mr 1978-6 couldfightoffensivelywin
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Bol d a ct i on s of t en br i n g vi ct or y t o a n um er i ca l l y i n f er i or
f o~ce. T h e A i r F or ce cr ea t es a n a i r cor r i d or 20 k i l om et er s
w i d e a n d 50 k i l om et er s d eep . E l em en t s of a n a i r a ssa u l t
d i v i si on p l u s a r t i l l er y su p por t a n d a n a i r ca va l r y com ba t
br i ga d e u se t h i s cor n ”d or by n i gh t t o p en et r a t e en em y f r on t
l i n es a n d est a b l i sh exp l oi t a t i on oper a t i on a l ba ses i n t h e
en em y r ea r . Ea ch ba se d ef en ded by a n i n f a n t r y com pa n y
m i gh t h ou se a n a r t i l l er y ba t t er y or con t a i n a FARRP t o
su pp or t t h e a t t a ck h el i cop t er ba t t a l i on s bu sy i n f l i c t i n g
m a x i m u m d am age on en em y r e8er ve8, comm a n d p ost s, l o-
g i st i cs com p l exes, a r t i l l er y p osi t i on s a n d com mu n i ca t i on
cen t er s. I f t h e cor p s l a u n ch ed a gen er a l a t t a ck a cr os8 i t w
f r on t w i t h t h e m a i n gr ou n d a t t a ck com i n g a l on g t h e a i r
cor r i d or r ou t e, t h e en em y w ou l d be f or ced t o gi ve gr ou n d . A
bol d p l a n w h i ch m i gh t w or k !
We Could Fight Outnumbered
--Offensively--and
Ma jor Ca lvin C . Seybold, U S Army Reserve
HSTORY is replet e w ith exa mples
of numerica lly in fer ior forces best -
ing their a dversa ries in ba tt le. U nfor-
t una tely , most of t hese confront a tions
a re repor t ed a s defensive a ct ions, a nd,consequent ly , t he published a ccount s
t end t o empha size the import a nce of
defensive t act ics. H ow ever , it is not t he
int ent nor purpose of t his a r t icle t o
present a hist orica l review of cam-
pa igns fough t long a go. Wha t w ill be
pm%-a yed is this
how w e, t he U S
ma ximum use of
a uthor’s concept of
Army, might ma ke”
our developed a tt ri-
but es t o fight offensively , out -
numbered—a nd w in !
The follow ing concept w as glea ned
from a review of t he la test Army lit er-a ture a va ila ble t o t he field. All refer-
ences a re da t ed in 1977. This is im-
portant . B eca use of t he ra pid
development of t echnology , milit a ry
concept s a nd procedures a re ext remely
per isha ble. Would a nyone conduct a n
exploit a t ion w it h just light in fa nt ry? I t
is not much of a n exploit a t ion a t 2%
miles per hour . How ever , how many
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MILITARY REVIEW
would a t t empt a n exploit a t ion w it h no
infa nt ry—w ho w ould prot ect t he t a nks
or t a ke out ha rd-t o-rea ch a nt ia ircra ft
sites?
This brings us to the most im-
port a nt a spect of this concept or , for
tha t ma t t er , a ny modern milit a ry
concept—a combined a rms a pproa ch.
How ever , this combined a rms a p-
proa ch w ill fea ture a tt a ck helicopters
a nd field a rt illery suppor t ed a nd sus-
t a ined by infa nt ry , a rmor a nd the US
Air F or ce.
The concept dea ls w it h a delibera te
a t t a ck to crea t e a penet ra t ion for t hepa ssa ge of highly mobile elements in a
deep dr ive int o the enemy’s rea r a rea s,
dest roying reserve forces, a rt illery, a ir
defense posit ions, comma nd post s, lo-
gist ics complexes a n d communica t ion s
cent ers. While the concept ma y not be
n ew , t he pr oposed pr ocedur es t o a ccom -
plish the mission a re.
