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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

Katri Pynnöniemi FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 81 • May 2011

81

THE EU’S TRANSPORT DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

• The EU’s eastern transport corridors, established in the mid-1990s, have evolved into ‘axes’,‘dialogues’and‘partnerships’which,takentogether,formanetworkofoverlappingvenuesfortheEU-Russiainteraction.Thechangescurrentlyunderwayarepavingthewayfortheconsolidationofregionalcooperationschemes.

• TheEU prioritizes so-calledhorizontalmeasures, includingefforts toharmonize the legislation,standardsandtechnicalspecificationsoftheneighbouringcountrieswiththoseoftheEU.

• From the Russian perspective, pressing issues in transport and infrastructure development lieelsewhere.TheSochiOlympicGamesandtheWorldCupareproviding theprimary impetus fortransportmodernizationupto2019.Anothermajorissueistransportsecurity–orthelackofit.

• TheopeningoftheNorthernSeaRoutewillpotentiallychangethewholefaceofRussia,apossibilitythatshouldbeheededmoreclosely,alongwiththepossibleeffectsofthenewrouteontheglobaltradeflows.Inthefuture,especiallyintheframeworkoftheArcticregion,highpriorityshouldbegiventothesustainabilityandsecurityoftransport.

• Notwithstandingthedifferencesinpriorities,derivingpartlyfromtheasymmetryoftheeconomiesandpartlyfromdifferentpolicyenvironments,thepartiesshareamutualinteresttocooperate.ApredictablepolicyenvironmentinRussiawouldbeparticularlybeneficialinthisrespect.

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

FIIA Briefing Paper 81

May 2011

THE EU’S TRANSPORT DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Katri Pynnöniemi

Researcher


THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

Transport isoneof those few topicswhere theEUandRussiaseemtohavecometoanagreement.Thecommonunderstanding is that further integrationofthetransportsystemsandtheremovalofbottle-necksservestheinterestsofbothpartiesinthefaceoftheexpectedincreaseintrafficvolumes.

However, variations in the actual trade flows arethe underlying cause of differences in the actualpolicyobjectives.EUimportsfromRussiaaremainlytransportedviapipelinesandonlyasmallpercent-ageofthetradeutilizesrailandroadtransport.EUexportstoRussia,ontheotherhand,mainlymakeuseofroadandrailtransport.Thisasymmetryoftheeconomies,reflectedinthemodesoftransport,isnotexpectedtochangesignificantly inthe foreseeablefuture.Itislikelytocontribute,togetherwithotherfactors, to adifference inpriorities, suchas thoserelatedtocustomsandtrans-bordercooperation.

Metaphoricallyspeaking,theEU’seasterncorridorscreateacommonspacebetweentheEUandRussia.Institutionalized in themid-1990sas apartof theEU’seasternenlargement,thepan-Europeantrans-portcorridorconceptservedasabroadframeworkfor theEU to engage in the infrastructure-relateddevelopmentofitseasternneighbourhoodand,toalesserextent,inRussia.

The corridors can be seen as hybrid agencies thatbring together national, regional and local stake-holdersaswellasdifferentinternationalandtrans-national agencies, and thus blur the traditional

distinctionsbetweenexternalandinternalpolitics.Atthesametime,itshouldbenotedthatthecorri-dorsaresubjecttonationaldecision-makingandthereflectedgeopoliticalandgeo-economicinterestsoftheparticipatingcountries.

Administrative resources for EU-Russia dialogue

EU-Russia cooperationon transportdatesback tothePartnershipandCooperationAgreement(1997)and article 70 in particular, where broad policyobjectives for cooperation were set. Accordingly,thecooperationshouldfocuson“Restructuringandmodernizing the transport systems and networksinRussia(…)includingthemodernizationofmajorroutesofcommoninterestandthetrans-Europeanlinks (…)”. In practice, theworkwas carried outin the framework of the above-mentioned pan-Europeantransportcorridors,threeofwhichwereextendedtotheterritoryofRussia.

