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Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action

Author(s): Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter OppSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 471-488Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1958269

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RATIONALCHOICEAND

REBELLIOUSCOLLECTIVEACTIONEDWARD N. MULLER

UniversityfArizona

KARL-DIETER PPUniversityamburg

A basicproblemfora rationalchoicetheory frebelliouscollectivection stoexplainwhy verage itizens ouldparticipaten uchbehavior,sincetheyhavenothing ogain theywillreceive enefitsfsuccessfulebellion,ntermsf public oods,regardlessfwhetherhey akepart rnot),butmuch o lose(rebelliousehaviormaybequite ostly). ccordingothe onventionalrivatenterestor by-productheory,he ncentiveoparticipate ust ome romhe xpectationfreceivingelective enefits;ut ince verage itizensna general asecannot xpectsubstantialrivatematerial ewards,herelevantelective enefits ustbe psycho-logical n nature.n contrasto themodel f privatenterestheory, public oodsmodel sproposed,tipulatinghat he alueofrebellionntermsfpublic oods an bea relevantncentiveor articipation.sing atafromurveysonductednNewYorkCity ndHamburg,WestGermany, e investigatehe elationshipetweenarticipa-tion nrebelliousolitical ehaviorndmeasuresfthe ncentivesfpublic oods ndprivatenterest.heresults o not upportredictionsftheprivatenterest odelnregardononmaterialelectivencentives.ypothesesf thepublic oods model resupported.

C onsider hefollowingituation:An individual, orwhatevereasons, olds verynegativeopinion of the political ystemunderwhichhe or sheis governed,nd thereexists n opportunityo participaten asocial movement hat seeks to effectpolitical hangeby meansof rebelliouscollectivection.This ndividuals facedwith decision etweenwo courses faction: aking art nrebelliousehavior,or staying t home whilewishing herebels well. Rational individualswillcompare he benefitsnd costs of par-ticipation ith thoseof inactivity,nd

choose he ourse f ction nwhich heirexpected tilitys maximized.

If rebelliousollective ction s stipu-lated y definitiono referobehaviorynonelites hat (1) deviatesfrom egalnormsregardingcceptableforms ofpolitical articipation,nd 2) hasbroadpolitical bjectives f changing overn-mental tructure,olicy,or personnel,then t canbe shownSalert, 976)that,under conventional ssumptions, herationalhoice f naverage itizennthegeneral ase is to be an inactive freerider, reapingthe public benefits frebelliousollectivection hould t be

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWVOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE,1986



1986 RebelliousCollectiveAction

to participaten rebelliouscollectiveaction.

In order o explainwhy t might e

rationalor n average itizeno take artin rebellious ollective ction, Olson(1971),Tullock1971), nd Silver1974)introducehefactor f selectivencen-tives:private ersonal ewardshat heindividualan expect o receive nlybyparticipating.lsonand Tullock mpha-size materialnducementsuch s powerand status ewards,s wellas financialgainresultingrom irect aymentsrlooting. ullock lso includesn enter-tainment motive-enjoyment f theadventurefrebelliousollectivectionfor ts ownsake.And Silver 1974,pp.64-65), in addition o privatematerialrewards,xpands ullock'sntertainmentmotive o include, nder herubric fpsychicncome, the ndividual'sense

of dutyto class, country, emocraticinstitutions,he aw,race,humanity,herulers, od, or a revolutionaryrother-hood as wellas histaste or onspiracy,violence, nd adventure. he privateinterestmodel of Olson, Tullock,andSilvermaybewrittens:

E(R)= E(M) + E(P) - E(Cr), (4)

where (M) is expected rivatematerialbenefitsromebelliousollectivection,andE(P)isexpectedrivatesychologicalbenefitsromuchbehavior.

Neither lsonnorTullock ttachmuch

causal significanceo theE(P) term nequation4).However,s Salert1976, .44) points ut, he roblem ith privateinterest heorywhich emphasizes heE(M) terms thatf n averagendividu-al's expectation f receivingmaterialbenefitss assumedto be reasonable,power and status ncentivesmustbeassumed obenegligible,eavingncomerewards s theprincipalrivatematerialbenefit. ut t is implausible priori o

postulate that most participants nrebelliousollectivection reeithermer-cenariesrelse retaking artn thehope

ofpersonalain romillagendplunder.This s whyMueller 1979,p. 146)con-cludes that the economictheoryof

revolutionasedonthe ndividualmaxi-mizingalculus eemsmuch etteruitedto explaininghecoup d'etat,where henumberf actors s small, heoddscal-culable, nd the stakes eeminglyarge,than it is at explaininggrass roots'revolutions.

The dilemma f theprivate nteresttheorysthatfE(M)andE(P)arenegligi-bleinthegeneralase,thenndividuallyrational, veragecitizenswill be freeriders. nd faverage itizenshoose obe free iders,henrebelliousollectiveactions likelyofail, esultingna con-tinuationf the tatus uo. Thuswhat sindividuallyrational is collectivelyirrational,ince ndividuals hoattachhigh ublic oodsvaluetorebelliousol-lectivection nd choose o free ide relikely oobtain lesspreferredutcomethan f they ll behave rrationallyndparticipate.

Itfollowshat ollectivelyationalndi-vidualsmight stimate i to be signifi-cantlygreater hanzero because theyrecognizehatfree idings collectivelyirrationaln the ase ofrebelliousollec-tive ction,where roup izeand cohe-sion anbea factorf riticalmportance.And fpicannot eassumed ecessaryobenegligible,hen hepublic oodsvalueofrebelliousollectivectionbecomes

relevant onsiderationn the decisioncalculus f rationalverage itizen.An alternativeayofreintroducinghe

public goods component,V, into arational hoicemodel s to stipulatenadditional term, erived rom ociallearningheory. andura1973,p. 206)states hatvicarious einforcement-per-ception fpositive utcomes ccruingoothers-isa powerfulource f motiva-tion, nd that observationalncentives

play n especiallymportantole n socialactivism,orherethe chances f quicksuccess repoor,butprotestehaviors

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AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 80

partlyustainedy the ong-rangettain-ments f groups hathaveperseveredntheir fforts. he individualesponding

tocontingenciesf vicarious roup ein-forcementanbe ikenedoa calculatingKantian orwhom, s Hardin1978,p.5) argues, the ssuewillnotbewhetherhe himself enefitsmorefromhis owncontributionhan he atterostshim asin Olson's ogic), utwhethere andthegroup of like-mindedctivists enefitmore romheir roup ctions han hoseactionscost. This introduceshepos-sibilityhat he nfluencef thegroup n

the rovisionfpublic oods, enotedg.mayplay role nthe ecisionalculus ywhich a rational individualchooseswhetheroparticipatenrebelliousollec-tive ction.

