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Hiawatha Hoeft-RossMonica Hoeft-RossPO Box 6946(775) 544-2721In Pro Se

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

*****

Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross Et. Al.CASE NO. CV-N-05–0121 LRH(VPC)

Plaintiffs,60(B) MOTION

vs. SANCTIONS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL PURSUANT TO 60(B)(3)

Werner and Christel Hoeft, Et Al. AND THE ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Defendants._______________________________/ MOTION TO EXTEND TIME OF DISCOVERY

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF HIAWATHA HOEFT-ROSS and asks this Honorable Court to

set aside the order of January 18, 2007, on the grounds of Excusable Neglect, Illness of Party, and

Sanctions against opposing counsel Michael Kealy for not being candid with this tribunal. The court

has not been apprized of the additional injuries suffered by Mr. Hoeft-Ross although Mr. Kealy,

counsel for the defendants, has been kept in regular contact as to the situation through

correspondence from Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross. Mr. Kealy only presented evidence of

correspondence up to September 8 , 2006 when there was actually correspondence up to January ofth

2007. Declaration of Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross in Support of Motions attached hereto.

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FACTS

Plaintiffs submitted a discovery plan on July 27th, 2006, and sent a copy to Mr. Kealy by certified

mail (see exhibits "1- 1G" ). The Plaintiffs did not submit a Discovery Plan within the 30 days

because it was Plaintiff's history with this court that the represented party be the first one to draft

such documents. Plaintiffs wrote two letters to Mr. Kealy regarding the meet and confer and an

agenda regarding the meet and confer. The August 23rd letter proposes a date for a meet and confer

and advises counsel that Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross is very ill (see exhibit "2") The August 24th

letter addresses the Agenda (see exhibit "3 and 3A"). The discovery plan of the defendants on

September 8th, 2006 was submitted to the court by Mr. Kealy at the same time he sent a copy to the

plaintiffs. This plan was completely non-compliant with the order of the court by being way outside

the time frame of the 30-day disclosure requirement of the Local Rules. The differences have yet to

be reconciled. Mr. Kealy submitted his Proposed plans and witness list on the 8th day of September

(see exhibit"4") without advising plaintiffs either orally or in writing, thus forestalling any meeting

of the minds. On September 8th, 2006, Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross received a note from his

specialist regarding his medical and mental health status, that he was not to partake in a legal

conference (see exhibit"5"). Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross had an appointment with Dr. Steve

Berman of Sierra Pain Consultants on September 22 , 2006 for his medical conditions (see exhibitnd

"6" and "6A" "6 B") for two surgical procedures namely a "Cervical facet" and a "Cervical Epidural

Steroid Infiltration." Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross moved for and Extension of Time, due to his

severe pain and was seen in the hospital for it (see exhibit "7 - 7C"). Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross

submitted to the DMV from his specialist that he was in a hit and run accident on October 12th 2006

in order for him to get the records of the accident (see exhibit "8") See exhibit"9" police report of

hit and run accident on October 12th 2006, and was seen in the emergency room for his injuries and

was referred to a specialist. This Accident exacerbated Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross' existing

injuries and/or created new ones. On November 1st 2006 Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross saw his

specialist and said specialist prepared a letter for the court (see exhibit "10" and "10A")

Unfortunately when Plaintiff thought he had sent this document to the Court an opposing counsel,

but it subsequently was discovered in his "files"while preparing this motion. In a write-up on

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November 13th 2006, by Dr. Berman, the surgical procedures that Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross

underwent were not effective at alleviating his pain or stabilizing his condition (see exhibit

"11").Plaintiff advised counsel on November 21st 2006 of this (see exhibit "12" through "12D") and

asked to stipulate to an indefinite continuance, but did not receive an answer by November 27th 2006

(see exhibit "13-13D"). Plaintiff then received a letter from counsel stating that they would not

stipulate to an indefinite continuance, but seek out a summary judgement (see exhibit "14"). Plaintiff

wrote back to Mr. Kealy, Defendants' counsel and stated that he regretted that a stipulation cannot

be reached without court intervention ( see Exhibits "15-15C") plaintiff Monica Hoeft-Ross wrote

Mr. Kealy on January 3rd 2007, stating that Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross' condition had not stabilized and

was awaiting their summary judgement (see exhibit "16-16C"). Plaintiffs received a response from

Mr. Kealy on January 10th 2007, confused about the awaiting of a summary judgement and

discussing a resolution. As stated before, Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross was in no condition to

discuss any such resolution as he was not mentally capable of resolving legal matters (see exhibit

"17").

