IAREP WORKSHOP on

“The Euro: Currency and Symbol”

3-5 July 2003

University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Moving to the Euro Currency System: Familiarisation Processesat the Introduction of the Euro

Annamaria S. de Rosa (University of Rome La Sapienza, Italy)1

Jorge Jesuino (I.S.C.T.E., Lisbon, Portugal)

Cristina Gioiosa (University of Rome La Sapienza, Italy

AbstractThe introduction of the Euro illustrates how Social Representations can also be constructed andintroduced through top down ideological processes. More than a mere medium of economic exchange,as symbolic generalized media (or better mediator), money can also convey meanings and feelings ofsocial identity. A case in point; introducing the Euro as a further way of reinforcing Europeanidentity. Given that the Euro as such had already been implemented three years earlier, in technicalterms such a measure was not indispensable. New coins and bank notes were, nevertheless, importantfor objectifying the representation of a new economic and political space. In an era where moneybecomes ever more virtual, such a measure appears to be a step backward. Instead, it actually aimsat providing a new collective image to European citizens objectified in a name: the Euro, and animage in the logo and in a variety of coins and notes that wisely combine national and unified symbols.The Social Representations Theory can here be applied to illustrate how such social psychologicalmechanisms are manipulated, as well as how they come to be received by the public at large.Goals: The familiarisation processes at the introduction of the Euro represented the main “object” ofthe empirical investigation carried out in Italy by de Rosa assisted by Gioiosa..Hypotheses: a) Familiarisation with the Euro occurs more via the effect of knowledge mediated bypractical experience and socio-economic transitions than by analytic-descriptive information. In aword, knowledge is re-cognition (visibility and functional value) rather than a detailed set of organisedcomplex information and meanings (for example, knowledge of symbols); b) Time and use influencefamiliarisation; c) There are differences depending on the age, the educational level and the referencecontext "workers/consumers of services"; d) In subjects having more difficulty with familiarisationwith the Euro, there is a change in payment strategies to avoid using cash.Method: Sample design: 239 subjects working in different contexts (Banks, Post Offices, Mega-stores, Retailers) and Consumers (Public Services, Business)Technique : A questionnaire about Familiarisation agents; Knowledge about the Euro; level ofsatisfaction; financial behaviours; socio-demographic profile of subjects. Analysis of print media andfocus groups on theIinternet. Interviews with key people.Results. Based on data collected between March and June 2002 and analysed by different statisticalprocedures including those derived from SPSS and HUDAP analyses, the results shows FamiliarisationProcesses to the euro accomplished especially by practice in sectors of daily life that are more markedby interaction and the use of the currency, that is, by socio-economic transactions, rather than receivinginformation via the media; there appears to be a polarisation in the degree of satisfaction at theintroduction of the new currency; subjecting the data to analyses of the structural type via Hudap, theydemonstrates a circular structure, showing the channels of familiarisation positively correlated to thelevel of education. In fact, together they occupy the centre of the structure. Inversely, they are outsidethe "cloud" when correlated to age. Older people are less familiar with Euro. The variables linked toattitude toward the currency change and familiarity with the political-economic phenomenon are alsolocated near, and therefore in relation to, the education level.

Keywords: eurocurrency, social representations, communication.

1 Corresponding author; Annamaria de Rosa, European Ph.D. on Social Representations andCommunication, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Faculty of Psychology 2, via dei Marsi, 79 – 00185 RomeItaly, Tel.:+39-06-4991-7544.; Fax: .:+39-06-4991-7652; e-mail: annamaria.derosa@uniroma1.it

IntroductionBetween “Europhoria” and “Europhobia”: an Euro-novel throughimages in the print media and on the Internet.

This small selection of images provides a clear picture of the novel of the Euro through extensivepublic awareness campaigns in both traditional print and new media (Internet) at crucial phasesbeginning with the Euro’s introduction in the stock market (January 1999 - see Fig. 1: Euro, newborder), then passing from its official birthday (1-1-2002) to a year later and finally its role in thesocial life of citizens of the 12 EU Member States that accepted its introduction and the replacement oftheir own national currency.

On the basis of these images it is possible to identify two attitudes towards the Euro. The first is“Europhoria” (see Fig. 2, 3, 4: from the web page of The Economist January 2002) and the second“Europhobia” (see Fig.5: also from the The Economist web site January 2002). The time sequence ofthese images, published in the course one year from the day that the Euro was introduced until its firstbirthday, makes us think of an evolution (if not regression) from the original enthusiasm for the newcurrency into a n equally pessimistic attitude, based on the experience of a year. In fact, the two polesof behavior were both already present in the social discourse, not without controversies, betweencountries and within countries (Both those that had accepted the Euro from its introduction and thosethat had declared themselves opposed to it).

Fig1. First page headline in the Italian newspaper “LaRepubblica” published 2 January 1999. “The Euro,the New Frontier”. In the photo: Frankfurt,hundreds of people around the Euro symbol.

Fig.2: The Economist January 2002:Dossier on the Euro of the Economist.

Fig.3: The Economist January 2002:Duisenberg presents the Euro.

At least concerning countries that from its introduction had emphasized the advantages linked to thenew currency, behaviour marked as Euro-phobia seemed only to appear over time. It is almost as ifcritical ideas had been submerged by the “pro” reasons, which, in reality, did not end with thefamiliarisation period. Even today it persists, reinforced by elements linked to daily life (especiallythe unjustified rise in prices) but also the difficulty in attributing the right purchase value to the coinsthat took the place of old paper notes. This even led to discussions on a specially created web siteabout the appropriateness of introducing 1 Euro paper notes (www.banconote.it) (see Fig. 6: Euroshopping).

The coexistence of Europhoria and Europhobia did not end even though during the introductionperiod the European Central Bank tried to transmit a reassuring image of the Euro’s entering into forcefor all of Europe (see Fig. 7).

These two representations of the Euro are even more striking if we look at the data recentlypublished in the Eurobarometer that shows interesting trends in support of the Euro from 1993-2002.

Fig.4: The Economist January 2002:Crossing the final bridge.

Fig.5: The Economist January 2002: Euro and the Britain’s people.

Fig 6. “Donna Moderna” March 2003: “ Food Shopping in Euros costs more” ….

“ even when it weighs a lot less.”

Fig 7. From the ECB web site: A hand holds theEuro’s introduction in Europe.

