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Policing and Accountability in the

Netherlands: A Happy Marriage or a

Stressful Relationship?E.R. Muller aaE.M. Meijers Instituut , Witte Singel 103, Leiden, 2313, AA, The

Netherlands

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To cite this article:E.R. Muller (2002) Policing and Accountability in the Netherlands: A Happy

Marriage or a Stressful Relationship?, Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and

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Policing and Society, 2002, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 249258

POLICING AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE

NETHERLANDS: A HAPPY MARRIAGE OR A

STRESSFUL RELATIONSHIP?

E.R. MULLER*

E.M. Meijers Instituut, Witte Singel 103, 2313 AA Leiden, The Netherlands

This article overviews the principal structural features concerning the system of police accountability in theNetherlands. At issue is the police ability to deliver good standards in public safety, especially in thecontext of local communities and small towns, after a decade of police organisational reform. The articleoffers insights into the complexities for managing police accountability in the Netherlands under the currentstructure. Police systems across Europe are experiencing, to varying degrees, the tendency to centralisemanagement functions. The Dutch case is an example of this. In the Netherlands, police reorganisation asa result of the Police Act 1993 has had negative consequences for local accountability which are notadequately addressed by the characteristic informalism that underpins the system. A tendency to structuralincidentalism exacerbates these weaknesses. The article concludes by calling for greater transparency in policedecision making and greater participation by external representatives of the public in order to bolster a fragilelegitimacy of the system.

Keywords: Police accountability; The Netherlands; Democracy; Rule of law; Police legitimacy

INTRODUCTION

Police accountability is a heavily debated topic in the Netherlands (see for an overview

Fijnaut et al., 1999) and it is a topic that also features prominently in policing

studies (Jones, 1995; Wintle, 1996). Many books have been written on the subject

and many conferences have been organised to discuss its implications (Fijnaut, 1979,

1983; Rosenthal et al., 1987; Fasseur, 1990; Van Helten, 1990; Reiner, 1992; CrisisOnderzoek Team, 1994; Muller, 1994; Boek, 1995; den Boer, 1997; Koopman, 1998).

Despite the attention of academics, it remains the case that, in everyday police practice

in the Netherlands, the subject receives far less attention. How the police account for

their actions is evidently considered to be of little consequence for the police organi-

sations daily execution of policing tasks. It would seem that this subject is merely an

issue which attracts attention from academic police experts and the occasional

management cop (Punch, 1983).

This article addresses the relationship between the police performance in practice

and accountability concerning this performance (Gunther Moor et al., 1998;

*Director of the Dutch Police Academy; Director of the Crisis Research Team; Professor of ConflictResolution, University of Leiden. E-mail: [email protected].

ISSN 1043-9463 print; ISSN 1477-2728 online/02/040249-16 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/1043946022000007930


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Rosenthalet al., 1998a). In European countries there is a commonly held principle that

the justification of police performance is essential to a democratic constitutional state.

A properly controlled police organisation is a prerequisite in a balanced concept of a

constitutional state. This article aims to explain how the Dutch police view and respondto this responsibility (Brantjes, 2001). It concludes with a number of recommendations

for improving the relationship between police practice and accountability. The article

concentrates on police accountability in the Netherlands; and draws heavily upon

Dutch literature on police accountability (see for an introduction to the Dutch police

system Elzinga et al., 1995; Michiels, 1997), but I believe the lessons are more general

ones that can, with due alteration of detail, be applied to liberal democracies elsewhere

(see for example: Sheptycki, 1999 for a comparison of the Dutch and Belgian police

systems).

It may appear at first remarkable to claim that the relations between the police, the

government, the law and parliament constitute the weakest point of the police organ-

isation (Cachet et al. 1998). It is uncontentious to say that, absent good relationsbetween these different parties, a police force cannot be managed and controlled effi-

ciently. However, there is a relationship be it a rather distant one between police

performance in the field and the managerial and control activities which are executed

by the most senior police officers, the mayors and the public prosecutors (Muller

and Poelert, 1999). Past experience in the Netherlands clearly shows that the corollary

of poor connectivity between the police, the government and the law can lead to serious

problems in police performance in the streets. Let us explore this contention in a little

more detail.