The penet ra tion envisioned w ouldbe the result of a n ext ensive sup-
pression of enemy a ir defense (SEAD)
opera t ion a nd would, in a ctua lit y , be
a n a eria l penet ra t ion . This a eria l pene-
t ra t ion , or a ir corr idor , w ould be the
responsibilit y of t he Air Force sup-
por t ed by the ground forces. B eca use of
the coordina t ion a nd a sset s required
for this joint opera tion, t he opera tion
should not be conduct ed below corps
level.
This penet ra t ion of enemy a ir de-
fense ca pa bilit ies w ould require a t
lea st tw o da ys, a nd possibly a s long a s
a week, in order to crea t e a n a ir cor-
r idor of a t lea st 20 kilometers in w idth
a nd 50 kilometers in depth . I t is under-
st ood tha t it w ould be virt ua lly im-
possible t o neut ra lize a ll enemy a ir
defense in the a eria l penet ra t ion; .
however , sufficient degra da t ion of
en emy a ir d efen se a r tiller y ca pa bilit ies
could be obt a ined to a llow a night
pa ssa ge of element s of a n a ir a ssa ultdivision a nd a n a ir ca va lry comba t
br iga de (ACCB ) w ith minima l losses
(see F igure 1).
Once the Air Force comma nder ha d
forced t he a eria l penet ra t ion , he w ould
ha nd off t he opera t ion t o the Army
comma nder. At this t ime, t he a ir ca v-
a lry element s of t he ACCB would
scout t he a eria l penet ra tion corridorcrea t ed by the SEAD opera t ion t o
est a blish the sa fest rout es t hrough.
The ACCB scout s t hen would guide the
a ir a ssa ult element s t hrough to secure
exploit a tion opera tiona l ba ses deep in
the enemy rea r , proba bly betw een the
ma in a nd second defensive belt s (see
F igure 2.)
Major Calum C. Seybold, US Army Re.serve, M a student m the 1977-78 USACGSCRegular Course. He recetued a B.A. from theVwgmta Mdrtary Institute, an M.A from theUmvemwy of Oklahoma and an M, Ed. and aPh.D. from the Unwerslty of Utah, He hasserued with the 193d Infantry Brigade m theCanal Zone and uvth thd US Army SpecialForces m the Repubkc of Vwtnam.
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FIGHT OUTNUMBERED AND WIN
b
AIR CAVALRY COMBAT BRIGADE*
,x
nm
I 1 I I
““T SPr
BN
t I 1 I
““, @’:Ry
r I I I I 1 1
: ,,.s . . . . / MEL SW : ~&T ~A,NT ,...s ,s,, SP
!, ’0,AC,, ME,
L. ..., L.-__. J
r
I 1 .~~~~~~I A“GM, NTA,,oN
- FM 17.47, AI. Cw.air” Combm Br,g.ade Department .1 the Arm”L---.’
. Washington. D C 1977, D 3.2
Figure 1
This ent ire a irmobile opera t ion Wha t a bout t he rema inder of t heshould be init ia t ed a t night a nd con- corus forces dur ing this uer iod? Their
t inue unt il t ermina t ed by the com-
ma nder . As Field Manua l 71-2, The
Tank ,and Mechan ized In fan try Ba t-
ta l ion Task Force, su ccin ct ly st a tes:
The extra prob lems crea ted by ex.
t remely l im ited visib i l i ty shou ld not
d iscou rage planners, for each can be
overcome. Remember too, th e enemy
has the same prob lems and more. H e
does not k now w hen and from w here
the a ttack w il l come and any factor
w h ich lim its th e range of w eapons
fa vors the a t ta ck er . Ad d i t iona l ly , i t
w il l tak e the enemy longer to concen -
t ra te rein forcem en ts agains t the
a ttack . Lim ited visib i l i ty w il l of ten
crea te the cond i t ions necessa ry for a
su ccessfu l a tta ck . I
mo~ t effect ive us: w oul~ be t hrough
night -suppor t ing a t t a cks a long the’
ent ire corps front . E ven if t hey a re
out numbered, t hey should press t he
a t t a ck beca use, a t a min imum, they
w ill con fuse the enemy tempora rily a s
t o their int ent ions a nd fix him in pla ce.
