daily discourse, people begin saying “Cham”,

thus taking up the generic term, which assimilates all Muslims and is used by the majority of Khmers in

their daily language. In order to unite themselves with a majority, the minority Chvea also do not hesitate

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to say, initially, “Cham” (implying, once again, “Muslim from Cambodia”) thus erasing the “foreign” aspect

that might be attached to “Chvea.” In the villages Chvea and Cham rarely mix together, but in urban areas

the communities can be relatively easy to dissociate, if only because of language: the Chvea speak only

Khmer, while the great majority of Cham use their own language in daily speech.

Yet again, and in addition, other Khmers-Islam can be encountered on occasions, and they call themselves

neither Chvea nor Cham. What did they call themselves before Sihanouk applied his terminology is

impossible to discern from the current state of research. They are the result of intermarriages between

young Khmer or Cham women with Chvea soldiers in Battambang, or with urban Indo-Pakistani

merchants. Few survived the migrations to Thailand or Pakistan before the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975

and the purges that followed.

Besides these diverse origins, and in spite of the discourse of unity of the Cambodian umma, we can also

note a variety of understandings of the message of the Koran. If these diverse modalities of appropriation

are sometimes ancient and intimately linked to the cultural and historical past of the various groups, new

tendencies have emerged, especially through foreign influences, be it passive and receptive or active. One

might mention the ‘’orthodox’’18, who form a majority among both Chvea and Cham. The ‘’Jahed’’ - or

more correctly, the ‘’Group of the Imam San’’, or ‘’traditionalists’’19 - who are a minority, claim to be the

advocates of the preservation of the heritage of Champa. They are often criticized for praying only once a

week (on Fridays), whereas the first group insists upon five daily prayers. At the same time, they are

granted a certain respect for the preservation of tradition. But might this dualism inherent in the discourse

be as simplistic as that? Although they are blamed by the traditionalists of abandoning their customs for a

“foreign” Islam, the “orthodox” of Kompong Cham also claim a pride in their origins, and call themselves

- in the image of a majority of Cham in the country - “the old people”: the direct descendants of the

Champa migrations. But essentialist tradition used in an instrumental way (as it also has been for a few

years among the Khmer) is not solely the preserve of the heirs of Champa: in Kampot, the majority of

Muslims are Chvea, divided into two groups: the Lohao20, or those who pray five times a day, and the

‘’Jumat’’21 who pray weekly, and who insist…that they are preserving original traditions22.

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II. FROM A WIDE DIVERSITY OF RELIGIOUS TRENDS, TO NEW PRACTICES AND

CURRENT REARRANGEMENTS

Just as most of the rest of the ‘Malay World’, the Muslim population of Cambodia is Sunni-Shafi’i23, But

the diversity of inspirational sources drawn on by the Cham in order to forge an Islam that bears witness to

a long history of eclectic influences, be they Shiite24 or Sufi25. Not to mention that this has been grafted

onto a background of ancestral cults and of pre-Islamic Brahmanism. With the reopening of the country in

the 1990’s, a certain religious “renewal” was noticeable, which sometimes worried observers, especially in

the aftermath of September 11. The presence of Salafist movements, of preachers coming from the Middle

East or from India, but also news ideas introduced by the Cham and Chvea upon their return from

studying in Malaysia, in the south of Thailand or in Saudi Arabia, (and to a lesser extent in Egypt), aroused

some fear about a “new radicalism’’. Yet none of those terms have actually been defined. The closing of

the “Koranic” school Umm Al-Qura26 near Phnom Penh in May 2003, followed by the arrest of teachers

suspected of links with the terrorist organization Jemah Islamiyah, increased this suspicion27.

Still, links with foreign co-religionists are far from being a new phenomenon. A few examples from history:

the mingling of faiths of the Cham and the Chvea through their religious centers - especially Trea in

Kompong Cham and Chruy Changvar in Phnom Penh - which attracted visitors from around the region;

their continuing exchanges of instruction with the ‘’Tuans’’ – religion teachers - and Imams from Kelantan

and Pattani, already mentioned by Marcel Ner in 1941 (Ner 1941: 166, 177); their pilgrimages to Mecca

already attested in 1891 (Aymonier 1891: 98)… All clearly show that their interest in religious debate is

neither passively receptive, nor of recent emergence (Guérin 2004)28. Marcel Ner emphasizes in his writing

in 1937 on the Hajj: “Think of the distance of the holy city, the length of the pilgrimage requiring at last 7

or 8 months, its cost, and the number of people who prolonged their visit for several years in order to

frequent the schools in Mecca. Think also of those who received Koranic instruction in Kelantan or

Pattani, and you will understand the value that was attached to religious observation and to an exact

knowledge of the precepts of the Prophet” (Ner 1941: 186).

What does seem new though is the flow of money from abroad, the construction of dazzling mosques in

the new Middle Eastern style, the ostentatious dress of the Malay or Arab style, the fact of new access to

transportation brought about by the democratization of air travel, along with outside support, the sending

of massive numbers of pilgrims to Mecca, and of students of religion to the countries mentioned above.

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The foreign influences and the divisions they brought about are nothing new or surprising: in the 1930’s,

M. Ner points to a split between the Cambodian Muslims into two groups, ‘’Kobuol’’ and ‘’Trimeu’’, over

the importance of instruction in Arabic by some, and in Malay by others. In the 1950’s, the Cham Imam

Ali Musa, on his return from studying in Kelantan, gave birth to a prime community rupture: the ‘’Kaum

Muda’’ (from the Malay “new group”) close to Wahhabism, and the ‘’Kaum Tua’’, (from the Malay “old

group”) which was conservative in most Cham and Chvea Islamic customs. Discussion was lively and

sometimes bitter in families that rallied to one or the other movement (Collins 1996; Blengsli 2003).

Finally, looking back to the last fifteen years or so, the phenomenon of “rupture” sometimes observed

within the Cambodian umma should probably be viewed in continuity with these debates and movements,

temporarily frozen by 20 years of war. Today, elders often compare the new fragmentation of the ‘’Muda’’

to the Salafists and Middle Eastern Wahhabis, called “Kuwaitis” and the ‘’Tua’’ to the ‘’Tabligh’’, also

called ‘’Dawa’’29. The cohabitation of Dawa with the practices already in place, allows the movement to be

well assimilated - in spite of criticisms often formulated - as a trend internal to the community, whereas

Wahhabism is often described as exogenous.

