muslim accommodation in thai society

O Journal of Islamic Studies 9:2 (1998) pp. 229-258

MUSLIM ACCOMMODATION INTHAI SOCIETY

RAYMOND SCUPINLindenwood University, St Charles, MO

Theravada Buddhism, along with other early Brahmanic and animistspiritual practices, is accepted by about 95 per cent of the approximately62 million citizens of Thailand. Muslims comprise the largest religiousminority in Thailand, approximately 6 per cent of the population.About 4 million Thai citizens profess the Islamic faith and maintainover 2,700 mosques. The Muslims in Thailand comprise two broadself-defined categories consisting of 'Malay Muslims', who speak theMalay language and reside primarily in south Thailand in a number ofprovinces bordering on Malaysia, and 'Thai Muslims' or Thai Isalam,who reside in central and north Thailand. The Malay Muslims of southThailand make up over 70 per cent of the population in that region. Incontrast, the Thai Muslims of central and north Thailand reside assmaller ethnic and religious minorities in those regions. Historically,the Muslims of south Thailand resided in a cultural region imbued witha Malay-Indonesian Islamic political and religious cultural ethos,whereas the Muslims of central and north Thailand have been influencedby the political-religious culture of Brahmanic, animist, and TheravadaBuddhist traditions. Recently, however, because of the administrativepractices and policies of the Thai state during the twentieth century,all Muslims in Thailand have been greatly affected by the dominantBuddhist-Brahmanic-animist political and religious culture. This essaywill focus on how Muslims in Thailand have accommodated to thedominant political culture that has circumscribed the Islamic beliefsand practices in this South-East Asian country.

THAI POLITICAL CULTURE

A number of recent scholars have emphasized how Thai nationalistleaders and bureaucrats have constructed an image of Thailand as aculturally homogeneous nation, whereas in actuality there are many

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different ethnic and linguistic communities that have existed within thecountry, including the Muslim minority.1 Despite this diversity, Thainationalist leaders and state officials promoted a collective identitybased on what has been referred to as the 'Three Pillars'. The ThreePillars of this Thai collective identity were the Nation (chat), Religion(sasana), and Monarchy (phramahaksat). This Thai political and cul-tural code constituted an iconic representation of the structure of Thaisociety that was formulated to mediate the actual ethnic ambiguitiesand contradictions within the country. The first pillar, chat, derivedfrom the Hindi term jati, which translates roughly as 'caste', is used bythe Thai majority to refer to their common cultural or ethnic identity.In Thai linguistic usage chat is often combined with Thai to refer to acommunal ethnic and historical identity as chat Thai. Historically, thesecond pillar, sasana, religion, was synonymous with TheravadaBuddhism, although more recently the term has expanded to includenon-Buddhist traditions such as Christianity and Islam. This secondpillar, religion, also includes the sanctity of the Buddhist monasticorganization, or sangha, which is interwoven with Thai political author-ity. The third pillar, phramahakasat, is an honorific term for 'king' or'monarch' and embodies the vertical or hierarchical symbolic relation-ship between the ruler and the people in Thai society. In early periodsof Thai history the monarch represented a paternalistic devaraja, ordhammaraja, a sacred universal ruler connecting the social and cosmo-logical realms. More recently, although the Thai kings gradually abdic-ated their divine status, the monarchy has come to personify all that issacred and valued in Thai history and culture.2

The classical Thai state, referred to by the term 'galactic polity', had

1 On the attempts to construct an image of a homogeneous, united Thai nation bystate officials see T. Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation(Honolulu, HI, 1994), W. F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development ofThai Nationalism (Honolulu, HI, 1978), and S. Barmc, Luang Wichit Wathakan and theCreation of a Thai Identity (Singapore, 1993). Essays that focus on the heterogeneouscharacter of Thai society are C. Prachuabmoh and C. Satha-Anand, 'Thailand: A Mosaicof Ethnic Tensions under Control', Ethnic Studies Report (Sri Lanka), 3:1 (January1985), and R. Scupin, 'Thailand as a Plural Society: Ethnic Interaction in a BuddhistKingdom', Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 2:3(1986).

2 For early conceptions of the Thai monarchy see R. Heine-Geldern, 'Conceptions ofState and Kingship in Southeast Asia', in J. T. McAlister (ed.), Southeast Asia: ThePolitics of National Integration (New York, 1973). For recent conceptions of the Thaimonarchy see B. R. O'G. Anderson, 'Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies'in E. B. Ayal (ed.), The Study of Thailand (Athens, OH, 1978), and F. E. Reynolds,'Sacred Kingship and National Development: The Case of Thailand' in B. L. Smith (ed.),Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos, and Burma (Chambersburg,PA, 1978).

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similarities to other South-East Asian polities in that it was a hierarchic-ally organized political structure, which was originally based in Ayudhyain central Thailand, where the monarch lived and ruled over sur-rounding regions arrayed in concentric circles, and the ruler's authoritywas diminished in peripheral areas that were remote from the centre.During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries due to both internal andexternal developments, including the expansion of capitalism andabsorption of Thailand into the world political economy, the Thai stateevolved from a 'galactic polity' to an expansive 'radial polity', nowbased in Bangkok, which began to administer and directly controlvarious regions to the south, north, west, and east, outside the domainof traditional royal authority.3 Gradually, traditional royal authoritygave way to a more rationalized administrative state based on a Western-inspired bureaucratic apparatus that blended civilian and militarysources of authority. By the 1930s Thailand had established a semi-democratic regime based on a constitutional monarchy. The presentThai government, including the military, civilian, and royal factions,has developed authority through various networks of powerful patronsand circles of clients throughout the nation.4

Thai political culture, which draws on polysemic symbols of national-ity, royalty, and religion, has had major consequences for ethnic andreligious minorities such as Muslims. Over time the Thai state developeda complex ethnic management programme that combined assimilationpolicies without openly denying pluralistic tendencies. Until the 1950sthe emphasis of the Thai government was to promote the assimilationof its ethnic minorities. Aggressive assimilationist policies were adoptedby both military and civilian political leaders. Eventually, during the1960s the government began to pursue an assimilation policy along withsome recognition of pluralism. This ongoing ethnic management pro-gramme was based on the modernization and development policiespromulgated by the Thai political 61ite, which attempted to underplayethnic communal differences, while simultaneously maintaining theethnic dominance of Thai Buddhism, without having to do so explicitly.These ethnic policies and practices were developed primarily in the

3 For an overview of the development of the Thai state and the formulation of theterms 'galactic polity' and 'radial polity' see S. J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and WorldRenouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background(Cambridge, 1976). In this work Tambiah argues that the secular authorities withinthe Thai polity have co-opted the Buddhist religious hierarchy to reinforce statelegitimacy.

4 For modern developments of the Thai state see D. Morell and C. Samudavanija,Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1981),and S. Xuto (ed.), Government and Politics of Thailand (Oxford, 1987).

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context of dealing with the Muslim minority, especially in the southernregion of Thailand.

SOUTH THAILAND: RELIGION AND POLITICS5

The majority of the Muslims in Thailand are based in south Thailandas a result of the expansion of the Thai state into that region. The foursouthern provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, Satul, and Yala bordering onMalaysia have been gradually integrated into Thailand since at leastthe sixteenth century. It is difficult to establish a definitive date for theintroduction of Islam into what is now south Thailand. Although somescholars have posited that Islam came to Patani, the principal Muslimcentre of south Thailand, before it came to Malacca, no firm evidencehas been established to corroborate this conclusion. Most specialistsassume that local inhabitants were converted to Islam during the thir-teenth or fourteenth century CE.6 As in many other areas of theMalaysian-Indonesian region, the form of Islam was based on the Sunni-Shafi'I tradition; however, this tradition coexisted with earlier Hindu-Buddhist-animistic spiritual beliefs and practices. In addition, both Shi* aand Sufi elements influenced local forms of the belief system in thisarea. The majority of the Muslims in these southern provinces speak

5 A number of scholars have described the historical developments and problems ofthe Muslims in south Thailand including W. K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: TheMows of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Oxford, 1990),N. Haemindra, 'The Problems of the Thai Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces ofThailand (Part One)', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7:2 (1976), 'The Problems ofthe Thai Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part Two)', Journal ofSoutheast Asian Studies, 8:1 (1977), A. D. W. Forbes (ed.), The Muslims of Thailand:Politics of the Malay-Speaking South, vol. 2 (Bihar, 1989), A. Suhrke, 'Loyalistsand Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand', Asian Survey, 17 (1977), L. Thomas,Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand (Singapore, 1975),L. Thomas, 'Political Integration of Muslims in Southernmost Thailand: RecentDevelopments and Their Impacts', in B. Huang-Kay Luk (ed.), Contacts between Culturesin Eastern Asia: History and Social Sciences, vol.4 (Lewiston, NY, 1992), C. Satha-Anand, Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four SouthernProvinces, Thailand 1976-1981 (Tampa, FL, 1987), C. Satha-Anand, 'Pattani in the1980s: Academic Literature and Political Stories', Sojourn: Social Issues in SoutheastAsia, 7:1 (1992). The most thorough historical account of the southern Muslim provincesby a Thai Muslim is S. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of theMalay-Muslims of Southern Thailand (Bangkok, 1985).