POLICING ISSUES IN THE NETHERLANDS

Policing in the Netherlands has been and continues to be under considerable pressure

(cf. Almelo and Wiewel, 1991). It is no exaggeration to say that the organisation

and performance of the police, the government and the law are topics of constant

debate in Dutch society in the contemporary period. In the recent past, various

incidents gave rise to media discussions and portrayals of a crisis in the constitutional

state of the Netherlands1. Debates about these matters in the Dutch parliament

and town councils frequently culminate in sweeping statements but scarcely quell the

controversy. Political authorities, the magistrates and others in positions of responsibil-

ity suffer the consequences of the constant flow of incidents concerning policing

in the Netherlands (cf. Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). This flow of controversy can be

understood as the problem of structural incidentalism a constant pattern of incidents

that have major consequences for the organisation and performance of the police,

the law and the government. The result of structural incidentalism is that the legitimacy

of this set of institutions is now at stake. Structural incidentalism in matters of police

performance can be traced back to fundamental questions concerning the performance

1There have been two parliamentary inquiry commissions on the topic of policing methods; ParlementaireEnquete Commissie Opsporingsmethoden, 1996 and Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie EvaluatieOnderzoeksmethoden, 1999.

250 E.R. MULLER


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of our democratic constitutional state and concerning the violation of civilians basic

rights, one of which is the right to safety.

At present the role of the Dutch police in the context of social order more generally is

undergoing a process of reconsideration. One of the most visible results of this is thatthe Public Prosecutors Department has been drastically reorganised to enable it to per-

form a more effective oversight role in the future (see Schalken, 1992; Hart, 1994). This

is symptomatic of the general task that political and administrative authorities face in

finding ways of asserting their authority. Henceforth, elected representatives will be

required to demonstrate that they take their legislative and inspecting tasks in this

area of government care seriously:

The legitimacy of the police and the judiciary has come under pressure as a result of a too decisive use ofcriminal investigation methods. Since the outcome of the 1995 parliamentary committee, peopleexpress less trust in both. As far as the 1999 parliamentary committee is concerned, the police and the

judiciary have actually succeeded in realising organisational changes, as well as changes with respect

to content. Those far-reaching changes are hardly visible to the general public, however. Media andthe public opinion focus mainly on incidents that are regularly uncovered. The damage to legitimacywill therefore last for another few years. The legitimacy of the police and of prosecutors will only increaseif they are able to keep up with the changes that have been launched. (Muller and Pieterse, 2001)

The following ten propositions summarise the current state of play in the adaptations

to the contemporary situation2.

1. Good standards of public safety care still ranks high on the list of public priorities

for the police. Discussions and debates concerning this issue tend to exclusively focus

on the organisation of safety care at the expense of a concern with what safety

care should entail. This leads to a gap between the publics safety requirements

(expectations) and the limited organisational conditions under which the police,the government and the law can function. Despite diminishing indicators of crime

and criminality (as measured by a variety of statistical indicators), anxiety about

the crime problem remains widespread. This is connected with new problems

concerning the maintenance of public-order on and around football fields, in

entertainment centres and in particular town districts. These anxieties intensify

public feelings of dissatisfaction concerning lack of safety and government failure

to take effective measures against it.

2. The authority of the police, the government and the law has suffered as a

consequence. Structural incidentalism is the name given to the apparently continu-

ous problems in safety care and the concomitant series of incidents involving

problems of, or at least allegations of, police misconduct. The legitimacy of the

actions of the police, the government and the law (and even of ministers) can no

longer be taken as a given. All these parties have lost credibility (Cachet, 1990).

The public is aware of a major discrepancy between political bombast and the

actual actions taken by the police, the government and the law. Conscious of the dis-

crepancy, there seems, to the public at large, to be no end to the series of incidents

involving clashes between personal interests and public. The police, the government

and the law continually strive will have to re-convince the public of the legitimacy of

their actions.

2These propositions are, in the main, based on the conclusions of an in-depth inquiry into the Police Act of1993 (Rosenthal et al., 1998b).

POLICEWORK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 251


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3. The structure of the current police organisation in the Netherlands is highly

complex. This complexity leads to flaws in the system of management. There is

insufficient dualism of authority and management. The managerial dualism is

unclear. The relations between central and local management and control areunclear. The democratic justification system is inadequate. The various parties

operating within this faulty organisation work hard to arrive at consensus with

respect to managerial issues, but the organisation as a whole is characterised by

substantial managerial chaos. The process of arriving at managerial decisions

involves many different people. For many of those involved the amount of time

that has been spent on consultations and planning is considerable, indeed it

may even be at the point of consuming all the available institutional energy.

History will demonstrate that the present police organisation in the Netherlands is

a transitional one.