II. 1. The Advent of a “Globalized Islam”30

Nonetheless, these two tendencies draw attention and even attraction because of their foreign provenance.

Many Khmers perceive Europe and most of Asia as modern, exotic, often idealized, allowing a widened

field of vision and a global network. In the same way, Cambodian Muslims see in an international umma,

an opening onto a transnational outside world from which they have been cut off, after having been - for

long - dynamic actors in it. In the continuity of an Islamization initiated within the borders of Champa, and

with the hope of a better future than what Cambodia is currently able to offer, the communities have

turned toward a positive future: either built on an absolute rationality based on a reformist Muslim

modernity, or toward an imagined “ancestrality” of reconstructed traditions, guarantee of a reassuring and

comforting harmony that would have existed in a mythic past. It is therefore understandable that, in

general, Salafists and Wahhabis - relatively mixed and / or confused together in Cambodia - might be

attractive to students, the urban population, and the elites; whereas the Dawa has more appeal with the

peasant “masses” and the elders31.

The “’Kuwaiti” tendency advocates, as the ‘’Kaum Tua’’ did 50 years ago, the return to a purified Islam

through the return to the primary written sources. They preach a certain cleansing of the Islam, notably

from the ulamas and their interpretations often considered today as unreliable and a source of discord.

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They also advocate the reduction of costs linked to festivities carried out with great pomp, notably during

the Mawlud (the birthday of the prophet), in which offerings are made during visits to the tombs of saints

and ancestors in the hope of happiness, cures for illnesses, and prosperity. One young Cham, a public

health official, hopes to contribute to a more rapid development of his community: “When I go into the

villages and see people who prefer to incur debt in order to celebrate spirits who don’t even exist and who

will bring them nothing - and they still hope to cure their illnesses, whether benign or serious, by means of

costly offerings - I really feel pity and compassion. It’s not surprising that Muslims are not moving

forward...”. Wahhabism is thus perceived as an access to a unique and unified Islam with a contemporary

and international label. As such, it permits the connecting of a resolutely transnational community and its

various extended networks. It is seen as a leap forward, an education which would constitute a first step to

a future-oriented action. The elites consider that the Muslim associations in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Dubai

and Malaysia, provide them with key interlocutors for the organization of pilgrimages, the design of

development programs, the establishment of university exchanges, and support to the Tuans and the

Imams.

Unlike Wahhabism and Salafism which, although they may reject the West, nonetheless borrow its modes

of operating in their quest for modernity, the Dawa preaches a return to the way of life of the Prophet

Mohammed and his companions as a renaissance of lost traditions that once held society together. Those

who have not given into Wahhabism because they didn’t want any foreign intervention in their religious

affairs, find in Dawa an idealization of reconstituted traditions: the new apparel - may it be an “Arab-

Muslim” dress - is justified as a return to ancestral practices. Contributing to this image of the “tradition

revival”, the preservation of visits to ancestral tombs and the celebration of the Mawlud and other

festivities in all their splendor are not repressed or prohibited by the members of the Dawa. Within this

logic, “ancestrality” and Islamism are one and the same. A little saying often brought up on the field, here

from a farmer, is revealing: “The Kuwaitis want us to stop our prayers to the dead and the Mawlud. But we

inherit that from our ancestors, and even in spite of the Khmer Rouge - life was very hard then - we never

gave up on our customs. The Dawa are just guys like us, but they manage to follow the path of religion in a

better way”. The Dawa allows for another type of relationship to the umma. The visit of the ‘’Khuruj’’32 to

the village mosque is an occasion for awaited religious teachings, when too often the community is only

left with the men generations whose religious formation was restricted by the war. The visits also provide a

chance to widen the circle of relations in the area, and in the umma of the whole country. A time to hear

news from families in the region where the preacher originally comes from; or to share all kind of

information: opportunities for religious teachers in other provinces, new methods to raise cattle or grow

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crops which have proven successful in other locations, stories and accounts about journeys abroad. While

today the majority of the Tabligh groups are Cambodians, the occasional Khuruj arriving from overseas

always makes a strong and lasting impression33. And we cannot fail to mention the massive infatuation for

the ‘’ijtima’’, huge annual Tabligh reunions in Trea, a village in Kompong Cham that has always been a

center of religious dialogue. Its last assembly, in April 2006, drew about 40,000 attendees34.

Still, this reification of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ into two fixed and opposite concepts is not restricted to

the distinctions between “Kuwaitis” and “Dawa,” as some have perceived it, nor is it particular to Muslims

in general. Dealing with the suppression of its intellectual elites, and of its purveyors of culture and

knowledge, religious teachers of all tendencies, its artists, Cambodia has been attempting for the past

decade to re-conquer a “lost identity” frozen in the idea of a folklorized tradition: a return to classic Khmer

silks (often woven by Cham workers), to local products in supermarkets (revived by foreign NGO

programs); to culture consumption through visits to museums or theme parks where the authentic is staged

(through Asian funding)… In the end, the “return” to “Muslim tradition” (once again, reified in the myth

of a single / unified Islam), must be understood as a response to the exacerbation of “Khmer culture”

which was abused for 30 years and which should now be ‘’preserved’’ and ‘’saved’’35. It can also be viewed

as a mirror to the prevalence of a communal Islam on a global scale, expressed in the perception that

Cambodian Muslims have of their identity and cultural environment very much determined by the lens of a

certain “Muslim-Arabic” pattern36. But beyond this foregrounding of a global Islam, the logic of affiliations

is often mingled with a certain individualism that we will now analyze.

