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University; date: 26 November 2013

Art and Abstract ObjectsChristy Mag Uidhir

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199691494Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: Jan-13DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691494.001.0001

Musical Works: A Mash-Up

Joseph G. Moore

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691494.003.0014

Abstract and Keywords

It is argued that the concept of a musical work shifts innocuously withjudgmental setting between the notion of a sound-structure and a moremusically flexible notion that is grounded in musico-historical context. Thisindividuative indeterminacy in the work-concept explains and defuses adebate between contextualists and structuralists about the individuationof musical works, but it raises the Quinean worry that musical works areontologically illegitimate entities without identity. It is argued that thischallenge can be met by adopting a supervaluation model of how the work-concept shifts, coupled with a disjunctive (schizoid) metaphysics and asemantic pretense account of our seeming reference to individual musicalworks. The proposed view also suggests that the existence conditions ofmusical works are indeterminateone of the two entities that groundsthought and talk about musical works comes into (and goes out of) existencewhile the other does not.

Keywords: musical works, metaphysics, individuation, supervaluation, sound-structure,provenance

I. ControversingWhat role in the individuation of a musical work is played by its provenance

by the musico-historical and biographical conditions that surround the

works composition and reception? The fact that Beethovens Hammerklavier

Piano Sonata (No. 29 in B flat major, Op. 106, 1818) occurred in the musico-

historical setting that it did, and the fact that it was composed when
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it was in the sequence of Beethovens oeuvre determines some of the

sonatas broadly aesthetic features. The Hammerklavier established a new

precedent for the length of a solo work, for example; and certain features of

Beethovens later work, such as situating the fugue within a classical form,

emerge here for the first time. Its natural to attribute these novelties to thework itself, since they contribute to the pieces critical importance.

On the other hand, even a highly informed listener doesnt encounter these

features in a narrowly perceptual way when the work is performed, nor do

they guide a proper or even insightful performance of the work. And if a

musical work is individuated by those of its features that can be presented

and experienced in performance then provenance shouldnt figure in the

works identity.

(p.285) But perhaps this illegitimately privileges those aesthetic features that

are narrowly experiential, and these are sometimes of secondary evaluative

importance (think of chance music, or the use of found sounds). In any case,

its not clear that we can cleanly distinguish those aesthetic properties of

a work that can be heard in performance from those that cant. Who would

deny that The Rite of Springsrevolutionary character was apparent to its

first audience in Paris? (If you think Nijinskys choreography was really the

focus, consider instead the reception given to Ornette Colemans The Shape

of Jazz to Come.) Isnt this striking historical property part of the works very

nature?

II. Just Yoking

Controversies such as this about the proper role of provenance have

been hotly debated in recent decades. And I think it is fair to say that

contextualiststhose who think work identity is sensitive to provenance

are winning the day. If we agree with Jerrold Levinson and other

contextualists1that at least some historical or even biographical properties

should figure in the identity of a musical work, then its plausible to construe

a musical work as a sound-structure yoked somehow to certain art-historical

features that surround its composition. There are interesting and subtle

disagreements about how we should best understand and deploy the notionof a sound-structure, as well as the notion of art-historical provenance,

but these are not my main concern here.2My concern instead is with the

yoking: How should those of us moved by contextualist considerations

best understand the way structure and provenance mix in our concept of a

musical work?


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An obvious way to incorporate provenance in a works identity is to construe

a musical work as a fine-grained concatenation of a sound structure and a

particular provenance. Ill take as representative Stephen Daviess (p.286)

suggestion that a musical work is a performed sound-structure as made

normative in a musico-historical setting.3The proposal may allow thatstrict similarity in sound structure and provenance is somewhat loosened

in application, but its logical root is conjunctive: Two works are identical if

and only if they have the same sound structure andthe same provenance.

This is the main form of contextualism on offer in the literature, presumably

because its the only straightforward way to mix structure and provenance.

I propose a different mix. On my view, our judgments of work identity

are more disjointed. They are variously sensitive to structure, or to

provenance, or to both in a way that occasionally pulls us in different

directions. Moreover, our identity judgments can shift with the explanatorypurposes, evaluative foci, and pragmatic considerations that characterize the

different judgmental and conversational settings in which we find ourselves.

Sometimes were focused primarily on a works musical structure, while

sometimes were concerned more with its art-historical status. Most of the

time, both criteria are implicitly at play. Exactly how our sensitivities shift

and even that they shift at allis not readily apparent to us because the

two concerns rarely come apart. If Im right, theres a sort of tacit semantic

indecision or individuative indeterminacy built into our work concept.

This indeterminacy isnt worth resolving through revisionary conceptual

sharpening because not doing so yields cognitive and conversational

economy. And as Ill eventually explain, it doesnt rule out the worlds

answering to our shifting concept.

This is the view I will develop in this chapter. I first argue that

shiftism (sorry) is a superior alternative both to contextualism about

musical works and to contextualisms main opponentthe structuralist

view that musical works are simply sound structures.4In Section III, I argue

that this shifting (p.287) view gives a better treatment of some hypothetical

and actual cases of work individuation because it explains some unsettled

intuitions. And in Section IV, I argue that considerations that might sharpen

this indeterminacy are either tangential or inconclusive, particularly onceshiftism is seen as a theoretical alternative. I then worry, in Section V,

that the individuative indeterminacy that shiftism exposes challenges the

existence of musical works. However, in Sections VI and VII, I develop a

more detailed account of the indeterminacy that I argue, in Section VIII, is

compatible with realism about musical works.