The first curve represents the percentage of subjects in favor in the countries that use the Euro(For: euro-zone average). Before 1994 there were 9 countries, 11 in 1995, and 12 in 2000.

The second curve represents the percentage of subjects in favor in countries that do not use theEuro (For: EU average). These were 12 in 1994 and 15 in 1995.

The third curve represents the percentage of subjects opposed in countries that do not use theEuro (Against: EU average).

Above all, support is much stronger in the countries of the Euro zone, compared to those that didnot wish to adopt the Euro. In addition, Euro zone countries show peaks in support corresponding tokey moments; the same periods in which countries opposed to the Euro demonstrate a substantial fallin support. Finally, immediately following these key moments, countries in favor demonstrate a verysubstantial drop in support, which was evident even in 2002. This demonstrates both the coexistenceand the different importance that arguments pro and con the Euro assume in social discourse,especially corresponding with particular moments that emphasize a special rhetorical dynamic.

1. A theoretical framework between media, communication and socialrepresentations.

As a social integration mechanism, communication is becoming increasingly difficult within aswell as between organizations and societies. At least in the western industrialized world, socialevolution has led to an increasing differentiation and complexification of institutions and respectivecoordinating processes. It is Durkheim’s problem: how solidarity is possible with the transition fromsegmented to organic societies. The collective representations linked to the cohesiveness of archaicsocieties seems no longer to be adjusted to the complexities and relative fragmentation triggered by thesocial division of work. With the benefit of hindsight, it could be said that hegemonic socialrepresentations also became fragmented into local or parochial modalities. But the problem ofintegration does not seem to have found a satisfactory solution in Durkheim’s sociology.

The answer and, perhaps, Max Weber’s (1947) major contribution to a better understanding ofsocietal evolution, was articulated in terms of rationalization. Modern organic societies reduceuncertainty through mechanisms of market and bureaucratization of Public Administration. Civilsociety becomes synonymous with liberal economic exchanges sustained by the rational normsimposed by national states. In more recent times, Talcott Parsons (1962) also attempted to draw agrand theory to explain the logic underlying complex societal structures and processes. For Parsons(1962), social systems are divided into four sub-systems or functions. They are the adaptive sub-system (the economy), the goal-attainment sub-system (the polity), the integrative sub-system (law andsocial control) and the pattern-maintenance sub-system (locus of cultural and value commitments).

Fig.8 Eurobarometer 58, March 2003, p. 61. Percentages of subjects favorable or contrary tothe introduction of the Euro from 1993 to 2002. The “don’t know” percentage is not shown.

These sub-systems are linked by what Parsons (1973) calls symbolic media; respectively money,political power, influence and value-commitment. The underlying idea in introducing this concept ofsymbolic media is to explain how the complexities of modern social systems can be overcomenotwithstanding the limitations of language.

As clearly summarized by Luhmann (1995) in elaborating on Parson’s model (1962),communication as a social integration mechanism is “exceedingly improbable”. First of all, it isimprobable that ego understands what alter means. Second, it is also highly improbable that themessage travels beyond its immediate addressees. Finally , it is also improbable that even whilereceiving and understanding the meaning intended by alter, that ego accepts to comply with theinjunctions proposed by alter. Insofar as communication is constitutive of social systems, this is madepossible through developing strategies that transform what is improbable into what is probable. Inevolutionary terms, as suggested by Luhmann (1995), the emergence of language contributed to anincrease in understandability beyond perception.

Dissemination media, such as writing and printing, extends the reach of addressees both in spaceand time. Finally, the symbolic generalized communication media aims at increasing the motivation toaccept.

The four symbolic media proposed and described by Parsons (1962) do not, however, have thesame epistemological status. As shown by Habermas (1987) in his work on Communicative Action,money and power are distinct from influence and value commitments. Money is the symbolic mediapar excellence. One can understand that without money, economic exchanges mediated by languagewould be difficult, lengthy and fuzzy. Without a doubt, we would still be at the barter stage. With theintroduction of an abstract and symbolic medium, (it is tempting to invoke here the thirdness of Peirce,economic exchanges become increasingly easier. From symbiotic they become symbolic. An importantconsequence of this kind of mediating mechanism is to facilitate, if not open, economic growth.Money has quantitative and qualitative properties that are both lacking in language. It can bemeasured, it can be saved, and it can be invested. Most of all, mechanisms such as credit clearlyillustrate the potentialities of its guiding role as a symbolic medium. Economic exchanges are nolonger a zero-sum but rather a mixed-sum game. Global wealth can thus increase due to thesuccessively ever more abstract avatars of money. According to Parsons (1973), the same processescan be observed in other media..

Symbolic power must be distinguished from the symbiotic reserve backing to which they areanchored. Force is to power what gold is to money, or sex is to love. Power is the media used inpolitical games. As such it also must be seen as a non-zero sum game, which amounts to saying thatsocial systems can increase their power capital as a symbolic medium supervening physical properties.Like the pecking order observed at sub-human levels, it can increase or decrease. Symbolic media areelastic in the sense that they can be shared by an ever-growing number of participants. The economicmetaphors here are inflation and deflation.

According to Parsons (1973), this same metaphor could apply to higher levels of social systems.As regards another symbolic medium, influence, Parsons invokes “the common belongingness in aGemeinschaft as the equivalent of gold for monetary and force for power systems” (1973, p.94). Theyare a kind of security base. Once again influence is elastic, not zero-sum. The more associative linksare established in the society, the more mutual influence can be exerted and the more cohesive thesocial fabric.

It is, however, questionable if money as a steering medium can be taken as an appropriatemetaphor beyond the economic and the political levels. According to Habermas (1987), and a centralidea of his theoretical approach, one has to distinguish or rather, in his words, “uncouple the systemfrom the lifeworld”. The concept of system allows for a sort of what Luhmann (1995) designated as“technicization” of the lifeworld. This can be observed in the economy and to some extent also inpolity. Steering media as money and power are instrumental for rationalizing societies, superveningand supplementing linguistic communication. But this “technicization” has its own limits. And thereason for that, as suggested by Habermas (1987), could be the fact that steering media when turnedinto action imply sanctions that only can work for money in the form of inducement, and at a certainextent for power in the form of deterrence. But these cannot be applied, as sanctions, neither forinfluence, nor for value commitment. Parsons (1962) suggests as a positive sanction for influence themechanism of “persuasion” and for value commitment the mechanism of “admonition”. As Habermas(1987) stated, “generalized means of communication such as influence and value commitment requireillocutionary acts and thus remain dependent on the binding effects of using language with anorientation to mutual understanding. Steering media such as money and power guide interactionthrough ego’s intervention in the situation of alter, through perlocutionary effects if need be” (1987,p.280).