6 See I. Syukri, Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani {History of the Malay Kingdom ofPatani, translated by C. Bailey and J. Miksic, Athens, OH, 1985), for an indigenousMalay account of Islamization in Patani in south Thailand. For a translation of anindigenous Thai account of this area see D. Wyatt and A. Teeuw, Hikayat Patani (TheHague, 1970).

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Malay, and historically and culturally are linked to the Malaysian-Indonesian island world. These Malay Muslims identify themselves asore nayu (the Malay people), and they refer to the Thai Buddhists asore siye (the Siamese people). The Thai Buddhists, or chat Thai, usethe ethnic category khaek Musalayam to refer to the Malay Muslims,which was perceived as a pejorative term by the native Muslims inthe south.

Prior to the nineteenth century these southern Malay Islamic regionswere informal tributary states tied to Bangkok authorities. But after thenineteenth century and the introduction of colonialism into this regionthe Thai state began to compete with the designs of the British inMalaysia, and initiated a policy of directed expansion and colonialisminto these Islamic regions. After 1902 the Thai state led an attempt torestructure the traditional political order in the Malay Islamic regions.Through the imposition of new tax policies and administrative reformsthe Thai polity divested the indigenous leadership of their traditionalauthority in the south. As the British colonial economic and politicalstrategies developed in neighbouring Malaysia, Thai authorities adoptedpolicies which paralleled those of the British in these Malay regions,namely, the building of roads, post offices, and other infrastructuraldevelopments. However, whereas the British wanted to retain the Malayelite authority base as a means of reinforcing the status quo and assertingindirect colonial policies, Thai authorities were suspicious of the tradi-tional Malay elite and sought to subvert their power base through theappointment of conscientious Thai Buddhist bureaucrats throughoutthese southern Malay regions.

The result of this Thai policy was that it created immediate resent-ment in this southern area. The Malay elite felt a sense of deprivationin comparison with their Islamic neighbours in British Malaya. TheMalay elite in the Patani region had close social and political ties withthe Malay nobles in Malaysia through marital alliances. Thus, theMalay ruling elite in this entire region was united by fate and historywhich fuelled their desire for autonomy. This solidarity, combined withinsensitive Thai policies, led to an increase in support for Malay resist-ance and political distance between central Thai authorities and thesouthern Malay rulers. In addition, Thai authorities began to interferedirectly with the religious practices of the Muslims in the south.Bangkok authorities attempted to assume all legal matters under Thailaw. In effect, this meant that the Muslim legal code, structured by theSharVa and adat (Malay custom) and administered by the local QadT(Muslim judge), was to be controlled by Thai Buddhist officials. Thesestate policies induced conflict between the Malay elite and Thai authorit-ies, but also with religious leaders, the 'ulama", who had vital support

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from the rural people and had served as a legitimating force for Malayauthority throughout the history of Patani, as the spiritual centre of theIslamic world in the Malaysia-Indonesia area. These policies led to thefirst large-scale rebellions in these southern regions in 1903 and 1922initiating the use of Thai military force—which set the stage for theconsistent pattern of Malay Muslim irredentism plaguing central Thaiauthorities until the present.

Following the outbreak of mass rebellions in 1903 and 1922, the Thaigovernment was forced to reconsider its policies in the southern prov-inces by establishing new guidelines for the treatment of the Malays inthe south. Taxation policies were to be equal to the policies institutedby the British in Malaysia. In addition, a modicum of pluralism wasintroduced by giving official recognition to the Islamic religious tradi-tion. Yet, as Thai compulsory education spread into these southernprovinces, mosques were encouraged to modify the Islamic curriculumto include an emphasis on the three sacred pillars of the Thai state:nation, religion, king. And the Thai government continued to appointBuddhists from central Thailand, who were unable to speak Malay, asthe bureaucratic officials in these southern provinces. These policiesresulted in negative attitudes and misconceptions between the Muslimsand Thai Buddhists.

In the period following the establishment of a democratic regime inThailand in the 1930s the government promoted education as the meansof instilling new democratic values throughout the region. This createda dilemma for the Malay Muslims in the south, because the Thaicompulsory education system was based upon Buddhist values, intim-ately associated with a curriculum developed by the Buddhist Sangha,and the language of education was Thai. Therefore, to become involvedin the Thai political process necessitated a rejection of one's languageand religion, the primordial basis of ethnic identity for these MalayMuslims. To resolve this dilemma, the 'ulatna', the local religiousleaders and the source of political legitimacy, played a prominent rolein mobilizing political support around Malay leaders in democraticpolitics as a means of strengthening their autonomy. Islamic religiousand cultural symbols were highlighted in the election of the Malayleadership in this southern region.

In the late 1930s, with the downfall of democratic politics and theresurgence of the military faction in the Thai state led by the extremenationalist Prime Minister, Phibun Songkram, who emulated the statepolicies of fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan, Malay Muslim aspirationswere devastated. Phibun adopted a concept of a racist nation basedupon the Thai race (Thai Rathaniyom) and a cultural policy basedupon 'Cultural Rules' (Kot Wattanatham). These policies attempted to

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MUSLIM ACCOMMODATION IN THAI SOCIETY 2.35

enforce central Thai 'race' and culture at the expense of other minoritygroups in Thailand. This pan-Thai movement celebrated the threepillars in order to unify the state. The Malay Muslims were not allowedto wear their traditional clothing, remaining elements of the Sharfawhich applied to marriage and inheritance were banned, non-Buddhistswere deliberately discriminated against in government, and consciousattempts at proselytization of the Buddhist faith in the south were tobe carried out within the government-sponsored educational system.Thus, any attempts at reform or good will which had been carried outin the south during previous Thai regimes were emasculated by theaggressive assimilationist policies enforced by the Phibun regime.

After World War II the Thai state began once again to liberalize andpluralize its policies towards its southern provinces by establishinggovernmental machinery to manage the Malay leadership and draw the'ulamd' into the official bureaucratic network. Through legislationknown as the Patronage Act of 1945 the 'ulamd', the mosque councils,and the madrasas were centralized under the authority of the Shaykhal-Islam or Chularajmontri and articulated into the Thai bureaucracythrough the Ministry of Interior.7 The Chularajmontri would advisethe monarchy and be considered the spiritual leader of the Muslims inThailand. The office was to be a counterpart of the Sangharaja (theSupreme Patriarch) of the Buddhist religious hierarchy. The PatronageAct also directed the government to develop Islamic educational institu-tions for Muslim children with an appropriate Islamic curriculum. Inconjunction with this an Islamic college was to be established inThailand with king's scholarships for pilgrimages to Makka. The'ulamd' were to be integrated into the state bureaucracy through IslamicProvincial Committees set up by the Minister of Interior. One surrepti-tious clause of the Act allowed the Minister of Interior to appoint anddismiss 'ulamd' in order to ensure loyalty and to subvert irredentism.Unfortunately, because of deep suspicions of Malay Muslims towardsThai authorities, the Patronage Act became a divisive issue in southernThailand, splitting Malay Muslims between 'loyalists' and 'separatists'.

The next phase of Thai government policies in the southern area7 The Chularajmontri is an institution that has an extensive history in Thailand. It

evolved out of an early appointed administrative position which was given to a PersianShi" a Islamic leader during the Ayudhyan period (1350-1767 CE). However, the positiondid not get official recognition by the government until the 1945 Patronage Act. To someextent, the Chularajmontri position was parallel to the Shaykh al-Islam or mufti officeestablished in various Islamic countries. The office of the Chularajmontri evolved to beable to issue fatawd (religious rulings), regulate the administration of the mosques,distribute subsidies for the mosques, support Islamic publications, organize the Islamicfestivals, co-ordinate the hajj, oversee the certification of halal in the manufacturing andproduction of foods and other consumer goods for Muslims, and other religious activities.

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began with a succession of military governments from 1957 until recenttimes. During this phase a new ideology of nation-building referred toas patanakarn or 'development' was promoted by Thai authorities forthe southern Malay area. National integration and assimilation wereto be approached through socio-economic development programmes.Yet, as previously, these national integrationist policies were based uponan assimilation-cum-pluralist model, including the imposition of deeplyentrenched Buddhist cultural ideals in the southern Malay areas. TheThai policy was directed at promoting socio-economic development asa means of reducing social conflict and rebellion in the south andreinforcing political (and Buddhist) legitimacy. As expected, manyMuslim leaders viewed this new ideology as another means of inducinginternal colonialism. Specifically the Thai government tried to promul-gate this new ideology of development through the educational institu-tions in the south, the traditional pondoks or religious schools(madrasas). What the Thai state did not recognize was the reality ofthe pondok as the pre-eminent symbol of Malay Muslim ideals andcultural resistance to Buddhist authorities in the north. The pondoktended to reinforce ethnic and religious differences through symbolsand rituals which affected individuals throughout their entire lives. Inthe process these inculturation rituals created problems for ThaiBuddhist legitimacy in the south. As the Thai authorities viewed thepondok, correctly, as the key institution in transmitting Malay religiousand political ideology in the south, their aim was to transform thisinstitution into a quasi-secular instrument to cultivate 'Thai' values.The Ministry of Education initiated a plan to regulate and secularizethe pondoks and introduce Thai language instruction. The curriculumwas restructured and by the end of 1970 there were 463 pondoks in thesouth that were formally incorporated into the Thai governmentprogramme.