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III. Intuition-Mongering

Hypothetical cases are sometimes treated as grist for a theoretical mill, or

presented along with a favored intuition that the theory goes on to honor.

For the moment, Id like to effect the opposite: Insofar as its possible,consider the following counterfactual scenariosmy own versions of some

familiar exampleswith an open, uncommitted, and pre-theoretic mind.

Scenario #1: The Hawaiian-Hammer. Suppose Beethoven had lived in some

remote part of Hawaii, as yet untouched by the culture of Captain Cook. In

1817, a Broadwood piano washes ashore. The Hawaiian genius soon figures

out how to play and compose for it, and to do all of this in classical style

no less. Even more miraculously he does so all on his own. By the fall of

the next year, he has composed a piece that is note-for-note identical to

the actual Hammerklavier. Is the Hawaiian-Hammer the same as the actualHammerklavier?5

Scenario #2: The Honey-Hammer. Suppose instead that, back in Vienna,

Beethoven sits down to write his 29th piano sonata during the (p.288) same

time period; and he dedicates it to Archduke Rudolph, as he actually did.

Suppose, though, that the sonatas third movement turns out to be more

upbeat and somewhat sweeter than the actual Hammerklaviers famously

sorrowful third movement. Suppose our counterfactual Beethoven has upped

the tempo a bit, made a few themes a touch less searching, and tossed

in a few more major tonalities. The differences are subtle, but noticeable

(at least to those who can shuttle between possible worlds), although thecounterfactual piece goes on to much the same critical acclaim and influence

as the actual Hammerklavier. Is this counterfactual 29th Sonata none other

than our actual Hammerklavier?6

The strict contextualist holds, of course, that neither the Hawaiian-

Hammer nor the Honey-Hammer is the same work as Beethovens actual

Hammerklavier, while the pure structuralist agrees that the Honey-Hammer

is a different piece but will allow that the Hammerklavier could, indeed, have

been composed in a remote part of Hawaii.

But what do our untutored intuitions tell us? (Or have I already reloaded

them?) The examples are far-fetched, of course, and there isnt universal

agreement, but some of us draw a blank; and we do so because were pulled

in different directions. If we successfully discharge the presupposition that a

determinate yes or no is called for, we might well say that the Hawaiian-

Hammer is the same as the actual Hammerklavier in one sense but not


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another. Ditto for the Honey-Hammer, with the senses converted. I dont

know for certain that Im in the intuitional majority here, though I suspect it.

(Confirming this might be a project for experimental philosophy.) In any case,

I want to investigate exactly what wide-spread intuitional indeterminacy of

this type might show about our work concept.

In the first scenario, we notice a structural similarity and a provenancial (if

I may) dissimilarity. Since this pulls us in conflicting directions, our overall

judgment about the identity of the Hawaiian-Hammer remains indeterminate.

This would be nicely explained if our work concept shifts, as I claim, between

a structural strand and an entirely provenancial strand. But the contextualist

might claim that our intuitional uncertainty arises instead because we

recognize a similarity in one of the (as he holds) two components of the

musical work, while we simultaneously disregard a (p.289) dissimilarity in

the other. Perhaps we disregard provenance because our consideration ofthe case has been too hasty, or we havent fully appreciated the truth of

contextualism.

This alternative explanation of the Hawaiian-Hammer is already inferior,

since it makes our intuition half-mistaken, but I think the Honey-Hammer

nails the case against the contextualist. Regarding this second scenario, the

contextualist has to say, I think, that any intuitional indeterminacy results

from a looseness in our enforcement of structural similarity. But this gets

things wrong: We dont blank on the Honey-Hammer solely because we

cant gauge whether the structural differences transgress some permitted

degree of looseness; rather, our sense that the structural differences are,or might be beyond the pale is balanced against our sense that the strong

provenancial similarities should rule the day.

We think of a musical work as a product, but also as a process. And the

process, at least, is almost always cultural. (This is one reason the Hawaiian-

Hammer, with its isolated genius, is a particularly far-fetched example.) To

count as a work, a musical offering must have presentational content

a performed sound structure, close enoughbut someone must also

consider it to be a work, and indeed a work of a certain type. The composer

isnt entirely authoritative here; and in this respect, musical works area bit like marriages and touchdowns. Even when shes working solo, the

composers work is shapedboth constrained and enabledby a socio-

artistic tradition and practice, which she might shape in turn. This practice

helps determine what features can count as artistic, and how: It helps

determine, for example, which expressive features are conveyed by which


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transformations of the medium. But this social practice also plays a role

in determining whether something is a work at all, and how the work is

institutionally recognized, presented, described, categorized, canonized, and

so on. All of these considerations drive the way we individuate works.