Dr. John N. Chappel wrote a declaration in that Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross has not been able to

function well enough to attend court (see exhibit "18"). Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross has had

another appointment with Reno Diagnostics for diagnostic medical examinations to be performed

due to his non-responsiveness to previous medical procedures (see exhibit "19").

ARGUMENT

60 (b)Motion

Grounds For a 60(b) Motion:

Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order

(a) Clerical Mistakes.

Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from

oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion

of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such

mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter

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while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc.

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence

could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse

party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior

judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable

that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from

the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons

(1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its

operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve

a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally

notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.

Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill

of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by

motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

Rule 60(b) is meant to be remedial in nature and therefore must be liberallyapplied See Butner v. Neustadter, 324F.2d 783 (9th Cir 1963). Second, judgementby default is a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a caseshould , whenever possible, be decided on the merits. See Schwab v. Bullock's Inc.,508 F.2d 353 (9th Cir 1974). More specifically, in applying the general terms ofRule 60(b) to default judgements, this court has emphasized that such judgementsare "appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case should, whenever possible,be decided on the merits. Falk v. Allen 739 F.2d 461 (9th Cir 1984).The districtCourt denied [her] motion to set aside default judgement based on excusableneglect, because [she] was grieving and moving her residence at the time. Defaultjudgement was reversed and remanded. TCI Group Life Insurance Co., v.Knoebber 244F.3d 691 (9th Cir 2001).

" We recognize that a somewhat delicate balance exists between the necessity fora trial judge to exercise control and management over his/her courtroom and

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docket and the litigants' substantial rights which may result which may from timeto time suffer as a result of this acknowledged need " We conclude therefore thatthe sanction of default was too harsh and that the default judgement should bevacated. Vac-Air v. Mohr 471 F.@d 231(7th Cir 1973).

A party may obtain through full vacation of the [prior] judgement or by partialvacation or modification of that Judgement In re Whitman 690 N.E.2d 535 Civ.R.60(b) is remedial and should be liberally construed so the ends of justice may beserved Kay v. Marc Glassman Inc., (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 665 N.E.2d 1102. Ascited in Banfield v. Brodell 2006 Ohio 5267.

The determination of whether a particular failure is excusable neglect “must bemade from all the individual facts and circumstances in each case.” D.G.M. Inc.,v. Creamans Concrete & Supply co., Inc., (1996) 111 Ohio App.3d 134, 675 N.E.2d1263.As cited in Banfield v. Brodell 2006 Ohio 5267.

Plaintiff contends that the reason for not appearing at the January 18th 2007 conference was that of

excusable neglect, in that Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross has a severe brain impairment/dysfunction

due to a closed head injury, he often forgets appointments and/or mixes up dates. This

impairment/dysfunction is beyond his control. At the time Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross began this

action, he discussed the matter with his specialist and was advised that he was sufficiently stabilized

to be able to properly participate in litigation. However, the hit and run accident in October of 2006

apparently caused either a new injury or an exacerbation of the existing injuries. And destabilized

his ability to function in a legal situation and he has been advised that he should not make any legal

decisions and has been advised that he "has not been able to function well enough to attend court."It

is for these reasons that Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross has not attempted to make any legal decisions

or to participate in any court function. Clearly the automobile accident in October of 2006 was not

due to any negligent and/or intentional act of Plaintiff. Thus the injuries which are not stabilized are

beyond the control of Plaintiff and constitutes excusable neglect.

"Because the Five-year statute of is designed to prevent avoidable delay, anexception to the statute is recognized where, due to the circumstances beyond theplaintiffs control, moving the case [to trial] is impracticable for all practicalpurposes (§ 583.340(c): see Hughes v. Kimble (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 59, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 616. Emphasis added.