Returningo the simplebenefit-costmodelof equation 3), rejectionf theassumptionhat i = 0 and ntroductionof group nfluencen theprovision fpublicgoods,pg.resultsnthefollowingspecification:

E(R) = (pn+ Pg+ pi)V E(Cr) (5)

E(I) = pnV. (5a)

Accordingo utilityheory, occurs fE(R) is greater han E(I); that is, if[E(R) - E(I)] > 0. If E(R) - E(I) isreplaced ytheright-handidesofequa-tions5) and 5a),weobtain

[(pn+ Pg+ pi)V - pnV-E(Cr)] > O.

(6)Solvinghebrackets, eobtain

[pnV pgV+ piV - pnV E(Cr)]> 0. (7)

SincepnVs rrelevant,eget s a condi-tion or erforming

[(pg pi)V-E(Cr)] > 0. (8)

Thus,thehigherhevalueof pg+ pi)Vandthe ower he alueofE(Cr), hemoreoften isexpectedooccur n a popula-

tion.This s a modelfor publicgoodstheoryfrebelliousollectivection.

Now etus expand hemodel o nclude

selectivencentives.We assume hatforaverage citizens n the generalcase,expected rivatematerialenefits,(M),are negligible.his leaves expected ri-vate psychological enefits.Tullock'sentertainmentotive s one example fintrinsicpsychological gratificationderived rom ebelliousollectivection.Silver'shoppingist f psychicncomeis essentiallyresidualactorhat ncom-passes anythingonceivablyntangible.

We focusmore pecificallyn a classofsoft nonmaterialelective ncentives

that ntail ocial ewardsseeOpp,1986).In particular,ndividualsmay expect oreceive 1) affiliationewards uch asmeetingewfriendsndfeelingolidaritywith group,nd 2) psychologicalrati-ficationrom onformingo the xpecta-tions freferenceersonsbouthowtheyshouldbehave, fsuchexpectationsresubjectivelymportant.he fullmodel,includingublicgoods andsoft electiveincentives aybe writtens

E(R) = (pg+ pi)V+ E(F) + E(A)+ E(O) - E(Cr), (9)

where (F) is the xpectedntertainmentor fun alue of participationn rebel-lious collective action; E(A) is theexpectedocial affiliationalue ofpar-ticipation;ndE(O) is the xpectedalue

of conformingo behavioralnormsofimportantthers.

ResearchDesign

Empiricalvaluationfrational hoicemodels of rebellious ollective ctionrequires research esignn which heindividuals theunit fanalysis. xperi-mentation ndercontrolled aboratory

conditions ouldbe themost ppropriatemethod for testingrational choicehypotheses,ut,since rebelliousollec-

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tive ction s illegal ndmay nvolve heuseofviolence,nexperimentalesignsnotfeasibleueto problemsfverisimili-tudeand ethical onstraints.hus therealisticlternativesreeitheroengagein armchairpeculationsing necdotalevidencee.g.,Tullock, 971),or to testhypothesesymeans fsurveyesearch.

Thedisadvantagef surveyesearchsthat he ontextfparticularhoice itua-tionss uncontrolled.n nterviewched-ule can be designed o collectdata onrespondents'urrentssessmentsf thevalue of public goods, theircurrentestimationf ndividualndgroupnflu-ence on theprovision f publicgoods,theirurrentxpectationfreceivingoftrewardsromebelliousollectivection,andtheir urrentxpectationfthe ostof suchbehavior.However,t mustbeassumedhat hevalues ndexpectationsmeasuredt the ime f the nterviewreapplicable o past behavioral ecisionsand futureecision otentials,egardless

of variationn thecontextf the hoicesituation.his sa well-knownndmuch-debated generalproblem nherent osurvey research on the relationshipbetweenattitudes nd behavior,forwhich here s no satisfactoryolution.Therefore,while acknowledginghatsurvey-basedestsof the relationshipbetweenttitudesnd behavior ever anbedecisive,uetotheproblemfuncon-trolled ituational actors,we use the

surveymethodnthe roundshat,ntheabsenceof a more feasible lternative,survey evidence is better than noevidence.

Assuminghat ne doesnotreject hesurveymethod er e,the tudy frebel-lious ollectivection ymeans f urveyresearchtillmustovercome wobasicobstacles. irsts theproblem f varia-tion.Acts frebelliousolitical ehaviorare rareeventsn societies otactually

undergoing mass rebellion,yet thepopulationhosen or he urveymust eone in which rebellious ehaviorhas

occurredwith sufficientrequencyopermit tatisticalnalysis.Second,theenvironmentf the surveymust beconduciveofree xpression.

The structuralonditionmost con-duciveto freedomf expressions thepresencef democraticoliticalystem.The frequencyf rebellious ollectiveaction as been omparativelyow,how-ever,nmost ontemporaryemocracies.If one is effectivelyestrictedo demo-cratic ations,heUnitedtates ndWestGermanyreappropriateites ecause ftherelativelyighevels f political ro-test hat ccurredntheformerountryfrom hemid-1960sntil hemid-1970s,and in the atter ountryrom he ate1960s,withebbs and flows,untilthepresent.

Appropriatepopulations to studywithinheUnited tates re residentsfurbanareas, especially onwhites,ndstudentsnd facultytlargeuniversities.Thegeneral ublic fNewYorkCity nd

studentsndfacultytColumbianiver-

sityand New York UniversityNYU)were onsideredobe suitablenstancesfcitynd campus ecause ftheir asthis-tory fcomparativelyrequentoliticalprotest.Our American ata werecol-lected yResponse nalysis orporationof Princeton,New Jersey, surveyresearchirmwith xpertisendesigningand implementingurveys n sensitivetopics e.g., druguse, violence n the

home).During he pringndsummerf1978personalnterviewsere onductedwith probabilityample f778adultsresidingn the ive oroughsfNewYorkCity;1also, a random ampleof 240undergraduates,raduate tudents,ndfacultyn theCollegeofLiberalArts tColumbia nd NYU completed super-vised, self-administeredersionof thesamequestionnairenMay andJune fthatyear (forcomplete etailsof the

sampling rocedureee Muller,Jukam,andSeligson,982).In theFederal epublicfGermanyn

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appropriateroup ostudys opponentsofnuclear ower.Especially ince1974,numerousegal nd llegal rotestctionshave occurredgainst articulartomicpower tationsndagainstheutilizationofnuclearnergyngeneral.

We expectedopponentsof nuclearpower o ivemainlyn arge itiesnd nthe icinityf tomic ower tations. hesamplingites elected ere imsbiittel,districtfHamburg heremany ounter-culture eoplereside, ndGeesthacht,small own earHamburg ithnatomicpower station n theneighborhood.randomsample was

drawn from thepopulationsf the two ocations. ftherespondentxpressed positive eneralattitudeoward uclearnergy,nly er-sonal background ata were collected.Full nterviewsere onducted ith 87opponentsfnuclear nergy, howereasked to give addresses f other ppo-nents fnuclear ower.The additionalsnowballample onsistedf211respon-dents.Differencesetween he random

and snowball ampleswith espectothedemographic characteristicsof therespondentserenot ufficientlyarge owarranteparate nalysesfor ompletedetails fthe ampling rocedurend theanalysesfthe ubsampleseeOppet l.,1984).