So far, of course, the contextualist will agree. What supports my shifting view

against contextualism is the further observation that many art-institutional

means of work-individuation neednt have much connection with musical

content. In order to count as a musical work, a creation must have some

musical content or other, to be sure,7but a works art-institutional (p.290)

individuation neednt concern the particularities of this content. This

suggests that provenance can have an individuating force all on its own.8

Consider the way we think, at least theoretically, of musical works over time,

both during their composition and after their initial or official completions. A

composer confronts a deadline, and very late in the day she decides to alter

the key signature or tempo of her piece, or to tinker with its harmonies, or to

cut and add measures or entire sections, or even to completely change the

principal theme. We nevertheless seem to regard the work as numerically

unchanged for sound practical reasons of a broadly institutional and

intentional kinda piece has been commissioned, a title has been chosen,

or the composer has simply stuck to the self-imposed task of composing

her next new work. On the other end, a deadline may have passedan

initial performance has occurred, or a score has been publishedyet the

composer tinkers with her composition because it dissatisfies her in some

way (true of Bruckner and Chopin), or because she wants to change thingsto suit the different musicians, instruments, or audience involved in an

upcoming performance (true of Mozart, Stravinsky, Ellington, and many

others).9We say that the work has changed, but we seem to mean this

qualitatively and not numerically: We might distinguish drafts or versions

in order to mark the relatively stable musical, or institutionally noted points

in the diachronic stream of structural variation, but we dont stray from the

pragmatic, provenance-driven reasons for counting the whole structure-

shifting enterprise as of a piece, and not many.

I see no reason to think that our work concept is any less modallyflexible than it is temporally so. And once were gripped by the force

of art-institutional considerations then our work concept can, I submit,

accommodate structural variations even greater than those involved in the

Honey-Hammer. Suppose Beethoven set out with the express goal of writing

a sonata in which to reconceive the fugue. (For all I know he actually did


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this.) And suppose he accomplished this with music that is very different

that doesnt move by descending thirds, for example. Couldnt this still be

the Hammerklavier?

Ive chosen Beethoven as the source of my examples because its preciselyin the era he dominates that Lydia Goehr has controversially claimed that

our work concept came into being in its complete and mature form.10

One (p.291) mark of this is that Beethoven and his contemporaries could,

and did make normative heightened levels of performative uniformity,

precision, virtuosity, and musical detail. But this actually makes Beethoven

less tractable for my purposes since we tend to focus so intently on, as it

were, his music. Consider instead pieces that are composed with a particular

person or occasion preeminently in mind, or that are strongly driven by some

non-musical theme. Couldnt Handels Fireworks Music, Ellingtons Queens

Suite, or Arlo GutheriesAlices Restaurantsurvive even greater variations inmusical structure?

Whats going on here? Bound up in our work concept are two distinct

metaphysical criteria of individuation, one structural and the other

provenancial. Works themselves seem to vary in how two distinct types of

properties bear on their identity: Some works have greater structural detail

than others, and some are surrounded by more forceful and determinative

art-historical particularities. The Hammerklavier has more structural detail

than the ditty I just wrote (trust me); and this same ditty might have been

composed anytime in the past few decades, whereas Bartoks Concerto for

Orchestra, actually composed in 1943, could not have been composed before1942, when Shostakovich penned the Seventh Symphony which Bartok

satirizes.11

But I think our work concept is doubly shifty: Our relative sensitivity to these

two variably thick ingredients can itself shift and remix as our thought and

talk focus on different aesthetic issues, and as they make salient different

kinds of aesthetic property. So our individuative judgments shift as we

consider differentmusical works, and also as this consideration is driven

by differentaesthetic concerns. Very occasionally, a perfect semantic

storm blows in: We stumble across an example that pulls our two criteriain different directions, as we consider the case in a manner that leaves

our divergent sensitivities in intuition-numbing equipoise. This happens

most readily in theoretical discussions, like this one, in which an example

is purposely constructed, and we regard it without any particular concern

(other, perhaps, than understanding the very nature of this regard). In these


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rare, untethered, theoretical settings our work concept blanks, and breaks

down. But thankfully, what might be common in philosophical discussion is

almost unheard of in everyday talk of musical works and performances of

them.

(p.292) IV. Can We Sharpen Up?

My claim so far is that our received concept of a musical work is

individuatively vague: In the vast majority of normal cases we

unproblematically tell musical works apart and count them cleanly; but in

certain cases, such as in the thought experiments Ive discussed, our work

concept doesnt individuate cleanly and determinately because its structural

and provenancial strands pull in different directions (and judgmental setting

doesnt resolve this conflict). But the case Ive made for this conceptual

indeterminacy rests largely upon a few thought experiments, and intuitionsabout these are notoriously complex and various, as are their explanations.

One might suspect that there are other considerations that will resolve this

pre-theoretic indeterminacy.

What about the published debate over the individuation of works? Portions

of that discussion properly concern, in effect, our separate understandings

of structure and provenance, whereas my concern, again, is with the more

fundamental question of how the two are mixed in our work concept.12

Also tangential, I believe, is the discussion of whether works are created or

discovered, and how, if theyre created, they can also be abstract entities.

(Ill suggest at chapters end that the existence conditions of musical worksmight also be indeterminate.) What remains seems largely a consideration of

actual and hypothetical examples, and Ive here proposed an alternative and

superior way of treating them.

Moreover, its difficult to see how further considerations coulddecisively

sharpen up our work concept. A discovery model seems entirely implausible

in this realm: Musical works are not natural kinds whose essential features

might be discovered through empirical investigation. On the contrary,

musical works seem constructed entities whose identity conditions are

entirely determined by our discursive practice and the conceptual schemethat drives it.13

We might hope instead for conceptual resolution through reflective

equilibrium: Perhaps our work concept will sharpen up once we see how it

connects to (p.293) broader aspects of the way we think about music and

artistic practice. Here too Im sceptical. The problem, it seems to me, is that


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the obvious issues we might plumb are, on reflection, either independent of

the question of work identity or themselves unsettled (or both). Ive already

suggested that the issue of existence conditions wont help. Where else

might we look?