4. The democratic accountability of regional police care in the Netherlands is still

highly circumscribed. The adjustments that have been and are being made in theadministrative structure and organisation of police care in several regions

have done little to address this. The worst effect of this is that town councils

have no genuine influence on the management and control of the police. This has

considerable implications for police legitimacy at the local level that cannot be

answered by recourse to a national schema.

5. It is a paradox that the competent authorities have sufficient formal powers of

management and control at their disposal, but they do not make sufficient use of

those possibilities. These authorities consistently under-perform with respect to the

management of policing activities. Indeed, they exercise no genuine control over

the police organisation. It is a small mercy that police professionals generallyhandle the latitude they are offered in a responsible way and do not attempt to

operate independently.

6. One significant aspect of the current system for local accountability is that there are

major differences in the administrative powers of the mayors of different towns

with respect to safety care. With regard to each and every aspect, the competences

accruing to the Mayor of a central town within a region are not the same as those

of small towns. These actual differences in administrative powers are at conflict

with the formal equality of the individual mayors in a regional council and lead

to discrepancies in the exercise of authority. Unevenness of formal powers in this

regard leads to inequality of outcome.

7. The fundament of Dutch policing is that consensus needs to be built and that

compromises can be formulated. However, police care in the Netherlands depends

to a significant extent on informal, personal relations. All too often police perform-

ance is the outcome of an opportunity-chemistry between the various parties

directly involved in police management. One effect of informalism is that key

individuals often prove to be more important than key functions. At times all this

may work out well, but in some cases it leads to serious problems. Informalism

means that there is an insufficiency of corrective mechanisms when things go

awry. Personal conflict between a mayor, a prosecutor and a police chief may nega-

tively influence the way in which policing in that area is conducted.

8. Policing in the Netherlands is held to account by two Ministries, that of the Interiorand of Justice. It is a matter of concern that the Ministers of the Interior and

Justice seem to have very little actual influence on safety care and often fail to exploit

252 E.R. MULLER


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the competences provided by the current Police Act. However, even if ministers

would exercise those competences with greater frequency, it is doubtful that this

would have much practical result in specific localities. It would prove very difficult

in practice to combine centralised management and control with the equallynecessary incorporation of police care on a local basis.

9. There is some evidence within the police organisation of an intensified focus on the

improvement in the content of police work. For example, currently a great deal of

attention is being given over to improving the quality of criminal investigation.

Large-scale structural reorganisation in the Dutch police during the 1990s has

been time consuming and has, to an immeasurable degree, sapped its strength.

For at least a decade, if not longer, attention has been almost exclusively focused

on the organisational implications of measures affecting the content of police

work. The institutionalisation of too many forms of consultation, inspection and

centres of expertise deflected attention from actual police work, whereas the

professionalism of the police organisation should primarily be manifested in thequality of its work.

10. The Public Prosecution Service is also undergoing major reorganisation and this is

now beginning to pay off. The involvement of the Prosecution Service in manage-

rial issues remains limited and its members still have few opportunities to suggest

measures adapted to regional and local conditions (Foque and t Hart, 1990).

The decisions of the Board of Procurators-General allow the Public Prosecution

Service limited scope to take action on a regional basis. It is only to be hoped

that the Public Prosecution Service will be granted the peace and time required

to satisfactorily conclude its reorganisation (De Doelder, 1994).

NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES

The need for a democratically sound, effective and efficient police care is now greater

than ever. A number of normative principles associated with this increased need have

been articulated. These normative principles relate primarily to the organisation of

police care, which in turn is directly related to the content of police care. Optimally

organised police care is of great importance for both objective and subjective safety

(see Rosenthal et al., 1998b).

1. Law and Practice A first important improvement from which police care would

greatly benefit would be to narrow the gap between law in theory and law in

practice. A wide gap between the two implies a waste of administrative and organi-

sational energy. In a living constitutional state it is understandable for there to be a

healthy tension between laws and the structures and processes that are put in place

within their confines. But a prerequisite for constitutional police care is that the laws

and the regulations based on them are not too far removed from administrative

practice.

2. Disclosure Also important for good police care is that administrative decisions

are disclosed to the public, even if that may sometimes involve difficulties.

Transparency of administrative decisions is the best way of ensuring broadinvolvement in administrative decision-making and is in the interest of democratic

justification.



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3. Transparency A related factor with respect to good police care is transparency

of complex structures and processes. The police organisation and police care

function in a context within which consensus, consultation and compromising are

highly valued. Of great importance with respect to ensuring transparency is anunambiguous distribution of powers and responsibilities.