Besidesthecorridors,theEUandRussiahaveseveralothervenues for cooperation in the transport andinfrastructuresphere that, ideally, shouldcomple-menteachother.However,inpractice,thedifferentinstitutions involved overlap rather than supportoneanother.

The institutional set-upof the transportand infra-structurecooperationhasundergoneseveralchangesfollowing the general developments in EU-Russiarelations.InMay2003,theEUandRussiaagreedto

The EU hopes to facilitate border crossings between EU countries and Russia. Photo: Poggis / Flickr.com.


The Partnership for Modernization

It is telling that in the summaryof theEU-RussiaCommonSpacesProgressReport fromMarch2011,the only achievement mentioned in connectionwithtransportcooperationisareferencetothejointstatementoftheVice-PresidentoftheCommission,SiimKallas,andtheMinisterofTransportofRussia,IgorLevitin,fromNovember2010.1Inthestatementthe parties stress the importance of making thecurrentdialoguemoreefficient,givinga“concretemandate to existingworking groups, particularlyinviewoftheircontributiontothePartnershipforModernization”.2Themention of the PartnershipforModernization in this connection indicates itsimportance in the current parlance of EU-Russiarelations.Whatisperhapslesscleariswhatitentails.Does the Partnership help to “streamline the dia-loguesandsubgroups”,assuggestedintheProgressReport,orisitjustanotherlayeraddedtotheexist-ingpileofvenuesandforumswherethetransportandinfrastructuredevelopmentisdiscussed.

ThePartnership forModernizationoriginates fromtheEU-RussiasummitinDecember2009inStock-holm.Ayearlaterthepartiesagreeduponthejointcoordinatesfortheworkwhich,inpractice,includesalistofpreferenceseachpartyhasputonthetable.Inthetransportandinfrastructurespherethelisthasspecificprojects,suchasthedevelopmentof intel-ligenttransportsystemsandtheimprovementoftheTrans-Siberianrailconnection(seebelow),butalsomore conceptual agreementson, for example, theconsolidation of theNorthernDimension Partner-ship on Transport and Logistics (NDPTL) and theCentralAxisasmajorvenuesforcooperation.

InfactitseemsthattheNortherntransportaxishasbecomeanemptysignifierandthemajorityoftheactivities are currently taking place in the frame-workoftheNDPTL.ThedecisiontoestablishsuchapartnershipwasmadeinOctober2008bytheNorth-ernDimensionMinisters.Indesigningthepartner-ship,oneideahasbeentomaximizetheinteractionbetweenthebusinessandthepolicyspheresinorder

1 EU-RUSSIA Common Spaces Progress Report, March 2011.

URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/commonspaces_prog_

report_2010_en.pdf

2 Pressrelease19.11.2010,IP/10/1532,URL:http://europa.eu/

rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/15.

createfourCommonSpacesintheframeworkofthePartnershipandCooperationAgreement.Theworkwithinacommoneconomicspaceisorganizedintodialogues and subgroups that aim to solve issueshamperingthefurther increaseanddiversificationof trade between the two parties. The transportdialoguewasestablished inMay2005andconsistsoffiveworkinggroupsthatdeal,respectively,withtransport strategies and infrastructure; transportsecurity; air transport; maritime, sea, river andinlandwaterwaytransport;androadandrailtrans-port.Thepaceofcooperation ineachof thework-inggroupshasvaried considerablyover theyears.Althoughimportantintheirownrightasvenuesfordiscussion,theworkinggroupsarehardlyanythingmore,thuscontributinginthisindirectwaytothegeneralimpasseintheEU-Russiarelations.