In other words, soft processes such as persuasion or admonition are far from being as effective asinducement or deterrence. Habermas’ approach (1987) apparently aims at preserving a social spacewhere consensus is reached by “communicational action” rather than by the tacit mechanisms ofsteering media. Communicational actions so understood, are thus closer to free-floating linguisticdiscourses than to institutionalized codes of symbolic media.. Underlying Habermasian (1987)philosophy as currently understood, one finds the modernistic idea of preserving the role of the Actoralthough admitting the advances of the technicization of the lifeworld. What seems, however, to be atstake is to what extent the complexification of the economic and political sub-systems do not tend tocolonize the lifeworld, rendering the metaphor of money as symbolic media increasingly more globaland generalized.

Luhmann (1995), another author that took Parsons (1962) seriously and attempting to build on hissystem, suggests a rather different view of the role of communication and symbolic media . Accordingto Luhmann (1995), communication does not aim at leading to consensus. Or, to be more precise,consensus lives alongside dissent. In his own words: “if communication continues, a doublephenomenon of redundancy and difference emerges, and in this lies the content of communication’sprinciple of unrest. The concept of redundancy designates countless possibilities that fulfill the samefunction… A surplus of informational possibilities emerges, which is still functionally meaningfulbecause it makes the system independent of specific relations and protects it against the danger thatsomething will be lost… This alone can produce the impression of objectivity, of normative orcognitive correctness… But at the same time communication produces difference. If all informationprocessing amounted only to redundancy, the danger of unanimously accepted misconceptions wouldbe too great. That this cannot be eliminated is well known; the rapid spread of truly narrow-mindedintellectual fashions, which are suited to communication precisely because of that narrow-mindedness,supplies ever-new occasions to observe this. But communication systems always simultaneouslyproduce self-corrections. Every communication invites protest… In this way communication setssystem formation in motion” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 172-173).

In a word, the media process reduces and at the same time increases the improbability of success.It stabilizes but also destabilizes. It closes but also opens the system. It is also in this sense thatcommunication could be understood as constitutive of social systems, explaining the apparentparadoxical circularity of groups defined by the social representations that they produce. It is thiscontinuous gestalt switch between genesis and structure that could be labeled, according to Luhmann(1995), as autopoiesis in the sense of self(social)construction.

With hindsight, it could be argued that the very idea of the emergence of new forms throughsymbolic media was already present in Parsons (1973). It suffices to recall the non-zero sum propertyas one of the main features of the media, largely ignored by Habermas (1987) as well as by e readersthat insist in the statism of the structural-functional approach. In Parsons own words: “The introductionof a theory of media into the kind of structural perspective I have in mind goes far, it seems to me, torefute the frequent allegation that this type of structural analysis is inherently plagued with a staticbias, which makes impossible to do justice to dynamic problems. Let me, then again, insist that underthe category of dynamic I mean to include both equilibrating processes of structural change” (1973, p.98-99).

So, instead of confining the role of symbolic media to economic and political exchangesobservable in social systems, what is proposed by Parsons (1973) and his followers is to extend themedia metaphor to higher levels of analysis, as it is in the case of the generalization to the actionsystem in which social systems are embedded. Such a generalization inevitably implies highersymbolic complexity. The level of action system comprises, according to Parsons (1973), four systemsthat are respectively the personality system, the behavioral system, the cultural system and the socialsystem. This second round of generalizing the concept of media leads to the identification of newmedia of intelligence (behavioral system), performance capacity (personality), affect (social system)and interpretation (cultural system), which in turn allow for additional specifications. Such aproliferation of media is viewed by Habermas as rendering “the structural analogies to the moneymedium increasingly unclear and the conceptual specifications increasingly abstract and imprecise –in the end, merely metaphoric” (1987, p.258).

But, as Habermas (1987) also admits, we are facing a “work in progress” (ibid.). As a matter offact, the generalization of media was addressed by Parsons only in the 1970s, and developed later byauthors like Luhmann (1995), Charles Lidz and Victor Lidz (1976), Loubser (1976), Alexander,Schluchter, Münch (1987) and others. Luhmann (1995), in particular, has greatly contributed to thedevelopment of a new conception of systems theory in which the concept of generalizedcommunication media play a central role. In his words, “the most successful and most relevant

communication in contemporary society is played out through these media of communication, andaccordingly, the chances of forming social systems are directed to the corresponding functions…Language, dissemination media, and symbolically generalized communication media are thusevolutionary achievements that interdependently ground the process of information and increase whatcan be produced by social communication. This is how society produces and reproduces itself as asocial system” (1995, p. 161-162).

In particular as developed by Luhmann (1995), the theory of symbolic media might cast some lightin articulating the theory of Social Representations with (Social) Communication. It helps to drawattention to the need of not limiting the communication processes at work at the genesis of socialrepresentations, to language and mass media, but rather to extend it to the level of symbolic media, ormore precisely, to the interplay of these three interdependent levels.

In his work “La Machine à Faire des Dieux”, Serge Moscovici (1988), in suggesting that money isa social representation, already seemed to be aware of the potentialities of symbolic media for a betterclarification of the underlying dynamics of social representations. In a more recent text, the idea isreiterated in the following terms:

“I suppose that social representations in movement more closely resemble money than language.Like money they have an existence to the extent that they are useful, circulate, take different forms inmemory, perception, works of art, and so on, while nevertheless always being recognised as identical”(1998, p.244).

I am not suggesting that Moscovici (1988) borrowed from Parsons (1962, 1973) or Luhmann(1995), at least in the sense of adhering to their theories of social systems, but rather that he is aware ofthe need for going beyond language, or even the mass media, I would add, in order to achieve a morecomplete understanding of the constitutive role of communication in social representations.

In this light it also could be argued that the traditional trichotomy of diffusion, propagation andpropaganda as mass media mechanisms, although necessary, are not sufficient for a fullunderstanding of the structure and genesis of the object (socially) represented. As Moscovici (1961)commented in La Psychanalyse, a complete account would require assessing the effects ofcommunication strategies in targeted audiences. The theory of symbolic media, in focusing on the aimof increasing the motivation to accept , could thus help in going further.