...Bankruptcy Court to find excusable neglect [is] if the movant is preventedfrom complying with the deadline by an act of God or some other circumstancebeyond the movant's control. Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick

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Associates Limited Partnership et.al. 507 U.S. 380: 113 S.Ct. 1489; 123 L. Ed 2d74;1993 U.S. LEXIS 2402; 61 U.S.L.W. 4263; 25 Fed R.Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 401;Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P75, 157A; 28 Collier Bankr.Cas. 2d (MB) 267;24 BankrCt Dec.63; 93 Cal Daily Op Service 2096; 93 DAR 3705; 7 FLA L. Weekly Fed. S101

In Re Pioneer 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L. ED2d 74(1993) (finding thatattorneys inadvertence failure to file proof of claim within the court's deadlineconstitutes excusable neglect, and for an attorney's dire medical conditions , seeThomas Murkerson 2005 WL 3591958 (M.D. Ga. December 30, 2005)(counsel'sfailure to meet filing deadline due to medical condition and subsequentconvalescence constituted "excusable neglect")

“...Plaintiff’s counsel also attached, in camera, a detailed summary of his medicalproblems. It appears that the best characterization of counsel’s failure to appearis excusable neglect as opposed to any willful or bad faith conduct. This would notsupport a sanction of dismissal.” Sampson Fire Sales v. Oaks 201 F.R.D. 351

In Lambert v. Jo An Barnhart 2006 WL 832516 (N.D. Tex) FN2: A one half pageletter from counsel’s physician describing his medical condition and the course ofhis treatment has been tendered to the court In Camera.Plaintiff’s motion is subject to the “excusable neglect” standard of Fed.R.Civ.P.6(b) [sic] that rule provides in, in relevant part”

When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order ofthe court an act is required to be done at or within a specific periodof time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion,upon motion made after the expiration of the specific period permitto be done where the failure to act was the result of excusableneglect....

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) [sic] (emphasis added) . The determination of what constitutes“excusable neglect” is an equitable one. See Pioneer 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489,123 L. ED2d 74(1993)

The bankruptcy court's finding did not consider the impact of the recent traumaof the spouse's illness upon the attorney's ability to focus upon this appeal, nor didthat court's finding take into account the reality that the order appealed from wasentered on a Friday. Although we do not know when the attorney received thatorder, acknowledging the time required for receipt of the order by mail, he had lessthan ten days to focus upon the order and the need for appeal. In the context of theequitable decision on the attorney's motion for an extension, the extraordinarycircumstances presented in this case and the absence of factors supporting denialof the motion required that this motion be granted.We recognize that it appears harsh, in the words of the Waterman opinion, toaddress the bankruptcy court's decision as unreasonable. We are, however, leftwith a "definite and firm conviction that the [bankruptcy court] committed a clearerror of judgment." In re M. J. Waterman & Assocs., Inc., 2000 FED App. 0324P Because the bankruptcy court failed to distinguish the particular facts of

this case from neglect due to "law office upheaval," we find that the bankruptcy court abused itsdiscretion in denying the Debtor's motion for an extension of the time to appeal based onexcusable neglect.

A party seeking to set aside a default judgement under T.R. 60(b)(1) mustdemonstrate that the judgement entered was as a result of mistake, surprise orexcusable neglect. The trial court’s discretion in this area is necessarily broadbecause any determination of mistake surprise or excusable neglect must turn on

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the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Kmart Corp., v. Englebright719 N.E.2d at 1253.