The Hamburg interviewsN=398)were onductedy tudentsromheUni-versityfHamburgwho werecarefullytrained.o test or he xistencef gree-

mentbias, each variableused in thefollowingnalysiswas correlated ithsocialdesirabilitycale.Bivariateorrela-tionswere llwithinherange f ?.10.Also, no significantorrelations erefoundbetween ropertiesf the inter-viewers e.g., gender, ttitude owardnuclearenergy) nd responses f theinterviewees.

Measurementf theDependent ariable:

Rebellious ollective ctionThe conceptof rebellious ollective

action ntails ctsofaggressiveoliticalparticipationsee Muller, 979,pp.4-7).Aggressiveolitical articipationn theNewYorkCity tudysmeasuredollow-ing a procedure evelopedby Muller(1979, pp. 37-68). Respondents erequestionedbout their astperformanceof ndfuturententionoperformseriesofbehaviors,egalandillegal, escribedas actionshat eoplemay ake oaccom-plish heir olitical oalsand objectives.2The setofaggressiveehaviorsncludes(1)participatingn an unofficialr wild-cat strike,2) participatingn a group

that efusesopay taxes,3) seizing ac-tories,ffices,r other uildings,4)par-ticipatingn fights ithpoliceor otherdemonstrators,5) participatingn agroup hatwants o overthrowhegov-ernmentyviolentmeans.A compositeAggressivearticipationotential cale(Rp) was constructedy summingar-ticipation eightedy intentioncrossthefive ehaviors.3 simpleAggressiveBehaviorndex Rb) is the sum of the

numberof aggressivebehaviorsper-formedn thepastby the espondent.The correlation etweenAggressive

Participationotential nd AggressiveBehaviors r = .72.Weightingarticipa-tionby intentionhusproduces some-whatdifferenteasurehan he ndex fpastparticipation.he principal iffer-ence s that omerespondents ho havenotpreviouslyakenpart n aggressiveactivityxpressntentionoperformne

ormoreofthebehaviorsn thefuture,and manyof theserespondentseceiveintermediatecoreson Aggressive ar-ticipation otential, espitetheir eroscore nAggressiveehavior.

Therange f theAggressivearticipa-tion otentialcale s0-21,4with meanof2.2 and a standard eviationf2.7.Thirty-threeercent f the respondentsscore zero on Aggressive articipationPotential.ncomparison,he ange fthe

Aggressiveehavior ndex s only0-4,and fully87.6% of the respondentsreceive scoreof zeroon thisvariable.

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Because of the restricted ange andextremekewness f the indexof pastbehavior, xplanatoryariables an beexpected,eterisaribus,o correlateessstronglyith t thanwith hemeasurefparticipation otential.However,thepattern f relationshipshouldnot beaffected.nclusionf both ndicatorsfrebelliousollectivection hus ffordsuseful onsistencyheckn the estingfhypotheses.n particular, hypothesisthat olds or heprospective easurefaggressivearticipationotentialt the

timeof the interview,ut not forthe

retrospectivendex fpreviousggressiveparticipation,illbe suspectn regardoitsvaliditys a causal xplanation.

In theHamburgurveyhe eferentsfaggressivearticipationre 1) participa-tionin a demonstrationhich s for-bidden,2) engagingn resistancefthepolice ttack emonstrators,3) breakingthrougharricadesnd the ikeduringdemonstrations,4) paintingslogans

againstnuclearplantsand the like onwalls ofhouses, 5) participationn anoccupation f a constructionite fornuclearpowerplants, 6) attacks ndsabotage gainstnuclearpowerplants,and 7) attacksnindividualsesponsiblefor the constructionf nuclearpowerplants.AggressivearticipationotentialandAggressiveehavior ariableswereconstructedccordingo thesamepro-cedure s that sed n theNewYorkCity

study.5 he correlationetween ggres-siveParticipationotential nd Aggres-sive Behaviorn the Hamburg tudy sr = .88.

MeasurementftheIndependentariables

The Hamburg interview chedule,designedn 1981 and administeredn1982,contains morecompleteet of

measures f the independentariablesthan the New York City interviewschedule. heNewYorkCity nterview

schedules imitedo an ndirectndicatorofpi,the nfluencefthe ndividualntheprovisionf publicgoods;andmea-sures fpg.the nfluencefthegroup ntheprovisionfpublic oods, ndV,thepublic oodsvalueofrebelliousollectiveaction.The HamburgnterviewcheduleincludesmeasuresfpiandV,as well smeasuresfE(F),the ntertainmentalueof rebelliousollectivection,E(A), thesocial ffiliationenefitf uch ehavior,E(O), the enefitfconformingobehav-ioral normsof importantthers, nd

E(Cr),thecostsof performingebellious

collectivection.

The publicgoods value of rebelliouscollectivection.A personwho sproudandrespectfulf thepoliticalnstitutionsunderwhichhe or she s governed,ndwhobelieveshat heyperateopromotejustice nd protect hebasic rights fcitizens,wouldbe unlikelyo consideractsofrebelliousehaviors beingn the

public interest-indeed,uch a

loyalcitizenwouldbe likely oregardhangeresultingrom ebellious ehavior s apublicbad. By ontrast,person ho sfundamentallylienatedrom he xistinggovernmentnd political institutionswould e ikelyoregardhange esultingfromebelliousehaviors a public ood.Thusa very asic ndicatorf thepublicgoodsvalueofrebelliousollectivectionis theextent o which n individuals

hostile o or alienated romhepoliticalsystemngeneral.n addition,or ppo-nents fnuclear ower, heutilizationfnuclearnergys a public adand essorno utilizationsa public ood.

In theNew York Cityand Hamburgsurveys,n indicatorfthepublic oodsvalue of rebellion, denoted Vs, ismeasured yresponsesoa series fques-tions about the extent o whichtheindividualupportshepoliticalystem.6

In theHamburgurvey,n indicatorfthe xtentowhich he xistingtilizationof nuclear nergys consideredo be a

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 80

publicbad, denotedVt, s measured yyes-no esponsesostatementsuch s Ipersonallyfeel threatened y atomic

power stations nd to be sure, amagainst tomicpower tations, ut theyreally o not oncernme thatmuch. 7

Perceivednfluencen the provision fpublicgoods.Respondentsn the Ham-burg urvey ere resentedith batteryofquestions esignedo measure hepiterm,perceived nfluence f the indi-vidualon theprovision f publicgoods,that ncludedtems uch s Afterll, t s

superfluoushat am active gainst heconstructionf atomic power stationsbecause havenoinfluence,nd Every-one whois active gainst tomic owerstationsmakes a small contribution. 8ThePersonalnfluencecale,with rangeof 0-1, has a mean of .73; thus,theaverage espondentntheHamburgtudyestimateshathe or shehas considerablepersonal nfluence n theprovision fpublic oods.