4. Prevention of Concentrations of Power Police care will benefit greatly from efforts

to prevent concentrations of power, dual positions and personal unions. Checks

and balances, including dualism of authority and balance of interests, are key

issues in the Dutch constitutional state, and hence also of great importance for

sound police operation.

5. NoAuthorityWithoutResponsibility,noRresponsibilityWithoutJustification Because

of their appointed powers and the means at their disposal including the possibility

of using violence the police occupy a special place in society. A strict rule holding

for all conditions, relations and forms of consultation within the police organisation

is that all powers must be coupled with responsibilities, and responsibility meansthat all actions must be justified.

6. Integral Democratic Justification Something else from which police care would

greatly benefit is integral justification to a democratically elected body. Such integral

democratic justification would enhance the legitimacy of the actions of the police,

the government and the law.

7. Primacy Government Irrespective of the great importance of safety and police

care, the police organisation must act in conformity with the basic characteristics

of government and not vice versa (Hoogenboom, 1994).

ISSUES RELATING TO THE MANAGEMENT AND

CONTROL OF THE POLICE

This section provides an overview of the most important issues concerning the

evaluation of the functioning of the Police Act of 1993, which offers an insight in the

way accountability works in the Dutch police organisation (see Rosenthal et al., 1998b).

Formal and Informal

The informal, personal relations between the various parties involved in police care

are crucial. The need for good personal relations, especially between the members

of the regional triangle, is widely acknowledged. It is virtually impossible to enforce

the provisions of the Police Act if there are problems in the personal relations.

The Police Act is entirely in line with the Dutch political-administrative culture of

consultation, compromising and conflict avoidance. Many decisions relating to the

management and control of the police are taken in an informal way. Only rarely

are the formal procedures followed. The advantages of informal decision-making

are that decisions can be quickly made and that they are generally widely supported.

Disadvantages are the difficulty of controlling such decisions and their susceptibilityto changes. Of importance in this respect is the existing management culture in

particular regions.

254 E.R. MULLER


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Consultation and Decision-making

The management and control of the police are topics of discussion in many different

contexts, such as the executive committee, regional triangle, bilateral consultations,

staff meetings, district consultations, local consultations, etc. (see also Van der Hulst,1990; Albert, 1994). As a result of the highly complicated level of these forms of

consultation, it often happens that the same subjects are being discussed at meetings

in different places, which obviously contributes to a duplication of efforts.

Increasingly, attempts are made to coordinate expectations and wishes in all the

different circuits, to avoid the risk of actual decisions being taken by a formal commit-

tee, such as the regional council. Force managers realise that giving all the parties

involved ample scope for consultation is the best way of arriving at a successful

police policy (Hoogewoning, 1993).

The many forms of consultation render decision-making a diffuse process. It is

virtually impossible to reconstruct when, and by whom, a particular decision wastaken. The formal decision-making procedures may have been followed, but the

background and reasons for the decisions often remain unclear. The main aims of

the many consultations actually prove to be coordination and implicit decision-

making. And the main purpose of the formal institutes, such as the regional council,

is then to ratify the decisions. But as all the different parties have had the opportunity

to express their wishes in the extensive consultations, the great majority of the members

of the regional council support this development. In this way, the decisions of the

regional council generate wide support. At the same time, however, this form of

decision-making means that the mayors in the regional council have virtually no

opportunity to influence decisions.

Communication Patterns and Forms of Consultation

One can distinguish a number of dominant communication patterns in the police

regions which were investigated. These communication patterns and the exchange of

information that takes place within them can be ranked according to their intensity.

The most intensive exchange of information is that between the managers and chiefs

of the force. As far as management is concerned, these are the most important

exchanges in the communication patterns. All relevant issues are ultimately discussed

in the consultations of a formal or informal nature between the chiefs and the

managers of the force. It is necessary to add that most information in the manager

chief relationship is exchanged orally. The second most important form of consultation

is that of the regional councils executive committee. In the executive committee, the

force manager, the field officer, the force chief and the mayor discuss most aspects

of police care in their region. The meetings of the executive committee usually generate

sufficient information, and often also new facts to satisfy most participants.

Of importance with respect to the local management and control of the police is

the exchange of information that takes place in the district councils. In the district

councils in particular, mayors try to take decisions concerning local police care in a

more or less inter-town context. Together with the consultations between the mayors

and the local chiefs of police, this flow of information constitutes the core of thelocal communication patterns. None of the participants regard the regional council

as a single, independent source of information. The most relevant issues will already



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have been discussed via the other forms of consultation. Only for the mayors, who

play no active part in regional affairs, is the regional council an independent source

of information. Within the regional council itself, communication is often restricted

to a formal exchange of viewpoints and the formulation of decisions.