Though, on the face of it, this Thai administrative and educationalprogramme appeared somewhat successful, in actuality the 'ulamd'were not submitting to Thai authority in this matter, but were ratherpractising, again, a policy of restrained participation. Since the 'ulamd'could not legally operate their own private pondoks, they opted toco-operate in the hopes of avoiding too much government (Buddhist)interference in their religious affairs. Yet, as in previous Thai regimes,secularization was equivalent to the adoption of 'Thai culture' whichincluded Buddhism. One result of these secularizing-Buddhist policiesinterwoven with the Thai political culture was the decision of someMalay Muslims to send their children abroad to Islamic countries.Another result was the development of more overt irredentist activitiesamong the Malay Muslims in these southern provinces.

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A number of Islamic-based factions emerged during the 1960s and1970s in south Thailand reflecting a diversity of political views andbecame engaged in irredentist activities. One early separatist group,the National Liberation Front of Patani, the LFRP, desired there-establishment of Patani to its former glory with a raja or sultan atits head. Its final objective appeared to be autonomy within the federa-tion of Malaysia. Thus, it remained connected to traditional Malayanpolitical groups. The LFRP wanted to establish a republic with asocialist-revolutionary political framework. It had contacts with com-munist movements based in Thailand and Malaysia, and had beeninvolved in bombing and kidnapping throughout the region. The alli-ance with the communist movements had been counterproductive indrawing support from either ASEAN nations, such as Malaysia, orMiddle Eastern Islamic countries.

One of the most influential irredentist organizations in southThailand, PULO, the Patani United Liberation Organization, wasformed in the late 1960s by Tenku Bira Kotanila and was the best-known and most effective guerrilla organization and separatist move-ment in the Patani region. PULO was devoted to preserving 'Malayness'and the Islamic way of life in south Thailand.8 It had several levels oforganization with its headquarters in Makka. PULO also maintained aregional headquarters in Kelantan where it co-ordinated its guerrillaoperations. In Thailand itself the military organization of PULO hadbeen well armed and had received financial support in the past fromLibya and Syria. The political effectiveness of PULO was related to itsextensive international network of supporters. The leadership of PULOwas composed of the young Islamic-educated Muslims with degreesfrom universities in the Middle East and South Asia. This educationabroad tended to reinforce traditional Malay Muslim identity and globalIslamic issues. This leadership organized the largest mass demonstrationin Patani in 1975, which resulted in a bombing and Malay Muslimdeaths.9 These militant activities created deeper divisions between theMalay Muslims and Thai Buddhists associated with central Thai author-ities. The overall goal of PULO was to create an autonomous Islamicstate. PULO, however, also had internal factions with more modestaims to improve its political situation vis-a-vis Bangkok.

Although there have been sporadic skirmishes in the recent past, since

1 For a brief overview of PULO see L. Thomas, 'Patani United LiberationOrganization' in J. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern IslamicWorld, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1995).

' A. Suthasasna in Panha Kwam Kad Yaeng Nai Si Changwat Pak Tai (Conflicts inthe four Southern Provinces) (Bangkok, 1976) summarizes the historical and politicalevents leading to the bombings of 1975.

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the 1990s the Malay Muslim communities of Patani have largely turnedaway from the extremist separatist movements such as PULO andLFRP. Increasingly, they have changed their political strategies, activelymobilizing their communities and seeking a voice in the Thai politicalsystem. A number of Muslim leaders from the south have organized apolitical group known as the Wahda (Unity) Group, and have beeninstrumental in influencing government policy stemming from Bangkok.Wahda has been peacefully agitating Thai government officials toappoint more Muslims as cabinet ministers. Recognizing that the south-ern provinces face difficult economic and social problems, and main-taining their apprehension towards Bangkok authorities who continueto support cultural assimilation policies, these Malay Muslim leaderspromote their ethnic and religious identity, while pressing for morepluralism and fair treatment from Bangkok.10

CENTRAL AND NORTHERN THAI MUSLIMS

Because of historical and cultural conditions the experience of Muslimsin central and northern Thailand has been very different from that oftheir Islamic affiliates to the south. Historically, these Muslims of thecentral and northern corridors of Thailand have migrated, either volun-tarily or by force, into these regions bringing distinctive ethnic, social,and religious conventions. Thus, these Muslim communities are muchmore heterogeneous than the Muslims of the south. And, unlike theirIslamic brethren to the south, these Muslims are ethnic and religiousminorities residing in the centres of a predominantly Thai Buddhistcultural environment.11

By far the largest group of Muslims in central Thailand, especiallyin the capital city of Bangkok, are descendants of peoples from thesouthern provinces of Thailand and parts of Malaysia. Their presencein Bangkok and surrounding areas resulted from the forced relocation

10 One other ethnic minority group in south Thailand are known as the Sam-Sams,who are Thai-speaking Muslims who reside in some of the southern provinces and alsofurther south in Malaysia. Apparently, these Sam-Sams were migrants from Thailand,who were converted by Muslim merchants from Arabia as early as the tenth or eleventhcentury. See K. Suwannathat-Pian, 'The Sam-Sams: A Study of the Historical and EthnicAssimilation in Malaysia', Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 9:1 (1994).

11 For insights into the social and economic features of Bangkok Muslim communitiessee O. Farouk Bajunid, 'The Other Side of Bangkok: A Survey of Muslim Presence inBuddhist Thailand's Capital City' in Y. Tsubouchi (ed.), The Formation of UrbanCivilization in Southeast Asia (Supplement) (Kyoto, 1992), and C. Satha-Anand, 'BangkokMuslims and the Tourist Trade' in M. Ariff (ed.), The Muslim Private Sector in SoutheastAsia (Singapore, 1991).

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policies of the Thai state as an attempt to integrate the southern MalayMuslim provinces such as Patani as described above. Part of the stateintegrationist policies was to weaken the antagonistic southern Malayareas by transferring hostage populations from the Malay areas tocentral Thailand. Though historical records lack details, the transfer ofthis southern Muslim population northwards apparently began in thethirteenth century when manpower and resources were needed by theThais in their warfare with Cambodia. How extensively this policy wascarried out between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries can onlybe estimated. It is well known, however, that during the seventeenthcentury many inhabitants from the south were transferred to northerndomains. In one historical account of Patani, after the Thai troopsattacked in the seventeenth century, they took back one child fromevery family as a hostage. Following the emergence of Bangkok's Chakridynasty (1782), and Rama I's subsequent invasion of Patani, families ofPatani who had fought against Thai troops were transported toBangkok.12 Later, Rama HI followed the same policy as his predecessorsand abducted a number of hostage populations from the Malay statesand had them brought to the Bangkok area. In 1828 it was estimatedthat Bangkok had 3,000 Malay residents, but shortly thereafter thispopulation tripled, for after the successful suppression of a Patanirebellion in 1832 many Muslim families were taken to Bangkok andnorthern locales. Conservatively, 4,000 to 5,000 captives were roundedup and taken en masse to Bangkok. The majority of these Muslimswere resettled in the suburban districts running from south to north inthe extreme eastern portion of metropolitan Bangkok. Many of theirdescendants still reside in these areas.

These Muslim war captives were organized to provide labour onmajor projects for the Thai state. One important project they particip-ated in was the digging and construction of canals under the patronageof the Chakri dynasty. Klong (canal) Saen Saeb, which runs from thecentre of Bangkok eastwards, was constructed by corvee labour, mostof which was drafted from the Malay Muslims and their descendants,residing in the surrounding Muslim communities. Anyone travelling onthis canal will find it punctuated by mosques which have been erectedon both the east and west sides. Of the more than 150 mosques inBangkok, over 70 per cent were built by Malay Muslims and theirdescendants. Although precise statistics are not available to calculatethe exact number of these descendants, considering demographic factors

12 For historical accounts of the relocation of Malay Muslims from the Patani regionsee J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries (London,1837/1968), W. F. Vella, Siam under Kama III, 1824-1851 (New York, 1957), andK. Wenk, The Restoration of Thailand under Kama I, 1782-1809 (Tucson, AZ, 1968).

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such as fertility, mortality, migration, and intermarriage, this populationnumbers about 250,000.u

Several communities of Muslims in central Thailand, including Cham,Indonesians, and Iranians, have a long-term history that extends backinto the Ayudhyan period (1351—1767 CE). One of these ethnic groups,the Cham, settled in Ayudhya in central Thailand, where the Thaicapital was situated. These Cham were from the area of Cambodia,where they had been living as refugees following the Vietnamese con-quest over the remnants of the Champa kingdom from the fifteenth tothe eighteenth century. Most of these refugees had settled at KampongThom and Kampong Cham near the Mekong River, about 120 kilo-metres from present-day Phnom Penh.14

The historical details regarding the Cham presence in Ayudhya arebased on some sketchy royal chronicles. The evidence suggests that theCham were attached to the early Thai state under King Narai (1656—88)in a military capacity, perhaps as mercenaries, but eventually as anadjunct to the early Royal Naval and Marine force of Ayudhya.Organized within the Thai military, the Cham defended the capitalagainst the Burmese, who eventually destroyed the Ayudhyan kingdomin 1767, precipitating the migration of the Thai state and royalty toBangkok, along with many of the Cham. Other Cham settled inBangkok after 1782 as a result of both internal and external politicalactivities of Thailand and Cambodia. The evidence suggests that mostof them came as war captives resulting from Thai-Cambodian conflictsduring the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, or as politicalrefugees following civil disturbances within Cambodia.