II. 2. The Logic of Individualization and Secularization

The Khmer Rouge regime dismantled the social structures of Cambodian society intentionally and

systematically and dispersed the population to hamlets and villages that were completely unfamiliar to their

new inhabitants. Once the war was over, once the displaced settled, a great number of people set up new

communities when demographic growth pressured in their areas of origin and made it too difficult to

acquire land or to develop economically. But if people were to reconstruct themselves individually, in

appearance abandoning family and village links as well as ancestral tombs, in a vision of a better personal

life to come, they nonetheless never really abandoned their natal villages. Connections are maintained

through weddings and other regularly attended festivities; the sons are sent to religious schools in their

home villages; and there is a preference for Friday prayer at mosques that may be far away, but where

pilgrims will find other exiles, rather than a closer mosque where there are no “ancient” links with the

13

worshippers. Individualization logics therefore do not neutralize the attachment to the community of

origin: children are raised socially, individually, but the fallout and effects are those of the family, the

community, the greater network. Funds from Chvea and Cham who took refuge overseas (Malaysia,

United States, France…) during the war enable the reconstruction upon their return to the country of

family villas and mosques, an occasion to “acquire of merit”37. The process is the same for the numerous

“Excellencies”, high-ranking bureaucrats who all bestowed their generosity on their communities by means

of large donations. This is not so different from the affiliation with the protective patron, of “clientelism,”

which allows a community as a whole to improve itself, thanks to a “reputable” individual who has been

successful in life. The individual, continually in search of a protective network, is not unlike what we find

in the few conversions of Khmers to Islam. An example would be the Khmer elderly and orphans who,

having lost everything, displaced to unknown territories of a Muslim majority, preferred to remain living

with their new neighbors and to “become Cham / Chvea” in their adoptive alien community.

But Islam also allows an individual access to international donors. When the annual competition of the

recitation of the Koran is held, the participants may travel at no expense to Malaysia or Brunei for the

international sessions. Such a victory contributes to the strengthening and knowledge of their faith, as well

as the personal pride and prestige - shared by their villages - and also the perspective gained from traveling

and discovering a wider umma. In most cases, villages account one or several young men who leave to

pursue religious studies in the south of Thailand, in Malaysia, or in Arabia, sometimes financed by foreign

donations, and more often than we think, by their own families. The young man returns with the

prestigious halo of an education, of religious knowledge and the experience of a journey to another umma.

His social position is paradoxical, because he takes the respected title of Tuan or Hajji, even though the

village is often not able to offer any compensation. Very often, it will be another village, whose more

profitable “zakat’’ – the annual Muslim alms - will be better able to provide him a good living, calling upon

him to take the offer and acquire the social position he deserves. The link to his original community

remains, but often it is in this relocation that he will find a wife and found a family, thus transferring his

recent economic and social acquisitions to this new personal environment.

The return of these young men to the homeland, now adepts of “globalized Islam”, does sometimes pose

problems with some of the elders. New ideas throw into question old practices, and often the resulting

dialogue is endless. In the case of the Dawa, acceptance is more common, although sometimes disputes

will occur. But the interests of society in general are too great to be put into question. As one fisherman

happily stated, “since we have had the Dawa, young people have stopped drinking, drugging themselves

14

with ‘’Yaa baa’’38, and getting into trouble.” Such remarks are common in most of the Muslim villages

where people are proud to see their youth enthusiastic and active in these missions: they find a masculine

community life when they travel; they take on the social function of preachers, and, as such, the prestige of

an educated man of good conduct. Previously, many of them had no employment or qualifications, and

nothing to occupy their time (unless they fell into delinquency).

II. 3. The Questioning of Traditional Authorities

All the same, this new social position, which challenges the supremacy of the elders, who were formerly the

repositories of religious knowledge, troubles the village community by interfering in the controversies

opposing Wahhabis and Salafists on one side, Dawa and elders on the other side. The main targets for

contestation are the ‘’Krus’’, the Gurus : those masters who are considered special experts in matters of

health and treatment of illness, of magic and protection, counselors and intermediaries against occult

forces, and whose actions are connected to their deep-seated religious practices. The young Tuans and

Imams, trained to a faith based on rationality that rejects all “superstition”, as well as the less young who

also tend to see fetishism and archaism in these customs, have relegated these masters of all situations to

the ranks of the discredited - at least on the surface - since their place among the population still remains

essential today (Blengsli 2003)39. The krus are not the only ones who find their position disputed. The

Khuruj visits also pose the problem of “competition” for religious power. The beliefs and the transmission

of religious knowledge within the mosque by men unknown to the community and often young, lead to the

appropriation of a social role formerly held solely by a Hakem40 and his adjuncts, and also to the

questioning of the superior knowledge formerly attributed to them alone. Similarly, the arrival of Wahhabi

groups, who bring new and different teachings that are declared to be - or are interpreted as - superior

owing to their strict return to the sources. This puts the older heads of mosques (and of communities) in a

delicate position.

As a consequence, conflicts are not rare. In one small Chvea village in Kampot, there are two mosques, a

few hundred meters from one another, each one counting about forty families among the faithful. On side

proclaims its attachment to the elders and the Dawa, while the other side prefers to turn to the new

“Kuwaitis.” Some of the villagers speak out saying they miss the former situation of the community, but

without - yet - finding a solution to the discord. In other places mosques are just divided in two parts (De

Feo 2005). In a village in Pursat province, the conflict has lasted several years and has been taken to the

highest Muslim authorities, as well as to the local state religious administrations. One group of Khuruj

15

which took over the place in the mosque to pray (or lead the prayer) without asking permission from the

Hakem, allegedly challenged its authority. In the last few years the situation seems to have calmed down,

but the authorities, both Muslim (the Mufti and its local representatives) and governmental (the Ministry of

Cults and Religions and its local representatives) are paying close attention. Everyone agrees that the

animosities of the past, stemming from the then freshness and bitterness of the debate, have now abated

and that measures have been taken. For example, putting a stop to the construction in a same area of

competing mosques41, very often stemming from a desire for prestige on the part of the initiators. This is

also common among the Khmers and could be related to the desire for “acquisition” that penetrates

Buddhism.

II. 4. Cambodian Muslims and Political Divisions

These conflicts do not always stem from a divergence of opinion about what “Islamically correct” would

actually mean. An important role is played by affiliation with associations linked to political parties: the

CPP, Cambodian People’s Party, which has governed since the Vietnamese period; the FUNCINPEC, by

turns royalist and / or oppositional; and the Sam Rainsy Party, resolutely oppositional. In Cambodia, Islam

does not seem to seek to instrumentalize politics: on the contrary, it would be politics that appear to take

charge. Therefore, there is no Muslim party, since proposing a model other than the one already conceived

by the Cambodian nation as a whole would mean opposing a Buddhist majority. Many Muslims are quick

to point out that the Khmers were willing to welcome them when Champa was lost: to contest this would

commensurate to “behaving badly in the home of the host” as William Collins suggested (Collins 1996).