AroundthesametimeastheintroductionofthefourCommon Spaces between the EU and Russia, theEU commenced a complete revision of its easterntransportcorridorpolicy.ThiswasinresponsetothecompletionoftheeasternenlargementoftheEUin2004and2007.Inaccordancewiththesuggestionsof theHighLevelGroup, theCommissiondecidedin2007tocreatefivetrans-nationaltransportaxesinsteadofthepan-Europeancorridors/areas.

From the viewpoint of EU-Russia relations twoissuesareofparticularimportance.First,theoverallchange is topological in that the previous Pan-EuropeanCorridorswerefullyintegratedwithinthenewdesignofthefivetrans-nationaltransportaxes.Second,theshiftinterminologyismostlycosmeticfor it doesnot entail change in the general policyframework.ThechangemerelyreflectsthefactthattheaxesareconsideredasapartoftheEU’sexternalrather than internal policies.TheCommissionhassoughttostrengthentheinstitutionalstatusoftheaxis,butthecontinuousreshufflingoftheconceptsunderminesthisobjective.

Thelatestdevelopmentswouldsuggestthattheini-tialideaoftheaxesastheconjunctionpointoftheEU’sexternaloutreach,regional-levelactivitiesandmarket-drivendevelopmenthasnotyetbeenreal-ized.Therearemultiplereasonsforthis.Theglobalfinancialcrisisandsubsequenteconomicdownturnhave reduced available funding for infrastructureprojects intheEU ingeneral,andinRussia inpar-ticular.Otherfactorsstemfromthedifferentpolicypreferencesandnationalinterestsatplay.


tofacilitatetheimplementationofinfrastructureaswellasnon-infrastructure-typeprojects.TheactualworkofthePartnershipisexpectedtostartin2011,oneyearlaterthanoriginallyplanned.

Takentogether,theprogressreportedabove,aswellas in the context of the aforomentionedworkinggroups,underlineswhathasbeennotedmanytimesbefore,namelythattheEUandRussiahavesubstan-tialadministrativeresourcestofacilitatecooperationon specific issues. But the mutual understandingabout the need for integration is easily impairedwhenitcomestoissuesofspecificinteresttoeachparty. This reflects the fundamental difficulty inEU-Russiarelationsofcomingto termswithwhateachsideconsidersitscoreinterestsandvalues.Thetransportandinfrastructuresphereisnoexceptioninthisregard.

What really is in Russia’s interests?

RussiahasshowngoodwilltowardstheEU’seasterncorridorsandis,tosomeextent,willingtogoalongwiththewaytheUnionenvisionsthem.Russiahaseven adopted similar terminology in its domesticdiscussions on transport and infrastructure mod-ernization. However, in the Russian context, theEU’seasterncorridorsfunctionforthemostpartasspatialmetaphorsthatrefertothesymbolicspaceof“EU-Russiaintegration”.3

AcaseinpointisRussianMinisterofTransportIgorLevitin’sstatementontheoccasionof the interna-tionalconferenceon“thefutureoftrans-Europeantransport networks” in October 2009, where heargued that Russia is interested to see the majorinfrastructureprojects inNorth-WestRussia,suchastheUst-Lugaseaport,theKaliningradandMur-mansk seaports aswell as thedevelopmentof theNorthern Sea Route, become part of the develop-mentofthenortherntransportaxis.Untiltimebeing,however,Russiahasadopteda‘wait-and-see’atti-tudeanddoesnotwishtofullycommittothepolicyframeworksdesignedinlargepartbytheEU.

3 Pynnöniemi,Katri(2008)New Road, New Life, New Russia.

International Transport Corridors at the Conjunction of Geo

graphy and Politics in Russia. Tampere:ActaUniversitatisTam-

perensis1314.

Siberian overflights

At present, EU airliners are obliged to pay Siberian overflight charges for routes to many Asian destinations. The EU argues that this is in breach of international law. The issue was negotiated between the European Commission and the Russian government in 2006. The two parties signed an agreement in November 2006 to the effect that the Siberian overflight duties will be phased out in six years by December 31, 2013.