As in the earlier capital of Ayudhya, groups of families were resettledin Bangkok by the Thai state in their own ethnic neighbourhoods,sometimes referred to as yarn, outside the royal grounds. As a resultof their loyalty in serving the Thai military the royal family gave theCham a tract of land in Bangkok known as Ban Krua ('kitchen village')or Asamak Cham. In Ban Krua most of the Cham were engaged inagriculture, but some were fishermen and expert boat builders. Ricepaddies and fruit orchards made up Ban Krua, which was an agricultural

u One demographic study of Thailand that focuses on population trends among theMuslims and other ethnic groups is S. Prasithrathsint, Ethnicity and Fertility in Thailand(Singapore, 1985).

14 See A. Cabaton and G. Meillon, 'Indochina (Islam in)', The Encyclopaedia of Islam,2nd edn., vol.3 (Leiden, 1971), G. Maspero, The Kingdom of Champa (translation ofCh. 1 of Le Royaume de Champa (New Haven, CT, 1951), and E. Aymonier, LesTchames et leurs religions (Paris, 1891), for historical descriptions of the Cham Muslimsof Cambodia and Vietnam. For a recent account of what has happened to the ChamMuslims of Cambodia see B. Kieman, 'Orphans of Genocide: The Cham Muslims ofKampuchea under Pol Pot', Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 20:4 (1988).

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settlement, one of many, on the margins of Bangkok's political-administrative centre. In addition, the skills of boat building and navalactivities enabled the Cham to utilize the commercial aspects of trans-portation and marketing on the klongs of Ban Krua. Gradually, as theprocess of industrialization and urbanization became more intensiveduring the later twentieth century, Ban Krua became another denselypopulated sector with many older wooden homes typical of many ofthe other inner-city areas of Bangkok.

The Cham were eventually drawn into the economic roles whichdeveloped as a consequence of the transition to an increasinglydiversified and capitalist urban economy. One important economicdevelopment which had a definitive impact on the Cham Muslims ofBan Krua occurred in the 1950s. The introduction of silk-weavingtechniques for mass production brought about economic changes forthe Muslims of Ban Krua. The Cham, like most agricultural peoples ofSouth-East Asia, maintained their own household hand looms to weavetextiles for their own uses. The Cham women of Ban Krua maintainedthis tradition by weaving aesthetically pleasing symbolic designs intotheir traditional textiles, which were used for funerals, weddings, orother everyday purposes. After World War II an American, JimThompson, surveyed the market and mobilized capital to bring aboutmass production of Thai silk for export. Thompson established thecentre of this silk-weaving industry at Ban Krua in the midst of theCham settlement.

Like the other Muslim communities of Bangkok, the Cham built theirown mosques, beside the klongs in the Ban Krua area. For example,the Masjid Salamiyya, one of the community's most important mosques,has a madrasa for the community, as well as a beautiful lamp presentedto the community over a century ago by Rama V (1868-1910), thefamed King Chulalongkorn. Outside the mosque near the main doorhangs a drum, and the Cham—unique among Muslims—bang the drumas the signal to call people to prayer with drum-beats. Near the mosquesof Ban Krua are well-tended community cemeteries.15

A recent development has had a dramatic influence on the Chamcommunity in Bangkok. In March 1988 the Cham community found

u For an overview of the Cham Muslim communities of Bangkok seeS. Phonsiripongse, P. Usuparat, and D. Kumnoonwat, 'Caracteristiques demographiqueset relations dans la communaute de Ban Khrua Nua', J. Baffie, 'Ban Krua, village deBangkok? Question de l'origjne et probleme d'identite de la population Cham',P. Kalamkaset, 'Recherche sur la communaute de King Phet: la composante religieusede la communaute de Ban Khrua Nua', and J. Baffie and C. Ratanasamaharn, 'Families,pouvoir, espace a Ban Khrua Nua', in S. Ratanakul (ed.), Actes du seminaire franco-thailandais d'anthropologie culturelle (Bangkok, 1995), and J. Lowira and J. J. Baffie,'Ban Khrua: A Rich Past but an Empty Future', Sinlapa Wattanatam, 13:10 (1992).

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that the Thai government under the authority of the' Expressway andRapid Transit Authority of Thailand (ETA) had developed a plan fora new expressway that would cut through their community. Part of theCham community would be destroyed, some 200—500 families wouldbe relocated, and cemeteries and mosques would be demolished. Also,if a section of the expressway was going to be built through Ban Kruanext to the klongs, noise and smoke from passenger boats wouldintensify. It was recognized that this would be an unhealthy and unpleas-ant environment for the Cham Muslim community. The Cham com-munity mobilized through various Islamic organizations to protest atthese developments proposed by the ETA.

The Thai media, including newspapers, television, and radio, beganto report on these developments in the Cham community. Althoughmany Thai citizens realized that the need to redevelop their expresswaysystem to alleviate Bangkok's traffic congestion was one of the toppriorities of the ETA and the Thai government, many people began tosympathize with the plight of the Ban Krua community. In some sensesthe Cham Muslim community represented a model of a moral commun-ity standing together against the forces of modernization, corporatecapitalism, vested interests, and corrupt government-inspired develop-ment. Many Thai academics and community activists throughout thenation became involved in various ways with the Cham struggle. Inaddition, most of the various Islamic organizations and Muslims inThailand from different communities rallied around the Cham cause.To some extent these developments solidified the Muslim communitiesthroughout Thailand and became a condensed symbol of the Muslimminority's struggle against Thai authorities and their sponsorship ofdevelopment at any cost. This struggle of the Ban Krua communitycontinued for eight years against five different governments. Throughprimarily peaceful demonstrations and activity throughout the Islamicorganizations, coupled with support from Thai academics and othersympathetic organizations, the Cham were able to retain their valuableland and community resources.

As in other parts of South-East Asia, trade was an important factordetermining the migration of some Muslims to central Thailand. Onecontingent group of Indonesian Muslims came and established them-selves in the Ayudhyan capital to become successful traders. Althoughno precise population data are available, the French visitor La Louberedescribed Indonesian Muslims residing in their own neighbourhoodof Ayudhya in the seventeenth century.16 Later a small percentage of

16 See S. La Loubere, The Kingdom of Siam (Oxford, 1969), for descriptions of thevarious ethnic communities of Ayudhya.

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Indonesian Muslims migrated to Bangkok during the nineteenthcentury. There was no mass migration of Indonesians toThailand in any particular era; generally they tended to come asindividual traders and established small businesses related to theThai-Indonesian trade in cloth, batik products, or molasses. Anotherchannel for immigrant Indonesians coming to Bangkok was opened upwith the visit of Rama V (Chulalongkorn) to Java and other parts ofIndonesia in the 1870s. Impressed with their agricultural and gardeningtechniques, he invited some Javanese gardeners to Thailand to managethe royal gardens and teach nursery and gardening methods under hispatronage.

Gradually a settlement of Indonesians, most of them Javanese, clus-tered in an inner-city area of Bangkok, that was referred to as theMakassan area. A number of SunnT-Shafi'T-based mosques were erectedin the Makassan and Yanawa areas of the city. One important mosque,Al-Atiq, serves as a central meeting-place for the Muslims of the Yanawadistrict. Public lectures on Islamic themes are given in this mosquefollowing Ramadan and other important religious events.

One of the most influential trading communities in seventeenth-century Ayudhya was composed of Iranian or Persian Muslims. Thefirst Persian Muslims mentioned in the Ayudhyan chronicles were twobrothers, Shaykh Ahmad and Muhammad Sa'Id, who came during thereign of King Naresuan (1590-1605). In this area there are the remainsof what is called the Kudithong or 'Golden Mosque' which is identifiedwith the personage of Shaykh Ahmad.17 Many of the Iranians weredescendants of the aristocratic or upper classes of Iranian society. Thecommunity included not only merchants but also a fair number of othereducated people, such as architects, artisans, scholars, and poets. Thus,in effect, the Iranian migrants comprised a fully developed ethnic'community' in this early Ayudhyan kingdom.

In Ayudhya the Iranians had their own quarter of the city, or baan,headed by a political leader, or Nai, appointed by the king to managethe affairs of the community. Shaykh Ahmad was appointed as thePraklang, the minister in charge of all foreign residents. This gave theIranian community a great deal of political leverage in dealings with

17 For historical details regarding this early Persian community in Ayudhya seeK. Pramoj, Khwaampentnaa Khong Isalaam nat PrathedThai (A History of Islam inThailand) (Bangkok, 1971), D. Kulsiriswasd (Ibrahim Qureyshi), KhwaamsamphanKhong Muslim thaang prawadtisaad W wanna khadii thaj (The Historical and LiteraryRelations of Muslims in Siam) (Bangkok, 1972), and O. Farouk Shaeik Ahmad, 'Muslimsin the Kingdom of Ayutthaya' in JEBAT, Journal of the History Deparment, UniversiriKebangsaan, Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1980/1). In addition, a full narration of a voyageto Thailand by M. Ibrahim, The Ship of Sulaiman (translated by J. O'Kane, London,1972), gives a comprehensive account of the early Persian community in Ayudhya.