“The ground a tt a ck follow ing t he a eria l
penet ra tion rout e should be w eigh t eda s hea vy a s possible a nd funct ion a s a
follow a nd suppor t element of t he corps
ma in a tt a ck.
The ma in a t t a ck would be a n a ir-
mobile opera t ion tha t w ould be com-
posed of t he ACCB a nd a t lea st tw o a ir
a ssa ult in fa n t ry br iga des w it h tw o
ba t t a lions of field a r t illery a nd re-
quired comba t suppor t a nd comba t
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MILITARY REVIEW
x
CORPS AERIAL PENETRATION/ENVELOPMENT
(SCHEMATIC) SUPERIMPOSED ON AN ENEMY
COMBINED 4RMS ARMY DEFENSE BELT CONCEPT
8 @
Third Defense Belt
@ @
@@
Second Defense Belt
@Exploitation Operational
x
:
x x
Main Defense Belt x
; x
x
00
0
Follow
and
1
Support
Attack
Figure 2
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FIGHT OUTNUMBERED AND WINf,
service support element s. We should
think in t erms of field a r t illery ba t -
t er ieein a direct support role toa tt a c~
helicopt er ba tt a lions a nd the infa nt ry
t a sked w ith prot ect ion of the forw a rd
a rea rea rm/refuel point s (FARRP s)
loca t ed in t he exploit a tion opera t iona l
a rea .
The exploit a t ion opera t iona l a rea
w ill consist of a t lea st 18 sepa ra t e
ba ses, ea ch w a rded by a compa ny of
infa nt ry , a nd no ba se closer tha n 2
kilometers t o a ny other . Opera ting in a
ra ndom sequence from these ba ses w ill
be six a rt illery ba t t er ies a nd four
FARRP s. At lea et tw o ba t t eries a nd
one FARRP w ill be opera t iona l a t a ll
t imes. E a ch a r t illery ba ttery a nd ea ch
FARRP w ill rot a t e betw een the 18
exploit a t ion opera t iona l ba ees (EOB S)
a t lea st four t imes per 24-hour per iod.
S tored a t ea ch EOB w ill be sufficient
fuel a nd ammunit ion to rea rm a nd
refuel a compa ny of a tt a ck helicopt ers
a nd a ba sic loa d of ammunit ion for a
field a rt iller y ba t ter y.
E a ch EOB w ill be under the pro-
t ect ion a nd cont rol of the infa nt ry
compa ny commander . He is respon-
sible for request ing a resupply of fuel
a nd ammunit ion to redelivered by t he
Air F or ce.
No a rt illery ba t t ery or FARRP
would opera t e from the same EOB a t
t he came t ime. I t w ould be the respon-
sibilit y of the a ir a ssa ult division G 3 t o
a pprove a nd cont rol the rot a t ion se-
quence for the a r t illery a nd FARRP s.
The a ir a ssa ult division a via t ion a eset s
w ould be required t o ineert t he infa nt ry
to secure the EOB S init ia lly a nd t o
rot a t e the field a r t illery a nd FARRP
a sset s. The resupply of the EOB S , a s
st a ted ea rlier , w ould be the responsi-
bilit y of t he Air Force. H elicopt er ma in-
t ena nce problems a nd ca sua lt ies w ould
be eva cua ted through the a er ia l pene-
t ra t ion corr idor to a id a nd ma inte-
na nce sta t ions loca t ed in a forw a rd
division rea r a rea .
I t is felt tha t rot a t ion of the a rt illery
a nd FARRP s would grea t ly increa se
their a bilit y t o survive while st ill a l-
low ing them to eupport a nd susta in the”
exploit a t ion mission of the ACCB .