The suggestion made is, in the first place, that social representations linked as they are to commonsense, take place at the more abstract level of the action system. Within the action system they anchorin the behavioral sub-system. In other words, its function is above all adaptive. The symbolic mediumoperating at this level, as suggested by Parsons (1973) and associates, is intelligence. Intelligence isunderstood here as media and not as trait, either individual or collective. One can start by accepting theconventional definition of intelligence as “the capacity to mobilize resources to the solution ofcognitive problems” (Parsons, 1973, p.105-106). But what appears less conventional in the Parsonianview of intelligence is the social dimension attributed to the way it circulates. Circulability is onemain features of symbolic media. The structural equivalence with the root metaphor of money seemsvery clear. Intelligence is not only something that a person has, but rather a fluid resource that can beacquired and enhanced in the course of action and effectively used by being spent. This points to asecond major property, the capability of growing, of displaying “non-zero sum” features. Parallelingthe paradigmatic case of money, the intelligence as media “places the individual in a network ofinterchange transactions where he can not only acquire such assets but also use those he has in thefurther interchange system” (Parsons, 1973, p.106).

Another major feature of intelligence, and again structurally equivalent to money, has to do withinstitutionalization. According to Parsons, institutions are here to be understood as “complexes ofnormative rules and principles which, either through law or other mechanisms of social control, serveto regulate social action and relationships – of course, with varying degrees of success” (Parsons, 1973,p.97). In the case of intelligence, the institution is the university in the broad sense of a collegial(democratic) association, distinct from either markets or hierarchies.

In further developments of the theoretical framework, Lidz and Lidz (1976) examine the foursubsystems of the behavioral system, which help to map the functional field symbolically mediated byintelligence. We then have the subsystem of perception associated with the adaptive function; thesubsystem of interpretation linked to the goal-attainment function; cooperation, that is, the“coordinated efforts of a plurality of individuals” associated with the integrative function; and finallygeneralized abstractions – such as collective representations, symbols, categories, beliefs, andhypotheses, linked with the pattern-maintenance function.

To complete the ambitious conceptual framework designed by Parsons (1973), it is worthwhile tomention the other symbolic medium of affect circulating in the action system and complementing therole played by intelligence. In Parsons’ words “affect is the generalized medium most definitely

concerned with the mobilization and control of the factors of solidarity in Durkheim’s sense” (Parsons,1973, p.109). Affect as a generalized circulating medium also expresses the dual role of social systems,in the sense of positing an external environment internally constructed.

Borrowing from Schutz and Husserl , as Habermas reminded us, “the lifeworld forms the setting inwhich situational horizons shift, expand, or contract. It forms a context that, itself boundless, drawsboundaries” (1987, p.132). Drawing boundaries could thus be interpreted as a constitutive step forsolidarity.

Anchoring social representations at the level of the action system does not mean that analysisshould not be not pursued at lower levels of abstraction, namely at the level of the social system, linkedby the symbolic media of money, power, influence and value commitment. Neither does it exclude themore immediate linguistic exchanges nor those mediated by the mass communication.

With all their vulnerabilities, grand theories offer the secure advantage of proposing a generalframework where one can map intellectual itineraries and research strategies. At best, they also help tounderstand the boundaries of the system where the observer, not always aware of it, is confined.

2. The case of the Euro: a generalised symbolic media/mediator. In terms of initiating new practices, new related representations and a new international, political,

economical and social order, the recent introduction of the eurocurrency in 12 of the 15 countries ofthe European Union constitutes an unique event. it is probably yet another step towards globalization.The story of the Euro is a success story that was carefully prepared long before it became materiallyvisible in bank notes and coins in January 2002.

Initiatives of such scope within a democratic space like the European Union can no longer betaken unilaterally by national governments without the clear support of their populations. In the case ofthe Euro, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden remained outside as such support was notgranted, although probably not for long as suggested by recent surveys .

Beyond national consultations and political debates, the process of introducing the Euro wascarefully accompanied by both standard and specific systematic surveys aimed at assessing the beliefsand attitudes of people towards the Euro. We now have an important body of information that allowsus to examine the evolution of public opinion on this specific subject. In parallel, many other studiesconducted by social scientists also contribute to provide a more comprehensive view of the topic.

Briefly summarising Eurobarometer findings, people in the 12 countries that adhered to the Eurobelieve they are well informed (86%) and consider the Euro more convenient for travelling (93%),purchasing in the Euro zone (90%), for comparing prices (87%) and to a lesser extent, for eliminatingtransfer payments (47%) and extra charges (45%). People also believe that the Euro will become aninternational currency like the dollar (68%),as well as providing price stability (60%) and, to a lesserextent, will contribute to reduce differences in development (46%). In terms of job creation, only 26%believe that the Euro could be of some help. In terms of attitudes, 26% of the people feel happy thatthe Euro has been adopted and 60% now feel more European.

Fig.9 Flash Eurobarometer, May 2002, n°121-3. Attitudes to the euro.

Concerning less positive attitudes, the Eurobarometro findings show that people think that theintroduction of the Euro led retailers to round off the prices to the higher amount (83%) and only aminority of Europeans (18%) are using the Euro as their only mental yardstick currency for purchases.The introduction of the Euro is also seen as a loss of national identity and loss of control over nationaleconomic policy as well as social policy.

From the standpoint of the Theory of Social Representations, the Eurobarometer findings are ofinterest for various reasons. It can be said that the nature of the questions used in the surveys is notsubstantially different from those used in current studies of Social Representations.

In addition, as a rule, the design of the questionnaires was developed by competent socialscientists who, in the case of some surveys, were guest experts familiar with the theory of SR. Theapparent triviality and superficiality of the results that were made public via Internet and the media canalso be submitted to secondary analysis and eventually lead to more enlightening interpretations.

An obvious development of the findings presented above would be to disaggregate the dataestablishing comparisons between and within nations. Such a research strategy would aim at findingsociological or, at best, psycho sociological anchorings. This is , in addition, one of the most commonprocedures used in social studies of public opinion. It cannot be denied that this research strategy couldlead to interesting and useful results. For example, returning to the Eurobarometer data , it is of interestto note that among the three "pre-in" nations, the UK is the one more resistant to the idea of monetaryintegration. This is true even though 65% of the British population is convinced that the Euro, sooneror later, will be introduced in the country and replace the pound.