To another extent it would call into question the allegiance to the King, now their king. To a lesser extent,

probably left silenced yet still recalled by some, are the consequences of a potential radical change in the

system: many still remember the Thbaung Khmum rebellions which were crushed down by King Ang

Duong; the population displacements that resulted; and, closer to contemporary history, the atrocities of

the Khmer Rouge. In addition, the freedoms currently granted to Muslims in their daily life - religious or

other - whether it be the result of indifference or a true politics of tolerance, do not necessitate - in the eyes

of interested persons - the establishment of a Muslim political system in public life. Thus, when someone

expresses his convictions about the values of “shari’a’’42, his opinion is intended to influence those in his

community (village or neighborhood) but rarely aims at the national umma, and is - in any case - solely

addressed to Muslims, since such opinions would be considered inappropriate in a Cambodian context.

The idea of the adoption of shari’a is limited to a few tuans and religious officials, and seen as off-putting

or tedious by a majority of the population. The last Cambodian elections saw the emergence of numerous

16

parties who openly defined themselves as Buddhist. In neighboring countries, various parties claiming

affiliation with Islam have run candidates for public office. But the Muslim community in Cambodia has

never considered itself as a movement apart. One of the reasons given is the watchful concern for the unity

of the umma, in spite of the clearly displayed affiliations of some of the party leaders. Thus, the Mufti, even

though a unifying figure as head of the Muslims, is nonetheless the subject of polemics: behind the

arguments, we regularly find old stories of networks conflicts, often political, since the Mufti is clearly

affiliated with the CCP, the party of the current prime minister, Hun Sen. The Mufti is not the only one

having difficulties in uniting a varied community when confronted with the blame of standing out for his

own political positions. The leader of the Imam San community, who also declared his sympathy for the

CPP “who liberated the country from the Khmer Rouge” as he puts it, is regularly criticized in the villages

whose heads support the opposition. One might therefore wonder how far these tensions referred to as

“religious” are indeed politically rooted, and vice-versa.

Religion therefore tends to be instrumentalized by politics. Villages and communes with Muslim majorities

are most often led by the Chvea or the Cham, whose positions of power depend on party affiliations. An

example: a Cham youth radio station, because of its affiliation with an association led by a member of the

opposition, freezes out the partisans of the CPP43. Another example: the organizing of the annual

competition on the recitation of the Koran is not much under the responsibility of the Mufti, but rather of

a group of Muslims from the opposition44. The 2006 edition had Nhek Bun Chhay, as its patron: then vice

minister of defense, key member of the FUNCINPEC… and a Khmer Buddhist. Finally, the mosques are

of considerable political importance: sometimes financed by associations who are quietly but certainly

politicized, but even more often by a personal donation from one “Excellency” or another45. We are

getting closer here to what has been a near-frenzy in the construction of wats - pagodas - by Khmer men in

power, who acquire merit that the electors can appreciate in the bright light of day. And one would be

surprised to reckon how many mosques are financed by politicians who are Khmer Buddhists. While the

three parties are still currently unable to put together a tangible political program, the Cambodians -

Muslims and non-Muslims - define their convictions on the basis of the involvement of the different

existing networks, in a very “clientelist” pattern which feeds the hope of an improvement in their

conditions of life.

17

III. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES, PRACTICES & ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

III. 1. The Impact of State Economic Failures: the Relationship with NGOs

On the subject of development, is there discrimination experienced by this umma in Cambodian society?

The poverty of the villages, the continuing lack of access to disease prevention and health care measures or

treatment, the absence of Muslim students in higher education in the capital - these are often brought up.

If an attempt is made to estimate the deprivation of one community or another, it is worthwhile to

consider the resources potentially available in the area, especially by comparing them to the difficulties of

neighboring Khmer villages. Poverty can thus appear most visible when we know that a great number of

Khmers live in an inordinately high state of debt, which is constantly renewed: borrowing from the local

lender in order to treat an unexpected illness, for an impressive wedding to emphasize a social status, for

the purchase of land on which there is hope to speculate. On the other hand, recourse to usurers is

condemned by Muslim tradition, and thus such ostentatious spending occurs in much less proportions.

The Muslims in Cambodia tend to resolve their problems among friends, neighbors, or family, and thus

borrow to a lesser extent, in the end displaying more modest houses and neighborhoods.

The economic situation of the Muslim community is often a mirror of the greater Cambodian crisis: a

government apparatus whose resources depend on the “good will” and the orientation of donors and

foreign investors. To this extent, if the Cambodian umma has often found itself marginalized out of

donations from the innumerable NGOs who have come to “assist” the country for the last fifteen years, it

is probably more the result of a geographical exclusion: the villages farthest away from roads - and

therefore the neediest - are completely left out from the path of development, and this is true whatever the

religion of the village may be. When development indeed comes, it is generally viewed with sympathies by

the villagers, who see a break with the monotony, either through exotic trainings (on Human Rights,

Gender Equity, Good Governance, AIDS Prevention…) or through providential aid (donations of rice,

sarongs…). The fact remains, though, that these gestures are devoid of any long term perspective

(sanitation workshops without the establishment of any system of evacuation for the waste water;

veterinary care trainings, without any actual access to accompanying treatments…), nor any local

perspective in order to provide a relevant framework (a blind application of principles of “democracy”

without even any attention paid to local systems that have proven efficient for generations). All combined,

18

this lead to a relative absence of any real effectiveness. If Muslim villages are low on the scale of

“humanitarian benefits”, the same observation can be made with regard to equally unsuitable programs in

neighboring Khmer villages46.

With the opening up of the country to new foreign capital, the enthusiasm has increased for new Muslim

associations that would benefit47 from foreign aid from their co-religionists throughout the world. While

Cambodia begins to be disenchanted with promises of development, in which they see nothing but

dependence, the Cambodian umma also has no lack of criticism for their Muslim “brothers” who were full

of promises left unfulfilled48. In the words of an Imam in Kompong Cham, “The NGOs… Well of course

we see them. They come, promise money for the mosque, a new school building, and salaries for our

teachers… That lasts for about three months, and then we never see them again…and that’s if they come

back at all! In any case, everything depends on your connections, and here we don’t have any, so the

Excellencies and the others put their money elsewhere.”