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the royal authorities. The Muslim community was governed by its ownreligious judges in accordance with customary Sharfa practice. As theIranians were SliTa, important ShTa rituals such as the Muharram tohonour 'All, the son-in-law of the Prophet, and his descendants wereinstituted in Ayudhya. Apparently, the Thai royalty was tolerant andeven supportive of the Muslim religious rites in this era. For example,several mosques were established at royal expense and the Thai kingscontributed lavishly towards the Muharram and other Muslim rites.

A number of the families related to the Iranian Muslims fromAyudhya have settled near Klong Bangkok-Noi and Klong Bangkok-Yai in Dhonburi, just across the Chao Phraya River from Bangkok.Though historically Dhonburi was a separate city and a previous siteof the Thai capital, in 1971 it was eventually incorporated into theBangkok metropolitan area. Some of these Iranian Muslim families hadmoved to the Dhonburi area when it was a frontier capital from 1767to 1782, following the sack of Ayudhya by the Burmese. The descendantsof these Iranian Muslims who settled among other Muslims andBuddhists represent the oldest ethnic group of the Islamic communityin Bangkok. They continued to play an important role in early Thaipolitics and intermarried among the royal and noble families. Some ofthe leading aristocratic families of Bangkok, including the Bunnags andPramojs, are descendants of these Iranian Muslims.

Because of the settlement of these early Iranian Muslims along theriverbanks in Dhonburi, it remains as the centre of ShI'a activities inThailand. The oldest ShI'a mosque in Dhonburi is referred to as KudiChao-Sen, the name derived from Hussein, the son of 'All and Fatima,and it provides the community with the major annual rituals such asthe celebration of Muharram. There is a SliTa religious school, nowknown as Imam Khomeini School, and a large old cemetery maintainedby the community.

Muslim merchants from South Asia also migrated to central Thailandduring the Ayudhyan and Bangkok periods.18 Muslims from India,present-day Pakistan, and Bangladesh have settled in the Bangkok area.These Muslim migrants came from various linguistic and geographicalareas of the subcontinent. Punjabi, Sindhi, Gujarati, and Bengalispeakers came from north India, as well as Pathans or Pushto speakersfrom Peshawar. From south India came Tamils, Madrasis, and othersfrom the Malabar Coast. Many of the South Asian migrants came as aresult of the Bowring Treaty of 1855, which opened up trade between

1B See T. N. Dubey, India and Thailand: A Brief History (New Delhi, 1990), andA. Mani, 'Indians in Thailand', in K. S. Sandhu and A. Mani (eds.), Indian Communitiesin Southeast Asia (Singapore, 1993), for specific descriptions of the Indian migrants andsettlements in Thailand.

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the British and Thailand and also granted extraterritorial privileges toBritish subjects. Under Article IV of the Anglo-Siamese treaty, theIndians, as British subjects, were permitted to trade freely in Thailand.As Thailand moved towards a globally based market economy, SouthAsian merchants and migrants settled into specialized occupations forwhich indigenous Thais were not trained. For example, some IndianMuslims were hired as postal agents, that is, to read, sort, and deliverincoming foreign mail. They could read Hindi, or Urdu, or sometimesEnglish, enabling them to fulfil this function. Opportunities for dealingin textiles, sundries, and other newly introduced luxury goods fromWestern sources were grasped by these Indian Muslims.

South Asian Muslims began to prosper in the import-export busi-nesses in central Thailand. For example, A. E. Nana, a Bengali Muslimwith British citizenship, was a major property developer in Bangkok.Nana moved from trade in rice and sugar, and was linked to the Thaiaristocracy. He acquired extensive land holdings throughout centralThailand. One of the oldest communities of Indian Muslims in Thailandis the Dawoodi Bohra Muslims. They established the A. T. E. Maskatecompany in 1856. The Dawoodi Bohra Muslims came from Ahmedabadin the Surat and developed an extensive business importing Indiantextiles and other British goods and exporting local Thai goods. TamilMuslims from Pondicherry and Karikal, under the patronage of theM. T. S. Marican family, were also early businessmen in Thailand,opening precious-stone and textile stores. These Tamil Muslims havebecome dominant in the precious-gem trade in Bangkok. The DawoodiBohra and Tamil Muslims often intermarried within each other's group.

The vast majority of the Muslims who migrated from the SouthAsian regions to Thailand were Sunnl. There is, however, a smallnumber of Shi* a from South Asia. The Sunn! and Shfa South Asianshave established their own distinctive mosques in Bangkok, most ofwhich were developed in the older inner-city area. In 1975 the 200 orso Tamil Muslims imported a Tamil-speaking imam from south Indiato deliver the khutba in Tamil. The original Dawoodi Bohra Muslimmosque is still controlled by the amir in India.

South Asian Muslims were responsible for the founding of an import-ant Islamic organization in Bangkok, the Jam' I-yatul-Islam. This wasmodelled along the lines of the Jama'at-i Islam! of the subcontinent,which played an important role in Indian and Pakistani religious andpolitical life. Originally the organization was established by the SouthAsian Muslim community, but after the 1950s it opened its ranks to allMuslims in Thailand. Another religious-based development among theSouth Asian community was the establishment of some tablTgh Islamicactivities associated with the tablTgh movement founded by Indian

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Muslims in the 1920s. From time to time, various tablTgh leadersfounded small groups within the Muslim communities of Bangkok, andlater throughout Thailand, to attempt to strengthen moral and spiritualqualities associated with Islam. The tablTgh movement in Thailand hasdeliberately maintained its distance from any political activity.

Since the late 1970s and 1980s many Muslims have migrated toBangkok from the Middle East. Initially some came as tourists, buteventually decided to remain for business, trade, or religious purposes.As bilateral trade between Thailand and the Middle East increased,especially during the 1980s, a number of Muslims from Lebanon, Yemen,Egypt, and other Arab areas arrived in Bangkok. Middle Eastern restaur-ants and hotels opened to provide for Muslim Arab visitors and resid-ents. One area of Bangkok has become known as the Arab quarter andis sometimes referred to as the mini-Beirut of the East. Arabic calli-graphy, Arabian music, coffee-houses, belly-dancing, etc. became recog-nizable in this evolving cosmopolitan city.

Muslim communities were also established in north Thailand. Manyof the Muslims there came from the Islamicized portion of China. Mostauthorities refer to them as Chinese Haw, Cin-Ho, or Hui.19 Most ofthe Chinese Muslims in Thailand originate from the south-western partof Yunnan. Historically, this ethnic group operated an expansive tradingnetwork between the Shan states, China, and north Thailand. Forexample, they carried Chinese silk and metal products into northThailand and returned to China with cotton. Although some of theseChinese Muslims gradually settled in the northern provinces ofChiangmai, Chiangrai, Mae Hong Sorn, and Lamphun, it appears thatthey were a transient population until the nineteenth century. After thenineteenth century the Chinese Muslims began to establish themselvesas permanent residents in north Thailand. Then in the 1950s, as aconsequence of the Chinese revolution, another wave of Yunnaneserefugees fled into northern Thailand, many settling in Chiangmai prov-ince. These recent Yunnanese migrants or refugees had first fled toBurma. However, in 1954 the Burmese government directed a campaignto drive them out. These recent migrants have their own SunnT mosque

" Sec M. Moerman, 'Chiangkham's Trade in the "Old Days"', in G. W. Skinner andA. T. Kirsch (eds.), Change and Persistence in Thai Society: Essays in Honor of LaunstonSharp (Ithaca, NY, 1975), and F. W. Mote, 'The Rural "Haw" (Yunnanese Chinese) ofNorthern Thailand' in P. Kunstadter (ed.), Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities andNations (Princeton, NJ, 1967), and A. W. D. Forbes, 'The "Cin-Ho" (YunnaneseChinese) Muslims of North Thailand', Journal of the Institute of Muslim MinorityAffairs, 7:2 (1986), for historical details regarding the trade of Chinese Muslims through-out northern Thailand. For a full ethnographic account of Muslims in north Thailandsee S. Soonthornpasuch, 'Islamic Identity in Chiengmai City' (unpublished PhD thesis,University of California, Berkeley, 1977).

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and a modern religious school, both built in the early 1970s. AlthoughYunnanese Muslims are involved in a wide variety of occupations inChiangmai, traditionally they were primarily engaged in wholesale orretailing activities.