Fig.10 Eurobarometer 56,2, October-November 2001. The Euro and National Identity.

Fig.11 Tracking Flash Eurobarometer 56,2, March 2000-May 2002, "Attitudes on the euro(Euro Zone)" p.25

Also unique in the British data is their feeling towards the European identity as a consequence ofthe introduction of the Euro. In November 2001, 41% of the British respondents declared they felt a bitless European with the arrival of the Euro in the 12 European countries. This is rather higher than the24% seen in Denmark and the 16% in Sweden.

One possible reason for the UK’s relative reluctance vis-à-vis the Euro, if not the EuropeanUnion, could be related to information seeking, or maybe the media strategy, which also appears to besignificantly lower than in other countries.

We would like however to submit that the Theory of Social Representations could be invoked to

Fig.12 Tracking Flash Eurobarometro 56,2, March 2000-May 2002, "Attitudes on theeuro (Euro Zone)" p.25

Fig.13 Tracking Flash Eurobarometro 56,2, March 2000-May 2002,"Attitudes on the euro(Euro Zone)" p.25

Money, beyond its obvious interest for economists and political scientists, has also been on theagenda of social scientists for a long time.

One example is Simmel (1995), who wrote a rather voluminous Philosophy of Money in which themediated function of money became the symbol of all mediation processes. Things acquire meaning bybeing related to one another through the mediation of money. Money thus objectifies the symbolicmediation taking place between a subject and an object. Over and above its economic functions, itsymbolizes and embodies the modem spirit of rationality, of calculability, of impersonality. Moneylevels qualitative differences between things as well as between people.

The mediation role gives money symbolic properties similar to language. Classical economistshave always stressed that money, like linguistic symbols, has value in exchange, but not value in use.

As mentioned above, Talcott Parsons (1973) also became aware of the importance of themediation role of money, which is at the core of its theory of generalized symbolic media ofinterchange. Other symbolic media observable in social systems are, according to Parsons, power,influence and value commitment.

Symbolic media have both quantitative and qualitative properties that permit the extension ofcommunication between people beyond language games. Money can be institutionalised through legaltender, it has specific meaning and effectiveness in both evaluation and interchange. It circulates,changing hands, and is elastic, that is, it could not have a zero-sum character attributed to it in allcontexts. This last property of elasticity, an outcome of credit creation, acquires a special importance inhigher level symbolic media such as power and influence.

When, for example, as found in Eurobarometer data, people declare that the introduction of theEuro contributes to increasing European identity but decreasing national identity, they seem toreason in terms of a zero-sum game rather than in terms of elasticity. Media experts could contributetowards a n improved clarification.

Again invoking Simmel (1995), it could also be argued that the substance-value of money isnever entirely lost, even in its most abstract forms of exchange. This could explain its symbolic role inexpressing and reinforcing the social identity. Money became important as a symbol of nationalidentity particularly from the nineteenth century onwards, when nations replaced the legal circulationof multiple currencies with the exclusivity of their national currency. As such, the degree of acceptanceand prestige in the international scene of currencies like the dollar, the pound or the yen, can by thesame token reinforce the pride of group belongingness. On the hand, economically weaker currenciesdo not have the same capacity for boosting national pride.

Various aspects can therefore be related to the social representation of money. In a seminal studyconducted in France in the early 1990s, Pierre Verges (1992) found that such a representation could beorganised at different levels: as a substance, as an exchange catalyst, as a standard of the economicsystem and also as merchandise.

At the first level, money is a substance objectified in bank notes or coins, or recalls things (goodsand services) that can be purchased. At a second level, money reflects currency circulation throughbuying and selling, as well as the effects of that circulation on the quality and style of life. At the thirdlevel, money is represented in more abstract terms as a value manipulated by economic and financialinstitutions.

Pierre Verges (1992) adopted the usual qualitative method of free association, in this casetriggered by the word money. The structure of three layers that he found covers only 56% of theevocations, which suggests that many others, less central, could also be candidates for giving meaningto the representation.

Meaning plays a key role in the theory of social representations, as introduced by Serge Mocovici(Moscovici & Markova, 1998). Meaning is referred to here in the Husserlian sense of "horizon" ofpossibilities, present in every one of its actualisations. The "difference that makes a difference" in theBateson’s famous formula.

The same idea was developed by Nikolas Luhmann (1995), another author that gave credit to theParsonian theory of generalised symbolic media. For Luhmann (1995), as well as for Moscovici(Moscovici & Markova, 1998), meaning is actualised at the interface of the "psychic system" with the"social system", which amounts to conceptualising the object of social psychology in terms of themeaning processing system of communication.

It is in this light that we can understand that the most heuristic strategy for studying socialrepresentations is still the one introduced in "Psychanalyse - son image et son public" where meaningis actualised in terms of the difference between scientific and lay discourses,as it could also take placebetween scientific discourses, or between lay discourses.

What appears , however, to be innovative in Luhmann's approach (1995) is the role attributed tothe dynamics of the social system, as a consequence of the role played by the symbolic media.

Re-elaborating Parson's model (1962; 1973), Luhmann (1995) begins by drawing attention to thefact that communication as a social integration mechanism is "exceedingly improbable". First of all, itis improbable that ego understands what alter means. Beyond that, it is also highly improbable that themessage travels beyond the immediate addressees. Finally, it is also improbable that even receivingand understanding the meaning intended by alter, that ego accepts to comply with the injunctionsproposed by alter. In so far as communication is constitutive of social systems, this is made possibledeveloping strategies that transform what is improbable into probable.

In evolutionary terms, the emergence of language was the first step. Language contributes toincreasing the comprehension of the message beyond perception. A second step is accomplished withthe dissemination of writing and printing, extending the reach of addressees both in space and in time.Finally, due to the highly codified routines and implicit norms, the symbolic generalisedcommunication media contributes to increase the motivation to accept.

However, for Luhmann (1995), communication does have the goal of leading to consensus, asclaimed, for example, by Habermas (1987). According to Luhmann (1995), consensus lives alongsidedissent. In his own words, "if communication continues, a double phenomenon of redundancy anddifference emerges, and in this lies the content of communication's principle of unrest... Everycommunication invites protest" (Luhmann 1995, p. 172).

In a word, the media process reduces and at the same time increases the improbability of success.It stabilises but also destabilises. It closes but also opens the system. It is also in this sense thatcommunication can be understood as constitutive of social systems, explaining the apparentparadoxical circularity of groups defined by the social representations they produce. It is thiscontinuous and dynamic rather than static "gestalt switch" between shared and non-shared, betweenconsensus and dissent, that the social systems evolve.