Information to Town Councils

The provision of information to the town councils is a case apart within the wider

context of information and communication. Under the terms of the Police Act, the

force managers and the mayors are obliged to pass all relevant information on to the

councils without delay. In practice, however, this is not always done. The force

managers almost always immediately forward the regional councils reports to the

town councils, but the other mayors are usually more selective in providing information

to the town councils. However, not all mayors behave in the same way in this respect.

The quality and quantity of information forwarded to the council depends to a largeextent on the mayors style of management and his/her general relationship with the

town council.

All this does not alter the fact that the town councils primarily receive the results

of formal communication patterns within their regions, optionally supplemented with

an explanation from the mayor. They get to hear virtually nothing about the reasons

for and backgrounds of the decisions. And they are therefore never fully informed

about the management and control processes in their regions. Town council members

of non-central towns rarely ask for further information on general aspects of the

regional police. They are interested in detailed information on local safety. Town

council members of central towns tend to have more interest in information on theregional force. But it is often difficult to draw a line between information relating to

the mayors authoritative role and that relating to the force managers managerial

role. In actual fact, the councils of central towns quite regularly both formally and

factually raise statements about managerial issues concerning the regional force or

ask the force manager to justify police actions. This is the great disadvantage of the

dual role of the force manager/mayor of a central town.

Democratic Accountability

Although the way the police forces account for their actions to the town council meets

the formal statutory requirements, they only account for the broad outlines of their

policies. Police forces seldom give a detailed account (through the mayor) of the way

they conduct their policies. Town councils generally approve the reports by the

police forces without much discussion. In-depth discussions about the measures

taken and the choices made are rare.

With it comes to the management of the police forces, democratic accountability is

essentially non-existent. Mayors are seldom called to account by their town councils

for their role in the regional council. Town councils only discuss the way the mayor

exercises his/her authority in maintaining public order within the municipality.

The fact that in a few cases authority is confused with management is taken for

granted by both the mayor and the council. But if democratic accountability for themanagement of the police forces is virtually non-existent, the situation with regard

to democratic accountability for the mayors authority in preserving public order is

256 E.R. MULLER


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not much better. The town councils primarily focus on their role in influencing the

development of local and regional plans.

Supralocal Accountability

Virtually none of the regional and local actors perceive any need to account for their

actions to the Minister of the Interior or to the Queens Commissioner at the level of

the provinces. They strongly emphasise the individual responsibility and autonomy

of the police regions. Interventions by the Minister of the Interior primarily concern

the implementation of general regulations, and the regions generally comply with

these regulations without too many problems. Hence, in practice the Queens

Commissioners role as the overall supervisor of police care in his municipalities

does not amount to much.

The role of the Board of Procurators-General and the Ministry of the Interior

vis-a` -vis the chief public prosecutors, is fundamentally different. There is a clearhierarchical relationship. Chief public prosecutors make a considerable effort to put

the judicial priorities on the agenda of the regional councils and policy planning meet-

ings. The other parties involved are sometimes irritated by this approach; in their

opinion, the Public Prosecution Service pays too little attention to local issues and

focuses too much on national priorities. In some regions this has prompted a heated

debate between the regional police force mayor and the chief public prosecutor

about which interests should prevail. However, in most cases a compromise was

reached that was acceptable to both.

CONCLUSION

Three conclusions may be drawn concerning the relationship between police practice

and accountability in the Netherlands:

1. Police practice and accountability do not relate very well. In the Netherlands, in

spite of well-meant rhetoric and principles endorsed by all, accountability has

led to a situation where the policing is controlled only to a limited extent.

2. In the Netherlands, as well as in other countries, alternative forms of control are

applied, such as complaints handling schemes, planning cycles and self-evaluation.

In these forms of control, the controller is mainly the police itself. There is toolittle objective control from outside the police.

3. Neither the police nor civilians seem to make an issue of accountability. Especially

in the Netherlands, the police are assumed to operate within the confines of the law.

There is no tangible wish for higher levels of accountability and disclosure.

Where do these conclusions and comments lead to? They ought to lead to a more

realistic picture of feasible forms of accountability. Formal bodies that directly

represent civilians would be the ideal instruments to control the police. This article

has shown that current forms of control are less far-reaching. That is the basis for a

realistic control concept with formal arrangements for the external control of

the police, independently and directly by civilians. A caveat is that each partymust appreciate the limits of such control. After all, police work is a job done by

professionals and full control of its performance is neither possible nor desirable.



11/11

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