III. 2. Failures of State Economic Policies: The Education Case

Yet, the international umma and its ensemble of representative associations remains an alternative path to

the services for which the State has no resources. Education is the primary issue, as a majority of the

Cambodian population is under 25 years old: the public institutions cannot absorb all, and private schools,

particularly in urban areas, have developed exponentially. For their part, the Muslims have found in this

system the possibility of enrolling in certain private universities whose tuition and fees are paid by Muslim

associations49, but also - thanks to similar funding - to leave for vocational training (to Indonesia, for

example)50 or alas, to enroll at no cost in Cambodian and Muslim private schools whose curriculum is as

much religious as it is general.

For example, the schools of the RIHS (Revival Islamic Heritage Society) of Kuwaiti origin, whose

headquarters and institute grant the baccalaureate, are based in Chom Chau, in the suburbs of Phnom

Penh. Each day, the orphans have a half-day devoted to religious studies, and another to state curriculum51.

The exams taken to obtain the major degrees are recognized by the Ministry of Education. The institution

is thus aiming to establish a future Muslim elite that will be a guarantor of professional development in the

community, and is beginning by setting up programs for vocational trainings. Through its seven primary

schools located in the provinces, the RIHS aims a completely covered education for orphans, but also for

local kids for whom teachings come also at no cost. However, these schools gather mainly orphans who

19

have sometimes come from distant areas, and only a small number of children from the village attend. A

number of parents consider these boarding school students who have come from afar as being under an

outside influence – through the affiliation with Wahhabism – and prefer not to send their kids there but

rather to the local Cambodian public schools and the small village ‘’madrasas’’.

Another example, the former Umm Al-Qura School, closed because of accusations of terrorism made

about some of the teachers, has now reopened as the Cambodian Islam Center and placed under the joint

supervision of the Ministry of Cults and Religions and the Mufti. Strangely enough, the school formerly

financed by Arab donations, better known to the Cham under the name “Chroy Metrei School” (the name

of the district near Phnom Penh where it is located), does not have this image of a “foreign” institution.

Muslims in Cambodia regretted its closing, considering it the “heart of Cambodian Islam,” and the decline

in financing and educational standards as a result of the departure of the foreign teachers, who were the

guarantors of its reputation. Last, if Cham and Chvea students have only a small visibility in the capital

universities, the same is true for young provincial Khmers without family members or any other network in

the capital. They remain on the margins of the system of higher education. As an answer to the

relationships developed by the Khmers with relatives in America, Australia, and France, the Muslims have

re-built long-time bridges linking them to the transnational umma beyond their borders.

III. 3. The Influence of Islam Advocated by Various Movements on Economic Development

Even though the salafist theories, when they were born, widely disapproved of Western hegemony, they

have not hesitated to borrow its models, especially its education mode. In Cambodia, the disapproval of

the West, while already not so obvious in those movements’ theories, is even imperceptible in practice.

With a huge desire for development, but a great gap in funding (despite large individual donations from

Malaysia, the Middle-East, and Cham / Chvea refugees, especially in the United States), the Cambodian

Muslim associations must now turn to new possibilities of funding. The embassies as well as the NGOs -

notably those representative of the United States, and to a lesser extent Great Britain and Australia - offer

new opportunities.

In April 2006, the RIHS was hoping for positive feedback to its applications for funding for vocational

training from the embassies of Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore, with the largest contribution expected to

come from the United States. The former Umm Al-Qura was regretting its lack of relations with the

American Embassy to contribute to the restructuring of the school. A great number of the Muslim

20

associations and NGOs were, or had been, financed for some of their programs (with a marked preference

for the teaching of the human rights), by the American Embassy or American institutions, and on some

occasions by the Australians and the British. At present, it is rare that zones with Muslim majorities have

not been provided with sewing machines, given to a large number of families, with the intention of

allowing women to increase family income. The Dawa was not totally excluded from these new

contributions: in a Kompong Chhnang Village with a clear affiliation to the Tabligh movement, a hospital

was built with similar contributions. In other locations requests were made to embassies and NGOs by

provincial mosques in order to support the setting up of various infrastructures. In spite of the massive

enthusiasm, the risks to social structures involved in any globalizing development program can be

regrettable over the long term: the homogeneity of practices taught in a workshop whose intention is the

harmonization of traditional customs; the increasing number of women who leave the villages for garment

factories at a time when the saturated Cambodian market cannot absorb any more seamstresses; the

massive diffusion and acceptance - however temporary - of concepts that come from the West, with the

risk that come one or two generations from now, those may be challenged by the lack of local anchorage.

Meanwhile, the Islam that had been considered radical and anti-Western seems to have accommodated

itself quite well with practicality and lenders formerly considered unlikely.

In a general way, Islam - here as elsewhere - accommodates itself, in the economic sphere, to what is said

and what can be done. Prohibited amulets are still purchased to guarantee the success of an enterprise. The

business and wealth resulting are not even disparaged as the access to power – whether political or

economic – by a member of the umma, is a promise of the visibility of the whole community on both local

and national spheres. It is also seen as an equilibrium as much social (a protector bringing together its

enlarged network) as economic (in the form of gifts, of consistent zakat, or participation in the building of

mosques and schools). On the periphery of Phnom Penh, while its proportion is still limited compared to

the Buddhist majority, a Muslim middle class consisting of bureaucrats, shopkeepers, employees of service

industries has emerged. Normative Islam doesn’t seem to enter much into debate as long as it leaves

individuals free to dispose of their own choices. The five recommended daily prayers are adapted to busy

schedules, and finally are a practice limited to the most devout, even in the villages where the Dawa are in

the majority. The preachers then form a group visiting families who do not pray: in these discussions,

preachers talk about the necessity of prayer; sometimes patrols put pressure on the undecided. If the Dawa

is mainly known for its quasi-ascetic values, guarantors of a certain moral balance in society, it is

denounced when it tries to impose itself as the exclusive model, putting the development of the

community in peril. A high-ranking Muslim official confides: “Young people are all ready to rejoin the

21

Dawa now. That’s fine, but only to a certain limit. Who is going to rebuild the country if they’re all

absorbed with the mosque?” For his part, a Tuan from Battambang worries: “The problem with the Dawa

guys is that because of their travels, they are often absent from economic life. That’s bothersome in itself,

but some of them become totally detached from their families, abandoning their wives. And then again

they finance their travels themselves, leaving the family to fend for itself or fall into debt”.