Russia has not implemented the agreement and, instead, has linked it to the WTO membership negotiations. As these negotiations between the EU and Russia were closed in December 2010, the final agreement over the Siberian overflight issue could be expected to be reached as well. During Vice-President Kallas’ visit to Moscow in November 2010, it was also announced that the EU-Russia aviation summit that has been pending since 2006 is likely to take place in 2011 (most likely in Russia in October).

The five trans-national axes

Motorways of the Seas: to link the Baltic, Barents, Atlantic (including the outermost regions), Mediterranean, Black and Caspian Sea areas, as well as the littoral countries within the sea areas and with an extension through the Suez Canal towards the Red Sea.

Northern axis: to connect the northern EU with Norway to the north and with Belarus and Russia to the east. A connection to the Barents region linking Norway with Russia through Sweden and Finland is also envisaged.

Central axis: to link the centre of the EU to Ukraine and the Black Sea and through an inland waterway connection to the Caspian Sea. A direct connection from Ukraine to the Trans-Siberian railway and a link from the Don/Volga inland waterway to the Baltic Sea are also included.

South Eastern axis: to link the EU with the Balkans and Turkey and further with the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, as well as with the Middle East up to Egypt and the Red Sea.

South Western axis: to connect the south-western EU with Switzerland and Morocco, including the trans-Maghrebin link connecting Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and its extension to Egypt.

Source: COM(2007) 32 final. Communication from

the Commission to the Council and the European

Parliament. Extension of the major trans-European

transport axes to the neighbouring countries.


Thereare,however,certainareaswherethereclearlyisamutualinteresttocooperate.

The concept of the “international transport cor-ridors” neatly encapsulates what is regarded asRussia’snationalinterestsinregardtotransportandinfrastructuredevelopment.ThetermincorporatesRussia’sgoaltoturnitselfintoaEurasianlandbridgebetweenEuropeandAsia.Thedevelopmentof theinternationaltransportcorridorsintheterritoryofRussiaissupposedtoboosttheinternationaltransitthroughRussia,butwithfewtangibleresultstodate.It is estimated that aroundoneper centof freighttransportbetweenEuropeandAsiacurrentlyusestheRussianroute.

Until recently, theEU positionhasmerelybeen toacknowledge the existence of the links from theneighbouring countries to the third countries andto stress that the coordination of their develop-mentwiththatoftheaxesisimportant,butcanbedeferredtoalaterstage.However,intheframeworkoftheModernizationPartnership,theEUhastakenaslightlymoreactivepositiononthisquestion.IntheworkplanthatwasformulatedinDecember2010,thepartiesagreedto“attributeaRussia-EUdimensiontotheRussianRailway’sproject“theTranssibin7days”.

Underlying this rather specific project aimed atrestartingtheregularcontainertrainsrunningfromthe Russian ports of Nakhodka and Vostochny toRussia’swesternborderisthelong-termcooperationbetweenRussianRailways and theEuropeancom-

panies,especiallythetwoGermangiants:SiemensandDeutsche Bahn.This cooperation is driven bytheneedtomodernizeRussia’scurrentlocomotivestock,andalsoby theplans tobuildahigh-speedrailwaynetworkinRussia.

Developmentsinthislattersphereincludetheopen-ing of the high-speed train connection betweenSt. Petersburg and Helsinki in December 2010. Itremains tobeseenwhether the intensifying inter-industry linkages are actually an effective way ofachieving theEU’s policy goals for increasing thetransparency andpredictability of the investmentenvironment inRussia,aswellas thesecurityandspeedofthetradeflows.

ComplementarytothiscooperationwiththemajorEuropeancompanies,RussianRailways isalsopro-motingcooperationwithintheCISspaceundertheslogan“Integration1520”.Theconceptdatesbackto2006andisaimedatharmonizingtherailwaypoli-ciesofthecountriesthatsharethesamebroadgaugerailway.Althoughtheprojectseemstoconformwithtraditionalgeopoliticalthinkingandhasaquitedif-ferentspatialhorizonfromtheoneinscribedintheEU’seasterncorridors,itisdoubtfulhowattractivethisprojectactuallyisforthosewhomRussialikestoregardasitsmajorpartners.