In light of due process concerns raised by the conclusive foreclosure of legalrights, the district court may not enter a judgment of dismissal or default as asanction without finding "willful" noncompliance or bad faith, which in thiscontext means a voluntary, intentional refusal to comply with a discovery order.See Gocolay v. New Mexico Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 968 F.2d 1017, 1020-21(10th Cir. 1992); M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluidics, Inc. , 834 F.2d 869, 872-73 (10thCir. 1987). We review such a sanction generally for abuse of discretion, seeGocolay , 968 F.2d at 1020, but we assess any supporting factual findings underthe clear error standard, see Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co. , 76 F.3d 1538, 1557(10th Cir. 1996). Thus, while we gauge the appropriateness of the sanction byreference to the totality of the surrounding circumstances, see id. , we must firstdetermine that sufficient evidence establishes the specific instance(s) of willfulnoncompliance on which the sanction is based, compare Toma v. City ofWeatherford , 846 F.2d 58, 60-61 (10th Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal whererecord did not support finding that sanctioned noncompliance was willful) withEhrenhaus v. Reynolds , 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissalwhere finding of willful misconduct was "not clearly erroneous"). Defendant contends that the district court never made the requisite finding ofwillful noncompliance and, moreover, that the record is insufficient to supportsuch a finding in any event. Both of these contentions have merit. Absent a findingof willfulness to support dismissal or default, "reversal is required." Gocolay , 968F.2d at 1021.Furthermore, the scant evidentiary record regarding defendant's medicalcondition would not warrant a finding that his failure to appear for the ordereddeposition was willful. Documentation from his treating physicians in Indonesia,though short on specifics, showed that he had been hospitalized at least three timesduring the previous year and a half, twice in very close proximity to the pertinenttime-frame (once in mid-July and once in mid-September 1996). See App. II at473-75, 513. It also indicated that in between the latter hospitalizations defendantremained under "treatment/medication" and "in need of total rest." Id. at 549.The situation depicted in these materials certainly does not reflect willfulnoncompliance in connection with defendant's failure to travel halfway round theglobe for his deposition. Cf. Gocolay , 968 F.2d at 1021 (reversing dismissal andciting similar medical evidence which "suggest[ed] [the sanctioned party] did notfabricate his health claims to avoid [his] deposition"). Myles v. Sapta 139 F.3d 912(10 Cir 1997)th

Excusable neglect is a general equitable concept, not necessarily reserved forextraordinary circumstances, and takes account of factors such as prejudice, thelength of the delay and impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay,including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whetherthe movant acted in good faith. parties. Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055(9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

A defendant's or her counsel's physical or mental illness is a common ground forfinding conduct non-culpable when considering whether to lift a [default]judgment or overturn the failure to lift a [default] judgment. TCI Group LifeInsurance Plan v. Knoebber supra. The court of appeals has admonished that, asa general matter Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and . . . must be liberally appliedTCI Group Life Insurance Plan v. Knoebber supra.

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A defendant's or her counsel's physical or mental illness is a common ground forfinding conduct non-culpable when considering whether to lift a default judgmentor overturn the failure to lift a default judgment. To be prejudicial, the settingaside of a judgment must result in greater harm than simply delaying resolutionof the case. Rather, the standard is whether plaintiff's ability to pursue his claimwill be hindered. To be considered prejudicial, the delay must result in tangibleharm such as loss of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, or greateropportunity for fraud or collusion.

The defendant's or counsel's physical or mental illness is a common ground forfinding conduct non-culpable when considering whether to lift a [default]judgment or overturn the failure to lift a [default] judgment. See, e.g., Leshore v.County of Worcester, 945 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1991); Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr &Sons, Inc., 471 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1973); Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d166 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman,485 F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1980). TCI Group Life Insurance Plan, L v.Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8583; 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d(Callaghan) 140; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2376; 2001

[T]he court said: "No reason is apparent why excusable mistakes should not beremedied on behalf of successful litigants as in case of those not successful. Theobject to be attained is to do complete justice to all the parties. The right to remedymistakes is an inherent power with courts and this power extends to all parties toactions." Dedrick v. Charrier (1906) 15 ND 515, 108 NW 38, 125 Am St Rep 608,40 ALR 1127 "To be entitled to relief from a judgment in his favor, a party mustin some way be prejudiced by the judgment", 40 ALR 1127.