III. 4. Transformations in the Conditions of Women

In Cham society, and to another extent, in the Khmer society, who are traditionally matrilineal, the role of

the woman in the household is too important not to be taken into consideration. What is of great value is

protected, and if Islam has modified some aspects of the social structures, it has in most cases only been

set side by side to the place traditionally assigned to mothers. A far cry from the clichés about the

submissive woman behind her veil, a woman has become, in the absence of her husband in Dawa, the sole

master of the household, of her daughters and sisters. This young woman under a black veil, a recluse

because she is ‘’haram’’, forbidden and therefore sacred, comments ironically: of course her husband has

left her alone, but at least he has left in order to search for God, not for girls… Many women in the large

communes of the Dawa continue not to wear the enveloping black veil, but rather simple colored shawls,

arguing that for moving around, for business, or certainly for work with livestock and for agriculture,

where they do the same work as the men, this garment is totally unpractical. In the same places where the

words “radicalism” and “fundamentalism” weigh heavily, women can pursue their religious studies beyond

puberty, whereas traditionally - among the Cham as well as the Chvea - women put an end to their studies

as soon as the perspective of a couple and family life becomes a possibility. If traditions and the Dawa

traditionally limit women for the sole roles of mother and spouses - the assurance of a certain long-awaited

social status – in some places such as this Kompong Cham island – Cham have seen see their economies

take off with the resumption of silk weaving, an exclusively female activity. Does this mean independence

for women? We must remember that regardless of economic imperatives, Cambodia has always considered

that a woman working means that the husband has failed to suitably support his family. Elsewhere, many

young women are active in associations with Wahhabi tendencies, along with their male colleagues, they

put together orientation programs for female students in Phnom Penh or to travel abroad in order to gain

training. Many women also leave alone or accompanied by a relative, to find a new life in Malaysia: they

leave the country to become factory workers or domestic servants through recruitment and placement

agencies. Some of those are approved by the two countries. Others are clandestine, and the consequences

have too often meant slavery or rape in Malaysia or Saudi Arabia. When they leave independently rather

22

than through an agency, and are successful, they become freelance workers, and may feel satisfied by the

changes that have come about in their new lives. They become a new and essential source of support for

their families, and return home only occasionally, especially to give birth. While AIDS awareness or birth

control campaigns didn’t always received approval from the religious leaders, they have slowly become

more successful. A worker loading trucks on the Vietnamese border prefers, like her neighbors, to use the

pill, even if often disapproved of by men, resulting in new children unbalancing weak family finances. But

in the end, “husbands also seem to find benefit in this...” she says smiling… Much like these couples,

theoretically in disagreement but pragmatic, Cham and Chvea, the orthodox, the elders, the modernists, the

traditionalists—all seem not to submit to influences, to resist them. They rather skillfully test them, in

order to retain what is adaptable or necessary. Thus, if there is an influence from various Islamist

movements, it should not be overestimated, in order not to freeze the community in an enclosure, at the

end rather external.

CONCLUSION

The discussion developed in these pages is not intended to minimize the concern of the Khmers about

their Muslim neighbors, who seem to be taking a ‘new’ direction towards “globalized Islam” and the much-

feared “extremism” that could eventually stigmatize the Muslim community. Although the mutation in

progress and its potential cannot be denied or ignored, one may regret that the obsession with the growth

of “fundamentalism” and “radicalism” seems too often to obscure the approaches of a community whose

Islamism is in continual redefinition and stated within the Cambodian context, even if the fascination with

the “outside” is not absent. In the same way that the Khmer elites - whether educated abroad or not -

often look down on the possession ceremonies and the confection of protective diagrams as superstitions,

Muslims are seeking a new foothold in the domain of religion, and with all the more acuity, since the

perspectives of a better living remain only promises. Whatever community they belong to, young graduates

and also the youth who don’t have the means to education themselves, come from all regions to swell the

ranks of those who are frustrated by a development allotted in trickles. In the absence of adequate

structures, repentant delinquents are feeding the ranks of the novices in the wats, to such a degree that the

head of the bonzes himself is alarmed, and is calling on national youth to put forth an effort to reconstruct

the country—and themselves. The exacerbation of the religious impulse as a justification for equilibrium in

23

the society of the future is modeled on an idealized past that is far from being ignored as well by

Cambodian Buddhists.

In the end, beyond the confessions of a reciprocal lack of knowledge of the two communities, beyond the

suspicion toward the unknown, Cambodians - Muslims and non-Muslims - use the same tools to

reconstruct themselves as mirror-images of the other, proving that each of them, unconsciously, seeing one

another on a daily basis, know themselves and live themselves perhaps more and better than originally

thought.

Phnom Penh, December 2012

(For the English translation)

° ° ° ° °

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Campa organisé à l’Université de Copenhague le 23 mai 1987, Paris, 83-94. MANGUIN Pierre-Yves 1979 : « Etudes cam II: L'introduction de l'Islam au Campa », BEFEO, LXVI,

Paris, 255-287. NER Marcel 1941 : « Les Musulmans de l’Indochine Française », BEFEO, XLI : 151-200. PO DHARMA 1981 « Note sur les Cam du Cambodge », Seksa Khmer IV, Cedorek, Paris, 161-183. 1982 « Note sur les Cam du Cambodge: religion et organisation », Seksa Khmer V, Cedorek, Paris, 103-116. OSMAN Ysa 2002 Oukoubah: Justice for the Cham Muslims under the Democratic Kampuchea Regime, DCCAM -

Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh. REID Anthony 2000 : Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia, Chiang Mai, Silkworn Books,

Bangkok. ROY Olivier 2002 : « L’islam mondialisé », Le Seuil, Paris. STOCK Emiko 2012 « Au-delà des ethnonymes. À propos de quelques exonymes et endonymes chez les

musulmans du Cambodge », Moussons - Social Science Research on Southeast Asia, 20, Paris, 141-160. TROLL Christian 1994 ‘’Two conceptions of Da’wa in India : Jama’at-i Islami and Tablighi Jama’at’’, Archives

de Sciences Sociales des Religions 87, 115-133

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VICKERY Michael - 1988 : ‘’Correspondence’’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 20, 70-73. - 1990 : ‘’Comments on Cham Population Figures’’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 22, 31-33. - 2004 ‘’Revising Champa History’’, Symposium on New Scholarship on Champa, N.U.S, Singapore. WEBER Nicolas 2005 : Contribution à l’histoire des communautés cam en Asie du Sud-Est (Cambodge, Vietnam,

Siam, Malaisie) : intégration politique, militaire et économique, thèse de Doctorat, INALCO, Paris.