A generic approach to social representation would, therefore, give priority to dissent, to conflictingviews, to the work of the negative, not in terms of attitudes (being in favour of or against).

To return to the case of the Euro, an alternative to the Eurobarometer approach could be theanalysis of Eurocrat decisions related to the symbols adopted for representing the Euro currency.

As told by the experts, this decision was far from easy. From the standpoint of policy makers,the problem was to arrive at a consensus about eligible symbols that could objectify a sharedrepresentation of Europe.

They could be historical figures. But Homer was considered much too Greek, Goethe much tooGerman, Victor Hugo much too French. The same impasse appeared with landscapes, as well asartistic monuments.

In the end, the solution found was rather abstract, at least for the bank notes. The selected symbolsare: a bridge, with a starting point but no clear end, monumental doors and windows with ancientcomposite styles. It was as if the meaning they intended to convey was elusive, floating abovenational cultures, devoid of an integrated social memory and no less vague in terms of a projectedfuture.

If we compare the Euro notes with the dollar, the contrast is striking. As remarked by BrunoThévet (2002), on dollar bank notes there is a reference to the governmental authority backing thelegal tender, the image of institutional buildings, such as the White House, the Capitol, the USTreasury, historical figures such as Lincoln, Franklin, Hamilton, Grant, and Washington; various crestsas well as the seals of the Federal Reserve System and of the Department Of Treasury.

Above all, two statements summarize the very theory of money without intrinsic value: on thefront side "This note is legal tender for all debts, public and private" and on the reverse "In God wetrust".

The intended meanings of both statements are straightforward. The first one links modern moneyto the debt, not only to commercial exchanges. It may therefore also be used for tax payments, aswell as for the public debt.

The second statement, not with standing its religious flavour, conveys the important idea that asymbolic medium does not work without trust, an idea very much stressed by Luhmann (1995) andalso by Simmel (1995). In Parson’s (1962; 1973) complex architecture, the economic subsystem islinked to the fiduciary subsystem through the media of money and value commitment. In other words,the value of the money is grounded in a general system of ethical values that confers consistency andlegitimacy to the societal system.

Compared to the dollar, as well as with former national currencies, the newborn Euro seems to bedevoid of both ethical and institutional prerequisites.

It may be conceded that for the coins an effort was made to reach a compromise between commonand national identities. Euro coins display a sketchy map of Europe common to all participatingcountries on one side. On the reverse side, the images displayed vary from country to country.

The message seems clear: Europe is to be constructed under the aegis of diversity rather thanaiming to be a sort of melting pot.

It is also curious and worthy of note that the variety of the coins may have attracted the attentionof collectors across Europe, to the point of contributing to moderate the estimated speed of itsdiffusion.

This could open another window for social scientists to deploy their talents.Be that as it may, however, it is doubtful that the strategy adopted for the coins will be sufficient

to compensate for the fuzzy iconic representation displayed on the bank notes or, just the opposite,whether it further reinforces the ambiguities surrounding the political construction of the EuropeanUnion.

3. How average people experienced the change: Eurocurrencyfamiliarisation processes between the introduction of informationcampaigns and daily use.

The switch to the Euro represented a special moment, a natural experiment, in which the Euro asa symbolic medium collected the desires, expectations and dreams of institutions, organization and,above all, the common man.

Our research, therefore, begins with the daily life of that man who was in the town square in themidst of New year’s celebrations in 2002, with Duisenberg when he announces the birth of the Euroon television, the institutions that from 1999 began a broad information and education campaign tohelp people to familiarise themselves with the new currency and finishes today when the Euro hasbecome the “guilty party” of current inflation. This is not only stated by average people but evenrecently by Duisenberg during a press conference 26 December 2002 when he said, “the Euro hasoverheated inflation In Europe. Perhaps we should have been more honest and explain that the effectof the Euro on prices would have been limited in any case.” (source: “la Repubblica”, 27-12-2002,p.3)

In any case, the Euro’s introduction was characterized by a n extensive information and educationcampaign co-financed by the ECB and individual governments that involved all the countries in amajor way. “The necessary preparations for the transition to the Euro were initiated according to acalendar that assigned distinct and precise tasks to institutions and monetary authorities. PreparingEurope for the currency change is the responsibility of the European Commission, which prepared aglobal communication project: “A currency for Europe”. The information was first centralized andchanneled via traditional media, special events, exhibits and information tools useable in the 11 officiallanguages of the European Union. At the same time, each interested country prepared the legal basesand developed the necessary structures for the transition to the common currency (“l’Euro è entrato nelquotidiano”, p.1).

On January 1, 1999, the subjects involved were: 11 countries, around 300 million people and 15million companies in 15 member states of the European Union. In Italy, under the guidance of theECB, that task was assigned to the bank of Italy for the economic aspects and for the regulatory aspect,to the Ministry of the Treasury which established the Euro Committee on September 12, 1996.

Fig. 14 “ The Euro comes into the daily life.” 2002, from an advertisement of the EuroCommittee.

“It was instituted on September 12, 1996 via a Ministry of the Treasury, Budget and EconomicPlanning decree following a June 27, 1996 directive from the President of the Council of Ministers. Ithas the task of organizing the transition from from the Lira to the Euro. It coordinates initiatives tointroduce the Euro into the Italian economic and legal systems and is composed of public and privaterepresentatives from the economic, financial and corporate worlds.” (“2000€EURO: The challenges offinancial administration”, 1999)

It was located at the Ministry of the Treasury and was made up 24-30 members, excluding thePresident, coming from:• civil service• other authorities, agencies and public administrations with national importance• representative organizations from local government• major industrial and professional associations• labor union representatives• representatives appointed by the national consumers council

At the local level, the task of transmitting information was given to the Provincial committee forthe Euro. The campaign was of the information variety , including timing and means of introductionand the value and form of each of the coins and bills. Short, simple and clear sentences weretransmitted via the press, television, radio, Internet, billboards were placed along principle routes, andbrochures and posters to display inside public institutions. These were all designed to facilitate thetransition to the Euro from the emotional viewpoint as well.