TheNew YorkCity nterviewcheduledid not nclude directmeasure f theperceivednfluencef the ndividual nthe provision f public goods. As anindirectndicatorfpiwe used questionthat measures erceived mportancefparticipationngeneral,denotedpi*.9Weassume hatndividuallyational espon-dentswill tend o believe hat articipa-tion ypeople ike hemselvessunimpor-tant ecause heparticipationf a single

personmakes ittle rnodifferencentheprobability f thesuccessof collectivepolitical ehavior, xceptn the case ofvery small groups. By contrast,weassume hat ollectivelyational espon-dents,whoarecognizantfthedilemmaarisingfrom ndividuallyationalfreeriding, ill end o believe hat articipa-tionby people ikethemselvess indeedimportant.he meanof the mportanceofParticipationariable s .65on a scaleof0-1.

The nfluencef he roup nthe rovi-

sion of public goods-the pg term-ismeasuredntheNewYorkCity urvey ya question bout he xtentowhich issi-

dent roups re perceivedo havehelpedor hurt heir ause by engagingnrebel-lious collectiveaction. Six rebelliousactions were evaluated in regard towhetherhey a) haddefinitelyelpedhecause of thegroups nvolved, b) hadhelped the cause somewhat, c) hadneither elped orhurthe ause, d)hadhurt he ause omewhat,r e) definitelyhad hurt the cause.'0 The EfficacyfGroupAggressioncaleconstructedrom

thesetems, hen ransformedo a rangeof0-1,has a mean f 25.Thus, he ver-age NewYorkCity espondentstimatesthat ggressiveacticsydissidentroupsin thepasthavenotenhancedheprovi-sionofpublic oods.

The entertainmentotive.The F termis measured y three temswithwhichrespondentouldmore r less agree: 1)If protest gainst he constructionf

atomic ower tations,his ctivitys funforme ; 2) althougham an opponentof nuclearenergy, find t somehowunpleasant eing active against tomicpower tations ;nd (3) I feel nhibitedto show that am against tomic owerstations. A factor nalysis principalcomponents) eveals unidimensionality(thefirstomponentxplains 0% ofthevariance).We didnot eek o determinesubjective robabilityf receivingnter-

tainment from rebellious behaviorbecause we assumed thatrespondentsalready nowwith ertainty hat nter-tainment alue such behaviorhas forthem.

Behavioralnorms f importantthers.Measurementf theE(O) termntailedcomplex procedure.Respondents irstwere asked to statewhatmostpeoplewhose pinions importanto themlikefriends nd relatives) hink bout theirparticipationn the anti-nuclear ove-

478




ment.The possible esponseswere thatsuchpeople 1) consider articipationnthemovemento berather ood positive

referenceersons);2) considerarticipa-tion n the movemento be rather ad(negativeeferenceersons); 3) holddif-feringpinionsmixed eferenceersons);and (4) are indifferent.espondentschoosinghepositive r negativeptionswere skedhow mportanthe pinionsfthe referenceersons re, using five-point calerangingrom doesnotmatteratall to matterserymuch. heywerethen skedto statewhether,mong hepersonswhose opinions re important,there re lso persons hohold he ppo-siteopinion.f theresponseo this ues-tion was affirmative,he importancequestionwas repeatednregardorefer-encepersons ith he pposite pinion.frespondentshose the optionof mixedreferenceersons heywere asked howmuch hey are aboutconformingo theopinion f each ofthetwo setsof refer-encepersonspositivendnegative).

From the answers o thisbattery fquestions e constructedscale measur-ing theutility f following heexpecta-tions f mportanttherswith egardobeing ctive.Forrespondentsndicatingonly referencepersons who expectactivitypositive thers), hemore heseexpectationsatteredo them,hehighertheircoreswere. or espondentsndicat-ing onlyreferenceersonswho expectinactivitynegativethers), he esstheseopinionsmattered,hehigherheircoreswere. If respondentsndicatedmixedexpectations,e firstssignedcores orfollowing he expectationsf positivereferenceersons,nd then or ollowingthe xpectationsfnegativeeferenceer-sons; themorerespondentsared boutfollowing xpectationsf beingactive,and the essthey aredabout followingexpectationsfbeingnactive,hehigher

their coreswere.The second corewasthen ubtractedrom hefirstcore.Finally,we weighted he utility f

following he expectationsf importantothersby the respondent'subjectiveprobabilityhat the referenceersons

hold he erceivedxpectations.hiswasdeterminedyasking ow ertain espon-dentswere in regardofive ategoriesfcertaintycored , .25, .5, .75,and 1.0)that he eferenceersonsn questionrepositive, egative, oldmixed pinions,or are ndifferent.

Social affiliationewards nd costs ofrebellious ollectivection.Respondentswere presentedwith a list containingsevenpositive eactionsndsevennega-tive eactionsf other ersons r nstitu-tionsthatmightbe incentives r dis-incentives orparticipationn the anti-nuclearmovement.hepositiveanctionsentailedocialrewardsuchas receivingsocialapproval rom ther pponentsfnuclear power, feeling olidaritywithother pponentsfnuclear ower, ndgettingo know nterestingeople.Thenegativeanctions ntailed osts uchasbeing abeled leftist r crazy, einginjured y the police,and Berufsverbot(prohibition romemploymentn thepublic ector).Respondentsere sked,for achof the 4sanctions,irsto eval-uatethem n a five-pointcaleofverybad tovery ood, cored rom 1 to +1;and second, o state he ikelihoodhattheywould occur usingthefive-pointcertaintycale mentioned bove). Theutilityf each sanction henwas multi-pliedbythe ubjectiverobabilityf tsoccurrence.