Another group of Muslims that settled in north Thailand is thedescendants of South Asian Muslims who came from Calcutta duringthe second half of the nineteenth century. Later, after 1947, with Indianindependence and partition, there was a continuous flow of migrantsfrom East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) who first settled in Burma, butgradually moved into northern Thailand and Chiangmai city. TheseChiangmai quarters also received a small Pathan Muslim populace whomigrated either directly from their homes in Pakistan or via Burma.The majority of the present population of these two quarters are third-and fourth-generation descendants of the nineteenth-century settlers.Originally, these Muslims from the subcontinent were involved primar-ily in cattle breeding, butchering, dairying, or other retail or tradingactivities. In Changklam quarter a Sunn! mosque, established in 1880by the South Asians, is the oldest mosque in north Thailand. In additionto the Chinese and South Asian Muslims and their descendants, a smallcommunity of Malay Muslim refugees from south Thailand was relo-cated by the Thai government into north Thailand during the nineteenthcentury. These Malay Muslim refugees were known by their descendantsas the chao nai (the leading elite) because of their superior knowledgeof Arabic and Islamic texts.

ASSIMILATION OF MUSLIMS IN CENTRAL ANDNORTHERN THAILAND

Based on conservative estimates, the Bangkok Muslim population isprobably near 280,000 or 8 per cent of the city's population. In northThailand there are twenty-four registered mosques (including four innorth-east Thailand) and the total population of Muslims in northThailand is approximately 16,000. Though the degree of assimilationof these Muslims in central and north Thailand varies between thedifferent ethnic groups, and even between families within the ethnicgroups, most of these Muslims refer to themselves as 'Thai Muslims'.Most of these Muslims have not taught their native languages to theirchildren. Thai has become the first language and native language ofmost Muslims in central and north Thailand. Although some of thedescendants of the Malay, South Asian, or Chinese Muslims can speaktheir native language, it is not used in everyday affairs in central andnorth Thailand.

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Other factors that created conditions for assimilation for the groupsof Muslims in central and north Thailand included education andintermarriage. These minority groups were subject to similar educa-tional patterns that were characteristic of the majority of the Thaipopulation. The descendants of these early settlers became involved inthe same educational processes which were being institutionalized bythe late nineteenth and early twentieth century. By the 1920s mandatoryeducation for children between the ages of seven and fourteen wasenacted by royal decree. This meant that Muslim children attendedThai schools and were exposed to reading and writing Thai at a veryearly age. Thus the traditional ethnic differences among these earlyMuslim settlers were partially erased by a common system of educationand communication. Intermarriage was another factor which played apart in the loss of traditional patterns of ethnicity among central andnorth Thai Muslims. A certain percentage of the male Muslim migrantsmarried Thai females, who then converted to Islam. An aphorism oftenheard in the Thai Muslim community is that 'the children of thesemixed marriages would adhere to the dress, manners, and language oftheir Thai mothers, but to the religion of their Muslim fathers.'

One colloquial Thai term of reference for the Muslims in central andnorth Thailand is kbaek which was used liberally to refer to South andsouth-west Asians, Arabs, Malays, Indonesians, and Persians. Thus,instead of chat Thai, Muslims in Bangkok are sometimes referred to askhaek lsalam or kbaek Musalam. Aside from Muslims, Hindus andTibetans are also included within the khaek category. Unlike the situ-ation in south Thailand, up until recently this term khaek did not havea pejorative connotation in central and north Thailand.20 However, thisethnic designation, kbaek, was not used to categorize the children ofMuslims in a rigid manner. And historically, despite mutual misunder-standings between Buddhists and Muslims, there has been no aggressiveanti-Muslim hostility in central or north Thailand. Consequently, agood deal of structural assimilation has occurred among these Muslims

20 The term khaek is discussed in C. Prachuabmoh, 'The Role of Women inMaintaining Ethnic Identity and Boundaries: A Case of Thai-Muslims (The MalaySpeaking Group) in Southern Thailand' (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University ofHawaii, Honolulu, 1980). Prachuabmoh found that the term khaek did have a verynegative, pejorative meaning for Muslims in south Thailand. For an etymological under-standing of the term khaek, see A. V. N. Diller, 'Islam and Southern Thai EthnicReference', in A. D. W. Forbes (ed.), The Muslims of Thailand: Historical and CulturalStudies, vol. 1 (Bihar, 1988). A more comparative essay that draws on the conditionsamong the Muslims in the Philippines and the Muslims of south Thailand is P. Gowing,'Moros and Khaek: The Position of the Muslim Minorities in the Philippines andThailand', in A. Ibrahim and S. Siddiqui (eds.), Readings in Southeast Asian Islam(Singapore, 1985).

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in their accommodation to residing in a Thai Buddhist environment.Although the Muslim communities in these Buddhist regions are identi-fiable by their needs for a halal-bascd diet and by their mosques, theytend to participate in the same institutions as their Thai Buddhistneighbours.

Despite the great degree of structural assimilation that has affectedthe Muslims in central and north Thailand, there have been sometendencies towards traditional ethnic expression and assertiveness. Forexample, ethnic expression is observable within the context of Islamicactivities during the celebration of holidays such as Mawlid al-Nabl inBangkok. During these events various ethnic groups such as the Pathansor Indonesians will set up booths to serve their own foods and particip-ate in a combination of ethnic and religious celebrations. In the case ofthe Cham crisis in Bangkok, noted above, Cham ethnicity and religiousidentity were mobilized in a form of political ethnic protest against theThai government. In north Thailand, beginning during the 1950s,Muslims from Yunnan and South Asia began to assert their ethnic andreligious identities in certain contexts when dealing with their Buddhistneighbours. However, in general, in both central and north Thailandethnic assertiveness or cultural expression of one's religious or ethnicidentity has usually not been mobilized towards political ends.

ISLAMIC REFORM IN THAILAND

Prior to the early twentieth century the form of Islam in south, central,and north Thailand was a heterogeneous complex of indigenous Hindu-Brahminist-Buddhist-animist and Islamic spiritualistic conceptions andpractices. From ethnographic studies of rural Muslim villages inThailand it is possible to characterize what is sometimes known as'folk' or 'popular' Islam.21 For example, a fundamental feature of 'pop-ular Islam' in Malay villages in south Thailand is the role of the bomohor supernatural specialist. The bomoh is recognized as being importantwith respect to controlling other types of spirits, and performs exorcisticrituals and other trance-like curative activities. While conducting theserituals the bomoh regularly utilizes the Islamic tradition by chanting

21 Ethnographic studies of popular Islam in Thailand include T. Fraser, Kusembilan:A Malay Fishing Village (Ithaca, NY, 1960), A. Burr, 'Religious Institutional Diversity—Social Structural and Conceptual Unity: Islam and Buddhism in a Southern Thai CoastalFishing Village', journal of the Siam Society, 60, (1992), and R. Scupin, 'Popular Islamin Thailand', in A. Forbes (ed.)> The Muslims of Thailand: Historical and CulturalStudies, vol. 1 (Bihar, 1988).

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passages from the Qur'an which are considered appropriate. Islamicand non-Islamic practices are conjoined to induce a valid religiousatmosphere for these paranormal undertakings in the rural Malayvillages in south Thailand.

Another major characteristic of popular Islam in rural south Thailandis the communally based ritual meals known as the kenduri (also knownas the slametan in Indonesia) or informally known as the makan pulot(to eat rice), which are found throughout rural Indonesia and Malaysia.These communal ritual meals are held in conjunction with various life-cycle rites including birth, puberty, marriage, pregnancy, and death. Inaddition, the communal meals are an important basis in celebrating thetwo 'Id festivals, and other traditional Islamic holy days such as theMawlid al-Nabl. Most of the kenduri meals involve chanting ayas fromthe Qur'an, especially the Fatiha. These communal rituals are elaborateceremonies that invoke both Islamic and non-Islamic spiritual sourcesin the local rural areas of these Malay southern Thai villages.

In contrast to the rural villages of south Thailand, the form ofpopular Islam in the rural and urban areas of central and north Thailandhas been influenced by the cultural and religious traditions of thedominant Buddhist majority. Theravada Buddhist cosmology permitsthe existence of a multiplicity of spirits. Most Thai Buddhists acceptthe existence of spirits known as phi that can influence the physical andmental well-being of individuals. Muslims in rural villages in centraland north Thailand combined various animistic beliefs and otherBuddhist concepts with popular Islamic traditions. These rural Muslimsin Buddhist environments relied on spiritual practitioners called mauphi to help them solve physical and mental problems. Spirit worship,the belief in spiritual practitioners, the use of amulets for spiritualprotection, saint worship, communal ritual feasts called thambun (tomake merit), or colloquially known as kinbun feasts, and other ritualactivities and beliefs coexisted in conjunction with the Islamic tradition.

The modernist Shart* a-minded reformist movements of the earlytwentieth century, which emerged in the Middle East and spreadthroughout Islamic South-East Asia, had major consequences for theMuslims of Thailand. These trends have been discussed by manyscholars dealing with the Muslim-majority areas of South-East Asiasuch as Malaysia and Indonesia. In South-East Asia, as in the MiddleEast, these Islamic modernist trends corresponded with the globalimpact of Western capitalism, colonialism, and what is sometimesreferred to as modernization, including increases in print journalismand improvements in literacy, especially in the urban centres. TheIslamic reformist movement emerged among some members of the

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MUSLIM ACCOMMODATION IN THAI SOCIETY 2JI

urban Thai Muslim community and developed in the context ofthis Islamic modernism that emanated from the Middle East andSouth Asia.