...and the parties' neglect must be excusable. Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v.Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 123 L. Ed.2d 74, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 63, 28 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 267, BankrL. Rep. (CCH) P 75157A, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 401 (1993). Pioneer sets forth anequitable "framework"for determining the question of excusable neglect inparticular cases, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit willordinarily examine all of the circumstances involved rather than holding that anysingle circumstance in isolation compels a particular result regardless of otherfactors. "The determination of whether neglect is excusable is an equitable onethat depends on at least four factors: 1) the danger of prejudice to the other side;2) the gravity of the neglect and its potential impact on the proceedings; 3) thereason for the neglect ; and 4) whether the movant acted in good faith." Batemanv. United States Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220 (9th cir 2000) citing Pioneer Inv.Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S. Ct.1489, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 63, 28 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d(MB) 267, Bankr L. Rep. (CCH) P 75157A, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 401 (1993), Barryvs. Lindner, 75 P.3d 388; 2003 Nev. LEXIS 50

Movant hereby moves this Court in good faith. Plaintiff has medical reasons that go beyond his

control. He gets forgetful and easily confused in high pressure situations as explained by Dr. John

N. Chappel. A valid excuse are ones of medical reasons. It doesn't even have to go as far as being

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medical. One case held that a movant could set aside judgement based on excusable neglect because

she was grieving and moving her residence at the time TCI Group Life Insurance Plan, L v.

Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8583; 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 140; 2001

Cal. Daily Op. Service 2376; 2001

When counsel (or pro se party)attests that his dysfunction in the case was due tomedicinal impairment and/or substance abuse, that is substantial reason to havea judgment vacated. Leslie v. ICA 198 F.3d 1152; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31932;45 fed R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan)920;99Cal Daily Op. Service 9515; 99 Daily JournalDAR12323. In Falk v. Allen, 739 F2d 461; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 19906; 39 Fed.R. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 901, the trial court was overturned because Allen went toKorea for medical treatment and hence did not reply to the complaint against her.Allen's conduct was non-culpable and the default judgment against her wasreversed. Under Falk three factors should be evaluated in considering a motionto reopen a [default] judgement under Rule 60(b): 1) whether the Plaintiff[defendant] will be prejudiced; 2) whether the defendant [plaintiff] has ameritorious defense, and 3) whether the culpable conduct of the defendant[plaintiff] led to the default [judgment]

The defendant's or counsel's physical or mental illness is a common ground forfinding conduct non-culpable when considering whether to lift a [default]judgment or overturn the failure to lift a [default] judgment. See, e.g., Leshore v.County of Worcester, 945 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1991); Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr &Sons, Inc., 471 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1973); Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d166 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman,485 F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1980).TCI Group Life Insurance Plan, L v.Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8583; 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d(Callaghan) 140; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2376; 2001

SANCTIONS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL PURSUANT TO 60(B)(3) AND THEABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Rule 172 Candor Toward the Tribunal

[4] In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the

lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are

adverse.

Mr. Kealy appeared at the Case Management Conference on January 18 , 2007. He providedth

documentation and correspondence he had received from Plaintiffs. However he intentionally failed

to provide a complete history of the documentation and correspondence as shown in Plaintiffs’

exhibits. Mr. Kealy also failed to note for the court the fact that Plaintiffs had responded to the

mandatary disclosure requirements and the proposed Discovery Plan prior to action being taken on

behalf of his client (see exhibit “2"). This omission falsely led the Court to believe that Plaintiffs

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were non-compliant with all discovery matters. Additionally the omission of the documentation and

correspondence carried on between Plaintiffs and defendants counsel could only lead the Court to

believe that Plaintiffs were refusing to comply with court orders and thus appeared to be

contemptuous of the Court. This may be the basis for the extreme sanctions imposed by the Court

on Plaintiffs. Clearly the Aba Model Code of Professional Responsibility cited above requires all

members of the ABA to be completely candid with the Court and to provide information to the Court

which may not always be in the best interest of their client(s).

Rule 173 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

[1] Unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal

a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or

assist another person to do any such act;

Mr. Kealy concealed from the Court all documentation and correspondence between the parties

which showed an ongoing effort by the Plaintiffs to keep Mr. Kealy apprized of the unfortunate

results from the accident suffered by the Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross. If Mr Kealy had notified the

Court of the information in his possession the Court would have been in a better position to act in

a manner consistent with the long established case law involving medical disabilities which

constitute excusable neglect. Mr. Kealy was fully aware that Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross was

under medical orders to not engage in any “legal conflict.”