A factor nalysis principal ompo-nents) f the xpectedtilitiesfpositiveandnegativeanctions ielded our ac-torswith igenvaluesreaterhan .Mostofthe ositiveanctionsoadedhighlynthefirst actorndmost fthenegativesanctionsoadedhighlynthe econd ac-tor. Another actor nalysiswas per-

formed,imitinghenumberffactorso

two.Under his onstraintll oftheposi-tive anctionsoadedon the first actor

479




and all ofthenegative anctionsoadedon the econd actor. n Expected tilityof Positive anctionscale,the ndicator

of theE(A) term,was constructedromthe actorcores fthe irstactor,nd nExpectedUtility f Negative anctionsscale, he ndicatorftheE(Cr) erm, asconstructedromhefactorcores fthesecond actor. hesevariablesre stand-ardized o havea mean f 0 anda stand-ard deviation f 1. Sincemostrespon-dents ssign positive tilityopositivesanctionsi.e., socialrewards),coresnthehigh ange f theExpected tilityf

Positive anctions cale indicate sub-jective robabilityhat ositiveanctionsare ikely ooccur,whereascoresn thelowrangendicate subjectiverobabil-ity hat ositiveanctionsreunlikelyooccur. By contrast,most respondentsassign negativetilityonegativeanc-tions i.e., costs), o high cores n theExpectedUtility f Negative anctionsscale whichremostlyround )indicatea subjectiveprobabilityhat negativesanctionsreunlikelyo occur,whereaslow scoreswhichrenegative)ndicatesubjectiverobabilityhatnegativeanc-tionsre ikelyo occur. hus t hould ekeptnmind hatfnegativeanctionsrea disincentiveorperformancef rebel-liouspolitical ehavior,herehould e apositiveorrelationetweenheExpectedUtilityfNegativeanctionscale ndtheAggressive articipationotential ndAggressiveehavior ariables.

Results

The privatenterest odelpredictslackof ssociationetweenebelliousol-lective ction nd itspublicgoodsvaluebecause of individually ationalfreeriding.Peoplewho attachhighpublicgoodsvalue o rebelliousollectivectionare expected o realizethattheywill

receivethe publicgoods of successfulrebellionegardlessf whetherhey ar-ticipaternot;therefore,heyhould e

no more ikely oscorehigh n ndicatorsofR thanpeoplewho attach owpublicgoods value to rebelliouscollective

action.The public oodsmodel llowsfor hepossibilitythat group rather thanindividualnfluencen theprovisionfpublic oodsmay e a relevantactornarational itizen's ecision alculus, ndthat ollectivelyational ndividualslsomay estimatendividualnfluenceo benon-negligible ecause they believeindividuallyationally reeridingwillreduce he ikelihoodfsuccess.Empir-

ically, he xpectationfthe ublic oodsmodel s to observenontrivialorrela-tions etween andVas weightedyPiand/or g;moreover, eighting bypiand/or gshould mprove he orrelationincomparisonoV alone.

Thepredictionsf theprivate nterestand public goods theorieswere testedacross four ubpopulationsf the NewYorkCity urvey:whites nd nonwhitesfrom hegeneral ublic nd from he ni-versities.We controlled or these ub-populations n order to determinefresults old across ndividuals ho (1)have differingbjectivesocial back-groundharacteristicswhite ersus on-white), nd (2) reside n differingom-munity ontextsgeneral ublicversusuniversity)hatmightemore r ess on-ducive orebelliousollectivection.

Correlations etween he two indica-tors of rebelliousollectivection,theAggressivearticipationotentialcale,denoted p,and theAggressiveehaviorindex, enoted b,and thepublicgoodscomponent ariables ndproduct ermsare isted n Table1.11Comparisonfthefourth owwith hefirst ow hows hatthe orrelationsetweenpg+ pi*)V,ndRpandRbexceed hose etween 5 ndRpand Rb in every ase except hatofRbamongwhites n theuniversityontext,

where he orrelationsunchanged.incePi*, the Importance f Participationvariable,s only n indirectndicator f

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Table1. Correlationsetween ebellious ollective ction nd 1)The PublicGoodsValueofRebellionnd 2) nfluencenProvision fPublicGoods:

New YorkCity ample

General ublic University

Whites Nonwhites Whites Nonwhites

Aggressive Aggressive Aggressive AggressiveParticipa- ggressive Participa- ggressive Participa- ggressive Participa- ggressive

tion Behavior tion Behavior tion Behavior tion BehaviorPotential Index Potential Index Potential Index Potential Index

Scales (RP) (Rb) (RP) (Rb) (RP) (Rb) (RP) (Rb)

Politicalupport/Alienation Vs: .36 .24 .40 .19 .40 .26 .72 .63

ImportancefParticipation Pi*: .10 .02* .13 .10 .08* .05* .46 .32

EfficacyfGroupAggression Pg: .31 .21 .17 .06* .46 .20 .18* .08*

Producterms(pg+ pi*)Vs: .38 .26 .46 .24 .44 .26 .77 .66

pgVs: .39 .30 .42 .26 .45 .26 .65 .52

NumberfCases 349 361 316 327 202 207 23 24

*Not ignificantt the 05 evel for able ntries).

individualnfluencen theprovisionfpublicgoods, the fifth ow gives theproduct erm orgroup nfluencenly.Comparisonfthe ifthowwith he irstrow hows hat or he eneralublic ndforwhitesn theuniversityontext,hecorrelationsetweengVs ndRpandRbexceed hose etween ,andRpandRb nevery aseexcept ne,Rbamongwhitesntheuniversityontext, here he orrela-tion is unchanged. or the smallsub-sampleof nonwhitesn theuniversitycontext, eighting

,by

pgreduces he

correlationith pandRb. n sum,n inewith he pecificationf thepublic oodsmodel,weightinghepublicgoodsvalueof rebellious ollective ction by indi-vidual nd groupnfluencen theprovi-sionofpublicgoodsresultsn nontrivialcorrelationsith ndicatorsfparticipa-tion in rebelliousbehavior;and themagnitudefthese orrelationssusuallygreaterthan that observed for the

unweightedublic oodsvalue, findingconsistent ith general ational hoicetheory.

The results rom heHamburgurveyare presentedn Table2, wherewe havetwopublicgoodsvariables, ,andV ,12and a directmeasure f thepiterm. hecorrelationsetween he publicgoodsvariablesndthe ndicatorsf rebelliouscollectivection renontrivialnd, s thepublic oodsmodel pecifies, ultiplyingthepublicgoodsvariables y perceivedindividualnfluencen provisionf thepublicgoodsagain raises hemagnitudeof the orrelations.