Begun in 1997, the information campaign was divided into three phases, each of whichemphasized a specific aspect:• from 1997 to 1998, promotion of the European Identity;• from 1 January 1999, highlight the arrival of the Euro. The target: progressive familiarisation with

the new currency;• from summer 2001, the most intensive phase. 2 types of information formats that contained brief and

precise information concerning substitution of the currency, the fixed rate of exchange, rulesconcerning rounding off, and emotional formats to give a sense of security about the Euro’sintroduction.

Subcommittee:

The Euro Committee worked in collaboration with the Bank of Italy, which since 1996 hadinternally instituted a Coordination Committee for Economic and Monetary Union that hadresponsibility for:

• disseminating and implementing the ECB’s economic directives concerning the Euro incollaboration with other European banks

• direct education about Euro bank notes and coins:• public sector• private sector• citizens• disseminate publicity to facilitate the economic transition• disseminate information concerning Euro bank notes and coins

MINISTRY OF TREASURE

EURO COMMITTEE

Provincial Committee for the Euro

Local public and private authorities

Public

administration

Finance

Enterprises

Fig.14 Methods of education and information about the Euro: the Euro Committee.

EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY

By hypothesising links between knowledge systems, social representations and social practices(de Rosa, 2000) of the dialog and circular type, we were able to formulate the following hypotheses:

- Familiarisation with the Euro occurs more via the effect of knowledge mediated by practicalexperience and socio-economic transitions than by analytic-descriptive information. In a word,knowledge as re-cognition (visibility and functional value) rather than a detailed set of organisedcomplex information and meanings (for example, knowledge of symbols),- Time and use influence familiarisation,- There are substantial differences between groups depending on age, educational level and thereference context "workers/consumers of services",- In subjects having more difficulty with familiarisation with the Euro, there is a change inpayment strategies to avoid cash.To verify those hypotheses we created a semistructured questionnaire and administered it to a

sample of 239 subjects in the city of Rome in the period between February and June 2002. They weredivided into:

• Work Contexts:• Banks• Post Offices• Megastores• Retailers• Users:• Public Services• Business

After a preliminary agreement with management in each of the work contexts investigated, in eachsituation the interviewer introduced himself/herself with a letter of introduction that contained thegoals and objectives of the survey. They administered the questionnaire during the work day, for thosewho were working, and in front of businesses and agencies for those who intended to visit publicservices and private businesses. The interviewer was always available for any necessary clarificationfor both individual subjects and managers. The sample was balanced as in each context investigatedthe same number of subjects were interviewed.The questionnaire contained 35 questions with multiplechoice responses grouped by the following areas of knowledge: Socio-demographic Data,Familiarisation Agents (questions 5, 6, 27, 28, 29), Knowledge about the Euro (questions 8- 26, 35),Level of satisfaction (questions 1- 4, 7, 30 -33), Financial Behaviours (question 34). The questionswere ordered on the basis of their intrusiveness. In addition, questions that required cognitive abilitywere centrally positioned as recognition and memory competencies.

The Familiarisation Agents were divided in the following ways. These choices were in part basedon what had emerged from the Eurobarometer data and in part on the recognition that these agenciesreally represent two different ways of collecting information. One is more tied to traditional media andthe other, to daily transactions:

• Via information:• newspaper• radio

Fig.15 Methods of education and information about the Euro: the Bank of Italy.

BANK OF ITALY EURO COMMITTEE

BCE

BANKS POST OFFICES CITIZENS

Coordination committee forEconomic and Monetary Union

RETAILERS

• television• Internet• Treasury Ministry• Via transaction:• Daily food shopping• Interaction with people• Bank employees• Public service employees

For the aspect linked to Knowledge about the Euro, the following areas were investigated. Theyare linked to the aspects that, from an analysis of of institutional data found ineducational/informational materials distributed by the Bank of Italy and the Euro Committee, werefound to be most important:

• Recognition of bank notes and coins• Recognition of the symbols present on the Euro bank notes and coins• Knowledge of the cultural aspects linked with the Euro• Knowledge of the security and anti-counterfeiting features• Perception of the value of products in Lire or in Euros

Finally, the Level of satisfaction was evaluated while remaining aware that satisfactionconcerning the Euro was not simply a n individualistic and abstract fact, but tied to concrete aspects ofdaily life:

• Difficulties linked to the introduction of the Euro• Advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of the Euro• Perception of the behaviour of commercial agents• Level of security in working with the new currency

On the basis of these constructs and the indices created to evaluate them, it was possible to obtainthe following results.

Familiarisation and Practical Experience: As is seen in in the graph, “Recognition front face ofbank note “ This reproduces the answers by categorizing them according to the criterion: “No answer”- subject’s complete lack of response ,“wrong” - making an error in an attempt to respond correctly,“2 mistakes” - correct response after 2 errors, “1 mistake” - correct response after 1 error, “correct” -immediate correct response.) The number of “no answer” is very low while “1 error”, “2 errors”, and“wrong answer” are centrally located. Interesting is the presence of the highest response frequenciesfor “1 error”, compared to the other two answers and, especially concentrated for the larger coins.There was a totally different tendency for the “correct responses” that are positioned with a highresponse rate and a trend that lowers somewhat only for 50 and 10 Euros. In the second graph therate of “no response” is very low, such as “1 error”, “2 errors”, while “incorrect response” is onceagain centrally located,even if it drops substantially for the lower valued currency, especially for 5Euros. The trend is different for “correct responses” that are located with high rates of response and alow trend for the higher amounts that little by little grows for the lowest amounts.

Fig.14 Recognition front face and back face banknote

Comparing the results concerning the recognition of bank notes with those in fig. 15, we note that,in general, these rates were higher than the rate of recognition of the bank notes. It is probable thatthis result, which goes against the importance of the perceptive datum, such as the largeness of thebank notes compared to coins, is due above all to the transactional experience linked to the use ofautomatic tellers and to the fact that it is difficult to use the bank notes, especially for small dailyexpenses. It is much easier to use the coins and therefore, they are better known.

In particular, the correct response is very high, that of “no response” for coins is almost zero,“incorrect response” and “2 errors” are on the whole more than “1 error”.

Insert imagine

A very interesting aspect that emerged from the data is that during the whole interview period,from February to June 2002, people use and recognise the Euro, but do not "know" its symbols. Infact, they did not remember the symbols present on the bank notes and coins.