[4] In pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort

to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;

Mr. Kealy was dilatory in corresponding with plaintiffs and in several instances ignored discovery

requests outside of the purview of this Court as required by the FRCP: the movant (Plaintiffs) have

in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the

dispute without court action, or failing to file a motion to compel, whereas Mr. Kealy has been

totally unamenable to negotiation which would avoid consuming the time of the Court. As Plaintiff

states in exhibit 15A-C on December 4 , 2006, in response to Mr. Kealy’s letter of November 28 ,th th

2006 (exhibit 14), “Since you appear unwilling to stipulate to indefinite continuance or stabilization

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of Mr. Hoeft-Ross’ medical conditions, we will prepare a motion before the court. We regret that we

cannot stipulate to an agreement without intervention of the court.”

Mr. Kealy placed additional stress on Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross by offering a settlement

contingent upon Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross obtaining a medical release or he faced with

defending a motion for summary judgement. (See exhibit “14").

60(B)(3)

60(b)(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party.

Plaintiff contends that he was taken advantage of because of mental problems: "where it appears that

the other party was guilty of fraud (60)(b)(3) or bad faith or imposed upon the infirm party by taking

advantage of his infirmity to secure from him a contract or a conveyance which he otherwise would

not have executed , the contract or conveyance may be set aside." 37 Am Jur 2d § 13.

Rule 60(b)(3) allows relief if there was fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse

party. Relief is only available under Rule 60(b)(3) where the party’s misconduct prevented the

[moving] party from fully and fairly presenting its case. Planned Parenthood v. Janklow, 2003 DSD

2.

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME OF DISCOVERY

This is an exceptional circumstance, where Mr. Hoeft-Ross did not foresee the sudden intensity of

his medical condition and that the circumstances present are clearly beyond the control of the

litigant. Huzar v Greate Bay Hotel & Casino Inc. 375 N.J. Super 463, 868 A2d 364. The decision

whether to grant a motion for extension of time lies within the broad discretion of the court and will

be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Lint (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 209. An

abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgement; it implies that the court's

attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio

St.3d 217, 219. For the court to proceed with a case management conference would be

unconscionable because of the fact that Mr. Hoeft-Ross is presently medically and mentally unstable

and would not be able to fully participate in the Conference. The parties have yet to meet and confer

and no discovery has been held at this time. Accordingly the plaintiffs motion for an enlargement

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of time should be granted. Glover v. Haferman 2006 WL 1388753 (E.D. Wis). See also Myles v.

Sapta supra. Mr. Kealy himself states in his Proposed Discovery plan of September 8 , 2006, thatth

“Defendants believe that the mere volume of the complaint, the difficulties experienced in

scheduling the meet and confer, some communication problems among the parties, and the

representation of plaintiffs of a medical condition currently impairing Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross,

requires special scheduling , as this matter likely cannot be completed within the time periods

provided by the rules.”

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201 Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross requests this court to take judicial notice

of the following facts:

1) Defendant Ernestine Montgomery and Cornelius Montgomery were named as

defendants in an action based on Ankenbrandt v. Richards 504 U.S. 689 (1992).

Filed in this Court in the District of Nevada, Civil Action CV-N-02-0160-HDM-

VPC.

2) Defendants’ counsel Jeralyn Spradlin submitted Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross’ extensive

medical findings to the court in a motion (exhibit unknown).

3) Valerie P. Cooke read the report and took notice of it.

4) Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross hereby asks this court to take judicial notice of the

medical report file by the defendants in case no. CV-N-02-0160-HDM-VPC.

Courts are presumed to be no more ignorant than the public generally, and will take judicial notice

of that which is generally known to be true. The medical report is not sealed and is public record in

the above named case CV-N-02-0160-HDM-VPC and is still available to this Court.

CONCLUSION

60(B) MOTION

It has been well established that excusable neglect is one of the foundations for a court to use in

remedying a decision which prejudices a participant their right to justice by reviewing and reversing

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judgement which deny the participant a fundamental right. In order to avoid further complications

due to Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross’ current inability to address legal proceedings in a

knowledgeable fashion, it would appear that all legal proceedings in abeyance until such time as

Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross’ conditions are found to be sufficiently stabilized.