We might try looking outside the realm of Western classical music. Here,

though, we will encounter musical practices without works or, more often,

practices with musical works that might be structurally thinner but beset

by the same individuative indeterminacy nevertheless.14Our thought

experiments could be made just as inconclusive if we substituted for

Beethovens Hammerklavier sonata John Coltranes Giant Steps or, I

suspect, a piece of Classical Indian, or Javenese gamelan music. Or perhaps

we will find unhelpfully that the concept of a musical work is elsewhere

deployed in a quite different and heterogeneous fashion, as has been argued

for rock music.15

We might look to other entitiessymbols, flags, car models, booksthat

seem both created and repeatable. But here too, I suspect we will encounter

the same individuative indeterminacy. Indeed, the shifting view might be

extended to cover repeatable non-musical works such as Henry Fords Model

T and Saul Kripkes Naming and Necessity, because work concepts seem

generally to yoke a structural or content-sensitive criterion together with a

provenancial one.

Finally, we might hope that some general theory about the production and

reception of artworks might sharpen our work concept. But Im still skeptical.Take the debate at play in our opening controversy. To paint in very broad

brushstrokes, the neo-formalist holds that what is to be evaluated in an

artwork are the significant features we narrowly perceive in encountering it

in a gallery, in a book, or in performance, for example. (These are sometimes

called a works aesthetic properties as opposed to its artistic ones.)

On this view, it might be useful to know a works art-historical setting in

order properly to perceive itin order, that is, to appreciate which of its

many perceivable features are artistically relevant.16But it is only these

perceivable features that properly figure in an evaluation (p.294) of the work

itself as opposed to the artist or the genre; and so it is only these featuresthat are built into the work metaphysically.

The neo-expressivist holds, by contrast, that since art is at core a

communicative activity, cultural and historical setting is essential to an

artworks communicative force. On this view, a sound structure or a canvas

may be the crucial perceptual vehicle of an act of artistic communication,


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but it is still only one part of that act. For this reason, the artwork is more

inclusive than the sheer communicative vehicle (i.e. the canvas or sound

structure); the artwork also includes the vehicles relations to cultural setting

and to the contingent expressive connections that are an indispensible part

of the artistic communication.

Whos right? Perhaps the neo-formalist and the neo-expressivist capture

divergent but equally useful ways to conceptualize the worlds enormously

diverse variety of artworks and artistic practices. This theoretical pluralism

would support, and be supported by the individuatively mongrel character

of our work concept. But even if only one view is right, the independence of

work-individuation from this general debate seems ensured by significant

theoretical looseness in this domainthat is, by unclarity or outright freedom

about whether one theoretical choice point has any bearing upon another.

For example, the neo-formalist might have reason to hold that, althoughonly narrowly perceptual properties of the artwork are properly attended to

while evaluating the work itself, other features including relations to context

are nevertheless part of the work. And the neo-expressivist might favor a

conception of the artwork according to which the work itself is a narrow

expressive vehicle, with the rest of the expressive act captured in events

centering around the artist.17One can imagine motivation for each of these

complex views. And their very possibility shows that the general debate

about the nature of artistic practice privileges neither the structural nor the

provenancial strand of our work concept.

So, if Im right, theres a deeply irresolvable indeterminacy in our conceptof a musical work. This would defuse the debate about work-individuation:

Structuralism and contextualism overprivilege, in effect, distinct and

sometimes divergent individuative strands bond up in our mongrel concept

of a musical work. Each view is half-right, but also (p.295) half-wrong. But

this nice result is balanced against a dark metaphysical implicationif our

work concept is irresolvably indeterminate, perhaps there arent really

musical works at all.

V. Interlude: A Quinean Tension

So far, Ive argued for the following two claims:

Conceptual Indeterminacy: Our concept of a musical work

(and the discourse/practice in which its embedded) doesnt

determinately individuate all cases we might consider;


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sometimes different individuative strands within our concept

pull us in different directions.

No Sharpeners: Theres no hidden criterion of individuation

for musical works that can be discovered empirically; andreflecting on broader conceptual connections wont favor any

particular revisionary sharpening of our concept.

Along with these two claims, I also hold that we have a strong prima facie

reason to be realists about the existence of musical works. We seem

successfully to talk about and quantify over works; indeed, we seem to

perform them. Much of our music making seems to traffic in works; and talk

of musical works seems an ineliminable part of the performative, critical, and

even legal discourse that surrounds this music making.

But this combination of views is in tension. If Conceptual Indeterminacy andNo Sharpeners are both true, then its hard to see how realism about musical

works can be squared with Quines compelling metaphysical injunction

against entities without identity. How can we admit musical works into our

considered ontology if they lack clear identity criteriaif we cant say, even

in principle, whether the Hawaiian-Hammer (or the Honey-Hammer) and

Beethovens actual Hammerklavier are one and the same musical work?