Information reached all of us via various means; the traditional media (newspapers, radio,television) and the new media (Internet) which, in fact, represented one of the most targeted andexhaustive information tools, even if the least used. As concerns information sources, the Ministry ofthe Treasury seems to be the least well known. Comparing the data , it is possible to see how the rates“pretty well” and “very well” concerning familiarisation are substantially higher for familiarisation viatransaction rather than via information.

Fig.15 Recognition of Coins‘ front and back.

Fig.16 Recognition bank notes’ front and back.

All this leads us to believe that familiarisation with the Euro was, in general, accomplishedespecially by practice in sectors of daily life that are more marked by interaction and the use of thecurrency, that is, by socio-economic transactions, rather than receiving information via the media.

While retaining a growing trend along the banknote-coin continuum, the recognition curveobtained by averaging the points obtained in recognising each banknote and coin is located on a planeof values that become ever higher as the months go by.

As for satisfaction, around 40% of subjects said at the time of the interview that they were notable to understand the value of things without first converting the prices into Lire. However, abouthalf of the subjects preferred the Lira to the Euro and vice versa. Only 3% of all the subjectsinterviewed believed that the Lira was a symbol of our culture. 15% said that they were emotionallytied to it. One third believed that using Lire was a habit while 20% recognized the usefulness of theEuro for travel within the European Union, its economic advantages, its economic stability and itsrepresentation of European unity.

There appears to be a polarisation in the degree of satisfaction at the introduction of the newcurrency. 40% of subjects are located at the two extremes, very bad and very good. This is so even if,in general, people said that they had experienced the change positively and more than half said theythey had not had difficulties. Among the few that said that they had had problems, most of themotivations were linked to the stress of the change, such as calculating and the dealing with the cents,especially in work and daily shopping. In fact, 85% of the subjects said that they felt secure in usingthe Euro for payments. Among the disadvantages in introducing the new currency, 40% of subjectsmentioned the rise in prices, while 50% identified economic advantages for the economy and thecurrency’s stability. 42% of subjects thought that market vendors had taken advantage of thecomplications for their own benefit while 28% said that the vendors suffered complications because ofthe introduction of the new currency. There was more or less the same response for regular stores,even if it was a little less marked. 43% of the subjects said that supermarket retailers had been polite,transparent and honest, slightly less than bank and post office employees.

Familarization via Information

Familarization via Transaction

Fig. 17 Frequencies concerning familiarisation via Information and via transaction divided byvarious work contexts and typology of consumers.

The data shows that only utilities consumers showed a tendencial avoidance of cash, specificallybank notes. A good number of bank and post office employees preferred to use credit cards and theautomatic tellers for payments, more than they had done prior to the introduction of the Euro.Concerning the use of cheques and home banking, there was not and substantial difference, neitherbetween groups, nor before and after the introduction of the Euro.

In the sample studied, the social representation of the Euro, investigated during the transitionalphase by subjecting the data to analyses of the structural type via Hudap (WWSA 1 procedure) ,demonstrates a circular structure. We note that the channels of familiarisation are positively correlatedto the level of education. In fact, together they occupy the centre of the structure. Inversely, they areoutside the "cloud" when correlated to age. Older people are less familiar with Euro. The variableslinked to attitude toward the currency change and familiarity with the political-economic phenomenonare also located near, and therefore in relation to, the education level.

4. Conclusions Interest in studying the processes of familiarisation concerning the introduction of the Euro was

amply supported by previous research in economic psychology. In the 15 member countries of the European Union, a study was conducted in the summer of

1997 that had a questionnaire that aimed at identifying attitudes towards the Euro (Müller-Peters A.,Pepermans R., Kiell, G. Battaglia, N. Beckmann, S. Burgoyne, C. Farhangmehr, M. Guzman, G.Kirchler, E. Koenen, C. Kokkinaki, F. Lambkin, M. Lassarre, D. Lenoir, F.-R. Lunca-Arocas, R.Marell, A. Meier, K. Moisander, J. Ortona, G. Quintanilla, I. Routh, D. Scacciati, F. Uusitalo, L. vanEverdingen, Y. M. van Raaij, W. F. & Wahlund, R., 1998). That study, interesting because of its cross-cultural optic, highlighted the significant differences between countries and has been further deepenedvia investigations that were repeated over the years. (Meier K. & Kirchler E., 1998; Kokkinaki F.,1998; Pepermans R., Verleye G. ,1998; Van Everdingen Y.M., Van Raaij W. F.,1998; Müller-PetersA.,1998)

Fig.17 Principal structural Results by Hudap

From the data, Italy, along with Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Belgium, France and Luxembourg,results as among the countries most favorable to the Euro. Those most opposed to the introduction ofthe Euro were Great Britain, Sweden, Germany and Denmark. Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands,however, appeared neutral on the issue. The authors interpreted this based on the fact the formerbelieved that they would gain more from the economic union than what they would lose, contrary tothe latter, especially in terms of perceived justice.

Studies were also done in a evolutive perspective designed to detect the “Knowledge of theEuro in the period of transition from the Lira to the Euro in a sample of children in the third and fifthyears of elementary school”. The research was conducted on children in an elementary school inNaples. They were given a questionnaire with 15 questions on knowledge of the Euro. It showed howboth groups had a good knowledge of the number, form, value and zone of geopolitical validity of theEuro. The 5th year children were more successful than the 3rd year children. (Sergi, Gnisci,forthcoming).

Inside the perspective of the relationship between European and national identity, Cinnirella(1997) conducted a study based on the Tajfel’s theories on social identity and Moscovici’s socialrepresentations. He used a questionnaire geared towards university students on the European identityin Italy and Great Britain. In his research he showed that the English often perceive Europeanintegration as a threat to the English identity, so much so that there is a negative correlation betweenBritish and European identities. They have higher levels of national identity than European identityand use discoursive strategies that emphasise the perception of a threat due to integration withEurope. On the contrary, Italians obtain higher points concerning European identity rather than Italianidentity.

Still in the vein of the intertwining of symbolic dimensions, social representations and nationaland supranational identities, it could be interesting to conclude this paper by looking at results thatemerged from a cross-national study conducted by de Rosa in from 1995-96 in the light of today’sevents. A section of the study aimed to investigate social memory in relation to multidimensionalconstructs of social representations and national and supranational identity in young people from 10European countries using free evocation of elements associated to both Nation and European Union.The Euro resulted by far the most popular logo of the European Union (more than the flag or thehymn), while for Nation, elements associated to historical persons and events, both past and present,were prevalent. (de Rosa & Mormino, 2002)

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