The predictionsf thepublicgoodstheory thus are supported cross-nationally s well as acrosssubpopula-tions fNewYorkCity.Weightinghepublic oodsvalueofrebelliousollectiveaction by perceivedndividual nd/orgroupnfluencen the rovisionfpublicgoods enhances consistentlyut notdramatically)hecorrelationsithcur-rentpotential or performingebelliouscollectivectionand pastperformance.This result s in accordancewithanexpected tilitymodelofdecisionmak-ing,and lends mpiricalupport o our

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AmericanPolitical ScienceReview Vol. 80

Table 2. Correlationsetween ebellious ollective ction nd(1) The PublicGoodsValue of Rebellion nd 2) nfluencen Provision f

PublicGoods: Hamburg ample

Aggressive AggressiveParticipation Behavior

Scales PotentialRP) IndexRb)

Political upport/Alienation, Vs .47 .43Discontent ith uclear nergy, Xn4: .33 .29Personalnfluence, Pi: .27 .23ProductTerms, piVs: .49 .45

Pi~n: .39 .35

Number f Cases 398 398

contentionhat heres ndeed p insuchparticipation.3

The dataofTables1 and2 indicatehatpublic oods re n ncentiveor erform-ingrebelliousolitical ehavior. owweturn o thequestion f whetherelectivesoft ncentivesnd expectedosts lso aredeterminantsf such behavior. n thisregard e focused n the ollowingelec-tive ncentives:, intrinsicsychologicalgratificationerived rom ebelliousol-lective ction ecause t s fun ; (O), theexpected eward fperformingebelliousbehavior ecause t conformso behav-ioral norms f importanteferenceer-sons; ndE(A), expectedocial ffiliationbenefitsfrebellious ehaviorpositivelyvalued reactions f thesocial environ-ment).We also take nto ccount hedis-incentivef E(Cr),theexpected alueofcosts negativelyaluedreactionsfthesocial nvironment,speciallyhe olice).SincetheNew YorkCity urvey id notincludemeasures f selectivencentivesand costs,we use only data from heHamburg urvey.

The firstquation fTable 3 shows heordinaryeast quares OLS) regressionfcurrent otential orperformingebel-lious politicalbehavior gainst 1) thepublicgoodsvariables,2) the ndicators

of soft electivencentives,nd (3) theexpectedutility f negative anctions(costs).As anticipatedrom hebivariate

correlations,hepublicgoods variables,p1V, ndpiV,,are estimatedo havesig-nificant ositive effects n Rp. Withrespect o selectivencentives,heenter-tainment alue of rebellious ollectiveaction, ,and expectedositive anctionsin theform f social affiliationewards,E(A),are tatisticallyonsignificant;nlythe expectedvalue of conformingobehavioralnormsof importantthers,E(O), shows a small (in terms f thestandardizedoefficient)ut statisticallysignificant ffect.Surprisingly, heexpectedutility f negative anctions,E(Cr), s estimatedo have a significantnegativenstead f positive ffect.incecosts enerallyrenegativelyalued, hismeans hat espondentsho ttach rela-tively igh robabilityo theoccurrenceofnegativeanctionsresomewhatmorelikely o have a high ebellious ehaviorpotentialhanthosewho attach lowprobabilityo theoccurrencef negativesanctions.

When the explanatoryariables recompared n regardto theirrelativeimportance,hedominant redictorfpotential for performing ebelliouspoliticalbehavior s the public goodsvalueof rebellions indexed y general-ized hostilityoward hepolitical ystem

weightedy perceivedersonalnfluence

on theprovision fpublicgoods.Thisalsois the ase nregardo the quations

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Table3. Rebellious ollective ctionRegressed gainstRational hoiceVariables: amburgurvey

Equations Intercept PiVn PMVs F E(O) E(A) E(Cr)

(3.1) Rp= 5.24 0.70* 0.02** 1.02 2.90* 0.25 -1.22**(2.26)a (5.00) (0.80) (2.15) (0.57) (-3.13)

R2=.28 0.12b 0.31 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.14

(3.2) Rb= -0.45 0.07 0.003** -0.01 0.29 0.08 -0.11A (1.75) (5.00) (-0.05) (1.47) (1.33) (-1.89)R2=.22 0.09 0.32 0.00 0.07 0.07 -0.09

(3.2a) Rb= -0.54 0.09* 0.003** -0.12*(2.09) (6.25) (-2.05)

R2=.21 0.12 0.35 -0.09

Number fcases 398

Note: Rp: AggressivearticipationotentialRb: AggressiveehaviorVn: Discontent ithNuclear nergyVs: Politicalupport/Alienationpi: PersonalnfluenceF: Entertainmentalue

E(O): Expected ehavioral orms f mportantthersE(A): ExpectedocialAffiliationewardspositiveanctions)E(Cr): Expectedosts negativeanctions)

at-rationparentheses.bStandardizedegressionoefficientsn talics.

*p< .05**p < .01

forpastperformancefrebelliousolit-icalbehavior,b,where he tandardizedregressionoefficientsfp1V,re 32and.35, a magnitudeimilar o theestimateobtained or utureerformancenequa-tion 3.1). Indeed, nequation3.2),

pV,is the nly tatisticallyignificantxplan-atory ariable. he ndicatorsfpiV, ndE(Cr) are of borderlineignificancenequation 3.2), however,nd whenthenonsignificantoftselective ncentivesvariables retrimmedromhe redictionequation, 3.2a) shows thatp1V,andE(Cr) chieve ignificancetthe 05 evel,althoughhestandardizedoefficientfE(Cr) sof rivialmagnitudeless han 1).Thus the

multivariatenalysis showsthat,ncontrastoconventionalationalchoicemodelsof rebellion,hepublic

goodsvariables, otselectivencentives,appearto be themost mportantncen-tivesforperformingebellious oliticalbehavior.xpectedosts o not ppear obea disincentive,ndtheymay venhavesomeweak incentivealue. This latterresults inconsistentith ationalhoicetheoryngeneral.

Conclusion

A fundamentalroblemor rationalchoice theoryof rebellious ollectiveaction s toexplainwhy verage itizensmight choose to take part in suchbehavior. ccordingotheprivatenter-

esttheoryfcollectivection ngeneral,formulatedyOlson 1971) and appliedspecificallyothe ase ofpoliticallyebel-

483




lious behaviorby Tullock 1971), thepublic oodsvalueofrebellionannot ean incentiveoparticipateecause ffreeriding. onsequently,heprivatenteresttheoryredicts hat herational veragecitizenwillparticipatenly fcoerced odo so or ifprivatematerial ewards reoffered,uchas direct aymentrpro-ceeds of looting. The coercion andmaterial ainfactors, owever, an beincentivesor verage itizens nly nderspecial ircumstances,uch swhen dis-sidentroup lreadyssufficientlyower-ful o controlerritoryr when ebelliouscollectivectiontakesthe form f landseizures.

The dilemma f the private nteresttheorynregard o behavior faveragecitizenss recognizedxplicitlyy Salert(1976, p. 49), who concludes hat theproblemwith his heory tems rom tsrelative eglectfpsychologicalactorsrfrom he conception f rationality nwhicht sbased,orboth. nthis aperwe pursue hetwo inesof nvestigationsuggestedy Salert sways fdevelopinga rationalchoice theory f rebellion:modificationf core assumptions ndmore recisepecificationfthenaturefpsychologicalncentives.