Infact,“Integration1520”shouldperhapsbeseenasyetanother indicationofthegeneralpreferenceinRussiaforall-encompassingschemesthatbearthetitleof‘strategicthinking’andareorientedtowards

Russia aims to modernize its railways by buying new rolling stock from Germany. Photo: Tatiana Bulyonkova / Flickr.com.


promotingRussia’sposition in theworldmarkets.However,thisemphasisonstrategicplanningoftenturns out to be merely rhetorical, with policiesthat are actually driven by short- and medium-terminterestsandprofitmaximizationratherthansystem-wideplanning.This is,however,a featureofRussia’scurrentpolitical-administrativeregime,rather than something specifically related to thetransportsectorassuch.

Major puzzles confronting Russia

Arguably,Russia’spoliciestowardstheEU’seasterncorridorshave,ingeneral,beensporadicandreac-tiveratherthansystematicandproactive.Therearenumerous reasons for this related to the differentpolicyprioritiesand interests.Yet, thesituation isalsodrivenbyRussia’sdomesticpolicyenvironment,whichismorepronetoad-hocdealsthan‘strategicthinking’,althoughthelatterisstronglypromotedintheofficialdiscourse.

Infact,infrastructuredevelopmenthasbeenamongthe prioritized sectors of economic developmentin Russia since December 2001 at least,when thegovernmentapprovedthefederaltargetprogrammeon transport modernization. Yet, during the lastten-yearperiod, the shareof investments in infra-structureandtransporthasremainedataround2.5percentofGDP, insteadof the targeted4percent.Asnotedintherecentreport4bytheHigherSchoolof Economics, Russia’s anti-crisis arrangementsbetween2008and2009didnotincludeinvestmentsininfrastructure.Indeed,theplannedbudgetfinanc-ingwasreducedinboth2009and2010.Asaresult,thecurrentgovernmentprogrammesoninfrastruc-turedevelopmenthavebeenextendeduntil2019.

The latterdecision isnaturally linked to the forth-comingSochiOlympicGamesin2014andtheWorldCupfinalsin2018.Amajorpartofthepreparationsfor these events relates to infrastructure-building,from theports and roadsused in public transpor-tation tomore specific aspects such as sport sites,hotelsandother facilitiesdesigned for thevisitorsandathletes.Althoughattentionwillprimarilybe

4 Akindinova,N.V.,S.V.AleksashenkoandE.G.Yasin:Scenarios

and challenges of macroeconomic policy.HSEPublishingHouse:

Moscow2011.

focusedonthesemajoreventsinthecomingyears,thereisgrowingconcernabouttheactuallowlevelofmobilityinRussiaanditseffectsontheeconomicgrowthprospectsaswellastheintegrityofthecoun-try.Thischallengegoesfarbeyondtheinfrastructuresphereandthereforecannotbefixedjustbybuildingnewroadstoconnectperipheralregions.However,manyofthemajorinfrastructureprojectsinprevi-ousyearshavemostlyservedtheneedsofRussianforeigntrade,afactorthatshouldalsobetakenintoaccount.

Thecentralmessageintheabove-mentionedreportis that the engines of growth Russia experiencedduring the preceding ten-year period cannot berevvedupagainandthatthecountry is inneedofaneweconomicgrowthmodel.Thisispreciselythetask that has been assigned to over twentywork-inggroups currentlypreparing anewdraft of theStrategy2020document.Theauthorsofthereport,however, emphasize that Russia has “huge sparecapacity”forgrowthifitonlymanagestoimprovethe quality of its institutions and thedynamics oftheirtransformation.Thisalsoappliestothebureau-craciesinvolvedinmasteringtheinfrastructurepro-jectswhich,moreoftenthannot,feedthecorruptsysteminRussiaratherthanfacilitatetheeconomicgrowthprospectsofthecountry.Ontopofthesetwocontradictorytendencies–thedecreaseinfinancingavailablefortheinfrastructureprojectsandtheup-comingmajorevents that requirenew facilities tobebuiltinaccordancewithinternationalstandards–Russiafacesanentirelynewtypeofchallenge.