We might question or scrutinize Quines principle. Indeed, Quine himself

once archly asked whether certain entities (he had in mind meaning-notions

like propositions) might be accepted as twilight half-entities to which theidentity concept is not to apply? If the disreputability of their origins is

undeniable, still bastardy, to the enlightened mind, is no disgrace.18But

despite the appeal of enlightened disrepute, Im with Quine. At least, Im

(p.296) with him in opposing the possibility of in-the-world metaphysical

indeterminacythe putative possibility that, for example, the Hawaiian-

Hammer and the actual Hammerklavier neither determinately stand in nor

fail to determinately stand in the identity relation to one another. For one

thing, the general possibility of this type of metaphysical indeterminacy

faces strong general challenges to its coherence.19More importantly,

the possibility doesnt match up well with the source of the conceptualindeterminacy in this case. For the conceptual indeterminacy in our work

concept arises not from a lack of intuitions, but from conflicts among them.

And this suggests that the indeterminacy resides not in the world itself, but

in our representations of it.


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a performance of the sweeter sonata by our counterfactual Beethoven on

the same autumn evening counts as a performance of the same work: The

counterfactual performance stands in the same-provenance, but not the

same-structure relation to Beethovens actual performance.

A more comprehensive and nuanced model of our work concept would

need to be complicated in a variety of ways. And even then, no model will

perfectly capture our work concept. For one thing, folk-constructs such

as this vary somewhat with person, culture and domain of application.

Nevertheless, I think this supervaluationism nicely explains our concepts

individuative indeterminacy. It captures the profile of our intuitions, including

conflicted intuitions, that I elicited earlier in the chapter; and it explains why

our work concept functions perfectly well in the vast majority of cases in

which the two relations dont come apart.

I will comment briefly on two complications at play in the examples Ive

discussed. The first complication concerns vagueness in each of the two

criteria considered separately. We might allow that Beethoven and the

(p.298) Hawaiian genius could have indicated the same sound structure

despite some relatively minor differences in their musical specifications.

But how great can these differences be? Not as great as the significant

harmonic differences that yield the Honey-Hammer, I think, but we might

allow differences in key, for example, and slight differences in specified

tempo and ornamentation. Wheres the cut-off point? The allowable degree

of variation seems vague.

The relation of same-provenance also seems loose. Beethoven could have

indicated his sonata later than he did, perhaps even after he had composed

what is actually counted as his 30th piano sonata (op. 109). But could the

very same Hammerklavier, provenancially considered, have been composed

by one of Beethovens contemporaries? Considered in the right setting, I

think it could, but I suspect vagueness here as well.21In any case, as far as

I can see, the vagueness in these two criterial relations, and the best way to

understand it (perhaps with a second application of supervaluationism?) is

independent of my account of the indeterminate criterial mixing.

A second complication has to do with the way that our judgments of work

identity might vary with judgmental setting. The norms and standards

of different musical genres seem to make for differences in the way we

individuate works within them.22But as I suggested in Section III, our identity

judgments might also vary, even concerning one and the same case, with

judgmental settingthat is, with the variable conversational, aesthetic


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and practical concerns that are at play when an identity judgment is called

for.23Its not my goal here to establish that our work concept is (p.299)

deployed in this type of setting-variable way, but I strongly suspect it. If so,

this would add another layer of complexity to our model, and raise some

new questions.24However, as far as I can see, this setting-dependenceof our work concept cuts across its individuative indeterminacy and the

supervaluation model Ive just proposed.

VII. A Schizoid Metaphysics

The conceptual model Ive just proposed nicely captures the way our work

concept is deployed in musical practice, but it leaves a crucial metaphysical

question unresolved: What do the two criteria track? What makes it the

case that two token performances are structurally or provenancially similar,

or both? The metaphysics that seems to me best to match the conceptualmodel is almost flat-footedly simple: The distinct criteria track respectively

two distinct and largely distinguishable types of entitiesstructural-

works (S-works) and provenancial-works (P-works). But what are these?

Before pursuing this question, I emphasize the relative independence that it

has from the conceptual model. To be sure, there must be something about

the world that these criteria track, unless we are to leave the door open to

eliminativism about musical works. But my conceptual account might remain

entirely accurate even if the metaphysics I pursue turns out to be misguided.

I think we can take structural-works simply to be sound structures. Soundstructures are not, of course, uncontroversial entities. We might wonder

which particular sequences should play the role of S-works. For example,

do sound structures include performance-means?25As I noted earlier there

are general metaphysical worries about sound structures as abstracta.

For example, how do abstract sequences enter into the causal relations

at work in our putative reference to musical works, and our knowledge of

them? But my claim about the existence and structure of the individuative

indeterminacy in our work concept is, as far as I can see, compatible with

(p.300) a wide range of possible answers to such questions. In any case,

these worries dont tell more forcefully against my position than the positionsto which Ive argued its superior. We need confidence only that there is

some workable account of sound structures, or at least of sound structure

talk.

The more novel construction is that of a provenancial-work.26I think of P-

works as causal webs of intentionally linked action-tokens grounded initially


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in status-endowing actions of a composer and the musical institutions

that surround her. They spread diachronically from the actions involved in

composition and work-endowment through certain performative, evaluative,

and representational events that those acts of composition influence. Since

the acts of composition, work-establishment, performance, and evaluationare to be specified and understood relative to a background of expressive

and performative traditions that inform them, we can usefully regard P-works

as tradition-threadsthat is, as individual threads in the broader causal

tapestry of musical, psychological, and social events upon which a musical

culture and tradition supervene.