1 The equivalent of the English expression: “When pigs fly”. 2 Umma: community of Muslims. While most of the time implying its transnational dimension (Umma Al-Islamiyah: the community of Muslims around the world and beyond national borders), it can also refer to a region or a country Muslim community (The Cambodian Umma: the Muslim community of Cambodia). 3 Statistics are numerous and diverse (Ministries of the Interior, of Cults and Religions, of Planning) and do not provide an adequate account of their methods: do we count the Cham who claim an affiliation to this cultural group or the Muslims who comprise a majority of Cham, but not only? The Cham researcher Ysa Osman stated that 510,000 Cham were victims of the Khmer Rouge (Osman 2002), a figure challenged by Ben Kiernan (Kiernan 2003). A high-ranking state official from the majority party stated anonymously in March 2006 that the figures were inflated for political purposes and that there were no more than 300,000 Muslims in Cambodia. The figures from the Ministry of Cults and Religions and from the High Council of Muslim Affairs in Cambodia seemed to agree on a total of 312,000 Muslims in May 2006, data which seems pertinent since both entities took surveys that consulted with village chiefs, and were carried out yearly if not monthly. 4 Even though the term “ethnic” seems reductive because of the immutable and substantivist vision that accompanies it, we will use the term here for lack of anything better, as well as lack of space for discussion of the terminology. (For more on this issue: Stock 2012). 5 A. De Féo emphasizes furthermore the possibility of Islamization in China (De Feo 2004: 51-52). 6 Today, scholars go as far as finding common origins in Funan – the ensemble of principalities that were ancestors of Angkor, and in Champa (Vickery 2004: 12). 7 We can imagine to a lesser extent (owing to its size and lack of information about it) that this is also the case for the Chveas, some of whose oral traditions report a splitting off from the Javanese monarchies. 8 The founding myth of Cambodia features the marriage of an autochthon, a Khmer naga princess, and a foreign Brahman, probably Indian. In this myth, the Cham of Cambodia consider themselves autochthonous, descendents of the union of a naga princess no longer Khmer but Cham, and a Khmer foreigner. (Stock “Les enjeux de l’autochtonie des Cham au Cambodge: Lecture des relations des Cham avec le Royaume à travers le mythe de la nagi », unpublished article). 9 We might compare this situation with that of the Muslims in the south of Thailand, called the Jawi, but designated officially as Thai-Islam (Le Roux 1998). 10 Thus, the term ‘Champa’ wouldn’t have appeared in Cham manuscripts before the 60’s, when it would be popularized by the elites with access to the language (Personal communications Nicolas Weber & Po Dharma, 2004). 11 As discussed in the column of the bi-monthly Phnom Penh Post between October 2005 and April 2006: legal experts, researchers and observers, Cambodians and foreigners debate the notion of genocide using – notably – the case study of Cham (Phnom Penh Post 14/20, 14/22, 14/24, 14/25, 15/01, 15/02, 15/05, 15/06). 12 The list of publications relevant to this debate would be too long to quote here, we will refer the reader to Collins 1996 and Osman 2002 to begin with.

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13 The statistics used do not expose clearly if the counting refers to Cambodians Muslims or to Cambodians Cham. Are Chvea and Indo-Pakistanis included in this Cham-Muslim majority or left out of it? 14 M. Vickery suggests a more reduced account, with a Cham population of 191,000 before 1975, 180,000 in 1979, and therefore a total of 11,000 deceased Cham under the Khmers Rouges (Vickery 1988, 1990). 15 ‘’The Organization’’ referring to the supreme authority body during the Khmer Rouge regime. 16 It shall be noted that when it comes to Khmer-Cham relations, the latter often refer to the “3 years, 8 months” tragical period as a common element to both groups (the expression aiming the Khmer Rouge period has been popularized by the government which came to power on the aftermath of the Vietnamese era and before the International Khmer Rouge Trial). 17 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 18 The term is not used here in the pejorative sense that it can sometimes bear in the West, but rather to the way the protagonists refer to themselves, claiming that they are “those who live according to the religion”. (Stock 2012) 19 From the self-designation, “those who live according to tradition”. The term Jahed may have been overused by researchers, after W. Collins first spread the term. Still, from the beginning, W. Collins emphasized how this was an external designation. It would thus be more judicious not to impose an external term, but to renew the one used by the group itself, such as “the Group of the Imam San,” in memory of its ascetic founder. (Collins 1996: 62; Stock 2012). 20 From the Arabic “Zuhur”: the daily mid-day prayer. 21 From the Arabic translation of “Friday”, sole day of prayer for this group. 22 I have further developed the arguments in this paragraph in Stock 2012. 23 Sunni Islam is composed of 4 law schools. The Shafi’I school – from the eponymous founder – is one of them. Created in the 8th century, it is notably present in Africa, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and in the Malay world. It is also by far the main affiliation school of the Cambodian Muslims. 24 Some examples concerning the Shia influence: young “traditionalist” cham couples who, at the time of their engagement, take the names “Fatima” and “Ali” in honor of the 4th Caliph and his wife, venerated by the Shiites. It is also to Ali, that are attributed both the origin of magic and the conversion to Islam in Champa. Genealogies of the Saeth families, descendants of the Sayyid and Champa families, are said to take their origin in one of the Ali branches. Finally, there is the enthusiasm and the copying and disseminating of booklets recounting the tales of Ali, but also of Hassan and Hussein, his sons. These remarks are the result of personal research on oral traditions. While no historical source alludes to the passage of the Caliph to Champa it is interesting to note that it is his name and memories that have been transmitted from generation to generation. 25 Notably the community of traditionalist ascetics near the old capital of Udong, organized along the mode of the brotherhood. Also the importance in the texts of the same community on personal efforts for an introspective encounter with God, and with no doubt, the booklet used for meditation guidelines entitled “Kitap Sufi”. In other places in the country, we can mention the visits and offerings to Saints tombs – Cham, Jveas, Malays, Arabs – to whom all the powers are attributed. Finally the division in discourse between Shari’a – the law to be applied to human society – and the Hakekat - access to ultimate internal truth through fusion with God – that are most probably the reminiscences of former Sufi Masters teachings. 26 The very name Umm Al-Qura, “The Mother of Cities,” referring to Mecca, refers obliquely to an eponymous work which appeared in 1899, a text having an important role in the genesis of Muslim reformism. 27 It should be noted that the coup de filet preceded the visit of Colin Powell by a few days. The four accused men were detained well beyond the legal limit (a year and a half), and they were condemned to life imprisonment without any tangible proof (Cambodge Soir, No. 2462, 03-05/02/2006). 28 In the article retracing precisely the ancient nature of links of the Cham with Malaysia and Thailand, Mathieu Guérin emphasizes the pursuit of a process of Islamization over the long term, from the lands of Champa to the present day (Guérin 2004). 29 Rather than dwelling here on the organization of the Dawa movements, I will refer the reader to some of the publications consulted for this article: Troll 1994; Gaborieau 1997; Braam 2006. 30 Echoes the eponymous work of Olivier Roy (Roy 2002).