The opening of the Russian Arctic and especiallytheNorthernSeaRoutedue toclimatechangehaspromptedRussiatoreviseexisting(oractuallynon-existent) policies and administrative structures intheregion.Twoparallelprocessescanbeobservedhere.First,inSeptember2008PresidentMedvedevapproved the Arctic Strategy outlining Russia’sinterests in the Arctic. The new strategy on seaactivities adopted by the Russian government inDecember2010putsforwardspecificobjectivesforthestrengtheningofRussia’spresenceintheregion.Second,Russia has sought to define its ‘sphere ofinterests’intheArcticbyexpandingitscapacitiesintheregion(newvesselsandborder-guardpoststobesituatedintheRussianArcticfromMurmansktotheislandofWrangelinEastSiberia),andbyarrivingatanagreementwithNorwayattheendof2010onthedisputedterritoriesintheBarentsSea.


Runningparallelwiththisaspirationtostrengthenthe country’s position visàvis other countriesin theArctic, theRussian government has soughttoregaincontroloverthedomesticadministrativeregimeintheNorthernSeaRouteinparticular.TheSoviet-era administrative structures were partlyprivatizedandpartlymarginalized in themidstofthemanyadministrativereformsandmergersthathavetakenplaceduringthe last twentyyears.Thelackofadministrativeresourcesisnotperhapsthesolereason,buthascontributedtothedegenerationoftheinfrastructuresalongtheNorthernSeaRoute,from rescue services to ports and other types ofinfrastructure.

TherewritingofthenewfederallawontheNorthernSeaRoutestartedapproximatelytenyearsagoandhas gained momentum since 2009. According tothelatestinformationfromtheRussianMinistryofTransport,thelawisexpectedtobeapprovedbytheStateDumain2011.Thelawwillclarifynewrulesontheadministrativeregimeoftheroute,includingtheregulationsonsafety,navigationandtariffs.Incon-junctionwiththisprocessofstrengtheningthestateadministrationoftheroute,theRussiangovernmentisplanningtosellpartofitsshareinthemajorship-pingcompanies,includingtheMurmanskshippingcompany, and Sovcomflot, the largest shippingcompanyinRussia.

The opening of the Arctic clearly brings with itample opportunities for international cooperationin developing the state-of-the-art technologiesrequiredinArcticexplorationorintheexploitationof thenorthernmosttransitroutebetweenEuropeandAsia.5However,itshouldbekeptinmindthatRussia feels increasingly threatenedbythemyriadpossibilitiesforinteractioninthispreviouslyclosedregion.

A member of the Russian Security Council, YuriAveryanov,saidinarecentinterviewthatthemelt-ing permafrost is regarded as a serious threat tonationalsecurity.TheexistinginfrastructuresintheRussianArcticaswellasinlargepartsofSiberiaandtheFarEastareindangerofbecomingobsolete.Thispossibility, combinedwith the inefficientmanage-

5 Laulajainen,Risto(2009),”TheArcticSeaRoute”.InInterna

tional Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics,Vol.1,No.1,

2009.

mentofthefundingrequiredforthemassiverecon-structionoftheinfrastructuresandthesimultaneousopeningoftheArcticforinternationalinvolvement,posesapuzzlethatRussiahassimplynothadtocon-frontbefore.