In contrast o the private nteresttheory, e assume hat verage itizensmay adopt a collectivistonceptionfrationalityecausetheyrecognize hatwhat is individuallyational s collec-tivelyrrational-thatf

peopleike hem-

selves were individually ationalfreeriders, he likelihood f thesuccessofrebelliousollectivectionwouldbeverysmall,ndthat,herefore,t scollectivelyrationalor lltoparticipate,ven houghtheobjective robabilityfa singlendi-vidual nfluencinghe outcome s negli-gible. Thus we reject ne of thecoreassumptionsf he rivatenterestheory,namely, hatthepublicgoodsvalue of

rebellious ollective ction necessarilydropsoutof an average itizen's tilitycalculus. 4

Accordingo ourmodel fora publicgoods theory,wo perceivednfluencevariablesre tipulatedsrelevant:1)the

subjectiverobabilityf ndividualnflu-enceon the provision fpublicgoods,and (2) the nfluencef thegroup s anundifferentiatedhole. nregardpecific-allyto the atter,we postulate hat heperceivednfluencef thegroupas awholewillbe a functionfobservationfthe uccess r failuref dissidentroupsin the past: if dissidentroups reper-ceived ohavebeengenerallyuccessful,thenperceived roup nfluence n theprovisionfpublic oodswillbe high; fdissident roups re perceived o havebeengenerallynsuccessfuln the past,thenperceived roup nfluencen theprovisionfpublic oodswillbe low.

Postulationfrelevanterceivednflu-encevariables llowsus to introducehemultiplicativenteractionf nfluencendpublic oods ncentivento model f naverage itizen's ecision alculus.Withrespect o operational efinitionf thepublicgoods ncentive, e expect hat twillbe a functionn general erms facitizen'sverall valuationfthe oliticalsystem- diffuseupport n the ter-minologyfEaston 1965); legitimacyin the terminologyf Lipset (1963);systemffect n the terminologyf

Almond ndVerba 1963)-and a func-tionnspecificerms f citizen'svalua-tion fparticularovernmentalolicies-an

importantspect,nthe espectiveer-

minologyf these cholars, f specificsupport, effectiveness,nd incumbentaffect. heweakness fprevious heo-rizing bout determinantsf rebelliouscollectivection n thebasisofdiffuse/specificupport,egitimacy/effectiveness,or system/incumbentffects that t isindividuallyational o free ide nsteadofrebel, egardlessfthe xtentowhichdiffuse/specificupport,egitimacy/effec-

tiveness,r system/incumbentffectre

lowornegative. urpublic oods heoryprovides plausible ausalrationale or

484




linkinguchtraditionaloliticalupportvariables, s indicatorsfpreferencesorpublic oods, o thedecisionsf average

citizensboutwhetherr not otake artin rebelliousollectivection.

Apart romublic oods ncentives,ealso take nto ccounthe xpectedtilityof a varietyof nonmaterialelectiveincentives,s well as expected osts.Olson 1971) sskepticalbout he ole fnonmaterialewardss a determinantfcollective action in general. Tullock(1971)argues hat lthough particularkindof nonmaterialelectivencentive,the ntertainmentalueofrebellion,sanimportant otive f pseudo-rebelliousbehaviorengaged in by students nadvanced emocracies,he ntertainmentmotives notan importantncentivenserious ebellion.ilver1974) xpands

upon he ntertainmentotive o ncludea long utvaguely efinedist f psychicincome.We measure heentertainmentvalueofrebellious olitical ehavior,swell as two kindsof psychicncome:expectedbenefitsof conformingobehavioral expectations f importantothers, nd expected ocial affiliationrewards.

The principal esults f our testsofrational hoicemodels f rebelliousol-lective ction are, first, hatselectiveincentivesppear or hemost art o beirrelevant.hisruns ountero the piritofOlson's eneralheory,hich,sBarry

(1978, p.23-46)hasargued,mayhave

somewhat arrow ange fapplicability;and it contradictsirectlyhe rgumentsofTullock ndSilvernregardoprivatepsychologicalratification.econd,wefindthatpublic goods incentives-thevariables ssumed obe irrelevantntheprivatenterestr by-product odels fOlson,Tullock, ndSilver-consistentlyareestimatedo havesignificantmpacton participationn rebellious ollective

action. hese ariablesrecomponentsfa public oodsmodel hatspredicatednthe ssumptionhat,nregardo an aver-

agecitizen'shoice f whetherrnot torebel,considerationsf what s collec-tivelyrationalcan override he indi-vidually rational ogic of the privateinterestheory.

A findinghat oes gainsthegrain frationalhoice heorys theobservationof a small but statisticallyignificantnegative relationship between theexpectedtilityfnegativeanctionsndrebellious ollectivection.Respondentswho believethatrebellious ehavior slikelyto be costlyshow a somewhatgreaterendencyoparticipatehan hosewhobelieve hat t s unlikelyobe costly.Thesolutionfthis nomalysanimpor-tant riorityffutureesearchn the or-mulation nd testingf rational hoicetheoriesf rebellion. ne possibilitysthat the unexpectedignof the costsvariable reflects he presenceof amartyryndrome,hichwouldneed o

be measured ndependentlynd con-trolled or.Alternatively,igh xpectedcostsmaybe closelyntertwinedithhighpublicgoods value of rebellion,stemmingrom erceptionf the xistingregimes extremelyepressive.f o, thisraisesthequestion f how to separatecosts romublic oods, heoreticallyndempirically.

Notes

This researchwas supportedby the National

ScienceFoundation, ward S0C77-00187, and byagrant rom heStiftung olkswagenwerk.n earlierversion of this paper was presented t the 1984annual meeting f the AmericanPolitical ScienceAssociation,Washington, .C. We are grateful orhelpfulcommentsfrom membersof the RationalChoice Seminar t theUniversityf Arizona.

1. Of 2425 potentially ligiblehouseholds,928refused o give the nformationecessary o deter-mineeligibility. f theremaining297knowneligi-ble households, he ompletion atewas 60%. Of allpotentially ligiblehouseholds,thecompletion atewas 32%. ResponseAnalysisdevelopeda complex

weightingrocedure hat anbe usedtocompensatefor heproblem f owresponse ate.We do notusetheweightingrocedure, owever, inceour nterest

485




is in testing eneralhypotheses ather handescrib-ingdistributions.

2. Respondentswere asked firstwhether hey

approvedofeachbehavior, nd second, toestimatehow large a percentageof citizens n the UnitedStateswould approveof each behavior.Thesewereintended principally as warm-up questions.Respondents henwere asked to report heirnten-tion to performach behavior n thefuture woulddo; mightdo, dependingon the circumstances;would notdo ) and whetherheyhad performedhebehavior n thepast.Specialprecautionwas taken oensure anonymity.For the behavioral intentionquestiona deck ofpreshuffledards (each listingparticularbehavior)was givento the respondent,who was instructedto circle the appropriateresponseoption on each card and place it in anenvelope, which then was sealed in his or herpresenceupon completionof the series.This pro-cedurewas repeatedfor thequestionabout actualparticipation.

