mr. michael vanrassen speaker briefing_ausa missiles conferen

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A P P R OV E D F OR P UB L I C R E L E A S E

C-RAM Program Directorate, ATTN: SFAE-C3T-CRM,

121 Research Blvd, Madison, AL 35758

26 – 27 April 2011

C-RAM Overview

13th Annual AUSA Missiles Conference

Mr. Michael Van Rassen

Program Director

UNCLASSIFIED

Any Soldier – Anywhere – All the Time… UNCLASSIFIED

• Mission:– Responsible for the overall management of activities related to research, development, acquisition,

fielding, and sustainment of automated Air and Missile Defense command and control systems, to include

Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) (ACAT II) and Air and Missile Defense

Planning and Control System (AMDPCS) (ACAT III).

– Serve as the Lead System Integrator for emerging Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) and

the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) System of Systems. Responsible for development of IFPC

C2 and the holistic C-RAM/IFPC capability; and ensuring effective interfaces are developed and

maintained between Air Defense C2 and C-RAM/IFPC systems and the Army Battle Command System

(ABCS)/Battle Command – Collapse, Command Post of the Future (CPOF), other services, and allied

nations.

• Products:

– Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) / Indirect Fire Protection Capability

(IFPC)

– Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2)

– Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS)

• Sheltered Systems and Communications Equipment

– Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) Cell

– Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Sheltered Systems

– Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Brigade Sheltered Systems

• Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS)

• Air Defense Systems Integrator (ADSI)

C-RAM Program Directorate

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• C-RAM Requirement– The Army validated a theater Operational Requirements for a system to destroy

rockets and mortar rounds in flight in Sep 04

• C-RAM Capability– In Sep 04, the Army directed the AMDCCS Product Office to complete a Proof-of-

Principle (PoP) test of their concept for a C-RAM capability

– Proof of Principle test was completed in Nov 04 with Phalanx destroying > 60 % of mortar rounds• CG CENTCOM observed, said it met theater requirements and requested immediate fielding

• Results of C-RAM PoP test briefed to VCSA, Sec Navy, and DepSecDef in Dec 04/Jan 05– C-RAM directed to conduct more stressing test – “If successful, Field Immediately”

• First increment of C-RAM test conducted in Feb 05 – validated Sense, Warn– ATEC CG said “field immediately” because “it can save lives”

– C-RAM Sense and Warn capability fielded to 1st FOB, just 4 months after Proof of Principle test

• Second test increment conducted in Apr 05 – validated Intercept capability– Two LPWS systems deployed to Initial FOB in May 05

• Multiple improvements have been incorporated, responding to Lessons Learned by soldiers and to respond to changes in threat tactics

C-RAM Requirement/Background


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Capability Fielded at some of these – Mission Now Expanding

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• Senses an Indirect Fire (IDF) round/rocket in flight. This is done by

integrating both Fire Finder and Giraffe radars and acoustic sensors, already at the Forward

Operating Bases (FOBs), and Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars (LCMRs) that are

procured and fielded by PD C-RAM.

• Warns personnel within the hazard area of the predicted impact point. A Commercial

Off-the-Shelf (COTS) warning device was integrated by PD C-RAM and fielded to FOBs to

provide timely, localized, and accurate Warnings.

• Intercepts the rocket or mortar round in flight, precluding lethal effects on the ground.

Intercept is performed by a modified US Navy Phalanx system.

• Coordinates/enables lethal or non-lethal Response to the insurgent IDF team.

Response by the Battle Captain is enabled by the integration of C-RAM C2 with Army and

Marine Corp battle command systems (AFATDS, MCS, C2PC) and UAV ground stations.

• Provides Command and Control by modified versions of standard Army C2 systems.

• Shapes the battlefield by assessment of threat data collected by C-RAM systems.

C-RAM Functions in Countering the IDF Threat


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• The use of RAM against US and Coalition forces is an enduring threat

• This threat continues in areas where US and Coalition forces are

drawing down or building up

• The C-RAM capability is now generally sought at all contingency

operations locations and requirements are vetted and approved on a

case-by-case basis

• As we install capability in new locations, we continue to build on the

successes and lessons learned

C-RAM Capability Expanding


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• As the C-RAM program transitions to an Army Program of Record (PoR), it will change names

and become the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)

– IFPC is planned to continue to be an evolutionary development program with

established Increments

• Increment 0 (current C-RAM) is an ADHOC organization

– Sustainment of Increment 0 is vital so as not to re-introduce a capability gap and to

provide a bridge to future efforts.

• Increment I, WARN for Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), will be the initial Army PoR effort

– Increment I, has little to no impact on current Army force structure as Warn

capabilities are being incorporated with existing ADAM Cell and Target Acquisition

force structure within BCTs and will provide them organic Sense and Warn capability

• The Army has also approved and funded the upgrade of the LPWS to increase its effective

range as requested by the Warfighter

– Force structure is being approved for composite Avenger/IFPC Battalions to receive

the upgraded LPWS systems

• Increment II will include improvements across all functional areas with principal effort focused

on additional or follow-on Intercept capabilities.

– The concept is to utilize the current architecture to be fully interoperable with Inc 0

and I, to fall-in on or take advantage of an already approved Force Structure

IFPC Increments


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• The next level of Joint Warfighting is required – NOW• As Operational Concepts shift from “System-Centric” focus to “Network-Centric” modular component-based (Plug and

Fight) architectures capable of operating within the Army and Joint integrated framework are a must• Given fiscal limitations, we must focus on the integration of existing systems and capabilities, across the Services,

leveraging on the vast investments in previous/current S&T efforts, inserting technological advances as they mature, and eliminating duplication of efforts in filling gaps

• Services and coalition partners need to continue close coordination to develop and deploy efficient, effective, holistic system of systems capabilities to meet the needs of the Warfighter in a timely manner

• For complex system of system integrations, a single Government Lead System Integrator or Project Office is needed and must be empowered to ensure the desired capability is delivered and it is not optimized for/by one component or another

• Capabilities must be able to take advantage of, and integrate with, any and all available sensors and shooters• There are never enough sensors, so you have to use all you have• Netting of sensors is vital -You can do more with less as well as more with more• All sensors are not the same, each having strong and weak points – netting all provides enhanced/complementary

coverage, overcomes weaknesses, and maintains surveillance when other systems are down• C2 is the key and backbone to the architecture• A common standardized C2 baseline which is fully interoperable with other battlefield functions is vital• All sensors produce false/unwanted detections and no one sensor or type of sensor can do the required mission• The right C2 and sensor mix can overcome other weaknesses in the system as well as missed events and false ones• Force protection and engagement operations require REAL-Time SA/SU, messaging, and data processing• Communications must support REAL-Time operations• Data must be limited to just what is required so it does not burden available communications capacity or tactical nets• Component data record capabilities are critical to forensic analysis, not only to determine what happened, but how the

system can be enhanced• All components must be tested and certified individually and as a system of systems• LIMIT THE DATA

Summary - Lessons Learned


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mr. michael vanrassen speaker briefing_ausa missiles conferen

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