Conclusions

Overtheyears,theEU’seasterntransportcorridorshave evolved into ‘axes’, ‘dialogues’ and ‘partner-ships’ which, taken together, form a network ofcomplementary yet competing venues for interac-tion.Thisnetworkservesmoreasavehiclefortheevolving discussion than for decision-making,although there are some examples of the latter aswell, such as the recent agreementon theNDPTL.Thus, although it is generally acknowledged thatboth the EU and Russia would gain substantiallyfrom better relations and more intensive coop-eration,theEU’seasterncorridorshavenot,byandlarge,fulfilledthehopesthatwerevestedinthem.

Thisispartlytodowiththedifferentpolicyhorizonsin the EU and Russia.The EU’s eastern corridorsweredesignedtorepairpreviouslylostconnectionsand,intheprocess,toconsolidatetheEU’stransportspaceasawhole.InRussia,thevisionofinfrastruc-turedevelopment is also about restoration,but ina reversed order.UnderpinningRussian transportstrategiesistheunderstandingthatthecountryhas‘lost’someofitsmajorinfrastructureinstallationsintheEuropeandirection.UnliketheEU,whichseesbenefitsininteroperability,Russiaismoreinclinedtowards safeguarding its independence from theinfrastructuresoftheadjacentcountries.

Theotherparthasmostlytodowiththegeneralpol-icyframeworkinRussia.EvenifRussiahasdeclaredthatitisinterestedtoworkwiththeEU insolvingthemany pending issues, the current administra-tiveregimeinitself impedesratherthanfacilitatestheimplementationofwhathasbeenagreedattheEU-Russia level.Thecorruptionthathas acquiredsystemic features in recentyears is another factorcharacterizing the general unpredictability of thepolicysphereinRussia.Inotherwords,thepoliticalframeworkofdecision-making inRussia, coupledwithitsinherentfeatures,suchastheindividualiza-tionofpowerandprevalenceofshort-terminterests,does not bode well for engagement in long-terminvestmentssuchasinfrastructureprojects.


Thissituationisunlikelytochangenotwithstandingthefactthatinfrastructure-building,especiallythedevelopment of the logistics sector, is highly pri-oritizedinthestrategiesforeconomicdevelopmentandmodernizationinRussia.Onthecontrary,theconstruction of major infrastructure installationsis likely to feed the corrupt system, unless therulesofthegamearechangedforgood. ThemanyagreementsonpracticalcooperationbetweenmajorRussianandEuropeantransportcompanieswould,however,seemto indicatethatsomethingisbeingdone,evenifthepolicyframeworkisfarfromper-fect.

TransportsecurityisoneofthesphereswhereboththeEUandRussiahaveindicatedtheirreadinesstocooperate.The jointworkingplan for theModern-ization Partnership notes possible cooperation inthe “Intelligent Transport System and road safetyimprovement”framework.Thissphereofcoopera-tioncouldbeextended,forexample, intheframe-workoftheNDPTL.However,thegeneralproblemof transport insecuritycannotbesolvedbysimplyincreasing theamountofmonitoring technologiesat themajor transporthubs inRussia. In fact, therecentlyadoptednewfederallawonsecurityhigh-lights themainweakness in theRussianapproach.(Transport)securityisviewedasanadministrativeissue subject to control andbureaucraticmanoeu-manoeu-vring.

Inthefuture,workinthetransportandinfrastruc-turesphereshouldextendinamorecoherentwaytotheArctic,especiallyinrelationtotheNorthernSea Route.The EU’s Arctic Communication fromNovember2008makesreferencetotheneedtohavea“holisticandsystemic”approachtotheArcticwithspecialemphasisonprotectionofthearea,sustain-able development of resources and improving themultilateral governance. However, the conceptu-alizationoftheArcticasapartoftheEU’seasterncorridorsisstillalongwayoff.Inthisframeworkinparticular,butinmoregeneraltermsaswell,highpriorityshouldbegiveninthedecision-makingtothesustainabilityandsecurityoftransport.

Katri Pynnöniemi


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