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31 This dichotomy is not absolute: some mosques in Phnom Penh frequented by the same wealthy social classes remain clearly conservative and open to the teaching of the Dawa. If a majority of high-ranking Muslim officials are more favorable to joining the mosque in Beung Kak financed by the Wahhabis of Dubai, others are also drawn to the Dawa (De Feo 2005: 120) 32 Travels undertaken for preaching for 3 days a month and 40 days a year. 33 Examples: the visit to Battambang in 2005 of a group of Muslims from France, some of whom were converted Khmers, and to Kompong Cham in 2004 of a Brazilian group, are regularly reported by the local population. 34 Those figures, provided by the organizers, are confirmed by several participants of various backgrounds. 35 Among the traditionalists, the process of exacerbation of such a specificity occurs as much in response to “’khmeritude” (Khmer-ness) as to ambient “reislamization”: folklore associations, small village schools teaching the written Cham language or the literature originating in the group are appearing. In 2005 a series of workshops discussing the homogenization of the teaching of “’traditions” and the language was set up with help from the American and Australian embassies. In July 2006, the small village of Svay Pakaw in Kompong Chhnang saw the opening of a “Cham Culture Center,” thanks to the initiative of the Cham National Federation of Cambodia (CNFC), founded by a Cham Brahmanist from Vietnam. 36 Examples: young woman at weddings parading in their most beautiful cover-up (“according to tradition”) garments, very much in style because they are imported from Malaysia. The halal label emphasizing the respect for culinary “traditions” which are nonetheless equally Malaysian, in markets and streets food stands. And after the infatuation with the showy, spacious mosques, more modest architectural models are now slowly coming back: not a return to the old structures resembling the Wats (Khmer pagodas), but to a middle-eastern inspiration, “because it is a part of our tradition, in the Koran”. 37 The expression is taken up in Khmer from a Buddhist tradition of the accumulation of “merits” for the next life. Its use does not necessarily mean the penetration of a Buddhist custom into the Muslim community, but rather an adaptation to the linguistic context of the discourse. 38 Amphetamines. 39 It is not rare to see families that have given, at the same time, all their sympathy to the local Dawa or salafist movement, and who continue nonetheless to attend possession ceremonies, for example. One young woman from a village of Kompong Chhnang: “We don’t tell the religious authorities, because they don’t like it, but meanwhile what can you do? When you’re sick, it’s the only solution!” 40 While the Hakem was originally a scientist and / or a judge, the title is now – in Cambodia – referring to the head of the mosque, and leader of the village or community. 41 To be noted: the refusal of the administration to grant authorization for the construction of new mosques of fewer than several kilometers away from one another. 42 This “confession” seems more and more perceived as such, with the new international geopolitical stakes linked to “the Muslim world.” Rare are the interlocutors who openly preach the interest in Shari’a for society, particularly when questioned by a Western female researcher. On this point (and many others) the work of our Muslim colleagues could bring a completely different and complementary view. 43 This radio station broadcasts, in Cham language, international and national news, reports on health care, democracy, gender, and human rights, sometimes linked to Islam issues. If the interest for this little broadcast grows, it is nonetheless limited to the Cham (the Jveas criticize it for its use of a language that has nothing to do with Islam, and is not understood by everyone), and to the “orthodox” (traditionalists do not recognize themselves as members of the prescriptive Islam offered on those airwaves). 44 This has been the case since the first competitions were organized by a Cham deputy of the opposition party, then in position at the Ministry of Cults and Religions. Today, set aside from any state apparatus, it is his former comrades who assure the continuity of this event. 45 A title given to high-ranking State officials, or currently somewhat less than 400 individuals in Cambodia. Most of the time, people forget the name of the Excellency in question and recall only his title, or perhaps his political affiliations.

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46 In a large Muslim community in Kompong Cham, and American NGO came to dig wells at a depth where - in this location at the river’s edge - the water clogged with sand remained unusable, for both the Cham and the Khmer villagers. On the contrary, in a small Kompong Chhnang village, another American association built a school and funded a few teachers, at first for the Cham community. Very quickly, the children from the nearest Khmer villages joined what had become the sole place of local learning. 47 Several Muslim NGOs, especially the ILDO (Islamic Local Development Organization) and the Cambodian Muslim Youth Coordination Center design some programs intended for Khmers and Chveas, or Khmers and Cham, together. 48 In the defense of these NGOs, it should be noted that the transfer of money, following 9/11, became more and more difficult because of the suspicion climate. 49 Before it exhausted its funds, the Cambodian Islamic Development Association made it possible for 300 Muslim students to pursue their studies at the private Norton University 50 Especially through the Cambodian Islamic Youth Association (CIYA), the Cambodian Muslim Student Association (CAMSA), and the Islamic Medical Association of Cambodia (IMAC). The example of Indonesia is not unique and is joined by Malaysia and Thailand, especially when it comes to technical studies. 51 The Cambodian public school, which has too many students and not enough teachers, is open in the morning to one section and in the afternoon for another. The pupils thus have only a half-day of classes every day.