An example might help. The P-work that corresponds to Beethovens

Hammerklavier piano sonata (call it the P-Hammer) is to be specified and

understood against a broad range of performance traditions, contingent

musico-expressive conventions, and prominent cultural events that wouldhave been at play in the Viennese musical culture in which Beethoven

composed his sonata. This expressive background is roughly a collection

of musical conventions that Beethoven and his contemporaries would have

implicitly regarded as the relevant musical backdrop against which a new

musical composition was to achieve its expressive effects.

The P-Hammer itself starts with some specific actions of Beethovenshis

deciding to compose another sonata, or his being commissioned to do so.

They extend through the process of composition, and the moment when

Beethoven (or a publisher or a deadline) determined that his composition

was done. This is the period during which the P-Hammer came intoexistence.

The P-Hammer continues by including the specific performative and

evaluative tradition that Beethovens composition has brought about.

It includes all token performances intended to be of Beethovens 29th

piano (p.301) sonata, or more broadly, performances (and playbacks) that

stand in a chain of referential intentions reaching back to Beethovens

composition. It also includes representationsthoughts and words about

the Hammerklavierthat are grounded in causal chains reaching back

to Beethovens compositional actions.27The P-hammer is, then, a singletread in the still on-going musical tradition that includes all of Beethovens

compositions and the many performative and representational events

theyve spawned, as well as the vastly more numerous musical events that

comprise the on-going history of Western classical music.


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As Ive sketched them, P-works supervene upon particular actions, including

particular psychological and social events. So, to the extent that such action-

tokens are temporally bounded, then P-works are as well. And this means

that P-works come into existence somewhere in the compositional process,

and go out of existence when the causal effects of these compositional actscome to an endwhen the last performance has been played, the last score

has been burned, and no one thinks about the Hammerklavier any more.

A number of questions remain for a fleshed out account of tradition-threads,

but this sketch suffices for my purposes here.28Its time now to situate

shiftismto show how it allows us to maintain realism about musical works.

VIII. How to be a Realist about Musical Works

Ive argued that bound up in our concept of a musical work are two distinct

criteria of individuation, one musico-structural and the other provenancial.

And Ive also suggested that the relative force of the two criteria can shift

with judgmental setting. Usually the two criteria are harmlessly aligned.

But occasionallywhen we confront certain examples or when we ask

certain philosophical questions about musical worksthe criteria pull in

different (p.302) directions. When this happens, our concept doesnt yield a

determinate judgment about work individuation.

Ive also argued that this conceptual indeterminacy is no reason to abandon

realism about musical works. According to the metaphysics Ive sketched,

the world contains individuatively determinate entities (sound structuresand tradition-threads) that our work concept gets at, and responds to in a

fashion nicely modeled by supervaluationism. When the application of our

work concept is unsettled we can, if we wish, fully describe the situation in

terms of these individuatively determinate entities. But a general conceptual

revision or divorce is uncalled for. Not only would sharpening or abandoning

our work concept be inefficient, but something important would be lost. The

distinct criteria arise from a cluster of features that are bonded together in

a unified work concept for artistic and cultural reasonsby the way music is

thought about in practice, appreciation, and evaluation.29

However, even if one agrees with all this, one might still wonder whether the

view really honors realism about musical works. For one thing, there is not,

metaphysically considered, a unified kind of entity that answers to our work

concept. If there are metaphysical categories, then sound structures and

tradition-threads are surely to be sorted differentlyperhaps as abstracta

and concreta respectively. This on its own doesnt undermine realism, of


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course. A concept can be disjunctive in application without violating the

broadly realistic condition that it get relatively straightforwardly at entities

in the world. For example, we can competently apply the concept of jade

without realizing that it comprehends entities (jadeite and nephrite) that

are categorically distinct when considered from within a mineralogicalframework. And this small misfit between concept and reality isnt enough to

undermine realism about jade.

But my view posits a bigger misfit than this. It holds that in the normal

case, there are two entities that answer to our talk of one musical work.

And Ive argued that we cant construe a musical work, in the contextualist

way, as a concatenation of these two entities. Its surely surprising, then,

to learn (p.303) that when we count the thirty-two individual musical works

that comprise Beethovens complete piano sonatas, we traffic in sixty-four

distinct entities!

If Im right, our work concept involves a tacit semantic presupposition that

is falsenamely, that there is a realm of metaphysically unproblematic

entities that answer in a clean, one-one fashion to our talk and counting of

musical works. This presupposition might have arisen from a sort of tacit and

collective linguistic pretense. Its musically and culturally useful to making

certain work-wise distinctions among groups of performances and topics

of appreciation and evaluation. Speakers within a musical practice adopt or

simply inherit the practice of talking as if there are things to which these

groupings and topics answer in a one-one fashion. Individual such things

are given names which draw revealingly on both musical and provenancialfeatures. And a work concept and a surrounding discourse are quickly up and

running.

The false presupposition is never exposed by the normal conditions in

which the concept is applied. Most people never consider, and never need

to consider whether there is really one metaphysically coherent thing

that The Hammerklavier Sonata picks out. A philosopher might point out

that this musical work cant comfortably be identified with a score, with a

psychological idea in Beethovens head, with a class of performances, or with

any other prima facie plausible candidate; and she might note that musicalworks are philosophically strange in other ways besides. But the utility of

the practice is largely untouched, even if conceptually-minded composers

might stretch it by playing off the philosophy. In short, our work concept

continues to function perfectly well despite theorectical problems with the

presupposition.