Once the a irmobile element s suc-
cessfully negot ia t e the a er ia l pene-
t ra t ion a nd est ablieh exploit a tion oper -
a tiona l ba ses, t he ACCB ehould go into
a n exploit a t ion mission immedia tely .
S ince the ACCB ha s vir tua lly no ca pa -
bilit y t o hold ground, it must a t t a ck by
firez w it h tw o ma in purposes: t o
dest roy enemy forces a nd to depr ive
t he enemy of resources, demora lizing
him a nd dest roying his w ill t o cont inue
t he ba t tle.
The most obvious t a rget e for t he
ACCB w ould be enemy reserve forces,
a rt illery , a ir defense posit ions,
comma nd post s, logist ics complexes
a nd communica t ion centers. Theee
t a rget s a re idea lly suit ed for the a tt a ck
helicopters, a nd their dest ruct ion
should ha ve a n immedia t e impa ct on
t he enemy’e a bilit y t o prevent even anumerica lly in fer ior foe from ma king
gaine.
I f only one a t t a ck helicopter ba t -
t a lion of the ACCB wa s commit t ed to a
maximum-dest ruct miesion a t a t ime, ,
a nd the FARRP e were loca t ed a nd
survived in the exploit a t ion opera -
t iona l ba ees, t hen efficient disrupt ion
should be genera t ed w ithin t he
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MILITARY REVIEW
enemy’s rea r to ca use him to give
ground a long the ent ire corps front .
The Air Force w ould ma int a in loca l
a ir superior it y a nd enga ge enemy a ir
defense a r t illery , field a r t illery a ndcomma nd post a rea s, in tha t pr ior it y ,
unt il t he opera t ion t ermina tes.
Int elligent specula tion would
predict 30 to 40-percent losses a mong
the ACCB . Is tha t t oo high a price t o
pa y? Only t he comma nder in such a
situa t ion could make tha t determi-
na t ion. However , one fa ctor is
preeminent—the vict or in w a r must
a tt ack. Alt hough defensive opera t ion
ma y w ea ken the enemy a nd prevert
him from obt a ining his object ives, it M
the a t t a ck which brings decisive re-
Suits.j t ,
This a r t icl,e ha s a t t empted to con-
cent ra t e on tw o cent ra l themes for
fight ing offensively , out numbered: mo-
bilit y a nd concealment—mobility,
t hrough the a ir a sea ult divieion a ndthe a ir ca va lry comba t br iga de, a nd
con cea lmen t, ~ t h rou gh n igh t oper a tion s
a nd cont inua l displa cement s. H ere, ”
a lso, t he Air Force is responsible for
crea t ing t he penet ra t ion, a nd t he
a tt a ck helicopter ba tt a lions, w ith their
direct support field a r t illery , a re t he
ma in corpe a tt a ck element s. The a rmora nd in fa nt ry element e conduct a follow
a nd support miesion for t he ma in
a t t a ck. E lect ronic w a rfa re a nd field
a r t illery element s w ould ha ve prime
roles in this concept of offensive opera -
tions.
Obviously , noth ing new ha s been
st a t ed in mission or terminology.
How ever , t he rea lignment of t a sks
w ithin the t ra dit iona l comba t element s
of the Army could give us t he comba t
pow er neceesa ry to fight offensively ,
out numbered—an d w in !
NOTES
1 Freld Mamal ,FM, 71 2 The 18”, and &fech,”,z?O /nf.9”,r”
B.!,,!,.” le,h force Dewart,nent of the Army W,,h,ngton. D C
1977 P 4.47
2 FM 17.47 Arr Cava/r, Combat E?<,g#de.Demrtment al the
Awn, W. S”WJ,O” D C %977. D 3 1
3 FM 71 Z The Twu anti Mechwrzed In fantr, .9Wtat,on Task
Force. w c,t P 4 T
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