The plaintiff has provided this Court with substantial documentation to demonstrate that the failure

of Plaintiff to appear at the Scheduling Conference was due to a medical disability arising from an

accident which exacerbated a pre-existing condition and medical orders to not participate in any legal

proceeding until the medical condition is stabilized. The court has pre-existing knowledge of the

medical conditions of the Plaintiff and should recognize the problems that would arise from

proceeding against medical advice. As an example, in the Ross v. Montgomery case ( CV-N-02-

0160-HDM-VPC ) Plaintiff Hiawatha hoeft-Ross forgot to take his medication and stipulated by

mistake to something he was not aware he stipulated to, which resulted in prolonged litigation.

Therefore Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross requests that the orders made at the Scheduling Conference

held January 18 , 2007, be voided.th

SANCTIONS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL PURSUANT TO 60(B)(3) AND THEABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The actions of Mr. Kealy both of omission and commission by failing to provide the court with a

complete history of this matter and his blatant lack of candor to the Court are sufficiently egregious

to warrant sanctions. The magnitude of his failure to be candid has left the Court blindfolded and

unable to properly schedule this action. Due to Mr. Kealy’s failure to communicate of his awareness

of the medical situation, Plaintiffs have been severely prejudiced.

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME OF DISCOVERY

Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross requests that the Scheduling Conference be set to be heard 180 (one

hundred and eighty) days from February 15 , 2007. Plaintiff suggests that he provide a monthlyth

report from his physician as to his medical status. Plaintiff acknowledges that he may not be

sufficiently stabilized to proceed at that time but he sets forth proposal in good faith with the hope

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that he will be stabilized earlier and medically released so that he may proceed. Plaintiff would like

the Court to take note of Tamburina v. Combined Insurance Company of America, 2007 WL

259825 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.) wherein, “Parties’ stipulation to continue trial date due to plaintiff and his

counsel’s illness were sufficient to demonstrate 424-day period of impracticability, as required to

support impracticability tolling exception to application of five-year limit on bringing a case to trial;

stipulations were specific regarding severity of illnesses, their extent and duration, and necessity of

surgery in both cases.” West’s Ann.Cal.C.C.P. §§ 583.310, 583.340(c).

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff hereby requests this honorable Court to take Judicial notice pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201

regarding Ross v. Montgomery Case No. CV-N-02-0160-HDM-VPC of the medical report therein

that is of public record and a foundation for the ongoing medical conditions of Plaintiff Hiawatha

Hoeft-Ross in this matter.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

1) That the findings of Scheduling Conference be altered to reflect the following:

A. that the sanctions against Plaintiffs be set aside,

B. that discovery be granted to Plaintiffs,

C. that Plaintiffs do not waive any right to extensions or revisions pursuant

to LR26-1 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 and;

D. that the deadlines contained in the order will be invalidated.

2) That the Court sanction Opposing Counsel as it deems appropriate;

3) That the Court grant an extension of 180 (one-hundred and eighty) days or until a

medical finding has been made that plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross’ conditions are

sufficiently stabilized;

4) That the Court take Judicial Notice of Plaintiffs medical records pursuant to FRE 201

of Case No. CV-N-02-0160-HDM-VPC as the basis for Plaintiff Hiawatha Hoeft-

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Ross’ medical conditions;

5) Whatever the Court deems appropriate.

Respectfully Submitted,

____________________________

Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross

DATED February 12 , 2007th

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

Pursuant to FRCP 5(b), I certify that, I on February 12, 2007, I deposited in the U.S. Mail at Reno,

Nevada, in a sealed envelope, a 60(B) MOTION, SANCTIONS AGAINST OPPOSING

COUNSEL PURSUANT TO 60(B)(3) AND THE ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY, MOTION TO EXTEND TIME OF DISCOVERY, and a REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE and Points and Authorities in support of motion included therein and the

declaration in support motions of Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross, and attachments; a true and correct copy

postage prepaid thereon, addressed to:

Michael Kealy50 West Liberty Street Suite 750Reno, NV 89501

_____________________________

Monica Hoeft-Ross