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References

Bibliography references:

Cameron, R. (2008) There Are No Things that are Musical Works BritishJournal of Aesthetics48: 295314

Caplan, B. and Matheson, C. (2006) Defending Musical Perdurantism British

Journal of Aesthetics46(1): 5969

(2008) Defending Defending Musical Perdurantism British Journal of

Aesthetics48(1): 805

Currie, G. (1989)An Ontology of Art(New York: St Martins Press)

Davies, D. (2004)Art as Performance(Oxford: Blackwell)

Davies, S. (1997) John Cages 4 33Australasian Journal of Philosophy75:

44862

(2001) Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration

(New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press)

(2003) Themes in the Philosophy of Music(Oxford: Oxford University

Press)

(2007) Versions of Musical Works and Literary Translations in K. Stock(ed) Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning and Work(Oxford: Oxford

University Press)

(2008) Musical Works and Orchestral Colour British Journal of

Aesthetics48: 36375

Dodd, J. (2007) Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology(Oxford: Oxford

University Press)

Evans, G. (1984) Can There Be Vague Objects?Analysis: 38

Field, H. (1973) Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of ReferenceJournal

of Philosophy70: 46281

Goehr, L. (1992) The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the

Philosophy of Music(Oxford: Oxford University Press)


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Gracyk, T. (1996) Rhythm and NoiseAn Aesthetics of Rock(Durham, NC:

Duke University Press)

Kania, A. (2006) Making Tracks: The Ontology of Rock Music The Journal of

Aesthetics and Art Criticism64(4): 41014

(2008) The Methodology of Musical Ontology: Descriptivism and its

Implications British Journal of Aesthetics48(4): 42644

Kivy, P. (1983) Platonism in Music: a Kind of Defense Grazer Philosophische

Studien19: 10929

(p.306) Kivy, P. (1987) Platonism in Music: Another Kind of Defense

American Philosophical Quarterly24: 24552

Levinson, J. (1980) What a Musical Work IsJournal of Philosophy77: 528

(1990) What a Musical Work Is, Again in J. Levinson (ed) Music, Art, and

Metaphysics(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)

Lewis, D. (1996) Elusive KnowledgeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy

74(4): 54967

Mag Uidhir, Christy and Magnus, P.D. (2011) Art Concept Pluralism

Metaphilosophy42: 8397

Matheson, C. and Caplan, B. (2008) Modality, Individuation, and theOntology of Art Canadian Journal of Philosophy38(4): 491517

Moore, J. (1999) Misdisquoation and Substitutivity: When Not to Infer Belief

from Assent Mind108(430): 33566

(2008) A Modal Argument Against Vague Objects Philosophers Imprint

8(12): 117

Quine, W.V.O. (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays(New York:

Cornell University Press)

Rohrbaugh, G. (2003) Artworks as Historical Individuals European Journal of

Philosophy11(2): 177205

Salmon, N. (1982) Reference and Essence(Princeton: Princeton University

Press)


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Thomasson, A.L. (2005) The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism63(3): 2219

van Fraassen, B. (1969) Presuppositions, Supervaluations and Free Logic

in K. Lambert (ed) The Logical Way of Doing Things(New Haven: YaleUniversity Press)

Walton, K. (1970) Categories of Art Philosophical Review79: 33467

Wolterstorff, N. (1980) Worlds and Works of Art(Oxford: Clarendon Press)

Notes:

(*) For help with this chapter, I thank Bradley Armour-Garb, Richard

Beaudoin, Thomas Bennigson, Mark Crimmins, Stephen Davies, James

Harold, Christy Mag Uidhir, Stephen Maitzen, Lisa Moore, Margaret Moore,Robert Pasnau, Dave Robb, Nishi Shah, and Thomas Wartenberg, as well as

audiences at the University at Albany, the Eastern Division Meeting of the

American Society of Aesthetics, and the Philoso-Ski Conference in Boulder,

Colorado.

(1) The debate concerning musical works was notably sharpened by an

exchange between Jerrold Levinson and Peter Kivy begun in the 1980s. See

Kivy (1983, 1987) and Levinson (1980, 1990). For more recent discussion

see, for example, Davies (2001) and Dodd (2007).

(2) For my purposes, we can take sound structures to be abstract

rhythmically articulated sequences of sound types. However, see Davies

(2001, 2008), for a thorough discussion, and reasons why we might include

in sound structures not just timbre, but instrumentation. Ill say a good deal

more about provenance below.

(3) See 2001, p. 97. Although Davies is not out to define musical works, I

invoke his suggestion because I think it sensibly incorporates Levinsons

inclusion of performance-means, while relaxing the inclusion of individual,

as opposed to less restrictive general, bits of musico-historical context. (See

Levinson (1980) for this distinction.) Daviess proposal also incorporates,as Levinson eventually did (see 1990, p. 260), the normativity from

Wolterstroffs (1980) influential idea that musical works are best seen as

norm kinds.
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(4) A note on labels: I use structuralism even though neither Kivy nor

Dodd apply this label to their views. My use is meant to be neutral on the

disagreement, alluded to above, over whether sound structures should

incorporate such features as timbre, instrumentation, or performance-

means more generally. As Ive set things up, shiftism is technically a formof contextualism, since it incorporates provenance in somemanner in its

account of work identity. But in the interest of clean contrasts and clarity

Ill henceforth restrict contextualism to fine-grained conjunctive proposals

like those of Levinson and Davies. My taxonomy also leaves out the art-

historicist view of Rohrbaugh (2003) and the musical perdurantism of Caplan

and Matheson (see 2006, 2008). These views also individuate works by

context, perhaps at the expense of structure. I dont have space adequately

to incorporate these views here.