3. The participationpotential variables aredefined perationallys theproduct fbehavior ndintention, herebehavior sscored1 for ack ofpar-ticipation nd 2 for participation,nd intentionsscored 1 fornegative ntention, for conditionallypositive ntention,nd 3 forunconditionally osi-tive ntention. ery ittle onresponsewas observed(only3% oftherespondentsouldnotbe scored onall five variables). When subjected to a factor

analysis principal omponents) hefiveparticipa-tion potentialvariables load highlyon a singlefactor,ndicative f unidimensionality.

4. A constant qual to thenumber f temswassubtracted rom he totalscore in orderto set theorigin t zero.

5. As intheNew York City urvey, espondentsin theHamburg urveywerepresentedwith listoflegal and illegalbehaviors 23 in all), described sactionspeoplemight aketoprotest gainst he on-structionf nuclear ower plants.Foreach behaviorrespondentswereasked to reportwhether heyhadengaged n it or not. Respondents lso wereasked

about their ntention o perform he action in thefuture, singfiveresponse ategories anging romin no case to quite certain. The participation

potential ariableswere constructed y multiplyingpast behavior scored1 for have not done and 2for have done ) byfuturententionscoredfromto5,where high coremeans that hebehaviorwillbe performed ith highprobabilityn thefuture).Therewere no missing alues on thequestion boutpast behavior, butbecause of missingdata on theintention uestion, only 85% of the respondentscould be scored on the behavior times ntentionproductvariables.This can be explained npart byinterviewer rrors, as some of the interviewerswrongly ssumed that hey houldask the ntentionquestions only for those actions previouslyper-formed ya respondent. or each intentionariable

the missing value was replaced by themean. Afactor analysis of the participation potentialvariables ndicates nidimensionality.

6. Respondents n the New York City surveywereasked to state he xtent o which hey1) haverespectfor the political institutionsn theUnitedStates, 2) think hat he courts n theUnitedStatesguarantee fair rial, 3) feelthat hebasic rights fcitizens re well protected y thepolitical ystem,4)areproudto liveunderthepolitical ystem,5) feelthat the system f governments the bestpossiblepolitical system, nd (6) feel that they hould sup-portthesystem f government. he responsecon-tinuumwas a seven-point cale. The average nter-item correlation was .57, and scale reliability(Alpha)was .89. Scores were reversed nd summedto form Political Support/Alienationcale (Vi).Respondents n the Hamburg urveywereasked torespond on a five-point gree-disagree cale to thefollowing tatements: 1) At present, feelverycritical f our political ystem ; 2) Ingeneral, necan relyon the federalgovernment o do the rightthing ; (3) The courts in the Federal Republicguarantee veryone fair rial egardlessfwhetherthey re richor poor, educated or uneducated ; 4)I find it very alarmingthat the basic rightsof

citizens are so little respected in our politicalsystem ; 5) Looking back, the eading politiciansin theFederalRepublichavealwayshadgood inten-tions ; 6) I havegreatrespect nd affection or he

political nstitutionsn theFederalRepublic. Theaverage inter-itemorrelationwas .40 and scalereliability as .80. Itemswere cored n thedirectionofnegative valuation nd summed.

7. The seriesalso includedthefollowing: Theexistence f atomicpowerstations s a catastrophefor me ; I am really afraid of atomic powerstations ; Sometimes think bout atomicpowerstations,but theydo notplay an importantole inmy life ; It is sometimesdifficultor me to fallasleep if I think about the problemof nuclearenergy ; nd I am worried bout the existence fnuclearpowerstations. A responsewas scored 1 if

it ndicated iscontent ith he xisting tilization fnuclear nergy; therwise score of 0 was assigned.The mean inter-itemorrelationwas .26 and scalereliabilitywas .71. Responseswere summed crossitems oconstruct DiscontentwithNuclearEnergyscale (V/n).

8. The seriesalso included thefollowing: Theanti-nuclearmovement would lose influence f Iwereno longer active ;* The activity f a singleperson against the construction f atomic powerstations annotprevent hedevelopmentf nuclearenergy ; The questionof whether he anti-nuclearmovements successful r notbecause ofmy par-ticipation everoccurstome ;* I don'tbelieve that

my activity gainstatomicpowerstationshas anyweight. five-pointgree-disagreeesponse ormatwas used, scored to rangefrom ow to highper-

486




ceivedpersonal nfluence.A factor nalysis prin-cipal components)yieldedtwo factorswitheigen-values greater han1. The starred tems how lowloadingson the first actor.A Personal Influence

scale (pi) was constructedrom hefactor coresof

thefirst actor.Scale scoreswere transformedo arange of 0-1 according to the formula: Xi' =

(Xi - Xmin)/(XmaxXmin), hereXi s theoriginalscalevalue andXi' s the transformedalue.

9. Respondentswere asked: In your opinion,how importants it forpeople like yourself o beinvolved in politics today? Is it very important,somewhat important, omewhatunimportant, rvery unimportant? Responses were scored inreverse rder,0, .33, .67, and 1.

10. The six actionswere (1) disruptingecturesand meetings,2) staging llegaldemonstrationsrstrikes, 3) obstructing raffic r preventing ree

access to schools,factories, r otherbuildings, 4)damagingor destroyingoomsor furnituren uni-versities,5) taking ver publicbuildings nd fight-ingwith hepolice,and (6) taking pguerrillaacticssuch as bombingbuildings,holdinghostages,andhijacking irplanes.The mean nter-itemorrelationbetween esponseson a five-pointcalescoredfromhurt o helped ) s .52, and scalereliabilitys .87.

An EfficacyfGroupAggressioncale pg)was con-structed y summingcoresacrossitems nd trans-forminghem orangebetween0 and 1.

11. Scores on the Political Support/Alienationscale are squared because the hypothesisof a

positivelyacceleratedfunction s more plausibletheoreticallyhanthat of a linearfunctionsee thediscussionnMuller,1979,pp. 83-88).

12. Scores on the Political Support/Alienationscale are squared; scores on the DiscontentwithNuclearEnergy cale are not squaredbecause thistransformationoes not improvethe correlationwithRp and Rb, perhapsbecause of therestrictedrangeof theDiscontentwithNuclearEnergy cale,which s limited o eightvaluesbetween0 and 7.

13. Mixed evidence on thequestionof whetherthere s a p in conventionalpoliticalparticipation(e.g., voting, campaign activity)is reportedbyAldrich1976); however, he ndicators fp usedbyhimare indirect.

14. Mason (1984) also rejects his ssumption nthegrounds hat ertain inds f publicgoods-i.e.,those that are inclusive nd non-inferior-arenotsubject to free-riding. n implicit ssumptionofMason's argument s that the influenceof theindividualor thegroupon the provisionofpublicgoods willnot be negligiblen thecase of inclusiveand non-inferiorublicgoods.

References

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burg, edanstrasse9,D 2000Hamburg3,FRG.

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