As is well known, the early impetus for Islamic modernism or reform-ism or islah in the Middle East and South Asia was associated with theSalafiyya movement of Jamal al-DTn Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, andRashTd Rida who founded the monthly review Al-Mandr. In the early1900s a political refugee from the Minangkabau community inIndonesia, Ahmad Wahab, settled in Bangkok and began to teach urbanThai Muslims reformist Islamic ideas stemming from 'Abduh, Rida,and the Salafiyya movement. Wahab had lived in Makka for some timeand eventually became familiar with modernist Islamic tendencies. InIndonesia Wahab had been connected with the Muhammadiya move-ment and its political counterpart Sareket Islam in Indonesia, and theDutch authorities exiled him and forced him to become a politicalrefugee. After attracting many followers and students in Bangkok,Wahab set up informal study groups; and he and his family weresupported by his students. From this base in the 1930s he eventuallyestablished the first two Islamic reformist associations in Thailandknown as Jamiyatyl al-Islah and Jamiyatul al-Salafiyah. Eventually thesegroups issued a monthly periodical, edited by Wahab, and financiallysupported by some members of the Muslim community in Bangkok.

Although Ahmad Wahab was responsible for the introduction of theMiddle Eastern and South-East Asian versions of Islamic modernism toBangkok, it was through his students and followers that these ideaswere galvanized and translated into a bona fide religious movement.One of the individuals affected by Wahab's teaching was DirekKulsiriswasd (Ibrahim Qureyshi), a central figure in contemporaryreformist Muslim theology in Thailand. Qureyshi was born in Ban Kruain 1922. His father was a migrant from Haripur, India, now located inPakistan. His mother was a descendant of Cham Muslims residing inthe Ban Krua area. Aside from Thai, his father taught him Urdu, aswell as some Arabic, Hindi, and English, which enabled him to read awide range of Islamic literature. Qureyshi's father had become acquain-ted with Wahab's reformist teaching, and eventually Qureyshi himselfwas introduced to him. Qureyshi became convinced of the necessity forIslamic reform in Thailand. He became an avid spokesman and writerpromulgating the same ideas that Ahmad Wahab had introduced intoBangkok. Ultimately Qureyshi was to have a more profound effect onthe development of the reformist movement than Wahab. This was dueto the fact that, since his native language was Thai, he was able topresent reformist ideas to the Thai Muslims in a more persuasive formatwithin their own idiom.

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By 1949 Qureyshi had completed the first of his many books onIslam, entitled Swasdipab Sangkhom (Social Welfare). Throughout hiscareer as a very successful businessman in the silk-screen-printing tradehe was simultaneously writing tracts on Islamic religious and culturalaffairs. He wrote treatises on such topics as Islamic marriage customs,prohibitions on eating pork, fasting, the hajj, and Islam and science. Inhis attempts at reforming Islam in Thailand he wrote essays on 'folk'or 'popular' Islamic beliefs, a scholastic treatise on the history of ThaiMuslims, and one on the influence of Muslim literary style on Thailiterature. In addition to many periodical articles, and translations ofthe hadlth literature, he completed a massive four-volume Thai transla-tion of the Qur'an.22

The urbanization of Bangkok provided the social conditions for theIslamic reform movement in Thailand. The movement attracted ayoung, educated, urban-based social clientele. As in other South-EastAsian urban areas, steady improvements in communications, especiallyprinting, brought Thai Muslims into closer touch with centres of Islamicreformism in the Middle East, South Asia, and other Islamic areas ofSouth-East Asia. The Islamic reformists attempted to purify the formof Islam as it existed within the Muslim communities of Thailand. Theycriticized what they perceived as the syncretistic beliefs and practicesof the popular forms of Islam that were influenced by animistic andBuddhist conceptions. The Thai Muslim reformers, like most otherIslamic modernists, were opposed to taqlid, the uncritical acceptanceof textual sources, or traditional religious teachings. They maintainedthat the only sources for religious beliefs and practices were the Qur'anand the Sunna, including authentic hadlth. They contended that humansshould strive to attain truth by utilizing akal (reasoning), through theprocess known as ijtihad, or independent judgement. Ijtihad and akalbecame the rallying theme of the Muslim reformist proponents in theirdialogue and struggle with more traditionally inclined Muslims, whowere accused of promoting taqtid or blind reverence to tradition.

During the 1960s the reformist influence came to south Thailandthrough another Indonesian known by the name of Haji Abdullah whofounded a pondok where he began to teach Islamic modernism andcriticized the widespread popular forms of Islam, bomohs, and otheranimistic beliefs and practices. One other source of Islamic reformism

22 At present there are four Thai translations of the Qur'an, all written by ThaiMuslims. Aside from Ibrahim Qureyshi's, another translation was completed by a formerChularajmontri, Tuan Suannarsard. The latter was supported and financed by the Thairoyal family. Another translation was completed by Marwan Sama Oon and BarlcatSiamwalla. And a recent translation was" done by a group called 'The Committee of theFormer Thai Students of the Islamic Seminaries in the Arab World'.

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in south Thailand came from India through Abdullah Chinarong whostudied at Deoband, the famed Islamic religious academy that initiatedIslamic revivalism in British India. Abdullah Chinarong formed his ownpotudok in Yala, about 20 kilometres from Patani.

Within Thailand, with the growth of the reform movement, theredeveloped two different factional alignments known as the kaum tua(Malay) or the khana kau (Thai), the traditionalists, and the kaummuda (Malay) or the khana mai (Thai), the modernists or reformists.These contending factions have offered different interpretations of theIslamic tradition within the Muslim communities of Thailand. Thetraditionalists and reformists have differed over various issues regardingIslamic ritual and practice. The modernists criticized the rural-basedpopular forms of ritual such as the communal feasts and the influencesof animist, Brahministic, or Hindu-Buddhist merit-making rituals onMuslims. They differed from the traditionalists on a variety of issuesincluding the use of amulets, saint worship, death rites, and otherreligious practices.

These factional alignments between the reformists and the traditional-ists have persisted. To some extent, however, as education and urbaniza-tion have increased, and as more Muslims from Thailand have travelledto other Islamic areas for education and jobs, the reformist-modernistmovement has exercised a definitive and sometimes subtle influence onthe Islamic tradition in Thailand. Gradually, forms of popular Islamand commitment to communalistic rituals have been eroded as villageshave had increasing exposure to national and international media suchas radio, television, and printed Islamic texts and pamphlets, as well asmore contact with the urban forms of Islamic reformism.

More recently, since the emergence of Islamic resurgence movementsin the Middle East and elsewhere, some Muslims in Thailand haveparticipated in contemporary Islamic movements similar to those thathave influenced Malaysia and Indonesia. The new Islamic movementsstem mostly from what has been referred to as the da'wa religioustrends which have been growing in Thailand. The da'wa movementhas often been described as a form of Islamic fundamentalism. Inactuality, the da'wa movement represents multiple strands of recentIslamic developments within Thai society, some of which exhibit funda-mentalist tendencies. The major da'wa movement, however, is a con-tinuation of the earlier reformist or tslah revivalist tendencies. Theda'wa movement has been linked with the reformist cause to spreadthe truly revealed knowledge of Islam. Aside from the basic Qur'anicmeaning of da'wa (a call to prayer or to preach), or an individual'sinvocation of God for a special purpose or a missionary intention, theconcept of da'wa in the reformist or modernist Islamic discourse in

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Thailand refers to a process of 'interiorization'.23 In this reformistnotion, instead of reaching out to convert others such as Buddhists,da'wa is aimed at reducing the materialist and secularist processesinfluencing modern Muslim life in Thai society. Excessive consumerism,materialism, corporate capitalist and political greed, and status-seekingare viewed as dehumanizing processes antithetical to Islamic spiritualand moral traditions. Modern da'wa leaders refer to the Westernizationof society or 'Westoxification' as the adversarial aspects of modernityin Thai society. In the da'wa movement in Thailand, Muslims are calledon to devote their lives to improving the social welfare of their fellowMuslims, rather than pursuing narrow self-interests. Da'wa leaders areactive in many of the Islamic associations throughout Thailand. Theypromote the revitalization of Islamic cultural and religious values andsponsor community-based social programmes.24 In addition, the da'waleadership often calls for a Muslim-Buddhist dialogue and co-operationto help bring about mutual understanding and social and economicimprovements throughout Thailand.

As the older generation of reformists relied on the religious-politicaltracts of 'Abduh, Rida, and Afghani, the younger-generation da'waleadership read, translate, and interpret the works of Sayyid Qutb,Muhammad Iqbal, MawdudT, 'All Shari'atT, Muhammad Asad, andHasan al-Turabl as well as other South-East Asian Muslim leaders suchas Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia to inspire themselves and their localcommunities. Stimulated by these religious-political works, the da'waleadership have been emphasizing human rights, justice, and ethnic andreligious dignity, and are attempting to mobilize their communities foreconomic and social development.