(5

) This example could be presented as a case of counterfactualdoppelgangers, though I see no significant difference, and some simplicity

of presentation in casting it as counterfactual comparison with the actual

Hammerklavier. This type of example has been widely considered, though

my version is essentially a poor mans version of Curries (1989, p. 62), with

Hawaii substituted for Twin Earth.

(6) This second type of example is much less common, though a notable

predecessor is Rohrbaugh (2003, p. 182).

(7) Whether Cages silent piece, 433, has any musical content at all is at

the heart of one interesting argument that itisnt a musicalwork. See Davies(1997).

(8) This possibility is proposed for photographs by Rohrbaugh (2003).

(9) For some of these examples and others, see Davies (2007).

(10) See Goehr (1992).

(11) unless Shostakovich had composed his symphony earlier; but then

Shostakovichs symphony wouldnt have had its characteristic wartime

theme, unless the war had happened earlierI riff here on Levinsons niceexample (1980, 1990, p. 71).

(12) For example, the debate about the role of instruments and performance-

means bears on the proper understanding of a works structural component.

And the question of how much of a works provenance is identity-
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view problematizes an application of the de re/de dictodistinction in this

realm, since our work concept traffics in two types of entities (as Ill argue

below).

(22) See S. Davies (2001, ch. 1), where the notion of the relative thicknessof a work is introduced, though I think this notion properly applies only

to a works structural component. And see D. Davies (2004, ch. 5) where

provenancial thickness (my expression) is claimed to be work-relative.

(23) In other areas of philosophy, these settings might be called judgmental

or conversational contexts; and a view that honored this type of variation

would be called contextualism. (See Moore 1999, pp. 347ff. for an

articulation of contextualism in this sense. And see Lewis (1996) for an

influential application of the view to knowledge reports.) But this usage

would be confusing in this debate where contextualism is already used to

pick out a dependence of musical works upon musico-historical surrounding.

(24) How much of this variability is due to a setting-dependent application

of the two criteria separately, and how much to a setting-dependent mixing

of the criteria? (How can we tell?) And how can we best allow this type of

setting-dependence without turning judgmental evaluation into a subjective

free-for-all?

(25) See, for example, Davies (2008). Questions about the exact nature

of sound structures strike me as reflections of looseness in our structural

criterion.

(26) Predecessors here might include Rohrbaugh (2003), as well as Caplan

and Matheson (2006, 2008), though I cant pursue here exactly how my

notion compares to theirs.

(27) My intent here is to capture the intuition that a work, even in its

provenancial sense, might be kept alive even if there were no more

performances (or playbacks) of it. This might be so, I think, if a culture

continued to think and write about the work, or the work continued to

influence the composition of other works. A plausible minimal condition

for the continued existence of P-works, suggested by Rohrbaughs 2003account of photographs, might be that there remains at least the potential

for performance.

(28) I investigate these in a follow-up manuscript Musical Works as Tradition-

Threads.
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(29) This commitment to the existence and utility of a unified work concept

rules my view out as a form of concept pluralism. Still, in allowing that our

core-concept binds together distinct conceptual strands, my view is a near

neighbor. Indeed, as far as I can see, shiftism about the individuation of

individual musical works is compatible with pluralism about the applicationconditions for our artwork concept(s). Christy Mag Uidhir and P.D. Magnus

plausibly defend such a view (2011).

(30) Thus, Kania distinguishes between the claim as made in descriptive

metaphysics and as made in real metaphysics (metaphysics of the

fundamental level), while Cameron distinguishes between the truth of this

sentence in English and the falsity of a homophonic sentence in Ontologese,

Englishs metaphysically more considered counterpart. Despite my sympathy

for these views, I worry that musical and philosophical discourse, especially

concerning such existence claims, doesnt always fall cleanly and discerniblyon just one side of some such linguistic-cum-semantic divide. And my

theory has the advantage of not requiring one. In any case, these fictionalist

views are driven by the desire to avoid the eternal existence of musical

works, while (as Ill observe in a movement) my view partially obviates this

motivation by allowing that the existence conditions for musical works are

indeterminate.

(31) The sharpening sound structures are sound structures is true while

the sharpening sound structures are tradition-threads is false. This result

that neither S-works nor P-works are determinately musical worksaccords

nicely, I think, with the philosophical view Ive tried to motivate. I shouldacknowledge, however, that not everything runs smoothly in this world

of supervaluations. For example, interpreted in a straightforward fashion

Musical works are individuatively determinate is determinately true; and

of course this seems to be precisely the claim Ive been arguing against!

However, its not implausible, I think, to give this sentence a meta-linguistic

reinterpretation. In fact, I suggest that the sentence really claims that talk of

an individual musical work univocally refers to a unique and individuatively

determinate entity. And the supervaluation account of our work concept

allows us to deny this claim.


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musical works a mashup

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