In south Thailand the da'wa movement has also become a means ofenhancing the struggle for religious and cultural autonomy and emphas-izing Malay Muslim ethnic-identity issues. To some extent the da'wa

23 I. Yusuf, in an essay entitled 'Islamic Da Wah in Thailand: The Cultural andHuman Dimensions of Dialogue between Islam and Buddhism' read at the InternationalConference on Islamic Da Wah Southeast Asia: Cultural and Human Dimensions (KualaLumpur, 1993), explicates the meanings of da'wa as interpreted within modern ThaiIslamic discourse. Yusuf suggests that at times the term is misunderstood in the Thaicontext to refer to tabttgh missionary activities (personal communication, I. Yusuf,July 1997).

24 The best-known da'wa organization in Bangkok is the Santichon (People of Peace),established in 1988. Santichon organizes regular classes for new converts and otherMuslims who desire a more informed approach to Islam. Other organizations that havebeen influenced by da'wa activities are the Thai Muslim Women's Foundation ofThailand for the Welfare of Orphans, the Muslim Medical Association, the Parent-Teacher Association of the Islamic College of Thailand, and the Muslim WelfareOrganization of Thailand.

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movement countered the overt government secularization and assimila-tion programmes for the pondoks in these southern Thai regions. Thegovernment-sponsored education was perceived by the Malay Muslimsas a means of eroding traditional ethnic and religious values. The da'wamovement was seen as an alternative means of instilling Islamic valueswithout government interference. Thai authorities, fearful of this resur-gent Islamic movement, actively sought the support of 'ulama' whowere perceived as loyal to the Thai government in order to control themovement. For some time this resulted in an official da'wa movementmonitored closely by Thai authorities as well as an unofficial one.

In many respects the da'wa movement can be viewed as a perpetu-ation of Islamic reformist ideals and discourse in the context of politicaldevelopments among Muslims in Thailand. As indicated above,Muslims in south Thailand have tended to renounce their affinities tothe militant irredentist activities of the 1960s and 1970s. Generally,Muslims throughout Thailand have accommodated to their status asminorities within a non-Islamic society. Instead of initiating a militaryand political struggle against the Thai Buddhist state, more Muslimshave strengthened their religious ties and are involved in revitalizingtheir Islamic identity. As education increases among the Muslimcommunities, more leaders have been recruited to participate in thesemi-democratic process in Thailand as a means of promoting a morepluralistic nation. The da'wa Islamic reform movement enhances thisprocess. The founding of the Wahda party was a direct outgrowth ofIslamic reformism in Thailand. The leadership of this political group,including Den Tohmeena, the son of Haji Sulong, a well-known southThailand Muslim leader who became a political martyr, has beenrecruited from reformist organizations. Wahda has been actively pro-moting religious and political reform in Muslim institutions throughoutThailand.

In 1986 a crisis, known as the hijab crisis, mobilized the variousda'wa Islamic organizations throughout Thailand. A Muslim teacherin Nonthaburi, who was dressed in a blouse with long sleeves, an ankle-length skirt, and a head covering, or hijab, was fired for disturbing the'normality' of school. In the same year in Patani another Muslim womanwalked into a government building to report for work wearing thehijab and was asked to leave. Later in 1987, in Yala province, insteadof dressing in their Thai college uniforms, a number of Muslim studentswent to school dressed in their hijab. These students were barred fromtheir classrooms. Muslims from da'wa organizations throughout thecountry mobilized to protest at the treatment of these women.Eventually mass demonstrations were organized by da'wa leaders, andthe Ministry of Education was forced to amend its policies to accom-

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modate Islamic dress and to respea the cultural and religious traditionsof the Muslim communities.25

Another example of this new form of Muslim political involvementthat reflects the influence of da'wa and Islamic reformism is the IslamicAdministrative Act, the most dramatic piece of legislation passed bythe Thai parliament for Muslims since the Patronage Act of 1945.2*Wahda had actively supported the Islamic Administrative Act which isaimed at reforming the administrative framework for Muslims withinthe Thai government. The reformist leadership and da'wa organizationslobbied the Thai government to vote for this legislation. Though delayedwithin the Thai parliament for five years, it was finally passed alongwith the enactment of a new 'People's Constitution' in Thailand inOctober 1997.

One aspect of the new Islamic Administrative Act has a bearing onthe office of the Chularajmontri. In contrast to the past, when theChularajmontri was elected by a small number of representatives fromthe Muslim communities, under the new legislation he is to be electedby some 384 members of the 29 Provincial Islamic Committees, a muchmore democratic and broader representation of the Muslim communit-ies. The fourteenth Chularajmontri, Prasert Mahamad, passed away inAugust 1997. On 16 October, under the new election guidelines of theIslamic Administration legislation, Sawasdi Sumlayasak, an Islamicscholar and politician, who was twice a member of the Thai parliament,was elected as the new Chularajmontri. Sawasdi appears to have broadsupport from within the Islamic and Thai political system.

PERIPHERAL DEVELOPMENTS

In addition to the development of da'wa religious movements inThailand, some Muslim leaders in the 1980s were influenced by theIranian ShT'a religious and political movement. Some of these leadershave endorsed the Shi*a tradition as a means of restoring what theyperceive as a more authentic religious and political liberation forMuslims in Thailand. These converts to the ShT'a tradition have been

25 See C. Satha-Anand, 'Hijab and Moments of Legitimation: Islamic Resurgence inThai Society', in C. Keyes, C. L. Kendall, and H. Hardacre (eds.), Asian Visions ofAuthority: Religion and the Modem States of East and Southeast Asia (Honolulu, HI,1994), for an elegant analysis of the hijab crisis and its consequences for the Muslimsin Thailand.

u An insightful analysis of the Islamic Administrative Act is made by I. Yusuf in hispaper, 'Islam and Democracy in Thailand: The Case of the 1992 Islamic AdministrativeBill', read at the International Conference on Islam and the 21st Century, Leiden, 1996.See below, pp. 277-98.

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publishing and translating the works of Shi* a leaders such as the lateAyatullah Khomeini and 'All Shari'atT. These Shfa writings and teach-ings have had some influence on the Muslim communities throughoutThailand. A number of Muslims in Thailand have converted to theShTa movement. It remains to be seen whether this movement willemerge as a significant political force in Thai society.

One other Islamic movement has had a marginal influence inThailand. In 1968 an Islamic movement called Darul Arqam wasfounded by Ashaari Muhammad. Darul Arqam established some forty-three communes and economic enterprises throughout Malaysia. Themovement is estimated to have some 100,000 members. EmphasizingSufi traditions integrated with practical economic activities and someunorthodox practices, Darul Arqam was viewed as a deviation frommore mainstream Islamic traditions in Malaysia. The Malaysian IslamicAffairs department banned al-Arqam from interfering in any govern-ment affairs, and eventually in 1994 the National Fatwa Council bannedal-Arqam. Many of its members were arrested in Malaysia for distribut-ing literature. Ashaari migrated to Thailand and developed his com-munes in both south and north Thailand. Although very few ThaiMuslims converted to the Darul Arqam movement, at first Thai author-ities supported their activities as they initiated positive economic devel-opments in various communities. However, rumours spread about thestockpiling of arms by the Darul Arqam communes. In addition, inter-governmental relations were strained between Malaysia and Thailandregarding the toleration of Ashaari's movement by Thai authorities. Ingeneral, Muslim intellectuals in Thailand tended to view the movementas harmless and even emphasized the positive aspects of its activities,especially the innovative economic developments within the communes.Eventually, however, in 1994, because of Malaysian government pres-sures, Ashaari was deported back to Malaysia.27

CONCLUSION

The major challenge facing the Muslim minority in Thailand is thesame one currently facing many other nations—the transformationfrom a society based on an imaginative, homogeneous communal orderto one based on a more heterogeneous, pluralistic civil order. There aresome indicators of a more pluralistic civil order becoming more accept-able to Thai citizens. For example, in 1997 there were some demonstra-

27 For an excellent overview of the Darul Arqam movement throughout South-EastAsia see J. H. Meuleman, 'Reactions and Attitudes towards the Darul Arqam Movementin Southeast Asia', Studia lslamika, 3:1 (1996).

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tions led by Thai Buddhist monks to demand that Buddhism be madethe official national religion under the new constitution. However, mostThai citizens rejected that demand, and the Thai legislature also opposedthis policy believing that it would fuel ethnic and religious divisiveness.It would appear that most Thai citizens tend to support an open socialstructure with room for a diversity of people and traditions, rather thana narrow one with reinforced walls creating barriers to so-called alienor minority influences. This pluralistic view represents an encouragingdevelopment for the Muslim minority in Thailand. The Thai govern-ment has helped to initiate the development of some positive policiesaffecting the Muslim communities such as the recognition of Islamicholidays as official holidays and the legitimation of Shan*a courts inpersonal Islamic legal matters in Muslim regions. The Muslim commu-nities in Thailand are actively striving to work for the development ofa tolerant and pluralistic society that recognizes the significance of theircontributions to Thai culture and society. Generally, the Muslim com-munity in Thailand has acknowledged the need to move away fromrigid ethnic and religious exclusive tendencies in favour of co-operationand political integration. Though there are still tensions and conflictsbetween Muslims and Buddhists in Thai society, the prospect of greaterethnic and religious harmony in a pluralistic civil society seems to be apredominant trend.

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